

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.

No.

27

406

N

813

## CORRESPONDENCE

RELATIVE TO THE

# AFFAIRS OF THE LEVANT.

PART I.

*Foreign Office, November 1840.*

3

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

No.

**CORRESPONDENCE**

RELATIVE TO THE

**AFFAIRS OF THE LEVANT.**

---

**PART I.**

---

*Foreign Office, November 1840.*



# TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.		No.	Date	Page
1	Earl Granville .....	59	Feb. 13, 1839	1
2	Lord Ponsonby .....	18	Jan. 22,	2
3	" .....	19	Feb. 4,	4
4	" .....	20	6,	4
5	" .....	24	8,	5
6	" .....	26	12,	5
7	Earl Granville .....	103	Mar. 11,	6
8	To Lord Ponsonby .....	38	15,	6
9	Lord Ponsonby .....	42	Feb. 26,	7
10	" .....	59	Mar. 7,	7
11	Mr. Milbanke .....	33	20,	8
12	Earl Granville .....	128	April 8,	9
13	To Lord Ponsonby .....	43	12,	9
14	Lord Ponsonby .....	67	Mar. 18,	12
15	Colonel Campbell .....	12	11,	14
16	" .....	13	11,	14
17	Lord Ponsonby .....	71	19,	14
18	" .....	73	20,	15
19	Lord Clarendon .....	28	April 1,	16
20	To Lord William Russell .....	63	16,	16
21	Lord William Russell .....	48	24,	16
22	To Lord William Russell .....	74	May 2,	17
23	Lord Ponsonby .....	76	Mar. 22,	17
24	Rechid Pasha .....	-	April 26,	21
25	To Rechid Pasha .....	-	May 6,	22
26	Rechid Pasha .....	-	April 27,	22



No.	To	No.	Date	Subject	Page
27	To Reshid Pasha		May 6, 1839	Receipt of letter of 27th of April. Satisfaction at probability of peace with Mehmet Ali	22
28	Lord Ponsonby	88	April 6,	Communication made by Lord Ponsonby to the Sultan respecting Mehmet Ali. Treaty	23
29	Mr. Consul Moore	10	Mar. 14,	Conscription. Events in Syria. Anticipated war with Turkey	23
30	Colonel Campbell	18	April 1,	List of Egyptian army in Syria	24
31	Lord Ponsonby	99	27,	Respecting prevention of hostilities with Mehmet Ali, and respecting Treaty between England and Turkey	25
32	Lord Beaumont	15	May 6,	Pacific accounts from Turkey	27
33	Lord Ponsonby	103	April 23,	Interim communication to Lord Ponsonby respecting Mehmet Ali	27
34	Lord Clarendon	44	May 14,	Count Nesselrode's observations on Eastern affairs	28
35	Colonel Campbell	26	4,	The Sultan's forces have crossed the Euphrates at Bir	28
36	"	27	3,	Relative to the movements of the Sultan's forces	29
37	"	Private	7,	Despatch from Count Nesselrode to Count Metternich calling upon Mehmet Ali to recall Ibrahim from Syria	30
38	Earl Granville	193	23,	Hostilities have commenced between Turkish and Egyptian forces	31
39	"	194	24,	Conversation with several Members of French Cabinet relative to commencement of hostilities between Turkish and Egyptian troops	31
40	"	197	24,	News confirmed of hostilities having commenced between the Sultan and Mehmet Ali	32
41	"	199	27,	Moniteur containing speech of Minister of Marine for vote of credit of 10,000,000 f. to augment navy in the Levant. Communication of Marshal Soult respecting Turkey and Egypt	32
42	Lord Ponsonby	196	1,	Answer of the Sultan to communication respecting Mehmet Ali	33
43	Earl Granville	203	31,	French Government have despatched two officers to headquarters of Turkish and Egyptian armies	35
44	The Duc de Dalmatie	-	30,	Affairs of the East	35
45	Lord Ponsonby	111	11,	Letter from Alexandria stating that Mehmet Ali will not pay tribute this year	36
46	Earl Granville	209	June 5,	Part of despatch from M. Cochelet. Confidence shown by Marshal Soult in communicating intelligence from Constantinople and Alexandria	37
47	"	213	7,	French Government waiting for opinion of Her Majesty's Government relative to instructions to Admirals of combined fleet in the Levant	37
48	Lord Ponsonby	117	May 19,	The communication of Lord Palmerston's No. 28 has given great dissatisfaction to the Porte	38
49	"	120	30,	Hostilities appear imminent between the Sultan and Mehmet Ali	38
50	Lord Beaumont	23	June 1,	Conversation with Prince Metternich on prospect of war in the East	40
51	Lord William Russell	70	3,	Conversation with Baron Werther on the East. Prussian officers, &c.	41
52	Lord Ponsonby	123	May 21,	Return of Tahir Pasha from Haidar Pasha's army	41
53	Earl Granville	220	June 14,	Conversation with Marshal Soult on Turco-Egyptian Question. Moniteur containing speech of Marshal Soult relative to English Alliance	42
54	"	223	15,	Further intelligence from the East	43
55	Lord Clarendon	55	8,	Dispositions of Russian Government with reference to the advance of the Turkish army	43

No.	To	No.	Date	Subject	Page
56	Mr. Acting-Consul Werry		May 6, 1839	Turkish troops crossed the Euphrates. Egyptian proceedings	45
57	Mr. Consul Moore	19	9,	The Sultan's troops have crossed the Euphrates at Mr. Ibrahim at Aleppo	50
58	Mr. Consul Werry	9	10,	Positions, &c., of the Turkish and Egyptian troops	51
59	French Consul at Alexandria	-	15,	Respecting Mehmet Ali	53
60	Baron Roussin	-	15,	Affairs of the East	53
61	Colonel Campbell	25	19,	Details of communications of Consuls with Mehmet Ali. Turkey and Egypt	55
62	Lord Ponsonby	172	22,	Conference with Turkish Ministers	72
63	"	123	26,	M. de Scherer's communications	74
64	"	126	26,	Message from the Sultan	74
65	Earl Granville	225	June 17,	Marshal Soult presses upon Her Majesty's Government necessity of concerting measures for preservation of tranquillity in the East	77
66	The Duc de Dalmatie	-	17,	Respecting the measures to be adopted for the preservation of peace in the East	78
67	To Earl Granville	249	19,	To obtain opinion of French Government on proposed instructions to Sir R. Stopford for preservation of tranquillity in the East	80
68	Lord Ponsonby	131	May 27,	Present posture of affairs	83
69	Earl Granville	229	June 21,	Has not had an opportunity of communicating with Marshal Soult as to the proposed instructions to Admiral Stopford	83
70	Lord Beaumont	28	14,	Conversation with Prince Metternich on Eastern affairs	85
71	"	29	14,	M. de St. Aulaire's conversation with Prince Metternich on the line of conduct of the Five Powers as to the East	86
72	To Lord Beaumont	54	26,	Explanation of what is known about the agreement at Kutaya in 1833, between Mehmet Ali and the Sultan	87
73	Earl Granville	239	22,	Has delivered to Marshal Soult the instructions to the British Admiral in the Levant	87
74	"	240	23,	Telegraphic despatch from Marseille	88
75	To the Admiralty	-	25,	Instructions for the Admiral with reference to the present state of affairs in the Levant	89
76	"	-	25,	Secret instructions for the Admiral with reference to the present state of affairs in the Levant	92
77	"	-	25,	The Admiral not to communicate Secret Instructions to the Austrian Commodore	92
78	To Earl Granville	263	25,	Intelligence of breaking out of hostilities in the Levant has induced Her Majesty's Government to send off the instructions to Admiral without further delay	93
79	Earl Granville	227	24,	Marshal Soult approves instructions to Sir R. Stopford. They will be communicated to the Council tomorrow	93
80	"	235	24,	Selection of despatches received by French Government from Constantinople and Alexandria	94
81	Count Nesselrode	-	25,	Affairs of the Levant	95
82	Instructions to French Admiral	-	26,	"	97
83	Earl Granville	243	26,	Conversation with Marshal Soult relative to instructions to English and French Admirals in the Levant	99
84	Colonel Campbell	36	May 28,	Details from Syria, and remarks	100
85	Lord Ponsonby	136	June 2,	No hostility yet committed by Haidar Pasha. Turkish fleet to sail on the 8th	100



No.	Lord Ponsonby	No.	Date	Subject	Page
No. 86	Lord Ponsonby	No. 136	June 5, 1839	Intermarriage efforts to prevent war fruitless. Declaration to be issued by the Porte	109
87	Colonel Campbell	37	6	Despatches to Lord Ponsonby. Cer- tainty of hostilities. Ibrahim Pasha's reports of May 30	103
88	To Lord Beaumont	58	28	The views and opinions of the Bri- tish Government on Turkish and Egyptian affairs. Copy of com- munication from Russia	109
89	"	56	28	Is not to communicate "Secret" In- structions to Sir R. Stopford, to Prince Metternich	111
90	To Earl Granville	265	29	Nov. 56, 56, to Lord Beaumont. De- spatch from Count Neuselrode to Count Pozzo di Borgo, Egypt	111
91	"	265	29	Extract of despatch from Prince Metternich to Count Appony rela- tive to the establishment of Con- ferences of Great Powers on the present state of affairs in the Le- vant	112
92	Lord William Russell	72	26	Berni Werther's views on Egyptian affairs	114
93	To the Admiralty	-	July 2	Copy of French Instructions to Ad- miral in the Levant. As to co- operation with Russian squadron	114
94	Earl Granville	249	1	Telegraphic despatch announcing ar- rival of officers despatched by Marshal Soult to Constantinople and Alexandria	115
95	"	250	2	Telegraphic despatch reporting that Mohamet Ali will swear solemnity of Great Powers	115
96	Lord Ponsonby	141	June 12	State of the army under Haidi Pasha. Instructions sent to him	115
97	"	143	13	Turkish fleet sailed for the Darda- nelles on the 9th of June	116
98	To Lord Ponsonby	22	July 3	To offer assistance of squadron at Constantinople in case of need	116
99	Mr. Acting-Counsel Werry	12	June 4	Movements of Turkish and Egyptian forces	117
100	Mr. Consul Werry	21	7	Egyptian and Turkish troops ad- vancing against each other	124
101	Mr. Consul Moore	31	8	Advance of Ottoman troops. Egre- ssion troops gone forward	127
102	Colonel Campbell	41	14	Details of affairs in Syria. Orders sent on June 10, to Ibrahim to engage	127
103	"	43	16	Affairs of Syria. Occupation of Ales- sah by Turks. Ibrahim's letter to Haidi Pasha	130
104	"	44	16	Affairs of Syria. Arrival of Captain Caillier; his instructions; and the result	132
105	"	45	18	Affairs in Syria. Letter from Alex- andretta	133
106	"	46	19	Affairs in Syria up to June 16. Letter from Haidi Pasha to Ibrahim Pasha	135
107	Lord Ponsonby	146	16	Instructions received by French am- bassador respecting present state of affairs	136
108	"	148	16	Letter to Admiral of May 22	137
109	Earl Granville	251	July 2	Has communicated to Marshal Soult Count Neuselrode's despatch to Count Pozzo di Borgo on present state of affairs in the Levant	138
110	"	252	3	Debate in Chamber of Deputies on Eastern affairs. Desire shown to maintain independence of Turkey	138
111	"	254	3	Interview with Marshal Soult, and further intelligence from the East	139
112	Lord William Russell	81	2	Turkey and Egypt	140
113	To Lord William Russell	167	2	Answer to No. 63. Opinions of Russian Government on Turkish Question	140

No.	Subject	No.	Date	Subject	Page
No. 114	To Lord Clanricarde	No. 108	July 9, 1839	Views of British Government on Eastern Question	141
115	Lord Beaumont	36	June 30	Prince Metternich approves plan of Her Majesty's Government on Eastern affairs. Proposes that fleets of France and England should join the Russian fleet	143
116	"	37	30	Bad accounts of the Sultan's health. Views of Austria and England re- specting integrity of Turkey are identical	144
117	"	38	July 1	Prince Metternich wishes Emperor of Russia to be asked to join the Russian to the French and Eng- lish squadrons	145
118	"	40	1	Austrian squadron to be reinforced and put under command of Sir R. Stopford	145
119	To Lord Beaumont	57	12	Course to be pursued by Her Ma- jesty's Government in case of the Sultan's death	146
120	Earl Granville	260	6	Marshal Soult has read to him Note proposed to be addressed to the Porte by the French Government, requesting that French fleet may pass the Dardanelles. Sultan's health	148
121	Lord William Russell	84	6	Favourable reception by Emperor Nicholas of Prince Metternich's proposition of Conference on East- ern affairs	148
122	Lord Ponsonby	151	June 24	State of Sultan's health. Answer of Porte to French Ambassador	149
123	"	152	24	Has authorized M. E. Ponsi to ac- company the Capudan Pasha to Rhodes. The latter's instructions intelligence from the fleet	150
124	To Lord Ponsonby	153	24	To offer assistance of British fleet in case of Sultan's death	152
125	To Admiralty	-	13	Sir Robert Stopford to go to Con- stantinople with his squadron, if invited by the Porte	152
126	"	-	15	Explanation of term "Admirals and Ambassadors" in the above letter	153
127	"	-	18	Further instructions to Sir R. Stop- ford with reference to No. 96 to Lord Ponsonby	153
128	To Lord Ponsonby	96	18	To apply that British fleet may enter Bosphorus if Russian fleet does so	154
129	Earl Granville	263	12	Conversation with Marshal Soult on affairs of the East	154
130	Lord Clanricarde	65	8	Conversation with Count Neuselrode on Egyptian Question. Russia un- prepared for war	155
131	To Earl Granville	256	16	No. 132 from Lord Ponsonby rela- tive to Capudan Pasha's orders and intentions, should French squadron attempt to bar his passage	156
132	Earl Granville	268	13	Including two telegraphic despatches from the East	156
133	"	269	13	French Government willing to enter into an arrangement with five Powers to guarantee integrity of Ottoman Empire	157
134	"	271	13	Telegraphic despatch announcing death of Sultan Mahmud	158
135	"	272	16	Including continuation of telegraphic despatch from Strasbourg	158
136	M. de Bourqueney	-	12	Despatch from Duc de Dalmatie pro- posing that the British and French Governments should make a decla- ration to uphold the integrity and independence of Ottoman Empire	159
137	"	-	13	Note from Duc de Dalmatie request- ing proposal to guarantee the in- tegrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire	160



## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	To M. de Montigny...	No.	Date	Her Majesty's Government would, like France, oppose any combination hostile to existing dynasty of Ottoman Empire	Page
139	Earl Granville	276	19,	Has communicated to Marshal Soult No. 57 to Lord Beaconsfield, on affairs of Turkey	160
141	Lord William Russell	89	14,	Baron Werther approves of Lord Palmerston's observations on Count Nesselrode's despatch on Eastern affairs	161
142	Lord Clarendon	67	15,	Observations on Count Nesselrode's despatch respecting Turco-Egyptian Question	162
143	"	68	15,	Conversation with Count Nesselrode on Turco-Egyptian Question	163
144	To Lord Clarendon	118	23,	Answer to No. 67. Points of difference in British and Russian views of Egyptian Question	163
145	Lord Beaconsfield	46	10,	The Emperor of Russia approves of Prince Metternich's despatches in all their parts	163
146	"	47	10,	Orders were immediately sent to Haid Pasha, on the Sultan's death, to suspend operations. Quarantine abolished	164
147	"	49	10,	Has communicated letter to Lords of the Admiralty, inclosed is No. 52, containing result of several conversations with Prince Metternich	164
148	"	50	11,	Prince Metternich has received answers from St. Petersburg in his despatches of June 14. Turkish Question	165
149	"	51	11,	Prince Metternich cannot admit the principle of parity as established by France between the Sultan and Mehmet Ali	167
150	"	52	12,	Prince Metternich answers for the conduct of Russia in coming to a common understanding with the other Powers	168
151	"	53	14,	On the differences existing between the reports of the Internuncio and Lord Ponsonby	168
152	Lord Ponsonby	163	1,	Has written to Lord Beaconsfield on the state of affairs	169
153	"	163	2,	Lord Ponsonby to see the H. E. Secy on the 2nd	169
154	"	166	3,	Interview with Nouri Effendi. The Sultan offers terms to Mehmet Ali	170
155	To Lord Beaconsfield	73	23,	Draft of a Note which Admiral Roussin is to present for permission for French fleet to pass Dardanelles	171
156	Note to be presented by Baron Roussin to the Porte				171
157	Earl Granville	290	22,	Rest of Turkish army. Determination of Sultan to accede to Mehmet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt	172
158	Lord Ponsonby	168	8,	Defection of the Capudan Pasha	173
159	"	169	8,	Defeat of Sultan's army at Nezh	176
160	Lord Beaconsfield	60	15,	Has communicated to Prince Metternich, No. 54, to remove from his Highness's mind any impression which Count Appony's despatch may have caused	177
161	"	61	27,	Prince Metternich believes that the news of the battle had reached the Porte before their departure to Mehmet Ali was made. M. Laurin's report	178
162	"	62	13,	Prince Metternich is so little satisfied with the Internuncio, that a gentleman will be sent from the Chancery of State to assist him	179

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	To Lord Beaconsfield	No.	Date	Note to Prince Metternich on new state of things, to which his Highness will send an answer to London	Page
163	"	65	19,	Prince Metternich is much pleased at Prince Esterhazy's account of his conversations with Lord Palmerston, and suggests the necessity of Ambassadors at Constantinople and Consuls at Alexandria receiving orders of Five Powers from Vienna	179
166	To Lord Beaconsfield	25	26,	Measures with which Her Majesty's Government received fresh proofs of views of Austria and other Great Powers on Turco-Egyptian Question, as reported in despatches from No. 46 to No. 57	180
167	"	76	26,	Her Majesty's Government of opinion that there should be no change of policy of Five Powers in consequence of Sultan's death. Mehmet's victory	181
168	Earl Granville	282	20,	Substance of despatches received by French Government from Alexandria and Constantinople	187
169	"	283	26,	Telegraphic despatch from Alexandria. Capudan Pasha has placed Turkish fleet under protection of Mehmet Ali	182
170	To Earl Granville	310	30,	Satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at sentiments of French Government respecting course to be pursued by the Five Powers in present state of affairs in the Levant	183
171	The Duc de Dalmeide		26,	Respecting recent events in Syria and course to be pursued by Five Powers	184
172	To Earl Granville	321	30,	Copy of the above	185
173	Lord Clarendon	79	18,	Conversation with Count Nesselrode on Turco-Egyptian Question	186
174	Sir George Hamilton	4	24,	Conversation with Baron Werther on Eastern affairs	187
175	Colonel Campbell	48	6,	Defeat of the Turkish army at Nezh on the 24th of June	189
176	"	49	6,	Reskin intends to move on Orfa, Diarbekir, and Melat	191
177	To Lord Clarendon	121	30,	Her Majesty's Government have not changed their opinion in consequence of recent events in the Levant	192
178	Mr. Acting-Consul Werry	12	1,	Letters to Captain Davis of Her Majesty's ship "Dido," and to Lord Ponsonby, respecting Egyptian victory at Nezh	193
179	"	14	1,	M. Petit's account of the battle of Nezh	195
180	Mr. Consul Moore	24	1,	Victory gained by Ibrahim Pasha over Turkish army at Nezh on the 24th of June	196
181	Mr. Consul Werry	12	5,	State of Syria. Mehmet Ali's position	200
182	Colonel Campbell	50	11,	Communications made to Mehmet Ali by Capudan Pasha and the Porte, and his decision	201
183	"	53	13,	Impolicy of late Sultan's conduct towards Mehmet Ali. M. Coehut's insinuations	203
184	"	54	13,	No details received of the action of Nezh	205
185	Earl Granville	285	23,	Marshal Soult dissatisfied with Admiral Lalonde	206
186	To Lord Beaconsfield	85	Aug. 1,	Late events should make no change in policy of Five Powers relative to the affairs of the Levant	207
187	"	87	1,	Reasons why no change of policy should take place towards Mehmet Ali on part of Five Powers	208



No.	To	No.	Ang.	Page
No. 188	To Lord Ponsonby	No. 107	Aug. 1, 1829	210
189	Lord Ponsonby	171	July 10,	210
190	"	172	10,	211
191	M. de Bourqueney	-	Aug. 1,	212
192	To M. de Bourqueney	-	3,	214
193	Earl Granville	290	2,	215
194	"	292	2,	216
195	Sir George Hamilton	8	July 31,	217
196	"	9	31,	218
197	Lord Clanricarde	77	27,	219
198	"	79	27,	220
199	To Admiralty	-	Aug. 5,	221
200	"	-	5,	222
201	"	-	5,	223
202	To Earl Granville	318	5,	224
203	"	319	5,	225
204	To Sir George Hamilton	2	6,	226
205	Colonel Campbell	55	July 17,	227
206	"	56	17,	228
207	"	57	17,	229
208	"	Private	17,	230
209	"	Separate	17,	231
210	To Admiralty	-	Aug. 7,	232
211	To Earl Granville	324	7,	233
212	Earl Granville	297	5,	234
213	"	298	5,	235
214	Count Nesselrode	-	July 14,	236
215	Lord Beaumont	74	30,	237

No.	To	No.	July	Page
No. 216	Lord Beaumont	No. 75	July 30, 1829	238
217	"	76	30,	239
218	"	77	30,	240
219	"	78	20,	241
220	"	Secret and Confidential	30,	242
221	"	79	31,	243
222	"	81	Aug. 1,	244
223	"	82	1,	245
224	"	83	1,	246
225	"	85	1,	247
226	"	86	2,	248
227	"	87	2,	249
228	Earl Granville	300	8,	250
229	"	303	9,	251
230	"	307	13,	252
231	Lord Clanricarde	82	3,	253
232	Lord Ponsonby	180	July 30,	254
233	"	181	20,	255
234	"	182	20,	256
235	"	183	21,	257
236	"	187	21,	258
237	"	188	21,	259
238	Colonel Campbell	59	18,	260
239	"	60	18,	261
240	The Duc de Dalmatie	-	Aug. 6,	262



No.	Subject	Page	Date	Subject	Page
No. 241	The Duc de Dalmatie ..	-	Aug. 7, 1839	Affairs of the Levant .....	266
242	"	-	13,	Affairs of the Levant .....	267
243	To Colonel Campbell....	No. 27	13,	Reproving sentiments expressed in his private letter of July 17, as being opposed to those of Her Majesty's Government .....	268
244	To Lord Beauvale .....	89	15,	If troops are sent by Russia to Asia Minor, it will be considered as a break up of the alliance. Approving Lord Beauvale's language on this subject .....	269
245	"	90	15,	Approving his declaration to Austrian Government relative to Levant, and of his having sent copies to Lord Ponsonby .....	269
246	"	92	15,	Relative to annoyance felt by Prince Metternich at communication made by M. Brunon to the Court of Berlin .....	269
247	To Earl Granville .....	332	16,	Publication in the French newspapers of confidential communications respecting the orders to be sent to the Admirals in the Mediterranean .....	270
248	Lord Ponsonby .....	191	July 27,	Said Effendi about to be sent to Egypt. Ibrahim Pasha advancing in Asia Minor .....	270
249	"	192	27,	Connection between Russian agents and Capudan Pasha. Establishment of Mehmet Ali's power at Constantinople .....	271
250	"	193	29,	Note presented by the Representatives respecting Mehmet Ali, and acquiescence of the Porte .....	272
251	"	194	29,	Communications to Consuls in Egypt respecting the above .....	272
252	Lord Clarendon .....	89	Aug. 9,	Conversation with Emperor on the affairs of Turkey .....	277
253	"	85	10,	Conversation with Count Neuselrode upon intelligence from Alexandria and Constantinople .....	277
254	Earl Granville .....	310	16,	Egyptian fleet retiring into the Port of Alexandria. Marshal Soult will send another Aide-de-Camp to Alexandria .....	279
255	Sir George Hamilton....	15	14,	Conversation with Baron Werther on communicating Lord Palmerston's No. 2 on Eastern affairs .....	279
256	Earl Granville .....	317	18,	Copy of Note of 27th July presented to the Porte by the Representatives of the Great Powers .....	280
257	"	319	19,	Marshal Soult's objections to proposal that British and French Consuls should leave Alexandria .....	281
258	"	322	19,	Relative to confidential communications between two Governments on Eastern affairs being made known to French newspapers .....	281
259	Count Neuselrode .....	-	July 28, 1839	Affairs of the Levant. Fleet in Dardanelles .....	282
260	To Lord Clarendon....	126	Aug. 20,	On communication by M. Kiseleff of Count Molen of July 19. Copies Count Neuselrode's despatch to of Nos. 92, 95, 96, to Lord Ponsonby .....	284
261	To Mr. Bulwer .....	3	20,	Measures to be taken by Five Powers for restoring the Turkish fleet to the Sultan .....	284
262	To Lord Ponsonby .....	122	21,	Approving Collective Note to Porte of 27th July .....	286
263	Lord Ponsonby .....	195	July 30,	Interview of Five Representatives with Nouri Effendi. Questions put by him and answered .....	286
264	"	196	30,	Dr. Alsworth's account of disposition of Egyptian soldiers .....	287
265	To Lord Ponsonby....	124	Aug. 23,	Approving language in Porte reported in No. 285 .....	288

No.	Subject	Page	Date	Subject	Page
No. 266	To Admiralty .....	-	Aug. 23, 1839	Sir R. Stopford to execute the instructions he may receive from Lord Beauvale .....	288
267	"	-	23,	Instructions of 5th and 7th August cancelled .....	289
268	To Colonel Campbell....	No. 30	23,	To execute whatever orders he may receive from Lord Beauvale .....	289
269	To Mr. Bulwer .....	9	24,	The Instructions to Sir R. Stopford sent to Paris on the 5th and 7th instant are cancelled .....	289
270	To Admiralty .....	-	24,	Further Instructions to Admiral Stopford to execute Lord Beauvale's orders even though not in conjunction with French Admiral .....	289
271	Lord Clarendon .....	86	18,	Further details of Count Neuselrode's conversation on Eastern affairs. French fleet .....	290
272	"	89	17,	Russia not likely to be influenced by Austria in Turkish affairs .....	290
273	Sir George Hamilton....	17	21,	Acknowledging receipt of No. 2, enclosing copies of despatches on Eastern Question. No news .....	291
274	Mr. Bulwer .....	2	23,	Has given to Marshal Soult a copy of Lord Palmerston's No. 2, respecting Eastern affairs .....	291
275	To Lord Beauvale .....	103	25,	Respecting the best line to be pursued to get back the Turkish fleet .....	292
276	"	108	25,	General Instruction on Eastern affairs .....	294
277	"	108	25,	Letters to Admiralty of 23rd and 24th August. Sir R. Stopford to execute any Instructions he may receive from Lord Beauvale .....	296
278	Baron Werther .....	-	16,	In answer to French note on affairs of the Levant .....	297
279	To Mr. Bulwer .....	13	27,	Copy of No. 107 to Lord Beauvale. Measures to be taken by the Five Powers respecting the affairs of the Levant .....	297
280	Mr. Bulwer .....	11	24,	Thinks that the French Government will object to Vienna as the point for the negotiations respecting the Levant .....	297
281	Colonel Campbell .....	61	July 28,	Language of Mehmet Ali and the Capudan Pasha respecting Horow Pasha .....	299
282	"	62	28,	Mehmet Ali writes to other Pashas. Letters from Grand Vizier to Turkish officers. Colonel Campbell's opinion .....	299
283	Mr. Acting Consul Werry	16	30,	State of affairs. Military movements. Position of troops, &c. .....	303
284	Colonel Campbell .....	63	30,	Ibrahim Pasha's percentage .....	312
285	Mr. Consul Werry .....	15	Aug. 2,	Positions occupied by Egyptian troops and future advantages thereof .....	312
286	Mr. Consul Moore .....	28	3,	Said Bey off Beyrout .....	314
287	Colonel Campbell .....	64	7,	Communications respecting note to Porte of July 27 .....	315
288	"	Separate	7,	Ibrahim remains in his position. Expediency of sending Syria to Mehmet Ali .....	315
289	"	65	6,	Letter from Mehmet Ali to Horow Pasha .....	320
290	Lord Ponsonby .....	200	6,	Correspondence between the Grand Vizier and Mehmet Ali .....	322
291	"	201	7,	Relative to communication to be made by French and English Ambassadors respecting fleets according to No. 95 .....	323
292	"	204	7,	Hafiz Pasha removed from command of army. 12,000 troops remaining .....	324
293	"	206	7,	French officers' report of disposition of Egyptian troops .....	324
294	"	207	7,	Discussions respecting bringing up the fleets to Constantinople .....	324
295	"	208	8,	Interview between the Representatives and Nouri Effendi .....	326



No.	Lord Ponsonby	No.	Aug. 10, 1833	Despatch to Sir R. Stopford of August 7	Page
297	Mr. Bulwer	15	30,	French policy with regard to the East	227
298	Lord William Russell	20	28,	Mehemet Ali persists in demanding Syria and dismissal of Horow	228
299	To Lord Ponsonby	229	Sept. 4,	Approving proposal to call up British and French fleets on reported approach of Ibrahim Pasha	331
300	"	130	4,	Approving No. 209, Language to Porte on Mehmet Ali's demand for dismissal of Horow Pasha	332
301	Lord Ponsonby	216	Aug. 13,	Proceedings in consequence of Egyptian brig of war appearing off Salonic	332
302	"	316	14,	Ibrahim Pasha obliged to send despatches to Scuderoon under strong escort	332
303	Colonel Campbell	67	14,	Intentions of Mehmet Ali respecting Turkish fleet	334
304	"	68	15,	Observations on present state of affairs	335
305	"	69	16,	Instructions from the Porte to Hafe Pasha	335
306	Mr. Bulwer	35	Sept. 6,	Wish expressed by the American Government for the withdrawal of the French and English fleets from the entry of the Dardanelles	336
307	To Admiralty	-	9,	Colonel Campbell's No. 47. A Detachment of fleet to remain at Dardanelles to protect Constantinople against Russian	338
308	To Mr. Bulwer	27	10,	Conversation with Count Scherzinski respecting policy of England and France and the other Three Powers respecting the Levant	339
309	To Colonel Campbell	31	12,	Statement to be made to Mehmet Ali in answer to his declaration, reported in Colonel Campbell's No. 67	339
310	Lord Ponsonby	218	Aug. 18,	Arrival of Sir R. Stopford at Thessalonica	342
311	"	219	15,	Message from Nouri. Complaints of Russia of proximity of British and French fleets. Reply	344
312	"	220	19,	Conversation with Internuncio	345
313	"	221	19,	Russian policy	345
314	"	222	19,	Renewed application from Nouri for separation of combined fleets	347
315	"	223	20,	Letter from Mehmet Ali to Grand Visir	349
316	"	224	20,	Confidential letter from Prince of Sannes respecting Note to be presented by Porte to Five Representatives	350
317	"	225	21,	State of affairs at Constantinople. Considerations and opinions	351
318	"	226	21,	Three official Notes to the Porte	353
319	"	227	22,	Communication to French Ambassador of above Notes. Instruction to French Dragoman	355
320	"	228	22,	Letter from Sir Robert Stopford and reply	356
321	"	229	22,	Note from Porte to Representatives demanding settlement of Egyptian Question	357
322	Lord William Russell	53	Sept. 4,	Communication to Baron Werther of No. 12 to Sir G. Hamilton. Prussian officers' account of battle of Neuh	358
323	Lord Clancarde	94	Aug. 22,	Conversation with Emperor on Turkish affairs. His Imperial Majesty's satisfaction at prospect of Russia and England acting in concert	359
324	"	95	27,	Baron Brunnow's mission to London	360
325	"	96	31,	Conversation with Count Nesselrode on Russo-Egyptian Question. Count Moden's report of French policy	361

No.	Lord Clancarde	No.	Aug. 31, 1833	Conversation with Baron Brunnow. Difference between terms demanded by the Porte in its Note of August 23, and those spoken of in Lord Palmerston's No. 108	Page
326	Lord Beaumont	105	Sept. 3,	Lord Clancarde's view of feelings of Russia towards Austria is correct. Emperor Nicholas irritated against France	363
327	"	106	3,	Approving Notes to Nouri Effendi enclosed in No. 226	364
328	"	107	14,	Lord Palmerston's No. 107 to Lord Beaumont was duly communicated to French Government	364
329	To Lord Ponsonby	137	13,	Recall of Admiral Roussin from Constantinople	365
330	Mr. Bulwer	45	13,	Conversation with M. de Langsdorff upon the views of France and Austria respecting the Levant	365
331	"	46	13,	Copy of Note to Count St. Antoine, and his Excellency's reply, on joint co-operation of all the Powers. Conversation with Count Flequembourg	366
332	"	47	8,	Submits the different aspects under which the Turkish Question presents itself at Vienna	367
333	Lord Beaumont	111	8,	Has not been able to act on instructions sent in No. 107. For instructions applicable to conflicting opinions of Five Powers	370
334	"	112	9,	Copy of Mr. Crampton's report of his conversation with Count Flequembourg	371
335	"	113	18,	Note of the Porte makes no difference in view taken by Her Majesty's Government of Eastern Question	372
336	"	114	11,	Problems satisfied with M. Brunnow's language on Eastern affairs	375
337	To Lord Beaumont	120	16,	Incloses instructions to Count Moden and M. Monténi	376
338	Lord William Russell	96	16,	Conversation with Louis Philippe on the crisis in the East. His Majesty will not employ coercive measures against Mehmet Ali	378
339	Mr. Bulwer	54	16,	Conversation with Marshal Soult on the Eastern Question	380
340	"	55	26,	Duplicate copy of Note from Porte, and Lord Ponsonby's answer	381
341	"	56	18,	Receipt of despatches from No. 94 to No. 100, and approval of language therein reported	382
342	Lord Ponsonby	231	19,	To express gratification at Baron Brunnow's mission	382
343	To Lord Clancarde	139	2,	Mehemet Ali says Ibrahim must advance unless arrangement is soon in train of settlement	383
344	"	140	3,	Arrival of Captain Caillier from Ibrahim's headquarters	384
345	Colonel Campbell	71	18,	Conversation with Baron Werther respecting British fleet at the Dardanelles	384
346	"	72	30,	Russian Minister threatens to ask for passport if British or French fleets are called up to Dardanelles	385
347	Lord William Russell	99	30,	Connection of Russia with Mehmet Ali. Respecting fleet at Dardanelles	385
348	Lord Ponsonby	235	30,	Austrian Dragoman's report to Internuncio. Russian policy	386
349	"	236	23,	Difference between the language of Louis Philippe and Count Scherzinski on the Egyptian Question	389
350	"	237	20,	Conversation between Count Moden and Marshal Soult on the Eastern Question	391
351	To Mr. Bulwer	58			
352	Mr. Bulwer	63			



No.	Mr. Bulwer	No.	Sept. 20, 1839	Page
No. 353	Mr. Bulwer	No. 65	Sept. 20, 1839	391
354	"	76	27,	392
355	To Colonel Campbell	34	26,	393
356	Lord Ponsonby	239	Aug. 31,	395
357	Mr. Bulwer	73	Sept. 23,	396
358	To Colonel Hodge	6	27,	396
359	To Lord Beaumont	193	27,	396
360	Lord Ponsonby	242	6,	397
361	"	246	6,	397
362	To Mr. Bulwer	44	28,	400
363	Count Schastli	"	28,	402
364	Lord Chamberlain	104	16,	404
365	Count Molen	"	Aug. 24,	405
366	To Colonel Hodge	1	Oct. 2,	405
367	To Mehmet Ali	"	3,	406
368	Lord Ponsonby	247	Sept. 7,	406
369	"	248	9,	406
370	"	249	10,	406
371	Mr. Bulwer	83	Oct. 4,	407
372	Lord Chamberlain	106	Sept. 26,	408
373	Mr. Consul Young	14	Aug. 12,	411
374	Mr. Consul Werry	14	20,	411
375	Mr. Acting-Consul Werry	19	24,	412
376	Mr. Bulwer	"	Oct. 7,	413
377	Lord Beaumont	117	Sept. 26,	414
378	"	120	Oct. 8,	416
379	To Lord Beaumont	101	16,	419
380	Lord Beaumont	123	8,	420
381	Lord Ponsonby	256	Sept. 22,	420

No.	Lord Chamberlain	No.	Oct. 12, 1839	Page
No. 382	Mr. Bulwer	No. 104	10,	423
384	"	106	18,	423
385	Lord Beaumont	126	14,	424
386	Lord Ponsonby	238	Aug. 31,	425
387	"	254	Sept. 21,	425
388	"	258	23,	425
389	"	260	24,	426
390	"	261	23,	427
391	"	262	24,	427
392	"	263	24,	427
393	"	264	24,	428
394	"	269	30,	428
395	"	270	30,	429
396	"	271	30,	430
397	"	272	30,	431
398	"	273	30,	431
399	"	274	30,	434
400	"	277	Oct. 1,	434
401	Colonel Campbell	74	Sept. 26,	435
402	"	76	Oct. 3,	435
403	"	78	6,	436
404	To Lord Ponsonby	165	23,	436
405	To Admiralty	"	24,	437
406	Earl Granville	326	21,	437
407	To Lord Chamberlain	352	25,	437
408	Baron Brunow	"	2,	438
409	Earl Granville	329	25,	443
410	"	Confidential	25,	451
411	To Admiralty	"	29,	453
412	Lord Chamberlain	312	18,	453
413	To Earl Granville	343	29,	453



TABLE OF CONTENTS

No.	To	Page	Date	Page
414	Lord Ponsonby	294	Oct. 8, 1839	435
415	"	294	8	438
416	"	294	8	438
417	"	294	8	438
418	"	294	8	438
419	To Admiralty	294	Nov. 3	438
420	Lord Ponsonby	295	Oct. 12	438
421	"	296	13	438
422	"	297	14	438
423	"	298	14	438
424	To Lord Ponsonby	299	Nov. 4	438
425	"	300	4	438
426	"	301	4	438
427	"	302	4	438
428	Lord Beaumont	303	Oct. 27	438
429	Lord Beaumont	304	25	438
430	Earl Granville	305	Nov. 4	438
431	Lord Beaumont	306	Oct. 16	438
432	Earl Granville	307	Nov. 6	438
433	Lord Beaumont	308	Oct. 21	438
434	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	309	Sept. 25	438
435	Lord Beaumont	310	Oct. 20	438
436	Lord Beaumont	311	Nov. 5	438
437	Sir George Hamilton	312	13	438
438	Earl Granville	313	15	438
439	To Lord Beaumont	314	19	438
440	Lord Beaumont	315	26	438
441	"	316	27	438
442	"	317	28	438
443	To Lord Ponsonby	318	Nov. 22	438

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	To	Page	Date	Page
444	Earl Granville	319	Nov. 18, 1839	438
445	To Earl Granville	320	22	438
446	Baron Werther	321	22	438
447	Colonel Hodgkin	322	11	438
448	Lord Beaumont	323	10	438
449	"	324	10	438
450	Lord Ponsonby	325	Oct. 20	438
451	Lord Beaumont	326	Nov. 6	438
452	"	327	6	438
453	"	328	15	438
454	Sir George Hamilton	329	20	438
455	Earl Granville	330	20	438
456	Lord Ponsonby	331	7	438
457	To Colonel Hodgkin	332	20	438
458	"	333	20	438
459	To Lord Beaumont	334	20	438
460	"	335	20	438
461	To Lord Beaumont	336	20	438
462	To Lord Beaumont	337	20	438
463	To Lord Beaumont	338	20	438
464	Lord Beaumont	339	Nov. 15	438
465	To Lord Beaumont	340	Dec. 6	438
466	Earl Granville	341	6	438
467	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	342	Oct. 16	438
468	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	343	23	438
469	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	344	24	438
470	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	345	24	438
471	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	346	24	438
472	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	347	24	438
473	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	348	24	438
474	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	349	24	438
475	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	350	24	438
476	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	351	24	438
477	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	352	24	438
478	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	353	24	438
479	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	354	24	438
480	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	355	24	438
481	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	356	24	438
482	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	357	24	438
483	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	358	24	438
484	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	359	24	438
485	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	360	24	438
486	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	361	24	438
487	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	362	24	438
488	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	363	24	438
489	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	364	24	438
490	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	365	24	438
491	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	366	24	438
492	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	367	24	438
493	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	368	24	438
494	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	369	24	438
495	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	370	24	438
496	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	371	24	438
497	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	372	24	438
498	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	373	24	438
499	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	374	24	438
500	Mr. Arthur Wellesley	375	24	438



No.	To	No.	Date	Page
477	To Earl Granville	394	Dec 10, 1839	520
478	Earl Granville	390	9,	520
479	To Earl Granville	391	12,	522
480	"	396	13,	522
481	Lord Beaumont	3	4,	523
482	Lord Ponsonby	398	Nov 17,	523
483	"	399	18,	524
484	"	313	19,	524
485	Lord Beaumont	134	Not 20,	524
486	M. Weyher	-	20,	526
487	Earl Granville	Confiden-	Dec 16,	527
488	Lord Ponsonby	313	Nov 24,	526
489	"	314	17,	529
490	"	314	17,	529
491	Baron Bunsow	-	Dec 24,	531
492	Sir George Hamilton	15	8,	531
493	Earl Granville	403	23,	534
494	"	417	28,	535
495	"	414	23,	535
496	Lord Ponsonby	316	Nov 28,	536
497	"	316	30,	536
498	"	319	30,	537
499	"	320	30,	539
500	"	321	30,	540
501	"	322	30,	540
502	"	326	Dec,	541
503	Lord Beaumont	16	17,	542
504	"	62	17,	543
505	Lord Beaumont	135	2,	543

No.	To	No.	Date	Page
506	Lord Ponsonby	327	Dec 3, 1839	544
507	Earl Granville	411	11,	544
508	Propositions made by	3	Jan. 1840,	544
509	To Earl Granville	3	1,	544
510	Lord Ponsonby	329	Dec 11, 1839	544
511	"	330	12,	544
512	To Count Nesselrode	-	Jan. 5, 1840,	545
513	Count Nesselrode	3	Dec 16, 1839,	545
514	Mr. Armitage	23	Nov 20,	545
515	Mr. Armitage	23	25,	545
516	Mr. Armitage	17	28,	545
517	Count Nesselrode	6	Dec 10,	545
518	"	4	20,	545
519	"	5	21,	545
520	"	6	21,	545
521	Earl Granville	3	Jan. 6, 1840,	545
522	"	6	6,	545
523	Lord Ponsonby	331	Dec 13, 1839,	545
524	"	333	17,	545
525	"	333	17,	545
526	"	337	19,	545
527	Lord Beaumont	4	Jan 5, 1840,	545
528	To Sir George Hamilton	3	14,	545
529	Lord Beaumont	5	5,	545
530	To Earl Granville	19	4,	545
531	Count Nesselrode	-	Dec 10, 1839,	545
532	Lord Beaumont	1	Jan. 2, 1840,	545
533	"	5	2,	545
534	"	Private	2,	545
535	Count Nesselrode	-	Dec 11, 1839,	545
536	Earl Granville	3	Jan 13, 1840,	545
537	"	5	17,	545



## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Earl Granville	No.	Date	Subject	Page
No. 348	Earl Granville	No. 17	Jan. 14, 1840.	Letter to Marshal Soult's committee	58
349	Lord Ponsonby	354	Dec. 23, 1839.	Message from Khedive Pasha	58
350	"	354	24.	Satisfaction expressed by Khedive	582
351	To Lord Clarendon	354	Jan. 18, 1840.	Mr. Bunsfield ought not to have	583
352	Earl Granville	354	19.	The Pasha not impatient at non-con-	583
353	Lord Ponsonby	344	Dec. 28, 1839.	Letter from the Grand Viceroy by Kiam	584
354	"	345	29.	Report from Austrian Consul in	584
355	Lord Ponsonby	7	Jan. 12, 1840.	Has communicated enclosure in Lord	585
356	To Lord Ponsonby	12	24.	Answer to his No. 344, re-	585
357	"	Separate	25.	Te recommended that full powers should	587
358	To Lord Ponsonby	4	30.	The Porte would be	587
359	Earl Granville	34	20.	Count Medem has communicated to	588
360	"	24.	24.	"	589
361	"	26	24.	"	589
362	"	32	27.	Question	591
363	"	32	27.	Marshal Soult will forward his reply	592
364	"	32	27.	Question	592
365	Earl Granville	3	20.	"	592
366	"	3	27.	"	592
367	Lord Ponsonby	2	7.	"	592
368	"	3	8.	"	592
369	"	3	29.	"	592
370	To Earl Granville	37	31.	Respecting negotiations now carrying	599
371	Colonel Hodges	7	Dec. 27, 1839.	Mohamet Ali amalgamates crews of	599
372	Lord Clarendon	8	27.	"	599
373	To Lord Clarendon	15	Feb. 3.	Appointing language reported in No.	602
374	Mr. Consul Werry	15	Dec. 23, 1839.	Syrian affairs. Commercial informa-	603

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Earl Granville	No.	Date	Subject	Page
No. 348	Earl Granville	No. 38	Jan. 31, 1840.	Marshal Soult approves of the pro-	604
367	Colonel Hodges	9	Dec. 30, 1839.	Reasons of Mohamet Ali for making	604
368	Colonel Hodges	1	Jan. 4, 1840.	Interview with Mohamet Ali	605
369	"	2	4.	Extraordinary meeting of Mohamet	606
370	"	3	4.	Mohamet Ali's conversations with	607
371	Sir G. Hamilton	11	Feb. 5.	Letter from Prussian Officer at Con-	607
372	"	13	8.	Conversation with Baron Werther	607
373	Lord Ponsonby	16	Jan. 15.	Letter from Mohamet Ali to Count	608
374	"	12	5.	Letter from Mohamet Ali to Count	610
375	Earl Granville	51	Feb. 13.	Mohamet Ali's reply to Lord	612
376	"	53	10.	Interview with Mohamet Ali	612
377	Lord Ponsonby	17	Jan. 18.	Mohamet Ali's reply to Lord	612
378	Colonel Hodges	6	12.	Arrival of troops from Syria	613
379	"	7	13.	Mohamet Ali proposes going with	613
380	"	8	13.	Mohamet Ali forms corps of National	613
381	"	9	14.	Mohamet Ali proposes to send Egyptian	613
382	"	10	16.	Mohamet Ali proposes to send Egyptian	613
383	"	11	16.	Mohamet Ali takes measures for fur-	613
384	"	12	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
385	"	13	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
386	"	14	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
387	"	15	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
388	Lord Clarendon	16	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
389	Sir G. Hamilton	17	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
390	Earl Granville	18	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
391	Lord Clarendon	19	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
392	"	20	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
393	"	21	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
394	"	22	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
395	Earl Granville	23	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
396	"	24	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
397	"	25	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
398	"	26	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
399	"	27	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
400	"	28	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
401	"	29	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
402	"	30	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
403	"	31	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
404	"	32	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
405	"	33	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
406	"	34	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
407	"	35	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
408	"	36	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
409	"	37	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
410	"	38	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
411	"	39	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
412	"	40	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
413	"	41	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
414	"	42	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
415	"	43	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
416	"	44	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
417	"	45	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
418	"	46	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
419	"	47	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
420	"	48	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
421	"	49	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
422	"	50	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
423	"	51	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
424	"	52	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
425	"	53	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
426	"	54	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
427	"	55	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
428	"	56	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
429	"	57	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
430	"	58	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
431	"	59	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
432	"	60	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
433	"	61	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
434	"	62	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
435	"	63	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
436	"	64	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
437	"	65	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
438	"	66	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
439	"	67	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
440	"	68	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
441	"	69	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
442	"	70	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
443	"	71	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
444	"	72	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
445	"	73	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
446	"	74	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
447	"	75	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
448	"	76	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
449	"	77	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
450	"	78	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
451	"	79	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
452	"	80	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
453	"	81	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
454	"	82	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
455	"	83	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
456	"	84	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
457	"	85	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
458	"	86	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
459	"	87	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
460	"	88	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
461	"	89	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
462	"	90	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
463	"	91	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
464	"	92	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
465	"	93	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
466	"	94	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
467	"	95	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
468	"	96	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
469	"	97	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
470	"	98	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
471	"	99	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613
472	"	100	17.	Interview with Count Medem and	613



## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	To	No.	Date	Page
1	To Colonel Hodgkin	No. 1	Feb. 25, 1840	623
2	Mr. Consul Werry	3	Jan. 18,	623
3	Mr. Pro-Consul Werry	3	20,	624
4	Mr. Consul Werry	Private	22,	625
5	Mr. Consul Moore	4	29,	625
6	Colonel Hodgkin	23	Feb. 6,	627
7	Lord Ponsonby	27	6,	628
8	Lord Clarendon	19	11,	638
9	"	15	11,	639
10	Earl Greyville	26	Mar. 5,	639
11	To Lord Clarendon	43	7,	639
12	Earl Greyville	54	6,	639
13	"	54	7,	639
14	Lord Clarendon	6	Feb. 24,	639
15	"	8	24,	643
16	To Lord Beauvale	23	Mar. 12,	644
17	Lord Ponsonby	29	Feb. 10,	644
18	Earl Greyville	22	Mar. 3,	645
19	Earl Greyville	24	17,	645
20	Lord Ponsonby	20	20,	645
21	Colonel Hodgkin	27	Feb. 26,	645
22	"	28	Mar. 6,	645
23	"	29	12,	645
24	To Earl Greyville	125	April 7,	645
25	Lord Esford	-	7,	645

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

29

No.	To	No.	Date	Page
26	Colonel Hodgkin	No. 24	Feb. 12, 1840	645
27	"	25	2,	645
28	To Colonel Hodgkin	4	Mar. 25,	645
29	To Lord Clarendon	42	24,	645
30	To Lord Ponsonby	32	24,	645
31	Earl Greyville	106	22,	645
32	Lord Ponsonby	4	Feb. 27,	645
33	Lord Ponsonby	48	Mar. 3,	645
34	Earl Greyville	110	24,	645
35	Lord Beauvale	Secret	10,	645
36	To Lord Beauvale	47	28,	645
37	To Lord Ponsonby	43	27,	645
38	Earl Greyville	13	27,	645
39	Lord Ponsonby	54	7,	645
40	"	55	1,	645
41	Lord William Russell	2	April 1,	645
42	Earl Greyville	24	3,	645
43	Mr. Consul Werry	3	Feb. 20,	645
44	To the Admiralty	3	April 7,	645
45	To Lord Ponsonby	40	7,	645
46	"	51	-	645
47	Lord Ponsonby	59	Mar. 18,	645
48	Colonel Hodgkin	27	Feb. 26,	645
49	"	28	Mar. 6,	645
50	"	29	12,	645
51	To Earl Greyville	125	April 7,	645
52	Lord Esford	-	7,	645



No.	To	No.	Date	Subject	Page
No. 650	To Earl Granville	No. 180	April 10, 1840	Copy of Note from Nouri Effendi of the Egyptian Government to the British Government, dated March 28, 1840, in relation to the Egyptian Question.	568
651	To Nouri Effendi	-	11,	A copy of the receipt of his Note of March 28, 1840.	568
652	Earl Granville	133	13,	His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in relation to the Egyptian Question.	568
653		135	15,	A copy of the receipt of his Note of March 28, 1840.	569
654		141	17,	His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in relation to the Egyptian Question.	569
655	Lord Clarendon	89	3,	His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in relation to the Egyptian Question.	569
656	Lord Ponsonby	47	Mar. 3,	His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in relation to the Egyptian Question.	570
657		52	23,	His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in relation to the Egyptian Question.	570
658	Mr. Consul Werry	7	Feb. 20,	His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in relation to the Egyptian Question.	571
659	To Lord Ponsonby	51	April 21,	His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in relation to the Egyptian Question.	571
660	Earl Granville	113	20,	His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in relation to the Egyptian Question.	572
661	Mr. Consul Werry	Private	Feb. 20,	His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in relation to the Egyptian Question.	572
662	Mr. Consul Moore	8	27,	His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in relation to the Egyptian Question.	572
663	Lord Ponsonby	56	April 1,	His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in relation to the Egyptian Question.	573
664	"	70	5,	His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in relation to the Egyptian Question.	573
665	"	71	5,	His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in relation to the Egyptian Question.	573
666	"	72	5,	His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in relation to the Egyptian Question.	573
667	Colonel Hodges	34	Mar. 27,	His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in relation to the Egyptian Question.	574
668	"	37	3,	His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in relation to the Egyptian Question.	574
669	Lord Ponsonby	55	April 24,	His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in relation to the Egyptian Question.	575
670	"	Confidential	24,	His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in relation to the Egyptian Question.	575
671	"	59	25,	His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in relation to the Egyptian Question.	575
672	Earl Granville	153	May	His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in relation to the Egyptian Question.	576
673	To Earl Granville	167	5,	His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in relation to the Egyptian Question.	576
674	Lord Ponsonby	77	April 4,	His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in relation to the Egyptian Question.	577
675	"	86	6,	His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in relation to the Egyptian Question.	577
676	Colonel Hodges	No. 37	8,	His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in relation to the Egyptian Question.	578

No.	To	No.	Date	Subject	Page
No. 677	Colonel Hodges	No. 28	April 16, 1840	Further warlike preparations of Me- hemet Ali. Remarks on his foreign policy.	577
678	"	47	20,	His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in relation to the Egyptian Question.	577
679	To Earl Granville	169	May 8,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of April 17, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	578
680	To Admiralty	-	6,	Two copies of the same to be sent to the Admiralty, one to be sent to the Admiralty, one to be sent to the Admiralty.	578
681	To Lord Ponsonby	67	6,	Copy of letter to Admiralty of 6th May.	579
682	To Earl Granville	181	12,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of 6th May, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	579
683	Earl Granville	173	12,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of 6th May, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	579
684	Lord Ponsonby	63	9,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of 6th May, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	580
685	Mr. Consul Young	9	1st 13,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of 6th May, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	580
686	Mr. Consul Werry	8	Mar. 9,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of 6th May, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	580
687	Mr. Consul Werry	4	22,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of 6th May, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	580
688	Mr. Consul Moore	-	27,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of 6th May, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	581
689	Lord Ponsonby	84	April 23,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of 6th May, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	581
690	"	42	26,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of 6th May, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	581
691	"	84	26,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of 6th May, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	581
692	"	83	26,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of 6th May, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	581
693	Lord Clarendon	63	May 4,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of 6th May, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	582
694	Nouri Effendi	-	18,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of 6th May, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	582
695	To Lord Ponsonby	70	20,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of 6th May, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	583
696	To Lord Ponsonby	79	20,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of 6th May, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	583
697	"	70	20,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of 6th May, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	583
698	To Admiralty	-	20,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of 6th May, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	583
699	Earl Granville	176	8,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of 6th May, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	584
700	Lord Ponsonby	91	April 29,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of 6th May, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	584
701	"	92	May 4,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of 6th May, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	584
702	"	96	5,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of 6th May, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	584
703	Chelik Effendi	-	3,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of 6th May, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	585
704	Lord Clarendon	60	31,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of 6th May, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	585
705	Lord Ponsonby	97	22,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of 6th May, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	585
706	Lord Ponsonby	100	12,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of 6th May, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	586
707	Mr. Consul Werry	5	April 24,	Copy of letter from Admiralty of 6th May, relative to the amount of the Egyptian fleet of England and France respectively.	586



No.	Subject	No.	Date	Page
No. 702	Colonel Hodges	No. 42	May 15, 1840	717
713	"	45	31,	718
714	To Colonel Hodges	3	June 11,	719
715	Lord Ponsonby	103	May 15,	719
716	Mr. Consul Moore	8	April 25,	720
717	Lord Granville	103	June 13,	720
718	Mr. Blandford	2	6,	721
719	Lord Beaconsfield	80	9	721
720	Lord Beaconsfield	37	May 26,	721
721	"	114	29	722
722	To Lord Beaconsfield	720	June 26	722
723	To Lord Beaconsfield	88	25	723
724	Lord Beaconsfield	1	9	726
725	"	1	9	726
726	"	119		727
727	Mr. Blandford	18	20,	728
728	Lord Beaconsfield	123	June 16,	729
729	Mr. Blandford	3	July 3,	729
730	Mr. Consul Werry	6	May 22	730
731	Mr. Consul Moore	49	29,	731
732	Colonel Hodges	46	June 6,	732
733	"	42	16,	733
734	"	56	17,	734
735	"	5	17	735
736	"	32	17	736
737	"	53	17	737
738	"	55	19,	738
739	"	56	19,	739
740	"	51	20,	740
741	To Admiralty		July 7	741

No.	Subject	No.	Date	Page
No. 740	Chakib Effendi	No. 11	July 7, 1840	745
741	To Mr. Blandford	10		746
742	Lord Ponsonby	125	June 23,	746
743	"	126	23,	749
744	"	127	23,	750
745	"	128	23,	752
746	"	129	23,	752
747	Lord Beaconsfield	103	June 15,	752
748	To Lord Beaconsfield	89	16,	756
749	Baron Brunnow	-	15	756
750	To Baron Brunnow	-	15	756

That immediate measures may be taken to prevent the outbreak of a civil war in Syria.

Note from Chakib Effendi of July 10, relative to the differences between the Porte and Mehmet Ali.

Letter from Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Ponsonby respecting instructions to Syria.

Letter to Sir John Lubbock respecting instructions to Syria.

Letter from Mr. Consul Moore respecting events in Syria.

Letter from a person at Alexandria in Mehmet Ali's confidence.

Conversation with Lord Beaconsfield respecting Syria. French influence.

Four copies of Convention, Separate Act, and Protocols, Turco-Egyptian affairs.

Copies of Treaty of this date for publication in the Gazette of the Government and of two Protocols.

Inquiry as to what is at present in the air.

And as to the state of the Mo-  
narchy in Syria.



PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

CORRESPONDENCE

RELATIVE TO

THE AFFAIRS OF THE LEVANT.

PART I

No. 1

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 18)*

(No. 89.)

My Lord,

*Paris, February 15, 1839*

COUNT MOLE, in the course of a conversation I had with him a few days ago, on the affairs of the East of Europe, took occasion to remind me of the approach of the period of Mehemet Ali's return from his expedition to the mines of Sennaar, and to express his wish that by previous communication, the French and English Governments should be prepared to act in entire concert, when the Pasha again brought forward the question of his independence of the Porte, which he would not fail to do soon after his arrival at Alexandria. His Excellency observed, that although France and England both aimed at the preservation of peace between the Sultan and the Pasha, shades of difference existed in the interests of the two countries on the Oriental Question, which should in previous concert be established might tend to produce a want of unity in the language and proceedings of the two Governments, prejudicial to the object which both have in view. In speaking of the importance in the interests of the two countries, he alluded to Egypt as a thoroughfare of communication and of transit between Europe and the British Empire in India, which was an object of far greater importance to England than to France. I replied that although the facility of communication with India through Egypt was a question in which England bore greater interest than France, I did not see why that circumstance should lead to a divergence in the measures to be adopted for averting a collision between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, but that I had no doubt of my Government giving the most favourable attention to any proposal suggested by his Excellency, with the view of securing unity in the language and proceedings of the two Governments in this matter.

I observed, that they had both protested, as well as Austria and Russia, against the assertion by the Pasha, of his independence of the Porte; and that we had threatened to employ our naval force against him, if, in spite of their protests, he carried that intension into effect. Mehemet Ali had been successful at least in suspending the announced declaration of independence.

Count Mole said he could not rely on the effect of our menace if not supported by action. The Pasha of Egypt might bring peace with the Sultan, favourable to the future position of his descendants; our object ought to be, considering the great age of Mehemet Ali, to gain



time and to stave off the crisis in the affairs of the East; and nothing would tend more to the attainment of that object, than to induce the Pasha in the expectation of the good offices of France and England being employed at Constantinople to secure to his son the succession to the Government of Egypt, on the same conditions on which it is now held by Mehemet Ali.

The above is the substance of Count Mold's conversation with me on this subject, and he requested me to report it to your Lordship.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 2.

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 18.)

My Lord,

*Therapia, January 27, 1839.*

I HAVE heard from good Turkish authority that advice has been given to the Sultan some say by Reshid Pasha others by a Dr. Barrachin, to propose to the Great Powers the formation of a conference to decide the Oriental Question; and that M. de Bouteneff, having heard of it, has combatted the proposition, saying, with many observations and reasonings to show the danger to the Porte of such a measure, that although certainly it would afford Russia a new occasion to give the Sublime Porte proofs of friendship, yet it is much to be feared that England and France would take advantage of it to suggest measures that might prejudice the rights and violate the decorum of the Porte.

(I do not profess to understand what is meant by decorum.)

That the Great Council was held on the 22nd, to discuss the question of peace or war with the Egyptians; that the Sultan is as much as ever alive to the question, and that the Russians, knowing his feelings, are exerting all to break the peace with the hope of inducing England to consider a reply (if not a necessity) for the renewal of the Treaty of July 6th, 1833.

That the Riza Bey has been sent to Alexandria in command of the steamer which took out the Sheikh of the Mosque of Mecca, and has been ordered to obtain the best information of the state of the Army and Navy of Mehemet Ali.

On the 26th (yesterday), I heard from the same Turkish authority that rumours continued to increase of war between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, that there is much movement at the Seraskierate; that a levy of 50,000 men has been determined to be made throughout the empire, including the capital, and that great changes are about to be made amongst the high functionaries of the Porte, and several of them will be replaced by men particularly known by their hostility to the Pasha of Egypt.

I have heard from another authority, not Turkish, though good, that the Russian Minister has just discussed the proposition made by Lord Palmerston to the Court of Vienna, for the establishment of a Congress or Conference which Russia had declined and prevented, and that if any such thing were to be established, it should be held at Constantinople, where the Sultan might take part in it.

The rumours of war mentioned above, make this a proper place for reporting the mission of M. Franchini to Erzeroum, with despatches for the Russian Legation in Persia. I have some ground for supposing this mission may be connected with the schemes supposed to be entertained here, for drawing the Sultan into measures that will produce hostilities between him and Mehemet Ali; and I am sorry to say, that Hafiz Pasha is suspected of being now inclined towards the Russians, whilst it is certain that he has lately shown a disposition to induce the Sultan to act offensively against Mehemet Ali. Your Lordship will observe, in the Persian correspondence sent home by this messenger, what is said respecting an understanding between the Shah of Persia and

Mehemet Ali (a fact I long ago knew and stated), and that both those parties are under the direction of Russia.

I am informed that Prince Handjery assures the Porte, that all matters in Persia have either been settled, or will be settled immediately; and that there is no manner of danger of collision between Russia and England. That there had been some jealousies in Russia about the British squadron being near the Dardanelles, and therefore it had been arranged by Russia, that the English should keep away, and that a French squadron should come so far as Smyrna. The object of these communications apparently is to make the Sultan believe that he has no chance of support from England, and had best place himself wholly in the hands of Russia, and depend upon the friendship of the Emperor.

I shall not be surprised if this succeeds; but I have endeavoured, as far as my means permitted me, to counteract what I knew (previous to the later information) had been doing with a view to induce the Sultan to deviate from his intention to wait for the results of Reshid Pasha's embassy to Her Majesty being fully known, before he should take any step whatever of importance; and with this end in view, I sent M. Etienne Pisani to Riza Bey, to communicate to him, for the Sultan's information, the fact of Mikosch's having thrown himself entirely into the hands of the Russians, and to urge the necessity for acting with the greatest prudence and caution in the difficult and delicate situation of the Sultan's affairs when a false step might have the most serious consequences, and when no evil could follow from continuing to avoid entering into engagements of any sort, and so escaping the risk of future embarrassments which might be created by acting before the whole state of affairs could be known to the Sultan; and I observed, that from the nature of our Government, a considerable time was necessary to allow of the formation of plans of action when immense interests are at issue; and that it would be wise that the Sultan should wait, before he decided how to act, for the coming of that hour when the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the feeling of the Parliament, and the disposition of the British public, could be known to him; and I observed, that it was a bad thing to be on the side of the weaker party—that everybody agreed in considering the present situation of affairs critical—that every one imagined war to be likely; and it seemed evident that should war unhappily take place, England, France, and Austria, must, in consequence of their own great interests, be found on one side, and Russia alone on the other; that the issue of a contest between such Powers could hardly be a matter of doubt, and I hoped the Sultan would not be found on the side that should be defeated. I need not trespass further on your Lordship's patience, by stating all the observations I made in furtherance of my object; and I have only to add, that notes were made of them, and that Riza immediately went into the Sultan's presence, and after the lapse of a considerable time, returned to where M. Etienne Pisani was, and desired him to tell me, in the Sultan's name, "that His Imperial Majesty was highly pleased with the sincerity of my communication; that he was not surprised by the behaviour of Mikosch which had a bad character; that His Imperial Majesty felt the truth of my observations, and that he would take care not to contract any engagements that could become a burthen or embarrassing to him." I have abridged as much as I can the account of what was said, leaving out the complimentary part; but M. Etienne Pisani assures me that Riza Bey's manner, after he had been in the Sultan's presence was such as to mark very strongly that the commission he had just executed had been agreeable to the Sultan. I have much reliance on the penetration of M. E. Pisani, and I feel sure his observation is a just one.

I hope that the Russians will not succeed in drawing the Sultan into any engagement or course of action favourable to English interests before the period when the results of Reshid Pasha's mission to England shall be fully known.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.



## No. 3

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 19, Confidential.)

(Extract.)

Therapia, February 4, 1839

TWO days after the departure of the January messenger, I had the honour of a visit, here, from the Internuncio. He spoke extremely openly to me on the political state of affairs, and left no room for doubt in my mind, of his own conviction, that the Austrian Government would resist (if necessary,) by force, the establishment of Russian authority over this country. He very explicitly said he thought war likely, very likely; when I said to him, that I earnestly wished some means could be found to secure against future danger the interests of England and Europe (bound up with the real independence of the Ottoman Government), he replied, that he feared it would be impossible to induce Russia to consent to arrangements that would produce that security.

He thinks war will take place, and entertains a great opinion of the means of Russia to come upon Constantinople by a maritime coup de main, and thereby to obtain an almost irresistible power. He admitted that there could be no attack made in Turkey in Europe, without the consent of Austria; and that no attack through Asia could be successful excepting under circumstances almost impossible. I think I proved to him I do not say convinced, but a coup de main by sea would not give ultimate success to Russia, unless England and France submitted to it. That the attempt also might be easily failed by extra troops, if employed; and that its failure would be most seriously injurious to Russia.

The Internuncio was very frank and very cordial in his manner to me, as he always is good enough to be. I think he came to lift me, and I was very willing to be so lifted, and glad to have the opportunity for disavowing hostile or unfriendly feelings towards Russia, and asserting the fact, that nothing was sought for, or desired, but security against injury and wrong; and further to call his attention to the means Russia actually possessed, and could more easily employ, if necessary, to have recourse to force, to maintain her rights and the balance of power in Europe.

## No. 4

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 20.)

My Lord,

Therapia, February 6, 1839

ON the 4th, there was a Grand Council of Ministers and Pashas, for the further discussion of the question of war or peace with Egypt.

The difficulty of obtaining from the Musulman population men enough to complete the projected levies, was taken into consideration, and a plan for raising Rayah Regiments, to be commanded by Turkish officers.

I am ignorant of the decision of the Council, the report of it is gone to the Sultan. I may not be able to ascertain the result, but I believe, if war is determined on, Hosrew Pasha will be made Bash Vekil (Prime Minister), he being the most marked enemy of Mehmet Ali.

I have at the same time to report, that the Ottoman treasury is said to be empty, that the Minister of Finance states his inability to provide for the most urgent expences, and upon that poverty justifies the continuation of monopolies.

I have written despatches, which will go by the messenger, to

acquaint your Lordship, that I had endeavoured to prevent the adoption of any warlike measures against Egypt; and it will there appear that I have been aware of the state of things and mindful of it.

Some people say that Russian influence is exerted to push the Sultan on to war; some say that it is not so. My views of these matters have been sufficiently stated to Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY

## No. 5

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 24)

My Lord,

Therapia, February 8, 1839.

WITH reference to my despatches Nos. 18 and 20, I have to say, that I do not believe the Sultan will commence hostilities against Mehmet Ali at present. I have just had a communication with his Highness, and recommended most strongly his observance of the greatest prudence in his conduct; and said, that his Highness could not at this moment have sufficient grounds on which to found a sound judgment of his position.

The Sultan thanked me for my communication, and renewed the assurances he previously gave, that he would do nothing precipitately. It is certain that Hafia Pasha has been advising war.

The Russian Minister asked Nouri Effendi the meaning of the rumour of war and of preparations for it, and said, that the Emperor Nicholas would learn with great dissatisfaction, that the Sultan had done anything to disturb peace. Nouri replied, that he had just been apprised to in a similar manner by the English Ambassador, and that the Porte had no intention whatever of making war.

It is with difficulty I have written the above: I am unable from feverish indisposition to do more, and I do not think it right to detain the messenger who arrived here in the night of the 5th inst.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

## No. 6.

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 25.)

My Lord,

Therapia, February 12, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to state, that I received on the 10th, a letter, extracts from which I transcribe and forward to your Lordship.

"Ce samedi, 9 Février, 1839.

"Je m'empresse de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence, le fruit de mes recherches, quoiqu'il ne soit pas fort agréable.

J'ai appris que l'idée de faire la guerre au printemps prochain, est plus que jamais enracinée dans l'esprit du Sultan, et que ceux qui voudraient maintenir le statu quo, ou prévenir les hostilités, auront beaucoup, mais beaucoup, à faire, car la guerre est comme résolue. Que Sa Hautesse compte fort peu ou rien sur la France et l'Angleterre, puisqu'elle ne reçoit de ces deux Puissances que de belles paroles;—qu'elle ait très-bien que l'Ambassadeur Britannique ici n'est pas appuyé par son Gouvernement;—que d'un côté elle compte sur l'appui des Russes;—qu'il est par conséquent d'autant plus à regretter, qu'elle se sacrifie une fois, qu'elle ne peut se servir de ce bras. Les Ministres actuels de la Porte ignorent plus de moitié sur ce qui se passe, et c'est pourquoi on remarque la gêne dans leurs communications avec le Corps



Diplomatique une si flagrante contradiction entre ce qu'ils croient eux-mêmes et la tournure que l'on donne à cette grande question au Sérail, qui est réellement le centre et la source des affaires de quelque importance. Le Capitan Pacha, qui est parti avant-hier pour les Dardanelles, à bord d'un bâtiment à vapeur, jouit actuellement d'une grande influence, et il est un des excitateurs à la guerre."

"Dans un autre endroit j'ai appris que les Princes Persans (arrivés ici) ont eu une longue conférence avec et chez M. de Bouténeff, le vendredi dernier."

"On parle du rappel du Baron Roussin: d'autres supposent que ce sera pour le faire Ministre de la Marine; mais ce qu'il y a de vrai, c'est que Monsieur Molé a dernièrement invité et beaucoup engagé Monsieur d'Eyragues à retourner ici, mais que le Marquis n'y a pas voulu consentir."

All of the foregoing that relates to the feelings in the Seraglio, is derived from excellent sources, namely, the Ottoman friends of the writer, who has inhabited this country during many years, and is very intimately acquainted with its language. That which relates to French affairs, is I presume, the mercantile news of Galata.

I hope the Sultan will avoid committing himself in any way at present. I omit no opportunity that offers, or that I can create, for renewing to His Imperial Majesty the counsel not to put anything to risk.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

## No. 7

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 107.)

My Lord,

Paris, March 11, 1839

THE last despatches from Admiral Roussin, represent that the appearance of affairs at Constantinople is very warlike. The Ambassador states that the Grand Signor is intent upon attacking the Egyptians; and his counsellors, though differing in opinion from the Sultan, and a proponent of the course of a continuing hostility, dare not risk incurring the displeasure of his Highness by giving him advice to remain at peace. On the other hand, Ibrahim Pasha, it is stated, says he will be cautious not to be an aggressor, but that if attacked by the Turkish Army, he has no doubt of entirely defeating it, and that he shall in that case march upon Constantinople immediately.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

## No. 8

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Ponsonby

No. 38.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, March 13, 1839

HER Majesty's Government entirely approve the language which, as recorded in my despatch N. 28, you have used in advising the Sultan to avoid committing himself in any way at present, and I have to instruct your Excellency to press strongly on the Sultan, that while, on

the one hand, Great Britain would undoubtedly assist him to repel any attack on the part of Mehemet Ali; it would, on the other hand, be a different question if the war was begun by the Sultan.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

## No. 9

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 42.)

My Lord,

Therapia, February 26, 1839

THE Ottoman fleet has been brought out of port, and is getting ready to be employed, if wanted.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

## No. 10.

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 59.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 7, 1839

ON the 20th February, I was made acquainted with the following fact upon which you may rely; and I have to beg that you will not communicate it to Reschid Pasha, because he will suspect an individual of being the person who furnished me with it, who ought not to be exposed to such suspicion.

The Sultan sent a Hattı-Sherif to the Great Council, to the following purport:—

"Hafiz Pasha informs me that my Army is able to defeat the Egyptian Army in Syria. The Capudan Pasha tells me that my fleet is strong enough to defeat and destroy the Egyptian Fleet. It remains for you to be courageous, and to do your duty."

To this Hattı-Sherif the Great Council returned for answer, "that his Highness' Ministers would do everything in their power to act in conformity with the pleasure of their master."

Your Lordship knows that Hafiz Pasha is suspected of being inclined to Russian alliance, and that he is supposed to be extremely influenced by the flatteries said to be lavished on him by the Prussian officers in his district; and that those officers are accused of being instruments of Russia. I give no opinion on the truth of the above-mentioned suppositions and accusations, because I have not sufficient data to form one correctly.

The Capudan Pasha had been notoriously a warm friend of the Russians. He appeared by his conduct, whilst he was in close connection with the British officers belonging to Her Majesty's squadron, to have taken a wrong view of affairs, and not to be aware that he has reverted to his former connection, when it is recollected that he gave to the Russian Minister the false report as to the dispute between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt.

The Capudan Pasha must be perfectly cognizant of the formal remonstrances addressed to the Sublime Porte by the Russian Mission, against the adoption by the Porte, of any measures calculated to produce hostility between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt. Why has the Pasha stimulated the Sultan to war against Mehemet Ali, and at the same time engaged himself to M. de Bouténeff, not to employ British officers?

Your Lordship has been informed that M. de Bouténeff proposed to the Ministers of the Sultan, the project of an arrangement for the establishment of peace between His Imperial Majesty and the Pasha,



upon the basis of the surrender of Syria to His Majesty, and the establishment of the hereditary right of Mehmet Ali's family to the Government of Egypt. If that object is to be executed by fair means and persuasion, then the proceedings of the Russians may be consistent. If Mehmet Ali is to be forced into the arrangement, and Russia is to be a party to the coercion, it may account for the conduct of the Capudan Pasha and show him to be one of those secret agents by whose instrumentality Russia might seek to obtain a result which it is expedient for her to appear to have taken pains to prevent. There are many reasons why Russia may be now interested to abandon her policy of the *status quo*.

I have just received a note from the Monstehar Nizam Eddin saying that letters from Reschid Pasha contained some things that expressed a strong hope of a favourable issue to our negotiations with the British Ministers, and the Monstehar desired me to tell him what I knew on the subject, adding that the burthen and expence is intolerable to which the Porte is exposed, by the necessity for keeping up a vast army to guard against Mehmet Ali.

I replied, that I had not the least knowledge of the proceedings, nor of the intentions, of Her Majesty's Government.

I have taken every measure within my power to persuade the Sultan of the advantages to be derived from peace, and I have not as yet produced any effect. I have said to him, and I expect that he will not act at present against the Pasha of Egypt.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 11.

Mr. Milbanke to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 33.)

My Lord,

Vienna, March 28, 1839.

HEARING of the arrival of the messenger Hacı on his way to London, Prince Metternich sent for me to request that I would be the channel of communicating to your Lordship the substance of a report which he had just received from the Austrian Minister at Constantinople, relating to the threatening aspect which affairs had assumed in the Syrian and Turkish frontiers. His Excellency then read to me the despatch in question, as well as one addressed by M. de Bouténeff to the Russian Ambassador here, from which it appears, that after an unusual degree of activity manifested for some days by the Divan, a communication has been made to M. de Bouténeff, in which he was requested to give his opinion upon the position in which the Porte would find itself placed in the event of hostilities commencing with the troops of the Pasha of Egypt, as well as whether it would be expedient to make any communication to the Representatives of the other Powers resident at Constantinople, respecting the light in which such an event would be viewed by them.

M. de Bouténeff's answer is, as it appears to me, calculated to make the Sultan pause before he does himself up in the difficulties which Hafiz Pasha's plans seem likely to entail upon him; and as I thought it important that your Lordship should be made acquainted with the contents of it, I requested Prince Metternich to send a copy of it, for communication to your Lordship, to the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires in London by this opportunity, which he has promised to do in a private letter.

His object in sending for me, however, was to beg me to call the earnest attention of Her Majesty's Government to the necessity of at once putting a stop to these warlike ebullitions, by the united remonstrances of all the Great Powers; and he said that he was about to dispatch a messenger to Constantinople, with instructions to Baron Stürmer, to state to the Sultan and his Ministers, in the most positive terms, that Austria would not quietly allow events in the East to assume a character by which the peace

of Europe itself might be compromised. That if the Pasha of Egypt was the aggressor, as the Turkish Ministers wished to make out, the Sultan might count upon the assistance of the other Powers in repelling any attack. But, that if the approach of the Turkish Army to the Syrian frontier led to a violation of the established *status quo*, the Turkish Government must not be surprised if those Powers withdrew their countenance from the Sultan, and abandoned the Empire to its fate.

Prince Metternich then added, that as he conceived this to be a case which admitted of no delay, he trusted that your Lordship would not lose a moment in instructing Lord Ponsonby to concert with his colleagues the means of warding off the mischiefs which the present conduct of the Sultan was calculated to produce.

I have written this in great haste, being anxious not to delay the messenger longer than was necessary, but I have, I believe, correctly stated the substance of Prince Metternich's communication to me.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

No. 12.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 138.)

My Lord,

Paris, April 5, 1839.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to N. 136. inclusive.

A letter having appeared in the "Journal des Débats" of yesterday, bearing the date of the 19th of March, from Constantinople, stating that the hopes which had been entertained of maintaining peace in the East had vanished, and that a war with the Egyptians was considered to be inevitable,—I, this day, enquired at the Foreign Office whether the last despatches from Admiral Roussin confirmed this intelligence?

I was informed that no despatches of a very recent date had been received by the French Government from Constantinople, but that Count St. Aulaire had written from Vienna, that the Russian Ambassador at that Court had communicated to Prince Metternich a despatch from M. de Bouténeff, in which it is stated, that although he, M. de Bouténeff, had declared that the assistance to the Turkish Government stipulated in the Treaty of Unkar Skelessi could not be claimed if the Turks were the aggressors in a war against Mehmet Ali, the Sultan had not renounced his warlike intentions, and that it was most desirable that the Austrian Internuncio at Constantinople should be furnished with instructions to use the strongest language to deter the Sultan from carrying into execution those intentions.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 13.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby

No. 43.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, April 12, 1839.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna, reporting the substance of a conversation with Prince Metternich, upon the disposition manifested by the Porte to commence hostilities with Mehmet Ali. I also inclose a copy of a despatch from Prince Metternich to the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires in this country, inclosing a copy of the despatch from M. de Bouténeff to M. de Tatistcheff, referred to in Mr. Milbanke's despatch.



With reference to what is stated in these papers, I have to instruct your Excellency to continue to co-operate actively with your colleagues in endeavouring by all means in your power to prevail upon the Sultan to abstain from any hostile proceedings against Mehemet Ali.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

P.S.—I add a copy of a letter which I have addressed to M. Hummelauer, on returning to him Prince Metternich's despatch.

Inclosure 1 in No. 13.

(See No. 11, p. 6.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 13.

Prince Metternich to M. Hummelauer.

Mon cher Hummelauer,

Vienne, ce 28 Mars, 1839

LE passage d'un courrier de Lord Ponsonby par Vienne, m'a procuré le moyen de vous prier de rendre Mylord Palmerston attentif aux nouvelles preuves de mouvement moral du Divan contre Mehemet Ali, et de son dessein de venir aux mains avec lui en Syrie. Tout dans ce plan est faux et n'est pas provoqué par un sentiment de force, mais par de l'irritation qui le pousse à l'appauvrissement de la faiblesse.

J'ai prié Mr. Milbanke de passer chez moi et de bien vouloir se charger de rendre compte à son Cabinet, de la lecture que je lui ai fait faire, d'un rapport de notre Intermède et d'une dépêche de M. de Bouteneff à M. l'Ambassadeur de Russie près notre Cour. Parmi ces pièces, c'est la dépêche de M. de Bouteneff qui offre le plus d'intérêt, car c'est le premier acte qui a été appelé à entrer en scène.

Je prends sur moi de vous autoriser à donner confidentiellement connaissance au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de cette dépêche. Le rapport de M. de Sturmer en est le reflet, et je préfère les originaux aux copies.

Je ne perdrai pas un moment pour faire passer par courrier à l'Intermède l'ordre de passer son langage à celui de son collègue de Rome, en y ajoutant, que telle est non seulement la pensée de notre Cour, mais que l'Empereur des Romains et le Sultan ne mette pas en doute.

1<sup>re</sup> Que Sa Majesté Impériale dans un parfait accord avec ses Alliés, saura continuer à maintenir le Pacha d'Egypte dans une ligne de respect pour la foi jurée, et que s'il devait se permettre de la violer, il aurait contre lui l'Europe tout entière.

2<sup>e</sup> Que la paix de l'Empire Ottoman étant ainsi mis parfaitement à couvert et l'appui de l'Europe étant assuré à Sa Hautesse dans les affaires susdites, l'Autriche pour sa part, ne regarderait comme dégagée de tout engagement envers la Porte, si c'était elle qui commit la faute de lever l'agresseur.

Le rapport de M. de Bouteneff renferme la preuve que les instructions que possède cet Intermède sont conformes à cet esprit d'union politique. Ce que nous regarderions comme fort désirable, ce serait que Lord Ponsonby, par le moyen des directions analogues, et que, je ne forme pas de doute, doivent entrer dans les vues du Cabinet Britannique. Si Lord Ponsonby devait vouloir concerter ses démarches avec l'Intermède, et ses autres Collègues, la cause publique ne pourrait qu'y gagner.

J'aurai soin de vous faire passer incessamment la direction que j'adresserai à M. de Sturmer, et je m'en rapporte du reste, au compte que Mr. Milbanke ne manquera certainement de rendre au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat, de l'entretien que je viens d'avoir avec lui.

Recevez, &c.,  
(Signé) METTERNICH.

Inclosure 3 in No. 13.

Copie d'une dépêche de M. de Bouteneff à Son Excellence M. de Tatischeff, en date de Pera, le 2 Mars, 1839.

JE regrette d'avoir à informer votre Excellence, que depuis quelques jours il est malheureusement de nouveau question d'un conflit probable et prochain entre les troupes Ottomanes et Egyptiennes en Syrie, en dépit des assurances formelles qui m'avaient été données il y a environ un mois, et que j'ai eu l'honneur de porter de son tems à la connaissance de Votre Excellence. Voilà ce qu'à ce sujet notre premier Intermède a recueilli dans une entrevue à laquelle il fut expressément invité, il y a quelques jours, par Nouri Effendi et le Capitan Pacha. Ces fonctionnaires chargèrent le Prince Handjéri de m'annoncer par ordre du Sultan, que Hafis Pacha, Commandant de l'Armée du Taurus, dans un rapport adressé au Bash Vékal, alarmé par les mouvements de l'Armée Egyptienne, croyait à une attaque prochaine de leur part, et demandait, de son côté, l'autorisation de se rapprocher des frontières de la Syrie, pour se mettre en mesure de repousser l'agression du Général Egyptien, pour le cas où ses prévisions venaient à se réaliser. Que l'Intermède était disposé à approuver le plan d'opération de Hafis Pacha, qui était purement défensif, mais qu'avant de donner les ordres nécessaires, elle désirerait connaître comment cette détermination serait jugée en Europe, et particulièrement par la Cour Impériale, son amie alliée; et nommément, si ce mouvement des troupes Ottomanes amenait, contrairement aux intentions de Sa Hautesse, un conflit, la responsabilité en retomberait sur le Sultan? En fin, les Ministres Ottomans avaient ordre de me consulter, pour savoir si je pouvais faire de semblables communications aux Représentants des principales Puissances.

A cette interpellation imprévue, j'ai cru, dans ma réponse, opposer une entière franchise. En conséquence, j'ai chargé notre premier Intermède d'annoncer à Nouri Effendi et au Capitan Pacha, que n'ayant pas, et ne pouvant pas avoir, des instructions de mon Gouvernement, sur une question aussi grave d'où dépendait peut-être la paix de l'Orient, je ne manquerais pas de porter ces déclarations des Ministres Ottomans à la connaissance de la Cour Impériale, qu'en attendant j'exprimerais mon opinion simplement personnelle, et que pour complaire au désir qui m'avait été exprimé de la connaître, je n'hésitais point à soumettre à l'appréciation de Leurs Excellences, les observations suivantes:—

1<sup>re</sup> Que sans me permettre le jeu de la tactique et la portée stratégique du plan d'opération proposé par Hafis Pacha, il me semblait difficile, sinon impossible, d'admettre, que Mehemet Ali ait osé attaquer l'Armée Ottomane, un moment où ses troupes étaient épuisées par les fatigues de la campagne d'été, et que d'ailleurs, les divers ports considérés par la Cour de Constantinople comme étant sous le contrôle de la France, ne pouvaient pas être livrés à son pouvoir.

2<sup>e</sup> Que, sous le rapport de ces considérations, on ne saurait guère supposer que Mehemet Ali songe réellement à commencer aujourd'hui ses hostilités, après avoir reculé tout dernièrement encore devant les déclarations formelles de toutes les Puissances, de s'opposer à ses projets d'indépendance, car il ne peut pas douter de rencontrer aujourd'hui le même accord entre les Cabinets pour l'en empêcher.

3<sup>e</sup> Que le rapprochement des troupes Ottomanes des frontières de la Syrie, pourrait faire naître, bien que contrairement aux intentions de Sa



Hautesse, une collision, dont les suites seraient incalculables, mais dont l'effet immédiat serait la proclamation de l'indépendance de Méhémet Ali.

4°. Pour ce qui est enfin de la question de savoir sur qui pèserait la responsabilité d'un premier conflit, cela dépendra entièrement du parti que prendra la Porte. Tant qu'elle persévère dans l'attitude pacifique qu'elle a maintenue jusqu'ici, elle peut compter sur l'appui et la sollicitude des Puissances; mais la question serait jugée différemment, si la Porte autorisait des opérations militaires qui lui donneraient l'air de provoquer des hostilités.

5°. Quant aux sacrifices et aux fardeaux que le *status quo* impose à la Turquie, ils sont grands sans doute, mais ils seraient certainement bien légers, lorsqu'on les comparerait aux éventualités d'une guerre qui pourrait devenir générale et mettre en péril l'existence même de l'Empire Ottoman.

6°. Finalement que ce *status quo*, dont Sa Hautesse paraît si désireuse de sortir, n'est pas l'ouvrage de la Russie, qui, au contraire, n'a rien épargné pour l'empêcher; mais une fois établi par volonté du Sultan, les Puissances y ont vu la seule garantie possible de la conservation de la paix en Orient, qui est dans l'intérêt général, et sont toutes décidées à la maintenir.

7°. Quant à la demande, si les communications de la Porte pouvaient être faites aux Représentants des autres Grandes Puissances, j'engagerais les Ministres Ottomans à s'en expliquer avec eux avec une entière franchise, puisque tous les Cabinets étaient également intéressés au maintien de la paix.

Telles sont, M. l'Ambassadeur, les réflexions que j'ai cru devoir exposer comme mon opinion individuelle, à l'appréciation des Ministres Ottomans. Je désire ardemment que mes conseils soient écoutés et suivis, mais mon espoir est loin d'être une certitude; et des informations indirectes qui nous parviennent du camp de Hafiz Pacha, s'accordent toutes à annoncer la crise comme imminente.

Inclosure 4 in No. 13.

Viscount Palmerston to M. de Hummelauer.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 10, 1839

I HAVE the honour to return to you herewith, the letter from Prince Metternich, and the copy of a despatch from M. de Bouteneff included in your letter of the 24th instant and to offer to you my best thanks for their communication. You may assure Prince Metternich, that instructions have already and frequently been given to Lord Ponsonby, to endeavour by all means to dissuade the Porte from commencing hostilities against Mehemet Ali; and that Lord Ponsonby has continued, whenever circumstances required it, and especially of late, to carry those instructions into execution. I shall not fail, however, to write again to his Lordship upon this important matter by the monthly messenger, who is about to set out, and Her Majesty's Government would fain hope that the united representations of the Representatives of all the Great Powers will succeed in persuading the Sultan to remain quiet.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 14.

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 67.)

My Lord,

Therapia, March 18, 1839.

I INCLOSE copy of a message I received this day from the Sublime Porte, and my reply to it.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure in No. 14.

Lord Ponsonby to M. E. Pisaní.

Sir,

Therapia, March 18, 1839

I HAVE received your note containing the message from his Excellency Nouri Effendi, in the following words.

"D'après les dépêches reçues à la Porte, de la part de Hafiz Pacha, de Malatia, écrites il y a environ vingt jours, un corps très-considérable de troupes Egyptiennes, sous le commandement de Kourschid Pacha, est arrivé à Adana, tandis que le corps d'armée à Alep reçoit tous les jours des renforts. La distance d'Adana au camp de Hafiz Pacha, est d'environ 60 lieues. Cet état de choses donne beaucoup à penser à Hafiz Pacha, qui a été conseillé par les officiers Prussiens employés dans son armée, de lever le camp, et d'aller occuper certains points militaires situés entre l'emplacement du camp et Adana. Cette mesure est jugée nécessaire par les dits officiers. Les dépêches de Hafiz Pacha ont donné lieu à la tenue d'un Conseil. La Porte ne sait pas quelle réponse elle devrait faire à Hafiz Pacha, qui attend ses ordres. Elle se trouve dans le cas de prendre, en cette circonstance, l'avis de son Excellence Lord Ponsonby. Je le prie de me faire savoir quelle serait, dans sa manière de voir, la meilleure réponse à faire à Hafiz Pacha."

To the foregoing, I request you will reply, in my name, that I am very sensible of the honour done me by the Ottoman Government in desiring my counsel, and that nothing would give me more satisfaction than to be able to prove my attachment to the interests of the Sublime Porte, by offering advice that might be of service, but that I value too much the interest of the Sublime Porte to venture to speak upon a military question, being myself ignorant of the art of war; and the question proposed to me is one that belongs exclusively to military men to determine. But I will, with the permission of his Excellency, take this occasion to renew what I have often and often said, with relation to the political part of the important matters of which this military question forms a portion, and again beg of the Sublime Porte to weigh most deliberately its decisions, and to make prudence and caution its guides. A false step might occasion irremediable mischief; and it seems to me, that the Sublime Porte can hardly be at this moment fully and completely acquainted with the precise situation of affairs in all those parts of the world where what is done, or doing, or to be done, must have a powerful action upon the welfare of the Sublime Porte.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY



## No. 15.

*Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 13.)*

(No. 12.)

(Extract.)

*Cairo, March 11, 1839*

THE Pasha may be expected here on or before the 17th instant, which is the 1st of the Turkish month of Muharem.

The Pasha's iron steamer left this for Esasonan, five days ago, in order to convey him to Cairo.

Abbas Pasha, who is intrusted with the Government, during the absence of Mehmet Ali, has been alarmed by the reports which have been received from Constantinople of the warlike preparations of the Sultan, which are said to be directed against Syria, and in consequence, wrote to press the return of the Viceroy to Cairo.

Orders have been given, and are in execution for getting the Pasha's fleet ready for sea. A considerable quantity of arms has been sent to Syria, and it is supposed that 4,000 troops, which have lately arrived at Alexandria from the interior, are for the same destination.

## No. 16.

*Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 13.)*

(No. 13.)

My Lord,

*Cairo, March 11, 1839.*

THE Riala Bey, who arrived here on the 14th of February, left this on the 1st instant for Alexandria, which place he left on the 7th instant for Constantinople, on board of the Sultan's steamer.

I saw the Riala Bey different times during his stay in Cairo, and he expressed much desire to see Mehmet Ali, but feared that he should not be able to await his return to Cairo.

I have not been able to learn that the Riala Bey came here with any ostensible mission; and conclude, that the object of his coming to this country, was merely to observe and to report the result of his observations.

He did not however appear to me to be a fit person for such a mission; and although the different public establishments here were ordered to be open for his inspection, and the chiefs of them were directed to afford to him all facilities and information, he did not evince any desire (to visit) them.

The Riala Bey was attended by an officer of the Egyptian Navy, and lodged in the palace of Houssein Pasha in this city.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

## No. 17

*Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 14)*

(No. 71.)

(Extract.)

*Therapia, March 19, 1839*

WHAT I am about to report may have connection with what I had the honour to communicate in my despatch No. 59, to your Lordship, and I entertain no doubt of its general truth. I got it from a Mussulman who has made me acquainted with many facts

"Hafiz Pasha and the Prussian officers are incessant in their demands and cries to the Porte to march against the Egyptians, alleging that there will never again be so favourable an opportunity for driving them out of Syria. The Russians have been informed of the last reports from Hafiz and the Prussian officers, and they support them, and renew the most splendid offers of succour in case of need. The reports were received almost at the same hour with another report from Reschid Pasha, in which it is said that there is nothing to be expected from the Courts of London or Paris. The two reports have given force to the desire to attack Ibrahim, before his father can return from his journey; and it is almost certain that on the 17th instant, a resolution existed of following the advice of Hafiz Pasha and the suggestions of the Prussian officers with his army. Reliance is placed upon the aid of the Russians in case of defeat."

Your Lordship will understand, that when I say, I believe in the general truth of what is stated, I mean, that I believe what is stated has taken place in the Seraglio. I do not mean to say that I or even the Ottoman Government will act in the way described, for on that point I give no opinion.

I have to state from some other sources of information, that the Russian Dragoman has been continually with Nouri Effendi, and the Prussian Dragoman also; that the Austrian Dragoman has not. An opinion prevails with several people, that the Russian and Prussian agents have been earnestly, but covertly, pushing on the Turks to war with the Egyptians. It is my own opinion, that such conduct would be consistent with the best policy Russia could adopt for the attainment of her ends.

## No. 18

*Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 14.)*

(No. 72.)

My Lord,

*Therapia, March 20, 1839*

AT the moment of the departure of the post, I have received a private letter from my friend the Baron de Stürmer, and think it right to send an extract from it for the information of Her Majesty's Government, as to the opinion of that gentleman.

The Internuncio's letter is dated Pera, the 19th of March, and runs thus:—"Les bruits de guerre ici se consolident de plus en plus; des lettres de Malatia, du 4 Mars, disent que Hafiz Pacha allait commencer son mouvement pour se porter en avant. Dans ce cas, un conflit paraît inévitable; et quand je songe aux conséquences qu'il y peut avoir si les Turcs sont battus, j'en frissonne d'avance. Ce n'est pas aux conseils des Puissances Etrangères qu'ils devront s'en prendre, car si je ne me trompe, ils ont été unanimes en faveur de la paix. Les Russes, loin de rester en arrière, ont adressé à la Porte les plus vives représentations. M. de Bouteneff m'a lu un travail qu'il a fait remettre à Nouri Effendi, et j'en j'en suis sûr, mérite votre approbation, si vous le connaissez. Je pourrais, si vous étiez curieux de voir cette pièce, vous lire un extrait que j'en ai fait pour mon Gouvernement."

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY



No. 19.

*The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 15.)*

(No. 28.)

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 1, 1839.*

WITH reference to the apparent probability that war may break out between Turkey and Egypt, and to the desire of the Sultan to reduce his refractory vassal to better subjection, I have to report to your Lordship that Count Nesselrode tells me he is confident the Sultan will maintain peace, and resign the hostile intentions he cherishes against Mehemet Ali, provided the Russian and British Ambassadors at Constantinople hold to the Divan the same language on that subject.

His Excellency says that Lord Ponsonby, last year, inflamed the Sultan's desire and hope of overcoming the Pasha of Egypt. I understood Count Nesselrode to allude to the negotiations upon the Commercial Treaty which Her Majesty concluded last year with the Porte, and which I thought it needless to discuss; and I only stated to his Excellency how assured I was that my Government would spare no effort to induce the Sultan to maintain peace.

My colleagues here are firmly convinced that it is the sincere and earnest desire of the Emperor that Turkey should remain in perfect tranquillity; and I see no reason to differ from them in that opinion.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) CLANRICARDE

No. 20.

*Viscount Palmerston to Lord William Russell*

(No. 63.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, April 16, 1839*

I HAVE to instruct your Lordship to state to Baron Werther, that Her Majesty's Government have been informed that the Prussian officers employed with the Turkish Army under Hafiz Pasha in Asia Minor, have united with that Pasha in urging the Porte to march against the Egyptian forces, alleging that so favourable an opportunity of driving the latter out of Syria cannot be expected to occur again.

Her Majesty's Government is convinced that if the Prussian officers have acted in the manner reported, they have not followed the instructions which they have received from their own Government.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 21

*Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 20.)*

(No. 48.)

My Lord,

*Berlin, April 24, 1839*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 16th instant, No. 63, by which I am instructed to state to Baron Werther, that the Prussian officers employed with the Turkish Army under Hafiz Pasha, have urged the Porte to march against the Egyptian forces; I beg to say

17

that having made that statement, Baron Werther read me an extract from a letter written by Colonel Fischer, in which he had endeavoured to prove to the Porte that the commencement of hostilities must lead to the most disastrous result; and his Excellency appeared to be much irritated at any suspicion of having departed from their instructions, being thrown upon the Prussian officers at Constantinople. Baron Werther has written to the Prussian Minister in London, to desire him to communicate the substance of this letter to your Lordship.

There is such want of unity of thought, language, action, and policy, in Prussian diplomacy, that I am never surprised when I hear that the diplomatic agents have departed from their instructions. But I am surprised when I hear this accusation made against the military agents; however in this case, it is possible that the accusation may not be without foundation. There are four officers who form the Prussian Military Mission at Constantinople: Colonels Fischer and Flnke, distinguished men, on whom perfect reliance may be placed, and Colonels Molke and Muhlbach, of whom I know little, but in whom I have no confidence. These last officers are, I believe, at the Head-Quarters of Hafiz Pasha, and it is very possible that they may have urged him to march against the Egyptian Army.

In the conversation I had this morning with Baron Werther, I told him, he would do well to recall Messieurs Molke and Muhlbach. He said he would consult the Minister of War.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) WILLIAM RUSSELL

No. 22

*Viscount Palmerston to Lord William Russell.*

(No. 74.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, May 2, 1839.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 48, reporting the substance of a conversation with Baron Werther respecting the Prussian officers in the Turkish service, I have to instruct your Lordship to explain to Baron Werther, that the statements which had reached Her Majesty's Government, and on which my despatch No. 63 was founded, did not relate to the Prussian officers at Constantinople, but to the Prussian officers in Asia Minor, who are with Hafiz Pasha, the Commander of the army which is in front of the forces of Ibrahim Pasha.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 23

*Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 29.)*

(No. 76, Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Therapia, March 23, 1839.*

I ENCLOSE a copy of M. de Boutenoff's instructions to the Russian Legation. It appears rather that Russia desires to have ostensible documents to justify her cooperation with the other Powers, or that Russia has reverted to her old policy, and will maintain the *status quo*. I am sure of the action of Russian agents to excite to war as I before stated to your Lordship.

I enclose also a note to me from the Baron de Sturmer, in reply to my answer to his letter, dated 20th March, from which I sent an extract in my despatch No. 72.

The amicable counsel given by such a powerful friend as the Emperor of Russia, to such a feeble friend as the Sublime Porte, ought to be persuasive.

F

Nouri Effendi sent me a message on the 21st instant, indicating that my advice on this subject would be followed. I do not believe it had much weight, but I think there will be nothing done at present to disturb the peace.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

**Inclosure 1 in No. 23**

*Copie d'une Instruction très-confidentielle au Prince Handjéri, en date du 17<sup>ème</sup> Mars, 1839; remise à Nouri Effendi le 17<sup>ème</sup> Mars.*

J'ai voué l'attention la plus sérieuse aux explications confidentielles et spontanées que vous avez été dans le cas de recueillir dans l'entrevue qui vous a été expressément assignée hier par leurs Excellences le Capitain Pacha et Nouri Effendi, et que vous avez été chargé par leurs Excellences de me rapporter, en y demandant une prompte réponse de ma part.

Ces explications sont d'une si haute importance par leur objet, que j'ai préféré y répondre par écrit, afin d'y mettre plus de clarté. Je crois devoir en reproduire ici le résumé tel qu'il se trouve exposé dans votre rapport par écrit.

D'après les explications fournies par les deux Ministres susmentionnés, et d'après le contenu du rapport officiel du Commandant-en-Chef Hafiz Pacha, dont leurs Excellences ont bien voulu me donner amicalement connaissance par votre entremise, on peut en conclure ce qui suit.

Que Hafiz Pacha, alarmé des mouvements faits par l'Armée Egyptienne en Syrie, pour se rapprocher des frontières respectives, croit avoir lieu de redouter une agression brusque et prochaine de la part d'Ibrahim Pacha, et représente en conséquence, la nécessité de faire marcher en avant l'Armée Ottomane vers le même point de frontières, afin d'occuper une position plus avantageuse, tant pour la sécurité de son armée, que pour empêcher l'invasion imprévue des possessions de Sa Hautesse.

Que de son côté, la Sublime Porte appréciant la force et la justice des motifs allégués par Hafiz Pacha, et considérant en général les fardeaux et les sacrifices de tout genre, qui résultent pour elle de l'état de choses actuel, paraît disposée à l'autoriser à exécuter le plan d'opération qu'il propose, mais sans vouloir nullement prendre l'initiative d'une agression contre l'Armée Egyptienne.

Que néanmoins, malgré l'urgence de ces motifs, la Sublime Porte, guidée par ses dispositions bienveillantes, et par ses égards envers les Puissances ses amis, qui n'ont cessé de manifester leur sollicitude pour le bien-être de l'Empire Ottoman, comme pour le maintien de la tranquillité générale de l'Orient, voudrait connaître de quelle manière une pareille détermination serait envisagée en Europe; et notamment, si les mouvements projetés de l'armée de Hafiz Pacha, pour se rapprocher des frontières de la Syrie, venaient, contre l'intention de la Porte, à amener un conflit entre les Armées Ottomane et Egyptienne, cette opération de Hafiz Pacha pourrait-elle être ou non, regardée ensuite comme une espèce de provocation à la guerre, et d'agression de la part de la Sublime Porte?

Ce sont là, si j'ai bien compris, les principales ouvertures qui vous ont été adressées par les deux Ministres. Leurs Excellences ont ajouté, que Sa Hautesse, par une suite de ses sentiments de confiance et d'amitié inaltérables envers Sa Majesté l'Empereur, son auguste ami et allié, avait bien voulu leur faire l'ordre de s'expliquer en premier lieu et sans réserve, avec le Représentant de Sa Majesté Impériale, et de connaître mon opinion sur ces faits, avant de prendre les déterminations ultérieures qui lui paraîtront dans sa haute sagesse, les plus analogues aux conjonctures.

Je n'ai pu qu'être pénétré de ce nouveau témoignage de la confiance bien-fondée que Sa Hautesse le Sultan se plaît à placer dans l'amitié et la sollicitude éprouvées de Sa Majesté l'Empereur.

J'ai été infiniment flatté aussi de celle que Sa Hautesse daigne accorder aux dispositions personnelles qui m'animent. Il est donc de mon devoir de répondre avec autant d'empressement que de franchise, à l'interpellation qui m'est adressée.

Mais ma réponse ne saurait être que préalable et incomplète, et uniquement fondée sur ma manière de voir individuelle; car il s'entend, que pour donner une réponse positive et formelle sur une question tellement importante, qu'on peut la regarder comme une question de paix ou de guerre, je dois nécessairement attendre des instructions de mon auguste Cour à la suite du compte que je vais lui rendre sans délai, les explications que je viens de recevoir de la part des Ministres de Sa Hautesse.

Non-seulement je ne possède pas maintenant, et je ne pouvais même avoir l'instructions de ma Cour qui puissent me servir de guide, puisque la Sublime Porte ne m'a jusqu'ici fait aucune ouverture de nature à m'obliger à demander des instructions sur les questions exposées plus haut; mais je prévois que le Ministère Impérial n'approuvera pas la surprise en recevant aujourd'hui de ma part, une demande semblable. En effet, dans mes derniers rapports adressés il y a à peine un mois, j'étais rendu compte à ma Cour des explications rassurantes et officielles qui m'avaient été données alors par son Excellence Nouri Effendi, et par lesquelles ce Ministre avait formellement démenti les bruits répandus sur les préparatifs et les projets d'hostilité de la Sublime Porte, en protestant de sa ferme détermination d'exécuter avec nous le traité qui pourroit prévenir un conflit avec le Pacha d'Egypte. Le Ministère Impérial ne pourra donc être surpris en apprenant ce changement de position de la Sublime Porte, sans qu'il ait été motivé par aucun changement apparent dans l'état des choses depuis un mois.

Mais en attendant les instructions que je vais demander à mon auguste Cour, je n'hésite pas, puisque la Sublime Porte veut bien consulter mon opinion personnelle, à l'exposer ici avec une pleine franchise, en prenant pour guide la connaissance que j'ai des intentions invariables ment bienveillantes et loyales de mon auguste Cour, ainsi que les dispositions personnelles qui m'animent pour les intérêts et la gloire de Sa Hautesse le Sultan.

Sans me permettre nullement de juger des considérations militaires et de l'opportunité des opérations militaires, au Hafiz Pacha dans son rapport, j'avoue que je ne saurais attribuer à Méhémet Ali, que puissent être ses arrière-pensées et ses projets audacieux pour l'avenir, ou, dans le moment actuel, songer sérieusement à une agression imminente contre l'Armée Ottomane, ou à une invasion des possessions de Sa Hautesse. Les informations les plus récentes que nous avons de l'Egypte ne fournissent au moins aucun indice à ce sujet. Méhémet Ali n'est pas encore de retour au Caire de son voyage dans le Sennar; on parle même de l'arrivée prochaine d'Ibrahim Pacha à Alexandrie, mais on ne peut nullement des projets d'agression de sa part.

Mais en mettant de côté ces informations, comment croire que le Pacha qui s'est vu il y a quelques mois, exposé aux remontrances énergiques et unanimes de toutes les principales Puissances de l'Europe, dont l'écueil et la fermeté de langage ont été si dignes de le faire hautement renoncer au projet de pousser son indépendance, comment croire, dis-je, que Méhémet Ali ait aujourd'hui l'audace et la présomption d'aller bien au-delà de simples projets amplement proclamés, — savoir, d'oser attaquer en pleine paix, et sans provocation, l'armée et les possessions de son souverain légitime en l'absence de l'Empereur? Cette supposition me paraît, je le répète, inadmissible dans les conjonctures actuelles.

Pour ce qui concerne le plan proposé par Hafiz Pacha, de faire marcher l'Armée Ottomane vers les frontières menacées, selon lui, par l'attitude de l'Armée Egyptienne, je puis encore moins me permettre d'en parler, sous le point de vue militaire, étant pas juge en de telles matières, et ne connaissant nullement le détail des situations respectives.

Mais c'est avec une vive satisfaction que j'ai vu tant dans les assurances données par Leurs Excellences le Capitain Pacha et Nouri Effendi,



que dans le rapport de Hafiz Pacha, qu'il est bien loin de l'intention de la Sublime Porte de vouloir commettre aucun acte d'agression. Toutefois, dans les dispositions actuelles des deux parties, n'est-il pas possible, et même trop vraisemblable, que ce rapprochement des deux armées en présence l'une de l'autre, pourrait entraîner d'un moment à l'autre, une collision involontaire mais presque inévitable, dont les conséquences pourraient devenir aussi incalculables qu'elles le furent ?

La première et la plus probable de ces conséquences serait, sans doute, comme je l'avais fait observer, si y a un mois, à son Excellence Nouri Effendi l'indépendance par laquelle Méhemet Ali se hâterait de procéder sans tarder. Il y a longtemps qu'on attend pour cela qu'un prétexte vienne servir de à la Sublime Porte à vouloir le lui fournir. Les Puissances amies de la Sublime Porte ont sans doute déclaré qu'elles ne reconnaissent pas l'indépendance de Méhemet Ali, mais une fois qu'elle serait proclamée et serait devenue un fait accompli, ce fait ne serait-il pas mis au vif et imposerait une crise à l'Empire Ottoman ? Quant à la question de savoir sur qui retomberait la responsabilité de l'agression, l'acte de violence ou la collision sus-mentionnée, n'étant pas à déceler, c'est un point qui me paraît devoir dépendre du parti que prendra aujourd'hui la Sublime Porte elle-même. Si elle continue à persévérer dans l'attitude prudente et pacifique qu'elle a su maintenir jusqu'à ce moment avec tant de sagesse, et tant d'efforts dignes d'éloges, il est clair que la responsabilité d'un tel conflit éventuel rejaillirait alors tout entière sur le Pacha d'Égypte, en assurant à la juste cause de Sa Hautesse l'intérêt et l'appui unanimes de toutes les Puissances amies.

Mais cette question serait jugée tout différemment, si la Sublime Porte, en ayant l'attitude d'ennemi, marchait ses armées à la rencontre de l'Armée Égyptienne, avant ainsi en quelque sorte l'apparence de vouloir aller au-devant d'une provocation hostile. Dans ce cas, il n'est donné à personne de prévoir ni de prévenir les chances, ni encore moins d'en arrêter les conséquences futures.

Enfin, pour ce qui est des fardeaux et des sacrifices que l'état de choses actuel fait subir à la Sublime Porte, personne n'est plus disposé que le Représentant de Sa Majesté Impériale, à reconnaître tout ce qu'il a de pénible et de douloureux pour le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse, comme personne ne se féliciterait plus vivement de voir la juste cause du Sultan appuyée d'un plein succès, si un tel résultat pouvait avoir lieu sans risque et sans péril pour l'Empire Ottoman; mais qu'il me soit permis de vous dire que ces choses actuelles, toute onéreuse qu'elle soit, ne sont-elles pas au moins des choses positives et certaines, au lieu que la guerre, si elle se déclare, telle qu'il faut s'y attendre avec un tel adversaire, Méhemet Ali ? Et si on ne passe au lieu de succès à une guerre, on se voit accompagnée de revers, comme ça a été la preuve de la guerre de 1820, qui ne peut pas admettre d'être mise en péril, comme alors le serait l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman, mais aussi de plus anéantir tout espoir de paix durable en Europe ?

En résumé, si on a le langage de vérité et de franchise à l'égard du *status quo*, il peut m'être permis de rappeler que jamais la Russie n'a voulu ni voulu ni voulu à amener le relâchement de ce *status quo* que la Sublime Porte trouve maintenant si odieux et pénible pour elle. Mais un jour, elle fut établie et sanctionnée par la volonté du Sultan, la Cour Impériale, après avoir ouvertement consacré ses efforts et sa puissance à la cause de Sa Hautesse, n'ayant plus hésité à s'adresser à son couronnement avec toutes les Grandes Puissances, pour insister sur le maintien de ce *status quo* comme devenu à la fois un gage de sécurité pour l'Empire Ottoman, et de paix pour l'Europe entière. Si maintenant cet état de choses en était venu à un tel point de crise, qu'il dût être modifié de manière ou d'autre, sans compromettre toutefois les deux conditions ci-dessus énoncées, intimement liées entr'elles, ce n'est qu'à la sagesse de Sa Hautesse, et à la sollicitude commune et réciproque des Puissances amies de la Sublime Porte, qu'il peut appartenir d'y aviser; mais sans doute ce n'est pas au moyen d'une collision brusque et spontanée entre les Armées Ottomane et Égyptienne en Syrie, que ce bon résultat pourrait être obtenu.

Telle est l'opinion personnelle par laquelle, dans ma conviction intime, je n'hésite pas à répondre à l'interpellation que Votre Excellence le Capitain Pacha et Nouri Effendi vous ont chargée, d'ordre du Sultan, de m'adresser. En les priant de soumettre respectueusement ma manière de voir aux hautes et sages lumières de Sa Hautesse, j'ose me flatter qu'elle daignera en tout cas rendre justice aux sentimens qui m'ont guidé. J'ose également espérer qu'elle se plaira, par une suite des intimes liens d'amitié et d'alliance qui l'unissent à Sa Majesté l'Empereur mon Auguste Souverain, me mettre à même de faire connaître plus tard à la Sublime Porte, et en temps opportun, la réponse de ma Cour au Rapport que je vais lui adresser par exprès, sur l'objet des présentes explications.

Vous voudrez bien, mon Prince, faire part du contenu de la présente à Son Excellence Nouri Effendi, et même lui en laisser confidentiellement la copie.

Incluse 2 in No. 23

Baron Stürmer to Lord Ponsonby

My Lord,

Péra, ce 22 Mars, 1839

JE n'ai reçu que hier au soir votre billet d'avant-hier au soir. J'y ai vu avec un extrême plaisir, *that you state that nothing will be done at present; car pour moi et les autres, cela est certainement quitté, et c'est dans ce sens que j'en ai refusé à mon Gouvernement par la poste d'avant-hier. Quoiqu'il en soit, je pense comme vous, that it is impossible things can long remain in the position in which they now are.* J'espère en causer avec vous, Mylord, plus amplement, de vive voix, lorsque nous nous reverrons. En attendant, je m'empresse de vous envoyer le travail de Boutébell, puisque vous m'avez témoigné le désir d'en faire connaissance. Ce n'est pas l'extrait dont j'ai eu l'honneur de vous parler, mais la pièce même telle qu'elle a été présentée à Nouri Effendi. Je pense que vous en serez content. Le langage qu'y tient le Ministre de Russie, me paraît prouver du moins que cette Puissance veut la paix aussi franchement que nous, et que nous n'avons pas à craindre qu'elle attise le feu pour amener des événemens qui ne pourraient profiter qu'à elle seule.

Veuillez agréer, &c.,

STURMER

No. 24

Reschid Pasha to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 26.)

Monsieur le Vicomte,

1, Bryanston Square, 26 Avril, 1839

IL y a quelques jours j'ai eu l'honneur de demander à votre Excellence qu'elle voudrait bien me communiquer le plus tôt possible, le projet de Traité contre les prétentions d'indépendance de Méhemet Ali.

Sachant bien que vous n'avez pas perdu de vue cette affaire, je ne vous la rappellerai pas aujourd'hui si je n'avais pas absolument besoin de m'absenter pendant quelques semaines; ce qui me serait facile après avoir envoyé ce projet à Constantinople.

Si vous pensez, M. le Vicomte, que la confection de ce document dût entraîner quelque délai, je vous serais infiniment obligé de me le faire

P.

savoir, pour que, suivant votre réponse, je diffère ou avance le voyage dont je vous ai parlé.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,  
*Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de la Sublime Porte,*  
*Ambassadeur Extraordinaire,*  
 (Signé) RECHID.

No. 25.

*Viscount Palmerston to Rechid Pasha.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 6, 1839.*  
 I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's letter of the 26th of April, requesting that I would communicate to you, as soon as possible, the draft of Treaty to oppose to the pretensions to independence advanced by Mehemet Ali, and I have to acquaint your Excellency that I propose to send it to you in the course of a few days.  
 I am, &c.  
 (Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 26.

*Rechid Pasha to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 29.)*

(Confidentielle.)  
 Monsieur le Vicomte, *1, Brynstone Square, 27 Avril, 1839.*  
 METANT toujours fait un devoir de tenir votre Excellence au courant de la tenue de nos affaires, j'ai l'honneur de vous annoncer aujourd'hui l'honneur de lui annoncer que les craintes qui ont existé sur le commencement des hostilités entre l'armée de Sa Hauteur et les troupes de Méhémet Ali, sont très-affaiblies par la teneur des dépêches que j'ai reçues aujourd'hui même; la paix semble désormais assurée pour cette année.

Je suis, &c.,  
*Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de la Sublime Porte,*  
*Ambassadeur Extraordinaire.*  
 (Signed) RECHID

No. 27.

*Viscount Palmerston to Rechid Pasha.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 6, 1839.*  
 I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's letter of the 27th of April, acquainting me that the tenour of the despatches which you had on that day received, led you to imagine that the apprehensions of hostilities between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali were much diminished, and that it was thought that peace would probably be maintained during the present year; and I hasten to express to your Excellency the sincere satisfaction which Her Majesty's Government have derived from this intelligence.

I am, &c.,  
 (Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 28.

*Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 27.)*

(No. 88.)

My Lord,

*Therapia, April 6, 1839.*

THE messenger who was the bearer of your Lordship's instructions to No. 35 inclusive, arrived late on the 4th instant. That evening I sent for translation into the Turkish language, the substance of your Lordship's communication to me—that you were greatly with Rechid Pasha on the principle of the proposed Treaty, and employed in preparing the details, and your other arguments. I attended to the matter as I could use, to induce the Porte to abandon warlike policy for the present. I pleaded for delay, knowing that I should do greater harm than good by calling for more.

I adopted this mode of communication because it is the only way to ensure a correct report being made by his Ministers to the Sultan, of my statements; and the report has been sent this day to His Imperial Majesty.

The Mousterhar Nouri Effendi has replied to my communication, "that the Sublime Porte could not be satisfied with the Treaty, because it is not the Treaty that Rechid Pasha wished to make; that the Porte desired to destroy the *status quo*, and a Treaty proposed by Lord Palmerston not only leaves it in full force, but also binds the Porte not to take advantage in future of any favourable occasion that may offer that Lord Palmerston's Treaty without extraordinary circumstances should be violated, and that he, and shall order wars against Mehemet Ali, if he or his successor (of his family) shall declare independence, or commit any aggression."

Nouri Effendi has promised to give a written answer to my communication as soon as he receives the Sultan's commands. I will deliver the messenger that it may be transmitted to your Lordship immediately.

Tahar Pasha, Chief of the First Military Division, arrived yesterday in the steamer for Trebizond, from whence he goes to the headquarters of Hafiz Pasha. He was dispatched after the Treaty in question had been submitted in the first instance to the consideration of Nouri Effendi and the Capudan Pasha; and secondly, to the consideration of the Council. I have reason to fear the orders of Tahar Pasha are not of a nature to please your Lordship.

I believe that M. de Boutonell has been seriously endeavouring to prevent war; the Internuncio has done the same, and the French Ambassador also; and I have continued unceasingly to recommend to the Sultan to delay at least, if not to abstain altogether from everything that may commit him in a perilous enterprise.

I have, &c.,  
 (Signed) PONSONBY

No. 29.

*Mr Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 29.)*

No. 10.

My Lord,

*Beyrout, March 14, 1839.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that the forced conscription is again in operation in Syria.

The levy to be raised is given out as 9,000 men,—a number, small as it may appear, the country will have great difficulty in supplying, so great has been the preceding drain on the population.



By advices from Damascus to the 9th instant, Ibrahim Pasha left that place on the 5th, for the north of Syria, where his immediate presence is said to be required.

Rumour adds, that the insurgents of the ranges of the Taurus have been joined by the Sultan's troops on the Aleppo frontier.

At the Ledges things remain in statu quo.

Up to this day, the authorities here remain without instructions relative to the Commercial Treaty, and the sale of the monopolies proceeds. In this neighbourhood all is tranquil.

We hear to-day that Ibrahim Pasha will remain for the present at Homs or Hamah. His Highness is making military preparations in consequence of advices received from the north. Solymán Pacha is about leaving Acre to join Ibrahim Pasha.

Affairs at the Lodges are re resorted as to a very distressed state, notwithstanding the conscription has been remitted, and a free promise of pardon given to every body.

I have, &c.  
Signed) N MOORE

PS.—Solyman Pasha is expected to pass near Beyrout this day, on his way to Aleppo, on urgent military affairs.

Solyman Pasha arrived at Beyrout on Saturday evening, and left the morning for Hama and Hamah. His Excellency spoke primarily of the probability of an approaching conflict with the Sultan's forces in the north, and the troops are all ordered to be in a constant readiness.

N. M.

(Extract.)

THE Pasha declares that he will not be the aggressor, but that if the Sultan does attack him, he will follow him up, and take entire possession of Orfa and Diarbekir, and which nothing will then oblige him to relinquish. He stated so this morning in my presence, in that of the Consuls-General of Russia and Tuscany, and of Boghos Bey.

The Pasha added, that he hoped the Sultan would not be so impolitic as to attack him. I am, however, of opinion that the Pasha was not sincere in his hope; and that he does desire a war with the Porte, provided the Sultan were the aggressor.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 16.)*

(No. 99)

My Lord,

Therapia, April 22, 1839.

IN No. 88, I reported that, in accordance with your Lordship's instructions, I urged with the Porte, as arguments against a breach between the Porte and the Pasha of Egypt, the facts that, in 1868, with Rich. & P. and on the principle of a Treaty, and were occupied in preparing the details, &c., &c. I also reported Nouri Effendi's answer, and his promise to give me a further reply in writing, after he had received the commands of the Sultan, for which I would detain the messenger.

I endeavoured to gain from Nouri Effendi some knowledge of the Treaty to which your Lordship alluded, in order to be better enabled to execute my instructions, but Nouri Effendi's answers were unsatisfactory. On the 12th, he said, "The Treaty is rather mischievous than useful to the Porte. We must take time to consider it." He promised to inform me what was decided upon.

The 13th, I acquainted Nouri that a French merchant had talked of a Treaty of Alliance being in negotiation at London, between England and Turkey. Nouri said he must have learnt it from the French Embassy as France was engaged in the affair.

On 15 Feb. Nour proposed to give me confidentially a copy of what he had intended to receive from Reza & Pasad and on the 16th he sent me a copy of the Treaty which is enclosed.

Your Lordship has ascribed the Treaty a motive that should induce the Porte to abstain from hostilities. I thought it my duty to state how far it interacted those who advised the Porte to reject it (although I had not been directed by you to do so, and did not know its contents from your letter) - and in this impression, I began, on the 18th, a discussion which I have continued up to the present time, - sending him reasonings, written in Turkish, to be submitted to the Sultan.

On the 21st Nov. said he agreed with me in many points and differed from me in others but on the whole he was in agreement that the Treaty would be of any use to the interests of the Porte which had not for its object the destruction of Mehemet Ali and therefore the Porte would not make any difficulty.

I refer to that the British Government could not be expected to exhibit in such a manner its lower powers than it was able to expect. That Her Majesty's Government asked the Porte for nothing but on the contrary gave the Porte by this Treaty a real security against any further attacks made upon the Pasha of Egypt. That the security thus afforded would enable the Sultan to be exposed to a real benefit of a peaceful and untroubled existence.

My second valued review is a very sweet, gentle, but no less responsible, review which tells that as well as I make a report to be sent to the student together with my dissertation.

[illegible]

I have not received from the Porte the reply which was promised to me for communication to the Government of the United States, and for which I had been assured that I have earned from other quarters enough to send me some money, but no hostile movement will be made at pre-

sent by the Porte, and I therefore dispatch him with that statement, but your ladies may well observe that I do not speak positively because a collision may at any time take place when hostile parties are in juxtaposition, as is at present the case.

It appears to me that the opposition to this most beneficial Treaty arises chiefly from the Capudan Pasha and Nouri Effendi, who are both supposed to be the tools of Russia.

The Sultan continues to repose confidence in Rechid Pasha. He has sent him orders to return here, and he will on his arrival resume the exercise of his functions as Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have guards on board with the Sultan, orders to remove Nouri Effendi and Mustapha Kianee Bey, and also Aristarki Logotheti, who is intimately connected with them, and is the avowed agent of Russia.

(Signed) **PONSONBY**

(Inclosure in No. 3)

*Traduction de la Minute d'un Traité à être conclu entre la Sublime Porte et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, contre les projets insensés d'indépendance du Pacha d'Egypte.*

[N. B. Cette traduction est faite sur une traduction Turque envoyée de Londres par Réchid Pacha.]

ATTENDU la possibilité que la Pacha d'Egypte, qui se considère comme un particulier, n'a pas à sa disposition tout le qu'il faut de ses devoirs auxquels il est obligé en sa qualité de sujet, attendu qu'il est impossible pour elle de s'occuper de l'éducation de son fils, et de quelque autre événement, quelqu'un de ses fils, ou quelque membre de la famille du Pacha, ou quelqu'un autre, se rende coupable de désobéissance à la loi, ou de quelque crime, le Pacha, ou le juge à propos le punira conformément aux Articles suivants.

## ARTICLE I

Le Sultan étant le souverain (Padishah) de l'Egypte, de la Syrie, et dépendances, Sa Hauteurs permet à la Flotte Anglaise d'arrêter les bâtimens de guerre et de commerce du Pacha; et comme il est probable que le Pacha se servira de bâtimens marchands des Puissances Amies qui ont des traités avec lui, la Flotte Anglaise, si elle est en force, et de haute, la Flotte du Sultan visitera, d'après le droit clair et évident de Sa Hauteurs, les bâtimens ci-dessus désignés, et, s'il le faut, elle en saisira les chargemens.

## ARTICLE II

Les Flottes Ottomane et Anglaise se réuniront, pour agir de concert, sur les côtes d'Egypte et de Syrie.

## ARTICLE 113

Le présent Traité sera en vigueur l'espace de

No. 32

*Lord Beaupre to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 16.)*

(No. 15.)

My Lord

Vienna, May 8, 1939.

PRINCE METTERNICH'S last advices from Constantinople assure him that the Sultan will not attack Mehemet Ali. His Highness has applied to Prince Metternich for advice in the very difficult situation in which he is placed; and the Prince is drawing up an answer, of which Prince Esterhazy will be the bearer to your Lordship.

The main idea in it seems to be, that the Sultan should run his life against Mehemet Ali's, denying at the same time the great difficulty of his situation, if he will but be content with it, and abandon the idea of improving it by the premature employment of force.

Signed) BEAU VALE

No. 33

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received May 16.)

No. 1433)

My Lord,

Therapia, April 23, 1939

THE Internuncio called on me this day to inform me of the substance of a communication he had made, by order of his Government, to the Porte. It was to the effect that an attack made by the Porte upon the Pasha of Egypt might be considered by the Great Powers as a justification of their taking the part of Mehemet Ali. The expressions used by the Internuncio were very friendly towards the Ottoman Government; and the Ministers in return used equally friendly language, whilst they stated the misery produced by the continuance of the *status quo*, which they said it was impossible to maintain without completing the ruin of this country. They said the Sultan had no desire for a triumph, because it must be bought by the blood of his people, but that things were hastening to that *&c.* *&c.*

The impression of the Internuncio was, that the Porte would not at present declare hostilities, but that they might be caused by accident; and he expressed that the state of affairs in this country could not be improved as far as he talked several things that had been suggested as possible for the removal of the evils, but without appearing at any great distance from the

We both agreed that to support Mehemet Ali against the Sultan of Turkey would be necessary to be done by the Great Powers, would be a partition of the Ottoman Empire *de facto*.

It was evident that this communication, made to me by the desire of Prince Metternich, was intended to show a disposition to act in concert with Her Majesty's Government.

The Internation spoke with entire frankness, of the community of the interests of England and Austria with respect to the preservation of Turkey.

The Internuncio told me, that the Ottoman Minister, in reply to a question, said, that there were still hopes of the success of Reschid Pasha in London. He did not ask me what the Treaty was, but talked of one being in contemplation between the Governments. I said, I thought it would be prudent to form some connection with Turkey, as a counterpoise to the existing relations between the Ottoman and Russian Governments, and for the express purpose of giving confidence and courage to the Porte. The Internuncio thought it possible that Russia would now enter into engagements that might give security for the future. He did



not appear to have any distinct ideas of what would give security, and I did not examine that point.

My impression is, that Prince Metternich would not venture to permit Russia to establish her authority here; that he feels he would be forced by the situation of Hungary and of his own country generally, to resist by arms the progress of Russia.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSOMBY

No. 34

*The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 27)*

(No. 44.)

My Lord,

St Petersburg, May 14, 1839

COUNT NESSELRODE expresses great confidence in the continuance of peace between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt.

His Excellency has shown me the instructions he has sent to Count Melen, the Russian General in Egypt, to persuade Mehemet Ali to withdraw his forces in Syria from their present advanced position, and the despatches directing Count Pozzo di Borgo to communicate these instructions to your Lordship.

Count Nesselrode professes to disbelieve the probability of the Shah of Persia sending any military expedition for this summer; and his Excellency says that the mind of that Sovereign is entirely occupied by his anxiety to renew friendly relations with Great Britain.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) CLANRICARDE.

No. 35

*Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 27)*

(No. 26.)

My Lord,

Alexandria May 4 1839

THE Pasha's steamer "Nile" arrived here on the 1st instant from Beyrout, and brought me a letter from Mr. Consul Moore, of which the following is an extract:—

"I hasten to acquaint you with the intelligence we have received here confirmed by Mr. Werry this morning from Damascus.—His letter is to the effect that the Sultan's forces have crossed the Euphrates at Bir Ali, the troops from every quarter are ordered to the north.

I much fear that this intelligence is true, and that the Sultan, in spite of the remonstrances of Lord Ponsomby, and of the other Ambassadors at Constantinople, has been persuaded by the presumptuous counsels of Ibrahim Pasha, to take this rash step.

The Pasha's fleet is all ready for sea, and I deem it probable that he himself will very soon be here if the reports from Syria prove to be correct.

The two sons of Ibrahim Pasha have returned from Syria in the "Nile" steamer.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 36

*Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 27)*

(No. 27.)

My Lord

Alexandria, May 5, 1839

WITH reference to my despatch No. 26, of yesterday, I have now the honour to transmit to your Lordship the copy of a letter from Boghos Bey, together with that of its inclosure.

Your Lordship will see by this inclosure, that Ibrahim Pasha writes to the Viceroy, that the Sultan's forces had advanced beyond Bir, where they had erected some fortifications, and that Ibrahim Pasha was going to Aleppo which is only about sixty miles from Bir, and that Mehemet Ali, evidently in order to prevent any possibility of his being considered the aggressor, had directed Ibrahim Pasha not to make any movements in advance.

I send copy of this despatch and of its inclosures to Lord Ponsomby, in the hope that it may possibly reach his Excellency before any collision may have taken place between the armies of the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, and that the Porte may be induced to listen to the counsels of his Lordship, and to retire its troops before any hostilities could take place. But still I much fear that the prudent measures of Mehemet Ali may be construed by the Sultan's General into fear, and that he will advance, and force Ibrahim Pasha into active hostilities; and, indeed, it is difficult to conceive that the two armies can remain long so near to each other without coming into hostile collision.

It appears to me that the present movement of the Sultan's army must have been formed some time since, and the necessary preparations made, as by crossing the Euphrates at Bir, they avoid all the fortified defiles of the Taurus, and will completely come in the rear of them.

Should hostilities take place, I think it very probable that the army of Kourschid Pasha, which is now in Arabia, will either march on Bagdad, or come in the rear of the Sultan's army.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 36

*Boghos Bey to Colonel Campbell.*

Alexandria, ce 4 Mai, 1839

EN exécution de l'ordre supérieur, le Soussigné a l'honneur de transmettre par la présente à M. le Comte Campbell Agent et Commissaire de Sa Majesté Britannique en Egypte et de ses Lieux, la traduction d'une lettre du 16 Sefer 1253 (der Ma) que M. Artin Bey, premier Secrétaire Interprète, lui a adressée de Chiban, dans la Basse Egypte, par commandement de Son Altesse le Vice-Roi, et relative à ce qui se passe en ce moment aux frontières nord de la Syrie.

Il saut avec plaisir cette nouvelle occasion pour lui réitérer les assurances de sa très-haute considération.

(Signed) BOGHOS JOUSSOUFF BEY

## Inclosure 2 in No. 36.

*Lettre de Monsieur Artin Bey, premier Secrétaire Interprète de Son Altesse le Vice-Roi, à Son Excellence Boghos Bey, datée 16 Sefer, 1255 (1er Mai, à Chiban, dans la Basse Egypte.*

(Traduction.)

SON ALTESSE le Généralissime ne veut de faire connaître par une lettre particulière que les forces du Sultan ont dépassé Balgah appelé actuel moment. Il y a eu fait quelques fortifications. Son Altesse le Généralissime après avoir donné ordre à ses troupes de se tenir en Syrie, le maréchal vers Alep, allant se rendre en personne dans cette ville.

Son Altesse le Vice-Roi ayant jugé que cette conduite de la Porte devait avoir pour but de faire tomber la faute sur nous, a écrit à Son Altesse le Généralissime de ne faire aucun mouvement avant que d'être sûr de l'avancement des troupes du Sultan, et de se confier en Dieu, et d'agir en conséquence, si l'avancement de ces forces se constatait d'une manière positive.

Son Altesse le Vice-Roi charge Votre Excellence de communiquer de suite à Messieurs les Consuls-Généraux, ce que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui écrire ci-dessus.

## No. 37

*Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 27)*

(Private)

My Lord,

*Alexandria, May 7, 1839.*

COUNT MEDEM read to me, yesterday, a despatch of 12th April, from Count Nesselrode.

Count Medem is directed to intimate to Mehmet Ali, to recall Ibrahim Pacha from Syria, and to retire the Egyptian troops towards Damascus, without delay. That as it is clear from the reports received by the Emperor from Constantinople, and from the Prussian officers in the service of the Sultan, that the offensive movements of the Egyptian Army have been the sole cause of the advance of the Sultan's forces, Mehmet Ali must be the first to retire his troops, and then the Emperor will prevail on the Sultan to cause his army to withdraw from the Syrian frontier.

Count Nesselrode adds, that a copy of the despatch will be sent to the different Courts of Europe; and he directs Count Medem to communicate it to his colleagues here.

Count Nesselrode appears to have grounded his despatch on very false data, in assuming that Mehmet Ali was the aggressor; and this assertion appears to be made solely for the purpose of an excuse to carry into effect the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. So far from Mehmet Ali being the aggressor, it is a fact, that for some months past, the letters of Lord Ponsonby to me, and the despatches from Baron Stormer and from Admiral Roussin to their Consuls-General here, mention the hostile preparations of the Sultan, and his intentions to attack Syria, and the efforts of the different Ambassadors to prevail on the Sultan not to take so rash a step, and, indeed, I am confident that the resolve of the Sultan to invade Syria was caused by his opinion, that upon the appearance of the Turkish Army, the whole of Syria would rise in his favour.

As to Mehmet Ali, I can assert confidently that it never was his intention to be the active aggressor, nor to pass the frontiers of Syria, nor to attack the Sultan's forces, and I am borne out in this view of the subject not only by the positive declarations of Mehmet Ali, but also by the opinions of the Consuls-General of the Great Powers, including Count Medem himself.

The Consul-General of Austria has received instructions from Vienna, similar to those received by Count Medem, but they are avowedly grounded on the despatch of Count Nesselrode, a copy of which was sent to Vienna. I believe that it is the intention of Count Medem to proceed to the Pasha, but M. de Laurin will pass a note to Boghos Bey on the subject, in three or four days, as before doing so, he wishes to await further details of the operations in Syria. M. de Laurin is quite of my opinion, that the Emperor of Russia has proceeded upon very erroneous data.

I do not believe that Mehmet Ali will accede to the intimation of Russia, either to recall Ibrahim Pasha, or to retire his troops, as in the latter case, he could not have any security, that after their withdrawal, the Sultan's army would not enter Syria, and perhaps destroy all the works erected by Ibrahim Pasha in the Taurus frontier; and if circumstances proved favourable, they might advance still further.

I need not point out the evident fact, that the Prussian officers in the service of the Sultan, appear to have been placed there in order to answer the ends of Russia.

I trust to be enabled to communicate to your Lordship, officially, by Her Majesty's next steamer, the result of the communication of Count Medem and of M. de Laurin with the Pasha.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

## No. 38.

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 27)*

No. 193)

My Lord,

*Paris, May 23, 1839.*

THE Marshal Soult called upon me this day for the purpose of informing me that a telegraphic despatch had been received this morning from Maracilles, communicating the important intelligence that the army of the Sultan had made a movement in advance, and that hostilities had actually commenced between the Turkish and Egyptian forces.

This intelligence was brought by a steamer which left Malta on the 16th of this month, and it appears that it had reached that island from Syria as well as from Alexandria.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

## No. 39

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 27)*

(No. 194.)

My Lord,

*Paris, May 24, 1839.*

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to No. 197 inclusive.

I have not seen Marshal Soult since his communication to me yesterday of the intelligence that he had just received by telegraph of the commencement of hostilities between the Turkish and Egyptian troops.

When I called this morning at the Foreign Office, his Excellency was attending a Cabinet Council, which was deliberating upon the measures to be adopted by the French Government, in consequence of this intelligence.

I had, however, the opportunity of conversing last night with several members of the Cabinet, and amongst others, with M. Duchatel, the Minister of the Interior, and with General Schneider, the Minister of War; they both seemed strongly impressed with the seriousness of the danger to the peace of Europe, which may be apprehended from this



invasion of Syria by the Turkish Army. They expressed an anxious desire that under these circumstances, the most cordial concert should exist between the French and British Governments; they had no doubt that the French Government would make great exertion to fit out a formidable fleet to be sent to the Levant, and hoped that it would co-operate with the naval force of Great Britain.

I may therefore, I think, give your Lordship reason to expect that whatever may be suggested by Her Majesty's Government as most expedient to be done in the present alarming state of affairs in the East, will be most favourably attended to by the French Government.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

No. 40.

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 27.)*

No. 197.)

My Lord,

Paris, May 25, 1839.

A DESPATCH was received yesterday by the French Government from Turin, stating that an Austrian steam-vessel had arrived at Trieste, which brought an account of hostilities having commenced between the Turkish and Egyptian Armies.

The intelligence previously received by way of Malta and Marseilles being thus confirmed, the French Ministry resolved to propose this day to the Chamber of Deputies, a vote of credit of ten millions of francs, to defray the expense of an augmentation of the French naval force in the Levant, rendered necessary by the rupture of the peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

No. 41

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 30.)*

(No. 199.)

My Lord,

Paris, May 27, 1839

THE inclosed "Moniteur" contains the speech of the Minister of Marine in the Chamber of Deputies on Saturday last, when he presented the demand of a vote of credit to the amount of ten millions of francs, to defray the eventual expense of an augmentation of the naval forces of France in the Levant, which the imminent rupture of the peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, may render expedient.

The Chamber will, without doubt, acquiesce in this demand.

Marshal Soult told me this morning that his last despatches from Constantinople and from Alexandria, were both dated on the 7th of this month.

Admiral Roussin writes, that the Turkish Ministers still continue to give assurances that the Sultan will not attack the Egyptians; but the unwonted activity in the arsenals of Constantinople, and the extraordinary efforts made by the Turkish Government to send reinforcements to their Army on the borders of Syria, contradict these assurances.

To Marshal Soult, as well as to me, the Turkish Ambassador at Paris asserts positively that his latest advices from his Government are of a pacific tone; and he contends, that if hostilities have commenced, the Egyptians must have been the aggressors.

On the other hand, the despatches of the French Consul at Alexandria, state, that according to advices received by Mehemet Ali from Ibrahim Pasha, the Turkish Army had crossed the military line of demarcation

between the Turkish and Egyptian Forces, and established fortifications at Bir, on the Euphrates; that he, Ibrahim Pasha, was in consequence, concentrating his troops at Aleppo; but that Mehemet Ali, under the persuasion that it was the object of the Turkish Government to throw the responsibility of aggression on the Egyptians, had enjoined his son to make no movement, until the Turkish troops had advanced so far as to put that question out of doubt, and then to trust to God and his Prophet for the success of his arms.

Marshal Soult and his colleagues, with most of whom I have had the opportunity of conversing upon this subject, express the strongest desire that the British and French Governments may act entirely in concert.

The Marshal received this morning a despatch from M. de Bourquency, reporting the substance of a conversation he had had with your Lordship, after the receipt of the last intelligence from the East, and was much pleased with this report; he understood from it, that the British Fleet in the Mediterranean, including the reinforcements which might be sent to it, would amount to ten sail of the line; and he told me that in a very short time, no less than eight or nine French sail of the line would be prepared for the Levant station.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 42

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 30.)*

(No. 108.)

My Lord,

Therapia, May 1, 1839.

I ENCLOSE for Her Majesty's Government, the answer His Majesty the Sultan has been pleased to make to my late communications respecting Mehemet Ali, and I reserve for the next messenger the remarks I may have to offer.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure in No. 42

*Réponse du Sultan aux communications qui lui ont été faites au sujet de Méhémet Ali; communiquée par Son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, à Son Excellence Lord Ponsonby, le 28 Avril, 1839.*

*(Traduction faite sur la copie de la Réponse.)*

LES instructions qu'accompagnait un billet de la part de votre Excellence, ont été mises sous les yeux de Sa Hautesse, qui en a pris connaissance.

L'Internonce d'Autriche a communiqué à la Sublime Porte les réflexions que le Prince de Metternich vient de faire sur une mesure qu'il propose, savoir: d'abandonner les préparatifs de guerre dirigés contre le Sultan, qui se trouve à l'Egypte. Il est même venu à la fin de jours, au Mabein, pour faire soumettre à Sa Hautesse quelques considérations relatives sur la nécessité de prendre un terme à la guerre, et fin à cette question embarrassante, sans recourir à la guerre. J'ai reçu alors de la propre bouche de Sa Hautesse l'ordre de dire à M. l'Internonce, ce qui suit: "Ce Méhémet Ali n'a cessé, depuis l'affaire de Conia, de se mettre sur un pied à tout entreprendre. Il ruine les pays qui ont passé sous son commandement, et il réduit les habitants à la misère; il lève des troupes, et fait construire des batteries et d'autres fortifications. Ma Sublime Porte n'avait songé, jusqu'à une époque récente, à élever

une part des fortifications et ce n'est que depuis l'année passée qu'elle a entrepris de faire fortifier quelques positions dans les environs de Conia. Et comme les projets de Méhémet Ali et ses folles prétentions, sont de nature à ne nous laisser aucune sécurité on a dû prendre les mesures de défense que les régens de la puissance suggèrent, en envoyant au sud et au de tout le monde les troupes et le matériel de guerre nécessaire, vers Syvas et Conia. Les Grandes Puissances ne disaient pas le mot contre ces actes de rébellion de Méhémet Ali et elles subsistent, en même temps, à vouloir empêcher Ma Sublime Porte d'agir, voilà, certes, qui ne serait ni équitable aux égards que les Gouvernemens se doivent entre eux ni conforme aux sentimens de bienveillance que l'on professe et les choses évidentes que Méhémet Ali commet quelque acte d'agression. Ma Sublime Porte ne pourra pas rester dans l'inaction. Il est également clair et évident que comme l'on ne doit dans aucune circonstance compromettre l'honneur sans qu'il y ait une juste cause de guerre, et Méhémet Ali rompt et pratique les obligations que l'on impose au qualité de sujet. Ma Sublime Porte ne prendra point de parti dans la guerre, d'autant plus que les pays soumis au Gouvernement de Méhémet Ali, faisant partie de nos provinces blanches, la porte d'armées de part et d'autre et les maux qui viendraient fondre sur les pays et allier les populations et surtout les classes pauvres, ne me toucheraient que de trop près. Mais que faut-il faire lorsqu'il ne reste plus aucune ressource de la part d'un empire devenu par l'ambition et l'avidité qu'il a des projets perfides? Tant que cet état de choses dure, la sécurité et la tranquillité mutuelles ne sauraient exister, et je suis donc le cas d'entretenir à grands frais, une armée et un camp impérial. Si l'on considérait cette question, comme on le fait le faire sous les rapports des convenances qui doivent subsister entre Gouvernemens, si on l'examinait avec l'excellence et justice n'est-ce pas que l'on trouverait que la raison est tout à fait de mon côté et que Méhémet Ali est coupable? Quant au Prince Metternich, c'est un homme animé de sentimens convenables et d'un bon jugement. Je n'ai donc soupçonner et croire que c'est un chagrin et cette vaine qui caractérisent le langage qu'il tient à l'égard de son sujet, l'effet de l'orgueil sur lequel on ne peut compter pour d'autres succès. M. l'Internonce a parlé à Notre Maître de terme moyen pour la solution de cette question, sans avoir recours aux armes; cela veut dire la rentrée de Méhémet Ali dans la possession de son pays comme sujet, mais cette position ne peut se réaliser que par la restitution, par Méhémet Ali, d'Adana, de Damas, d'Alep, de Seyda, de Jérusalem, et de Naplouse, et par la réduction de ses forces actuelles à ce point qu'il ne sera plus compatible avec sa qualité de sujet. Si les Grandes Puissances veulent travailler à faire naître un pareil état de choses, alors il serait digne de moi d'y donner mon adhésion impériale.

Telles sont les paroles que, d'ordre du Sultan, j'ai rapportées à M. l'Internonce. Son Excellence ayant prêté une oreille attentive à tout ce que je lui ai dit elle m'a assuré que conformément aux ordres qu'elle avait reçus de sa Cour, elle va faire savoir tout ce que je lui ai rapporté au Prince Metternich.

J'ai également reçu de Sa Hauteurs l'ordre de dire, que si le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique veut faire un acte d'amitié et de bienveillance en adhérant à un Traité d'Alliance conçu dans le sens ci-dessus exprimé, Sa Hauteurs l'acceptera avec plaisir; et M. l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre est prié de faire savoir à sa Cour cette réponse du Sultan.

N.B.—The foregoing answer is contained in a letter from Sayd Bey the Sultan's Private Secretary, to his Excellency the Mostashar Nouri Effendi.]

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 203.)

My Lord,

Paris, May 31, 1839.

I CALLED upon Marshal Soult this morning, and I informed his Excellency that your Lordship had not, as yet, had an opportunity of bringing under the consideration of the Cabinet, the measures which it might be necessary to adopt in the event of a collision ensuing between the army of the Sultan and that of Méhémet Ali. That I had, therefore, no official instructions upon the subject, but that from a private communication which I had received from your Lordship, it appeared that you were of opinion that, in the first place, it was essential that complete unanimity should exist between the Governments of England and France, as to the course to be pursued; that a combined fleet should proceed to the coast of Syria, and that the orders given to the admirals should be identical; the object of such instructions being to arrest the progress of hostilities, if commenced, between the two parties.

The Marshal said he entirely concurred in this opinion; and I gathered from his conversation, that he would be ready to give instructions to the French Admiral, in conformity with those addressed to the British Admiral.

His Excellency informed me, that he had dispatched two officers, the one to proceed to Constantinople, the other to Alexandria, with directions, after having communicated with the French Ambassador and M. Cochelet, to repair to the head-quarters of the two armies, and to endeavour, by personal representations to the respective commanders, to prevent the breaking out of hostilities, and to report the exact state of affairs.

The Marshal also stated, that he had written to M. de Barante, to inquire of the Russian Government whether it would be considered—the *S. can be given to the Russian Government*—at the *case of the Russian Government*—that in the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, had arisen; but M. de Barante is instructed to be cautious that his inquiries should not imply the recognition of the validity of that Treaty.

His Excellency added, that supposing the threatened collision should this time be averted, he considered it would be necessary that the Five Powers should concert together as to the means of definitively settling the future relations between the Sultan and the Viceroy.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

The Duc de Dalmatie to Baron de Bourqueney, communicated by Baron de Bourqueney, June 1, 1839.

(No. 16.)

Monsieur,

Paris, le 30 Mai, 1839

J'ai reçu les dépêches que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire jusqu'au No. 43 inclusivement. Leur contenu étant de nature à me faire penser que vous aurez bientôt à me transmettre des informations plus précises sur les vues du Cabinet Britannique, par rapport à l'état actuel de l'Orient, je me réserve de discuter alors quelques unes des opinions que vous m'avez exprimées à ce sujet Lord Palmerston. Je me bornerai pour le moment à remarquer, que ce Ministre me semble prendre un peu trop facilement son parti d'une seconde expédition Russe à Constantinople, moyennant des garanties peut-être illusoire; je crains aussi qu'il n'apprécie pas d'une manière suffisamment impartiale, la position respective de la Porte et de Méhémet Ali. A Vienne, on est à cet égard



Bien qu'avant d'avoir reçu des informations plus complètes, et de nous être concertés avec nos Alliés, nous ne puissions évidemment penser à arrêter une détermination définitive sur la grave question qui vient de surgir, il est certaines mesures préliminaires tellement indiquées par la situation, que nous avons dû les prendre sur le champ. On sait déjà à Londres, que nous avons envoyé aux Clames de nous ouvrir un crédit destiné à couvrir les frais des armemens maritimes qui pourront devenir nécessaires. L'accueil fait à cette demande prouve qu'elle sera votée avec empressement. J'ai, de plus, envoyé à M. l'Amiral Roussin et à M. Cochelet, des instructions qui leur prescrivent d'insister pour que les hostilités cessent si elles ont commencé, et par qu'en tout cas les armées rentrent, de part et d'autre, dans les positions occupées par elles avant la marche des Turcs vers le point frontière des territoires respectifs. Ces instructions seront remises à l'ordóestral in par deux de mes olacurs d'ordonnance, qui se rendront ensuite, l'un en Ame Mueure, l'autre en Syrie, à l'effet de constater l'état des choses, et, s'il y a lieu, de faire entendre avec énergie, aux deux parties, des paroles de prudence et de raison. Enfin, Monsieur, Je viens d'écrire à M. de St. Aulaire, à M. Bresson, et à M. de Barante, pour les charger de s'entendre avec les Cabinets auprès desquels ils sont accrédités, sur la marche à suivre dans les conjonctures actuelles. J'ai particulièrement recommandé à M. de Barante de s'attacher à pénétrer si le Gouvernement Russe penserait à étendre la portée du Traité d'Unkiar Skélessi à un état de choses auquel il ne s'applique évidemment pas, puisque ses stipulations sont formellement conçues dans la prévision d'une attaque dirigée contre la Porte, et non d'une lutte dont la Porte prendrait elle-même l'initiative. Je n'ai pas besoin d'ajouter, que M. de Barante devra mesurer son langage de manière à éviter ce qui pourrait faire supposer que nous reconnaissons, même dans le sens le plus restreint, la validité d'un Traité contre lequel nous avons protesté en 1833; comme aussi ce qui donnerait à croire, qu'indépendamment de ce Traité, ou de tout autre engagement formel, nous fusions disposés à tolérer, soit le renversement du trône du Sultan, soit le démembrement de l'empire.

Veuillez, Monsieur, donner connaissance à Lord Palmerston, des informations contenues dans la présente dépêche.

Vous trouverez ci-joint copie des derniers rapports de M. l'Amiral Roussin et de M. Cochelet.

Recevez, &c.,  
(Signé) DUC DE DALMATIE

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 6.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia*, May 11, 1870[illegible]

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) **PONSONBY**

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 7.)*

Paris, June 5, 1839

My Lord,

THE enclosed paper contains the essential part of a long dispatch from M. Cochelet, which was received yesterday by the French government, in it, and which Marshal Saut read to me this day. His Excellency's rotation related to me a despatch from Yumra, Resnais in the east, part of which, dated the 17th ult. from Therapia, the Anatolian station (that though no account of hostilities having commenced in Syria had reached Constantinople, he considered them to be inevitable.

I have only time to add, before the departure of the post, that I was much gratified with the cordial consideration which General Smith communicated to me the whole of the despatches he received yesterday from Alexandria and Constantinople.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

*Extract of despatch from M. Corbelot to Marshal Soult*

LE Vice-Roi a déclaré à M. Cochelet, Consul-Général de France, qu'il s'engage, dans le cas où les troupes du Sultan y ont franchi l'Euphrate près de Bir, se retirant du l'autre côté à l'ouest d'Am, un mouvement rétrograde à son armée, et de rappeler son Is Pacha à Hammah, que dans le cas où cette rétrogradation par lui n'est pas pour servir d'un mouvement rétrograde de l'armée de Haïz Pacha au-delà de Maïnah, Son Altesse rappellera le Généralissime en Egypte. De plus Son Altesse le Vice-Roi a ajouté, de son propre mouvement, que si les Quatre Grandes Puissances consentent à lui garantir la paix et s'entendent avec lui pour la lui obtenir la succession de la famille d'Al-Faraj, une partie de ses troupes de la Syrie, et serait prêt à s'entendre sur un arrangement définitif pour se garantir la sécurité et adapté aux besoins du pays.

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received June 9.)

Paris, June 7, 1839

My Lord,

I HAD an interview this morning with Marshal Scott. His Excellency has received a dispatch from the fleet of a later date than those which he communicated to me on Wednesday last and of which I have been informed.

It may perhaps be worthy of remark, that in M. Corbucci's despatches which was read to me by the Marshal, the French Consul attributes partly to the encroachments lately made by England on Mehemet Ali's dominions, the Pasha having given up his intention to assert his independence of the Porte. Mehemet Ali, he ~~was~~ argues that if in the

character of vassal of the Sultan, and in defence of the Turkish Empire, he claims the assistance of other Powers, in resisting these encroachments, his representations will be more favourably received, than if, as Sovereign of an independent State, he claimed their intervention.

The Marshal expressed his regret, that I had not as yet been able to make any official communication to him from your Lordship, in regard to the instructions to be given to the Admiral of the combined fleet on the Levant station. He said that the question of these instructions had been mooted in the Cabinet Council by Admiral Duperré, but that he, the Marshal, had desired to defer deliberating upon it, until they were in possession of the opinion of the British Government on that matter.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 48.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 117.)

My Lord,

Therapia, May 19, 1839.

I COMMUNICATED to Nouri Effendi the substance of your Lordship's instruction No 38, which gave great dissatisfaction.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 49.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 120.)

My Lord,

Therapia, May 20, 1839.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL CAMPBELL transmitted to your Lordship, copy of a letter, dated May 1st, written by Artin Bey, and communicated to the Consuls. A copy also reached the Sultan, who was so exasperated, that he gave orders that war should be declared against Mehmet Ali. R. Bey, however, said that order to be recalled. But orders were issued to hasten the equipment of the fleet, and to press the dispatch of troops and military stores to the army: both orders are in execution.

The Sultan said he would rather die, or be the vassal of Russia than not endeavour to destroy his rebel subject. The language of those about the Sultan is: "We hope for success, because all the Syrians are enemies to the Pasha; but if we should be beaten, we are still sure of succour from Russia."

I learned the above from that Turkish source from whence I have before often got information, and which was always correct.

Nobody here doubts of war, and the general opinion is, that the Army of the Sultan will be defeated. My opinion is not worth anything, as I am not skilled in military matters.

If the Sultan should be victorious, there will be comparatively little difficulty, at present, to consider what may be the probable consequences of his defeat. The common opinion is, that the conqueror will march for the Capital, having declared himself independent. It appears to me, however, by the will of the Pashas of Bagdad, Orfa, Diarbekir, &c., &c., and that the Russians will mediate, and induce the Sultan to confirm the possession of those conquests to Mehmet Ali, and give his family hereditary right to all the Governments held by it. Such an arrangement will be far towards the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. It will take from the Sultan his best title to the Khalifat; it will leave him entirely dependent upon Russia; it may be liked by those who

think peace is worth any price, however great; and it will give to Russia all she could hope to obtain, and save her from the risk of a war which she is not ready to support.

The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi gives a fair pretext or right to Russia to act. Count Nesselrode's remonstrances to Mehmet Ali to withdraw his troops, has prepared the way for the abandonment of the *status quo* by Russia; and having thus declared the Pasha to be the aggressor, she is free to threaten him with her arms, but may easily make it appear, that the Sultan having lost his army, prudence requires that a solid peace should be established, to prevent the total destruction of the Ottoman Empire by a protracted war; that the Pasha, being the victor, will not consent to less advantageous terms, and that the means Russia must employ to force him to do so, would be in the worst manner.

Such a termination of these affairs leaves Russia the absolute mistress of both parties,—the Sultan and the Pasha. It will establish Russian power in Persia, secure to her the means of completing all her plans of conquest in the Caucasus and elsewhere; rivet the dependence of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia upon her, and put it in her power to close, at pleasure, the Black Sea; and by direct or indirect, by sudden or by gradual measures, put a stop to that commerce now carried on there by Austria and England, from which, if continued, civilization, and knowledge, and wealth, will be generated in those countries, to the ruin of the moral power of Russia and her system.

There is one way to meet and defeat this possible or probable plan, which is, that England should immediately assume the right of equal interference with Russia in the settlement of the question, and should support that assumption by arms. Austria and France should be invited to do the same; and when all the Great Powers act together, Russia will have no better chance of carrying her point than may rest upon her capacity to deceive those she is obliged to act with.

The end that should be proposed to themselves by England, France, and Austria, is pointed out by common sense and by the experience of the late difficulties and dangers; for nobody can deny that the ambition of Mehmet Ali, and his rebellion against his Sovereign, are their original cause. And the common safety, the settlement of Europe, the preservation of peace, the prosperity of commerce, will all demand the extinction of that illegitimate despotism which has originated those evils, and at the same time has sacrificed a moiety of the population of Egypt for its selfish gratification; harassed and distressed Syria, Arabia, and other countries; and obliged those exertions to be made in Turkey, by which the unhappy people of that country have been nearly as much diminished in number, and oppressed by poverty, as the Egyptians themselves. Mehmet Ali, the loud professor of liberalism, has been the curse and destroyer of men, women, and children, everywhere within the circle of his empire.

The Great Powers have established, as the criterion of right or wrong, the abstinence from aggression, declaring the culpable to be the Sultan or the Pasha, as the one or the other might be the first to commence hostilities. Judgment has been given by Russia, who assumed to speak in the name of all, and the Pasha has been declared the aggressor. The charge of aggression made against him by Russia is confined to late acts done by the Pasha; but from the beginning, during the whole period as well as the whole of the Pasha's reign, he has been the aggressor, and the Sultan has a right to claim from the Great Powers the maintenance of their own declarations. Passing over all the acts of the Pasha until the moment when the presumed (with a view to the destruction of the Ottoman Empire) he will be found from that hour in a state of quiescence, relying upon the intervention of the Great Powers for the settlement of differences as to territorial questions between himself and the Pasha, and for the payment of the miserable pittance of tribute due to him for the possession of kingdoms alienated from him. He made no preparations for war, he committed no overt acts indicative of design to use force. He remained in a state of passive inadequacy to the defence of his remaining territories, until



he was forced to have recourse to augmented armaments, by the menacing attitude of the Pasha who had never ceased to assail the Sultan's power by intrigues, and had openly fortified all the avenues that lead through the Taurus into the provinces still under the Sultan's sceptre. The Pasha had never ceased to increase and perfect his army and his fleet, nor to push his conquests into new countries for the establishment of his power and he made those conquests in his own name; he openly called on the Great Powers to sanction his assumption of independence of the Sultan. Could his intentions be doubted? The Sultan had the right of self-defence to justify his tardy exertions to guard against danger, and he had the further right inherent in every man, be he sovereign or be he dependent, of placing himself in a position to repel insults.

No one of the Great Powers would have continued in a pacific attitude so long as the Sultan did, had any one of them been exposed to even a small part of the danger and the provocations he had to bear with.

Russia has declared a truth—a limited truth; the Great Powers cannot deny it; their repeated declarations engage them to oppose the aggressor.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSOMBY

No. 50.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 9)

(No. 23.)

My Lord.

Vienna, June 1, 1839.

PRINCE METTERNICH forwards to your Lordship the reports of the Intermunio, which agree with those of Lord Ponsomby as to the danger of war.

The Prince seeming to expect much from the arrival at Constantinople of his advice to the Porte, as to the course they ought to pursue, I observed to him, that the reply from thence might lead to the commencement of a negotiation, but it might also announce that of hostilities.

He admitted this, adding, that the only course to pursue was, for the Four Powers to agree among themselves what line to take; that the establishment of Egypt as an hereditary fief in Mehemet Ali's family, appeared to him the only solution of the present difficulties; that Austria, France, and Russia, were of this opinion; but that the real issue from all complications, must depend upon an intimate understanding between the Cabinets of London and Vienna, because England secures the concert of France, and Austria that of Russia.

If Her Majesty's Government should be disposed to enter into the Prince's views, as to the disposition to be made of Egypt, it will be necessary to decide whether the succession should be made personal to Ibrahim Pasha, or extended to his descendants, or to other descendants of Mehemet Ali. I would further remark, that such an arrangement, if it were practicable, would offer the best chance of preserving order in Egypt after Mehemet Ali's death, which will otherwise be exposed to many chances; and that the state of the Principalities on the Danube, would point out a permanent hereditary succession as far preferable to successive nominations.

This first branch of the question being disposed of, I remarked to the Prince that in all affairs there is a moment when writings and reasonings cease, and action begins. He admitted the truth of this, and also, that in this instance the moment might possibly be arrived. That it was only then that the real affair commenced—that everything previous was but talk, and that it was probable that we might now be at the beginning of its end.

Is it not time then, I asked, to foresee, and if possible, to regulate its march? He said it was; and that as the first branch of the affair could only be conducted by the joint moral weight of the Four Powers, so must

41

the second be (if it should present itself), by their combined material action; neither Russia, nor England, nor France, nor Austria, operating alone, but jointly, and in the name of the Alliance.

Being unacquainted with the views of Her Majesty's Government upon the subject, I did not think it advisable to press for anything more specific; but I should add, that the Prince said more than once that Austria would not decline her just share in the operation.

I have thought it my duty thus far to clear up the subject, and hope hereby to have furnished Her Majesty's Government with sufficient grounds upon which to determine as to the line of conduct, remarking only, that if war between the Sultan and the Pasha is to be averted, a firm and early demonstration on the part of the Four Powers, may, perhaps, be best calculated to produce that effect.

I would also observe, that nothing permanent would be gained, unless on both sides they are induced to disarm.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 51

Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 10)

(No. 70.)

My Lord,

Berlin, June 5, 1839.

HAVING found in Colonel Campbell's despatch of the 7th ultimo, to your Lordship the following passage:

I need not point out the evident fact, that the Prussian officers in the service of the Sultan, appear to have been placed there in order to answer the ends of Russia. I again spoke to Baron Werther on this subject. He treated the credulity of Colonel Campbell with derision. He had, however (in consequence of the formal complaint I had made against one of those officers,) written to Count Kappeler to warn them against giving advice to the Turks, so opposed to their instructions, and to the interest of Prussia. The Prussian Minister at Constantinople, as well as the military officers, had all co-operated to preserve peace and the status quo. One of them (Colonel Vincke) had drawn up a memorandum in which he strategically proved to the Turks, that the commencement of hostilities must end by their defeat. This document, his Excellency said, had made more impression on the Turks, than all the remonstrances of the Foreign Ministers.

Baron Werther said, that no man had laboured more zealously and sincerely to preserve peace than Count Monténell, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, and he (the Baron) felt convinced that the Court of St. Petersburg ardently desired the maintenance of peace in the East. I share this opinion with Baron Werther. Whatever may be the ulterior views of Russia, the maintenance of peace at this moment is her object and interest.

Baron Werther thinks that the Five Powers should call upon the Sultan and Mehemet Ali to retire and disarm their respective forces.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) W. RUSSELL.

No. 52

Viscount Ponsomby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 13.)

No. 121.

My Lord,

Therapia, May 21, 1839.

TAHAR Pasha returned on the 19th, in the afternoon, from his inspection of the Ottoman Army under Hafiz Pasha. A Council was held to take his Report into consideration.

The best informed persons concur in thinking war will take place.  
The fleet is nearly quite ready: workmen have been employed night and day to fit it out; it may sail, if ordered to do so, in two or three days time.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 53.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 16.)

No. 220)

My Lord,

Paris, June 14, 1839.

THE telegraph on Wednesday last announced the arrival at Marseilles of a dispatch from Lord Levant bringing dispatches which contained the report of statements having been made between the Turkish and Egyptian troops, though some scolding had occurred between the soldiers of each army, which had been expressed by their respective officers. The content of these dispatches is not stated in this telegraphic communication, and they had not reached the Foreign Office at the time I was at the office with Marshal Soult this morning.

I told the Marshal that though I had no official instruction upon the "Turco-Egyptian Question," I had received private letters from your Lordship which left no doubt in my mind, of the concurrence of Her Majesty's Government in the view taken by the Austrian and French Governments, as to the best and most practicable settlement of the question, namely, that Egypt should become an hereditary fief in the hands of Mehemet Ali, in order to the sovereignty of the Sultan, and that the Egyptian troops should evacuate Syria.

Marshal Soult said that in the despatches of Count St. Aulaire from Vienna of the 18th and 22nd of last month, and of the 4th of this month, all reporting the conversations he had held with Prince Metternich on the affairs of Turkey, it did not appear that the Austrian Minister had suggested the evacuation of Syria by the Egyptians, as forming part of the proposed arrangement.

I added that I was not apprised of the communications made by Prince Esterhazy on this matter, but that your Lordship was under the impression that this was the view both of the Austrian and French Governments, and indeed it seemed to me if Syria were to be continued under the government of Mehemet Ali, no involvement could be found for the Sultan, according to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt. Had the Pasha on the real or pretended ground of the necessity of a force to be sent to suppress insurrection, will continue to maintain a considerable army in that country, and the existence of such an army in the vicinity of Asia Minor would be a great burden upon the Sultan, the burden of keeping up a large military establishment in that province, and the preservation of peace which was the object of all the European Powers, would be rendered impossible. I have, if the question of the occupation of Syria is only provisionally arranged at this period. Marshal Soult did not say that these opinions were his remarks, that Syria was not the only Pashalic which was occupied by the Egyptians; that the Pashalic in which was situated the sacred city of Mecca, was held by Mehemet Ali, and might be a serious obstacle to our arriving at a satisfactory settlement; but on all these matters, his most anxious desire was, that our two Governments should be in perfect understanding, and that if a conference of the Four Powers (or of the Five, including Prussia,) should take place on the affairs of the East, the instructions of the Representatives of France and England at such conference should be identical.

The Marshal then asked me, if I had read (as reported in the "Moniteur," the speech he made yesterday in the Chamber of Peers, saying

that he thought I should be satisfied with the sentiments he had expressed on that occasion, in regard to the alliance with England.

I inclose the "Moniteur," and have marked the passage to which the Marshal referred.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 54

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 17)

(No. 223.)

My Lord,

Paris, June 15, 1839.

I APPRISED your Lordship, in a private letter which I wrote hastily at the moment of the messenger's setting off for Calcutta, late last night, of the substance of the despatches from the East, which had just reached the hands of Marshal Soult.

I have been informed this morning at the Foreign Office, that two despatches were received from the French Consul at Alexandria: one dated on the 24th of May, and the other on the 27th. In the first, it is stated that some Albanians belonging to the Turkish Army had entered a village occupied by the Egyptians, and had been driven back by a detachment of Egyptian troops, and that on the 27th of May, our Army and one Egyptian detachment killed between 1,000 and 1,500 men. The second despatch states that the Pasha represents the Turkish Army to be in a most deplorable state, that it suffers much from the want of provisions, that the troops were reduced to less than a third of their number, that one officer and not less than 500 Turkish soldiers had already deserted to the Egyptians, and that notwithstanding the advantage which he could expect to have in an engagement with the Sultan's Army, he should not do so, as he considered the Sultan to be the aggressor.

Admiral Rouson writes from Constantinople that although there is no official assurance that no orders have been given to our fleet, I still do not feel at ease in placing any reliance on these assurances, now subjects of complaint against Mehemet Ali. We have been informed that the Turkish Government assert that both Orfa and Rosetta have been occupied by Egyptian troops, but the advance which above all others, has irritated the Sultan against us, is the evacuation of Mecca, of two dignitaries appointed by the Highness, and his character of Head of the Mohammedan Church, to reside in the sacred city.

It may be inferred from the despatches received from Alexandria, that there is not a shadow of foundation for the two first reports.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 55.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 17)

(No. 55, Confidential)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, June 8, 1839.

I WAS informed on the 2nd instant, of a movement across the Euphrates, of the Turkish Army, by a letter from Mr. Yeamans.

I met Count Nesselrode the following day. He appeared uneasy, and in bad humour; and as soon as I mentioned the subject, interrupted me, saying, he believed that there was not a word of truth in the report; that his accounts from Constantinople were the most recent possible, and they led him entirely to disbelieve the intelligence which had been communicated to me, and which had appeared in the German papers.

I saw Count Nesselrode again, last evening. He appeared in good



spirits: but although it is impossible any longer to deny that the information which has been received from every quarter is well-founded, the Russian Ministers will not admit that it is accurately true; and they maintain the accounts to be exaggerated, because they are to them displeasing. Some assert, that the movement was merely one of reconnaissance, and a necessary precaution against a surprise, and that the Turkish Army speedily retired to its proper territory. Others affirm, that in some parts of the country near Bir, the Euphrates is not the boundary of Syria, and that the passage of the river does not necessarily constitute an invasion of the Pashalic of Mehemet Ali.

The Chancellor of Count Nesselrode was in great activity on the 3rd and 4th instant: on the last of which days his Excellency waited upon the Emperor at Zarukoe-Celoe; and I believe, (but I do not know it,) that directions have been dispatched to Constantinople and Egypt, to spare no remonstrances or threats to prevent, if it may yet be possible, a conflict between the troops of the Sultan and the Pasha.

I am convinced that this event has caused surprise and great annoyance to the Imperial Government; that the Emperor will not seek, but will avoid, as far as he can, recognizing any *casus fœderis* that the Sultan may allege to have arisen under the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.

I have no means of learning the exact amount of military force in the south, and on the eastern frontier of Russia. I believe that about 30,000 men might be speedily mustered in Bessarabia; and more troops than usual are quartered in Pultava, Karkoff, and other garrisons, south of, and not distant from, Moscow, which might easily be moved towards the Black Sea. The losses in the Caucasus, although immense in proportion to the force employed, have as yet made a scarcely perceptible drain upon the vast army of the Emperor, or upon a population which exceeds 50,000,000.

It is certainly true that (as Lord Beaumont, in his despatch No. 10, reports Count Fiquelmont to have stated to his Government) the Russian treasury is at present very low, and is further embarrassed, so much so, indeed, that the abandonment for this year of the proposed review and ceremony on the plain of Borodino, which will demand a considerable sum of money, is under consideration.

These difficulties, however, are but temporary, and arise from the lavish profusion of the Emperor, and from a defective administration of the resources of the country, which are in a prosperous and thriving condition. The revenue is rapidly increasing, and exceeds the estimates; that no advantage is taken of this circumstance, either to lessen the small public debt, or, as would be far more wise, to lessen the burthen, and improve the sources of taxation.

The rapacity of the courtiers does not leave in the Treasury sufficient money to answer the demands made by Ministers for an improved administration of their different departments.

The discontent in some provinces of the Empire upon matters of education and religion, reported by Count Fiquelmont, I have noticed in former despatches: but these and other elements of weakness, which may hereafter cause the overthrow of the Imperial Government, offer no immediate hindrance to any military operations the Emperor may choose to undertake; and his army is apparently in better condition than it has been at any former time.

His Imperial Majesty, however, will not dare to take any course which might involve him in a war with England and France, or with England alone.

It is expected in some quarters, that the failure of the Imperial negotiations and influence at Constantinople to restrain the Sultan, may occasion the dismissal of Count Nesselrode from his office. But the Emperor will find so much difficulty in replacing him, that I think his Excellency's official existence will last as long as his natural life.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) CLANRICARDE

No. 56.

Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 11.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, May 6, 1839

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, copies of two despatches, dated the 30th March and 4th instant, which I have addressed to his Excellency Lord Ponsonby, G.C.B., Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

Since the latter despatch was closed, nothing further of any interest has transpired on this frontier, and meriting your Lordship's attention.

The last advices received from the frontier in the direction of Beiruts, that the Sultan's forces continue daily to cross the river, with ammunition, stores, &c. But we have no advice of the further advance of any of the Sultan's troops on any other point of his frontier.

His Excellency Ibrahim Pasha is still here, and the Egyptian forces are daily arriving, and concentrating here from different points.

It is now rumoured, that his Excellency will soon march forward with his forces towards Aintab and the river Sedjour, there to wait any attack which may be made against him by the Sultan's forces. For it is reported that his Excellency has positive orders not to pass his limits, or be the first aggressor.

But I am very much afraid, my Lord, that these movements will, if they are not intended immediately to take the offensive, eventually degenerate into hostilities.

I shall not fail to watch vigilantly, and forward immediate advice of all that transpires, to his Excellency the Ambassador at Constantinople, and to Colonel Campbell in Egypt.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY

It closure 1 in No. 56.

Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby

(Extract.)

Aleppo, March 30, 1839

I HAVE to acquaint your Lordship, that during this month the authorities here and throughout the district have been actively engaged in making extensive preparations with regard to the laying in of stores of all sorts. 4,000 okeas of biscuit have been, and are still caused to be, daily made here, and in every town within this district, which are all being stored.

His Excellency the Seraskier has transmitted positive orders to this Government, to procure within five days time, besides the usual allowance made by the "Shora," 100 cantars of soap, and the same quantity of oil, and to set up and have all the wheat and barley in the Government granaries. His Excellency further demands of the Government here to procure as many horses and mules as possible, without considerations to price; and directs that neither the animals they purchase, or those of the artillery regiments in garrison here, are to be put out to grass until he arrives to give further orders on the subject.

I hear that of late there has been a considerable quantity of ammunition and military stores brought to this coast from Egypt, part of which have been landed, and are daily arriving here; the remainder, it is said, have gone round to Tarsous, and from thence conveyed to the defile of the Taurus and that district.

I am informed that this Government has issued orders to all the forces at the different points on this frontier, to hold themselves ready; but with the exception of a regiment lately landed at Suedia, from Egypt, which

I hear is to proceed to Ilep, there is no further movement of any sort among any of the troops, who, I hear, all continue in their usual positions. His Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha left Damascus after the Ramadan, and arrived at Hamah on his way to this place, under the 4th instant, where he has been ever since occupied. It is said in causing wheat and barley to be purchased, and all the horses and mules that can be procured. It is also positively stated, that his Excellency Solyman Pasha, French Colonel Sévès, has arrived at Hamah, from Seyda, in order to have a conference with the Seraskier, for what object it is not yet known.

His Excellency the Seraskier is now daily looked for here, but it is uncertain whether he will be accompanied by Solyman Pasha.

I beg leave to acquaint your Lordship, with regard to the movements of the Sultan's forces, that I learn from persons that have lately arrived from Malatia, Diarbekir, and Mesopotamia, that very great and extensive military preparations are also being made by all the Sultan's authorities throughout the whole line of that country. I have not been able to elicit to what direction all these are to be directed. The persons from those parts say that the most correct report even with the troops is, that they are soon to march to Aleppo; others again say that they are to act in conjunction with Ali Pasha of Bagdad's forces, against Ismael Pasha (the Koord) of Amadieli.

Other sources coming from Malatia, state that there has been very extensive military preparations making, but that they had very much decreased, and that there was no particular movement of any sort, not even among any of the troops; and further assert, that the Seraskier Hafiz Ali Pasha had been called to Constantinople, and had been replaced by the late Seraskier Reehid Mahomed Pasha's son, who has taken command of the Sultan's forces in Mesopotamia and that neighbourhood; that Solymian Pasha of Marash had also received orders to proceed forthwith to Constantinople, with two other Pashas, the names of which I have not been able to learn. It is stated that at Marash there are hardly any troops at all; at Bir there are about 5,000, and at Orfa from 15,000 to 20,000 men; the forces at Malatia are stated to be about 25,000 to 30,000 men, for owing to the very severe weather in those parts, and the bad condition of the barracks, the bulk of the troops are now at Diarbekir.

From all accounts, the military preparations making by the Government and that of the Sultan in Mesopotamia, and along the whole line of the frontier, have on both sides been certainly very extensive of late; but for the present all their preparations appear defensive and accompanied with nothing to denote any aggressive spirit on either side. A few weeks longer will throw a little more light on this subject, and develop more clearly the reason for which they are pursuing these preparatory measures. I shall not fail immediately to inform your Lordship of whatever may further transpire.

Hassan Bey, Colonel of the 2d Regiment of Foot Guards quartered here, has been arrested by his Excellency the Governor, until his Excellency the Seraskier's orders are known. There are several reports respecting his arrest: first, that he was in correspondence with the Sultan's authorities, and that the Government here had detected letters which he addressed to the Sultan's Seraskier, inviting him to invade Syria; the second report is that he was engaged in a premeditated plan to fly with some of his troops over to the Sultan, but both of these want further confirmation.

I beg leave to mention to your Lordship a circumstance which has this morning been reported here, that in under three weeks a considerable force composed of foot and horse are to come to Aleppo, and the reason given for this is that the Sultan is to be joined by Solymian Pasha, a grand military review, in which all the forces are to go through some military manoeuvres and evolutions. I am a good deal doubtful of the authority of this report, as I have not heard from any other quarter. But under the present state of affairs, and the very extensive preparations making by the Government, I cannot but consider it my duty to acquaint your Lordship of this circumstance, although it has not yet been confirmed.

Inclosure 2 in No. 56.

Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord,

Aleppo, May 4, 1839.

I HAD the honour of addressing your Excellency under the 30th of March, since then no Tatar has left this to enable me to communicate with your Lordship—indeed all our commercial Tatars are absent. I have been anxiously expecting the arrival of one of them, but he has not yet made his appearance; and as the events that have transpired on this frontier, within the last fortnight, are of great interest and importance, and such as I consider require that your Lordship should be made acquainted with them, without loss of time, I feel it my duty, although I reported the intelligence immediately to Mr. Consul Werry of Damascus, begging of him to forward a notice of the same, via Egypt, to your Lordship, as there were no Tatars here, to dispatch the present by Hadji Omar, who was formerly in the service of the Euphrates Expedition, and who has promised me to deliver this, my packet, to your Lordship, within ten days time from this.

I represented to your Lordship, in my last communication under the 30th March, that both this Government, and that of the Sultan, in the direction of Malatia, Orfa, and Diarbekir, were making very extensive preparations, both in provisions, ammunition, and military stores of all sorts, but without any movement of troops up to that period.

I now beg leave to acquaint your Lordship, that under the 23rd ultimo, advices reached this Government by spies, that the Sultan's authorities had begun to cross troops at Bir, which were stated to consist of three regiments of Infantry.

The Musselim of this town immediately mounted his horse, and proceeded to Khan Toman, distant about five hours from Lema, where his Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha was looking after the agricultural interests, in that neighbourhood, accompanied by Mehmedy Achmet Pasha, the Minister of War, who had reached this from Egypt, under the 16th ultimo, and said to be the bearer of secret instructions to his Excellency the Seraskier, from his Highness Mehemet Ali.

The Musselim, communicating the intelligence of which he was bearer, the Seraskier ordered his horse, and, previous to mounting, sent off a forced post, said to be for Egypt, and then left for this town, which he reached like wildfire. After holding a divan of his head officers, he dispatched that same night twelve forced posts, said to be to call his troops from their different stations, and sent an officer to bring immediately the animals of the Artillery Regiment stationed here, which only fifteen days ago been sent to grass.

The subsequent advices which reached this Government the following day are, that 3,000 Irregulars had crossed the Euphrates under Koord Mahomed Pasha; and since then, up to this time, that of a considerable force under a certain Ismael Pasha, all of whom are reported to have encamped at about three hours distance from the banks of the river.

With regard to the number of troops that have crossed there are several reports, but the most correct, from the latest intelligence received coming from an authentic source, is, that there are no more than 15,000 men under Ismael Pasha, Koord Mahomed Pasha, and Inge Bar, or Mehemet Pasha, that have passed the river at Bir with ammunition stores, and some few artillery pieces. I am told that the Sultan's troops find great difficulty in crossing the Euphrates at this period, owing to the late heavy rains which have caused it to swell greatly, so that the heavy boats they have there, can only perform the service twice a day—once to bring troops across, and then the provisions, &c. required for them.

The troops that have crossed at Bir compose part of one of the columns of the Turkish army, which is advancing on the frontier in that quarter, and which, it is said, will be joined by Ali Pasha of Bagdad, who, it is stated, has already arrived at Diarbekir with about 25,000 to 30,000



men. Another column, under the Seraskier Hafiz Ali Pasha, of, it is said, 60,000 strong, is advancing from Malatia, on Roum Kale; and the third column of 40,000 men, under Halil Pasha and Solyman Pasha, are advancing on the Marash line.

I am informed that a post reached this the day before yesterday from Aintab, bringing intelligence to his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, that a force of about 15,000 to 20,000 men had all at once appeared at the further extremity of that plain; but from very strict inquiry that I have made, I cannot find that either that column, or the other two of the Sultan's forces, have as yet passed their limits; and I am positively assured that for the present, and up to the last advices received, they all continued within their jurisdiction.

It is reported here by some, that the brother of Hafiz Pasha is advancing with Suffook Bey of the Gerba Arabs, to act with all the Arabs on the Desert line. This is not confirmed in any way; from all inquiry I have made, there does not appear to be anything doing on that line from Dair to Hamah. I shall not fail to inform your Lordship, if I hear of any operations on that line.

By last advices from Damascus, I hear that the Hauran insurrection still continued, and had assumed a more determined character. This may arise not unlikely from some understanding which may exist between them and the Sultan's Seraskier, to act in unison with Hafiz Pasha's brother and Suffook Bey, in any operations which they may undertake to the South and on the Desert line, to cut off his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha and his forces to the South, and his operations on this northern frontier.

With regard to the movements on this side, I have to inform your Lordship, that this Government is actively occupied daily in laying in with all possible dispatch, provisions, ammunition, and stores of all sorts, besides those obtained here, there are daily arrivals from Latakia, landed there from Egypt.

It appears that his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha intends to make Aleppo his head quarters, at least for the present. Since the advices reached this, that some of the Sultan's forces had crossed the Euphrates, his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha's forces are daily arriving here, and are being lodged in mosques, khans, and every place the Government can procure. I inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of a note of the forces that have arrived here, and those that are expected.

His Excellency Ibrahim Pasha intends, after the arrival of all the forces, to have a general review of the whole, and then purposes to march his forces at about ten or twelve hours' distance, and form his camp in the plain between this place and Aintab, and near the river Sedjour, and there wait any attack which may be made against him by the Sultan's forces. I am positively assured that his Excellency has received through Achmet Menekly Pasha, the Minister of War, positive orders from his father Mehemet Ali, not to move out of his limits upon any consideration, or to be the first aggressor. Some say that his instructions are to act on the defensive, and on his own territory to resist two attacks of the Sultan's forces; but on the third he gives him permission to advance. How far this may be true remains to be seen; as yet, he has no regular troops nearer the frontier than this. The Annadia, or Bedoun Cavalry, are the only troops on the frontiers; they are stationed at the Sedjour, watching the movements on the other side.

I have to inform your Lordship, that by Mr. Vice-Consul Hays's last letter, everything was quiet in his district, and among the late malcontents of the mountains in that neighbourhood. But from some conversation that I had yesterday with several persons who are well acquainted and come into continual contact with the inhabitants of the whole range of these mountains extending from Beylan to Byass and along that range to those of the Taurus I am afraid that in the event of any hostilities taking place between the Sultan's forces and the Government, which I do not at all regret, the whole of these immense range of mountains would all presently take up arms against his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha; and this is the opinion of many

persons; but only in the event of Ibrahim Pasha's forces meeting with a defeat.

I am informed by persons that have just come from the Adana district, that his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha has a force of Irregular Cavalry (Bashi Bosuks) and Annadia, say 4,000 to 5,000 men, on the Byass mountains, and some along the continuity of that range to the base of the Taurus.

Mr. Vice-Consul Hays informs me, that the mountains in his district are, for the present, quiet, but there is no doubt that if hostilities commence, the Sultan's Pashas will try to excite all the malcontents on that line to revolt, and take up arms against the Egyptians; I have begged of Mr. Vice-Consul Hays to be very vigilant on all that is doing in that quarter, which I will not fail to transmit to your Lordship.

I am further informed that his Excellency the Pasha has directed that the force at Adana is not to move, but to be ready to act in the event of any attack being directed by the Sultan on the defile line. I inclose for your Lordship's information, a note of the forces at Adana and the defile of the Taurus.

I have made strict inquiry, but I do not find that for the present there are any of the Sultan's forces marching on that line.

I am very sorry to be obliged to acquaint your Lordship, that from inquiry I have made from our merchants, the present critical state of affairs in this country is causing most ruinous consequences to our trade, for since the intelligence received of the Sultan's forces having crossed the Euphrates, and that the army is advancing on the frontier at different points, with an apparent hostile intention,—and subsequently the steps taken by this Government in the concentration of all the Egyptian forces in this neighbourhood,—the commerce of this place has been completely paralyzed, and commercial transactions of all sorts have entirely ceased, thereby causing great detriment to our British merchants who can neither effect sales of the large stocks they have on hand, nor can they recover, at this present moment that payments are suspended under the plea of the unsettled state of affairs, any of their outstanding debts, of which they have on the place to such large amounts; moreover, this suspension of trade is not only ruinous to our merchants established here, but it also causes considerable detriment and loss to our general commercial interests.

Mr. Vice-Consul Hays informs me, that under the 30th ultimo, the Austrian frigate "Medea" arrived there, in eighteen days from Smyrna, bearing the flag of Commodore Bandiera. I believe her visit at Alexandria, is only the yearly one, to obtain all the news from this part of Syria, for which purpose he sent up a messenger to the Austrian Consul-General here.

It is, I believe, the Commodore's intention from Scanderoon to go southwards.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY

Inclosure 3 in No. 56.

Note of the Egyptian Forces that are at Aleppo.

INFANTRY	CAVALRY
2nd of the Guards	1st Lancers of the Guard
3rd " " "	1st Carabiniers
2nd of the Line	1st Lancers
11th " "	2nd " "
5th " "	—
10th " "	4 Regiments
11th " "	
12th " "	
13th " "	
14th " "	

9 Regiments

## ARTILLERY

1st of the Guard.  
2nd of Foot.

2 Regiments.

*Note of Egyptian Forces expected to arrive.*

## INFANTRY.

1st of the Guard.  
6th of the Line.  
35th ditto

3 Regiments.

And 6 Regiments of the Line are expected from Egypt.

## CAVALRY.

6th.  
11th.

2 Regiments.

Inclosure 4 in No. 56.

*Note of the Forces at Adana and the Defile of the Taurus.*

## At Adana.

## INFANTRY.

29th of the Line.  
30th ditto.

2 Regiments.

## CAVALRY

5th  
7th

2 Regiments.

## At the Defile of the Taurus.

5th of Infantry of the Line.

2 Battalions of Sappers.

2 Battalions of Artillerymen.

And 2 Forts and 6 Batteries, mounting in all 150 Cannons.

No. 57

*Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 17.)*

No. 19.)

My Lord,

*Beyrout, May 9, 1839*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that accounts have been received at this place, of the passage of the Euphrates by the Sultan's troops, at Bir, and that forces under Haliz Pasha are also advancing on the northern frontier.

On the other hand, the Egyptian troops have been summoned to Aleppo by Ibrahim Pasha, from all parts of Syria and he has encamped his forces in the immediate neighbourhood of that city. His Highness is strongly fortifying and entrenching his position,—apparently with the intention to wait an attack, which is universally believed to be imminent.

The conflict, however, should it take place, will probably be deferred till after the Turkish moon Saffar, ending the 12th instant,—a season considered inauspicious by the Mussulmans for commencing military operations.

The maximum of Ibrahim Pasha's force in Syria is estimated at 60,000 regular troops. Recent makes that of the Sultan at least double the amount of the Egyptian regulars. But it is not possible, at this distance, to number the latter army with any degree of accuracy. And almost all that we know just now relative to pending events, coming chiefly through the organs or partisans of the respective parties, must be received with much caution.

The most active preparations are making by this Government to maintain a prompt communication with Egypt. Carriers from Aleppo are to reach Cairo the sixth day.

The Emir Bechur has received orders to send a force to Damascus and Tripoli; and about 1,000 Christian troops will march to each of the above places, under the command of the son and grandson of the Emir. This is a measure of precaution, as at neither of the above cities is the Mahomedan population believed to be well affected to the existing Government. Indeed any success on the part of the Sultan's troops, it is believed, would be the signal for revolt not only at those places, but throughout Syria.

An exception to this feeling I am of opinion may be looked for amongst the Christian troops of Lebanon, who certainly entertain fears that should the Sultan repossess himself of Syria, the Mahomedans would regain the ascendancy, and once more exhibit their naturally turbulent and fanatical character towards other sects.

In this immediate neighbourhood all is for the present tranquil—much anxiety exists amongst all classes, but especially in the Christian population, as to the issue of pending events.

An individual whose life is of great importance to the Turkish cause at the present juncture, is Soliman Pasha, perhaps the only person in Ibrahim Pasha's army possessing the necessary talents for conducting military operations.

No reliance can be placed on the accounts received respecting the insurrection in the Ledja. I have observed that as the monthly period of the communication with Europe approaches, the authorities represent them as terminated, and that subsequent information bolsters those accounts.

A distinguished traveller who has just returned to this place from a tour along the banks of the Jordan, assures me, that he found the Arab tribes there all opposed to Ibrahim Pasha, and ardently desirous of an opportunity of acting hostilely against him. They had, of late, begun to show themselves in large masses, armed, on this side Jordan, and to enter the villages, which a little time ago they did not venture to do. The news of the Sultan's troops having crossed the Euphrates, had not reached the Jordan, when the traveller alluded to left its banks about eight days ago; but he does not doubt the news will afford the liveliest pleasure to the Arab tribes there, and lead to an open demonstration; their feelings should a collision between the armies take place.

I have &c

Signed N. MOORE.

P.S.—13th May, up to this day, nothing new relative to the movement of the armies.

N. M.

No. 58.

*Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 17.)*

(No. 9.)

My Lord,

*Damascus, May 10, 1839*

ON the 27th ultimo, I received intelligence from Mr. Pro-Consul F. H. S. Werry at Aleppo, under date of the 23rd, of the advance of the Sultan's troops, crossing the Euphrates at Bir, and the measures taken by his Highness Ibrahim Pasha. This information I transmitted the same day to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, viz Beyrout, and to Her Majesty's Resident in Egypt, by the Government post.

On the 30th, I received further intelligence from Mr. Pro-Consul Werry at Aleppo, under date of the 25th and 27th, of the further movements of the Sultan's Army and his Highness Ibrahim Pasha's measures, which I transmitted the same day to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, viz Beyrout, and to Her Majesty's Resident in Egypt, by the Government post. And on the 29th, I transmitted viz Beyrout, to Her

( )



Majesty's Resident at Cairo, the information I was in possession of on the foregoing subjects.

I now have the honour to enclose copies of all the intelligence I received from Mr. Pro-Consul Werry, at Aleppo, to those dates, for your Lordship's information, as it may occur that the Pro-Consul at Aleppo may be prevented transmitting the same to your Lordship.

I make no doubt your Lordship is fully informed of the cause for which the Sultan's Army is advancing, whether for a demonstration for a political object, either to cover Bagdad, or for any other political motive connected with the Sultan's Asiatic provinces and Persia, or for that of invading Syria. I, consequently, abstain from intruding and fatiguing your Lordship with speculative opinions thereon.

The Sultan's forces are stated to be 80,000 men and 170 guns; but whether that number includes all arms and the Irregulars, is not ascertained. Lieutenant Lynch, at Bagdad, states the Seraskier's Army to be 35,000 regulars.

By the latest advices, it would appear that the Sultan's Army would have its head-quarters, and form the pivot of its operations at Roum Kale, its left extending on the high road from Bir to Aleppo, with its extreme left to be supported by the Arab tribes under Suffook Bey, operating by crossing the Euphrates between Bir and below Dair. Its extreme right resting on Marash, to co-operate with the malcontents of the ranges of the Taurus.

By way of Roum Kale and Bir, against the centre and main body of the Egyptian Army, the columns of the former turning the Egyptian positions at Aintab; by way of Marash, to co-operate with the malcontents of the ranges of the Taurus, extending to Byass, Beylan, and Alexandretta, and threatening the left wing and rear of the Egyptian Army, the Arabs under Suffook Bey acting on the right of the Egyptian Army, and attacking the flank of Syria, acting with the insurgents of the Haouran, threatening the desert line from south to north, cutting off the operations of Ibrahim Pasha therewith, and attacking him in the rear at Aleppo.

Besides crossing the Euphrates unopposed, and advancing into the Egyptian territories, and attacking Ibrahim Pasha's Army, the Sultan's Seraskier has also the advantage of having the population in his favour, but as he will be removed from his depôts of provisions, or have difficulty to bring them up in his rear, that latter advantage is counter-balanced, unless the population, which is not generally armed, rises against the Egyptians; such advantage will increase, should the first attack prove favourable to the Sultan's arms; but should a general action take place, and the contrary fate is experienced, the Sultan's Army will have great difficulty to retreat across the Euphrates; still the passage is susceptible of being defended against the Egyptians, if a operation both ways will be difficult of execution, as neither are provided with pontoon equipages, and the boats available on the river at different points for common purposes are inadequate. Thus in a military point of view it may be said that should the Sultan's Army be overthrown in a general battle on this side of the Euphrates, it may be looked upon as lost.

I am without any information of what is going on in the Adana district, and whether the Sultan's forces are advancing either along the coast of Cilicia, or by the centre of the Taurus.

His Highness Ibrahim Pasha's force will be twenty-two regiments of Infantry, twelve regiments of Cavalry, and six of Artillery. Regulars, say 5,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, including the Cavalry artillerymen, and 100 guns, say 6,000 Irregular Arab Cavalry, the body of Albanians said to be expected from Candia, and other irregulars, say 10,000 foot soldiers, sent from the neighbourhood of the Taurus. There will also be about 2,500 to 3,000 Haubarrah Irregular Cavalry to protect the desert line.

It appears, from the measures taking by Ibrahim Pasha, that he is concentrating his troops in the first instance, to cover Aleppo, and that if he waits to be attacked by the main body of the Sultan's Army from

Roum Kale and Bir, he is placed in an unfavourable and false position, and is exposing his position and both wings of his army, to the imminent risk of being out-flanked, turned, and taken in the rear; and the principal attack of the Sultan's Seraskier, if made at all, will not probably be made until that takes place. What measures Ibrahim Pasha will take to counteract any operations which the Sultan's Seraskier may undertake by Marash, and the malcontents of the ranges of the Taurus, whether by Byass, to intercept Ibrahim's communications with Alexandretta, or in the plains of Aleppo, I am not informed. The troops in position at Khas, though not sufficiently to the left, and far the present of an adequate force, and seemingly to support the position at Aintab, will require to be supported by a large body of irregulars, foot, and cavalry, should that position be intended to prevent the irruption of the Sultan's forces into the plain, with the object to menace the left wing of Ibrahim Pasha's Army before, or on advance of Aleppo. Probably the Albanians said to be expected from Candia under Mustafa Pasha, are intended to act on that line; and as the country from Marash, Byass, and Beylan, and to the plains of Aleppo, is chiefly mountainous, they may act with advantage.

To protect the desert line, and defend the right wing against the attacks of the Arabs, whether directed from the Sultan's jurisdiction, those of the Syrian desert and the malcontents of Haouran, and any which may be excited to join the Sultan's auxiliaries on that line, it would appear Ibrahim Pasha can only do it by the Annadi Cavalry and other irregular Cavalry; and it remains to be seen if he has sufficient force of this kind to direct on these points, to embrace all these objects effectually. But unless Suffook Bey penetrates to the Syrian frontier, and takes a decisive part in the attacks, or that one of whom there may exist some doubt, as the Arab tribes in common are too intelligent and cunning to compromise themselves until they are certain that a general battle has given a decided superiority to either the Sultan's or the Egyptian Army, nothing is likely to materially defeat the Egyptian operations on the desert line, though the marauding Arab tribes will take advantage of every opportunity to harass and plunder, which may be actually restrained by detachments of Annadi Cavalry. Late advices from Bagdad, mention that Suffook Bey had been in that vicinity, and had made peace with the Shamama Arabs, and had returned to the north through the Jesrah, saving Singar on the right to act with the Sultan's Seraskier, Habi Pasha, in his operations on the Syrian desert line. This could be commenced without coming on good terms with the Shamama Arabs, who are on the east side of the Euphrates, but as the latter are at war with the great tribes of the Anasrees, who hold the desert between the Euphrates and the Syrian line, it will be an operation of considerable difficulty for Suffook Bey to act successfully, and combine the whole against the Egyptian forces, or jurisdiction on the bank of Syria.

It does not appear by the progress made by the Egyptian Government in forming depôts of provisions, which generally are at a considerable distance in the rear of Aleppo, and on the desert line, and by the tardy point in executing by Ibrahim Pasha of concentrating the army on the Aleppo frontier, that his Highness had previously planned, to throw his operations across the Euphrates, and make Mesopotamia the theatre of his campaign, whether to prosecute the same towards Bagdad, or to the north. In fact, they would appear to have been planned for defence rather than for aggression. It may also be remarked that if the Egyptian Army is defeated, it has no reserves or force in its rear, or any means it can rely on, to recruit or recover itself, to hold possession of Syria.

The Haouran insurrection has not subsided, the insurgents have manifested a determined hostile spirit to the Government. Part remain in the Ledges, and most of them commit ravages on the adjacent villages and passengers of all descriptions. They pillaged the messengers bringing the intelligence of the approach of the caravan from Mecca, and have had a rencontre with the cavalry force under Shebli Harrian, in which they were the chief sufferers. They still, however, temporize and nego-

500, 600 M. <sup>1</sup> <sup>2</sup> <sup>3</sup> <sup>4</sup> <sup>5</sup> <sup>6</sup> <sup>7</sup> <sup>8</sup> <sup>9</sup> <sup>10</sup> <sup>11</sup> <sup>12</sup> <sup>13</sup> <sup>14</sup> <sup>15</sup> <sup>16</sup> <sup>17</sup> <sup>18</sup> <sup>19</sup> <sup>20</sup> <sup>21</sup> <sup>22</sup> <sup>23</sup> <sup>24</sup> <sup>25</sup> <sup>26</sup> <sup>27</sup> <sup>28</sup> <sup>29</sup> <sup>30</sup> <sup>31</sup> <sup>32</sup> <sup>33</sup> <sup>34</sup> <sup>35</sup> <sup>36</sup> <sup>37</sup> <sup>38</sup> <sup>39</sup> <sup>40</sup> <sup>41</sup> <sup>42</sup> <sup>43</sup> <sup>44</sup> <sup>45</sup> <sup>46</sup> <sup>47</sup> <sup>48</sup> <sup>49</sup> <sup>50</sup> <sup>51</sup> <sup>52</sup> <sup>53</sup> <sup>54</sup> <sup>55</sup> <sup>56</sup> <sup>57</sup> <sup>58</sup> <sup>59</sup> <sup>60</sup> <sup>61</sup> <sup>62</sup> <sup>63</sup> <sup>64</sup> <sup>65</sup> <sup>66</sup> <sup>67</sup> <sup>68</sup> <sup>69</sup> <sup>70</sup> <sup>71</sup> <sup>72</sup> <sup>73</sup> <sup>74</sup> <sup>75</sup> <sup>76</sup> <sup>77</sup> <sup>78</sup> <sup>79</sup> <sup>80</sup> <sup>81</sup> <sup>82</sup> <sup>83</sup> <sup>84</sup> <sup>85</sup> <sup>86</sup> <sup>87</sup> <sup>88</sup> <sup>89</sup> <sup>90</sup> <sup>91</sup> <sup>92</sup> <sup>93</sup> <sup>94</sup> <sup>95</sup> <sup>96</sup> <sup>97</sup> <sup>98</sup> <sup>99</sup> <sup>100</sup> <sup>101</sup> <sup>102</sup> <sup>103</sup> <sup>104</sup> <sup>105</sup> <sup>106</sup> <sup>107</sup> <sup>108</sup> <sup>109</sup> <sup>110</sup> <sup>111</sup> <sup>112</sup> <sup>113</sup> <sup>114</sup> <sup>115</sup> <sup>116</sup> <sup>117</sup> <sup>118</sup> <sup>119</sup> <sup>120</sup> <sup>121</sup> <sup>122</sup> <sup>123</sup> <sup>124</sup> <sup>125</sup> <sup>126</sup> <sup>127</sup> <sup>128</sup> <sup>129</sup> <sup>130</sup> <sup>131</sup> <sup>132</sup> <sup>133</sup> <sup>134</sup> <sup>135</sup> <sup>136</sup> <sup>137</sup> <sup>138</sup> <sup>139</sup> <sup>140</sup> <sup>141</sup> <sup>142</sup> <sup>143</sup> <sup>144</sup> <sup>145</sup> <sup>146</sup> <sup>147</sup> <sup>148</sup> <sup>149</sup> <sup>150</sup> <sup>151</sup> <sup>152</sup> <sup>153</sup> <sup>154</sup> <sup>155</sup> <sup>156</sup> <sup>157</sup> <sup>158</sup> <sup>159</sup> <sup>160</sup> <sup>161</sup> <sup>162</sup> <sup>163</sup> <sup>164</sup> <sup>165</sup> <sup>166</sup> <sup>167</sup> <sup>168</sup> <sup>169</sup> <sup>170</sup> <sup>171</sup> <sup>172</sup> <sup>173</sup> <sup>174</sup> <sup>175</sup> <sup>176</sup> <sup>177</sup> <sup>178</sup> <sup>179</sup> <sup>180</sup> <sup>181</sup> <sup>182</sup> <sup>183</sup> <sup>184</sup> <sup>185</sup> <sup>186</sup> <sup>187</sup> <sup>188</sup> <sup>189</sup> <sup>190</sup> <sup>191</sup> <sup>192</sup> <sup>193</sup> <sup>194</sup> <sup>195</sup> <sup>196</sup> <sup>197</sup> <sup>198</sup> <sup>199</sup> <sup>200</sup> <sup>201</sup> <sup>202</sup> <sup>203</sup> <sup>204</sup> <sup>205</sup> <sup>206</sup> <sup>207</sup> <sup>208</sup> <sup>209</sup> <sup>210</sup> <sup>211</sup> <sup>212</sup> <sup>213</sup> <sup>214</sup> <sup>215</sup> <sup>216</sup> <sup>217</sup> <sup>218</sup> <sup>219</sup> <sup>220</sup> <sup>221</sup> <sup>222</sup> <sup>223</sup> <sup>224</sup> <sup>225</sup> <sup>226</sup> <sup>227</sup> <sup>228</sup> <sup>229</sup> <sup>230</sup> <sup>231</sup> <sup>232</sup> <sup>233</sup> <sup>234</sup> <sup>235</sup> <sup>236</sup> <sup>237</sup> <sup>238</sup> <sup>239</sup> <sup>240</sup> <sup>241</sup> <sup>242</sup> <sup>243</sup> <sup>244</sup> <sup>245</sup> <sup>246</sup> <sup>247</sup> <sup>248</sup> <sup>249</sup> <sup>250</sup> <sup>251</sup> <sup>252</sup> <sup>253</sup> <sup>254</sup> <sup>255</sup> <sup>256</sup> <sup>257</sup> <sup>258</sup> <sup>259</sup> <sup>260</sup> <sup>261</sup> <sup>262</sup> <sup>263</sup> <sup>264</sup> <sup>265</sup> <sup>266</sup> <sup>267</sup> <sup>268</sup> <sup>269</sup> <sup>270</sup> <sup>271</sup> <sup>272</sup> <sup>273</sup> <sup>274</sup> <sup>275</sup> <sup>276</sup> <sup>277</sup> <sup>278</sup> <sup>279</sup> <sup>280</sup> <sup>281</sup> <sup>282</sup> <sup>283</sup> <sup>284</sup> <sup>285</sup> <sup>286</sup> <sup>287</sup> <sup>288</sup> <sup>289</sup> <sup>290</sup> <sup>291</sup> <sup>292</sup> <sup>293</sup> <sup>294</sup> <sup>295</sup> <sup>296</sup> <sup>297</sup> <sup>298</sup> <sup>299</sup> <sup>300</sup> <sup>301</sup> <sup>302</sup> <sup>303</sup> <sup>304</sup> <sup>305</sup> <sup>306</sup> <sup>307</sup> <sup>308</sup> <sup>309</sup> <sup>310</sup> <sup>311</sup> <sup>312</sup> <sup>313</sup> <sup>314</sup> <sup>315</sup> <sup>316</sup> <sup>317</sup> <sup>318</sup> <sup>319</sup> <sup>320</sup> <sup>321</sup> <sup>322</sup> <sup>323</sup> <sup>324</sup> <sup>325</sup> <sup>326</sup> <sup>327</sup> <sup>328</sup> <sup>329</sup> <sup>330</sup> <sup>331</sup> <sup>332</sup> <sup>333</sup> <sup>334</sup> <sup>335</sup> <sup>336</sup> <sup>337</sup> <sup>338</sup> <sup>339</sup> <sup>340</sup> <sup>341</sup> <sup>342</sup> <sup>343</sup> <sup>344</sup> <sup>345</sup> <sup>346</sup> <sup>347</sup> <sup>348</sup> <sup>349</sup> <sup>350</sup> <sup>351</sup> <sup>352</sup> <sup>353</sup> <sup>354</sup> <sup>355</sup> <sup>356</sup> <sup>357</sup> <sup>358</sup> <sup>359</sup> <sup>360</sup> <sup>361</sup> <sup>362</sup> <sup>363</sup> <sup>364</sup> <sup>365</sup> <sup>366</sup> <sup>367</sup> <sup>368</sup> <sup>369</sup> <sup>370</sup> <sup>371</sup> <sup>372</sup> <sup>373</sup> <sup>374</sup> <sup>375</sup> <sup>376</sup> <sup>377</sup> <sup>378</sup> <sup>379</sup> <sup>380</sup> <sup>381</sup> <sup>382</sup> <sup>383</sup> <sup>384</sup> <sup>385</sup> <sup>386</sup> <sup>387</sup> <sup>388</sup> <sup>389</sup> <sup>390</sup> <sup>391</sup> <sup>392</sup> <sup>393</sup> <sup>394</sup> <sup>395</sup> <sup>396</sup> <sup>397</sup> <sup>398</sup> <sup>399</sup> <sup>400</sup> <sup>401</sup> <sup>402</sup> <sup>403</sup> <sup>404</sup> <sup>405</sup> <sup>406</sup> <sup>407</sup> <sup>408</sup> <sup>409</sup> <sup>410</sup> <sup>411</sup> <sup>412</sup> <sup>413</sup> <sup>414</sup> <sup>415</sup> <sup>416</sup> <sup>417</sup> <sup>418</sup> <sup>419</sup> <sup>420</sup> <sup>421</sup> <sup>422</sup> <sup>423</sup> <sup>424</sup> <sup>425</sup> <sup>426</sup> <sup>427</sup> <sup>428</sup> <sup>429</sup> <sup>430</sup> <sup>431</sup> <sup>432</sup> <sup>433</sup> <sup>434</sup> <sup>435</sup> <sup>436</sup> <sup>437</sup> <sup>438</sup> <sup>439</sup> <sup>440</sup> <sup>441</sup> <sup>442</sup> <sup>443</sup> <sup>444</sup> <sup>445</sup> <sup>446</sup> <sup>447</sup> <sup>448</sup> <sup>449</sup> <sup>450</sup> <sup>451</sup> <sup>452</sup> <sup>453</sup> <sup>454</sup> <sup>455</sup> <sup>456</sup> <sup>457</sup> <sup>458</sup> <sup>459</sup> <sup>460</sup> <sup>461</sup> <sup>462</sup> <sup>463</sup> <sup>464</sup> <sup>465</sup> <sup>466</</sup>

The [redacted] have been [redacted] of funds sent to Aleppo for the [redacted] troops of the [redacted] The burden [redacted] which [redacted] for [redacted] [redacted] being actually collected. The farmers of the Customs' duty, and duty on wine and spirits, have been imprisoned and menaced with the bastinado, to oblige them to pay up arrears of the revenue: they consequently made terms with the Government; but fresh demands made on them for funds, have caused them to disappear.

The Government here continues to press the departure of all the Anasli Cavalry as it arrives from Egypt, for the north. 200 camels have been purchased and sent to the army, to complete the original number ordered by Ibrahim Pasha.

His Highness's Tatar Agha arrived here, to place additional relays between Aleppo, Damascus, and Cairo, by which the service would be performed in six days, between his Highness's headquarters and Cairo.

Damascus will be guarded by a battalion of the 25th Regiment, 1,000 Infantry from Jerusalem, about 500 or 600 Invalids, 3,000 Christian Irregular Foot troops from the Emir Bechar's territories, under his son Emir Halil, and a body of Irregular Cavalry; and though the Mussulman population is disaffected, I do not think they dare rise so long as this force remains here.

I hear that the Chiefs of the Haouran insurgents have arrived here.

I have also just received further advices from Mr. Pro-Consul Werry at Aleppo, and in order that your Lordship may not experience inconvenience from want of such information reaching you I have the honour to enclose copies of the same.

I have, &c.,  
Signed) N. W. WERRY

Substance of a private letter received April 27, per weekly post from  
Mr Pro-Consul P H S Werry, dated Aleppo, April 23 1831

There was no Tatar or any other conveyance leaving Aleppo for Constantinople by which Mr. Proctor could transmit the letter to Her Majesty's Ambassador.

The Proc. contd. was without information if the Sultan's troops were advancing by way of Marash.

It is stated that private advices mentioned the arrival of six regiments of the Sultan's troops at Orfa from Malasia, and it is conjectured the force that crossed at Bir formed a part of it.





date 16th instant, inclosing copy of his journal, mentioning the late extensive arrivals at that port, of ammunition and stores, and those reported that are to follow. (*Vide his Journal.*)

April 24.

I am this morning informed, from the same authentic source that I obtained yesterday's intelligence, that another Government spy reached this place during the night, who left after yesterday's one, and who reports that besides the three regiments of Infantry on this side of the Euphrates, there are 3,000 Bashi Bozucks, or Irregular Cavalry, that have crossed the river, under Kourd Mahomed Pasha.

It is further reported that this Kourd Mahomed Pasha has the command of 10,000 of these troops, 3,000 of whom have only crossed, but that more are to follow.

This morning, the Annadi troops have all been ordered to mount and proceed to Beglis, a village on the road from hence to Bir, with orders to reconnoitre and see what is going on, but not to cross in any way the limits.

This forenoon, his Highness the Seraskier dispatched twelve officers, all of whom have separate missions; said to be, to bring immediately troops from different stations. An officer also started to bring in the Artillery horses that are at grass; and I am positively informed that the Artillery is all out and ready, only waiting for the animals.

The Dragoman Lewis Hakim tells me, that this day at noon, he was at the Seraglio, and heard the Musselim give the following orders to the butchers and bakers: that by command of his Highness the Seraskier, beginning from the day after to-morrow, 7,500 oke of fresh meat are to be daily supplied for the troops, and 20,000 oke of flour daily, for the same purpose. It is also rumoured to-day, that Government are to pay the troops, officers, and employes, nine months' pay.

The Government Authorities are with great activity and exertion preparing the preparations, there is a really great scarcity of wood, charcoal, and grain of all sorts.

Everything continues quiet in the town. His Excellency Soliman Pasha, who has been, ever since his arrival here, staying at the garden of his Excellency Ismael Bey, has now transported his things into town, and has taken up his abode with his Highness the Seraskier in his palace.

April 25

I am informed, that during the past night, part of the Artillery horses reached this, from grass.

It is rumoured that the four regiments at present in garrison here, are to leave this and encamp between Aleppo and Aintab, and that other three regiments will replace them here.

It is said, that the Pasha has ordered the members of the Board of Health to go round the town and visit some of the mosques, to find one suitable as an hospital.

The public report during this day is that the Sultan's forces are marching on three columns from Marash, Bir, and the Desert. (This is not authentic.)

At mid-day, the remainder of the Artillery horses reached this.

This Government is actively pursuing the late preparations, and causing everything to be got ready.

It is reported that late last night, a forced post in forty-one hours reached this from Beyrout, to the following purpose:

"Jeri verso il tarde una posta da Berutti per 41 ore, giunse qui con dei telegrammi da Sua Altezza Ibrahim Pasha proveniente d'Alessandria, in data 5 Sefer, per informarlo degli avvisi, che egli avevano da Costantinopoli daver ordinato il Gran Signor che le sue forze si accingessero sulle frontiere della Siria, dietro tali avvisi, il Vice-Re d'Egitto prese diverse misure per rinforzare la sua Armata che si trova in queste parti con delle istruzioni pero a Sua Altezza Ibrahim Pasha, di non prendere sopra di lui

il principio della guerra, ma solamente di difendersi in caso che fosse attaccato, per la 1<sup>a</sup> e 2<sup>a</sup> Volta ed il 3<sup>o</sup> attaccato che dalle forze del Gran Signor verrebbe fatto agli Egiziani, Sua Altezza Ibrahim Pasha a Berlino di fare il suo possibile per bastare le Truppe del Gran Signor ritornandosi a quel territorio: le forze del Vice-Re d'Egitto decise di giungere quella della Siria, sono daverge fatte marciare 1<sup>a</sup> reggimento d'infanteria regolare parte dell'Egitto dal 8 al 20 Mubarrak occupando anche la via verso Aleppo e per l'Albania, Sua Altezza Ibrahim Pasha di Costantinopoli si accinge a una partita per il paese della Siria, accompagnato da 16 mille di suoi Arnauti.

In Alessandria si presero le necessarie misure per fare partire giornalmente, delle munizioni di guerra, provviste da bocca e dei fondi (dei quali si conosce già diversi arrivi alla scala di Lattachia) e si fecero le maggiori forze Egiziane che si forneranno in queste parti."

The above is publicly reported.

I hear it is also reported that his Highness the Seraskier has received advice that several of his regiments have already reached this neighbourhood from the south, and that he has ordered them to march forward on the frontier and await his orders. It is stated that the army that his Highness is forming to oppose any attack the Sultan may make, will be composed of 20,000 Irregular Troops, twenty regiments of Regular Troops, and 16,000 Arnauts that he is expecting from Constantinople. His Highness has also ordered the Seraskier to send his Excellency Soliman Pasha, and his Excellency Achmet Menekli Pasha.

No further advices have been received here respecting the movements of the forces (Sultan's) already crossed.

Inclosure 5 in No. 38

Copy of Aleppo Journal brought down from the 24th April to the 1st of May, 1839.

April 26.

THE Government is actively providing provisions, &c., which, with those arriving from the coast, are being put into store.

I am told that there are daily arrivals here from the coast, of ammunition.

All the bakers and ovens have been seized to work for the Government, so that not a loaf of bread is to be found in the bazars.

Mr. French Consul Guya visited his Highness the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha to-day. I am told that the conversation which took place between them, was on the late movement made by the Sultan's forces in the direction of Bir, part of which column had crossed the river Euphrates and which his Highness Ibrahim Pasha said, he considered as indicating an intention to attack him, and which obliged his Highness to take immediate steps to collect his forces, in order to be ready to meet any attack which might be made against him, to which, I am told the French Consul replied his Highness as follows: "I am of opinion that there will be no war between you and the Sultan, for the European Powers are

united to maintain the peace between you." To which Ibrahim Pasha replied again, that "all is very good, but can I have anything stronger indicating that the Sultan has the intention to attack me, when I have crossed some of his troops at Bir; and that there is another column advancing at Roum Kale, under Hafiz Pasha, for the same purpose?"

There are daily arrivals here of regiments, who are all quartered in the town.

April 27

This Government continues in its active preparations, both in the laying in of stores and military ammunition of all sorts, as also of daily



arrivals of troops, which are all lodged in mosques, coffee-houses, &c., prepared for their reception.

It is rumoured to-day, that a colonel and several subaltern officers, with 200 men, had deserted from the Sultan's side, and had arrived at Adana. This requires further confirmation.

It is positively reported to-day, that the son of the late Reshad Mehemet Pasha, in the direction of Merdin and Moussul, is marching with a force of 40,000 strong, to join Suffook Bey, Chief of the Gerba Arabs, who is with a considerable force of Arabs; both of whom are to advance along the desert, in order to act with the Haouran Arabs to the South.

Received this afternoon a letter from his Excellency Solyman Pasha, who states that owing to the different caravans and communications between the Sultan's territory and this place, having been lately stopped by that Government, and not allowed to come to Syria, this Government had in consequence come to the same determination, of not allowing any intercourse to take place between this country and the Sultan's territory, so long as the Sultan's Government impeded the intercourse on their side, which his Excellency begged might be communicated to the British merchants for their information.

Circulated this afternoon, the foregoing communication from his Excellency Solyman Pasha to the British merchants of this place.

April 30.

Part of the Horse Artillery from Hamah, in fifty-four pieces, reached this at noon.

It is reported to-day, that Inge Bairactar Mehemet Pasha has also crossed the river with a force, and that Ali Pasha of Bagdad had arrived at Diarbekir, with a force intended to act against Syria.

I hear from M. Geoffroy, the French Counciller, that his Excellency Solyman Pasha had said, that by the last advices they had up to Sunday night only eight battalions of the Sultan's forces had crossed the river Euphrates at Bir, with six pieces of Artillery; and further added, that it is with great difficulty the troops cross, owing to the river being very high, and only having seven boats, which can only take in and land a battalion a-day.

His Highness the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha's troops are daily arriving in this town from all quarters.

The desertion of a colonel with 200 men, from the Sultan's territory, is not yet verified.

May 1

I am informed that Germanoss Bagery with Shukri Teggat, went to-day to the Syrian Patriarch's, upon which the head Christian merchants were sent for; on their arrival the purport of the meeting was, that Germanoss Bagery communicated to them that his Highness the Seraskier demanded of them a loan of a sum of money, which the treasury is to pay in the course of a week, and that if it could not be obtained by that means his Highness would be compelled to levy the Ferah tax, which he is very anxious to do, as under the present miserable state of the poor country it would cause great suffering.

I am informed, that a meeting of the principal Turk merchants was held at his Excellency the Governor's for the same purpose, but I have not been able to learn yet what amount is required of them.

M. Geoffroy, the French Counciller, tells me that Mr. French Consul Guys received to-day a letter, via Beyrout and Alexandria, from his Excellency the French Ambassador at Constantinople under date 26th May, which states, "you hear a your neighbor and on the Sultan's territory of a considerable movement of troops, provisions, ammunition, &c. &c. &c. having taken place, but you have nothing to fear, for there will ultimately be no war between the Sultan and Mehemet A."

It is to-day reported that his Highness Ibrahim Pasha called Abdu-ur-Bahar, the Musselim, and required of him a guarantee for the security and tranquillity of the town of Aleppo, during his absence. The

Musselim replied, "if your Highness will leave me 4,000 to 5,000 troops, I remain responsible that during the time you are in the camp, everything remains in the greatest quietness here."

The result of this discourse is not known positively, some say that his Highness refused to leave him more than 2,000 troops, in consequence of which the Musselim refused taking any responsibility, others again say, that his Highness promised the Musselim the number he required.

The public report among the Christians of the town is, that the population is very dissatisfied against them, and that in the event of Ibrahim Pasha meeting with a repulse, a rise would ensue here and throughout the towns of Syria.

By the last advices from Mr. Vice-Consul Hays and Jones, everything appeared quiet in their respective districts. The former writes that there is still however, a little discontent among the inhabitants of Giaour-dagh mountains.

(Signed)

F. H. S. WERRY

Inclosure 6 in No. 58

Solyman Pasha to Mr. Consul Werry.

Monsieur,

Alep, le 16 Sefer, 1255.

DEPUIS quelque temps les caravanes n'arrivent plus de la Turquie, et le commerce de ces côtes se trouve entièrement suspendu. Nous avons dû prendre patience pour ne pas aggraver encore les préjudices que souffre le commerce. Mais depuis qu'une tête de colonne de l'Armée Turque a passé à Hama, il paraît qu'on a redoublé encore de sévérité, puisque rien n'arrive plus, ni marchandes ni caravanes. Aux circonstances présentes, et malgré tout le désir que j'éprouve à voir commencer, et sur une parfaite mesure, qui peut faire tout aux intérêts commerciaux en général, j'ai l'honneur de vous prévenir qu'il est décidé à toute espèce de caravane de se diriger vers les frontières. Pour tout quatre jours, à compter de la date de ma lettre les caravanes et marchandes quelconques seront arrêtées et renvoyées au point du départ. Mais après cette époque fixée, elles seront en libre circulation. Aussitôt que du côté de l'Armée Turque on rétablira la libre circulation, les ordres seront donnés pour qu'elle soit immédiatement rétablie ici. Il a été donné connaissance de cet arrêté aux Rayas et aux habitants, et j'ai l'honneur de vous prévenir de cette mesure, pour que vos commerçans et nationaux ne soient pas dans le cas d'éprouver des pertes par ignorance ou mal-entendu.

Je regrette qu'une pareille détermination, prise du côté de l'Armée Turque sans qu'il nous en ait été donné aucune communication, nous force à user de représailles, même dans le cas très-possible d'un commencement d'hostilités, ce que Dieu veuille éloigner pour la prospérité du pays; la guerre me paraît assez désastreuse par elle-même, pour ne pas y joindre encore sans motif des mesures désolantes pour le commerce et les populations en général.

Agréez, Monsieur le Consul, l'assurance de ma parfaite considération.

Le Major-Général des Armées Égyptiennes,

Chargé des Affaires Européennes,

(Signé)

LE GENERAL SULEIMAN

Inclosure 7 in No. 58.

Rapport de Hadji Hidou. L'arava envoie à Hama, le 23 Avril, 1839, pour examiner l'état du local des Anglais de l'Expédition de l'Euphrate, par suite des grandes pluies que nous avons eues cette année.

LE susdit Hadji Hidou partit d'Alep le mardi matin (23 Avril, 1839), pour se rendre à Hama; à passé le premier jour, divers villages dont il

[illegible]

N.B.—Le dit Hadj Hadou ajoute qu'en retournant il n'a vu dans aucun endroit des troupes Egyptiennes; il a entendu dire seulement qu'on avait été chassé par le Massarah d'Assi que de la Cavalerie des Bedouins dits Hannazi devant se rendre sur la rivière de Sagiour pour inspecter ce qui se passe.

No. 59.

*Extract of a despatch from the Consul-General of France in Egypt.—*  
(Communicated by Baron de Bourqueney)

Alexandrie, le 15 Mai, 1839.

C'EST dans ces circonstances que M. de Mehem est venu offrir au Méhémet Ali le service de l'expédition de Nasseou par le chemin de terre, un mouvement rétrograde de la terre égyptienne, et que M. de Mehem, qui avait aussi reçu une lettre de M. le Baron de Mehem, lui-même lui est venu offrir, qu'on le lui re-commande lui-même, et se fait par son influence morale en compagnie du Consul Général de l'Empire.

[illegible]

Méhémets Ah a parlé ensuite de la nécessité d'en finir avec sa position. Il paraît avoir renoncé à ses idées d'indépendance, et ne désire rien de plus que l'hérédité pour ses enfants, du pouvoir qui lui est confié.

Du 16 Mai

P.S.—Je viens de recevoir la note ci-jointe, qui a été communiquée par Artoz Bey aux Consuls généraux les Très-Hauts Possesseurs, et qui confirme le contenu de ma dépêche. Le Vice-Roi a déclaré à M. Cicheler, Consul-Général de France en Egypte, &c., qu'il s'engage, dans le cas où les troupes du Sultan qui ont franchi l'Euphrate près de Bir, se retireraient de l'autre côté du fleuve, à faire faire un mouvement rétrograde à son armée, et à rappeler son fils Ibrahim Pacha à Damas, que dans le cas où cette démonstration pacifique n'aurait à son tour suivi d'un mouvement rétrograde de l'armée de Haidar Pacha au-delà de Malutia, son Altesse rappellerait le Généralissime en Egypte. De plus, son Altesse le Vice-Roi a ajouté, de son propre mouvement, que si les Quatre Grandes Puissances consentaient à lui garantir la paix, et s'intéressaient à lui obtenir la succession de sa famille, il retirerait une partie de ses troupes de la Syrie, et serait prêt à s'entendre sur un arrangement définitif propre à garantir la sécurité, et adapté aux besoins du pays.

No. 60

*Baron Roussin to the Duc de Dalmatie.*—(Communicated by Baron de Bourqueney)

(Extrait.)

Thérapia, le 16 Mai, 1839

J'AI immédiatement adressé l'instruction ci-jointe à M. Laperre, mais il était trop tard pour qu'il pût voir le Ministre le même jour; son rapport ne m'est parvenu que ce matin, et le voici :

13



D'après vos ordres, je suis allé chez Nouri Effendi. Je lui ai lu votre instruction ainsi que la copie de la communication de Boghos Bey aux Consuls-Généraux, et après avoir entendu ces pièces, il m'a répondu :

"Dites à M. l'Ambassadeur, qui je lui confirme officiellement que la Porte n'a aucune nouvelle de cela; que d'après celles que nous venons de recevoir par un Tatar à Hafiz Pacha, l'armée Turque était encore loin des confins; la Porte n'a donné aucun ordre d'attaquer, mais si les troupes de Méhémet Ali attaquent, celles du Sultan se défendront, et feront ce qu'elles pourront."

"Ceci est encore une ruse de Méhémet Ali. Ce nom de Bir n'est pas connu dans le voisinage de l'armée à Hafiz Pacha, c'est Biledjick qui est dans l'eyalet d'Orfa, lequel appartient au Grand Seigneur, et le ministre a fait apporter une liste des villes et villages de chaque Gouvernement d'Asie, et m'a fait remarquer, en effet, que Biledjick est peu éloigné d'Orfa; 'le Gouvernement d'Orfa,' répéta-t-il, 'appartient à Hafiz Pacha; il est donc hors de doute qu'il peut y avoir placé ses troupes sans rompre la paix. Je vous prie de dire à M. l'Ambassadeur, qu'il doit connaître avec la mauvaise foi de Méhémet Ali, pour ne pas douter qu'il n'en donne ici une nouvelle preuve."

"Il m'a demandé à faire faire la traduction de mon instruction par le Drogman de la Porte, et à prendre copie de la seconde pièce, et j'y ai consenti. Il m'a assuré de nouveau officiellement, que la Porte n'a donné aucun ordre qui puisse commencer la guerre de la part de l'armée Ottomane, et répété que cette armée n'a pas dépassé la frontière."

Ce rapport ne répondant pas positivement aux deux questions posées dans mon instruction, j'ai renvoyé M. Lapierre pour demander une réponse plus catégorique.

Cependant, on ne peut pas nier que l'observation de Nouri Effendi ne soit vraie; c'est-à-dire, que le lieu indiqué dans le bulletin Egyptien est plutôt Biledjick du Gouvernement d'Orfa, que Bir, que je crois beaucoup plus éloigné vers les sources de l'Euphrate (ce que, d'ailleurs, nos mauvaises cartes de la Syrie ne me permettent pas de vérifier). La réponse du Ministre est l'affirmation qu'il a toujours donnée à toutes les Légations, que "l'armée Turque n'a point attaqué, et qu'elle n'attaquera pas si elle ne l'est elle-même."

Il est impossible, Monsieur le Duc, de savoir et de vous écrire autre chose. Si le second rapport du Drogman m'arrive avant le départ du paquebot demain, et si j'ajoute au premier, je le joindrai à la dépêche.

(Signé) BARON ROUSSIN

P. S.—17, une heure avant le départ du paquebot.—Je reçois un second rapport du premier Drogman. Il confirme le premier dans son point essentiel. La guerre ne paraît pas commencée, mais elle paraît imminente. La Porte ne l'a pas décidée dans un conseil, comme on l'avait dit; elle a au contraire voulu à l'éviter et à résister à l'entraînement du Sultan. Mais cette résistance manque d'ensemble et d'énergie, parcequ'elle pourrait être dangereuse. La Porte est divisée: contre la guerre on compte Réouf, Khosreff, Nazif Pacha, Nouri Effendi, Sarim Bey, et trois conseillers; pour la guerre, Saïd Pacha, Séraskier, gendre du Sultan, qui se sent que l'armée Ottomane est bien supérieure à celle de Méhémet, quoiqu'il n'ait vu ni l'une ni l'autre; Achmet, Capitan Pacha, qui assure que si on le laisse sortir les Dardanelles avant l'escadre Turque, celle de Méhémet Ali viendra aussitôt se rallier à lui; enfin Hafiz Pacha, généralissime, qui n'a jamais fait la guerre comme officier général. Ce parti se fortifie des familiers du Mabeim et d'un grand nombre de Rissals, tant ceux qui aspirent à sa faveur, que ceux qui redoutent les dangers d'une opposition trop marquée, et ceux encore plus nombreux qui, ennemis de l'ordre de choses actuelles, voudraient le renverser à tout prix, soit-ce à celui d'une catastrophe. Tous les ulémas sont de ce parti; la perte totale de leur influence qu'ils espèrent recouvrer, en est le motif.

Toutes les troupes de Roumélie et de l'Asie Mineure sont dirigées et en marche pour rejoindre le camp de Hafiz Pacha, et ceux de Ketchik. Il

reste à peine 8,000 de garnison à Constantinople, où l'opinion publique est hostile aux réformes.

Des émissaires arrivent chaque jour d'Egypte et de Syrie, envoyés secrètement par le Sultan; ils lui rapportent que toutes les populations sont prêtes à s'insurger contre Méhémet Ali, au premier signal. Tahar Pacha, parti il y a deux mois pour le camp de Hafiz Pacha, avait réellement mission ostensible d'ordonner de rester en-deça de la frontière; mais il a reçu des instructions secrètes du Sultan; on les ignore, mais on les devine. Le Sultan veut détruire son vassal ou succomber; il le dit tout haut. Tel est le résumé des derniers rapports. En résumé, Monsieur le Duc, on ne sait pas et l'on ne croit pas que l'armée ait franchi la frontière, mais on espère qu'elle en est assez près pour rendre l'attaque des Egyptiens inévitable, et le Sultan le désire ardemment.

(Signé) BARON ROUSSIN

No. 61

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 35.)

My Lord,

Alexandria May 19 1839

I HAD the honour to report to your Lordship in a private letter of 7th May, *via* Marseilles, the arrival of despatches for Count Medem and M. de Laurin, and I have now to correct two errors in my letter, which are however of little import, one in the date of the letter of Count Nesselrode, which is the 29th of March and not the 12th of April, and the other relative to the despatch to M. de Laurin, which was not from Vienna, but from the Internuncio at Constantinople.

Those despatches came in charge of a Russian messenger by an Austrian steamer.

On the 7th of May, Count Medem sent to Boghos Bey a copy of the despatch from Count Nesselrode, but Count Medem told me that it was not an exact transcript from the despatch, as he had deemed it necessary from the change of circumstances since that despatch was written, to curtail and modify (elaborer) some parts, and Count Medem read to me part of a despatch to his Court, in which he states his reasons for so doing.

Count Medem also sent to Boghos Bey the original despatch of M. de Boutenoff, and as Boghos Bey gave those two documents into my hands, I am enabled to send copies of them to your Lordship.

As Count Nesselrode states that he has sent a copy of his despatch to the principal Court, your Lordship will see the changes made in the copy sent by Count Medem to Boghos Bey.

In consequence of a letter from Boghos Bey, the Pasha arrived here on the morning of the 12th instant, and Count Medem and M. de Laurin had some interviews with him on the 12th, 13th, and 14th, *commençant* at the last of which he agreed to a declaration of the terms agreed to, which the Pasha said he would send to the Consuls-General of the Four Great Powers, to be by them communicated to their Governments, and on the morning of the 16th, Count Medem and M. de Laurin went together to the Pasha, when the declaration was agreed to; and on the same evening a copy was sent by order of the Pasha, to myself, and to the Consuls-General of Austria, France, and Russia.

I have now the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of that declaration, and I sent to Viscount Ponsonby, by the French steamer which left this on the morning of the 17th instant, copies of the despatch of Count Nesselrode, of M. de Boutenoff, and of the declaration of the Pasha.

M. de Laurin has been so kind as to send me the copy of his despatch on this occasion to the Internuncio, and I have the honour to inclose a copy of it, by which your Lordship will see the details of the interviews of M. de Laurin and of Count Medem with the Pasha.

My latest accounts from Aleppo are of the 5th of May, at which date Ibrahim Pasha was at Aleppo with the main body of his army, and Aleppo, Kullis, and Hamah, had been reinforced by troops from the south, but only after the arrival of the army of the Sultan at Bir; after which, also, the greater part of the horses of the Cavalry and Artillery had been brought in from grass.

It cannot, therefore, be said that Ibrahim Pasha was the first to commence operations indicative of hostilities, as even now he has not reinforced Aintab, which is the nearest of his posts to the Turkish frontier, from which it is distant about seven hours.

Part of the army of Hafiz Pasha, (it is said about 10,000 men,) with some artillery, has crossed the Euphrates at Hira but has not yet crossed this side of the Sedjour, which is there the boundary of the territory under Mehmet Ali; but there is a report, not official, that part of the Sultan's troops have entered Syria, near Antab.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry of Aleppo, writes to me on the 6th of May, that Ibrahim Pasha intends after the arrival of all his forces, to have a general review, and then proposes to march his force ten hours distance from his camp on the plain between Aleppo and Antioch, and there await my attack which may be made against him by the Sultan's forces; as he has received positive orders from Mehemet Ali, not to move out of his limits upon any consideration, or to be the first aggressor.

upon any consideration, or to be the first aggressor.

Ibrahim Pasha has some Bedouin Cavalry near the Bedjour, to observe the movements of the Sultan's army; but I am persuaded (and his orders from his father are peremptory to that effect) that he will not move forward to attack Hafiz Pacha's advance, which he might easily destroy, nor commit any act which can be called aggressive; and I trust that the representations of Lord Ponsonby and of the ~~British~~ <sup>American</sup> Ministers will yet prevail on the Porte to retire the Turkish Army before any action takes place. It does not however appear to me that in the ~~present~~ <sup>present</sup> state of a Turkish commissariat, any Turkish Army can long have means of subsistence, and it must, therefore, either retire or advance, and in this last case an engagement will be inevitable.

Mr Consul Moore writes, that the native Christians in Syria dread success on the part of the Sultan; and this shows that the Christians are loyal to Mehmet Ali. But it is far different with the Mussulman population in Syria where affections have been quite averted by the Sultan's favour to the Christians.

Mr. Consul Werry of Liverpool, has stated to your Lordship in his despatch No. 9, the bad prospects of commerce from the present state of affairs in Syria and from the Pascha having seized all the caravans, which ~~was~~ a further order by Seyidman Pascha, copy of which was transmitted to your Lordship by Mr. Werry.

Mr. P. J. Connel W.erry writes to me on this subject, as follows:—

I am very sorry to be obliged to complain that from what I hear from our merchants, the present critical state of affairs in this country is causing most ruinous consequences to our trade for such the intelligence received of the Sultan's forces having severely be-  
liephased and that the army is advancing on the frontier with their  
pursuits with an apparent hostile intention and subsequently he has  
taken by this Government in the concentration of all the troops in  
this town and neighbourhood, the commerce of this place is being com-  
pletely paralyzed, and commercial transactions of all sorts have entirely  
ceased, thereby causing great detriment to our British merchants who  
can neither effect sales of the large stocks they have on hand nor can  
they receive at this present moment that payments are suspended under  
the present unsettled state of affairs any of their outstanding debts,  
of which they have in the present such large amounts.

"Moreover, this suspension of trade is not only ruinous to our merchants established here, but it also causes extensive detriment and loss to our general commercial interests."

I may remark, that the British merchants in Aleppo suffer more particularly as much trade was carried on by them to Asia Minor and Mesopotamia.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 61

*Count Nasselrode to Count Medem.*

Petersbourg, le 20 Mars, 1884.

LES dernières nouvelles que nous avons reçues de Constantinople, nous annoncent qu'un changement notable venait de se faire remarquer dans l'attitude de l'armée Egyptienne en Syrie.

De nouvelles troupes et des dépôts du matériel de guerre ont été portés en avant jusqu'à Alep. De plus, une grande quantité de munitions a été expédiée successivement pour Antab, endroit qui ne se trouve qu'à une distance de 6 à 8 heures de Marache, de Biledjrk, et de Roumkala, qui forment les positions les plus avancées que l'armée Turque est dans la nécessité de couvrir, pour se mettre à l'abri d'une attaque imprévue. Enfin, sur l'extrémité même de la frontière qui sépare les deux armées, les Egyptiens ont établi des batteries à Tesbichlik-kouyou; de sorte qu'au premier mouvement qu'ils feraient, ils raient les maîtres de pointer le canon sur le territoire Turc, d'occuper Biledjrk et d'occuper jusqu'à Biledjrk et Ourfa, sans que l'armée Ottomane, qui se trouvait à une distance de 60 heures en arrière de ces positions avancées, aurait été en mesure d'opposer le moindre obstacle à une pareille agression.

Cette considération n'a point permis à Hafiz Pacha, Commandant-en-Chef de l'Armée Turque, de rester dans l'inaction, tandis que l'Armée Egyptienne venait de prendre une attitude menaçante et rapprochée des frontières.

En présence de ce mouvement de l'Armée Egyptienne, Haffz Pachà n'est resté qu'une seule option à faire : ou bien à se retirer avec sa cavalerie à la caucation et de défense. De son côté, il a fait avancer des troupes vers Oufsa, Diarbékir, et Siverek, pour mettre à couvert les positions que les Egyptiens menaçaient.

Ainsi les deux armées se trouvent aujourd'hui en présence. Les troupes de Méhémet Ali ont été les premières à se rapprocher de la frontière. Celles de Sultân-Ali ont fait quelques mouvements pour se porter être pris au dépourvu, et pour pouvoir rejeter la force par la force, dans le cas où l'Armée Egyptienne se livrerait à des excès de hostilité.

Tels sont les faits qui résultent des rapports circonstanciés que l'Empereur vient de recevoir de son Ministre à Constantinople, et qui se trouvent fondés de la manière la plus positive sur le témoignage des officiers Prussiens attachés à l'état-major de l'Armée de Turcs.

En portant un regard attentif sur la position respective des deux armées, notre Auguste Maître a acquis la certitude que c'est celle de Méhémet Ali qui a été la première à faire un mouvement qui, sans être agressif, porte néanmoins le caractère d'une démonstration menaçante que rien ne saurait justifier.

Or, une semblable démonstration se trouve ouvertement en contradiction avec les assurances pacifiques que vous avez souvent recueillies de la bouche de Méhémet Ali; elle est en opposition directe à l'intention formellement arrêtée de toutes les Puissances de l'Europe, qui ont unanimement résolu de maintenir la paix de l'Orient, et de ne point permettre qu'elle soit violée impunément.

Vous connaissez, Monsieur le Comte, les déterminations que l'Empereur a arrêtées à cet égard, elles sont irrévocables. Tous les Talents de l'Europe les partagent, car ils ont tous également à cœur de préserver l'Empire Ottoman du danger d'une nouvelle défection.

Le Pacha d'Egypte, s'il veut examiner mûrement ses propres intérêts, verra que personne ne devrait étre plus que lui, de donner le signal



d'une pareille complication. En effet, troubler l'état de paix dont il jouit, c'est ébranler son propre pouvoir; c'est remettre en question tous les avantages qu'il lui sont assurés par ses arrangements antérieurs avec la Porte; c'est échanger le danger d'une lutte hasardeuse contre le danger d'une possession paisible; enfin c'est se mettre en opposition avec l'Europe entière; car tous les Cabinets ont hautement frappé de réprobation tout acte d'hostilité que le Pacha d'Egypte commettrait au mépris des assurances pacifiques qu'il a si souvent répétées de la manière la plus solennelle.

Ces vérités sont trop frappantes Monsieur le Comte, pour qu'elles ne soient pas appréciées par Méhémet Ali, avec la supériorité de jugement qui le distingue. Aussi ne doutons-nous pas un seul instant des explications satisfaisantes qu'il s'empressera de vous offrir. Mais les circonstances du moment sont trop graves pour que ces explications seules puissent nous suffire.

Lorsque les armées se trouvent en présence, les paroles les plus pacifiques ne servent pas à éligner le danger d'un conflit, que le moindre incident peut provoquer d'un instant à l'autre.

Pour revenir au danger, il n'y a qu'un seul moyen: c'est de rétablir de nouveau la distance qui sépare les deux armées.

Or, comme c'est celle du Pacha d'Egypte qui est la plus rapprochée des frontières, c'est elle aussi qui devra être la première à se replier. En conséquence, les nouvelles troupes et les dépôts du matériel de guerre qui ont été portés à Antak et Alep, devront rétrograder de rechef vers Damas, pour remplacer les choses dans l'état où elles ont été anciennement.

Alors, lorsque celle-ci aura repris ses anciennes positions, les Cabinets amis de la Paix, passeront en appel à leur tour aux sentiments pacifiques du Sultan, pour inviter ce Souverain à donner à Hafs Pacha l'ordre de rentrer dans les anciennes limites qui ont été fixées, et de ne recommencer les mesures de défense que l'attitude menaçante de l'Armée Egyptienne avait rendues nécessaires.

L'Empereur vous charge, Monsieur le Comte, de vous acquitter immédiatement auprès du Vice-Roi, de la communication contenue dans la présente dépêche.

Le Feldjäger qui en est porteur, attendra la réponse que vous donnera Méhémet Ali.

Dans l'intervalle, notre Auguste Maître m'a chargé de porter la présente dépêche à la connaissance de tous les Cabinets de l'Europe. De même qu'ils ont concouru unanimement aux démarches que vous avez récemment faites en exécution des déclarations que l'Empereur a fait enlever à Toprak, de même aussi les grands Cabinets, unis avec nous d'intentions et de principes, sauront venir au soutien du repos du Levant en proclamant, comme nous venons de la faire, la cessation des hostilités entre les deux armées, auxquelles l'Armée Egyptienne s'est portée.

Persuadés de l'entente cordiale qui existe et existera entre toutes les Puissances nous vous invitons, Monsieur le Comte, à communiquer la présente dépêche à vos collègues, qui ne tarderont pas, j'en suis sûr, de recevoir des instructions analogues de leurs Cours.

Inclusure 2 in No. 61

M. de Bouténéff to Count Modem.

Monsieur le Comte,

Péra, le 12 Avril, 1839.

VOTRE dernier rapport sous cachet volant, à l'adresse de Son Excellence M. le Vice-Chancelier, en date du 12 courant, No. 6, m'est exactement parvenu par la voie du pyroscaphe Français, et je profite du retour de ce courrier pour vous en accuser la réception, et pour vous remercier de la communication des intéressantes informations que vous transmettez au Ministère Impérial, et que je ne manquerai pas à acheminer sans délai vers leur destination.

Sous pouvoir vous donner aujourd'hui des instructions spéciales sur la ligne de conduite que vous avez à tenir au milieu des circonstances du moment, je ne saurais, Monsieur le Comte, ne pas applaudir à la sage

réserve que vous mettez dans vos explications avec Méhémet Ali, ainsi qu'au zèle avec lequel vous plaidez auprès de lui, la cause de la justice et du bon droit.

Les assurances du Pacha d'Egypte sont tellement positives, elles vous ont été répétées si souvent, qu'il n'est pas permis d'élever des doutes sur leur sincérité sans suspecter la bonne foi de Méhémet Ali. Ces dispositions pacifiques sont d'ailleurs dans son propre intérêt, car le Vice-Roi n'a pas de perspicacité pour ne pas comprendre, que toutes les conséquences d'une agression contre son Souverain légitime, retomberaient infailliblement sur leur auteur et consommeraient sa ruine.

D'un autre côté, la volonté bien arrêtée de toutes les Grandes Puissances est pour le maintien de la paix,—but constant de leurs efforts et principal objet de leur guérruse sollicitude. Elles ne souffrent pas que le Pacha d'Egypte veuille la troubler impunément, au préjudice du Sultan et au détriment du repos général.

D'ailleurs le rôle de Méhémet Ali, qui doit son élévation à un concours de circonstances favorables, autant qu'à son mérite personnel, est assez beau, pour qu'il puisse s'en contenter, sans s'abandonner à des rêves, dont la réalisation entraînerait un bouleversement total de tout l'édifice de la politique Orientale.

Pour ce qui est enfin du Sultan, Monsieur le Comte, le Pacha n'aura rien à redouter, nous en avons la conviction, aussi longtemps que de son côté il respectera les droits imprescriptibles de son Souverain, et tant qu'il remplira fidèlement les obligations qui lui sont imposées par son contrat avec lui. Tant réclame-t-il encore. Si l'Empereur a protesté à deux reprises de l'empressement de son désir sincère d'éviter toute collision. Si le Sultan a réuni des forces considérables dans le Diarbékir, ce sont les armements de Méhémet Ali qui l'y ont contraint, bien à regret, car l'entretien d'une armée dans ces contrées lointaines et peu fertiles, sont un poids surabondant pour ces provinces, pour le trésor, pour le commerce et pour l'agriculture. Si de vouloir et de provoquer la guerre, le Sultan est au contraire très-disposé à livrer la guerre ouverte sans aucun grief et sous le prétexte d'un assassinat pour peu que ce dernier ne lui fournisse plus de nouveaux sujets de mécontentement.

C'est sans doute ce qui me semble le mieux il y a pour Méhémet Ali de faire à son Souverain la preuve nécessaire de la sincérité de ses intentions pacifiques, dont vous avez recueilli la promesse éventuelle de la propre bouche du Vice-Roi, et qui consisterait à rappeler auprès de lui son fils Ibrahim Pacha, et de retirer une partie de son armée de Syrie, ce qui, dans le présent état des finances Egyptiennes, serait un allégement réel dans les dépenses du Pacha.

Je résume à votre habileté, Monsieur le Comte, de vous ménager une occasion favorable de revenir sur une sage détermination, dont le Vice-Roi vous a lui-même suggéré l'idée dans ses entretiens avec vous et Messieurs vos collègues.

Recevez, Monsieur le Comte, l'assurance de ma haute et distinguée amitié.

Inclusure 3 in No. 61

Declaration made by Mehemet Ali to Colonel Campbell

LE Vice-Roi a déclaré à M. le Colonel Campbell, Agent et Consul-General de Sa Majesté Britannique, qu'il s'engage dans le cas où les troupes du Sultan qui ont franchi l'Euphrate près de Bir, se retireraient de l'autre côté du fleuve, de faire faire un mouvement rétrograde à son armée, et de rappeler son fils Ibrahim Pacha à Damas, que dans le cas où cette armée se retirerait au-delà de Malatia, Son Altesse rappellerait le Généralissime en Egypte. De plus, Son Altesse le Vice-Roi a ajouté de son propre mouvement, que si les Quatre Grandes Puissances consentaient à lui garantir la paix, et s'intéressaient à lui obtenir la succession de sa

famille, il retirerait une partie de ses troupes de la Syrie, et serait prêt à s'entendre sur un arrangement définitif propre à garantir la sécurité et adapté aux besoins du pays.

Inclosure 4 in No. 61.

*M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stürmer.*

M le Baron.

Alexandrie, ce 16 Mai. 1839

AINSI que j'ai eu l'honneur de l'annoncer à votre Excellence par mon Rapport du 10 du courant, Mélémet Ali est arrivé ici Dimanche matin, 12 du courant.

Je suis allé le complimenter deux heures après son arrivée, au Palais de Rassa-el-Tyn, sans l'intention de l'entretenir de la sommation que la Cour Impériale de Russie lui adressait, et à laquelle a trait la dépêche de votre Excellence du 29 Avril dernier. Cependant, après avoir congédié un nombre de visites, il aborda franchement la question, en me disant, "qu'il avait été indignement calomnié (faisant allusion à la Note de M. le Comte de Nesselrode dont Baghdaty n'avait fait part le soir du 7) en disant, ou il en avait pris un aussi et il même que la suppression d'avoir ses troupes pris une attitude autre que purement défensive est tout-à-fait fautive; que les troupes du Grand Seigneur, sous le prétexte de combattre les Kurdes se sont établis ainsi Diarbekir et dans l'Aïo Mineure, bien avant que les Egyptiennes ne fussent portées en avant; que c'est de ces camps des Osmanlis qui sortaient continuellement les provocations et cris de guerre qui ont été cause du soulèvement du Haouran; qu'il est vrai que les incursions des Turcomans dans les Provinces d'Adana et de Tarsus l'ont obligé à envoyer des troupes pour les contenir; mais que l'expédition faite, elles ont été constamment renvoyées dans leurs cantonnements; que même les faibles garnisons de Gulek et des Beïlans n'avaient d'autre but que celui de prêter main forte aux colonnes mobiles employées à la poursuite des nomades mentionnés; que ce n'est qu'au commencement du mois de Zilkadé de l'année 1254 (vers la fin le Janvier) que quelques renforts consistant en recrues égyptiennes, ont été envoyés en Syrie; et qu'alors l'Armée de Hafs Pacha avait déjà reçu une organisation. La Porte avait eu des nouvelles sinistres sur son sort, disait-il, et croyant pouvoir entrer en campagne avant mon retour elle se flattait d'être victorieuse; mais voyant que ce projet est tombé la guerre a pris une autre tournure, et qu'elle est devenue la guerre contre l'Egypte, signe évident de faiblesse, et qui me fait croire, qu'au lieu d'attaquer, on se bornera à crier, et à chercher du secours à l'étranger. Les nouvelles de Constantinople sont contradictoires; celles de la Syrie sont à la guerre, j'attendrai dans l'attitude actuelle l'issue de cette complication, et je n'attaquerai dans aucun cas, mais si l'on m'attaque, je me jetterai sur Oursa et Diarbekir, et ne les rendrai qu'à condition qu'on m'accorde l'hérédité."

Je laissai parler le Pacha jusqu'à ce qu'il me semblait fatigué; et ne voulant pas entrer en matière, je lui disais que s'il est accusé à tort il lui sera bien facile de se justifier, mais que ses troupes, quoique éloignées de la frontière, peuvent être considérées dangereuses, ayant égard aux prétentions à l'indépendance dont il n'avait fait aucun secret; que du reste n'ayant pas l'intention d'attaquer, lui, et la Porte ne pouvant pas le faire, il serait bon, tant pour lui que pour le Grand Seigneur, de renvoyer les troupes sans l'intervention et les employer à d'autres travaux publics.

"Je ne demande pas mieux," disait-il, "mais comment me fier de mes vœux? Ils parlent de la paix en passant l'Euphrate; je tous bien me rendre. La soumission de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Russes et la rentrée des troupes dans les cantonnemens de paix est venue bien mal-à-propos. Je ne saurais m'y soumettre sans ruiner mes affaires en Syrie. Si les démonstrations que l'Armée du Grand Seigneur vient de faire à Hirc sont pas aussi dangereuses qu'on les dit, et si ses troupes repassent l'Euphrate, le camp de Alep sera levé, et les troupes rentreront dans

leurs anciens cantonnemens; à cette condition, je suis prêt à entrer en explication avec M. de Modem et avec vous, qui êtes chargé de l'appuyer."

Je lui disais que nous en parlerions le lendemain matin, et pris congé de lui vers 11 heures.

J'ai fidèlement rapporté cet entretien à mon collègue de Russie, qui se proposait d'aller voir le Pacha le soir même, et de élucider quelque inexactitude de la Note qu'il voulait lui remettre le lendemain.

Votre Excellence apprendra du Rapport que M. le Comte de Modem  
 adressa à sa Cour les particularités des deux affaires qui ont eu lieu avec  
 Méhémet Ali, Dimanche soir et Lundi matin. Ils se sont quittés parfaite-  
 ment satisfaits l'un de l'autre, de sorte que me présentant moi au Pacha,  
 Lundi le soir, il me reçut avec beaucoup d'empressement, et me raconta  
 qu'il avait déclaré à mon collègue de venir et se soumettre au Caire de  
 Sa Majesté Russe tant que le permettront les circonstances actuelles,  
 essayant rien changer, à moins le motif de Mars en ce moment ne m'a  
 peut avoir provoqué la sommation dont il est question; et qu'il déclarera  
 solennellement et par écrit, aux Consuls-Généraux des Quatre Grandes  
 Puissances, qu'il n'avait jamais eu l'intention de troubler la paix, mais que  
 craignant l'agression de la France, il avait dû se défendre. Il a  
 voulu être prêt à repousser l'agression; que même il sera rentrer une  
 partie de son armée en Syrie en France et en Egypte, et qu'il se  
 fera-il voir que les Puissances Europe ne se contentent à lui garantir  
 la paix. De plus, il proposera d'entrer en négociation sous la médiation  
 de quelque Puissance amie de la Porte, sur un arrangement définitif, basé  
 sur l'équité, si la Porte consentait à lui accorder l'hérédité. Je ne  
 pouvais pas m'empêcher de lui faire des complimens sur la bonne grâce  
 dont il a répondu à la demande de la Russie, et d'exprimer mes regrets  
 que les circonstances aient en attendant tellement changées que sa con-  
 cession ne pouvait être que conditionnelle, mais qu'ayant pris la résolution  
 de maintenir une attitude purement défensive, sa conduite sera probab-  
 lement jugée correcte; que par cette déclaration, on est autorisé à croire  
 que si la Porte cesse de le menacer, il donnera le premier l'exemple de la  
 soumission, et que les troupes établies à Antak et à Kilis, retourneront  
 à Antioche et à Halbec.

Il me dit que tout cela sera arrangé à l'amiable, pourvu que la Porte le voit dans le cas de commencer ce mouvement rétrograde, ce qui n'a ex- gué en fait et l'Autriche s'y sera résignée. Le 20 mars, après les manifestations d'attente de l'ennemi et cet état de choses, l'Autriche avait fini à cloquer un certain commandement pour les jours que m'attendant, il y avait eu de ces choses que ce n'est pas la garnison qui peut être à l'heure qu'il est, se sont de ces choses qui...

[illegible]

J'ai rendu compte à M. et Mme Madam de ce qui s'est passé en et j'ai pu profiter des bonnes dispositions du Pacte arabe que quelque renouveau ex de Syrie, ou quelque autre circonstance peut trouver son bien-être dans sommes tombées d'accord le nous rendre 370 millions le 1er janvier 1916, et fixer ce qui avait été préparé dans les quatre audiences particulières.

D'après cela, nous sommes allés voir le Pacha hier matin, et après avoir fait quelque observation sur l'addition spontanée qui a trait à l'hérédité, nous nous sommes contentés de la Déclaration dont copie ci-jointe.

J'ai conseillé à M. le Comte de Modem d'accepter cette Déclaration  
quelques conditionnelle.

1°. Parce que j'ai considéré que la dépêche de la Cour de St.



Pétarbourg est basée sur un état de choses bien différent de celui dans lequel Meh. met Ali se trouve actuellement, vis-à-vis de la Sublime Porte; que d'agresseur qu'il y est supposé il est maintenant de fait lui-même menacé par les troupes du Grand Seigneur.

2° Parce qu'il est raisonnable de supposer, que la dite Cour Impériale, si elle eut connu la complication actuelle, aurait cru ne devoir pas obliger Meh. met Ali à rappeler ses troupes pour ne pas le priver de moyens de défense et pour ne pas encourager les Osmanlis à pénétrer dans la Syrie, et en troubler la paix, et finalement.

3° Parce que la condition que Meh. met Ali a stipulée de commencer par faire d'abord repasser les troupes du Grand Seigneur l'Euphrate est de peu de conséquence à l'égard du Grand Seigneur qui peut-être n'avait pas même ordonné le passage de ce fleuve, tandis qu'elle est au plus haut intérêt pour la tranquillité et le repos de la Syrie, surtout après une excitation si forte et si dangereuse que celle qui y a été produite par l'apparition des dites troupes en-deçà de l'Euphrate.

Agréé, M. le Baron, &c.,

Signé) A. DE LAURIN

No 62.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston. (Received June 17)

No. 122.)

My Lord,

Therapia, May 22, 1839.

BY order of the Sultan, his Excellency Nouri Effendi invited me to meet him this day at the Kasak-i-Calendar. I there found the Capudan Pasha Nouri Effendi, the Chief Clerk of the Foreign Department and the Chief Dragoman of the Porte. I was accompanied by the Chief Dragoman, Mr. Frederic Pisan.

Nouri Effendi speaking in the name of the Porte, said that Meh. met Ali had committed acts that furnished indisputable proofs of aggression, viz—

1st. He had sent a corps of troops to menace Bassora and Bagdad, and the Porte feared the former place might have already fallen into the hands of the Egyptians.

2ndly. He had ordered the arrest of seventeen of the chief individuals of Medina, and their transportation to Egypt, where they were thrown into prison and also the expulsion from Medina of the authorities established there by the Sultan for the administration of *casas* that is the lands belonging to the Mosques, accompanied by a notification to them that they had nothing more to do with those affairs; and Nouri said, this is an act not to be endured by the Sultan, who is bound by so many ties to the Holy City.

3rdly. His son had ordered the irruption of Arabs in the Pasha's pay and forming the advance guard of the Egyptian army into the villages of the district of Hirciya, which they plundered, acts Nouri said that established the aggression of Meh. met Ali, without the addition of many others, even stronger.

His Excellency then said, "We wish to know what is the opinion of the Government of England upon these matters?" I replied that the Government of Her Majesty was ignorant of them, and ignorant that war was imminent at the time when your Lordship last instructed me, and therefore I could not reply to his Excellency's question nor say whether the war would be considered just or not by my Government that Her Majesty's Government had always counselled the Porte against war and that wise advice had been solely founded upon the conviction that war was likely to have the worst results for the Sultan that as to the aggression of Meh. met Ali, I thought his Excellency should collect every proof he could obtain to establish the fact.

Both Nouri Effendi and the Capudan Pasha spoke a long time, to show that it is impossible the Sublime Porte could any longer suffer the

*status quo*; and then asked if the British Government might not be disposed to aid the Sultan to escape from a state of things that ruined him?

I replied, that it was not consistent with the policy of my Government to deviate in such a way from solemn declarations and successive acts, and that my Government would not act except in concert with the other Great Powers.

Nouri Effendi then said, there are some Legations that give the most pressing counsels to the Sublime Porte not to undertake war—it will be my business to reply to them; but should they pass from words to threats, will your Government interpose to make them silent?

I asked his Excellency in what way could he suppose it to be in the power of the English Government to prevent other Governments holding what language might be by their counsels red proper? He said "I will then ask if England will permit those Governments to attack us by force?" To this I said the British Government have always declared and felt the strongest desire to support the independence of the Ottoman Government; and I cannot suppose the British Government will ever concur with, or sanction any attempt to deprive the Sublime Porte of the exercise of any of the rights of Sovereignty, as long as the British Government continues to be at peace with and the ally of the Sultan. Nouri then asked if the British fleet would attempt by force to intercept the Ottoman fleet in its route towards Syria and Egypt? I replied, that I had no knowledge of any order having been given by Her Majesty's Government to that effect, and that I had no reason whatever to believe it had been given.

I knew that war had been determined upon by the Porte; but I thought it advisable to ascertain the fact, and I said, that judging from what their Excellencies had said to me, it appeared that the Sublime Porte had resolved upon war. Nouri admitted it to be so, and launched out into an enumeration of the causes that forced upon the Sultan the adoption of that resolution.

After again expressing the disapprobation I knew Her Majesty's Government would feel, I said that it only remained for me to hope the Sublime Porte had taken the best measures to secure success. The Capudan Pasha shortly afterwards brought a map from another room, and pointed out Jaffa as the place to which the Ottoman fleet would go, and, in reply to my question, said part of his fleet would sail on Friday the 24th of May for the Dardanelles where some ships were to be taken on, and that he would follow immediately. I understood he is only waiting till the great four-decker is ready, and that it will be so in a very few days.

I ought, perhaps, to have mentioned before, that in replying to Nouri Effendi's demand whether or not Her Majesty's Government would assist the Sultan to get rid of the Pasha, I took occasion to advert upon the ill-policy of the Porte in having declined the Treaty lately proposed by your Lordship to Reschid Pasha, which, if accepted by the Porte, might perhaps have made such a change in the state of affairs as would have induced the Porte to avoid war. The point was discussed for some time; and Nouri Effendi ended by saying, that if the Porte could succeed in freeing itself from the dangers and difficulties created by Meh. met Ali, the Porte would make any Treaty with Her Majesty's Government they might desire to have. I place no reliance upon such declarations, but I think it my duty to report what was said, as it may deserve attention.

This long despatch is but a brief abstract of what was said at the Conference that lasted several hours, but it states the main points, and I have only to add, that the impression made upon my mind, by the tone and manner of the Ottoman Ministers, is that the Sultan looks to Her Majesty's Government with infinitely more confidence than to any other quarter. I think he would be much guided by advice from thence, were he freed from the irritation he has felt against all who have forced him to submit to the *status quo*.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received June 17.)

*Therapia, May 25, 1839.*

COUNT MEDEM has written to Monsieur de Boutéeff, that he is dissatisfied with the explanations given by M. de Boutéeff, and that the Russians are on the aggressive and he will not be deceived by Count Dessoir de I understand that M. de Boutéeff is not pleased with this.

Monsieur de Bonténeff is to have on the 28th or 29th, an interview with the Ottoman Ministers, to communicate, with the utmost formality possible, the reply made by Mehemet Ali to Count Neuhaus's note, delivered by Count Medem to the Pasha. Your Lordship has received from Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell copy of the above-mentioned declaration.

I have found of late, the greatest frankness in Baron Stürmer upon the affairs of this country, which he has studiously made the subject of repeated conversations with me. He appears to entertain nearly the same opinions I entertain, and to have acted much as I have acted. We have both exerted our best means to persuade the Sublime Porte not to risk a war, and we both expect nearly the same results from the measure which we equally consider to be actually resolved, and certain to be carried into full execution, unless some sudden change be effected in the feelings of the Sultan.

Your Lordship will see some confirmation of part of what I have now said, in copy of a despatch from M. de Stürmer to Prince Metternich, which I confidentially communicate to your Lordship.

I have, &c.

Signed **PONSONBY**

Inclosure is No. 63

*Baron Stürmer to Prince Metternich.*

Constantinople ce 22 Mai 1833

[illegible]

Après l'expédition de 1811, les Turcs n'ont parvenu à cet égard. Talaz  
pour l'un d'eux, et pour l'autre, dans la position la plus  
favorable, car les Turcs ont des castilles et pour frapper un grand  
coup. Mais les ennemis les plus dangereux de la guerre sont les  
peuples armés et il y a eu, à la Porte, un ordre du Sultan  
de les combattre. Ce qui fut exécuté, car c'est effectivement la  
meilleure chose que l'on ait faite. Mais, comme les Turcs  
ne sont pas capables de la guerre, ils ne peuvent pas assister, à la guerre, car ils assurent, à la fois  
l'armée et la flotte.

Aussitôt qu'il eut cessé de s'occuper du plaisir de le manger à Votre Altesse, il se pencha vers Pierre Pacha, se rassurant évidemment sur le fait que dans le but de gagner du temps, et de tenir la porte à tout vent, il ne se souciait pas de s'expliquer avec les Missions étrangères, auxquelles elle était ne pouvoir s'expliquer sur ses projets, avant que ce fût d'abord examiné si ses propres vœux, la situation des affaires, et n'en eût rendu de vive voix un compte exact et détaillé. Maintenant le moment de lever le masque paraît venu, et déjà on se prépare, dit-on, à

Le public, qui jusqu'ici ne battait que les efforts des Puissances Etrangères en faveur du maintien de la paix ne resteraient pas sans intérêt en cas de retour de T. E. Pacha et le fait que la guerre imminente, peut-être même déjà commencée, est généralement accréditée. La question n'est plus maintenant que de savoir de quel côté vient l'agression? Cette question est difficile à résoudre. Certes ce n'est pas toujours celui qui tire le premier coup de canon qui doit avec justice être considéré comme l'agresseur, et dans ce cas la Porte, en supposant que l'attaque vienne de la part de ses troupes, pourrait bien ne pas l'être. Tout le monde connaît les actes provocateurs de Méhémet Ali, et les velléités d'indépendance et de guerre qu'il a manifestées l'année dernière encore. La Porte aurait donc eu raison de se mettre en défense et de travailler dès-lors à assurer les moyens de lui opposer au besoin une vigoureuse résistance? Une pareille conduite n'eût été que sage et conforme à sa dignité autant qu'à ses vrais intérêts. Mais pourquoi n'a-t-elle cherché à cacher ses vrais desseins aux Puissances ses amies? Ne pouvait-elle point leur dire : "Ma situation me force à agir ainsi, si vous croyez par vos bons offices prévenir un conflit, je suis prêt à le faire de mon côté, mais sans toutefois me relâcher sur les mesures que je prendrai pour me défendre et pour être impuissamment attaqué." En appellation à votre propre témoignage, doit être le premier mobile de nos actions. La paix européenne ne saurait se maintenir que si on ne trouve pas de langage est noble et franc, et personne n'aurait pu y trouver à redire. La marche, au contraire, que la Porte a suivie la place dans un jour peu favorable, et lui attirent infailliblement le reproche d'avoir agi avec duplicité. On ne comprend pas surtout comment elle a pu aller jusqu'à inviter la Cour Impériale à intervenir en sa faveur et à faire le mal à son profit, quand elle se rendait compte que son véritable intérêt était de ne pas se mettre en opposition avec la Russie, tandis qu'elle paraissait défendre à elle tenir aucun compte.

Les résolutions d'Al-Mehdi Al-Mahdi ont été votées à la fin de l'année 1869, et la Porte a déclaré qu'elle n'avait rien à opposer à l'exécution de ces résolutions. Elle a déclaré qu'elle n'avait rien à opposer à l'exécution de ces résolutions. Elle a déclaré qu'elle n'avait rien à opposer à l'exécution de ces résolutions.

Quoiqu'il en soit, au point où en sont venues les choses, il faut espérer que toutes les Puissances prendront le parti de la Porte et mettront ce qu'il peut y avoir de fausseté dans son langage, sur le compte de la Calotte et de la Calotte seule. En attendant, il ne faut pas tout ce qu'il faut le nom de Chrétien.

Si j'ai cru devoir toucher ici la question de l'agression, c'est que de sa solution dépendra la conduite de la Russie, si la Porte se voit obligée de lui demander du secours: car d'après les déclarations qui lui ont été faites dans le sens par M. de Ruckman, et dernièrement encore par M. de Monténéff, ce n'est qu'au cas où elle serait attaquée, que le Traité d'Amurghien\* lui donnerait le droit de réclamer son assistance.

Le bateau à vapeur Autrichien venant d'Égypte, dont j'ai eu l'honneur d'entretenir Votre Altesse dans mon Rapport du 15 de ce mois, est effectivement rentré le 19, mais sans apporter la réponse de Méhémet Ali, lequel ne devait arriver à Alexandrie que le 12 ou le 13. Nous espérons maintenant recevoir cette réponse par le bateau à vapeur Français



qui a dû quitter cette ville le 17, et qui sera ici après demain. En attendant, j'ai l'honneur de transmettre à Votre Altesse les deux derniers rapports de M. de Laurin qui contiennent quelques nouveaux détails sur la situation des armées, l'état de la Syrie, et les mesures prises par Ibrahim Pacha, par suite des événements de l'Armée Ottomane.

Le jour où cette a sera part en l'honneur de Mustafa à Alep qui, dans les jours actuels, pourra offrir de l'intérêt à Votre Altesse et que je dois à l'obligeance d'un voyageur qui vient de visiter ces pays-là. Parmi les lieux qui ont été marqués se trouve la petite ville de Neza, qui est située à dix lieues de la frontière égyptienne, et où, d'après les dernières nouvelles, les avant-postes Turcs venaient d'arriver. La distance de Nézib à Alep n'est que de vingt-quatre heures.

Il me reste à signaler à Votre Altesse le mécontentement qui règne ici dans le peuple. Les mesures sanitaires, les taxes qu'elles nécessitent, et les impôts de toute espèce dont on grève les diverses classes de la société, en sont la cause. Dans un Conseil tenu à la Porte, le 18 de ce mois, il a été décidé qu'on établirait une taxe sur les chevaux et les domestiques, ce qui va sans doute faire naître de nouveaux murmures. Cette mesure a été résolue dans l'intention de combler un déficit de 25 millions de piastres (2,500,000 florins de Convention) qui s'est manifesté dans les fonds alloués au service des milices.

Le Sultan voulant faire rentrer son gendre Halil Pacha dans les affaires, a eu l'idée de créer en sa faveur un nouveau Ministère (celui du Commerce) et de l'en nommer le chef. Sa Hautesse a voulu toutefois avoir l'air de consulter à cet égard les principaux membres de son Conseil. Le Grand Amiral et le Ministre de l'Intérieur Halil Pacha, alors vire, ont paru se sur la scène un rival aussi dangereux que Halil Pacha, proposèrent sous divers prétextes le laisser en place de préférer à Hussein Pacha. Cependant le Sultan, ne tenant aucun compte de leur opinion, a nommé Halil Pacha.

Agreez, &c.,  
(Signé) STURMER.

No. 64

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 17)

(No. 136.)

My Lord,

Therapia May 26, 1839.

LATE this evening I received a letter from the Chief Dragoman, who had been sent for in the earlier part of the day to the Sultan's Palace, of which I inclose copy.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 64.

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord,

Péra, ce 26 Mai, 1839.

SAID BEY m'a fait chercher aujourd'hui. Il m'a parlé de l'affaire égyptienne. La substance de ce qu'il m'a dit est absolument la même que celle de ce que Nouri Effendi nous a dit dans la dernière conférence; et j'ai essayé, en lui faisant mes réponses à la lettre de ce que nous avons dit. Saïd Bey a exprimé le désir de Sa Hautesse, que l'Angleterre lui donne des secours pour battre Méhémet Ali. Je lui ai donné bien à entendre que votre Excellence sait que l'Angleterre ne veut pas aider la Porte à détruire le *status quo* à présent, mais que si l'agression vient de la part de Méhémet Ali, l'Angleterre aidera le Sultan à repousser l'attaque. Saïd Bey a tâché de prouver l'existence de l'agression de la part de Méhémet Ali par les mêmes faits cités par Nouri Effendi et le Capitan Pacha.

Saïd Bey s'est beaucoup étendu sur la nécessité de détruire le *status quo*. Il a fini par me charger de prier Votre Excellence, de la part du Sultan, d'employer tout votre zèle pour les intérêts de Sa Hautesse dans les circonstances présentes et d'écrire à Votre Gouvernement en faveur de sa cause, et cela de manière à l'engager à rendre à la Porte les services que Sa Hautesse réclame de l'amitié du Gouvernement Britannique.

Saïd Bey m'a paru extrêmement pénétré de la gravité des circonstances; le Sultan ne s'en fait pas illusion non plus.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

(Signé) FREDERIC PISANI

No. 65.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 19)

(No. 225)

My Lord,

Paris, June 17, 1839.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to No. 244 inclosed.

Marshal Soult again expressed to me his disappointment that I had no official communication to make to him relative to the operations to be given to the British and French Armies in the Levant; and he requested me earnestly to press upon the attention of Her Majesty's Government the necessity of immediately commencing them. His Excellency informed me, that already seven sail of French ships of the line had arrived off Smyrna that one was to sail yesterday from Toulon for the same destination, that two others will speedily follow, and that thus the French fleet on the Levant station will consist of ten sail of the line, besides frigates and sloops of war. He concluded, that the British fleet in the Levant (though it appeared that some ships of Admiral Stopford's squadron were still cruising off the coast of Sicily) would not be inferior in force to that of France; and he looked forward with great confidence to the moral effect of the union of the two fleets, amounting altogether to twenty sail, on the conduct of the Sultan and of Méhémet Ali, as well as to the power they will have of preventing a collision between the Turkish and Egyptian squadron, and of suspending the military operations of the two armies, by cutting off their supplies by sea.

In regard to a permanent settlement of the differences between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt, the Marshal was of opinion that it could only be effected by the concurrence of all the Great Powers of Europe, and that a conference of their Representatives—done—afford any hope of their agreeing upon the terms of the arrangement; and that Vienna appeared to be the most central and convenient place for assembling.

Count Mocreni, the Russian Secretary of State, has just arrived at Paris, informs me that he has received letters from the Russian Consul at Alexandria which state that if hostilities should commence, it will be the fault of the Sultan, for that nothing can be more satisfactory than the assurances given him by Méhémet Ali of his determination to avoid, if possible, a collision between the Turkish and Egyptian army, and of his readiness to order the retreat of the Egyptian army, and the recall of Ibrahim Pasha from Syria, if the Turkish army shall retire from the Syrian frontier.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Monneur.

Paris, le 17 Juin, 1839

Ma précédente expédition vous a fait connaître la réponse du Cabinet de Vienne à nos premières communications sur les affaires d'Orient. Vous trouverez dans les extraits ci-joints de deux dépêches de MM. de Barante et Bresson, les seules données que nous ayons encore sur les dispositions de la Prusse et de la Russie. A Berlin, je vous l'ai déjà dit, on est tout disposé à s'unir, pour maintenir la paix, aux démarches des autres Puissances. A St. Pétersbourg, nos communications n'ont pas encore parvenues, M. de Barante supposant, d'après des indices dont la force ne me paraît pas douteuse, le Cabinet Russe enclin à saisir tout prétexte honorable de ne pas se jeter dans les embarras qu'entraînerait l'application du Traité d'Unkiar-Skelessi.

Les dépêches arrivées, le 15 août, par le paquebot le "Cherbourg" nous ont apporté les nouvelles tant soit peu importantes. Les armées étaient toujours en position, sans que l'ennemi n'y ait mis le moindre obstacle, si ce n'est une légère réaffectation, mais nous sommes sûr que les armées françaises, avec un peu de patience, vont faire un bon coup. Les rapports nous ont parvenus. Pour les renseignements, nous sommes en mesure de donner les renseignements les plus exacts. Nous sommes en mesure de donner les renseignements les plus exacts. Nous sommes en mesure de donner les renseignements les plus exacts.

Il me faut de résumer en peu de mots, l'état des choses tel qu'il se présente en ce moment, c'est-à-dire, propre à justifier encore de très-sérieuses inquiétudes. Vous en jugerez plus complètement, d'ailleurs, par les extraits joints de la correspondance d'Égypte et de Constantinople. Je vais maintenant vous mettre en mesure de répondre aux questions que vous s adressées Lord Palmerston, sur l'opinion que s'est formée le Gouvernement et du Racha d'Egypte, à prendre dans le but le pour ou aux nécessités du moment.

Le Congrès a voté, du 10 au 12 novembre 1921, la loi sur la décentralisation administrative, qui a pour objet de répartir entre les différents échelons de l'administration les attributions, les pouvoirs, les responsabilités, les crédits et les dépenses.

Il faut donc aller enlever les hostilités arabes et les faire encore de nous pour y mettre fin et nous enlever. Il faut donc aller enlever les hostilités arabes et les faire encore de nous pour y mettre fin et nous enlever.

La flotte Anglaise sera composée de dix vaisseaux de ligne, sans compter les vaisseaux auxiliaires. La nôtre sera portée aussi à dix vaisseaux, et comprendra de ces quatre ou cinq frégates, six à quatre canons, à vapeur ou à voile, et d'autres latineurs plus légers. Des sept vaisseaux, sont réunis à Smyrne, ou en route pour y rentrer. Les trois autres partiront très-prochainement. Il importe que des ostensions, non pas commodes mais inspirées par une pensée d'orgueil et par les deux Corps se communiqueraient au préalable, soient envoyées, sans motif, à ces commandants des deux escadres, pour diriger les opérations. Lorsqu'on saura, dans l'Orient, que de telles forces agissent dans un même

Pour mieux attendre le résultat que nous avons en vue, peut-être serait-il à propos que le pavillon Autrichien se montrât au moins de l'escale avec une frégate et Angaise une ou deux frégates, avec quelques bâtiments légers seraient suffisantes pour cela. Il est à remarquer au surplus, que M. de Metternich en a déjà exprimé la pensée.

« Les mesures que je vous ai indiquées ne doivent pas être  
« adoptées sans retard si l'on ne veut pas se laisser surprendre par les  
« événements. J'arrive à ces qui, lorsque des dénégations formelles  
« seront ouvertes entre les Cabinets, pourraient être prises pour terminer  
« la crise actuelle, et en prévenir à l'avenir le renouvellement. »

Dans le cas où nos deux armées et l'attitude de nos escadres n'auraient pu empêcher les deux parties de prendre les armes ou si les leur auraient pas fait déposer immédiatement la nécessité d'un acte en commun des Grandes Puissances deviendrait évidente, et il n'y a pas lieu d'espérer qu'on put alors décider la Russie à ne pas intervenir matériellement dans une question où ses intérêts seraient si directement engagés. Ce qu'il faudra obtenir, c'est que son action soit déterminée et dirigée de concert avec les autres Puissances, c'est qu'elle se ligat à celle que la France et l'Angleterre auront, de leur côté à exercer, c'est qu'elle par le fait même Convention Européenne remplisse les stipulations de l'okras Skeleski. Je n'ignore pas tout ce qu'on aura à se proposer de la part du Cabinet de St-Petersbourg, tout a pu lui être fait au point de vue de tenir autant que possible ses relations avec la Turquie en dehors du droit Européen. C'est pour le même motif qu'on est fondé à croire qu'il ne vaudra pas se porter à des négociations sur vus par voie de conférences permanentes. Cependant il aurait peu d'arguments tant soit peu spécieux à faire valoir pour se dispenser de combats avec évidemment suggérés par le droit d'indépendance et qu'on a par tout ses allies.

une route à partir du but final, le «*negotiation*» de l'arrangement par lequel il serait possible de placer le Sultan et son pays assés vassal dans une situation plus satisfaisante pour l'un et pour l'autre, plus rassurante pour la tranquillité de l'Orient que celle où ils se trouvent depuis six années.

La nécessité de concéder à Metamet Ali l'investiture héréditaire d'une partie au moins de ses possessions actuelles paraît maintenant admise comme mesure à peu près générale. On a tenu compte au point de grandeur où il est parvenu, le besoin d'assurer l'avenir de sa famille, et de la mettre, après sa mort, à l'abri des vengeances de la Porte, on s'est sentie trop impérieusement à son caprice, pour qu'il puisse se livrer à des pensées vraiment pacifiques, tant qu'il n'aura pas obtenu quelque satisfaction à cet égard.

D'un autre côté, on ne peut pas se flatter de l'espoir que la Porte consente à lui accorder et sûrement de lier sa morale si par compensation on ne lui donne pas à elle-même quelque avantage que la France seure garante matine e contre les entreprises éventuelles d'un tiers dont elle aurait à usurer la puissance. La nature et l'étendue de cet avantage ne sont certes pas faciles à déterminer. Lord Palmerston pense qu'il ne faudrait pas moins que la retrocession de la Syrie toute entière. A Berlin on semble admettre que le Sultan pourrait se contenter d'une partie seulement de cette province. Quant à nous, Monsieur nous ne pouvons que la Porte aurait droit à une compensation réelle mais nous croyons que le moment d'en fixer la nature et la proportion n'est pas arrivé, qu'une question parallèle ne peut être résolue que d'après les données diverses et compliquées dont l'appréciation ne peut être l'œuvre d'un moment; et que ce point doit être mis au concours qui, si nous venons à prévaloir, s'établira entre les Puissances.

Après avoir donné lecture à lord Palmerston de la présente dépêche. En exposant ainsi au Cabinet de Londres l'ensemble de notre



manière de voir sur les graves circonstances du moment nous lui donnons un gage non équivoque de la confiance qu'il nous inspire, et du désir que nous avons de marcher avec lui dans le plus parfait accord. Lord Palmerston comprendra de lui-même qu'au nombre des idées que vous êtes chargé de lui faire connaître, il en est d'hypothétiques, et que les événements ou même de plus mûres réflexions peuvent beaucoup modifier

Recevez, &c.  
(Signé) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

P.S.—Nous attendons impatiemment votre réponse et la communication que Lord Palmerston s'empressera sans doute de vous faire, de la décision du Cabinet de Londres, au sujet des délibérations communes dont nous proposons d'établir le siège à Vienne, aussi bien que des instructions destinées à l'Amiral Stopford.

No. 67

*Account Palmerston to Karl Grenville.*

(No 249)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 13, 1859

THE inclosed paper contains the substance of the instructions which Her Majesty's Government propose to give to Sir Robert Stopford, the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Naval Forces in the Mediterranean, and upon which they request the previous opinion of the French Government.

The part of these instructions which relates to the possibility of the English and French squadrons going up to Constantinople in the event of a Russian force entering the Turkish territory, may require some consideration. It seems clear that such a measure would in such case, be highly desirable, and that it would be the best if not the only way of effectually counteracting the bad consequences which might result from the entrance of the Russians into Turkey. But if that movement were to be resisted by a vigorous resistance on the part of the Turkish forces in the Bosphorus, it would be difficult to accomplish it, unless the fleet were accompanied by some force which could be landed to carry the forts by taking them in the rear. This operation would not be difficult and would not require any large amount of force, for though the batteries are formidable against ships on account of the narrowness of the Bosphorus, the strength of the current which sets downwards towards the Mediterranean, and because at that time of year the wind acts chiefly the same way as the current, yet those forts are very weak on the land side, and might be taken one after the other, by any moderate force which attacked them in the rear.

It is probable, however, that if the Turkish troops were defeated, and if the Russians had entered Turkey, the Sultan would cheerfully permit, if he did not actually invite, the British and French squadrons to go up to Constantinople; and as those squadrons would come as friends to protect the Sultan, and not as enemies to attack him, it would be difficult even for the Russians to suggest to him a plausible reason for refusing to receive such protection.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

Inclosure in No. 67.

*Substance of proposed Instructions to Sir Robert Stopford.*

THE Admiral to proceed with the ships under his command to the Bay of Scanderoon, or to any other neighbouring part of the coast of Syria, which may be near to the places where the armies of the Sultan and of Mehemet Ali may happen to be.

If on his arrival off the coast he should find hostilities have not commenced, and that, on the contrary, the two armies have made retrograde movements, and that there is no likelihood of collision, he will proceed in the execution of such other orders as he may have received from the Admiralty.

If he should find that, although hostilities had not actually commenced, the two armies, nevertheless, were near to each other, and continued to occupy positions likely to lead to collision, the Admiral should immediately open a communication with the Commander of each army, in doing which he will be assisted by the British Consul on the coast, and the best step to take for this purpose will probably be to select to the General of each army an officer, a French or a British, and a competent interpreter.

The Admiral should earnestly request each General to withdraw his troops some days' march from their actual positions, in order to create the distance between the two armies, by which the danger of collision should be removed, and to place them under the control of the Allied Powers to effect by negotiation a suspension of hostilities between the Sultan and his vassal. If either General should refuse to comply with this request, the Admiral should express his regret, and should urge the superior Authorities to send the necessary orders, and he should express to the Generals the confident and well-founded expectation of the British Government, that they should suspend all forward movements until they should hear from their respective Governments; and he should impress upon them the deep responsibility which they would incur by any hasty and inconsiderate step.

If on his arrival off the coast he should find that hostilities had already commenced, he should, as in the former supposed case, immediately open a communication with the Generals commanding the contending armies, and state to them that he has been specially sent by the British Government to propose and strongly to press upon them a suspension of arms. That the British Government, in concert and in co-operation with Her Majesty's Allies, is going to endeavour to bring about, by negotiation, an amicable and a mutually satisfactory arrangement between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt; and that it is of great importance, for the success of such negotiation, that the hostilities between the two armies should be suspended while that negotiation is going on, that the views of the Powers with respect to these arrangements must be founded upon an enlarged consideration of the great interests of Europe; and that, consequently, these views could not be altered by any events which a continuance of hostilities might produce, and that such a continuance of hostilities would be a useless effusion of blood without any counterbalanced by any permanent advantage to either party; because the final settlement will depend, not upon the chances of the campaign, but upon the negotiations between the Great Powers and the Contending Parties.

If the two Generals should accede to the proposed suspension of arms, the Admiral will immediately send off a report thereof to Constantinople and Alexandria, and also by the shortest way, to England; and he will, at the same time, urgently request the two Generals to withdraw their armies to a certain distance from each other, so as to leave a sufficient space between their respective troops.

It will also be desirable that the armistice should be confirmed by a formal Military Convention, and that its duration should be without any definite limit of time, and that a month's notice should be required before it could be put an end to by either party.

If either or both of the Generals should refuse to accede to this armistice, the Admiral should, as in the former supposed case, send off to Constantinople, or to Alexandria, or to both, to urge through the Ambassador at Constantinople, and through the Consul-General at Alexandria, that the requisite orders might be sent to the Generals in Syria, to agree to the suspension of arms.

If the refusal shall come from the Turkish General, it will, for many

reasons, political and physical, be difficult for the Admiral to employ any other means than those of persuasion, to procure the consent of the Sultan, for to say nothing of the position in which Her Majesty stands towards the Sultan who is Her Majesty's Ally, and who is also the acknowledged and undoubtedly the rightful Sovereign of the territory which is the cause of dispute, it is to be borne in mind that the operations of the Sultan's Army do not depend upon any communication by sea between Constantinople and the scene of operations and that it would not be easy for the squadron to force its way up to Constantinople for the purpose of supporting by its presence the representations of Her Majesty's Ambassador.

If in such case the Admiral would strongly point out to the Turkish Commander-in-Chief, that the chances of war and how great and fearful a responsibility would be after he had refused an honourable armistice, when proposed to him by a man of his master, for the express purpose of preventing any unforeseen disaster should befall his army, and if instead of meeting him in the security of an armistice at the head of a strong and undisciplined force he were to be compelled to retreat with a defeated army and be pursued by a victorious enemy, and if he should thus bring upon his country the most serious calamities through hostilities, the consequences of which he had himself invited upon.

If on the contrary the refusal should proceed from the General commanding the troops of Mehemet Ali, geographical circumstances would enable the Admiral to employ more effectual means to accomplish his purpose, because the Egyptian Army could not well carry on its military operations in Syria without a free communication by sea with Egypt, and because the squadron, by going to Alexandria, could exert a powerful influence in support of the representations which the Consul-General might make to the Pasha of Egypt.

In such case, therefore, the Admiral would employ towards the General commanding the troops of Mehemet Ali in Syria, all the arguments which have been pointed out as applicable to the General of the Sultan, but the Admiral would further proceed to employ all the means at his command, to produce compliance with his request.

For this purpose, he would, in the first place, prevent all further communication by Egyptian vessels, whether of commerce or of war, between Syria and Egypt. He would turn away all Egyptian ships of war, and would send all Egyptian transports and merchantmen to Malta, or to any other place, where they might be held for a time in safe custody. He would then leave on the coast of Syria such ships of war as he might think necessary for this purpose, and would proceed with the rest of his force to Alexandria, and would, in the meantime, earnestly press Mehemet Ali to send to Syria, in a limited state of war, positive orders for an armistice to suspend hostilities. If Mehemet Ali should comply with this request, all vessels which might have been detained should immediately be released, and the Admiral should remain off Alexandria with his squadron, to be held in readiness that the order might actually be obeyed, and he might then return to the coast of Syria to watch events, or might remain off Alexandria according to his discretion under the then existing circumstances.

If the Pasha should refuse to give the order, the Admiral should then employ such means of pressure, gradually increasing in their stringency as may be found necessary, or may think best calculated to accomplish his purpose.

Among the measures to which he might resort would be a refusal to permit the Egyptian fleet either to come in if in port, or to go on if out of port; and to prohibit Egyptian merchantmen and, according to his discretion, all Egyptian ships of war.

But it might happen that the army of the Sultan might have suffered a great defeat, and that measures of extreme vigour might become necessary to stop the advance of the Egyptians and to save the Turkish Empire. In this case the Admiral would be authorized to have recourse to any measures of compulsion which he might think to be within his

means, and which he might consider likely to induce the Pasha to give the necessary orders for stopping the advance of his army, and for bringing it back within the limits of Syria.

In such an event, it is also possible that a Russian force, either naval or military, might enter the ports and territory of Turkey with the professed object of protecting the Sultan, and of repelling the Egyptian invaders.

In such a case, and after the Admiral had obtained from the Pasha the order for the retreat of his troops, and after he had received certain information that such order had been obeyed, it would be extremely desirable that the British squadron should proceed to Constantinople, and should remain there, or in the Black Sea, until the Russian forces had evacuated the Turkish territory.

There would be time for the Admiral to communicate on this matter with Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople for the purpose of ascertaining in what manner the measures could best be executed, and having stated to the Admiral the views of this point Her Majesty's Government must leave it to his discretion, to determine whether, in the event of permission to pass not being granted, the force under his command would be strong enough to force the passage without sustaining such an amount of loss in men, and of damage to the ships, as would cripple the squadron and unfit it for any useful operation after the passage had been effected.

If the Turkish and Egyptian squadrons should be at sea, the Admiral should endeavour, as far as he could, consistently with the execution of the foregoing instructions, to prevent a collision between them, by interposing his squadron in a friendly manner between the other two fleets, and by urging the respective Admirals to retire to their own ports. But the last and most important object is to prevent or to put an end to hostilities by land, because it is the contest by land much more than a contest between the squadrons by sea that might lead to consequences disastrous to the Turkish Empire and fatal to the peace of Europe.

These instructions have been prepared with the view of providing for all the cases which can at present be foreseen, but unexpected circumstances may arise, and different measures may be required. The Admiral, therefore, should use his discretion in departing from the spirit, but not from the letter of these instructions, provided he adheres to their spirit.

Orders of a nature similar to these, have been given to the French squadron in the Mediterranean, and that squadron will be instructed to join and co-operate with Sir Robert Stopford's. The most perfect understanding has been established between the British and French Governments upon the great and important matters to which these instructions relate. The interests of the two countries on these affairs are the same, their views and objects are identical, and their measures will be uniform.

The Admiral will, therefore, communicate, concert, and co-operate with the French Admiral, with the utmost confidence and frankness, upon all matters connected with the execution of these instructions, which he will show in obedience to the French Admiral; and Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt that the same harmony which exists between the two Governments, will prevail between their Admirals and squadrons.

No. 66

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 131)

My Lord,

Therapia, May 27, 1839.

REPORTS from Syria have been made to your Lordship, of the hostile feeling of the Mahomedan population towards the Egyptian



Government; similar reports abound here, and they are, I believe, true: it is thought that these widely extended feelings will ultimately give success to the Sultan, provided his army shall be prudently directed.

The declaration made by Mehemet Ali, and forwarded by Count Modera, is public, and, as I hear, is universally considered to amount to a demand for the partition of the Ottoman Empire. I presume the Sultan cannot comply with it without ensuring the loss of his spiritual supremacy—the Khalifat.

The partition of the empire would necessarily establish the authority of Russia over all its parts, and Constantinople would be a Russian city under the nominal authority of a puppet. The defeat of the Sultan's army by that of the Pasha of Egypt, would be a ~~very~~ <sup>great</sup> opportunity to our interests than the partition of the empire as alluded to above, if it were to be established with our concurrence.

We might easily prevent the destruction of the empire by such a defeat, and, I believe, repair the mischief it would occasion; but the slow, silent, and perpetual action of universal disorder inherent in the partition of the empire, would defy our wisdom and baffle our power to resist and remedy.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

P. S.—I inclose extracts from Mr. Vice-Consul Hays' letter to me, dated May 7, lest your Lordship should not have received the statements it contains.

P

Inclosure in No. 68

*Mr. Vice-Consul Hays to Lord Ponsonby.*

(Extract.)

*Alexandria, May 7, 1839.*

THE last advices here from Bir are, that the Sultan's forces had crossed the Euphrates and from all appearances with an ~~intention~~ <sup>intention</sup> His Highness the Pasha here, with Solyman Pasha, and Achmet Menckly Pasha, Minister of War, are making active preparations to stand any attack that may be made against them, for I do not think the Egyptians will strike the first blow. There are about ten regiments already arrived here, and twenty more are expected, to form the force which is to be opposed against the Sultan, should he attack.

The information I have been able to obtain is, that the advanced guard only of the Turkish army, consisting of from 2,000 to 3,000 men, had ~~on~~ <sup>on</sup> the 4th instant crossed the Euphrates, they had encamped at a village about two miles to the eastward of Bir. The strength of the Turkish army was not at all known, but reinforcements were daily arriving with great quantities of stores and provisions.

The Egyptian forces were at that time estimated at about 60,000 men, but I have not been able to ascertain the proportions of Infantry and Cavalry. These forces were stationed between Aleppo and Aintab; and 30,000 more men were expected, which it was supposed would constitute the whole available force of the country.

On the 1st instant, his Highness Ibrahim Pasha made a demand for a loan of 1,200 purses from the native merchants of Aleppo, which, however, was not granted, on the plea of incapacity, and I understand was not attempted to be forced.

On the 4th instant, about twenty of the Annisee Arabs and as many Turkish prisoners, were brought into Aleppo by Mahomed Bey, who was sent with a party of irregular Cavalry against the former to prevent their junction with the Sultan's forces. The former prisoners were detained, but the latter were sent back by order of his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha.

The Commodore Handeira received a despatch on the 5th instant from his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, stating his intention of acting solely

on the defensive, and explaining the necessity he had been under of interdicting all commercial communication with the Turkish dominions, in consequence of an edict to that effect, in the name of the Sultan, regarding the Egyptian territories.

A proclamation to the above effect has been issued, I understand, at Aleppo.

I am informed the Albanians from Candia are not to be sent for.

On the 1st or 2nd instant, an order was issued at Aleppo for all European instructors to hold themselves ready for service at a minute's warning, who replied they were ready to do so, only on condition their arrears were all paid up, which are from ten to sixteen months, and up to the 4th not any measures had been taken. The general arrears of the army are, I believe, from twelve to eighteen months; the feeling at Aleppo appears opposed to this Government, and this has been increased by the mosques having been appropriated as temporary barracks.

The Egyptian forces stationed at Ailana, Tarsus, and on the frontier of Culuk Bugas, amount to about 15,000 men, a great part of whom are invalids, and the Sultan's army on the opposite frontier, I am told, amounts to about 40,000 men.

All is at present quiet in this district, but the general feeling, particularly in the mountains, appears to be opposed to this Government.

No. 69

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 24.)*

No. 229)

My Lord,

*Paris, June 21, 1839*

I RECEIVED yesterday, by the ordinary Calais messenger, your Lordship's despatches from No. 245 to 248, both inclusive, and I this morning received by a special messenger your despatch of the day before yesterday, No. 249, inclosing a copy of the instructions Her Majesty's Government propose to give to the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Naval Forces in the Mediterranean, and upon which they request to have the opinion of the French Government. A Council of Ministers met at an early hour this morning to determine upon the course to be taken by Ministers to-day in the Chamber of Deputies, upon a law now under consideration regarding the *Etat Major*, &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. and I opportunity of communicating with Marshal Soult, relative to the proposed instructions to the Admiral.

I hope to have a conference with his Excellency on this subject to-morrow, and will re-dispatch the special messenger in the evening, with the result.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 70

*Lord Beaule to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 24.)*

(No. 28.)

My Lord,

*Vienna, June 14, 1839*

THE last despatch I have seen from the Internuncio, is of the 30th ultimo. Prince Metternich will send all his despatches to Prince Esterhazy, for communication to your Lordship, but as this may reach your Lordship first, I have to acquaint you that the Prince's recommendations seem to have made little effect upon the Porta, and that the tone of the Turkish Ministers was decidedly warlike. The only overture to which they seem to have listened, was one for obtaining the immediate restitution of Syria

to the Sultan, by means of the intervention of the Four Powers. This overture was made by Baron ~~Stromer~~ in his own name, not in that of his Government, and was to be taken into consideration by the Turkish Ministers, and to form the subject of a conference. Upon seeing this, I asked Prince Metternich how he proposed to give effect to the proposition, in case it were accepted. He answered that it was but a first project of negotiation, not made in the name of Austria, and though it might serve to treat upon, was not the solution to be finally adopted.

There is something in this which I do not clearly understand, nor entirely approve. I doubt the Internuncio having made such an overture without authority, and I doubt the expediency of holding out a wire to the Porte, which is afterwards to be withdrawn.

Prince Metternich requested me in writing to your Lordship, to abstain from pronouncing the word conference, saying that the notions of all the Governments would necessarily cross here, but that if a conference were proposed, nobody would come to it. This mode of placing the question sufficiently marks what his wish is.

Since I saw him, I have learnt that France has already pronounced herself upon some of the leading points of the affair. King Louis Philippe thinks a conference indispensable, and that the place at which to assemble it is Vienna. He is willing to concur in securing the succession in Egypt to the family of Mehemet Ali, and in a reversion of Syria to the Sultan after the Pasha's death. This would certainly be the best plan the Four Powers could agree upon, it was however necessary that weight to secure the Two Powers to agree to it, the Sultan demanding the immediate restitution of Syria, and the Pasha its permanent annexation to Egypt. It is further to be foreseen that the project if agreed to, will not only produce a prolongation of the same armed force, which has existed since the peace of Kutaya, and that the ultimate restitution of Syria will depend upon the circumstances of the moment and probably not be effected without the employment of force. Only one other plan presents itself to my mind, and this is the immediate wresting of Syria from the Pasha, and its restitution to the Porte. It is doubtful how far the Powers could be induced to concur in this plan, but if it could be carried into effect without the employment of means which would endanger Mehemet Ali's position in Egypt, it would put an end to the provisional state which at present exists, and give a better chance to both the Sultan and the Pasha, of consolidating their respective dominions than they now possess.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 71.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 2.)

My Lord

Vienna, June 14, 1839.

I HAVE just seen the French Ambassador, of whose confidence and disposition to co-operate with us, I cannot speak in terms too strong. I learn from him that Prince Metternich still deprecates the employment of the word conference, representing strongly the inconvenience attached to it. Still I would seem that his objection to the term arises from his doubt of its being admitted by England or Russia, while he avows his anxiety for the thing under another name. His wish is, that each Cabinet should send its opinion to its Representative here, leaving a certain latitude for discussion, and that from a comparison of the five opinions should be sought one in which all might coincide, which, when found, should form the basis of communications to the Sultan and the Pasha.

The points upon which the opinions of the Cabinets are wanted, are:

1st. The securing Egypt to the family of Mehemet Ali, and whether this should be done by successive investitures, or by the establishment of hereditary right, reserving always to the Porte its feudal superiority.

2dly. Whether the restitution of Syria should be contingent on the death of Mehemet Ali or immediate, and upon this point although Prince Metternich argues the expediency in the interest of the Pasha himself of making the restitution immediate, he yet allows that there would be no chance of obtaining his assent to it, and also affirms the expediency of infringing the conditions established at Kutaya.

I have found it impossible to get a copy of those conditions, but by what I can learn, they only grant to Mehemet Ali the nomination to the Pashalics of Syria and Egypt in the usual form, that is to say, during the pleasure of the Sultan.

If the plan of restoring Syria to the Porte after Mehemet Ali's death should ultimately be the one resolved upon, we must expect that the Porte will demand the guarantee of the Five Powers for its being carried into effect, and must be prepared what answer to give.

Prince Metternich further stated that he had taken the Emperor's commands for sending the Austrian vessels to sail to go to take part in the expedition, and that the son of the Archduke Charles would probably embark in one of them.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

P.S.—Prince Metternich informs me that although he sends the Internuncio's despatches for communication to your Lordship, he writes nothing concerning them, as he is expecting your answer to the communications which have been already made.

No. 72.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale

(No. 51)

My Lord

Foreign Office, June 28, 1839.

WITH reference to your despatch of the 14th instant, in which you mention your inability to obtain a copy of the conditions established at Kutaya, between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, I have to inform your Excellency that there was no regular or revealed agreement between the two parties on that occasion, but that the manner in which their differences were settled was, that the Porte published a Firman on the 15th of April, 1833, by which Mehemet Ali and his son Ibrahim were reinstated in all the Governments which they had before possessed with the exception of those of Syria and of the Levant, Aleppo and Damascus, and subsequently another Firman was published, conferring upon Ibrahim Pasha the Government of Adana.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 73.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 25.)

No. 231

My Lord

Paris, June 22, 1839.

MARSHAL SOULT paid me a visit yesterday evening, and I delivered to him a copy of the instructions which the Ministry of the Government proposed to give to the Commissioners and staff of the British Naval Forces in the Mediterranean, but as a translation which he has directed to be made of these instructions has not been finished at the time I had an interview with him this morning, his Excellency was not prepared to enter into any discussion respecting them. He was, however, satisfied from the general impression made of their purport.



that the instructions issued by the French Government to their Admiral, would be in accordance with them.

Marsini Soult read to me a despatch which he had just received from M. de Bourqueney reporting the conversation he had with your Lordship, on his coming to you a despatch of Marshal Soult, developing at some length the opinions of the French Government upon the Oriental Question. He rejoined he said to find how entirely the views of the two Governments corresponded not only regarding the measures to be taken for preventing or suspending hostilities between the Turks and Egyptians, but also respecting the arrangements to be subsequently made for placing upon a permanent basis the relations between the Sultan and Mehmet Ali, and he was glad to find that after balancing the advantages and disadvantages of Vienna being selected as the place of Conference between the Great Powers upon the affairs of the East you were inclined to accede to the proposal of the Conference being held in that city.

Prince Metternich, he said, was not without apprehension of the startling effect in some quarters, of the word Conference on Eastern Affairs, but was, notwithstanding, most desirous that an identity of purpose and of language to be used to the Porte and to Mehmet Ali, should be concerted by the Representatives of the five Great Powers at Vienna, and he, the Marshal (provided he had the substance) was quite willing that the name of Conference should not be pronounced.

Count Appony communicated to the Marshal this day a despatch from Prince Metternich, inclosing Reports from the Internuncio at Constantinople; the communication is probably the same as that which Lord Beaumont apprises your Lordship you will receive from Prince Esterhazy.

Marshal Soult is particularly struck with the circumstance, that Prince Metternich had not confined himself to expressing his willingness that Austrian vessels of war should join the British and French combined fleet, but had also alluded to the effect of the union of the three Bays before the walls of Constantinople.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

#### No 74

*Karl Granville to Viscount Palmerston. (Received June 25.)*

No. 236.

My Lord,

Paris, June 23, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship, a copy of a telegram despatch from Marseilles, which has been communicated to me this morning by Marshal Soult.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Inclosure in No. 74

*Dépêche Télégraphique de Marseille, du 22 Juin, 1839, à 11 heures.*

LE "Minos" est parti hier au soir pour Malte. Le "Mentor" est arrivé en même temps. Ce dernier a rencontré le 17 entre Malte et la Sicile, l'Escadre de l'Amiral Stopford paraissant se diriger sur Malte.

Les Capitaines du "Scamandre" et du "Dante" ont le "Mentor" m'apportent les rapports annonçant le commencement des hostilités en Syrie au départ du "Dante" d'Alexandrie, le 7 Juin, apportant la nouvelle de l'invasion du territoire égyptien par les Turcs qui s'étaient emparés de quinze villages dont les habitants avaient été armés. A cette nouvelle, Ibrahim Pacha avait fait marcher un corps de 25,000 hommes

contre eux; des transports étaient partis d'Alexandrie avec des troupes à bord.

L'Escadre Turque était dans le Bosphore au départ du "Scamandre" de Constantinople, le 7 courant, avec 7,000 hommes, qu'on disait devoir opérer un débarquement en Egypte. Le bruit courait à Constantinople qu'une affaire sérieuse, dans laquelle les Turcs avaient été battus, avait eu lieu en Syrie.

Le Grand Seigneur était malade.

#### No 75

*Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty*

My Lords,

Foreign Office, June 25, 1839.

I HAVE received the Queen's commands, as they have been laid before Her Majesty's pleasure, that instructions to the following effect may be forthwith addressed to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, Commander in Chief of Her Majesty's Naval Forces in the Mediterranean.

Sir Robert Stopford will proceed with the ships under his command to the Bay of Scanderoon, or to any other part of the coast of Syria which may be near to the places where the armies of the Sultan and of Mehmet Ali may happen to be.

If, on arriving off the coast, the Admiral should find that hostilities have not commenced, and that, on the contrary, the two armies have made retrograde movements, and that there is no likelihood of collision, he will then proceed in the execution of such other orders as he may have received from your Lordships.

If he should find that, although hostilities had not actually commenced the two armies were near to each other, and commenced to occupy positions likely to occasion collision, the Admiral should immediately open a communication with the commander of each army, doing which it will be assisted by the British vessels on board, and the best step to take for this purpose would probably be to send to the general of each army an officer, accompanied by a competent interpreter.

The Admiral should earnestly request each general to withdraw his troops some days' march from their actual position in order to wear the distance between the two armies, and then to give a summary account of his movements. Should neither wish to do this, the Admiral should effect by negotiation a permanent suspension between the Sultan and his vassals. If either or both of the generals would not comply with this request, the Admiral should immediately send a copy of the Queen's commands to the British Ambassador at Constantinople, to urge the suspension of hostilities to avoid the necessity of war, and should express to the generals the confident and well-founded expectation of the British Government that all operations or forward movements should be suspended till the further orders of the respective Governments should have been received, and he should express upon the general law of responsibility which may be incurred by any hasty or inconsiderate step.

If, on his arrival off the coast, he should find that hostilities had already commenced, he should, as in the former supposed case, immediately open a communication with the generals commanding the contending armies, and should state to them that he has been specially sent by the British Government to propose, and strongly to press upon them, a suspension of arms; that the British Government, in concert and co-operation with Her Majesty's Allies, is going to endeavour to bring about, by negotiation, an amicable and a mutually satisfactory arrangement between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt, and that it is of great importance for the success of such negotiation, that the hostilities between the two armies should be suspended while that negotiation is going on, that the views of the Powers with respect to these final arrangements, must be founded upon an enlarged consideration of the great interests of Europe, and that those views could not be altered by any events which a

continuance of hostilities might produce; and that such a continuance of hostilities, therefore, would only cause an useless effusion of blood without being attended with any permanent advantage to either of the Contending Parties. Because the final settlement will depend, not upon the chances of the campaign in Syria, but upon the negotiations between the Great Powers and the two parties.

If the two generals should accede to the proposed suspension of arms, the Admiral will immediately send a report thereof to Constantinople and to Alexandria, and also, by the shortest way, to England; and he will, at the same time, urgently request the two generals to withdraw their armies to a certain distance from each other, so as to leave an ample interval of space between their respective troops.

It will also be desirable that the armistice should be confirmed by a formal military convention, and that its duration should be without any definite limit of time; and two months' notice, at the least, should be required, before it could be put an end to by either party.

If either or both of the generals should refuse to accede to this armistice, the Admiral should, as in the former supposed case, set off to Constantinople, or to Alexandria, or to both, to urge through the Ambassador at Constantinople, and through the Consul at Alexandria, that the two generals should be sent to the governor in Syria to agree to a suspension of arms.

If the two generals refuse to accede to the proposed armistice, the Admiral will, in such case, strongly recommend the Turkish General to withdraw his army from the coast of Syria, and to retire to the interior of the country, so as to leave the coast of Syria open to the Egyptian army, and to leave the Turkish army in a position to be able to retreat to the interior of the country, if the Egyptian army should advance to the coast of Syria. The Admiral will also recommend the Turkish General to acknowledge and rightful sovereign of the territory which is the cause of dispute, it is to be borne in mind that the operations of the Turkish Army in the coast of Syria, and the operations of the Egyptian Army in the interior of the country, are both necessary for the purpose of supporting by its presence, the operations of the Turkish Army in the coast of Syria.

In way up to Constantinople for the purpose of supporting by its presence, the operations of the Turkish Army in the coast of Syria.

But in such case the Admiral would strongly recommend the Turkish General to withdraw his army from the coast of Syria, and to retire to the interior of the country, so as to leave the coast of Syria open to the Egyptian army, and to leave the Turkish army in a position to be able to retreat to the interior of the country, if the Egyptian army should advance to the coast of Syria. The Admiral will also recommend the Turkish General to acknowledge and rightful sovereign of the territory which is the cause of dispute, it is to be borne in mind that the operations of the Turkish Army in the coast of Syria, and the operations of the Egyptian Army in the interior of the country, are both necessary for the purpose of supporting by its presence, the operations of the Turkish Army in the coast of Syria.

In such case, therefore, the Admiral would employ towards the General commanding the troops of Mehemet Ali in Syria, all the arguments which have been pointed out as applicable to the General of the Sultan; but the Admiral would, in addition, proceed to employ all the means at his command to produce compliance with his request.

For this purpose, the Admiral would, in the first place, prevent all further communication between the Egyptian army and the Turkish army, by sending all Egyptian transports and merchantmen to Malta, or to any other place, where they might be held for a time in safe custody. He

would then leave on the coast of Syria such ships of war as he might think necessary for this purpose; and would proceed with the rest of his force to Alexandria, and would lose no time in earnestly pressing Mehemet Ali to send to Syria, by a British ship of war, positive orders for an immediate suspension of hostilities.

If Mehemet Ali should comply with this request, all vessels which might have been detained should be released; but the Admiral should remain off Alexandria with his squadron, till he had learnt that the order had actually been obeyed; and he might then return to the coast of Syria to watch events, or he might remain off Alexandria, according to his discretion under the then existing state of circumstances.

If Mehemet Ali should refuse to comply with this request, the Admiral should employ such means of pressure, gradually increasing in their stringency, as he might think necessary or proper, to bring about a suspension of hostilities.

Among the measures which he might resort to, would be a refusal to permit the Egyptian army to land on the coast of Syria, and to prevent the Egyptian army from receiving supplies from the coast of Syria.

It is to be borne in mind that the army of the Sultan might have suffered a great deal from the operations of the Egyptian army, and might become necessary to stop the operations of the Egyptian army, and to prevent the Egyptian army from receiving supplies from the coast of Syria. The Admiral would, in such case, recommend the Turkish General to acknowledge and rightful sovereign of the territory which is the cause of dispute, it is to be borne in mind that the operations of the Turkish Army in the coast of Syria, and the operations of the Egyptian Army in the interior of the country, are both necessary for the purpose of supporting by its presence, the operations of the Turkish Army in the coast of Syria.

The Admiral would, in such case, recommend the Turkish General to acknowledge and rightful sovereign of the territory which is the cause of dispute, it is to be borne in mind that the operations of the Turkish Army in the coast of Syria, and the operations of the Egyptian Army in the interior of the country, are both necessary for the purpose of supporting by its presence, the operations of the Turkish Army in the coast of Syria.

But unexpected circumstances may arise, and different measures may be required. The Admiral, therefore, should use his discretion in departing, if he should think fit, from the letter of these instructions.

Orders of a nature similar to these, will probably have been given to the French squadron in the Mediterranean, and that squadron will be instructed to join and co-operate with the squadron of Sir Robert Stopford. The most perfect understanding has been established between the British and French Governments upon the great and important matters to which these instructions relate. The interests of the two countries in these affairs are the same, their views and objects are identical, and their measures will be uniform. The Admiral will therefore communicate, concert and co-operate with the French Admiral, with the utmost confidence and frankness, upon all matters connected with the execution of these instructions, which he will show *in extenso* to the French Admiral; and Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt, that the same harmony which exists between the two Governments will prevail between their Admirals and squadrons.

I am, &c.  
Signed PALMERSTON



~~Secret and Confidential~~

Foreign Office, June 25, 1839

I am, &c.  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 25, 1839.

addressed to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, I am to signify to your Lordships Her Majesty's further commands, that Sir Robert Stopford should be informed that, in the event of an Austrian squadron joining the English and French fleets, he would be at liberty to communicate to the Austrian Commander-in-Chief the instruction contained in my patent letter of this day, but Sir Robert Stopford should not communicate to the Austrian Commander-in-Chief the other instruction contained in my secret and confidential letter of this day.

I am, &c,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 75

(No. 261)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 25, 1939

If further communication between the two Governments should lead to any modifications of these instructions, these modifications could easily be sent out afterwards.

Signed) I am, &c.,  
PALMERSTON

No. 79

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received June 27.)

No. 237 )

My Lord,

Paris, June 24, 1939.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to No. 234 inclusive. The Marquis de La Fayette arrived in London on the 11th inst. to which Her Majesty's Government presented a letter from Sir Robert Stophord; but he was not prepared when I saw him this morning to communicate to me officially the opinion of the French Government upon them. His Excellency told me that he was this day to confer respecting them with the Minister of Marine, that to-morrow they would be submitted to the Cabinet Council, and that he would then communicate to me a Memorandum containing such observations as may have occurred to the French Government upon the consideration of them, and suggesting such changes as might appear advisable.

There are two points in the instructions on which I collected from the conversation of Marshal Suult, that it is probable some change will be suggested. The first relates to the conduct to be observed towards the Turkish fleet. The Marshal seemed to think that, though the operations of the Sultan's Army do not depend upon communication by sea between Constantinople and the scene of operations, it would be nevertheless expedient, in the case of the refusal to agree to a suspension of arms pending the Turkish Government's decision, to blockade the Straits of the Dardanelles, not so much for the purpose of preventing supplies reaching

\* Following codes of Num. 75, 76, 77

the Turkish Army from the coast, as to give to our proceedings the character of an impartial mediation — the other point refers to our desire not permitting the Egyptian squadron to go into Alexandria if it should attempt to do so.

I expect also that in the memorandum some observations will be made upon that part of the instructions which relate to the combined operations according to the instructions into the Black Sea. Marshal Soult talked to me this morning of the danger of cruising in a sea where we had no friendly port of refuge. I will not, however, attempt to anticipate the contents of the memorandum which I shall probably have to transmit by the next messenger.

I believe I have before mentioned that the Marshal was much pleased at the coming of the Austrians, and that we were preparing some vessels of war to act in conjunction with the French and English fleets. This union of the three flags will, he thinks, have a great moral effect, if some Russian ships of war were also to be added to the combined fleet, such an addition of course among the Great European Powers could not fail to have an irresistible influence on the contending parties and thus be the restoration of peace.

1. That St. Aulaire writes from Vienna, that Lord Beauvau has been ordered by the Emperor Prince Metternich to assemble a military force of 10,000 men at Trieste, ready to be embarked with a view to operations in the East; and that though the Austrian Minister had seemed to accede to this proposition, Lord Beauvau did not despair of his being induced to adopt it. Marshal Soult asked me, if I had heard of this correspondence between His Majesty's Ambassador and Prince Metternich. He appeared to take great interest in the success of this proposition. I answered that in the last despatch from Lord Beauvau, which had passed through my hands under flying seal, no reference was made to this subject.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GRAYVILLE

## No. 80

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston — (Received June 27)*

(No. 238.)

My Lord,

*Paris, June 24, 1839*

SINCE I wrote to your Lordship this morning, the French Government has decided to send a large force to the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. They were to have sailed on Saturday by the Marses (telegram).

Marshal Skult, who dined here, communicated to me the substance of

M. Cochelet writes, that according to the official report of Ibrahim Pasha, the Turkish troops had advanced beyond the bridge of the frontier, and that with a superior force of Cavalry, they had driven out of a village an Egyptian detachment of Cavalry which had been stationed in it, and which had retired upon Aintab, where some redoubts had been raised by Ibrahim Pasha, for the defence of the country. These arms have been taken into use in various villages to the inhabitants, who had been excited to revolt against the Government of the Pasha.

Mohemet Ali, on the receipt of this intelligence, had invited the Consuls of the five European Powers to attend him, and had laid before them the despatches of Ibrahim Pasha, and asked their advice as to the conduct he should pursue. That they advised him to act entirely on the defensive, and that, upon their remonstrating against the intention he had avowed of sending his fleet to sea, he gave up that intention.

The despatches from Constantinople state that the Turkish Government still gives assurances that orders have been issued to the Com-

mander of the Turkish Army, not to commence hostilities, but that no credit is given to these assurances.

The Sultan Mahmoud had been ill for four days, but had recovered from his illness.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

## No. 81

*Count Nesselrode to Count Pozzo di Borgo.—(Communicated by M. de Kisseleff, June 27, 1830.)*

Monsieur le Comte,

St-Petersbourg, le 4<sup>e</sup> Juin, 1839.

LES dernières dépêches de Constantinople, du 12 Mai, et d'Alexandrie, du 14, nous ont fait connaître les troupes Ottomanes et Persanes se trouvant tellement rapprochées les unes des autres, qu'un conflit entre elles semblait devenir imminent. Cette supposition acquiert d'autant plus de vraisemblance que le fort de Pukia, situé à l'extrémité des frontières de la Syrie, semble nous indiquer, qu'il entrerait réellement dans les vues du Sultan, tout en protestant de ses intentions pacifiques, de faire avancer l'armée du Taurus au point de rendre un conflit inévitable, en l'attribuant à quelque circonstance fortuite, sans que la Porte ait eu l'air de l'avoir provoqué.

M. de Boutinelli, à la date de ses derniers rapports, continuait encore à employer tous ses efforts pour détourner le Sultan de l'idée de se précipiter dans une lutte, dont les conséquences pourraient devenir si graves pour le royaume de France. Il ne peut que les remontrances de M. de Boutinelli, et celles de ses collègues aient réussi à prévenir une rupture qui aurait eu de graves conséquences pour la France.

Mais il se peut aussi que les victimes aient été en fait avec le procureur pour que les choses se présentent ainsi et pour que les victimes soient en fait accusées pour avoir mérité depuis longtemps, et qu'elle a un couvrir du plus profond mystère.

A la distance où nous sommes du théâtre des événements, les conclusions que nous adreuerions aujourd'hui à la Porte seraient certes tardives. Nous ne saurions empêcher une lutte qui déjà peut être engagée à l'ouest, il est. Il ne nous reste qu'à souhaiter que c'est de circonscrire cette lutte dans les bornes les plus étroites possible, afin qu'elle ne puisse pas devenir compromettante pour le maintien du régime royal de l'Espagne.

Le **MINRE** M. F. A. Russel a développé la recherche en biologie et l'usage des produits chimiques dans les politiques d'agriculture.

qui se livre en Syrie entre les troupes du Sultan et celles de l'armée d'Egypte.

Il n'y aurait pas de danger non plus pour l'Europe, si le Sultan, ainsi qu'il le désire et l'espère, parvenait à reconquérir la Syrie. Le danger ne commencerait à devenir grave que au le sort des armes venant à se déclarer contre le Sultan, le Pacha d'Égypte profitant de cet avantage pour mettre en peril la sûreté de Constantinople et l'existence de l'Empire

C'est là que se trouve le véritable et unique danger pour le maintien de la paix générale, car dès que Constantinople serait menacée, la question cesserait d'être agitée simplement entre la Porte et l'Égypte. Il ne s'agirait plus d'une lutte engagée entre deux Puissances musulmanes, il s'agirait d'une complication Européenne qui dès-lors nous semblerait imminente.

Pour empêcher que les choses n'en viennent là, il importe de prendre



à ternir des mesures pour circonscire la lutte entre le Sultan et Méhémet Ali, dans de certaines bornes, afin que cette lutte ne puisse, dans aucun cas, s'étendre au point de devenir compromettante pour la sécurité de la capitale de l'Empire Ottoman.

Dans cette vue, il nous a semblé urgent de nous entendre franchement avec les Grandes Puissances de l'Europe qui ont également à cœur, comme nous, de mettre obstacle au danger que nous venons de signaler. Parmi ces Puissances, la Grande Bretagne est incontestablement celle qui peut exercer le plus d'influence sur le sort de cette question, et concourir de la manière la plus décisive, à réaliser les intentions pacifiques de notre Auguste Maître.

Dans cette conviction, Sa Majesté vous charge, M. l'Ambassadeur, de vous expliquer au sujet avec le Cabinet britannique sans la moindre réserve. Veuillez lui exposer, qu'il est de son intérêt, ainsi que du nôtre, de faire savoir que la Grande Puissance Britannique ne quitte pas un instant le point de vue que la paix ne puisse jamais être en péril la sécurité de l'Empire Ottoman.

2<sup>e</sup> Pour éviter une pareille catastrophe, il faudrait être en mesure, 1<sup>o</sup> d'empêcher que la flotte du Pacha d'Égypte ne puisse sortir des ports; 2<sup>o</sup> de ne pas tolérer que l'armée Égyptienne, si elle avait des succès décisifs comme en 1833, s'avancât comme alors au centre de l'Asie Mineure jusqu'aux portes de Constantinople;

Qu'en conséquence, pour mettre d'avance de justes limites à l'action du Pacha d'Égypte, limites clairement définies, qu'il ne lui soit pas permis de franchir impunément, il faudrait lui déclarer de la manière la plus formelle, "que tant qu'il ne porterait à la défense des territoires qui lui ont été assignés par l'arrangement de Koutahia; tant qu'il se contenterait de repousser l'agression des Turcs, sans franchir le Taurus, tant qu'il ne se livrerait à aucune opération militaire au-delà des districts de l'Asie Mineure, qu'il en a donné aux Consuls Alliés la reconnaissance formelle, la Grande Bretagne, d'accord avec les autres Puissances de l'Europe, resterait témoin impassible de la lutte qui s'est engagée en Syrie; mais que dès qu'il prendrait l'offensive, dès qu'il étendrait le théâtre de la guerre au-delà des défilés du Taurus, pour la porter au centre de l'Asie Mineure, l'Angleterre considérerait un pareil acte d'hostilité comme s'il était dirigé contre elle-même, et agirait dès-lors comme si elle était en guerre ouverte avec le Pacha d'Égypte."

La Grande Puissance Britannique ne regarderait de même comme en état de guerre avec lui, qui se permettrait de faire sortir sa flotte pour engager avec le Sultan une lutte ouverte; l'intention formelle de l'Angleterre étant de renfermer le combat dans les bornes de la Syrie, et de ne pas permettre, sous aucun prétexte, qu'il puisse dépasser ces bornes, irrévocablement fixées par l'intérêt général de l'Europe, qui veut que la paix de l'Orient soit promptement rétablie, et que la lutte actuelle, quelles que soient les chances de la guerre, ne se prolonge pas au-delà de la tranquillité de l'Empire Ottoman.

Si l'Angleterre s'accordait avec nous pour émettre une déclaration conçue dans ces termes, l'Empereur autoriserait son Représentant à l'Angleterre de la faire connaître.

Les autres Cours Alliées s'empresseraient sans doute de joindre leurs efforts à ceux de la Russie et de l'Angleterre.

L'accord qui présiderait ainsi aux déterminations des Cinq Puissances pourrait préserver encore une fois l'Europe du malheur d'une conflagration générale dans le Levant, en renfermant, pour ainsi dire, les deux adversaires en champ clos, les obligeant à vider leur querelle en Syrie, sans leur permettre d'engager le combat sur un terrain plus vaste, dont l'intérêt général de l'Europe doit les tenir éloignés malgré eux.

Si nous parvenons à obtenir le résultat que je viens d'indiquer, si le Gouvernement Anglais accueille les idées que votre Excellence est parvenu de lui communiquer, si nous empêchons ainsi la flotte de Méhémet Ali de sortir de ses ports; et si nous défendons à son armée de franchir le Taurus, nous pourrions nous trouver en guerre avec l'Europe entière, nous aurons obtenu tout ce qui est nécessaire pour prévenir une complication comme dans le Levant.

Avant tout, il nous faut maîtriser les faits, c'est-à-dire, empêcher que la lutte ne devienne menaçante pour le repos de l'Europe entière.

Lorsque nous aurons une fois atteint ce but, les circonstances se simplifieront d'elles-mêmes; alors on jugera avec plus de maturité quelle sera l'issue du combat et quels devront être les arrangements ultérieurs qui pourront intervenir entre les deux parties, afin de rétablir les relations pacifiques de la Porte avec le Pacha d'Égypte sur une base solide et durable.

Pour le moment, notre préoccupation doit se borner à éviter au Levant ce qui est à craindre, c'est-à-dire, une complication qui soit de nature à amener la chance d'un conflit Européen.

C'est ce danger que nous sommes intéressés à éloigner de tous nos efforts; et c'est dans cette vue qu'il nous a semblé indispensable de vous expliquer franchement avec l'Angleterre, en faisant à Londres la démarche dont je viens d'ordonner de l'Empereur, de vous indiquer le but et le plan. Elle prouvera au Ministère Britannique, que loin de vouloir provoquer une complication dans le Levant, nous employons tous nos soins à la prévenir; et qu'au lieu de nous prévaloir avec empressement des stipulations de notre Traité d'Alliance avec la Porte, nous sommes les premiers à désirer nous-mêmes d'éloigner le renouvellement d'un traité qui nous forcerait, malgré nous, à reprendre une attitude militaire vis-à-vis du Pacha d'Égypte.

La certitude que l'Angleterre acquerra par là de nos intentions vraiment conservatrices, ne saurait manquer d'exercer une influence utile sur les dispositions du Cabinet de Londres. Il appréciera, je l'espère, la loyauté des sentiments qui a dicté la démarche dont vous allez vous acquitter. Veuillez ne pas tarder un seul instant, M. le Comte, à nous adresser l'avis de l'Empereur, et de l'Empereur de Russie, et de l'Empereur d'Autriche. L'Empereur se plaît à croire que cet accueil répondra pleinement à nos vœux, et que l'entente qui s'établira entre le Cabinet Anglais et le nôtre, pour le maintien de la paix du Levant, servira à la faire rétablir promptement, lors-même que la politique imprévoyante du Divan aurait tenté de la troubler momentanément.

Agréés, &c.  
(Signé) NISSELRÖDE.

No 82

Instructions to the French Admiral in the Levant. — (Communicated by M. de Bourqueney, June 29.)

M. le Contre-Amiral,

Paris, le 26 Juin, 1839

DÉJÀ quelques actes d'hostilité paraissent avoir eu lieu en Syrie, entre les troupes du Sultan et celles du Vice-Roi d'Égypte. Un puissant intérêt Européen existe à prévenir ou arrêter les effets d'une collision, et c'est là le but que se propose la France, aidée de ses alliés; c'est celui que vous devez chercher à atteindre avec l'escadre sous votre commandement, soit isolément, soit par votre co-opération avec l'escadre de Sa Majesté Britannique et avec la station navale d'Autriche dans le Levant, si, comme il y a tout lieu de le croire, cette station a l'ordre de se joindre aux forces navales Françaises et Anglaises. Vous aurez donc à vous concerter avec leurs commandans, sur les moyens de rendre la co-opération efficace. De son côté, sans doute, Sir Robert Stopford aura dans la conduite d'une affaire dans laquelle leurs vues et leur but sont identiques, et leurs mesures doivent être semblables.

Il doit donc y avoir entre les deux amiraux communication réciproque de leurs instructions, et il doit s'établir entre eux toute la franchise propre à amener dans leurs opérations le même accord qui existe entre les deux Gouvernemens. Lorsque le cas exigera concert

et co-ordination, la direction supérieure appartiendra à l'officier le plus élevé de la plus haute hiérarchie.

Après avoir reçu les instructions, l'escadre sous vos ordres devra se diriger vers l'extrême Syrie.

Dans l'un des deux cas, si les secours Turque et Egyptienne vous sont adressés à l'un ou l'autre de ces points, en vous interposant entre elles, et en essayant de leur faire de l'extrême Syrie, et vous en serez le maître de les diriger de troupes et de munitions de guerre, par mer ou par terre.

Vous devrez vous assurer que l'armistice et la communication avec les Egyptiens ne soient pas interrompues d'Alexandrie, soit sur tout autre point le long du littoral, soit par les troupes occupées par les deux armées.

Vous ferez tous vos efforts pour leur faire proposer et accepter une suspension d'armes, pendant laquelle les Puissances entreraient en négociation pour un arrangement satisfaisant mutuellement satisfaisant pour la Porte et pour le Pacha d'Egypte. Il convient de faire remarquer, que cet arrangement devant être fondé sur une large appréciation des grands intérêts de l'Europe, et non pas sur les éventualités de la guerre, aucune des deux parties ne doit être obligée de consentir à une suspension d'armes, si elle ne croit que les avantages de la paix l'emportent sur les inconvénients de la guerre.

L'armistice sera constaté par une Convention militaire portant que la reprise des hostilités, si elle avait lieu, devrait être dénoncée au moins un mois à l'avance.

Ces démarches, ces dispositions, soit qu'elles proviennent d'un des deux commandants des escadres, soit qu'elles soient adressées à l'un ou l'autre des commandants des escadres, doivent être prises avec la plus prompte célérité, et vous en ferez part à notre Ambassadeur à Constantinople, et au Consul-Général à Alexandrie, et l'avis en sera transmis en France par la voie la plus prompte.

Si les deux généraux, ou l'un d'eux, se refusaient à accéder à cet armistice, l'Ambassadeur à Constantinople et le Consul-Général à Alexandrie en seraient immédiatement informés, comme dans le cas précédent, afin qu'ils eussent à réclamer l'envoi aux généraux en Syrie, des ordres nécessaires pour les faire consentir à la suspension d'armes.

Si le refus venait de l'un des deux, on appellera son attention sur la grave responsabilité qu'il assumerait en cas de refus. Il lui serait signifié que dès ce moment, la voie de mer serait fermée à tout secours destiné à l'Armée Ottomane, tandis que notre Ambassadeur, informé du refus, agirait auprès du Sultan pour vaincre cette résistance.

Si le refus, au contraire, provenait du général Egyptien, des représentations analogues lui seraient faites et toute communication maritime entre la Syrie et l'Egypte serait immédiatement fermée.

Dans l'un ou l'autre cas, les deux escadres se concerteraient sur la position des forces qu'il serait nécessaire de placer soit à l'entrée du Bosphore, soit à l'entrée de l'Hellespont, soit enfin sur les points stratégiques de l'Asie Mineure qui serait jugé convenable pour s'assurer que l'ennemi ne pourrait pas sortir de l'Asie Mineure, et ne permettre la sortie d'aucun bâtiment de guerre ou autre.

Outre le concert établi entre les commandants des escadres Française et Anglaise, il y aura une communication directe entre les deux commandants des escadres, et vous en ferez part à notre Ambassadeur à Constantinople, et au Consul-Général à Alexandrie, et l'avis en sera transmis en France par la voie la plus prompte.

Ces instructions ont pour but, de pourvoir aux éventualités qui ont pu se présenter. Il est évident que, par leur nature et leur gravité, elles geront des instructions ultérieures: elles vous seront adressées. Le Roi s'en rapporte, pour tout le reste, au zèle et à l'habileté du Commandant en chef de la flotte, et de son conseil, et de la vieille expérience de l'illustre amiral avec lequel il va se trouver en rapports de service.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 30.)

No. 243.)

My Lord,

Paris, June 28, 1839

I MENTIONED in the postscript of a private letter to your Lordship, written on Monday night, that on that evening, Marshal Soult had communicated to me, that the French Government, in consequence of the intelligence received from Alexandria of the commencement of hostilities in Syria, had determined to send off without further delay, instructions to Admiral Lalande, commanding the French Naval Force in the Levant. These instructions, which would contain nothing which was not in accordance with the instructions which Her Majesty's Government proposed giving to Sir Robert Stopford, omitting that part on which the French Government were inclined to propose to Her Majesty's Government some change or modification.

The Marshal called upon me this morning, and put into my hands a copy of the instructions sent to the French Admiral, which I do not enclose in this despatch, having been informed by his Excellency, that a copy of them was last night forwarded to M. de Bourqueney, to be communicated to your Lordship.

On reading over these instructions, I observe two points of difference between them and the instructions transmitted to Sir Robert Stopford. The one relates to the orders given to the French Admiral to intercept all transport of arms or munitions of war to the theatre of war, whether those arms or munitions be sent to the theatre of war by the operations of the Sultan's Army not depending upon any communication by sea between Constantinople and the scene of military operations, direct him only to prevent all communication by Egyptian vessels, whether of arms or munitions, to the theatre of war. The other point relates to the instructions given to the French Admiral to co-operate with the French and English combined fleet. The French Admiral is instructed to admit of this co-operation, provided it be offered with a pacific object, and in a spirit conformable to the Admiral's instructions.

I learnt from Marshal Soult, that he had directed M. de Bourqueney to propose to your Lordship, that the British and French Ambassadors at Constantinople should be instructed to bring under the consideration of the Divan, the entrance of the combined French and English fleet into the Sea of Marmora, in case a Russian naval and military force shall have entered the Bosphorus. The Marshal said, he fully concurred in your Lordship's view of its being desirable that the British and French flags should appear before Constantinople at the same time with that of Russia. He also said, that he had declared to the Emperor of Russia, as the Emperor declaring war against Turkey and Russia, to which the forcing of the passage of the Dardanelles was tantamount, to be left to the discretion of the two Governments. The passage of the fleet up to Constantinople, he observed, would be a dangerous and difficult operation, if really resisted by the Turks, unless a military force were attached to it to take possession of the forts by land, and no military force adequate to such an undertaking had been embarked on board either fleet. The fire of the forts was not the only danger to which, he said, the fleet would be exposed. It might have to encounter in a damaged and crippled state the hostility of the Russian fleet, combined with that of Turkey, prepared in the Bosphorus for combat, and aided by the Russian Army.

I observed, that all these considerations would certainly be well weighed by the Ambassadors and the Admirals who, upon the spot, could best judge of the practicability and safety of the operation; but I thought the danger of it would be enhanced, if by communications with the Divan.



we indicated our intention, and allowed a length of time to elapse before we attempted the execution of it.

The Marshal has not received from St. Petersburg any official reply to the instructions he gave to M. de Barante relative to the affairs of the East. But he showed me the postscript of a private letter from the French Ambassador, stating that the disposition of the Russian Cabinet was very pacific and conciliatory.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 84

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 21)

(No. 38)

My Lord,

Alexandria, May 28, 1839

A COURIER of this Government, which arrived here yesterday, brought to me letters from Aleppo, of the 15th instant, and from Damascus, of the 20th instant.

Mr. Consul Werry of Damascus, writes to me, that the Haouran insurrection is entirely pacified, and that everything is perfectly quiet in Damascus and its neighbourhood.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry of Aleppo, writes to me, that he had an interview on the 5th instant, with Ibrahim Pasha, and the following is the extract of Mr. Werry's letter: "I have just returned from seeing Ibrahim and Hulyman Pashas, with both of whom I had a long conversation. The former says to me, 'we have at present twenty-three deserters from the other side, among whom is a Yimbachi, and a Chawish of Hafiz Pasha, who states to me, that Hafiz Pasha had crossed with three regiments; but who gives a very poor account of the troops under him.' His Highness then said, 'our forces are superior in every way; and I hear from the Chawish, that there are only 45,000 to 50,000 men intended to act against us. The Sultan has fifteen regiments of Infantry. We have eight regiments of Cavalry. He has six regiments of Cavalry, ours are eight regiments. His Artillery is of 100 pieces; ours are double that; so that, if they attack us, they will fare but badly.' He then turned round to five Colonels sitting in the room, saying, 'I tell you all, and the English Consul present, that when the match is placed to the first cannon, from that time, in half an hour, I am on the other side, and in pursuit of that Khanzir, (meaning, I suppose, Hafiz Pasha,) and who will see what Ibrahim Pasha is.' He then turned to me and said, 'I know Hafiz Pasha; he was at the Morea; he is nothing; his predecessor, Reschid Mehemet Pasha, was much superior, quite another man.' I then told his Highness, that the European Powers would not allow any fighting, and that all would be at an end. He then said, 'we have a good gunpowder. He answered, 'we shall see; but if he did not intend to attack me, why is he crossing with these forces? And, moreover, I will tell you, that I have heard positively, that as the forces find difficulty in crossing at Bir, the Seraskier had changed his march, and is bringing them on Roum Kale and on [illegible], which will oblige him, with his forces, to pass a part of my frontier and limits: why should he do that? If you will not believe me, and you have courage, mount a horse and go to Antak, from where you will see, with your own eyes, if they put their feet within my territory or not. I shall protest,' his Highness said laughing, 'against the Ambassadors at Constantinople, for all will do the same, or they will be laughed at by my territory.' and he said laughing, 'You say that there is no war, how can it be credited? You, Franks, are the cause that the Sultan's forces now are crossing my territory, by—your continuing to remain quiet: 'you must not act; they will not attack you,' and so forth. But what can be done now; there is no remedy. Had you left us without tying us down, the Sultan's troops would never have dared to cross and enter in any way our territory."

"I then brought the conversation round to the mountaineers of Pyass,

and along the continuity of that range to the Taurus extending to Marash. His Highness replied, 'All is quiet in that part. But I will tell you one thing, that the Sultan and we must come to blows, for I must have Marash. I require it for the keeping of these mountaineers in order; as it was evident; the other day they committed all sorts of depredations in Ghaour Dagh, and that range: I went against them, what followed? They merely went on the other side of the mountain, saying, 'We are in the Sultan's territory. And, moreover, I will tell you another thing, Marash I must have, as also along the line to Orfa; and then all will be quiet and safe in Syria. I shall not then require such a large force, to keep all these mountains, &c., in order, and I shall be able to give my attention to the interests of the country, and to further the commercial interests of all, and particularly of the English. And all will go on quietly, and without requiring troops continually, which I well know, without your telling me, that it is very detrimental. But so long as our boundary line is where it is, I must keep a large force to check both the movements of the Sultan's forces, as also those of the people of the mountains."

His Excellency Seraskier Pasha spoke in pretty nearly the same substance adding that he had heard that the Sultan's troops had only very small quantities of bread and provisions supplied to them. His Excellency was a sort of comedian that was what I did not take notice of.

A report from the Vice-Consul of French Latakia, Syria, and Aleppo, to the Consulate-General here, mentions the arrival of large quantities of wheat, barley, rice, &c. from Egypt, and from other parts, of which is none at Aleppo, at which place the use of the hills of troops which were on the coast and in the south of Syria have arrived.

These troops are abundantly supplied with provisions from the stores, and thus the peasantry and inhabitants do not suffer. And Mr. Pro-Consul Werry writes to me, that such is the good conduct of these troops, that no complaints have to be made against them, and that it could not be supposed that there were 80,000 soldiers in Aleppo and its neighbourhood.

Upon the 10th instant, there was a grand review of Ibrahim Pasha's Army at Gibreen, an hour and half distance from Aleppo. The troops consisted of thirteen regiments of Infantry, four regiments of Cavalry, and three of Artillery, in all more than 42,000 men. Ibrahim Pasha slept the previous night at the village of Gibreen, in order to see each regiment as it came on the ground.

The manoeuvres are said to have been conducted with good order and discipline, after which the troops returned to their respective quarters.

The Colonel of the 17th Regiment of the Line having not known the ground which he was to take up on the day of the review, was condemned by Ibrahim Pasha to give a dinner for sixty persons, which he did on the 12th May, and the table was laid out in the European manner.

The army of Hafiz Pasha suffers much from desertion, and is said to be in a very disorganized state; and the position of this army seems to offer only a choice of difficulties, as if the army advances to attack Ibrahim Pasha, it will most probably be signally defeated, and if it retreats, the soldiers of Hafiz Pasha will probably all disperse; and it does not seem possible that Hafiz Pasha can have supplies to remain in his present position.

The rash conduct of the Sultan in acting contrary to the advice given to him by the Ambassadors at Constantinople, will not only have drained his resources, but will very much have enfeebled his moral influence in all Turkey; and, on the contrary, the prudent and moderate conduct of Ibrahim Pasha, acting under his father's orders, and his refraining from any hostile act, or from destroying the army of Hafiz Pasha, will properly raise Mehemet Ali, and give him an increased influence in the affairs of the Turkish Empire.

Syria is now perfectly quiet, and the insurrection of Hafiz Pasha has cooled the part of the Turkish population in Syria which was indisposed to the Egyptian Government, at the same time that it has fixed the wavering

on the side of Mehemet Ali, and has in every way strengthened the party of the Viceroy.

The Christians in Syria are all in his favour, and they dread any success of the Sultan: the more as the Turkish population in Syria has for some time back been threatening the Christians, to whom they have said that their reign was nearly over.

Mehemet Ali had intended a few days ago to send out his fleet to cruise off Alexandria, and the order had already been given by him to that effect, but the Consuls-General of Austria, France, and Russia, as well as myself, having separately mentioned to him our opinions, that it would be better and perhaps conducive to the maintenance of peace, that his fleet should remain in harbour, he immediately acceded to our desires, and the fleet now remains here. On this subject Mehemet Ali has said that he appears to have listened with good grace to the pacific counsels given to him by us, and upon those points there has been perfect accord and frankness between my colleagues and myself.

The Pasha has sent two of his steamers to Alexandretta, in order to keep up a constant communication with Ibrahim Pasha; and he has assured my colleagues and myself that Ibrahim Pasha will not commit any act of hostility or advance with his army unless he should be attacked by that of the Sultan; and as Hafiz Pasha does not seem in a state to attack, it is still to be hoped that hostilities may be avoided, and that the Ambassadors at Constantinople may be able to persuade the Sultan to recall his army from the Syrian frontier.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 85.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 134.)

My Lord,

Therapia, June 5, 1839.

It appears that the Ottoman Army under Hafiz Pasha, is entrenched to the west-north-west of the point where it crossed the Euphrates near Hir. It is within the territory to which Mehemet Ali Pasha does not lay claim, and there has not been any act of hostilities committed by either I have heard of.

The Ottoman Fleet, it is said, will sail on the 8th.

The messenger will afford me the means of forwarding intelligence to your Lordship about that time.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 86.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 135.)

My Lord,

Therapia, June 5, 1839.

THE Austrian Intendant had, yesterday, an interview with the Ottoman Ministers, and I learn that all his efforts to prevent war were fruitless. I believe the actual commencement of hostilities will depend upon the time when all things are ready here, and that there will be then issued by the Porte a declaration addressed to the Sultan's Allies, setting forth the grounds upon which the Sublime Porte acts, &c., &c. That may take place the 8th instant.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 87.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 37.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, June 5, 1839.

AS in conformity with my instructions I send a special messenger to Malta, by the French steamer, with the despatches from India, I avail myself of the same messenger to transmit to your Lordship copies of my despatches Nos. 8, 9, 10, with their inclosures, to Viscount Ponsonby.

The duplicates of all those I shall have the honour to transmit by Her Majesty's steamer on its return from Beyrout, to which place it proceeds to-day.

I have been so much occupied for the last two days, in consequence of the departure of Her Majesty's steamer for Beyrout, of the French steamer for Constantinople, and of the letters to overtake our steamer at Suez, all of which happened at the same time, that my constant avocations have not permitted me to see the Pashas any more, even so fully as I should have wished, in my despatches to Lord Ponsonby, into the important nature of their contents at this critical moment; but I believe that I have not omitted anything of moment.

There are two steamers of the Pasha at Alexandretta; and the one which returned from thence on the 4th instant, is ready to start at a moment's notice.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 87.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby.

No. 8.

My Lord,

Alexandria, June 5, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that yesterday forenoon, myself and colleagues of Austria, France, and Russia, waited on Mehemet Ali by his desire.

The Inclosure No. 1, which was drawn out in common by myself and colleagues, is the detail of our interview with the Pasha; and before our departure we all most strongly urged him to be very particular in his instructions to Ibrahim Pasha, which we all requested should be in the most moderate terms, and in which he should be ordered not to commit any sort of aggression.

Inclosure No. 2 is the translation of the letters from Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet Ali, and which are referred to in the procès-verbal of our conference with the Pasha; and your Excellency will perceive by it, how much we have to fear that hostilities will take place.

Soon after we took leave of the Pasha, he sent off a steamer to Syria, with the letter of instructions for Ibrahim Pasha; and it was only this morning that my colleagues or myself had a copy of it, and which I now transmit in Inclosure No. 3.

Your Excellency will perceive that the Pasha writes to his son that we told him to "repousser la force par la force;" but, as is seen by the procès-verbal, we said so, in the event only that the army of Ibrahim Pasha should be attacked in its positions in his territory.

I fear that there is on both sides a strong desire for war, and, in this case, hostilities cannot long be delayed.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

2 D



*Procès-Verbal of the interview of the Four Consuls-General with Mehemet Ali.*

DANS la matinée du 4 Juin, le Vice-Roi fit inviter par son second interprète, Hossreff Effendi, les quatre Consuls-Généraux d'Autriche, d'Angleterre, de France, et de Russie, à se rendre chez lui vers les 10 heures, en conférence. Nous fumes tous exacts au rendez-vous. Aux complimens d'usage, qui consistent à demander des nouvelles de la santé de Son Altesse, elle nous répondit, qu'elle se trouvait bien de corps mais fort mal d'esprit, par suite des nouvelles alarmantes qui venaient de lui parvenir de son fils Ibrahim Pacha. Méhémet Ali nous fit alors part de trois lettres ci-jointes en copie reçues simultanément la veille d'Alep. A la lecture faite de ces lettres on apprit que les troupes de Sa Hautesse avaient définitivement franchi le territoire de Syrie, et avaient occupé le village d'Ouront, il nous déclara que l'objet de notre réunion était de nous consulter sur les mesures qu'il se proposait de prendre dans les circonstances du moment, et sur les instructions qu'il allait adresser dans le courant de la journée au Généralissime.

"Je suis d'avis," nous a-t-il dit en substance, "de faire évacuer plusieurs villages de la province d'Antak, à l'effet d'empêcher une collusion, et de laisser une distance convenable entre mes troupes et celles du Sultan mais j'autoriserai mon fils, dans le cas où les villages que j'aurai fait évacuer par mes soldats, seraient occupés par ceux du Grand Seigneur, à les en déloger et à commencer les hostilités. Je ferai de plus avancer le gros de l'armée vers la frontière, pour éviter que l'apparition des troupes Turques sur mon territoire ne donne l'alarme à la population, et ne l'enflamme à une révolte, soit à des excès de pillage."

Nous formons donc un corps à représenter au Pacha l'apparition d'une partie de sa cavalerie Turque sur la frontière de Syrie, en disant qu'il peut être envahi par un corps de l'armée qui occupe les déserts, et de passer les rivières sans être inquiété par les troupes Égyptiennes, pour aller faire passer son armée en toute sécurité par les avant-postes militaires d'El-Haï Pacha, que le malheur nous a fait voir, et par suite ces garnisons se retireront de ce pays, pour se joindre à son armée, et se mettre en rapport avec le Soudan Ottoman, et de demander à ce dernier des explications au sujet de l'apparition de ses troupes dans les limites de la Syrie; enfin, qu'il ne lui restait qu'à prendre une bonne position défensive dans telle ville de la Syrie qu'il jugerait la plus convenable à la sûreté du pays, et attendre d'abord que l'ennemi ne fût à la portée des troupes de Sa Hautesse pour la repousser ensuite par la force.

Après d'assez longs pourparlers, dans lesquels le désir de Mchémet Ali d'en venir aux mains avec les forces Turques se trahissait visiblement, il déclara qu'il écarterait à son fils :

1<sup>re</sup>. De se mettre sans retard en rapport avec Hafis Pacha, à l'effet de le prévenir de ce qui venait d'avoir lieu au village d'Oumont, et de l'engager de ne point donner lieu à un conflit, en permettant à ses troupes de pénétrer sur son territoire et d'occuper des villages Syriens;

T. Que le Généralissime avait à diriger une partie de ses forces vers Antah, afin de mettre cette ville dans un état de défense convenable, et que le général en chef, qui les avait envoyés, se proposait de se rendre à cette place, serait attaqué par les troupes du Sultan, qu'il eût à combattre les hostilités comme commencées ;

3<sup>e</sup>. Que dans ce cas seulement, Ibrahim Pacha était autorisé à avancer en personne avec toutes ses forces, et à combattre l'armée du Grand Seigneur. Le Pacha nous promit de faire remettre à chacun de nous quatre ou cinq lignes, qu'il adressait à son fils.

[illegible]

un troisième enfin, lui annonçait qu'une conférence extraordinaire venait d'avoir lieu entre les Ministres et les Pachas de la Porte, dans laquelle Tahar Pacha, récemment revenu du quartier-général, avait rendu compte de l'état de l'armée Turque, qu'il représentait comme fort peu satisfaisant; qu'un des membres de cette assemblée avait été d'avis que la Question Egyptienne devait être réglée par le Sultan seul; qu'elle ne regardait que lui, et qu'il ne devait admettre aucune ingérence quelconque des Puissances Européennes dans cette question; cet avis, ajouté tel qu'il avait été goûté par les grands dignitaires d'Etat, fut l'avis

Méhémét Ali ne manqua pas de manifester à cette occasion quelques velléités de faire sortir immédiatement sa flotte, mais il y renonça aussitôt, sur les observations qui lui furent adressées sur l'inopportunité d'une pareille mesure, et prit le parti de retourner son escadre dans le port jusqu'à la réception de nouvelles plus positives sur la sortie de la Flotte Ottomane des Dardanelles.

*Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby.*

(No. 9.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, June 5, 1889

IN reference to my preceding despatch, I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that a steamer of the Pasha arrived late yesterday evening from Alexandretta, with letters from Ibrahim Pasha to his father.

Those letters, dated the 30th May, from his head-quarters, state that some Turkish Cavalry of Hafx Pasha had attacked the Egyptian Cavalry encamped in front of Antah, and have excited the villages in the Aintab district to revolt: that eleven villages having received arms and ammunition from Hafx Pasha, are now in revolt.

On receipt of those news, Ibrahim Pasha had left Aleppo on the 29th May, and gone to a small village between Aleppo and Aintab, where he awaits the arrival of Solyman Pasha with a brigade and with some Artillery, most probably to drive back the advance which had attacked his Cavalry.

I shall endeavour to procure a copy of the letter of Ibrahim Pasha, in order to transmit it to your Excellency with this despatch.

Thus it may be said that hostilities have in a measure begun and the only hope which now remains is, that the officer to be sent by Ibrahim to Hafiz Pasha, (vide Procès-Verbal in my late despatch) may induce the latter Pasha to retire beyond the Syrian frontier.

Admiral Roussin has written to M. Cochelet, to inform him that the Porte has communicated to him that Mehmet Ali had committed the first aggressions: 1st In having sent 150 soldiers to Orda, who had violated the women and plundered that town; and 2ndly Toot Kourschid Pasha had entered Basora with the Egyptian Army; and Admiral Roussin requests M. Cochelet to give to him explicit explanations as to those reports.

The Porte appears to mystify Admiral Roussin in many cases, and it is only to that ~~Admiral~~ <sup>Admiral</sup> that these ~~complaints~~ <sup>complaints</sup> have been made. They are wholly false. And how could Admiral Roussin suppose that 150 troops were to cross the Euphrates, and plunder a town with a large garrison at some distance beyond Hir, where there was also a garrison? It is equally untrue that any part of Kerkuk ~~had been taken~~ <sup>had been taken</sup> ~~by the~~ <sup>by the</sup> ~~Porte~~ <sup>Porte</sup> but these allegations of the Porte evidently show its desire for war, and its natural wish to throw the blame of the aggression on Mehemet Ali.

That the Porte has many causes of complaint against Mehemet Ali is an undoubted fact. The reasons for the discontent are urged by Baron Roussin:

In fact, the great causes of complaint on the part of the Porte, date

from the peace of Kutaya, and from mutual irritation on the part of the Porte at the triumph of Mehemet Ali, as also from the semi-independent and anomalous position of that Pasha.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 4 in No. 87

*Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby.*

(No. 10.)

My Lord,

*Alexandria, June 6, 1839*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 9, of yesterday's date, to your Excellency, I have now the honour to transmit the report from Ibrahim Pasha, which was brought by the steamer from Alexandretta.

Hostilities have now unfortunately taken place, and it is probable that, before this, a battle of a more serious nature will have been fought between the armies of the two Seraskiers, headed by themselves in person.

If the inclosed report be true, it is most clearly evident that the Porte has been the aggressor in the commencement of active hostilities; as not only has Haïf Pasha moved the population of Syria to revolt and supplied them with arms, ammunition, and money, but he has also attacked a corps of the Cavalry of Ibrahim Pasha, at a point incontestably within the Syrian territory.

What the measures of Mehemet Ali may be in the event of an action, and of the defeat of the Sultan's army, which will be the probable result of it, time alone can show, but he will certainly not abate in his demands in regard to his independence.

Any measures now to be taken by the Great Powers must, in order to be successful, be conducted in a complete spirit of unity and accord, and it should be borne in mind that it is a certain fact that Mehemet Ali has a powerful party amongst the great dignitaries of the Porte, and even in the Divan itself; and I am almost certain that he could at any moment raise up the Turkish provinces in Europe (certainly Albania) in rebellion against the Sultan.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 5 in No. 87

*Lettre d'Ibrahim Pacha, à la date du 14 Rebi-el-avel.—Alep*

(Traduction.)

JE vous envoie ci-joint tous les rapports que j'ai reçus concernant l'armée Turque. Parmi eux il y a une lettre du Kaftana Bey datée du 13 Rebi-el-avel, dans laquelle il m'annonce que la Cavalerie Turque vient de prendre possession sur nos territoires. Ouront est un village de la province d'Antab, où se trouve maintenant la Cavalerie Turque. Le Boi Bey, le chef de ce village, a été maltraité par eux. Notre Cavalerie s'est retirée vers Antab d'après leurs instructions. Il est évident que demain ils s'avanceront d'avantage; ils maltraiteront les Boi Bey des autres villages, et nous serons obligés de reculer. Ce système peut occasionner une grande révolution dans les provinces qui sont sous notre autorité. J'ai pensé d'envoyer un officier à Haïf Pacha pour lui demander quelques explications à ce sujet. Mais pour cela je n'étais pas en mesure de le faire. L'état de choses ne pourrait pas continuer ainsi. Je présume qu'avant que cette lettre vous soit parvenue, le feu de la guerre sera peut-être allumé. Pour éviter tous les soupçons, et qu'on ne dise pas c'est vous ou c'est moi qui ait commencé les hostilités, j'attends la réponse à cette lettre. Pour accélérer la poste, vous pouvez l'expédier par un bateau à

vapeur à Alexandrette ou à Latakia, d'où elle me parviendra en peu de temps.

P.S.—Je vous expédie aussi toutes les lettres que je viens de recevoir d'Adana. Leur lecture vous fera connaître que les intrigues des Turcs y entrent aussi pour quelque chose. Je peux contrebalancer leur menée comme je l'ai fait à Antab, à Kourd Dak, en y envoyant des troupes. Mais comment empêcher leur avancement. J'ai écrit à Kaftana Bey de se porter en avant avec 800 Cavaliers, pour protéger les villages d'Antab, et si les Turcs font encore un mouvement en avant, ils vont se trouver près d'Antab à la distance de trois heures; il ne nous reste alors que deux moyens, ou se reculer ou bien commencer l'hostilité.

*Extrait de la lettre de Son Altesse Ibrahim Pacha, à la date du 15 Rebi-el-avel, 1255.—Alep.*

JE vous ai fait expédier hier par la poste exprès, tous les rapports que j'ai reçus par les troupes. Aujourd'hui encore j'ai reçu quatre lettres de Ferhad Bey, ainsi qu'une lettre de Magoun Bey, que vous verrez que l'armée Turque a fait avancer des détachements de cavalerie vers les villages qui sont sur le territoire d'Antab. J'ai fait acheminer sur le champ Kaftana Bey avec sa cavalerie pour Antab. Notre cavalerie se trouve donc au village qui se nomme Tel-Bécher; la Cavalerie Turque est à Ouront.

Les villages qui se trouvent entre ces deux points ne seront nécessairement pas exposés à de vaines attaques. J'ai écrit à Kaftana Bey ainsi qu'à Magoun Bey, de faire évacuer ces villages, et faire reculer leurs habitants en-deçà de ce district.

*Lettre du Kaftana Bey à Son Altesse Ibrahim Pacha, à la date du 13 Rebi-el-avel*

LA Cavalerie Turque qui se trouvait à Mézar, a fait un mouvement en avant; s'est emparée hier soir d'Ouront, d'où selon vos ordres, nos soldats ont été retirés; les Turcs ont pris et ont maltraité le Boi Bey qui est à Ouront.

Inclosure 6 in No. 87

*Extrait des Rapports qui sont parvenus de Syrie à la date du 15, du 16, et du 17 Rebi-el-avel, 1255.*

LES quatorze villages du district d'Ouront dans la Province d'Antab, ont été occupés par les troupes de Haïf Pacha. Il a ordonné aux habitants de ces villages de se rendre et de se soumettre à la guerre. Il leur fait présenter les vieillards de ces mêmes villages; il leur a donné des habits d'honneur. Trois cavaliers Arabes, Hanadias, ont été pris par les habitants de ces villages, qui se sont empressés de les conduire près de Haïf Pacha, pour en recevoir le backliche (pour-boire) promis en outre. Haïf Pacha a donné l'ordre à ses troupes, que s'ils rencontrent des soldats Egyptiens, de les arrêter sur-le-champ et de les leur sur eux. Il a fait tirer à Nésh des coups de canon pour annoncer l'arrivée de Haïf Pacha dans la dite ville. On a fait courir des bruits qu'Ibrahim Pacha ne peut plus avancer; qu'il sera obligé de se reculer devant les troupes Turques jusqu'au Caire, et que le Pacha qui se trouve à Moucho, va désertir et venir près de Haïf Pacha avec la moitié des soldats qui sont sous son commandement; qu'un Pacha avec onze régiments vient du côté de Malatia, et qu'auantôt ces régiments arrivés, Haïf Pacha marchera vers Antab, dans l'armée duquel se trouvent déjà 140 pièces d'artillerie. En outre on a maltraité les habitants des villes et les villages.



en répandant des bruits que le village qui ne se soumettra pas à tenir à l'autorité de Hafiz Pacha, hommes, femmes et enfans, tous seront passés au fil de l'épée, le village de Ouront est occupé par une partie de leur cavalerie; le Chef de ce même village a été appelé par Hafiz Pacha; il lui a fait cadeau d'une montre en or. Lorsque ce chef d'Ouront était de retour à son village, il a fait venir tous les vieillards des villages du district, et leur a eu int de repousser les soldats Egyptiens. Il a fait réunir les habitans de quatre ou cinq villages dans un seul, il leur a distribué des fusils et de la poudre que Hafiz Pacha lui avait envoyés.

Son Altesse Ibrahim Pacha par sa lettre du 17 Rebi-el-evel, mande en outre, que le Pacha qui se trouve à Marache, excite aussi la population de Kour Dak; qu'on a remarqué un des chefs des troupes de ce même Pacha parmi la tribu Kourde qui avait saccagé Boulanick; qu'on répand le bruit qu'on a à Koniah 16,000 hommes, à Gisté-kan autant sous le commandement de Ali Pacha de Koniah; qu'on va recruter 8,000 hommes encore dans ces contrées; qu'on a 20,000 hommes à Caramanie; et qu'on dit que toutes ces troupes sont destinées pour le Kuluk-Bogaz. Un autre corps marche vers la Syrie par le district de Nijlé. Le corps d'armée fort de onze régimens, marchera pour Kassarie; le Pacha de Marache avec autant de Kurdes et des canons, &c., &c.

En répandant tous ces bruits, on espère pouvoir exciter la population, comme on l'a déjà fait dans la Province d'Antah.

J'apprends à l'instant par deux exprès de Magnoun Bey, que cinq ou six de la Cavalerie Turque ont attaqué le corps de Cavalerie Arabe sous le commandement du dit Bey, à Tel-Béehir. Notre cavalerie n'a pu résister à leur choc, attendu qu'elle était inférieure en nombre, et que la Cavalerie Turque était suivie de près par des régimens d'infanterie. Pour empêcher que ces troupes ne se réunissent, j'ai communiqué aux environs d'Alep, je me suis décidé à aller à leur rencontre, et je suis arrivé à Tel-Chair avec sept régimens de Cavalerie, et douze batteries d'Artillerie à cheval, en laissant l'ordre au Général Solymian Pacha de me suivre avec le corps d'armée.

#### Incluse 7 in No. 87

Traduction de la Lettre de Son Altesse le Vice-Roi à Son Altesse le Généralissime Ibrahim Pacha, à la date du 22 Rebi-el-evel, 1253.

J'ai reçu par vos exprès, datée du 15 du présent mois, ainsi que celle du Kassar Bey, qui vous a été adressée, par lesquelles j'ai eu connaissance que quelques détachemens de la Cavalerie Turque ont saccagé les villages du district d'Antah, et qu'ils ont pris possession d'Ouront. En conséquence, vous me demandez la ligne de conduite à tenir dans cette circonstance. J'ai sur le champ fait traduire ces trois pièces, et je les ai communiquées aux Consuls-Généraux des Quatre Grandes Puissances résidans à Alexandrie. Après avoir longuement discuté leur contenu, ils m'ont dit: "L'intérêt de Votre Altesse est de repousser la force par la force par tous les moyens qui sont en votre pouvoir." Son Altesse Ibrahim Pacha envoie un officier à Hafiz Pacha, pour lui demander des explications de sa conduite, et de ses intentions. Il lui dira: "Le Pacha d'Antah contre un coup de main, fortifiez-la en envoyant le nombre suffisant de troupes; et si malgré tout cela, les Turcs persistent dans leurs menées et marchent vers Antah, la garnison se repliera vers le corps d'armée que s'avancera en même temps, et marcheront à la rencontre de l'Armée Turque. Par cette mesure, la bataille n'aura lieu que sur le territoire Egyptien; par là vous prouverez facilement, que la première agression a eu lieu de leur part." Cette explication me parut d'autant plus convenable qu'elle s'accorde tout-à-fait avec la conduite modérée que j'ai tenue jusqu'à présent à leur égard; en conséquence, je vous invite, mon fils, de vous régler exactement au contenu de la présente lettre.

*I recount Palmerston to Lord Beaconsfield.*

(No. 88.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, June 28, 1839.*

I HAVE to inform your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government have received from Prince Esterhazy, Count M. Kisseleff and from the French Government, important, and generally speaking, satisfactory, communications upon the subject of the present state of affairs between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali; and the result of these communications leads Her Majesty's Government to conclude, that the views taken of these matters by the Austrian, French, and Russian Governments, may be stated shortly to be nearly as follows:—

All three of these Governments appear to be strongly impressed with the necessity of preventing, if possible, the outbreak of hostilities between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, or of putting a speedy end to those hostilities, if they should unfortunately have already broken out; and in that opinion Her Majesty's Government entirely concur. The Russian Government, however, in a despatch of which M. Kisseleff gave me yesterday a copy, states, that the Powers of Europe might be contented to remain passive spectators of the continuance of those hostilities, so long as the Contending Parties should carry on their conflict within the limits of Syria. In this view, however, Her Majesty's Government can by no means agree; because it is not so much the scene of action, as the possible result of the conflict, which may exercise a decisive influence on the great interests of Europe, and a signal defeat and dispersion of the army of the Sultan, would be scarcely less disastrous on one side of the Taurus, or of the Euphrates, than upon the other.

Your Excellency will see, by the instructions given to Sir Robert Stopford, and which you are authorized to read confidentially to Prince Metternich, but without giving a copy of them, that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion, that if hostilities should have begun, and if the Egyptian Troops shall have advanced into Asia Minor, the first object to be aimed at, will be, to procure a suspension of arms, and to cause the Egyptian Troops to return within the limits of Syria, and, therefore, it is unnecessary to state that Her Majesty's Government do not agree with that of Russia, in being willing to consent that Mehemet Ali should continue to occupy the districts of Diarbekir and Orfa;—districts beyond the Province of Syria, of considerable importance from a military and political point of view, and which it has long been the desire of Mehemet Ali to acquire.

It is indeed singular that this proposition, which is contained in a despatch from Petersburg, dated the 4th June, should tally so much with the proposition made for the first time to the Austrian Government at Alexandria by Mehemet Ali, on the 12th of May, and it cannot fail to be remarkable, that the proposition and the proposal that the war should be allowed to go on so long as it is waged in Syria, appear to be evidences of views, on the part of Russia, not very friendly to the Porte, and not altogether in unison with those of the other Great Powers of Europe.

I stated to M. Kisseleff, in our conversation yesterday, that on these two points the views of Her Majesty's Government do not agree with those of Russia; but M. Kisseleff assured me, in reply, that he was certain that his Government would learn with satisfaction the opinions entertained by Her Majesty's Government on these two points, and would willingly adopt those opinions.

Upon the first point, then, connected with these affairs, there appears to be a general concurrence of opinion, that hostilities between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali ought to be prevented or stopped. Austria, France, and England, seem also to feel that the present relative position of the Sultan and the Pacha is incompatible with the safety of the Turkish Empire, and with the peace of Europe; and that some different arrangement must be arrived at in order to avoid serious and extensive dangers.

Some parts of Count Nesselrode's despatch, might, perhaps, be construed to imply that Russia is not of this opinion and is satisfied with the present state of things; but there are other passages which appear to indicate that Russia is not disinclined to take into consideration the possibility of making some more permanent settlement. France, Austria, and Great Britain have expressed a decided opinion that some such settlement is desirable for the safety of Europe, and that the Great Powers ought without loss of time to enter into communication with a view to that purpose. Prussia would of course concur in such a proceeding, and although Russia has hitherto declined to retain within her own sphere of activity any meddling with other Powers in their mutual relations, she is not likely to dissent from a proceeding which the general interests of all the Powers of Europe are so directly concerned in the face of the Turkish Empire, that no one Power can separate herself from the rest in her dealings with respect to Turkey; but that Turkish affairs must henceforward be considered to be as much an European question, as any other affairs with which the Cabinets of Europe have been occupied.

The French Government proposed that these matters should be discussed in a Conference of the Five Powers, to be held at Vienna. Prince Metternich has stated reasons why, in his opinion, these matters cannot properly be referred to a formal conference, but he has proposed that Vienna should be the seat of negotiation in these affairs. Her Majesty's Government saw many strong reasons in favour of the French proposal, and some of much weight against it; the proposal of Prince Metternich is open to fewer objections, and holds out less advantages.

The informal negotiation proposed by Austria would certainly not fetter the action of Great Britain as much as a formal conference would do; but, on the other hand, it would also bind Russia less.

Her Majesty's Government, however, are willing to agree to the proposition of Prince Metternich, provided it shall be acceded to by Russia and Prussia, as well as by Great Britain and France; and I have great satisfaction in stating to your Excellency, that one strong motive which leads Her Majesty's Government to acquiesce in this arrangement is, the entire confidence which they place in your ability, discretion, and firmness.

The general view which Her Majesty's Government at present informed, entertain of the affair in question, may be stated as follows.

The Great Powers are justified in interfering in these matters, which are, in fact, a contest between a sovereign and his subject, because this contest threatens to produce great and dangerous effects on the interests of other Powers, and to the general peace of Europe. Those interests and that peace require the maintenance of the Turkish Empire, and the maintenance of the Turkish Empire is, therefore, the primary object to be aimed at. This object cannot be secured without putting an end to future chances of collision between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali. But as long as Mehemet Ali continues to occupy Syria, there will also be danger of such collision. Mehemet Ali cannot hold Syria without a large military force constantly stationed there. As long as there is an Egyptian force in Syria, there must necessarily be a Turkish army in that part of Asia Minor which borders on Syria. Each party might agree at present to reduce those forces to a given amount, but neither could be sure that the other was not, after a time, secretly increasing his amount of force, and each party would be liable to a sudden attack. The same state of things which has existed of late would again recur: for the motives and passions which have led to it would still be in action. Mehemet Ali, or Ibrahim, would still desire to add more territory to their Pashalics; the Sultan would still burn to drive them back into Egypt.

It appears then to Her Majesty's Government, that there can be no end to the danger with which these affairs menace the peace of Europe, until Mehemet Ali shall have restored Syria to the direct authority of the Sultan; shall have retired into Egypt, and shall have interposed the Desert between his troops and authorities and the troops and authorities

of the Sultan. But Mehemet Ali could not be expected to consent to this, unless some equivalent advantage were granted to him; and this equivalent advantage might be hereditary succession in his family to the Pashalic of Egypt; Mehemet Ali and his descendants being secured in the Government of that Province in the same way that a former Pasha of Scutari and his family were so secured; the Pasha continuing to be the vassal of the Porte, paying a reasonable tribute, furnishing a contingent of men, and being bound like any other Pasha by the treaties which his sovereign might make. Such an arrangement would appear to be equitable between the parties, because on the one hand, it would secure the Sultan against the many dangers and inconveniences which arise from the present occupation of Syria by the Pasha, while on the other hand it would offer to the Pasha that security as to the future fate of his family, his anxiety about which he has often declared to be the main cause of his desire to obtain some kind of permanent arrangement.

It appears to Her Majesty's Government that if the Five Powers were to agree upon such a plan, and were to propose it to the two parties, with a full authority which belongs to the Great Powers of Europe, such an arrangement would be carried into effect, and through its means, Europe would be delivered from a great and imminent danger.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 89.

*Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beaumont.*

(No. 86.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, June 28, 1839*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 55, of this day's date, upon the subject of Eastern Affairs, I have to inform your Excellency that it is not intended that you should communicate at all to Prince Metternich the "Secret and Confidential" instructions which have been given by Her Majesty's Government to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, and which are inclosed to your Excellency in my "Secret and Confidential" despatch of the 28th of June.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 90.

*Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.*

No. 265.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, June 29, 1839*

I HEREWITH transmit to your Excellency, a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna\* acquainting His Excellency with the substance of the communications which I have received from the Austrian Ambassador, and from the French and Russian Chargés d'Affaires, upon the present state of affairs in the Levant, and also communicating to him a copy of a despatch from Count Nesselrode to Count Pozzo di Borgo upon the same subject, which was communicated to me by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires on the 27th of this month†.

I have to instruct your Excellency, to show to the French Government Count Nesselrode's despatch, and to draw the attention of Marshal Soult to the strong proof, which that despatch seems to afford, that the real object of Russia is not to uphold, but to weaken Turkey.

It would be impossible for Russia at once and openly to take part with Mehemet Ali against the Sultan; but Russia would gladly see the resources of the Turkish Empire continue to be wasted in internal war, so long as that war could be kept within such limits, as not to involve the Powers of Europe in quarrels, on account of Turkish affairs; and Russia

\* See No. 88, p. 109.

† See No. 81, p. 9.



would be glad, that the gradual encroachments of Mehemet Ali should still more weaken the Turkish Government, and render it progressively less and less able to resist the dictation of Russia as a friend, or to repel her attack as an enemy. The existence of a secret understanding between Russia and Mehemet Ali has long been suspected, and a glance at the map is sufficient to show, that those two Parties have a common interest in despoiling Turkey, which lies between them, and portions of which they each are desirous of appropriating to themselves.

Many people have been led to suppose, that Russia, whatever language she may have held openly at Constantinople and at Alexandria, has secretly encouraged and incited the Sultan and the Pasha in their war-like projects. But whether this suspicion be well founded or not, it is manifest, that the state of things lately and at present existing in Syria, has been advantageous to the interests of Russia, and injurious to the interests of all the other parties concerned. Encroachment upon Turkey is, no doubt, an object at which Russia steadily aims; encroachment by predominant influence over the Sultan in time of peace; encroachment by acquisition of territory from the Sultan in time of war. Everything that tends to weaken Turkey, tends to forward in this respect the views of Russia; and those views remain the same, though Russia may, according to circumstances, vary her means of accomplishing them.

Till recently, Russia proposed to herself to extend Russian influence over Turkey, by affording the Sultan military protection. Hence, the expedition to the Bosphorus in 1833; hence the Treaty of Unkar Skelessi, and hence the great military and naval preparations which, at various times during the last two years, have been made in the southern provinces of Russia, for marching troops through the principalities into Bulgaria, and for sending an expedition to the Bosphorus from Sebastopol. Russia appears now to have a more definite plan, and knowing that a military occupation of Turkey would either expose her to war with the other Powers of Europe, or would, by the interference of those Powers, be rendered productive of little or no permanent advantage to Russia, she now seems disposed to let the Pasha do her work for her, and to allow him to weaken Turkey, by dispersing the Sultan's Armies, and by occupying a greater extent of the Sultan's provinces. But the interests of France, Austria and England are in this respect so identical, and so diametrically opposed to those of Russia, that it is hardly possible that those three Powers should not agree in a common course of action, for the maintenance of their common interests; and if this should be, and if Prussia should join them, Russia would be unable openly to oppose them, and their united force would be amply sufficient to defeat any secret intrigues by which she might endeavour to thwart them.

It seems, however, to Her Majesty's Government, that the great interests of the Four Powers, as regards the affairs of Turkey, can never be considered as secure, until Mehemet Ali shall have evacuated Syria, and shall have withdrawn his forces into Egypt.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 91

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville

No. 266)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 29, 1839

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, an extract of a confidential despatch from Prince Metternich to Count Appony, which has been communicated to me by Prince Esterhazy, stating reasons why, in the opinion of the Austrian Cabinet, the resolution of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, as to the principles which ought to regulate the esta-

lishment of Conferences of the Great Powers, would prevent the establishment of a formal Conference upon the present state of affairs in the Levant.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

Inclosure in No. 91.

Prince Metternich to Count Appony

(Extrait.)

Vienne, le 14 Juin, 1839.

UN Protocole signé en 1818 entre les Cinq Grandes Cours à Aix-la-Chapelle a établi sur les relations internationales un principe sage fondé sur le respect pour le droit de porter à l'indépendance des Etats. Les Cinq Cours ont arrêté entre elles (et elles ont fait part de leur ferme détermination à cet égard à toutes les autres Cours), que jamais des questions touchant aux droits et à l'intérêt d'un Etat tiers, ne seraient abordées par elles en Conférence sans que le Gouvernement intéressé n'eût été invité à prendre part à la réunion. En appliquant cette utile règle au cas échéant, il faudrait faire intervenir un Plénipotentiaire Ottoman dans tel lieu que choisiraient les Puissances pour y établir une Conférence, et dans ce fait seul se trouverait un obstacle insurmontable pour la réussite de l'entreprise. Jamais la Porte ne nuirait son Envoyé de facultés suffisamment étendues pour que l'affaire pût marcher.

Mais il existe d'autres considérations encore qui seraient défavorables à la réunion d'une Conférence pour traiter de l'affaire du jour. Nous pouvons admettre que plus d'une Puissance ne serait que faiblement disposée au choix de cette forme, et le Public Européen y chercherait ce qui ne doit pas s'y trouver, et ce qui d'après les sentiments indubitables des Cinq Cours ne y trouve point d'effet. D'après ce qui vient d'être dit, il s'agit d'empêcher que la guerre n'éclate entre la Porte et l'Egypte, ou de mettre le terme le plus prompt à celle qui continuerait aux yeux déjà hautement et uniformément prononcés de ces mêmes Cours, aurait déjà commencé, ou qu'on ne serait plus à temps d'empêcher.

Ce n'est point par le moyen d'une Conférence placée à distance qu'il serait possible d'atteindre l'un et l'autre de ces buts. C'est à Constantinople et à Alexandrie que la pensée déjà connue des Cinq Cours devra être soutenue, sans perte de temps et avec vigueur. A cet effet, il est besoin que d'instructions fondées sur le principe pacifique, qui ont été données aux Représentants de ces mêmes Puissances, et qui leur donnent la latitude suffisante pour pouvoir régler leur conduite d'après les circonstances et les événements. Tout ce qui ne s'écartera pas de ce point de vue fondamental des Puissances, tel que nous le saisissons, sera bien, et devra produire un effet salutaire, si toutefois leurs Représentants n'imposent le devoir de tenir, dans leurs explications, un langage uniforme. Ce n'est cependant également possible dans la forme d'une Conférence que d'établir entre eux des relations tant à Constantinople qu'à Alexandrie, c'est, au contraire, dans celle d'une libre entente. Toute Conférence qui ne se trouvera point placée sous la direction immédiate d'un Cabinet, assumera constamment un caractère d'indépendance des commettants, qui, loin d'être favorable à l'affaire dont elle aura à s'occuper, y fera naître des embarras, et l'exposera même au danger de la faire dévier (et ne fût-ce même que dans des questions de détails) de l'objet qui aura motivé la réunion.

No. 92

*Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 1.)*

(No. 77.)

My Lord,

*Berlin, June 26, 1839.*

COUNT BRESSON showed me a despatch that Marshal Soult had addressed to M. de Bourqueney, in which he expresses the wish that the French fleet should co-operate with the English fleet in the Mediterranean, in order to prevent a collision between the Turkish and Egyptian squadrons; and that subsequently, measures should be taken in concert with Austria, to bring the Eastern Affairs to a final settlement. M. de Bourqueney was instructed to communicate the same despatch to your Lordship.

Count Bresson told me that he had made known to Baron Werther the views of Marshal Soult, and that his Excellency approved of them. I afterwards saw Baron Werther, and spoke to him on the subject. He said that Prussia had so little influence in the East, that she could in no way contribute to the maintenance of peace, beyond expressing a wish that peace should be maintained; but he thought the Four Powers most interested ought to prevent war, by imposing their authority on the hostile armies; and that afterwards, by the mediation of the same Powers, an arrangement should be brought about which would prevent a renewal of the present evil. His Excellency thought that Syria should be ceded to the Porte, and that Mehemet Ali should be allowed to transmit his Egyptian possessions to his posterity.

I have, &amp;c.,

(Signed)

WILLIAM RUSSELL.

No. 93.

*Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.*

My Lords,

*Foreign Office, July 2, 1839*

WITH reference to my letter of the 25th ultimo, conveying to your Lordships the Queen's commands as to the instructions to be addressed to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, I have the honour to inclose, for your Lordships' information, a copy\* of the instructions which the French Government have issued to the Commander-in-Chief of the French naval forces in the Mediterranean, and which have been communicated to me by the French Chargé d'Affaires. I am at the same time to signify to your Lordships Her Majesty's pleasure that a copy of the inclosed instructions be sent to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford for his information, and further, with reference to the contingency contemplated in the latter part of the French instructions, that a Russian squadron may join the British and French squadrons, Sir Robert Stopford should be instructed that although Her Majesty's Government conceive that such a contingency is not likely to happen, as the Russian squadron in the Black Sea cannot well come out through the straits, and it is not likely that Russian ships of war should be sent round about from the Baltic into the Mediterranean, yet if a Russian naval force should offer to co-operate with Her Majesty's ships, Sir Robert Stopford should accept the offer for the attainment of the objects specified in his general instructions.

I am, &amp;c.,

(Signed)

PALMERSTON

\* See No. 92 p. 37

No. 94

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 4.)*

(No. 249.)

My Lord,

*Paris, July 1, 1839, 11 p.m.*

MARSHAL SOULT has this moment communicated to me a telegraphic despatch from Marseilles, by which it appears that the officers whom the Marshal had dispatched to Constantinople and Alexandria, had arrived at those places on the 14th of last month.

Accounts had been received at Constantinople, of a slight engagement in which the Turks had the advantage, and had taken several villages. This success had given the ascendancy to the war party in the Divan; and on the 9th, an order had been sent to Hafiz Pasha to move forwards (*d'aller en avant*).

I have, &amp;c.,

(Signed)

GRANVILLE.

No. 95.

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 4.)*

(No. 250.)

My Lord,

*Paris, July 2, 1839*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship, the copy of a despatch from the Consul-General of France at Alexandria, which has been communicated to the French Government this morning by the Marseilles telegraph.

I have, &amp;c.,

(Signed)

GRANVILLE.

Inclosure in No. 93.

*Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles.**Le Consul de France à Alexandrie à M. le Président du Conseil des Ministres.**Alexandrie, 18 Juin.*

MÉHÉMET ALI a donné des ordres à Ibrahim Pacha pour s'arrêter partout où il serait, à l'arrivée de M. le Capitaine Caillier, et d'attendre l'issue des arrangements que prendront les Grandes Puissances.

L'Escadre Égyptienne est sortie, mais sans but hostile. Elle ira croiser sur les côtes de la Syrie.

No. 96.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 4.)*

(No. 141.)

My Lord,

*Therapia, June 12, 1839*

A STEAMER, hired by the Porte, is about to carry Mahomed Ali Bey, one of the Sultan's secretaries, to Samsoun, from whence he is to proceed direct to the head-quarters of Hafiz Pasha, to deliver to him the Vezan (that is, the mark of his dignity as Generalsissimo, to which he has been lately raised).

Mahomed Ali Bey also carries instructions to Hafiz Pasha, the main point of which is, that he should not risk any battle in the plain,



but should keep his army in the strong country, and in positions where it cannot be attacked but at a disadvantage to the enemy.

The accounts from Syria seem to concur in representing the population of that country to be very ill-disposed towards the Egyptian Government, and a Prussian traveller just arrived from thence, Prince Puckler Muskau, has described to a friend of mine, the Egyptian army as containing a vast proportion of boys, and as being inferior in that respect to the Ottoman army under Hafiz Pasha, though it may be better drilled. He estimates Ibrahim's army at 60,000 men, and, as I learn, does not appear to think it on the whole much, if at all, superior to the Ottoman army. The greatest exertions are making to reinforce the Sultan's army, and to supply it with everything. It is my belief that Hafiz Pasha will continue to avoid hostilities till after the appearance of the Ottoman fleet off the coast of Syria shall have given courage to the partisans of the Porte to show themselves; and it may also be intended to wait the results of the probable collision of the Ottoman and Egyptian fleets.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) P. H. S. WERRY

No. 97

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 4.)*

(No. 149.)

My Lord,

Thessalonica, June 12, 1839

THE Ottoman fleet sailed on the 9th instant under the command of the Capudan Pasha, for the Dardanelles, where it will remain during six or eight days, and thence proceed to the coast of Syria, as I am informed.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) P. H. S. WERRY

No. 98

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.*

(No. 92.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, July 5, 1839

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to state to the Porte, that if the course of events should lead the Porte to ask or to accept military or naval aid from any European Power, in the contest with Mehemet Ali, Her Majesty's Government trust that the Porte will at the same time address itself to Great Britain to the same effect, and your Excellency will say that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford has orders to repair with his squadron to Constantinople for the purpose of affording to the Sultan physical and moral support, and that Sir Robert Stopford shall receive from the Porte, through your Excellency, an invitation to that effect.

Similar instructions will be given by the French Government to Admiral Roussin, and you will make your communication on this matter to the Porte simultaneously with that of the French Ambassador.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) P. H. S. WERRY

No. 99.

*Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 12.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, June 4, 1839

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of my despatch of this day's date to His Excellency Lord Ponsonby, G.C.B., Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, together with copy of a translation in French, of an Arabic report made to me upon the state of the Sultan's Seraskier Hafiz Pasha's forces on this side of the river Euphrates, and extract of Vice-Consul Hays' journal, the whole of which, I hope, will meet with your Lordship's approval.

I have no further advices to lay before your Lordship, beyond what are contained in the inclosed despatch, which is the latest intelligence I have up to this moment, respecting the movements of both the Sultan's and Egyptian forces on the frontier; but should anything further transpire, I shall not fail to forward the same to your Lordship with all possible dispatch.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) P. H. S. WERRY

Inclosure 1 in No. 99

*Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.*

(Extract.)

Aleppo, June 4, 1839

I HAD the honour of stating to your Lordship, in my despatch under date 4th and 6th ultimo, that a part of the Sultan's troops had crossed the river at Bir, and the following advices that they continued daily to cross.

I beg now to inform your Lordship, that the subsequent advices which reached this from Aleppo, brought the intelligence that almost all the Sultan's troops together with the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha, had crossed the river, and that the column that had marched from Malatia to Roum Kale by way of Bisan, had also joined the main body of the army that had crossed at Bir.

It is stated that the total amount of the Sultan's forces under Hafiz Pasha form a body of 80,000 men; 56,000 of which are Regular, and 25,000 Irregular Cavalry. The former consists of Spahis, Miltia and Regular Infantry and Cavalry, with about 180 pieces of artillery; the latter, of Bachs, Bomaks and Arabs. Thus, I understand, is the total amount of the Sultan's Seraskier Hafiz Pasha's forces; the advanced guard which is composed of 6,000 strong, Regular and Irregular Cavalry are at Neuh, a village distant four hours from the river. Hafiz Pasha, with the rest of the forces, has, it is said, formed his camp, which extends from the banks of the river, occupying a distance of one hour inland.

During the concentration of the Egyptian Army here, I continually visited His Excellency Ibrahim Pasha and Solymann Pasha; both of whom always assured me, that they had no intention of moving, or of commencing hostilities, so long as the Sultan's forces did not invade Syria, and the Seraskier, under the 27th ultimo, added, that in accordance to his instructions, he would not make any hostile movement further forward, or advance his troops on the frontier, or in any way be the aggressor, but in the event of the Sultan's forces advancing and considerably surpassing his limits.

I beg further to inform your Lordship, that on the 28th ultimo, I obtained intelligence that some of the Sultan's troops had advanced, and had crossed the river at Bir, and that the Seraskier had moved forward, his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, who informed me that it was the case.

and that he had received a letter from Aintab, and from the Colonel of the Irregular Cavalry stationed on the frontier, along the river Sedjour, both of which state, that a part of the Sultan's advanced guard had taken possession of a village named Orul, distant four hours and a half from Aintab, and were obliging the inhabitants to supply them with provisions; and also attempting to make the inhabitants rise and take up arms against the Egyptian Government. His Excellency added, "this is not all, they have freed of my Annadi troops near the village, whom they had seized, and conveyed to the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha's camp." While I was with his Excellency in order to give an account of a mission which he had been sent on by his Excellency. The Seraskier accented him with "Well what have you done?" and then turned to me saying "Listen to what the gentleman is going to say, and then you will see if I can act with more prudence and discretion than to my instructions."

"I have sent off the officer your Excellency desired with the letter your Excellency gave me for the Colonel of the Annadi's telling him, His Excellency the Seraskier's orders are that you will rise with all possible dispatch to the river Sedjour and find Maggum Bey wherever he may be, and after leaving to him this letter from His Excellency the Seraskier, you will repeat to him verbally that his Excellency's positive orders are that he will not allow a single shot to be fired by any of his troops, and that if he sees the Sultan's troops advance and take possession of any of our villages he is to fall back and evacuate that country, taking no notice of the advance, and to continue to do so, falling back until he has arrived at least two hours in the Egyptian territory, and if he hears that the Sultan's troops can not advance as will have been said, and if upon return of, and some immediate advice to his Excellency, but need to say that this is only in the event of the Sultan's troops following him up two hours in our territory."

After which his Excellency observed to me as follows:—"This is the third attempt of the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha, since he has been on this side of the Euphrates, to cause my people to rise against me. He first attempted to make the malcontents of Gousur Dagh rise, in which he was aided by my sending a force of irregular Cavalry in those parts, threatening them. He then next tried to persuade the Koord Mountain near Kuls, to revolt by sending the son of Hacı Omar, formerly one of its chiefs amongst them, but in this he was also foiled by the inhabitants replying that they would have nothing to do with the matter either one way or the other. And now it appears he is attempting the same thing in the direction of Aintab, we shall see how far this will succeed." His Excellency then called on Achmet Memeky Pasha sitting in the room, to hear witness to what he had been saying, and which Hafiz Pasha had by contradicting at his Excellency had stated.

On the 29th ult. at about noon I obtained intelligence that the Seraskier's advanced guard, which had occupied a village of Orul, had also taken possession of several other villages in that district, and in the afternoon I learnt that his Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha, in company with Achmet Memeky Pasha had just left very solemnly for Telbisheir, distant about twelve hours from hence, on foot, towards the river Sedjour, taking with him seven regiments of Cavalry and one of Artillery, composed of twelve batteries, seventy-two pieces.

The following morning I called on his Excellency Solymen Pasha to inquire respecting the cause of this sudden movement of the Seraskier's, and he told me that two days ago that he had intended to quit Aleppo but in the event of the Sultan's troops positively entering his territory. His Excellency Solymen Pasha replied, that the cause of the Seraskier's sudden departure from Aleppo, arose from his having received advice, that the Sultan's Seraskier, with the main body of his army, which had been till now encamped near the banks of the Euphrates, had moved, and had apparently advanced to Nesib; and the advanced guard which was at Nesib, had come further forward near the frontier. Besides that, his Excellency had received intelligence that part of this advanced guard which had occupied Orul, had also taken possession of several other villages, some of which, it is stated, belong to the

Aintab district, among whom it had distributed 200 muskets and swords, persuading them to take up arms against the Egyptian Government, and that in consequence of this step, the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha thought that his presence might prevent any further rise among the villages, and had, therefore, taken the Cavalry and a regiment of Artillery, and had gone to Telbisheir, where it was always his Excellency's intention of forming his camp, in case of necessity; but that he, Solymen Pasha, did not intend to quit Aleppo, with the Infantry and rest of the Artillery, until he received orders to that effect from the Seraskier, which would only be in the event of the Sultan's troops continuing to advance, but which he did not think would be the case.

On the following morning, at about 6 A.M., it was reported to me, that the Infantry had all been ordered to get ready to march. As this was in contradiction to what his Excellency Solymen Pasha stated to me the day before, I immediately called on him; and upon my entrance, his Excellency said, "I told you yesterday that I did not intend to move, but affairs have changed since then; for one of his Excellency the Seraskier's Aides-de-camp reached this an hour ago, bringing me orders from the Seraskier to join them immediately with all the troops, in consequence of his having obtained advice that the Sultan's troops continued advancing, and had crossed the river Sedjour; and had come as far as Telbasheir, two hours on this side of the river, and five hours to Telbisheir, where his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha's camp is; so that I shall leave this in the course of two hours with all the Infantry and Artillery, to proceed to Telbisheir, where his Excellency the Seraskier is."

I learn from the Government here, that the Sultan's troops that have occupied Telbasheir, are principally all Koord Irregular Cavalry. The following is the report made to me with regard to the assault which took place; in which it appears that the Koords employed a ruse, or stratagem, and took the Annadi troops by surprise.

The day before the affray took place, the Koord Irregular Cavalry during the night crossed the river to the right and left of the Annadi camp, which was at Telbasheir; and at the dawn of day, some sixty or seventy Spahis, (Yeomanry Cavalry,) on the opposite side of the river, came galloping up; upon which the Annadis seeing this, they mounted their horses, with a view of galloping forward also, to check this apparent hostile demonstration of the Spahis. But great, I am told, was the surprise of the Annadis, on turning round, to find themselves thus opposed by these Koords, which movement being so unexpected and sudden caused great confusion among the Bedouin Cavalry, who, after a slight skirmish, and seeing that some thirty of their men were killed, and a great many wounded, they immediately fled in the greatest confusion, galloping towards Telbisheir, which place Ibrahim Pasha had just reached, leaving behind them a great many of their tents, among which were those of the chief, and containing very valuable horses &c. Yesterday a post arrived from the camp, by which I am told his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha writes under that date, that he would proceed to Kauscrio Salieh, distant two hours from Telbasheir. His Excellency was to take with him all the Regular Cavalry, a regiment of Artillery, and some of the Irregular Cavalry, and there remain to watch the further movements of the Turkish Irregular Cavalry. It is stated by some to-day, that on his Excellency's arrival at the above-named place, the Koords recrossed the river and left Telbasheir; others again assert that his Excellency had sent Maggum Bey and Caftan Bey, of the Bedouin Cavalry, to Telbasheir, to inquire of the Sultan's Irregular Cavalry why they had entered his territory; and that it was on seeing them approach that the Koords immediately left Telbasheir.

I have to inform your Lordship, that to-day I obtained the following intelligence from the Governor; that his Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha, having been informed that some of the Sultan's troops were approaching Aintab, his Excellency sent and ordered the two regiments of the line that were quartered there, with all the Government officers and employes, to leave the place, and come to the camp, which I am told they have reached; thus it appears that Aintab has been abandoned by



Ibrahim Pasha, with the exception of a few men who are in charge of the fort. It is supposed that this is a ruse of his Excellency. There are a great many reports in town respecting Aintab, and that it has been taken by the Sultan's authorities; but up to this moment, no authentic advices state that.

It is said by many, that Solyma Pasha of Marash, with 10,000 regulars, accompanied by the son of Hadji Omar, which latter was one of the late Kourdi Chiefs, with as many irregulars is coming on that line on Aintab; but this requires further confirmation.

I have not been able to elicit anything further respecting Saffook Bey with the Gerba Arab Tribe, who, was said, intended to act on the Desert line. I beg to inclose for your Excellency's information, a translation in French, of an Arabic Report made to me, on the state of the Sultan's Army under Hafiz Pasha.

By the latest advices we have from the camp under the Sultan's Seraskier, Hafiz Pasha, he, with a regular troops continued to be at Nezir, and had not made any further movement either way.

It is also positively asserted, that up to this date, of the Sultan's regular troops have in any point entered the Egyptian jurisdiction, or intruded on their territory.

I beg to represent to your Lordship, that since the concentration of the Sultan's Army on this side of the Euphrates, there has been great desertion among the troops. It is said, that up to this period, no less than 1,500 men have come over to this side, who were received by his Excellency Ibrahim, and after questioning them, his Excellency gave them the choice of either remaining with him, or returning again to the other side. I am informed that they preferred the former, and many have entered in the Irregular Cavalry, Bachi Bouzouks. Desertion has also taken place among the Egyptian troops, but not to so great an extent as from the other side.

It is generally supposed that there will be no war between the two parties. The French and Austrian Consuls here are firmly of that opinion, and it is to be hoped that this will be confirmed, as both countries are suffering greatly in consequence of the concentration of so large a force on one point. The present state of affairs causes great detriment to our British residents, as also to our general commercial interests.

I received advices from Mr. Vice-Consul Hays, under the 24th ult., that some little disturbance has taken place among the Arab tribes of the desert, the subsequent advices from Mr. Vice-Consul Hays say nothing more respecting it, so that things appear quiet.

I beg to enclose for your Lordship's information, extract from Mr. Vice-Consul Hays' Journal under the 24th ult. I beg to inform your Lordship that I have a Tatar here, whom I will dispatch to your Lordship immediately anything further transpires meriting your Lordship's attention.

P.S.—After closing my despatch to your Lordship, I obtained the following intelligence coming from Nizir Tagger, a servant of Ibrahim Pasha's private secretary, and M. Molinari, the Sardinian Pro-Consul, who both assert that they have read the letter which contained the same, and which I hasten to transmit to your Lordship.

"Last night a horseman arrived to the Musselim of this town, Abdullah Babinski, from the Bos Bey of Barrak, on the other side of the Sedjour, who is father-in-law to the former, and although under the Sultan's jurisdiction, communicated to his son-in-law, that the Sultan's Seraskier Hafiz Pasha's powder magazine, consisting of about 10,000 cases of gunpowder, had blown up, and that it had destroyed 350 persons and 400 horses; and that the maimed and wounded were innumerable."

I am also informed, that by a post which has just arrived from the camp, there is a letter from his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, who writes, that he had arrived near Telhashir a quarter of an hour, but that he could not see anything of the Sultan's Kourdi Irregulars, neither there nor anywhere else on the other side of the river. That 200 horsemen had deserted from the Sultan's Army and had come to him; but his Excellency

does not say whether regulars or irregulars. And further, that his Excellency has given orders to the two regiments of Aintab, who had arrived at the camp, to return again to their posts.

His Excellency Solyma Pasha, with the Infantry, is still at Tellishier.

#### Inclosure 2 in No. 99

*Traduction d'un Rapport fait en Arabe au Pro-Chancelier du Consulat Britannique à Alep, par un homme envoyé aux environs de Biredjik, pour prendre toutes les informations possibles à l'égard de l'armée Ottomane.*

#### Voici son propre Récit

EN partant d'Alep je me suis rendu d'abord aux environs de la rivière dite Saggiour, où se trouve le petit camp des troupes d'Ibrahim Pasha, postées là pour surveiller les mouvements de l'armée du Grand Seigneur.

Ces troupes consistent en cavalerie irrégulière dite Hanadi et Bachi Bouzouk. Les Hanadis, au nombre d'environ 1,500, sont commandés par leur colonel nommé Magroun Bey, et les Bachi Bouzouk sont commandés, 500 par Zeir Aga, et 400 par Kara Beirakdar, ce qui forme en tout environ 2,400 hommes sans aucune artillerie; ce camp est dressé sur les bords du Saggiour, à seize heures d'Alep, à un endroit qui porte le nom de Loulie et Elkoubal, et il s'étend jusqu'à un lieu dit Tel-Bécher distance de quatre heures toujours en-deçà du Saggiour. Ces troupes reçoivent leurs vivres du Miri, par les villages voisins appelés El Hagho, de là je me suis porté, avec ma marchandise, à un village nommé Barak, qui est en-deçà de la dite rivière du Saggiour, à une petite distance; là connaissant particulièrement le Musselim, j'ai obtenu de lui un *teskére* pour me rendre à Nézir, village à quinze heures du Saggiour. Arrivé à ce village, j'y ai trouvé le frère du Musselim de Barak, qui était à faire ramasser des grains pour l'armée du Grand Seigneur, dont le camp commence à peu de distance de ce village, et s'étend jusqu'à l'Euphrate; à ce village j'ai fait la connaissance du Nezoul Amiri (Fournisseur), qui m'a dit que l'armée du Grand Seigneur avait le pain à raison de 25,000 oke de pain, qui étaient distribuées aux soldats à raison d'une demi oke pour chacun, et ce, en outre du pain fin que les Pachas et les officiers consomment.

En parcourant le camp, j'ai appris que le nombre des troupes dites Bachi Bouzouk est à présent d'environ 1,000 cavaliers, et les Bachi Bouzouk sont au nombre de 2,000 cavaliers, dont 1,200 commandés par Agoua Dahi Moustapha Aga; 800 par Ali Aga de Malatia; et 50 cavaliers seulement, sous les ordres de Karagiali Darouneh Aga; et l'on recrutait à grand force pour grossir ce corps, parcequ'à ce que l'on dit, le Seraskier Hafiz Ali Pacha avait après Ibrahim Pacha avait reçu beaucoup de troupes à Alep, et jugeant que son armée n'était pas assez forte pour tenir tête à l'Armée Egyptienne, il s'était décidé d'augmenter le nombre de ces troupes dites Bachi Bouzouk, et à cet effet, il avait envoyé des recruteurs dans différents pays, avec des sommes d'argent pour l'enrôlement.

Le susdit Seraskier a fait venir auprès de lui le chef de la tribu Arabe appelée Maoualia, qui habite au-delà de l'Euphrate, à environ seize heures du camp, et il l'a fait vêtir d'une uniforme de Nizam, et l'a chargé de réunir sous ses ordres 1,000 cavaliers de sa tribu, mais il n'avait encore avec lui que 200 hommes.

Le même Seraskier a demandé aussi de la tribu des Kourdes appelée H-raie, qui est à environ dix heures au-delà de l'Euphrate, encore 1,000 cavaliers, mais ceux-ci ont refusé de fournir ces hommes, et ils ont pris la fuite en abandonnant leurs terres; alors le Seraskier a envoyé des gens vers des chefs de cette tribu, pour leur demander s'ils entendaient se révolter contre la Porte Ottomane; mais ces chefs ont répondu qu'ils n'entendaient nullement être rebelles, ni qu'ils préféreraient le

Gouvernement Egyptien, mais que pour fournir des hommes pour la guerre, ils ne le pouvaient pas, mais que si on leur demandait tout autre chose, ils étaient prêts à sacrifier toutes leurs fortunes pour le service du Grand Seigneur; d'après cette réponse, le Séraskier s'est contenté de leur demander pour le moment 1,000 chameaux, à quoi ils ont consenti; et le Séraskier dépêcha un moubacher (intendant) pour faire ramasser ces chameaux; et ces Kourdes sont rentrés maintenant dans leurs foyers.

Mardi 22 courant, une bande de vingt hommes, des Bédouins dits Moulis, s'est portée sur le village de Tédéf-el-bab qui est à la distance de neuf heures d'Alep (du territoire du Gouvernement Egyptien), et ont volé dix-huit bêtes de somme qu'ils conduisirent à Barak, où le Muassilim fit sauter ces animaux, et en donna avis au Séraskier de l'Armée Ottomane, lequel a ordonné de faire de suite retourner ces animaux au village d'où ils ont été enlevés.

Au camp de l'Armée Ottomane se trouvent onze Pachas; les noms que j'ai pu connaître, sont, Kourd Méhémed, Pacha d'Ourfa, Chérif Pacha, ci-devant Pacha d'Ourfa; Mirza Pacha, Commandant de Cavalerie; Ismaél Pacha, Commandant les Spahis; Assad Pacha, Commandant de Nizam (troupe régulière), et plus, un nommé Osman Pacha et un autre Chérif Pacha.

Le nombre des troupes régulières est d'environ 56,000 hommes, y compris cependant les Spahis et les canoniers; et entre les Bachi Bouzuk et les Bédouins il y aurait une vingtaine de mille; à ces derniers on ne fournit pas les vivres, ils se nourrissent à leurs frais, et chaque soldat a la paye de soixante piastres par mois; par ce motif, il règne une grande disette dans les villages voisins, où une dragme de pain coûte 2 paras; le fromage 9 paras le rotte; le lait, 3 paras; et le reste en proportion; la viande cependant ne coûte que 2 paras l'oke, et le beurre 6 paras.

Aussi à cause de la saleté qui règne dans le camp et les environs, il existe beaucoup de maladies parmi la troupe: on voit les soldats en général maigres et pâles.

Il m'a été dit, que Amin Pacha, fils de Rechid Méhémed Pacha, ex-Séraskier, vient du côté de Sivas joindre l'armée avec 10,000 Arméniens (Albanais).

Le Séraskier a ordonné de faire évaluer les champs ensimencés voisins du camp, pour en payer le montant aux propriétaires, aux prix suivants, savoir: le froment, à 150 paras le kel (mesure de 2 chumbols d'Alep); et l'orge à 75 paras la dite mesure.

Il a ordonné aussi d'estimer les terres ensimencées en les chameaux de l'armée sont en pâturage, pour en payer également la valeur aux propriétaires: il y a plus de 10,000 kels de somme qui se trouvent dans les champs à pâturer.

Le Séraskier a fait déjà prendre de Barak, 2,000 kels de blé; 1,500 kels d'orge, et 700 kels de bourghol (blé comassé); qui ont été payés, savoir: le blé et le bourghol à 50 paras le kel, et l'orge à 20 paras; et il en demande maintenant autres mille kels de blé, mais les habitants du dit village ont répondu qu'il ne leur en restait pas de quoi vivre eux-mêmes, et sur cela, le Séraskier a envoyé faire une perquisition dans le village. On a plus de 10,000 kels de blé et 10,000 kels d'orge et 2,500 kels de bourghol, aux prix susmentionnés. Maintenant les dits habitants cherchent une poignée de farine sans la trouver, et se trouvent réduits presque à la famine, et de la crainte qu'ils ont que la cavalerie ne dévaste entièrement toutes leurs terres, ils sont à moissonner leurs récoltes sans attendre la maturité des grains.

Il existe au camp environ soixante canons, et il y a deux gros canons placés devant la tente du Séraskier.

J'ai appris aussi que la bande de la tribu des Bédouins dits Anakis qui est sous le commandement du chef nommé Souffouk Bey, vient contre le camp de l'Armée Ottomane d'environ 20,000 hommes (ils sont arrivés à Zaferan d'une colline), à six heures d'Alep sur l'Euphrate, et ils voulaient passer le fleuve à cet endroit où les eaux sont basses, mais ayant trouvé de la résistance de la part d'un corps de 8,000 Bédouins de Horan, appelés Ferhan, que Ibrahim Pacha a placés à ce passage depuis peu de temps en leur fournissant

sept pièces de canons, et 200 canoniers, ils se sont retirés en donnant avis au Séraskier de l'Armée Ottomane, à qui ils ont demandé la permission de venir à Barak pour passer le fleuve à cet endroit, mais le Séraskier leur a répondu d'attendre un peu, parce qu'à présent on était occupé à faire passer les munitions et les attirails de l'armée.

Les 8,000 Bédouins placés par Ibrahim Pacha sur les rives de l'Euphrate, dont il est parlé ci-dessus, étaient jadis ennemis des Egyptiens, et avaient été battus par Ibrahim Pacha, mais après, ils se sont soumis en prêtant serment de fidélité à Son Altesse, et celui-ci leur accorda la paix.

J'ai appris aussi que le fils de Hadji Omar Bey, de la montagne des Kourdes, qui n'est pas éloignée d'Alep, a promis au Séraskier qu'il fera soulever les habitants de la dite montagne ainsi que ceux de la montagne voisine dits Gacour-dagh, et l'aidera par-là à attaquer Alep; le Séraskier l'a fait accompagner par le frère de son trésorier pour cette entreprise. Ce fils de Hadji Omar, Bey des Kourdes, avait été battu dans un temps par Ibrahim Pacha, et poursuivi vivement; il ne dut son salut qu'à la fuite, en se retirant vers les Osmaïns.

On m'a assuré, qu'en outre de l'armée dont je parle, il en existait une autre de 60,000 hommes, qui est aux environs de Nijde et Elbour, à dix-huit heures de Kulok Boghar; et l'on dit que ces deux armées avec les Bédouins alliés formeront une armée d'environ 200,000 hommes; de même l'on dit qu'avec les canons que l'on attend, il y aurait en tout environ 300 canons. (N.B.—Le récit de ce paragraphe mérite confirmation.)

Le jour 23 courant, j'ai vu un escadron de cavalerie en lieu entre les troupes du Grand Seigneur et celles de Ibrahim Pacha, seulement la veille de mon départ du camp, un cheval de la cavalerie des Spahis, s'étant échappé et ayant couru vers le Saggiour, quelques Spahis ont couru après lui pour l'attraper, et comme ils s'étaient bien approché de la rivière, quelques Hanadis (cavalerie d'Ibrahim Pacha) coururent sur les Spahis, qui, voyant cela, rebroussèrent chemin; mais un d'eux étant tombé de son cheval, les Hanadis s'avancèrent sur lui et lui coupèrent la gorge à demi; les Spahis s'étant aperçus de cela, retournèrent sur les Hanadis, mais ceux-ci prirent quelques vêtements de l'assassiné et son cheval, et regagnèrent leur camp; alors les Spahis enlevèrent le mourant et le portèrent à Nisab, où il expira en arrivant.

Le Séraskier a publié partout, que celui qui saluait et reconduirait à son camp un déserteur de son armée, aurait une gratification de mille piastres; et il a fixé les peines suivantes contre les déserteurs, savoir: que si le déserteur était un Spahi, il sera noyé dans l'Euphrate, et si c'est un Samaris, il recevra mille coups de verge; et si c'est un des Nizam (troupes régulières), il sera envoyé à Kara Nazam.

Pendant mon séjour au camp, j'ai assisté aux exercices des troupes, mais j'ai vu que les exercices ne sont pas réguliers: l'instruction des troupes Egyptiennes, consistant à marcher en ordre et à tirer, est très imparfaite.

Le 24 courant, j'ai vu le camp pour retourner à Alep, et j'ai vu les Nizam, qui sont les troupes régulières, et les Spahis, qui sont les troupes irrégulières, et les Bachi Bouzuk, qui sont les troupes de cavalerie. Le Séraskier a ordonné de faire passer les troupes à Alep, et de leur donner des vivres. Le 25 courant, j'ai vu le camp pour retourner à Alep, et j'ai vu les Nizam, qui sont les troupes régulières, et les Spahis, qui sont les troupes irrégulières, et les Bachi Bouzuk, qui sont les troupes de cavalerie. Le Séraskier a ordonné de faire passer les troupes à Alep, et de leur donner des vivres.

Il se trouve au camp, environ un millier d'Alepins, qui s'étaient émigrés à différentes époques, et parmi lesquels on se trouve des Alepins (gala de distinction) dont j'ai connu les noms suivants, savoir: Achmed Aga, fils de Hatab, chef des ouvriers en galon; Chérif Aga, fils de Loukman, Ex-Metesch d'Alep (Commandant de Police); et Méhémed Aga, fils de Khafsa, et le fils de Hachem Aga, tous deux ci-devant Yuzbachi dans le



Régiment de la Garde: tous ces Alepins sont nourris par les Osmanlis, mais aucun d'eux n'est employé.

Avant de retourner à Alep, j'ai voulu aller à Tedef pour voir ce qui se passait de ce côté-là et j'ai poussé même ma course jusqu'à Bach Koi, village à deux heures de là de Tedef; ayant rencontré là trois chameliers des Bédouins, appelés Sessara, qui venaient du camp, ils m'ont dit que toute l'armée était toujours dans sa position, à l'exception d'environ 6,000 cavaliers Syriens et Turcs qui, avec les Partis nomades Mahomet Pacha, Assal Pacha, et Mirza Pacha, se sont portés aux environs des villages dits Chermouch et Chetlik, à trois heures de distance du camp, pour faire pâturer leurs chevaux, l'herbe ayant manqué à l'endroit où ils étaient. Ils n'avaient point avec eux de l'artillerie.

En retournant, j'ai rencontré non loin d'Alep, de la Cavalerie d'Ibrahim Pacha (Hasanlis et autres) qui vont à Tel-el-Chair, à deux heures d'ici, pour surveiller ce qui passe.

*Inclosure 3 in No. 99*

*Extract of Mr Vice-Consul Hays's Journal, dated Alexandretta, May 24, 1839*

RECEIVED information of the descent of about 300 men from the Ghaour Dagh mountains, on the town of Masis, which they robbed and carried off the cattle.

Received information of the descent of about twenty men on, and the robbery of the village of Archi, one hour and a half from Alexandretta.

Was informed by Rushwan Effendi, who returned this morning from Byasa, that the reported attack upon Masis, was without foundation, but that an attack had been made at Borgas, three hours beyond Byasa, on a party of fifty police, during the night, by the mountaineers, in which two of the police were killed and some horses taken, the robbers getting off; their force was supposed to be about 100 men; and that in consequence of that, and the attack upon Archi, the cutting and transporting of timber was to be discontinued beyond the immediate vicinity of Alexandretta, on the Byasa side, and the men and animals employed in it to be sent to the mountains, on the other side of the Beylan and Arzous range.

He also said, that by the orders of his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, a body of 700 Irregular Cavalry, as mounted police, were placed under the orders of Rustan Effendi, Governor of Byasa, to patrol from Kourk-goluk to Alexandretta, for the protection of the roads and the country, with orders to put to death on the spot, any robber they may apprehend, an equal number of others were also daily expected to join them, so as to form a police force of 1400 or 1500 men.

*No. 100*

*Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 11)

My Lord,

*Damascus, June 7, 1839*

THE last despatch I had the honour of addressing your Lordship by the Beyrout steamer, was No. 9, under the 10th ultimo.

The road between Aleppo and Beyrout continuing uninterrupted and free, Mr. Pro-Consul F. H. S. Werry will put your Lordship in possession amply of all the information relating to the Sultan's Army, and proceedings on that frontier, as well as what is taking place by his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, and the forces under his command, on both of which subjects I instructed the Pro-Consul to be full, precise and correct, in the reports he transmits to your Lordship: therefore little remains for me to

offer to your Lordship's notice on this very important subject, further than to be permitted by your Lordship, to make a few cursory observations thereon, inasmuch as it appears to me it is connected with the general relations of this country.

From the information transmitted me by the Aleppo Pro-Consul, which I have duly forwarded to Colonel Campbell, it appears the military measures pursued by the Sultan's Seraskier, are in accordance with those I anticipated in my last despatch to your Lordship, which are in substance, that while the main body of his army, camped on this side of the Euphrates between Roum Kafe and Bir, makes advances towards and on the Egyptian territory, this movement is gradual, and in proportion to those operated by his irregulars and the malcontents on both wings of the Egyptian Army, and his Highness Ibrahim Pasha's position at Aleppo. It will be seen by the reports, that with many influential persons belonging formerly to Aleppo and other parts of Syria, there are also many Syrian Partisans assembled at the Sultan's Seraskier's head-quarters: this denotes the object of his advance to Aleppo, and corroborates the insurrectionary measures operating as above cited, and attempting to be extended in the rear and to all parts of Syria. Those measures are calculated not only to facilitate the success of an attack of the Sultan's Seraskier on his Highness Ibrahim Pasha's Army, but to induce a belief generally to the world, that he is invited by the Syrian population. Your Lordship will observe by the fact of Hafiz Pasha being the assailant on the Egyptian territories, and operating such insidious and undermining measures, the immense advantage derivable by the Sultan's Seraskier, doubly so compared with the advantage which would have accrued to his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, had he at once taken the offensive in his defence, or to reverse the question, had he thrown his operations on the eastern side of the Euphrates, in which countries, the same elements would have favoured his operations to a far greater extent than those of the Sultan's Seraskier in Syria, taking into account also that the Egyptian Army is in every respect superior to the Sultan's. Indeed, Sir, if we consider the general state of the Empire, and be correct, it does not appear to me in truth and justice, that the *status quo* established in the present attitude of the rival armies, that the *status quo* of the Treaty of Kutaya is observed by the Sultan's Seraskier on the northern frontiers of Syria. From these reports, it further appears that, in proportion as the measures of the Sultan's Seraskier are marked with aggression, the instructions sent by the Vice-Roy Mehmet Ali to his Highness Ibrahim Pasha to abstain from hostilities, are characterised in their execution with good faith and great prudence and discretion. Indeed, under the extraordinary and difficult position his Highness is placed in, and the difficulties with which he is surrounded and has to contend,—bound over to keep the peace, while he feels that the continuation of that state becomes every day more onerous to him,—few victorious generals, and himself an Oriental Prince, who has had so long, successful, and brilliant a career in arms, in Abyssinia, the Hedjaz, in the Morea, and in Anatolia, within a march of the Sultan's Capital, having the population of that capital and in Anatolia in arms in his favour, could it be looked for that he would act with such abnegation and devotion to the desire of foreign authority, while he feels that that over his hands untied, and he was to advance his army to the attack, from its superiority in condition and discipline, he would inflict a signal defeat and overthrow of the Sultan's into the Euphrates, tantamount to its annihilation, which, from particular and general report on the state of the Sultan's Army, fully warrants such a conclusion being drawn.

The indirect appeals of the Sultan's Government and his Seraskier, to the population of Syria, which have such an immediate effect to convulse these countries, on what are they founded? not on the religious feeling, nor on the loyalty of the population, but from a knowledge that the population would see, with satisfaction, a change, grounded on the hope of being relieved from conscription, exemption from taxation, and regaining their ancient independence in their different sects, each opposed to the other, and absolved from an uniform system of Government, under

a Supreme Government; on the supposition that the old Ottoman system would be restored, by which the Mussulman population would exclusively regain its ascendancy in its various spheres, to the chief detriment of the minor sects, and particularly of the Christians; while in fact, as is illustrated by the system acted on in the Sultan's territory, it would be only a change of rulers in its best acceptation, and it is very questionable that the general principles and details of the new Government would be so well adapted, and so well administered, as the actual Egyptian Government. Certainly, by the example of what we see operating in the Sultan's territories, the population would experience a change for the worse. Still in the face of all the efforts made by the Sultan's Government and Embassies, we see comparatively with the measures employed to produce insurrection, and the danger with which the Government is menaced by an invading army, the state of Syria has not attained that degree of disorder,—the full object sought for.

It cannot however be doubted, that the development of these revolutionary movements will produce the most destructive and disastrous effects to the interests of this country generally, and particularly to the British; and unless prompt and final measures are adopted to settle the pending question between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, this country will eventually become a scene of disorder, instead of a field for commercial enterprise and of prosperity.

I have adverted, my Lord, to the position and proceedings of the Ottoman Armies and the state of this country, as in point with our immediate interests in it, without connecting it with the ~~expressed by~~ your Lordship, in promoting the general pacific relations ~~between~~ ~~the~~ which it would appear inseparable, but which the assembling of the Ottoman forces on the Northern Syrian frontier do not for the ~~moment~~ they are maintained much longer in their present attitude, and ~~we~~ hope that hostilities between the rival armies can be averted.

I had thus far prepared this despatch to your Lordship when I received advice from the Aleppo Pro-Consul, that his Highness Ibrahim Pasha has quitted Aleppo with all his forces, between the 29th and 31st ultimo, and fixed his head-quarters, and concentrated his army at Telhaher, ten hours' ride from Aleppo. He has also ordered a guard of Irregular Cavalry from Hafiz Pasha's Army having occupied some villages, distributed arms and ammunition to the villagers within the Egyptian limits, and having crossed the river Sedjour, three hours on its western side, to Telhaher. The main body of the Sultan's Army ~~is~~ at Nexib with the Seraskier's head-quarters. These movements almost preclude the hope of hostilities being averted, unless very prompt measures are taken to preserve peace.

Damascus is in a tranquil state. I hear that the line of country between this place and Balbee, from thence to Tripoli, and that country to Hamah, is infested with the marauding Mutualia, at the head of whom an Emir of the Harfoush family, deposed from the Musselimie of Balbee, and replaced by a Cousin Emir, is at present at war. The Government does not appear to take any active part in this feud, and ~~proceeds to~~ ~~take~~ ~~the~~ ~~necessary~~ ~~measures~~ ~~to~~ ~~oppress~~ ~~the~~ ~~parties~~, and induce both to re-establish order in the country, through the intervention of the Emir Bechir, who is contiguous to them.

I hear that the Arabs in the Desert make continual incursions into the Haouran district and the surrounding country; but the Druse and Fellah population of that district and the country are quiet for the present.

The plague has spread from the south to the Naplous Mountains, and to the villages to the south of Damascus, a few hours distant. Here some cases have occurred and two or three at ~~the~~ ~~present~~ ~~time~~. Precautions are taking to prevent its propagation. It is not likely to do much mischief. I shall send reports as I get them. The season is also well advanced, and it is therefore hoped not to be of long duration.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) N. W. WERRY

No. 101

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)

No. 21.)

My Lord,

Beirut, June 8, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship with the latest intelligence which has reached this day, from Aleppo, under date of the 1st instant.

Hafiz Pasha had established his head-quarters at Isil, and the Sultan's troops had occupied a village five leagues distant from Antak, after expelling therefrom a party of Bedouins in the Egyptian service.

Both Ibrahim Pasha and Solyman Pasha had quitted Aleppo with troops, the former for Telhaher.

Much anxiety is felt here as to the result of the advance of the Ottoman forces, and a battle is apprehended may be the consequence.

In this immediate neighbourhood, tranquillity is maintained; but we daily hear of robberies taking place in almost every direction.

The Aleppo post, now due, is not yet received.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) N. MOORE.

No. 102

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 41.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, June 14, 1839

IN continuation of my despatch No. 37, of 6th June, I have now the pleasure to inform your Lordship, that on the evening of the 9th instant, an overland courier from Syria, with reports from Ibrahim Pasha.

Early on the morning of the 10th instant, a steamer of the Pasha arrived from Suedia, to the south of Alexandria; and as I was anxious for intelligence, M. de Laurin, the Consul-General of Austria, and myself, went to call on Mehemet Ali.

The Pasha told us, that he had received some details of the attack by the Turkish Cavalry on his Bedouin Arab Cavalry, within the limits of his own territory; and also, that emissaries of Hafiz Pasha were rousing up the people of the villages against him, and distributing arms, ammunition and money to them. And he then detailed to us the substance of the enclosed reports (Nos. 1. and 2.), of which copies were sent to myself, and the Consuls-General of the other Great Powers.

The Pasha then told us, that he would immediately send orders to Ibrahim Pasha, to drive the Turks out of Syria, and to follow them, and act according to circumstances, and that he would occupy Orfa and Diarbeck.

M. de Laurin and myself urged him, by every possible argument and consideration, to be on his guard, and to be aware that the danger was too imminent, and the aggression of the Porte too marked and too manifest, to permit any further moderation on his part; that he had done everything to avoid a war, but that now he must give discretionary powers to his son, as he was too far distant to refer to him on every circumstance and event, and great evils and danger might accrue from his so doing. And he added, that if his neighbour set his fire to the Pasha's house on fire, he had the right to take measures to punish him for it, and to prevent his so doing again.

On the evening of the 10th, Messrs. Laurin and Cochelet, and Count Medem, called on me. The two latter had been to wait on the Pasha, and had also, in vain, endeavoured to dissuade him from giving permission to

2 K



Ibrahim Pasha to pass his frontier; and the steamer was sent off that evening to Ibrahim Pasha.

I can assure your Lordship, that everything has been done by myself and colleagues to dissuade Mehemet Ali from allowing Ibrahim to pass his frontier; and the most complete accord and harmony has existed amongst us all on this point. But our arguments were very much weakened by the positive aggressions of Hafiz Pasha, and by the moderation and deference to our advice shown by Mehemet Ali up to the present moment.

There is also little doubt, that Hafiz Pasha wants only his reinforcements, and the march of his different corps, in order to attack Ibrahim Pasha in front, whilst his other corps act on different points of Syria, and the fact, that Hafiz Pasha is accompanied by all the Turks who have emigrated from Syria, particularly from Aleppo, clearly convinces Melimet Ali, that the Sultan intends to strike a decisive blow against him.

I think it probable, that a battle will soon take place between Hafs Pasha and Ibrahim Pasha; and I feel convinced, that as the Sultan has set the example of causing revolt in Syria, Mehemet Ali will follow it in Albania, and Roumelia, and Bosnia; and I firmly believe, that he may raise a conflagration in those places.

I think it also probable, that Kourschul Pasha, from the Nejd, may turn his views against Baskora, and the more so, as he has an Agent at Khouat or Gran, where he has large houses for granaries. He has, also, another Agent at Muburrah, who is employed in purchasing provisions which are forwarded to the former post.

The preceding intelligence is given to me, under date of 4th May, by Captain (Honour), from Karrak.

As to what Mehemet Ali may do in regard to Bagdad, I am quite ignorant, but the Resident there writes, that the late inundations have destroyed one-third of the houses of that city, and that the whole of that Province is "going to the devil, and that a worse Government cannot exist."

Since writing thus far, I have received a translation of the order sent by Mehmet Ali to Ibrahim Pasha, on 10th June; and I have now the honour to transmit copy of it.

This order has solely been caused by the outrages and the aggressions of the troops of Hafiz Pasha, as the previous order to Ibrahim Pasha merely directed him to drive the Turks out of Syria, but not to pass the frontier.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 102

*Extraits des Rapports adressés au Général-en-Chef de l'Armée Egyptienne,  
à la date du 18 Rebi-el-ewel, 1235*

LES LASTES que les Turcs ont envoyés contre la Province d'Arak venant d'arriver, nous avons eu rapport du 17 courant de la part d'un officier turc, K... Bey de Mussellim, datés du 17 courant, de Brook-Kessil-Hissar, ce qui suit : Un Cavalier Hanadi (Arabe) arrive ventre à terre et nous dit (pour acheter du pain) que les cavaliers turcs, les cavaliers de la province de cavaliers à Tel-el-Behir, tout-à-coup nous aperçûmes de loin un corps de cavalerie, à peu près 1,500 hommes, qui venait sur nous à la distance d'un mille, ces cavaliers ont commencé à faire feu. Nous avons fait un mouvement en arrière sans résister, nous avions en trois hommes blessés. Aussitôt après ce récit (Kassana Bey et autres continuent), nous sommes partis pour aller à la rencontre de la Cavalerie Turque. Chemin faisant, nous avons rencontré un cavalier turc, qui nous a dit qu'il nous a constaté la véracité du fait, un instant après, un homme de Mussellim Bey

nous est venu assurer que les Turcs sont encore à Tel-Béhir, et qu'on envoie à Mezar, qui n'est éloigné d'Antab qu'à peu près de cinq heures, des troupes et des canons, et qu'ils sont entrés à Kessil-Hissar, grand village appartenant à la Province d'Antab; là on a trouvé un homme de Mussellim Bey, on l'a fait prisonnier, et on a forcé le Boi Bey de ce village à se porter vers Antab, pour exciter la population. Le Boi Bey aussi est venu jusqu'auprès d'Antab, d'où il a fait avertir le Président du Conseil d'Antab, des intentions hostiles des Turcs contre cette ville, et lorsque ce même Boi Bey retourna à Kessil-Hissar, il fut enlevé par 40 ou 50 cavaliers Turcs et conduit à l'Armée Ottomane. Les Arabes qui se trouvaient entre Antab et l'armée Turque, se sont retirés vers Kellis, de manière qu'ils ont laissé le champ libre aux Turcs, qui se sont emparés des villages jusqu'auprès d'Antab; par conséquent, la population d'Antab est dans une grande anxiété.

*Extrait de la Lettre de S. A. Ibrahim Pacha, en date du 19 Rebi-el-erref, 1255*

JE vous ai déjà annoncé par ma lettre précédente, que j'ai laissé Soliman Pacha pour me suivre à Tel-el-Chair. J'ai fait revenir à moi les régimens qui se trouvaient à Antab et à Kellis; je laisse Soliman Pacha avec le corps d'armée à Tel-el-Chair, et je me porte en avant à la rencontre de la Cavalerie Turque, avec sept régimens de la Cavalerie et six batteries d'artillerie à cheval. Si l'infanterie Turque ne se porte pas en avant pour secourir leur Cavalerie, le corps de Soliman Pacha gardera sa position jusqu'à nouvel ordre, et je renverrai les régimens que j'ai retirés d'Antab. Si au contraire la grande armée Turque suit un mouvement en avant, Soliman Pacha viendra me trouver avec le corps d'armée. C'est cette l'armée Turque qui a passé le premier les limites du territoire des Français par ses actions contre nos villages. C'est elle qui a occupé les positions d'Araks, et qui nous a fait perdre ces positions. Elle est composée de 20,000 hommes. Elle a été vaincue par nous, mais c'est l'armée Turque qui a la première commis des hostilités contre nos villages, il est juste que j'use de représailles, en faisant faire dévaster par nos Hannas les villages de Borsah.

Notre du Traducteur :

Son Altesse le Généralissime dans cette lettre, mentionne sans aucun détail, il est vrai, la perte qu'on a eu dans cette affaire entre les Hannadis et Turcs; mais nous savons déjà par sa lettre du 17 courant, que les Hannadis ont attaqué une partie du corps de Cavalerie Arabe sous les ordres de Maghann Bey, à Tel-Béehir. On peut conclure par là que nos Hannadis se sont retirés en combattant, et que la Cavalerie Turque a été avancée jusqu'à Kessit-Hissar.

Inclosure 2 in No 102

Extrait des Rapports parvenus au Généralissime, sous la date du 21 Habi-el aed.  
et dont il rend compte au Vice-Roi, par sa lettre du 23 du même mois.

Le nommé Kutchuk Ali Oglou, qui avait passé du côté des Turcs, n'est pas le même que le Kutchuk Ali Oglou qui a été tué par les montagnards du Ghacour Daght. Le déserteur Khadjo Omar Oglou n'est pas le même que le Khadjo Omar Oglou qui a été tué par les montagnards du Ghacour Daght. Les Akkara, qui appartiennent au Sandjack de Tripoli, instigués par Mistic Bey, ont tué leur Musellim, saccagé sa maison, et pillé la caisse publique; de manière que si l'on n'arrête pas cet état de choses, la révolte se propagera de plus en plus.

Le 13 Juin, 1839.





conformer à la volonté de Sa Hautesse notre Auguste Maître. Au contraire, si Votre Excellence a l'ordre de commencer la guerre, pourquoi ces intrigues, pourquoi ces menées? Venez, mais venez ouvertement sur le champ de bataille. Votre Excellence n'aura probablement pas oublié qu'elle a à faire à des hommes sans peur; par conséquent ces intrigues ne seront pas souffertes longtemps. Enfin, je prends la liberté de vous écrire, et de vous envoyer le Colonel d'Artillerie Mahomed Bey, pour avoir une réponse franche de Votre Excellence.

No. 104

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 41.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, June 16, 1839

THE French packet-steamers arrived here late in the evening of the 13th instant with Captain Caillier, an aide-de-camp of Marshal Soult.

Captain Caillier was the bearer of despatches, dated the 26th of May, from the Marshal to M. Cochelet, directing him to call on Mehemet Ali to cease all hostilities in the event of their having taken place, and to retire his army into Syria, if they had passed beyond the limits of that province.

The Marshal says in his despatch, that the Five Great Powers have resolved to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, they demand that measures from the Pasha are necessary to Europe, "comme une nécessité Européenne," which it will be more to his advantage to conform to than to oppose, "qu'il vaut mieux respecter que braver," that Mehemet Ali having in these late affairs given proofs of good faith, "loyauté," and having kept his word, he had acquired fresh titles to the good-will of the European Powers, and so much the more, as the Porte, on her part, had evidently been the aggressor; that France consults at this moment with England and with the Allies, on the means of employing the united squadrons of England and France, whose Admirals will, without delay, receive instructions and powerful reinforcements; and that measures are taking to settle the Question of the East on a solid and equitable basis.

Monsieur Cochelet having explained this to Mehemet Ali, the Pasha, on the 15th instant, agreed to give a formal letter to Captain Caillier, to be delivered by him to his son Ibrahim Pasha, in which he directs him not to pursue the Turks beyond his frontier, in case the Turks should not already have repassed it, and to halt wherever Captain Caillier may find him, in case the Egyptian army should already have entered the Sultan's territory and occupied any part of it.

M. Cochelet had engaged myself and his other Colleagues to support the demand of his Government with Mehemet Ali, and we all did so.

As I had not then a full knowledge of the contents of M. Cochelet's despatch, I limited myself, (and my other Colleagues did the same,) to state to the Pasha, the same as I have ever done, that he should not pass the frontiers of Syria, as that would be an offensive and not a defensive operation, and would be injurious to his interests. But the Pasha did not seem disposed to accede to this, until after Ibrahim Pasha should first have defeated the Turks, and that he might remain in the country which he would occupy after a victory.

But M. Cochelet having accepted what Mehemet Ali offered, Captain Caillier was, I believe, the first steamer to be sent by the Pasha to Alexandria, and from whence he will proceed to the head-quarters of Ibrahim Pasha.

I believe that if M. Cochelet would have held out a little longer, our united representations might possibly have prevailed on the Pasha to accede to the further extension of his desire to retire his troops to the event that they were now in the Sultan's territory. M. Cochelet was, I believe, so glad that he had procured so far from Pasha what the aid of his Colleagues, that he hastened to accept the Pasha's offer in

order that he might be able to say that France had done everything, and that her voice was all-powerful.

I hope to be in time to transmit a translation of the letter to Ibrahim Pasha, of which Captain Caillier is to be the bearer, but which has not yet been sent to M. Cochelet.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL

June 17

P.S.—I have just received the document above alluded to, and of which I now transmit a copy

Inclosure in No. 104.

Lettre de Son Altesse le Vice-Roi à Son Altesse Ibrahim Pacha, en date du 5 Rebi-el-akhir, 1255.—(16 Juin, 1839.)

(Après les titres.)

LE porteur de cette lettre est M. Caillier, Aide-de-camp de Son Excellence le Maréchal Soult, Président du Conseil, et Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de France. Arrivé ici avant-hier, il m'a informé qu'il est chargé de vous voir, tandis qu'un autre Aide-de-camp comme lui, va à Constantinople, pour se rendre de là auprès de Hafiz Pacha. Je vous l'envoie donc par un bateau à vapeur et accompagné de mon second interprète, Husein Effendi. Cet officier annonce que sa mission, ainsi que celle de l'Aide-de-camp qui se rend auprès de Hafiz Pacha, a pour objet d'empêcher la guerre qui paraît imminente; et il ajoute, que les Grandes Puissances arrangeront cette affaire.

En conséquence, si jusqu'à l'arrivée de M. Caillier vous n'avez pas encore fait sortir de la frontière les troupes Turques entrées dans nos limites, cet officier vous fera rester où vous êtes, et après avoir été auprès de Hafiz Pacha, vu l'Aide-de-camp expédié vers lui, et reconnu ce qu'il aura fait, il reviendra vous en rendre compte. Si à son retour il vous dit que l'Armée Ottomane s'est arrêtée où elle est, et que les troupes Turques entrées dans nos limites vont être retirées, vous ne ferez de votre côté aucun mouvement et vous vous arrêterez où vous êtes. Mais si après le retour de M. Caillier avec cette assurance, Hafiz Pacha ne s'arrête pas, s'il continue les mêmes mouvements qu'auparavant, et ne fait pas sortir ses troupes de notre frontière, vous marcherez contre lui et le combattrez. Dans le cas enfin où à l'arrivée de cet officier, vous auriez déjà chassé les troupes Turques entrées dans nos limites, et où vous auriez marché en avant, vous devrez encore vous arrêter là où vous serez, et attendre que l'arrangement que prendront les Grandes Puissances, soit connu et vous ait été notifié par moi.

Je vous annonce aussi que pour faire cesser l'inquiétude que causera l'avis de la sortie de la flotte de Constantinople, je vais envoyer ma flotte sur les côtes de la Syrie; à cet effet, une portion est sortie aujourd'hui et le reste sortira demain.

No. 105

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 43.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, June 18, 1839

THE Government post from Damascus has this moment brought to me a letter dated 10th of June from Mr. Consul Werry of Damascus.

Mr. Consul Werry has inclosed to me copy of a letter of 5th of June, from Solyman Pasha to Mr. Pro-Consul Werry, and of which I have the honour to transmit a copy.

Your Lordship will perceive by this letter, that the Sultan's van-guard

has retired upon the main body, and thus evacuated the territory of Mehemet Ali, and I sincerely trust that a general action may yet be avoided. The Sultan's officers, however, continue their intrigues and efforts to stir up rebellion in Syria, and more particularly towards Beylan and Pyass. As your Lordship will perceive by the report of Mr. Vice-Consul Hays, of which I have the honour to transmit copy, and which shows the efforts of Hafiz Pasha to cause revolt in the lower ranges of the Taurus extending to Beylan and Pyass. And his plan, therefore, seems to be to avoid a battle, and to cause revolt, and to move on in the rear of that movement.

By intelligence from Lieutenant Lynch of the steamer in the river Tigris, I learn that Ali Pasha of Bagdad was detained at Mossoul by the spirit of insurrection which had been manifested by the inhabitants of that place.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 103

*Solyman Pasha to Mr. Pro-Consul Werry*

Monsieur le Consul,

*Du Camp de Buharrat,  
24 Rebi-ecel, 1255*

JE remplis avec plaisir la promesse que je vous fis à mon départ d'Alep, de vous donner quelques nouvelles sur ce qui se passe de ce côté-ci. A mon arrivée à Buharrat, près de Tell-Bachur avec l'infanterie de l'armée, j'ai trouvé Son Altesse le Général-en-Chef qui y était campé avec la cavalerie. Le lendemain avant le jour, Son Altesse partit avec ce dernier corps pour Tell-Bachur, afin de décider l'avant-garde Turque qui devait se trouver là, à un mouvement significatif; ce but a été atteint, en ce que cette troupe, sans attendre nos régiments, s'est repliée sur le gros de l'armée et ainsi évacuée entièrement notre territoire. Son Altesse est à Touzel.

Mais en renouant, du moins selon les apparences, à nous faire la guerre à face ouverte. Les Turcs ont pas renoncé à leur système d'hostilité sourde et constante: vous avez eu précédemment leurs menées sur l'esprit des populations du côté d'Antab.

Maintenant c'est dans le Beylan qu'ils cherchent à nous susciter des troubles. Ils viennent d'envoyer à Payass un certain Mistik Bey, ancien Mossoulin de cette ville, pour essayer de soulever les peuples; mais un régiment d'infanterie, un de cavalerie, et une batterie de canons se rendent à Payass; et leur présence suffira pour étouffer promptement tous les guerres de soulèvement qu'aurait pu répandre cet émissaire.

Hier, 26 cavaliers Turcs déserteurs sont arrivés ici; 30 autres sont dirigés sur Adana par Antab.

Agrées, &c.,  
(Signed) LE GENERAL SOLYMAN

Inclosure 2 in No. 103

*Mr. Vice-Consul Hays to Mr. Pro-Consul Werry.*

Extract.)

*Alexandretta, June 4, 1839*

I TAKE advantage of this conveyance, to inform you that an attack is apprehended on this side, and of the measures that have been taken in consequence.

Yesterday it was reported, that Mistik Bey had reached a place, called Bostank, fifteen hours from Pyass, with a force, stated variously at from 1,000 to 6,000 men, with the intention of making a descent on Pyass. This morning I heard he had advanced to Arsine, three hours from Pyass, to the Governor of whom he had sent notice of his approach with his forces, in the name of the Sultan, and not as robbers.

In consequence of these reports, I went to ascertain the facts from Rushman Effendi, who informed me that Mistik Bey had reached Arsine with the intention of advancing to Pyass, and that the force he had with him amounted to about 6,000 mountaineers. That the excuse of advancing in the name of the Sultan was a mere pretence, the people he had with him were the mountaineers of Giasour Dagh. The precautions taken are to re-land 400 of the troops embarked yesterday for Alexandria, 200 of which are going to Pyass by the "Cynedde" steamer, and 200 remain here, and to send 200 irregular Cavalry, arrived yesterday from Beylan, to a village called Arcl, one hour and a half from Alexandretta, towards Pyass, and also to re-land the remainder of the troops on board the vessels, amounting to 1,300 men, till orders are received from Ibrahim Pasha for which purpose this post is sent. They are on board the two corvettes that have been some time here, and were to have sailed to-day.

No. 100.

*Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 46.)

*Alexandria, June 19, 1839.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that "El Generoso," steamer of the Pasha, arrived yesterday from Alexandretta with letters dated, Touzel, 10th June, from Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet Ali.

Ibrahim Pasha was with his army at Touzel, which is not far from Antab, and Hafiz Pasha was at about three hours distance at Nexib, near the banks of the Sedjour river, but in the territory of the Sultan; and Solyman Pasha of Marash was still in Antab with troops of the Sultan.

The steamer of the Pasha, which left this on the 10th instant with the order of Mehemet Ali to cross the Ticks at I Syria and to inform Hafiz Pasha, had arrived at Alexandretta at the departure of "El Generoso," but Ibrahim Pasha had not then received the letter of Mehemet Ali; and although no action had taken place between the armies, I much fear that it would not be delayed long after Mehemet Ali's order of 10th June should reach Ibrahim Pasha.

I have the honour to transmit the reply of Hafiz Pasha to the letter sent to him by Ibrahim Pasha, at which is the enclosure, my despatch No. 43, of 16th June.

Your Lordship will perceive, that Hafiz Pasha writes in a very vague manner to Ibrahim Pasha that does not refer to his responsibility starting up in the villages in Syria, and taking possession of Antab. But does he say that it is his intention to retire his army.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

P.S.—Captain Caillier, the Aide-de-camp of Marshal Soult, will leave this morning on a steamer to return to Alexandria, whence he will proceed to the head-quarters of Ibrahim Pasha.



## Inclosure in No. 106.

*Lettre d'Hafiz Pacha à Son Excellence Ibrahim Pacha, sous la date du 28 Rebi-el-ewel, 1255.—(9 Juin, 1839.)*

(Après les titres.)

J'AI reçu le trésor de la lettre que Votre Excellence avait chargé le Colonel d'Artillerie Mohamed Hazik Bey de m'apporter, et j'en ai compris le prix et la valeur. Dans cette lettre, en adressant une grande somme d'argent à notre Lieutenant au bienfaiteur du monde, notre tout-puissant et très-haut Seigneur et Maître, et en exprimant le désir d'acquiescer à son bon vouloir de Sa Hautesse, Votre Excellence est bien averti de mon attitude modeste.

Que le Dieu, bon et sage, conserve le corps de notre Auguste Seigneur à ses enfants, que le monde dure, et qu'il fasse que son ombre se repose sur tous les serviteurs et protège ceux qui lui sont dévoués.

Il est hors de doute que la soumission ne s'est pas seulement dans les paroles, mais qu'elle se manifeste par des services effectifs.

Lorsque l'armée Sultanienne est venue à Bir et qu'elle a planté en cet endroit ses tentes victorieuses, Magioun Akasi, Commandant de la Cavalerie Arabe (Hanadi), s'est avancé jusqu'à demi lieue de Bir, dans l'intention de faire des reconnaissances, et probablement aussi de saccager les villages. En effet, à leur retour, ces cavaliers ont ravagé les villages de la Province d'Ourfa, et emmené tous les bestiaux; deux jours auparavant ces mêmes Hanadis ont volé et maltraité un meunier: ces deux faits doivent être à votre connaissance. De notre côté, forcés par la nécessité, et dans l'intention de protéger les pauvres, nous avons fait marcher un corps de Spahis comme avant-garde. Quelques uns de ces Spahis ayant perdu leurs chevaux, et s'étant avancés à leur recherche jusqu'au lieu qui sépare Antah de Bir, où se trouvaient 300 Hanadis, une trentaine de ces derniers se sont séparés de leur corps, ont couru sur ces quelques Spahis, en ont déarmé un, l'ont mis à mort, et non contents de cela, ils lui ont ensuite tranché la tête. Ce fait, qui est à votre connaissance, ne s'accordant pas avec les principes de soumission que vous professez envers notre Maître, nous avons été contraints d'user des représailles. Quoiqu'il en soit, si conformément à la loi pure, Votre Excellence fait accorder les faits avec les prétentions, elle sera un objet d'envie pour tous ses confrères, sous l'ombre tant puissante de notre tout-puissant Seigneur. C'est comme un avertissement de bienveillance que j'ai pris la liberté d'écrire cette lettre amicale, et je vous l'adresse par le Colonel Hazik Bey qui retourne auprès de Votre Excellence, accompagné par Achmet Bey, un des Colonels de l'armée victorieuse. Lorsque par la grâce de Dieu, elle vous sera heureusement parvenue, l'exécution de son contenu dépendra de la haute opinion de Votre Excellence.

## No. 107.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 7.)*

(No. 146.)

My Lord,

*Therapia, June 16, 1839*

ON the 11th inst. I received the enclosed note from his Excellency the French Ambassador, and I immediately waited upon him. He read to me part of a despatch from Marshal Soult, which he had just received. It contained instructions to apply in the strongest manner to the Sublime Porte to prevent hostilities, if they had not already commenced, and to put an instant end to them if they had; and it directed his Excellency to communicate with me, and said that the British Government entirely concurred with the French in everything relating to affairs in this country, and it appeared that the French Government had not had communication with the British Government since the arrival in Paris of

the intelligence that gave rise to this instruction from the Marshal to the Ambassador.

His Excellency asked me what I would do, I replied, that having no instructions, I could not take any steps, under circumstances that were new, and might occasion new views to be taken by my Government. His Excellency agreed that I was not authorized to act, but said that he must immediately apply to the Porte as he had been instructed to do.

His Excellency did send a message, which I understood was to the effect that the Sublime Porte must, without delay, recall the army of Hafiz Pacha from the position it occupies, and order it to recross the Euphrates, and that if it were the Porte will be considered to be the aggressor.

I am informed that the Ottoman Ministers are excessively angry

I have, &c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY

## Inclosure in No. 107.

*Baron Roussin to Viscount Ponsonby.*

*Cr 14 Juin, 1839*

LE BARON ROUSSIN a l'honneur de transmettre les lettres ci-jointes à son honorable Collègue et de lui demander un moment d'attention. Il a reçu un officier aide-de-camp de M. le Maréchal Soult, porteur de dépêches de la plus haute importance pour les deux Cabinets amis, et il désire vivement les communiquer à son honorable Collègue, qu'il prie d'agréer ses affectueux complimens.

## No. 108.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 7.)*

(No. 148.)

My Lord,

*Therapia, June 16, 1839.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a letter from me to the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Naval Forces in the Mediterranean, dated May 22

I have, &c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY

## Inclosure in No. 108.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.*

Sir,

*Therapia, May 22, 1839.*

I HAVE satisfied my own mind that the Sublime Porte has finally determined upon war against the Pasha of Egypt. It does not appear that hostilities have decidedly commenced as yet.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY

(No. 251.)

Paris, July 2, 1839.

I have &c.  
 S. 2009. GRANVILLE

1140

No. 252

Paris, July 8, 1839

The debate lasted three days, and terminated with a vote of 287 to 26 in favour of the proposition of the Government.

1:29

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

No. 111

254

Paris July 5, 1839

M. Cochelet writes that intelligence having reached Alexandria of the entrance of a detachment of Turkish troops into Asia, an of sixty soldiers having been excited to surrender by Hukm Pasha, the most exalted of all the Chiefs of the Great Powers had failed to inform the Viceroy to suspend the transmission of orders to Ibrahim Pasha against the Turkish army. That Captain Collier (the officer who had been directed by Marshal Soluto to raise the Alexandria land from the Egyptian headquarters of the Egyptian Army) had however arrived on the 14th immediately after the departure of the steam vessel which conveyed the order to Ibrahim Pasha, and now was dispatched without delay to the residence of the Viceroy, and that having succeeded in his mission the Captain Collier had succeeded in obtaining an order which he, Captain Collier, was to be made to deliver to the Viceroy of which M. Cochelet includes in his report to Ibrahim Pasha for the march of the Egyptian Army wherever it might be, on the arrival of Captain Collier at his headquarters.

M. Cocholet mentions that the Egyptian Fleet had left the port of Alexandria, but that Mehemet had declared it was sent upon a cruise for the purpose of exercising the crews, as was usual at this season of the year, and not with any hostile intention.

Admiral Roussin's despatches confirm the accounts previously received, of the resolution of the Sultan to go to war with the Pasha of Egypt, and of the efforts to reinforce the army of Hafez Pasha. On the sailing of the Turkish Fleet to the Dardanelles, the French Ambassador complained to Nouri Effendi of the secrecy which had been observed towards him in respect to the movements of the fleet, and inquired what was its destination. To this inquiry, Nouri Effendi distinctly replied that the fleet would proceed with the troops which were embarked on board of it to the coast of Syria. The number of troops embarked is supposed to be between 8,000 and 10,000 men.

Admiral Duperré expressed two days ago to me his opinion, that the Egyptian Fleet would have the advantage over that of the Sultan, if an engagement took place; and the more decidedly so if the latter were encumbered by having troops on board.

Marshal Soult told me that several of the despatches he had received were in cypher, and had not as yet been decyphered. If, he said, they contained anything of importance, he would in the evening apprise me of their contents.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE



*Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received July 8.)*

(No. 81.)

My Lord,

*Berlin, July 2, 1839.*

M. DE RIBEAUPIERRE (who has taken leave of the King of Prussia, and leaves Berlin to-day) read me a despatch addressed by Count Nesselrode to the Russian Ambassador in London, which his Excellency is instructed to communicate to your Lordship. This despatch suggests for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, a plan for putting an end to hostilities between the Porte and the Pasha of Egypt, and for regulating the affairs of the Contending Parties. M. de Ribaupierre told me, that the King of Prussia had spoken to him three times during his visit at Potsdam, on the subject of this despatch, expressing the pleasure he received from the moderate and politic views of Russia, and his hope that they would be acceptable to the British Cabinet. Baron Werther has also expressed to me his satisfaction at the language held by Russia; concluding by saying, that the question was placed by all parties in the hands of Her Majesty's Government.

Prussia will take no part beyond that of counselling the maintenance of peace.

Count Breason showed me some despatches of Count St. Aulaire's, relating to a conversation with Prince Metternich on this subject, which his Highness had suggested the expediency (in case the Sultan's army should be ordered to occupy the Russian Army to occupy Constantinople, whilst the English, French, and Austrian fleets sailed up the Dardanelles.

I observe in the despatches your Lordship, was good enough to communicate to me, that the writers do consider aggression as the pivot upon which the policy of the Four Powers is to turn. This induces me to call to your Lordship's recollection, the definition of aggression given by Frederick the Great, previous to commencing the seven years' war. His Majesty said I was not the Power which struck the first blow that was guilty of aggression, but the Power which by its armaments forced another Power to strike a blow in its own defence. The acceptance of this definition would make Mehemet Ali the aggressor.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) WILLIAM RUSSELL.

No. 113.

*Viscount Palmerston to Lord William Russell.*

(No. 107.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 2, 1839.*

YOUR Lordship states in your despatch No. 81, that M. de Ribaupierre had read to you a despatch from his Court on the present state of affairs in the Levant, and that Baron Werther had expressed to you his satisfaction at the language of Russia on that subject.

The despatch to which your Lordship alludes, is, I conclude, that of the 15th of June\*, of which I transmitted to you a copy on the 2nd of this month. The general tone and spirit of that despatch was satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government, and the more especially so, as it was a spontaneous offer on the part of Russia, to enter into concert with the other Powers of Europe upon the subject of Turkish Affairs; and Her Majesty's Government have no doubt that the result of the communications which are about to take place on these matters between the Five Powers, will be an unanimous adoption of a common course of policy.

But there were some parts of the particular plan recommended by Count Nesselrode, to which Her Majesty's Government could not agree.

\* See No. 81, p. 85.

In the first place, the Russian Government seemed to think, that provided the hostilities between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali should be confined to Syria, the Powers of Europe might, without any danger to their general and common interests, remain passive spectators of the contest; and might leave the two parties, like gladiators in an arena, to exhaust themselves, and cripple each other as much as they might choose. But Her Majesty's Government would regard such a conflict, even if waged in Syria, with much uneasiness, because it would probably end in greatly weakening the power of the Sultan, and in rendering him less able to maintain hereafter his political independence and the integrity of his empire, and would deliver him up to the influence or to the arms of Russia.

Again, the Russian Government proposes in the event of any marked success on the part of Mehemet Ali, to leave the Egyptians in possession of Orfa and Diarbekir. But Diarbekir is the central key of Asia Minor, and whoever is strongly in military possession of that post, will have the command of the whole country. A Turkish Army at Diarbekir, is equally well placed to defend the approach to Constantinople against an enemy advancing across the Taurus from Aleppo; to repel any invasion from the Russian provinces by way of Kars and Erzeroum; or to protect Bagdad from attack by a force descending the Euphrates from the frontiers of Syria. As long as the Sultan's Army is in strength at Diarbekir, the Egyptian Army will be kept in check. But if that post were taken from the Turks and given to the Egyptians, the latter would have all those means for attack which the former now have for defence. Bagdad would immediately fall; for, in fact, all communication between it and Constantinople would be cut off; and if ever the time should come, when Russia and Mehemet Ali should determine to co-operate together against the Sultan, a Russian force from Gumri, united with the troops of Mehemet Ali at Diarbekir, would sweep through the whole extent of Asia Minor.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 114

*Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde.*

(No. 108.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 3, 1839.*

I TRANSMITTED to your Excellency, in my despatch No. 102, of the 29th ultimo, a copy of a despatch from Count Nesselrode to Count Pozzo di Borgo, dated the 15th of June, containing a statement of the opinion of the Russian Government on the present state of affairs in the Levant, which was communicated to me by M. Kisseleff, on the 27th of June.

I have to instruct your Excellency, to thank the Russian Government for this communication. Her Majesty's Government fully appreciate the confidence thus evinced in the British Government by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and are rejoiced to find, that the general tenour of the views which have been taken of the matters in question by the two Cabinets, should be so much the same. Each Government has manifested an earnest desire, that hostilities between the Sultan and the Pasha should be prevented, or should be speedily suspended, if begun; and both Governments seem impressed with a conviction, that some final and permanent arrangement should be come to which by preventing the future, a recurrence of a crisis like the present, may secure the peace of Europe from the dangers which might arise from dissensions in the Levant. It is to be hoped, therefore, that Russia and Great Britain, in concert with the other Great Powers, may be able to agree upon a common course of policy, which may be calculated to accomplish purposes so essential for the general interests of Europe. The British Government has authorized and instructed Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, to commu-

cate with his colleagues, and with the Austrian Government, on these matters, with a view to establish a common understanding about them.

Her Majesty's Government has already taken in concert with that of France the first step which is averted to in the despatch of Count Nesselrode, and instructions have been given to Sir Robert Stoddard, to enter into a conjunction with the French Admiral to bring about a suspension of arms and to induce Mehemet Ali to withdraw his troops within the limits of Syria, if the course of events should have led those troops beyond the confines of that province. When an armistice shall have been agreed to by both parties, the Five Powers will be able with better effect to endeavour to negotiate a final arrangement between the Contending Parties; and the views and opinions at present entertained upon that matter by Her Majesty's Government may be stated as follows.

It seems to the British Government, that there can be no security for permanent peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, as long as they have both of them an army in Syria: for neither of them can look upon their present state of occupation as permanently satisfactory. Mehemet Ali has too much, not to wish for more; and the Sultan has lost too much, to be able to sit down contented with his loss. Each party, therefore, must consider his present position in Syria, as a starting point for an attempt to accomplish the object of his desire; the one for further encroachment on the Turkish provinces; the other for the reconquest of Syria. The two parties might, indeed, be invited to reduce their respective forces to a peace establishment; but no confidence could be placed in such an arrangement, even if for the moment agreed to. Mehemet Ali could not maintain his authority in Syria without a considerable force, and the Sultan would necessarily be obliged to have an equal force at Diarbekir and its neighbourhood. Each party would suspect the other of secretly augmenting his force; and probably their mutual suspicions would be equally well-founded. In a short time the two armies would again be in presence of each other; and the work of pacification would have to be done over again.

The only arrangement, therefore, which could appear to Her Majesty's Government to be calculated to secure peace for the future, would be the evacuation of Syria by Mehemet Ali, and the withdrawal of his authorities, civil and military, into Egypt. By such means, the Desert would be interposed between the two parties; and the chances of conflict between them would be almost entirely prevented. But Mehemet Ali would justly require some counterbalancing advantage, in return for such a concession on his part; and Her Majesty's Government conceive, that this might be given him, by making the Pashalic of Egypt hereditary in his family.

Mehemet Ali has always stated, that the chief considerations which render him discontented with his present situation, are, first, a feeling of regret that the public works which he has accomplished in Egypt should, after his death, be left to decay, by being entrusted to the care of an ordinary Pasha; secondly, an anxiety for the fate of his family, which might, after his death, be exposed to poverty and exile.

Now both of these circumstances would be provided for, by such an arrangement as that above-mentioned. While, on the other hand, the just rights of the Sultan might be secured by stipulations, that Mehemet Ali and his descendants should pay tribute to the Sultan; should furnish the Sultan with a contingent in time of war; and should, like the Governors of any other provinces of the Turkish Empire, be bound by all the treaties and laws which the Sultan, as Sovereign, might make.

If the Russian Government should concur in this general view, and should instruct its Ambassador at Vienna accordingly, there can be no doubt that such an expression of opinion on the part of Russia would carry with it the weight which it may be said to the sentiments of Russia upon such a matter, and if the Five Powers should by mutual agreement of course arrive at a similar conclusion, in a way equally to suppose that the Five Powers would be disposed to the two parties, by the Russian stipulations of the Five Powers, a Constantinople and Alexandria would, even in a reluctant way, be made to feel that they must not enter

into; and that such an arrangement would be carried into effect, as would be in the highest degree conducive to the maintenance of the peace of Europe.

Your Excellency will communicate this despatch to Count Nesselrode, and give him a copy of it.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 115.

Lord Beaumont to Viscount Palmerston, (Received July 11.)

(No. 36.)

My Lord,

Vienna, June 30, 1839

ON the 24th instant, the French Ambassador received from his Excellency a communication to Prince Metternich and myself, the plenipotentiaries of the Five Powers, in relation to the Egyptian and Syrian question, and in which he stated that he had received from the French Government the following despatch.

The French Government, with the approbation of Prince Metternich, and of the plenipotentiaries of the Five Powers, has decided to propose to Mehemet Ali, that he should withdraw his troops from Syria, and that he should limit his forces to a peace establishment, if they should have the opportunity.

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna, in a despatch from Petersburg, has stated that he had received from Count Pozzo di Borgo, the French Ambassador, a communication to your Lordship.

Prince Metternich had confidently predicted that Russia would take the same view of the question with himself, and these despatches, written previous to the receipt of any communication from the Russian Government, confirm this prediction.

It is impossible to refuse the evidence they afford, that, be it from what motive it may, Russia at this moment is frankly, pursuing the same conduct as ourselves with regard to the Turkish Empire. In one case, it is to prevent the Russian Government from being able to do anything in France. It is that of hostilities having actually commenced, in which case it is to prevent the Russian Government from being able to do anything in France. It is that of hostilities having actually commenced, in which case it is to prevent the Russian Government from being able to do anything in France. It is that of hostilities having actually commenced, in which case it is to prevent the Russian Government from being able to do anything in France.

These, however, he considers as minor points; and the Five Powers have pronounced themselves upon the principles by which they are directed to regulate them, and the danger to Europe, which is well defined in the Russian despatch, as averted.

One contingency only, the Prince remarked upon, as having been overlooked at St. Petersburg, and to that he had, in the mean time, called the attention of the Russian Cabinet: it is that of all our precautions being rendered ineffectual, if the Russian Government should decide to support Mehemet Ali.

The French and English armaments should unite with that of Russia for its defence, Austria joining her flag to the powerful squadrons of her Allies.

He now intends further to propose to Russia, to invite their co-operation in such a case.

With reference to this, I would suggest to your Lordship the propriety of a communication to the Russian Government, in which it should be stated that the Five Powers are disposed to support the Sultan, and that they are prepared to do so, if the Russian Government should decide to support Mehemet Ali.





Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beaconsfield.

(No. 57.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, July 13, 1859

YOUR EXCELLENCY'S DESPATCH No. 12, which has been received, is in the following terms:

With reference to the despatch of No. 36, I have to state that it is undoubtedly true, as observed by Prince Metternich, that the measures proposed to be taken by the British and French squadrons, with a view to put an end to hostilities in Syria, would probably not be as successful if the fate of arms had declared in favour of the Sultan, as they would be if the first encounters between the armies had been favourable to the Pasha. But this arises from the nature of things, and from the difference which exists between the position of the Powers of Europe with respect to the Sultan, and their position with respect to the Pasha. But it must also be remembered, that the motive of the interference of the Powers of Europe to bring about a cessation of hostilities, and the object which they propose to attain by that interference, can only be the fear of the danger to which those hostilities would expose the peace of Europe, and an anxiety to avert that danger; but it is evident that this danger would arise from the success of the Pasha, and not from the success of the Sultan.

Her Majesty's Government, however, cannot but entertain a sanguine hope that the interference of the two squadrons, backed as they will be by the exertions of all the Missions at Constantinople, and of all the Consuls at Alexandria, will succeed in accomplishing the desired object.

Your Excellency, in your despatch No. 40, announces, that an agreement has been entered into, which will be signed at Vienna, by the British, French, and Austrian Governments, and which will have the effect of suspending hostilities in Syria, and of placing the British, French, and Austrian squadrons in the Mediterranean, to co-operate with the Russian fleet, and to maintain the peace of the Sea of Marmora, and to prevent the Russian fleet from being able to pass the Straits of the Bosphorus, and to enter the Black Sea. In learning that this agreement has been entered into, I feel the full value of this measure as a public manifestation of the world, of the close alliance between Great Britain and Austria, and of the intimate union which exists between them upon the great and important matters to which this measure relates.

It is, however, to be observed, that the British, French, and Austrian Governments have invited Russia to send her Black Sea squadron into the Mediterranean, to co-operate with the combined British, French, and Austrian fleet; and you certainly urge many very strong reasons in support of that proposition.

But all things considered, Her Majesty's Government are inclined to doubt the expediency of such a measure at present.

In the first place, the object now to be accomplished in the Mediterranean is the suspension of hostilities; for this, the combined fleet would be sufficient, and the support which the Russian Agents at Constantinople and Alexandria will afford you will afford to our efforts the assistance to be derived from the weight of her open and avowed concurrence.

If, indeed, the Five Powers should determine to press upon the Porte the evacuation of Syria, and if the Pasha should demur to accede to that arrangement, there might then be an obvious advantage in proving to the Pasha, by the co-operation of the Russian flag with that of Austria, France, and England, that the Great Powers are unanimous in their decision. But the negotiations at Vienna have not yet arrived at such maturity as to admit of such a communication being made to the two parties.

It appears to Her Majesty's Government, that there is a marked distinction between the co-operation of the four flags in the Sea of

Marmora, or in the Bosphorus, for the defence of Constantinople, and the junction of those flags in the Mediterranean.

It has often been discussed whether it would be most for the advantage of Western Europe, that the Straits between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea should be open or shut to ships of war, while Turkey is at peace. When Turkey is at war, the question cannot arise, because those Straits will then of course be open to her friends, and shut to her enemies.

Now, with reference to strategical considerations, it may be doubted whether it is not most for the advantage of Western Europe, that the Straits should be closed to all parties. For though the closing of them protects Southern Russia from hostile attacks by sea, yet it paralyses the left arm of Russia as a Naval Power, and secures to the military, naval, and commercial interests of Western Europe in the Mediterranean, from molestation by the Black Sea Fleet of Russia, any passage through England or France might be able to have a fleet in the Black Sea, which would be stronger than the Russian fleet, yet the British or French squadrons would then be in a sea dangerous to navigate, and without any good harbours, and they would be far away from their own resources, in case of any accident or change.

But viewing this question solely with reference to its bearing upon Turkey, it must be remembered, that if the Straits were a thoroughfare for all parties, the Russian Fleet would get into the habit of frequently visiting Constantinople, and that it would do so with much more confidence, than the British or French Fleet could, and it is necessary to point out the many inconveniences which might arise from visits of that kind at critical moments, if they were sanctioned by established usage, and if therefore the Western Powers could no longer be cited ever to object to them, or to consider them as important measures, warranting serious steps on their own part.

I have adverted to these points, in order that your Excellency may know the views of Her Majesty's Government respecting them. But the alarming state of the Sultan's health, as described in your Lordship's despatches No. 57 and 58, is a danger more serious than those with which the Five Powers have hitherto been occupied. This new cause of peril requires new and additional measures.

The accounts received by Her Majesty's Government within the last few days, by various channels, from Vienna and Constantinople, render it highly probable that the Sultan may already have sunk under his complicated disorders. What effect his death might produce, Her Majesty's Government have not the means to foresee; but it seems probable it would, in the first instance at least, cause a suspension of hostilities in Syria, as both armies would naturally wait to see what might happen at Constantinople, and what might be the policy of the new sovereign.

In this state of things, nothing can be wiser, or more urgently required, than the measure proposed by Prince Metternich, namely, that the Five Powers should each make a solemn declaration of their determination to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire under the present dynasty; and, as a necessary consequence of such a determination, that none of them will seek to profit by the present state of things, for the purpose of gaining any acquisition of territory, or any exclusive influence.

Your Excellency is instructed to state to Prince Metternich, that you are fully authorized at once to make such a declaration on the part of Great Britain; and if it should be thought expedient to give to such declaration a more formal shape, your Excellency is authorized to sign on behalf of Great Britain, any instrument by which it may be proposed to record them.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.



*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 11.)*

(No. 260)

My Lord,

*Paris, July 8, 1839.*

MARSHAL SOULT has read to me the Note which he proposes should be addressed by the French Ambassador to the Sublime Porte, requesting that a French fleet may pass the Dardanelles, in case an Egyptian Army should approach Constantinople and foreign succour be required for the defence of the capital. A copy of this Note the Marshal told me was sent the night before last to M. de Bourqueney for the purpose of its being communicated to your Lordship, and His Excellency expressed his hopes that Her Majesty's Government would instruct Lord Ponsonby to address to the Turkish Government a similar Note for the admission of the British fleet within the Dardanelles, to be presented at the same time with that of the French Ambassador.

The Marshal said that Count St. Aulaire's last despatches from Vienna were satisfactory.

Prince Metternich was eager for the junction of the Austrian ships of war with those of England and of France, and he had reason to think, from the tenour of Count Fiquelmont's reports from St. Petersburg, that the Russian Government would acquiesce in the proposal of the combined fleet being stationed in the Sea of Marmora for the protection of Constantinople.

The last accounts received at Vienna from Constantinople, state that the Sultan is very ill; and that the German physician who attends him is of opinion, that though he may live till the autumn, he, in all probability, will die before the expiration of the month.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

*Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 12.)*

(No. 84)

My Lord,

*Berlin, July 6, 1839.*

A FRENCH courier arrived here this morning from St. Petersburg. M. de Barante states in his letters, that the proposition made by Prince Metternich to concert measures at Vienna for the pacification of the East, has been favourably received by the Emperor of Russia; and M. de Barante thinks the Cabinet of St. Petersburg well and sincerely disposed to act in union with the other Powers of Europe.

Baron Werther thinks that your Lordship has judged right in preferring simple negotiation to a formal conference. His Excellency has given the necessary instructions to the Prussian Minister at Vienna; and he feels convinced that the most perfect harmony will exist between the Five Powers on this important question.

The latest accounts received here from Constantinople, state that the Sultan's health is rapidly declining.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) WILLIAM RUSSELL.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 13.)*

(No. 151)

My Lord,

*Thessalonica, June 24, 1839.*

I KEPT the messenger, that I might have secure means of informing your Lordship of matters of moment, and have now to acquaint you that the Sultan's fever continues, and that it is the opinion of his physicians, that if it is not removed, he will not live fifteen days. The physicians think the fever will not be removed. The Sultan, it is said, cannot at any rate live more than two or three months. He has been obstinately persevering in everything most mischievous to his health.

The public is now aware of the alarming nature of the Sultan's illness, but the Ottoman Ministers have not mentioned it to my Colleagues or to me; they have, however, begun to consider what shall be done, and are discussing whether it be best to establish a Council of Regency or a Council of Government.

The Ministers have, I hear, written to Rechid Pasha to abandon every affair in England and return full speed to Constantinople.

The Ottoman Fleet is to sail from the Dardanelles for Rhodes, on Monday the 21st instant. On the 21st (Friday) last the French Ambassador had an interview with Naim Pasha, to receive a verbal reply from the Porte to his Excellency's Note, demanding the removal of the troops from the Aleppo side of the Euphrates. The Porte would not give a written reply. The verbal one was, "That the Ministers had not communicated to the Sultan the demands made by the French Ambassador."

I had a letter from Sir Robert Stopford, which I inclose. I have heard of the arrival of Sir Thomas Fellowes in the "Vanguard," at Beira Bay.

I think it probable the corps of Ulemas will take a part. It has great material strength as well as moral influence. The Chiefs are, perhaps, the best informed men in the country, and they may be aware of the weakness of it, and the necessity for acting with the greatest prudence. I have taken the only measures in my power to make some of the influential members reflect upon their real situation, but my means are extremely limited. I have stated the ruin that might follow any reaction attended with violence, and that at the present moment the existence of the Turks, as a governing nation, depended upon Foreign Powers.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

*Inclosure in No. 122*

*Admiral Sir Robert Stopford to Viscount Ponsonby.*

*"Princess Charlotte,"*

*Palermo Bay, June 7, 1839.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letters of the 22nd and 27th May, the former acquainting me that your Excellency had satisfied your mind, that the Sublime Porte has finally determined upon war against the Pasha of Egypt, the latter transmitting the copy of a letter from Mr. Vice-Consul Hays at Alexandretta, dated 7th May, describing the unprotected state of that port, and the danger to which British property is liable, in consequence of the disturbed state of that part of the country.

I have the honour to acquaint your Excellency that, although I have not received any orders from Government to guide my proceedings with respect to the two belligerent Powers of Turkey and Egypt, I shall

immediately send the "Vanguard" to the Levant, to be followed by a sloop of war, for the purpose of observing the proceedings of the two fleets, giving strict orders to Captain Sir Thomas Fellowes, to observe the strictest neutrality towards Turks and Egyptians, and to avoid all communication with either.

I have also the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that I have ordered the "Dido" to proceed to Alexandretta, to protect British property said to be endangered at that place.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) ROBERT STOPFORD  
Admiral.

No. 123.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 13.)

No. 152.

My Lord,

Thessalonica, June 24, 1839.

I HAD sent M. Etienne Pisani to the Capudan Pasha upon business, which will be elsewhere reported to your Lordship. I received from that gentleman a letter, which I inclose, as it contains important matter relating to the Capudan Pasha's orders and intentions, should the French fleet attempt to bar his passage. I have to report that the moment I received the letter, I wrote to M. Pisani, and directed him to accompany the Pasha as far as Rhodes; and to use his utmost endeavours to prevent a collision between the Pasha and the French, by engaging the Pasha to be calm, and to forbear the use of force by the French, to force he attempted to defend himself by arms, and to answer civilly, and state to the French the purport of his orders from his Sovereign, and that he must obey them; and that, doing this, he should continue his route without resenting anything that might be said. It will, I think, be fortunate, if my directions reach M. Pisani in time, because I believe there is nobody with the Capudan Pasha able to interpret well, and prevent misunderstanding of what may be said, and I also have not been able to see in the presence of M. Pisani, and in his influence over the Capudan Pasha.

I made no reply to what the Capudan Pasha said; but your Lordship will recollect, that in answer to a question from him and the other Ministers with whom I had an interview, I said that I had no knowledge of any intention entertained by Her Majesty's Government to oppose the Sultan by force; and that I did not think Her Majesty's Government would ever resort to such a measure.

The report here is, that the French fleet will oppose by force the progress of the Ottoman fleet. I disbelieve the report, because the French Ambassador told me when I last saw him that it was not in the contemplation of his Government to use force.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure in No. 123

M. Etienne Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby

My Lord,

Dardanelles, le 20 Juin, 1839.

J'AI l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence, que je suis arrivé ici hier matin et que je me suis rendu en droiture à bord du "Mahmoudié." Le Pacha pense parfaitement comme votre Excellence, au sujet de la quarantaine, et il est furieux contre les médecins. Il regrette infiniment qu'il ne m'a pas envoyé à Constantinople sur un de ses bateaux; et il m'a promis que tant qu'il serait aux Dardanelles, si je me trouvais dans

le cas d'aller à Constantinople, qu'il me prunt de disposer l'un de ses bateaux à vapeur.

Hier après avoir fait ma visite au Pacha et Capitaine Walker, Mr. Lander et moi nous sommes embarqués sur le petit bateau à vapeur Turc que le Pacha a en la route de l'Asie à notre disposition, et nous sommes allés à bord du "Vagabond" qui se trouve commandé par le Capitaine Sir Thomas Fellowes nous fit un très bon accueil, et nous nous sommes amusés avec lui. Nous sommes restés à bord jusqu'à 6 heures, après quoi nous sommes retournés aux Dardanelles. En quittant le bord, Sir Thomas m'a chargé de présenter ses respects à votre Excellence.

Le Capitaine Pacha se propose de faire voile avec toute la Flotte samedi, pour Rhodes. Mais je doute fort qu'il puisse partir avant mardi ou mercredi, car son bâtiment ne pourra guère être prêt avant lundi soir ou mardi matin. Le Pacha trouve que les Français n'ont aucun droit de l'empêcher de suivre les ordres de son Souverain. Et il dit qu'il a des ordres positifs de venir en contact avec la Flotte Egyptienne, qu'il espère, que cette année-ci les Anglais demeureraient neutres, et qu'ils ne s'opposeraient pas aux vœux du Sultan; et que si c'était le cas, que lui (Achmet Pacha) se dévouerait corps et bien pour complaire aux moindres désirs des Anglais; que si les Français étaient seuls dans leur démarche actuelle, que cela ne l'empêcherait pas de suivre ses plans; mais que si les Anglais étaient entendus avec les Français, qu'en ce cas il se verrait forcé, bien malgré lui, de se soumettre à leur volonté.

Discours faisant, le Pacha m'a proposé de l'accompagner jusqu'à Rhodes, et dès qu'il y serait, il me promettait de me renvoyer sur son bateau à vapeur. J'ai répondu à son Excellence, que j'étais réellement fâché de ne pas pouvoir complaire à ses désirs, vu que je dépendais exclusivement de votre Excellence, et que je ne pouvais pas prendre sur moi de m'absenter sans avoir au préalable demandé la permission et les ordres de mon chef.

Le Général et moi sommes extrêmement contents du Pacha. Nous n'avons qu'à nous louer de toutes ses politesses et de toutes les bontés qu'il a pour nous. Il est d'une prévenance sans pareille.

J'ai, &c.,  
(Signed) E. PISANI

No. 124.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 13.)

No. 155.)

My Lord,

Thessalonica, June 24, 1839.

ON the 23rd, the Ottoman Fleet was still at the Dardanelles. I inclose Consul Lander's despatch.

There are two French ships off the Troad, and two ships and a corvette at Vourla. The Prince de Joinville is on board. The "Vanguard" is at Beica Bay. The English Squadron was expected at Malaga from Palermo, on the 18th instant.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure in No. 124

Mr. Consul Lander to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord,

Dardanelles, June 23, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship, that the whole of the Ottoman Squadron are still at anchor between Nagara and these castles, and I am informed that it is the intention of his Highness the Capudan



Pasha not to leave these Straits before Friday next, the 28th instant. In the meanwhile, most of the large ships are daily exercising their guns, and firing at marks, under the direction of Captain Walker.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) C. A. LANDER

No. 125

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby*

(No. 95.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 13, 1839*

WITH reference to my letter of the 12th instant, your Excellency has been instructed by the Porte to state to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, that if the course of events should lead the Porte to ask or to accept military aid, I have to state to your Excellency, that if the Sultan should die, and if in consequence of his death the presence of the British Squadron at Constantinople should be required, your Excellency is instructed to offer the assistance of the Squadron to the Turkish Government, and to state to the Sultan, that the British Government will be ready to afford him such assistance as he may require, and as may be judged suitable by the joint and concurrent opinions of the Admirals and Ambassadors.

I have, at the same time, to acquaint your Excellency, that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty will instruct Admiral Sir Robert Stopford to go up to Constantinople, if invited to do so by the Turkish Government, and to state to the Sultan, that the object of his going up to Constantinople, is to afford protection and support to the Sultan's authority, chiefly by the moral effect of the presence of the fleet; but further, if actually necessary, by such measures as unexpected circumstances may require, and as may be judged suitable by the joint and concurrent opinions of the Admirals and Ambassadors.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 126

*Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.*

My Lords,

*Foreign Office, July 13, 1839.*

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordships, that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople has been instructed to state to the Porte, that if the course of events should lead the Porte to ask or to accept military or naval aid from any European Power, in the context with Mehmet Ali, Her Majesty's Government trust that the Porte will, at the same time, address itself to Great Britain to the same effect; and that the British Admiral in the Mediterranean has orders to repair to Constantinople with his squadron, for the purpose of affording to the Sultan physical and moral support, the moment he shall receive from the Porte, through Her Majesty's Ambassador, an invitation to do so.

Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople has been further instructed, that if the Sultan should die, and if, in consequence of his death, the presence of the British Squadron at Constantinople should

appear to be useful, his Excellency is to offer the assistance of that squadron to the Turkish Government, in concert with the French Ambassador, who will have instructions to make a similar offer of the assistance of the French Fleet in the contingencies above specified.

I am commanded by the Queen to signify to your Lordships Her Majesty's pleasure, that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford be instructed, under the circumstances which I have now stated, to go up to Constantinople with his squadron, if invited by the Turkish Government to do so; and the Admirals should be apprized that the object of his going up to Constantinople, either in the case of the request being made by the Sultan, or by the Turkish Government, in the case of the Sultan's death, should be to afford protection and support to the Sultan's authority, chiefly by the moral effect of the presence of the fleet; but further, if actually necessary, by such measures as unexpected circumstances may require, and as may be judged suitable by the joint and concurrent opinions of the Admirals and Ambassadors.

The Queen's messenger, who will be dispatched from this office on Monday the 15th instant, can convey to Malta your Lordships' instructions to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 127

*Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty*

(Secret.)

My Lords,

*Foreign Office, July 16, 1839*

WITH reference to my letter of the 13th instant, I have to acquaint your Lordships the Queen's commands, that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford be apprized, that by the term "Admirals and Ambassadors," in the last paragraph but one of that letter, he is to understand, that the Admirals, and Ambassadors and Ministers of England, France, Austria, and Russia, are meant; but that, if the Admirals, and Ambassadors, and Ministers, of England, France, and Austria, should be agreed as to any course of action, the dissent of the Admiral and Minister of Russia ought not to prevent anything from being done, which may appear necessary or urgently expedient.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 128

*Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty*

(Secret.)

My Lords,

*Foreign Office, July 16, 1839*

WITH reference to my letters of the 13th and 15th instant, I have to request your Lordships to acquaint Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, that a further instruction will be sent to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, stating, that if the Russian Fleet should, upon any pretext, or for any reason whatever, enter the Bosphorus, his Excellency will apply for permission for the British Fleet to do the same; and I am to signify to your Lordships the Queen's commands, that Sir Robert Stopford be instructed to act upon any invitation which, in consequence of the foregoing instruction, may be addressed to him by the Porte through Her Majesty's Ambassador.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 129.

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.*

(No. 96.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 18, 1839*

WITH reference to my despatches Nos. 92 and 95, instructing your Excellency, under the contingencies therein specified, to offer to the Turkish Government to bring up to Constantinople the British Squadron, I have now seen that if the Russian Fleet should upon any pretext, or for any reason whatever, enter the Bosphorus, you will apply for permission for the British Fleet to do the same.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 130

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 263.)

My Lord,

*Paris, July 12, 1839.*

I HAD an interview this morning with Marshal Soult, he told me that your Lordship had approved of the note which he proposed should be presented by Admiral Roussin to the Turkish Government, relative to the admission of the French fleet within the Dardanelles, and he expressed much satisfaction with M. de Bourqueney's reports of his late communications with you on the affairs of the East.

I said that M. de Bourqueney had, without doubt, mentioned in his reports, that he had seen some of Lord Ponsonby's recent despatches, which, by their explicit instructions, seemed to him to instruct us to demand the Porte from going to war with Mehemet Ali; and that your Lordship had sent instructions to Her Majesty's Ambassador to co-operate with Admiral Roussin, and would again write to him to the same effect, but I would not conceal from him that you had, in a private letter to me, intimated that the tone of the communications of the French Government with that of Turkey was rather too rough and harsh, and that it would be better for the furtherance of the object common to both Governments, if the language used to the Porte were more conciliatory. The Marshal answered that M. de Bourqueney had apprized him of the apprehension felt by your Lordship, that the use of strong language might excite irritation in the mind of the Sultan, and that he had in consequence written to Admiral Roussin to consult with Lord Ponsonby before he presented his Note to the Reis Effendi; and if his Lordship thought that there were expressions in the preamble which it might be expedient to soften down, to propose in any change in the wording of it which might be suggested by Her Majesty's Ambassador.

Marshal Soult informed me that he received yesterday despatches from Vienna, reporting that Prince Metternich, considering that the life of Metternich could be much longer, was very anxious that the Great Powers of Europe should lose no time in coming to an understanding to recognise immediately upon the Sultan's death, his son, as successor to the Sovereignty of the whole of the Turkish Empire. The Marshal Soult expressed his entire concurrence in the opinion of the Austrian Minister. And though the son of the Sultan is scarcely seventeen years old, he had no apprehension, under the circumstance of all the Great European Powers at once acknowledging him, of any serious danger arising from the change of reign.

M. de Barante's despatches from St. Petersburg gave a favourable report of the disposition of the Russian Cabinet. Count Nesselrode is much satisfied with the endeavours of the British and French Govern-

ments to prevent, or, if begun, to suspend, hostilities between the Turks and Egyptians. No mention is made by the Russian Minister, of the Treaty of Unkar Skelessi, but a wish expressed that the differences between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali may be settled by a concert between all the European Powers.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 131

*The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 65.)

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, July 8, 1839*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches to No. 98 inclusive.

They have not conveyed to me any instructions with reference to the late movement of the Turkish Army, or information of the course which Her Majesty's Government may adopt in consequence of the state of affairs in Syria. I have had two or three conversations with Count Nesselrode upon the subject, and his Excellency asked my opinion upon his despatch to Count Pozzo di Borgo, which embodies a proposition for giving a limit to the probable success of Mehemet Ali's war, and upon the suggestion which, I am told, has been made by Prince Metternich to Her Majesty's Government, and to the Cabinet of Paris, for settling the differences between the Pasha of Egypt and the Pasha of Syria to the Sultan, and granting the inheritance of the Pachalic of Egypt to the family of Mehemet Ali.

I replied to Count Nesselrode, that I had received no instructions upon the subject, but that I thought my Government would receive as communication with satisfaction, inasmuch as it indicated a desire to restore peace, and to check the warfare in Syria. But to the proposition in my opinion was defective, as it referred to only one possible result of the hostilities that had been commenced, and did not settle the whole question, even if that result should happen.

Count Nesselrode said he had provided for one only issue of the war in Syria, because he believed that that one was certain to occur.

With respect to the Austrian proposition, I said I thought it likely to meet a favourable consideration from Her Majesty's Government. Count Nesselrode offered no objection to it, but rather insinuated a doubt that it would be acceptable to the Contending Parties, particularly to the Porte.

Upon every occasion, Count Nesselrode has expressed to me the desire of the Russian Government to maintain the possession of a *certain* *federal* arising under the Treaty of Unkar Skelessi. His Excellency has held the same language to all my colleagues; and I believe this desire to be sincerely and anxiously entertained.

I have every reason to believe that the Sultan deceived M. de Boutéville, and that his commencement of hostilities was as disagreeable to, as it was unexpected by, His Imperial Majesty.

War at this moment would not suit either the political or the personal convenience or views of the Emperor. Even the necessity of a considerable army of observation would be very inconvenient.

His Imperial Majesty has ordered the disposition of his troops, and the expenditure of his revenue for the year, without reference to the possible contingency of a foreign war, and his Treasury is for the moment quite exhausted.

Count Casimir has failed in his efforts to prevent the great reviews at Borodino, and is loud in his complaints of the Emperor's extravagance; the reviews will cost about 16,000,000 roubles.

The Palace of the Hermitage is to be rebuilt according to a plan Klienta (the architect who has come hither for that purpose from Munich).



and at a cost of 10,000,000 of roubles. A new palace for the Duc de Leuchtenberg and his imperial bride is to cost 15,000,000 of roubles, and the marriage will occasion no inconsiderable expenditure.

Another conspiracy also has been lately discovered, but I am not able to give your Lordship any particulars relating to it.

Upon every account, I am confident the Russian Government are desirous of avoiding the possibility of a war in Europe; and Count Nesselrode thinks there is no probability of such a calamity, unless the successes of Mehemet Ali should bring him under the walls of Constantinople, or menace the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) CLANRICARDE

No. 132.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville

(No. 266.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, July 16, 1839

I HEREWITH transmit to your Excellency a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, in consequence of a letter from M. Etienne Pisan, relative to the Capudan Pasha's orders and intentions, should the French fleet attempt to bar his passage.\*

Your Excellency will communicate the substance of this despatch to the French Government.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 133.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 17)

No. 268.)

My Lord,

Paris, July 15, 1839.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to No. 261 inclusive.

The ~~unusual~~ copies of telegraphic despatches which were received here on Saturday by the French Government, were sent to me on Saturday evening by Marshal Soult.

The more detailed reports from Admiral Roussin and from the French Consul at Alexandria, had not reached Paris at the time I saw Marshal Soult this day, but are expected to arrive to-night or to-morrow morning.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

Inclosure 1 in No. 133.

Telegraphic Despatch from Marselles.

Le Consul de France à M. le Président du Conseil.

Alexandrie, le 26 Juin

L'N courrier arrivé aujourd'hui du quartier-général d'Ibrahim, annonce à Méhémet Ali que l'attaque contre l'Armée Turque devait avoir lieu le 21 Juin.

\* See Inclosure to No. 133, p. 150.

Inclosure 2 in No. 133.

Telegraphic Despatch of 13th July, 8 A.M.

ON mande de Constantinople, que le Sultan est gravement malade, qu'il ne s'occupe plus des affaires; et que les médecins avaient déclaré que son existence ne pourrait pas se prolonger plus de trois mois.

Le 26 Juin, on parlait à Alexandria, d'une bataille qui aurait eu lieu le 21, entre les Egyptiens et les Turcs, mais on n'avait pas de détails, et l'on attendait avec impatience le paquebot de Beyrouth.

La flotte Turque qui devait partir le 24, était encore le 28, dans le détroit des Dardanelles; on attribuait ce retard à la maladie du Sultan.

L'Amiral Lalande avait envoyé le "Trident," "l'Hercule," et le "Jupiter," à Ourlac, et se trouvait avec "l'Jéna" seulement à Ténédos.

L'Escadre Anglaise, composée de sept vaisseaux, deux frégates, une corvette, deux bricks, et un bateau à vapeur, a quitté Malte le 2 Juillet, se dirigeant sur l'Egypte et la Syrie.

No. 134

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 17)

No. 269.)

My Lord,

Paris, July 15, 1839.

MARSHAL SOULT, this morning, informed me that he has written a despatch to M. de Bourqueney, to be communicated to your Lordship, in which he has authorized the French Chargé d'Affaires to declare the refusal of the French Government to become a party to a general guarantee of the integrity of the Turkish Empire by the Five Great Powers. His Excellency added that he considered the advantages of such a self-denying engagement, and considered that it might have an important bearing even upon the Russian Protectorate of the Provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, and upon the relations of the Russian Government with Servia.

The Marshal then spoke to me of a conversation you had had with M. de Bourqueney, in which you mentioned that the Duke of Wellington, at the period of your succeeding him in 1835, had deprecated permission being given by the Turkish Government to ships of war to pass through the Straits of Constantinople, considering that the evil of a Russian fleet being allowed to pass from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean, would not be compensated by the fleets of the other Powers having the right to pass from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea, and that you had expressed to M. de Bourqueney your concurrence in this opinion. The Marshal said to me that he also agreed with your Lordship and the Duke of Wellington, and that he had proposed to join the combined fleets of England, of France, and of Austria, upon the Syrian coast, he said their being permitted to pass through the Dardanelles for that purpose should be considered as a *cas exceptionnel*—a case which he believed upon the established principle would be counterbalanced by the advantage of manifesting that all the Great Powers acted in concert, and that Russia had abandoned her pretension to take her own line, unconnected with other Governments, upon all matters relating to Turkey.

With reference to the Sultan's death, and the possible disturbance of the public tranquillity, the Marshal was of opinion that the Ambassadors, in case they apprehended danger to the lives and properties of their countrymen, might call upon the Admirals to station one or two frigates

near Constantinople for their protection, and which might be used as a place of refuge even for the young Sultan if any apprehension should be felt for the security of his person, from the disturbed state of the capital.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

## No. 135

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 271.)

My Lord,

Paris, July 15, 1839, 10 p.m.

I ENCLOSE the copy of a telegraphic despatch which I have just received from Marshal Soult, announcing the death of the Sultan Mahmoud.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

## Inclosure in No. 135

Dépêche Télégraphique de Strasbourg, le 15 Juillet, à 6 h. du soir

Le Préfet du Bas Rhin à M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

LE Ministre des Affaires Étrangères à Bade vient de donner avis à M. de Bacourt, que le 10, on a reçu à Vienne la nouvelle que le Sultan Mahmoud est mort le 30....

(Interrompue par la nuit.)

## No. 136

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 18.)

(No. 272.)

My Lord,

Paris, July 16, 1839

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship the continuation of the telegraphic despatch from Strasbourg, of which I forwarded to you the beginning by the messenger who left Paris last night.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

## Inclosure in No. 136

Fin de la dépêche télégraphique de Strasbourg, du 15 Juillet, à 6 h. du soir.

que le Sultan Mahmoud est mort le 30 Juin. Son fils, âgé de 17 ans, a été proclamé Empereur. Le 28, le sultan a ordonné Haïr Pachà de suspendre les hostilités.

## No. 137

Baron de Bourqueney to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 21.)

My Lord,

Londres, le 19 Juillet, 1839

JE m'acquiesce des ordres de mon Gouvernement, en transmettant sans retard à votre Excellence copie de la dépêche que je viens de recevoir de M. le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie, sous la date du 17 Juillet.

Le Gouvernement du Roi, my Lord, sait d'avance qu'il trouvera dans le Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique, des principes et des sentimens conformes à ceux qui dirigent et qui continueront invariablement à diriger sa politique dans les affaires d'Orient; mais il attache un véritable prix à recevoir un nouveau témoignage de cette heureuse conformité.

Je prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien m'accuser réception de cette lettre, et je saisis cette occasion, &c.

(Signé) BOURQUENEY

## Inclosure in No. 137

The Duc de Dalmatie to the Baron de Bourqueney.

Monsieur le Baron,

Paris, le 17 Juillet, 1839

DANS la crise si grave où la mort du Sultan Mahmoud, survenant au milieu des évènements qui ont marqué ces derniers mois, se trouve vient de jeter l'Empire Ottoman, l'union des Grandes Puissances de l'Europe pouvait seule offrir une garantie suffisante pour rassurer les amis de la paix. Les communications échangées depuis quelques semaines, ont heureusement prouvé que cette union est aussi complète qu'il était possible de le désirer. Tous les Cabinets veulent l'intégrité et l'indépendance de la Monarchie Ottomane sous la Dynastie actuellement régnante; tous sont disposés à faire usage de leurs moyens d'action et d'influence pour assurer le maintien de cet élément essentiel de l'équilibre politique; et ils n'hésiteraient pas à se déclarer contre une combinaison quelconque qui y porterait atteinte. Un pareil accord de sentimens et de résolutions devant suffire, lorsque personne ne pourra plus en douter, non seulement pour prévenir toute tentative contraire à ce grand intérêt, mais même pour empêcher qu'il ne se produise aucune circonstance susceptible d'en devenir un danger véritable par suite de l'agitation que les évènements de ce genre ont jetée dans les esprits. Le Gouvernement du Roi, par conséquent, ne saurait que se féliciter de la confirmation de la paix, en constatant dans des documens officiels, et se contentant de la recevoir avec satisfaction, et qu'il ne saurait non plus tarder à ne pas avoir en vue plus qu'un motif de complaisance pour les intentions de son Excellence. Et c'est ainsi, Monsieur le Baron, je le prie de le dire, que le Gouvernement du Roi, par ses sentimens et par ses résolutions, se déclare prêt à assurer à Lord Palmerston une coopération la plus prompte et la plus efficace, dans la mesure qui lui sera sans doute devoir faire à cet égard, et que vous lui transmettez cette déclaration d'être d'accord avec la satisfaction la plus formelle à cette profession de foi, et parfaitement en harmonie avec l'opinion généralement répandue de sa politique. Si, comme j'ai lieu de l'espérer, les Cabinets de Vienne, de Pétersbourg, et de Berlin, répondent de même aux communications semblables que je vous leur aiuro parvenues, le but que se propose le Gouvernement du Roi se trouvera atteint.

Recevez, &c.  
(Signé) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.



*Baron de Bourqueney to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 21.)*

My Lord,

*Bertford House, le 19 Juillet, 1839*

PERMETTEZ-MOI d'accompagner d'un petit mot confidentiel, la lettre officielle que j'ai l'honneur de vous adresser ce matin avec copie de la dépêche que je viens de recevoir du Maréchal Soult. Je joins aussi à ce petit mot une copie de la lettre de M. de Metternich, qui explique bien le but de mon Gouvernement.

L'accusé de réception que je suis chargé de vous demander, sera un véritable échange de déclarations de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman entre nos deux Cabinets. Le bon exemple entraînera ceux qui préféreraient les déclarations verbales aux déclarations écrites. On n'osera pas refuser de faire avec la France et l'Angleterre, ce que la France et l'Angleterre font de si bonne grâce entre elles.

Votre pensée ultérieure d'un acte plus Européen à Vienne, n'en subsiste pas moins dans toute sa force, et je suis que le Gouvernement du Roi la secondera de tout son pouvoir.

Je n'ai pas voulu vous déranger ce matin, ayant l'espoir de vous rencontrer ce soir chez la Reine.

Agréez, &c.,  
(Signé) BOURQUENEY

Inclusion in No. 135.

*The Duc de Dalmatie to Baron de Bourqueney.*

M le Baron,

*Paris, le 17 Juillet, 1839*

Il vous a fait connaître par le télégraphe, la mort du Sultan Mahmoud. Les nouvelles de la mort de ce Sultan, et les dernières dépêches de Constantinople annonçaient déjà comme imminente. Il est à craindre que l'ordre envoyé à Hafiz Pacha d'arrêter les hostilités, ne lui soit arrivé trop tard pour empêcher la bataille à laquelle on s'attendait. Bien qu'il soit difficile de prévoir dès à présent le genre d'influence que le changement de règne exercera sur les destinées de l'Orient, il est évident qu'on est arrivé à un moment de crise qui réclame de plus en plus le concours loyal et sincère de tous les Cabinets, pour donner suite à l'idée mise en avant par M. de Metternich, de garantir au moyen d'un échange de déclarations diplomatiques, le maintien de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, et pour éviter tout autre moyen qui pourrait compromettre l'engagement dont il est question. Lord Palmerston répondra sans doute à la communication que vous lui en donneres en termes assez précis pour atteindre le but que nous avons en vue.

Recevez, &c.,  
(Signé) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE

*Viscount Palmerston to the Baron de Bourqueney.*

Monsieur le Baron,

*Foreign Office, July 22, 1839*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 19th instant, including, by order of your Government, a copy of a despatch dated the 17th instant, which you have received from the Duc de Dalmatie, relative to the present posture of affairs in Turkey.

I have to express to you, in reply, the great satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government have received this communication; and I lose no time in authorizing you to assure your Government that the British Cabinet like that of France desires to uphold the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire under its existing dynasty; and is ready to use its influence and its means of action, for the purpose of maintaining this essential element of the balance of power in Europe; and that Her Majesty's Government, like that of France, would not hesitate to declare itself openly against any combination which might be conceived in a spirit of hostility to the principles above-mentioned.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 22.)*

(No. 276.)

My Lord,

*Paris, July 19, 1839.*

ALTHOUGH your despatch No. 267, does not instruct me to communicate to the French Government the despatch inclosed in it, addressed by your Lordship to Lord Beauvale, on the 13th instant, I have not, I trust, acted indiscreetly, in having this morning put Marshal Soult in possession of its contents. In the first place, the Marshal is so confidentially communicative in his intercourse with me, that I am glad to show my disposition to confide in him; and besides, it appeared to me desirable, that his Excellency should perfectly understand the circumstances under which you thought that the co-operation of Russian ships of war, with the combined Fleet of England, of France, and of Austria, in the Straits of Constantinople, would be a step in favour of the general principle, that the Straits between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea should be shut to ships of war while Turkey is at peace.

Lord Granville has also seen your view of the question, and he adverted to the expression of *cas exceptionnel* which he has used in your despatch. He has also seen the despatch of the moment the unanimity of the Great Powers of Europe upon the affairs of Turkey and Egypt, by the junction of a Russian squadron with the combined English, French, and Austrian Fleet, as showing that he was adverse to the opening of the Straits of Constantinople generally for the passage of ships of war.

Marshal Soult read to me a despatch from Count St. Aulaire, with a letter inclosed in it from Admiral Roussin to his colleague at Vienna. Count St. Aulaire writes, that the Court of St. Petersburg adopts unhesitatingly the propositions upon the Turkish Question, which the Austrian Ambassador had been instructed by Prince Metternich to submit to the consideration of the Russian Government. And Admiral Roussin states, not only that the order had been sent to Hafiz Pacha to suspend military operations in Syria, but that the Capudan Pasha commanding the Turkish Fleet had been ordered not to quit the Dardanelles.

Under these circumstances, Marshal Soult thought that the prospect of settling satisfactorily the Oriental Question was much improved, it behoved, he said, however, the Powers of Western Europe to be upon their guard against Russia availing itself of the more pacific disposition evinced by the Divan since the death of the Sultan, to revert to her separate system of policy, in regard to the affairs of Turkey.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

No. 141

*Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 22.)*

(No. 89.)

My Lord,

Berlin, July 15, 1839.

I COMMUNICATED your Lordship's observations on Count Nesselrode's despatch to Baron Werthier. It appears that your Lordship has taken of the Eastern Question; but think you will find the Russian Cabinet disposed to agree with the other Powers.

Kiamil Pasha, the Ottoman Minister at this Court, is of opinion, that a mere settlement of a frontier between Turkey and Egypt can only be a provisional arrangement. He wishes the British Cabinet to establish a basis for his country on which they can construct their negotiation, if this is not done, he fears that the internal weakness of the Empire will soon cause it to fall into the hands of Russia.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) WILLIAM RUSSELL.

No. 142

*The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)*

(No. 67.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, July 15, 1839.

WITH reference to the subject of your Lordship's despatch to Lord Beauvale, and of Count Nesselrode's despatch to Count Pozzo di Borgo, inclosed in your Lordship's despatch No. 102, I beg leave to state, that the impression made upon my mind by Count Nesselrode, in the conversation which I had with his Excellency, and the hostilities that have occurred in Syria, and upon his despatch to the Russian Ambassador in London, was, that he did not intend by the proposition communicated in that despatch, that the intervention of England, and other European Powers, should be wholly limited to confining the warfare to the Syrian territory; but that, as the success of the arms of Mehemet Ali appeared imminent, and as that success, if it carried him beyond the Taurus, would menace the safety of the Turkish Empire, and the Eastern Question, and a great chance of war in Europe, that he was not prepared to go to ulterior steps, or to such a settlement of the disputes between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt, and of their respective claims, as the Great Powers might afterwards determine upon. In answer to a remark I made thereupon on one occasion, Count Nesselrode said, "We shall have time to consider of that afterwards, but what we must do at once, is, to prevent Mehemet Ali from complicating the question, and perhaps causing a general war by his successes." Your Lordship will observe also, that Count Nesselrode in his despatch to Count Pozzo di Borgo, says, "Avant tout, il faut maîtriser les faits, c'est-à-dire, empêcher que la lutte devienne menaçante pour le repos de l'Europe entière." And I believe that by the words "avant tout," Count Nesselrode meant to imply, that subsequent arrangements should be entered into, after the precautions he

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) CLANRICARDE

No. 143.

*The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)*

(No. 68.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, July 15, 1839.

SINCE writing my despatch No. 67, I have seen Count Nesselrode. Our conversation has confirmed me in the impression I entertained of the nature and limited extent of the proposition which he made to Her Majesty's Government through the Russian Ambassador in London.

Count Nesselrode tells me that he has received very satisfactory intelligence from Constantinople; the Commander of the Turkish fleet, and Hafiz Pasha, having been directed, since the death of the late Sultan, to avoid a conflict with the Egyptian forces, and the latter having been ordered to retire from the Syrian territories. His Excellency said, that he had for some time considered it impossible, that a definitive arrangement of the matters in dispute between the Porte and the Pasha of Egypt, could be much longer delayed, and that such an arrangement had now become necessary. His Excellency proceeded to say, "Austria proposes, that for the hereditary tenure of the Pashalic of Egypt assured to his family, Mehemet Ali should relinquish Syria at his death. We do not object to that arrangement. Your Government say, that Syria should be immediately restored to the Sultan. We also think that better. But have you any reason to suppose that Mehemet Ali will accede to such a proposal?"

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) CLANRICARDE.

No. 144

*Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde.*

(No. 118.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, July 23, 1839.

I HAVE received this evening your Excellency's despatches Nos. 67, 68, and 69.

With reference to your despatch No. 67, I have to observe, that the impression which your Excellency has derived from your conversations with Count Nesselrode, as to the views of the Russian Government on the point referred to in that despatch, is, no doubt, quite correct; but there appears to be this difference between the British and Russian Governments, that the danger which Russia wished to avert, was the chance of a contest between herself and the other Powers of Europe, while the danger which England was desirous of guarding against was a great weakening of the Turkish Empire.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 145.

*Lord Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 25.)*

(No. 46.)

My Lord,

Vienna, July 10, 1839.

PRINCE METTERNICH has received intelligence of the arrival of his despatches of 14th of June at St. Petersburg.

Count Nesselrode had informed Count Fiquelmont that he should reply to them in a day or two, but that in the meantime he was directed



to acquaint him, that they had been laid *in extenso* before the Emperor, who had approved of them in all their parts. When Count Nesselrode's despatch arrives, I shall write more fully to your Lordship. In the meantime, I would only remark, that there appears to be a certainty of Russia quitting her counsels and her action to those of the other Powers; and that the more firmly she can be fixed in this line, the better chance will there be of traversing this difficult crisis without war.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE

## No. 146

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)

No. 47.)

My Lord,

Vienna, July 10, 1839.

PRINCE METTERNICH has had the goodness to communicate to me the Internuncio's despatches. It appears from them, that immediately upon the Sultan's death, his eldest son was proclaimed.

Orders were subsequently sent to Hafiz Pasha to suspend operations. This point then is gained, but the difficulty in inducing Mehemet Ali to relinquish Syria will remain entire.

Prince Metternich further informs me that, by way of doing a popular act upon the anniversary of the 20th, the government were a *concert* open, which was received with general acclamation.

This is a bad augury for the institutions introduced by Sultan Mahmoud. The reigning Sultan is stated to have had no education, nor any other companions than an Imam, a Dwarf, and two black eunuchs.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE

## No. 147

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)

No. 48.)

My Lord,

Vienna, July 10, 1839.

I COMMUNICATED to Prince Metternich your Lordship's letter to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, of the 25th of June enclosed in your despatch No. 52.

Before reading it, he remarked to me that the Note delivered by Admiral Roussin at Constantinople, and the instruction to Admiral Lalande, were both founded upon the false principle of an equality of right between the Sultan and the Pasha,—a principle which Austria could not adopt, and the falseness of which he had pointed out to M. de St. Aulaire, who had admitted both its existence and its incorrectness.

It will not be desirable that this admission of the Ambassador should be conveyed to the French Government.

After reading your Lordship's letter, Prince Metternich expressed his satisfaction with it in all its parts, and his sense of its completeness as an instruction. He has since dwelt much to me upon his astonishment that the French Government with such an instruction before them, should have given one varying from it in essential points, incorrect in principle, and comparatively vague in its provisions.

Upon these two last points, I observed to him, that the French instruction appears to be drawn up with a view to the eventual defence of the conduct of the Ministry before the Chamber, to which view of it he assented.

I did not omit to point out to Prince Metternich the advantage of

your Lordship's instruction over the Russian proposition, for confining hostilities within a certain district in case of their having commenced, in which, when he saw the application of the principle as laid down in your Lordship's letter, he fully concurred.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE

## No. 148

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)

No. 50.)

My Lord,

Vienna, July 11, 1839.

IT appears certain that the Sultan died on the morning of the 20th, and that his death was kept secret for six-and-thirty hours, at the end of which period the only notification of it was the proclamation of his successor.

The orders to the Commanders, by sea and land, to suspend operations, were sent on the 28th or 29th. Admiral Roussin claims for himself the credit of having determined the Divan to take this step, although he was ignorant till some time afterwards, of its having been taken, and although he had received a refusal to his demand to be allowed to send an officer to the army of Hafiz Pasha. This refusal was founded upon various pretexts, and accompanied by a request to be furnished with the grounds of accommodation which he was authorized to propose between the Sultan and the Pasha. He was told that his first step should be to inform the Sultan of the refusal, and then to propose to his Highness to revert to the *status quo*; but that if he would present a conciliatory reply, conveying a reasonable plan of arrangement, the clemency of the Sultan might probably be extended towards his

proposal.

This constant system of the French authorities to claim for themselves the credit of having determined all great events, creates some bitterness of feeling here, which however will not be allowed to prejudice the march of affairs.

The leading Turkish Ministers have stated to Baron Störmer, that if anything could have deterred them from ordering operations to be suspended, it would have been the insolence of Admiral Roussin's tone in demanding it.

They further requested the Baron to apply to Prince Metternich for his advice how to act; and Hosrew Pasha stated, that if Mehemet Ali would restore Syria and Candia to the Porte, and would reduce his forces, the right of hereditary succession in Egypt might be secured to his family.

All the documents, of which I have here given a summary, will be communicated *in extenso* to your Lordship, and, with omissions, to the French Government. The originals were placed in my hands.

Prince Metternich's answer to Constantinople will approve of the suspension of hostilities; will recommend the Porte to keep its army and fleet entire, withdrawing them out of the reach of daily collision; and will recommend them to await in total stillness the overtures of the European Powers. The Metternichs, the Prince will give the same advice to the Sultan.

As to the plan of peace proposed by Prince Metternich, I have already given your Lordship's ideas; but the Porte having itself suggested a plan, which is being considered by the Emperor and Metternich, and the French Government, the *status quo* is now the basis of the negotiations, and the terms of peace which are open to negotiation.

His plan for the conduct of this negotiation is the following. It must begin at Constantinople, and will be complete when the Porte shall

have agreed with the Five Powers upon the terms to be granted to the Pasha, this agreement to be assigned to official notes. When this is done, the Five Powers will notify to the Pasha the terms, and call upon him to accept them, warning him that in case of such pressure, in case of refusal, as may be sufficient to determine his assent. This assent being obtained, the arrangement to be agreed under the guarantee of the Five Powers. The outline of the terms is already sketched and may be considered as adopted by England, Austria and Russia. France remains and Prince Metternich, in answering for Russia, requests the British Government to undertake France.

As to the eastern coast of the Red Sea, the amount of tribute, the obligation of treaties, present and future, entered into by the Porte, upon the Pasha, and the extent of reduction of force to be required of him, these, although of minor importance, are yet points which will offer many difficulties, and which must be regulated with the Porte, before an ultimatum can be presented to the Pasha. The only difficulty of treating with the Pasha is, it will be for your Lordship to determine whether to treat them at Paris or here. I shall request Prince Metternich, in case your Lordship remains upon the former place, to direct Count Appony to give all the assistance in his power. If you should prefer treating them at Vienna, I would remark that justice to Egypt requires that we should deal lightly with her as to the amount of tribute.

In the question of disarming it is probable that the Porte will insist, as it is to be a condition of the peace, and this disarming is a point which will be most unpleasant to France, who has always looked upon the naval power of Egypt as a reinforcement to her own, and to her maritime superiority in the Mediterranean. If, therefore, this branch of the negotiation is to be treated here, it will be necessary that I should be furnished with instructions as to the amount of reduction to be made upon the Egyptian fleet, and whether any part of the fleet is to be sent up to the Suez Canal.

When this is settled, it will be necessary to establish the relations between the negotiators at Vienna and the Ambassadors at Constantinople.

It is clear that Vienna, in its relations with that place is nearly a neutral ground. I have heard from St. Petersburg that I will therefore be very anxious to keep the peace, and when the proposition is presented to the Porte, it is to be made by the Powers, and it is to be supported by the Powers. Austria, however, is a constant ally. The application of the Porte to Prince Metternich for advice, and the proximity of this Capital, will be a great advantage, and will be very much into his hands; nor, considering the duty of the negotiators with our own Government, it is better that the negotiation should be conducted here, and that the Porte should be brought to the notice of the Powers, which will be necessary to the success of the negotiation.

When we come to treat with Egypt, the Maritime Powers must take the lead, and the first question will arise upon the mode of summoning the Pasha to accept the conditions of the Porte.

The question of the mode of summoning the Pasha, or by a Commission, or by a single person, or by the latter. If the latter be preferred, it is to be chosen, and from whence is he to be sent? If the Commission be preferred, it will be necessary that the Admirals should be instructed how to act in case of Mehmet Ali's refusal to accept the Sultan's offer.

Prince Metternich believes that the moral weight of the Five Powers acting in concert will determine the submission of the Pasha, but that if the Pasha should refuse, it will be necessary to send a fleet to evacuate Syria. That country is reported to be provided with warlike stores for more than one campaign, nor would it be difficult to send a fleet to evacuate Syria. The Pasha's fleet would be a great advantage, and it is to be sent under neutral flags. In such a case, the Russian proposition to consider ourselves in a state of war might be a great advantage.

If any part of this second branch of the negotiation is to be treated

from hence, (and I do not see, after an agreement has been come to at Constantinople, what can be gained by references to Paris and London,) it will be requisite that the Admirals should be furnished with instructions, and the negotiation here with directions for its guidance.

I have comprised in this despatch the result of many conversations with Prince Metternich, with the view of assisting the deliberations of Her Majesty's Government, and I hope I shall not be considered to have exceeded my province.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

P.S.—I see I have omitted a consideration of much importance; it is, that whenever a common proposition shall have been agreed upon by the Five Powers, all separate communications either from the Ambassadors or from the Courts should cease.

If Mehmet Ali were to remark a difference of meaning, or even of tone, between any one of these and the collective language of the Alliance, the chance of his submission would be much diminished.

No. 149.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 51.)

My Lord,

Vienna, July 11, 1839.

PRINCE METTERNICH has received answers from St. Petersburg, to his despatches of 14th June. They were copying for transmission to London and Paris, so that I did not see them; but the Prince assures me that they bespeak an identity of views with Austria. The despatches to which they reply, did no more than convey Prince Metternich's first communications to Constantinople. Prince Jablonowski, who left this on the 21st, bearing a private letter from Prince Metternich, recommending the establishment of a central point of negotiation, had but just reached Petersburg before their departure; a further courier, therefore, must be expected with the official answer to this proposition, but Russia already adopts the principle, that everything is to be done in common.

Upon all the details Prince Metternich agrees to your Lordship's ideas without reserve, and answers for their adoption by Russia, so that according to him, England, Austria, and Russia, are placed exactly upon the same line, and there only remains to induce France to relinquish her deviations from it.

I write so much in haste and by snatches, that I must beg your Lordship's indulgence for any repetitions there may be in these despatches.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 150.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 52.)

My Lord,

Vienna, July 11, 1839.

THIS has applied to Prince Metternich upon the subject of the Austrian squadron. He told me it would consist of nine sail; that the Archduke had been ordered to hold himself in readiness to embark; but that its sailing would be delayed until an answer should be received from Paris to an application calling upon the French Government to conform its instruction to its Admiral to that which had been given by England, the principle of parity between the Sultan and the Pasha being one which



Austria could not admit, any more than she could its application to the equal treatment of their vessels. Till this was done, Prince Metternich said the Austrian squadron could not join the combined fleet, as it would not know with whom to act. The plea appears to me a fair one, and as it may be useful that Austria should take the lead in bringing this question (which must be cleared up, or it will hang upon all our future proceedings) to an issue, I made no observation upon the course Prince Metternich was pursuing.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 151

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 53.)

My Lord,

Vienna, July 12, 1839.

PRINCE METTERNICH has just communicated to me the whole of his despatches to Paris with their inclosures. They will be laid before your Lordship. His despatch upon the incorrectness of principle in the instructions to Admiral Lalande, is a masterpiece of address and argument. It treats the difference between the French and English Instructions as merely apparent assuming and proving that the real thought of the French Cabinet cannot be other than that of England and Austria.

The despatch of Count Fiquelmont is conclusive upon this point, the Emperor regarding Mehemet Ali only as a rebellious subject. Any apparent favouring of the Pasha which may be found in the despatch from Count Nesselrode, may be safely attributed to the wish of the Emperor to prevent war, and to the distance which keeps him so long behind the march of events.

Prince Metternich answers for his conduct in coming to a common understanding; and that understanding, judging from the term, a rebellious subject, applied to the Pasha, can be no other than an agreement with England and Austria.

All my experience of the Prince, added to the reasoning he has employed, convince me that the guarantee he gives for the conduct of Russia may be safely relied upon.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 152

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 57.)

My Lord,

Vienna, July 14, 1839.

THE departure of Prince Metternich's courier was suspended, by the arrival of an estafette from Constantinople. I inclose Lord Ponsonby's despatches received by this occasion; those of the Internuncio will be communicated by Prince Esterhazy. There are two important differences between them. The first is, that Baron Stürmer mentions it to be intended by the Porte to apprise Mehemet Ali that the Sultan may be induced to appoint one of his sons to the Pashalic of one of the Provinces he (Mehemet Ali) at present holds which is virtually a relinquishment of Syria to Ibrahim Pasha. The other, that the Internuncio notifies the consent of the Representatives of the Five Powers having been given to support the propositions of the Porte while Lord Ponsonby only speaks of our having agreed to notify the facts to the Congress. There is a further difference between this overture made by Nouri Effendi, and the

one he made to the Internuncio in that, the evacuation of the Holy Cities was omitted, as in this, is the disarming.

Prince Metternich intends making no change in the attitude Austria has taken; on the contrary, the squadron will receive immediate orders to join the combined one of England and France, in the Levant. He holds that no difference of sentiment has taken place in the Turkish Councils; that the tranquillity now sought to be re-established would not last; and that the European Powers having been brought forwards, must carry through the task they have undertaken.

The reasoning upon which this opinion is founded will be laid before your Lordship, and appears to me to be founded in truth.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 153.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 24.)

No. 161.)

My Lord,

Therapia, July 1, 1839.

THE death of His Majesty the Sultan was not expected to take place so soon for there had been alleviations of the malady though not such as to give well-grounded hopes of his recovery. The event obliges the Internuncio to dispatch an estafette without delay and I have time to write as I wish to do upon so serious a subject as the state of this country; but I did write some time ago to Lord Beauvale, and I have now written a hasty letter to him, in which I have summarily given such opinions as I should lay before Her Majesty's Government in an official form if I had time; and perhaps Lord Beauvale will have the goodness to communicate them to your Lordship, if he thinks they ought to be submitted.

I regret that it is not competent to me to suggest any measures to the Admiral commanding Her Majesty's squadron, for I am of opinion that the presence of the squadron at the Dardanelles would be useful, and perhaps necessary to prevent the occurrence of things that may be disadvantageous to Her Majesty's interests in this country.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 154

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 24.)

No. 165

My Lord,

Therapia, July 2, 1839.

I RECEIVED, this evening from his Excellency Nouri Effendi, a note, which I inclose copy. The meeting probably will not be over in time to allow me afterwards to write by post, and therefore I will report now what I have good reason to believe is the substance of the business intended to be brought forward by the Ottoman Ministers.—namely a communication of a resolution taken by the Sublime Porte, to propose to Mehemet Ali to make the Government of Egypt hereditary in his family on the terms of vassalage and tribute, provided he consents to restore Syria, and Candia, and Mecca, and Medina, to the Sultan.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 154.

*Nouri Effendi to Viscount Ponsonby.*

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, Constantinople, le 20 Rebi-el-akher, 1255.

CHARGE d'ordre Souverain de faire à votre Excellence une communication importante, je m'empresse de la prévenir du désir que j'ai d'avoir l'honneur de m'entretenir avec elle, et de la prier par conséquent de vouloir bien se rendre à ma maison de campagne à Emirghienoghlu, demain à 5 heures à la Turque.

Agrées, &c.  
(Signé) NOURI

No. 155.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 24)*

(No. 166.

My Lord,

Therapia, July 3, 1839

IN pursuance of the desire of the Sublime Porte, the Ministers of the Five Great Powers assembled this day at the House of the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs. Nouri Effendi was the only Ottoman Minister present. He stated, that the Sultan had commanded him to assure the Ministers, in his Highness' name, of his esteem and friendship for the Sovereigns they represented and his warm desire to cultivate by every means the good understanding that existed between their Governments and the Ottoman Porte. This was handsomely expressed according to Turkish forms.

His Excellency proceeded to say he was commanded to make known to the Ministers of his Christian friends, that the Sultan, being animated by the wish to put an end to the calamities which pressed heavily upon his people, in consequence of the conduct of the Pasha of Egypt, and the anger he had excited in the bosom of the late Sultan Mahmud, had determined to send one of the eminent men of his court to offer the Egyptian Pasha pardon for the past, and assurance of favour for the future. I would the Sultan, were a liberator as the mark and evidence, and to promise that his Highness would confer upon the Pasha and his family the hereditary government of Egypt to be held by the Pasha and his descendants as vassals, on the condition that Syria, &c. should be immediately restored to the Sultan.

Nouri Effendi asked for the opinion of the Ministers, who replied that they would rejoice in the restoration of peace, and were warmly desirous of the prosperity of his Highness; that, being unacquainted by their Governments, they could not give any opinion as to the terms which the Sublime Porte was about to propose to the Pasha, but they would not fail to report to their Governments the communication they had received.

Questions were asked to ascertain precisely the nature of the proposal intended to be made to the Pasha, and it was distinctly understood, that the Sultan would grant to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt, within the boundaries that were formerly the limits of that country; that is, as I understand it, the limits that used to circumscribe the country as a Pashalic.

It was asked if it was intended to leave Mehemet Ali in possession of Syria, or of Mecca, or Medina, or St. John d'Acre, and the reply was in the negative. The Ministers thought it right to confine themselves to inquiries directed solely to the perfect elucidation of what was stated to them, and not to enter at all into discussion of the merits of the proposition.

Nouri Effendi desired the Ministers to write to the Consuls of their respective Governments; and the Ministers agreed to notify the facts and what had taken place to the Consuls.

I will forward by the French steamer, copy of my letter to Colonel Campbell.

There were questions asked as to the state of the armies in Syria, and Nouri Effendi said that orders had been sent which would be received by Haliz Pasha in a short time, peremptorily commanding him not to engage in any act of hostility, and he added that Mahomed Ali Bey had already carried orders to that effect to avoid attacking the Egyptian Army, and said the Porte had no intelligence of any fighting having taken place of greater magnitude than skirmishes between detached bodies of Irregulars, and so forth.

The Sultan's measure has the advantage of showing his disposition to live on friendly terms with the Pasha: he offers pardon and oblivion as to the past, and favour as to the future. He shows that the Pasha has not to fear from him the effects of personal hatred, as he had to fear from the deceased Mahomed, and takes from the Pasha an excuse that fear afforded him for his armaments. It shows the determination of the Pasha of continued rebellion, and of the disturbance of the peace of the world, which will be the consequence of his pursuit of projects of aggrandizement and ambition.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY

No. 156.

*Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beaumont*

(No. 7.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, July 23, 1839

ENCLOSE for your Excellency's information a copy of a Note which Baron Bunsen has requested to present to the Turkish Government, requesting that, in view of the military force which are invited to Constantinople, the French Squadron may be permitted to pass the Dardanelles.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 157

*Draft of Note to be presented to the Porte by Admiral Roussin.*

June 1839

M. Soussigné, Ambassadeur de France, a reçu l'ordre de faire la communication suivante à Son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de la Sublime Porte.

Les événements qui se sont passés en Egypte, et les conséquences politiques les plus inraisonnables de la crise qu'ils ont fait naître.

Il est évident que ces événements ont eu pour résultat de créer les dangers qui en 1833 menaçaient la capitale même de l'Empire Ottoman, et forment la Porte à accepter un appui étranger. Sans parler des autres conséquences qui dépendent de ce fait, il est évident qu'il y a tout lieu d'espérer que les efforts de la France, pour empêcher l'extension de la domination de Mehemet Ali, ne seront pas vains.

En conséquence, la France, qui a toujours été l'ennemie de la domination de Mehemet Ali, et qui a toujours été l'ennemie de la domination de Mehemet Ali, ne peut que se féliciter de voir la Sublime Porte prendre une telle décision. Elle espère que les efforts de la France, pour empêcher l'extension de la domination de Mehemet Ali, ne seront pas vains.

La France, qui a toujours été l'ennemie de la domination de Mehemet Ali, et qui a toujours été l'ennemie de la domination de Mehemet Ali, ne peut que se féliciter de voir la Sublime Porte prendre une telle décision. Elle espère que les efforts de la France, pour empêcher l'extension de la domination de Mehemet Ali, ne seront pas vains.



la paix du monde, dont le maintien les intéresse tous au même degré. A Pétersbourg, à Vienne, à Berlin, à Londres, à Paris, il n'y a qu'un sentiment à cet égard.

Dans un tel état de choses, la Sublime Porte comprendrait sans doute que l'Europe ne peut pas se passer de la reconnaissance de sa dignité et de sa sûreté. Ce serait de demander, non pas à une Puissance en particulier, mais à l'Europe entière, l'appui qui lui servirait de garantie. Un grand Empire ne déchoit pas, en effet, on se place sous la protection des grands intérêts Européens. Il trouve dans la reconnaissance même de ces intérêts l'assurance de réunir pour venir à son aide, la garantie certaine que cette protection ne pourra pas se transformer en une suprématie dangereuse pour son indépendance.

Le système de conduite que cette considération puissante indique à la Sublime Porte est d'ailleurs le seul qui s'accorde avec les convenances et les justes susceptibilités de la politique des Grandes Cours, dont il lui importe certainement de tenir compte.

Le Gouvernement du Roi a donc la conviction qu'il va au-devant des intentions de la Sublime Porte en demandant que, dans le cas où les forces de terre ou de mer d'une ou de plusieurs des Cours Alliées seraient appelées à Constantinople, les ordres fussent donnés pour ouvrir immédiatement le passage des Dardanelles à une escadre Française qui viendrait, de son côté, protéger le trône du Sultan contre les périls dont l'imminence aurait déterminé une telle mesure.

Le *Seigneur* *l'Excellence* M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de lui faire parvenir le plus promptement possible, la réponse de la Sublime Porte à cette communication, pour qu'il puisse, ainsi qu'il en a l'honneur, l'envoyer sur le champ à Paris.

(Signé)

BARON ROUSSIN

No. 15b

Karl Granelle to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 25)

(No. 280.)

My Lord,

Paris, July 22, 1839.

THE inclosed telegraphic despatches, one from the French Ambassador at Constantinople, and the other from the French Consul-General at Alexandria, were sent to me this day by Marshal Soult. The intelligence they contain, though coming from opposite quarters, is in substance the same, and no doubt, therefore, can be entertained of the complete route of the Turkish army under Hafiz Pasha.

I was not at home this morning when Count Appony called upon me, but I have just been told by Marshal Soult, that the Austrian Ambassador has received despatches from Prince Metternich, containing accounts from Constantinople of the 3rd, stating that an entire change in the politics of the Divan had taken place.

The Internuncio writes, that Nouri Effendi had communicated to him, in consequence of the arrival of the great European Powers, that the Sultan had determined to accord to Mehmet Ali the hereditary right to the government of Egypt, and that he proposed sending an Envoy of rank in recognition to Ahmed Pasha, and to communicate to the Pasha this determination, and to deliver to him the decoration of the highest order in the Turkish Empire, with magnificent presents. The Marshal Soult was inclined to think that the news of the battle of the 24th of June, though not divulged, must have reached Constantinople on the 3rd, and that the situation of the Sultan, and the soldiers veering in the opinion of the Turkish Government, at a Marshal Roussin's despatch of the 3rd, from the Porte, and that the Porte had only just received the news of the battle. It is also probable that the partisans of Mehmet Ali at Constantinople, relieved from the terror inspired by the Sultan Mahmoud, may have been in the corners of the new Government, and that it is possible that Russian diplomacy may have been at

work to accomplish an arrangement between the Sultan and his vassal, without the intervention of the western Courts of Europe. It seems, however, that Prince Metternich had instructed the Internuncio to dissuade, if possible, the Sultan from this prostration, and to forewarn Mehmet Ali, and to engage him to rely upon the European Powers for protection.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

Inclosure 1 in No. 15b

Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles, of the 22nd July, at 3 a. m.

Le Consul-Général à M. le Président du Conseil des Ministres.

Alexandrie, le 6,

L'ARMÉE Egyptienne sous les ordres d'Ibrahim Pacha ayant attaqué l'Armée Turque commandée par le Sérasker Ibrahim Pacha à Nezib, au delà d'Alep, celle-ci a abandonné le champ de bataille après un combat de deux heures. Tout le matériel, en fusils, canons, et munitions, est tombé au pouvoir des Egyptiens. Ibrahim a écrit cette nouvelle le 25 Juin, sous la tente du Général-en-Chef Turc. Il était de retour à Antab le 28, mais avait donné ordre à trois régimens d'infanterie et trois régimens de cavalerie de se porter en avant sur Ourfa et Diarbékir.

Inclosure 2 in No. 15b.

Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles of the 22nd July, at 3 p. m.

Thérapsia, le 8

LA Porte vient de recevoir la nouvelle qu'une bataille a été livrée dans le voisinage d'Alep, le 24 Juin, et que l'Armée Turque a été détruite. Les débris ont repassé la frontière, et on ne dit pas que l'Armée Egyptienne les ait poursuivis.

No. 15c

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 26.)

(No. 168.)

My Lord,

Thérapsia, July 8, 1839.

I INCLOSE copy of a letter to me from his Excellency the French Ambassador, stating that Ahmed Pasha had sent his second in command Osman Bey, to Admiral Lalande, &c. &c. &c.

I had a long conversation with his Excellency, and he read me parts of Admiral Lalande's despatch. Ahmed Pasha accused Hosrow and Haid Pasha of having murdered Sultan Mahmoud, and of the intention to give up the country to the Russians. He said he had written on the 2d July to Hafiz Pasha, to call upon him to march with his army to depose the present Minister by force. That he (Ahmed) would ask Mehmet Ali for his support in the undertaking, and announced his intention to take the Ottoman fleet to Candia. Admiral Lalande said, that Candia belongs to Mehmet Ali, and it would be to deliver up the Ottoman fleet to him; and the Pasha subsequently said he would go to Rhodes.

The French Ambassador communicated what he had heard to the Grand Vizier, accompanied with assurances of the friendship of the French

Government, &c. I wrote to the Grand Visier, and said that Her Majesty's Government would act as a faithful Ally. It was necessary to say something, and what I did say is not calculated to commit anybody.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) **PONSONBY.**

P.S.—I inclose copies of my letters to Admiral Stopford, and to Colonel Campbell.

P

Inclosure 1 in No. 159

Baron Roussin to Viscount Ponsonby

Therapia, le 7 Juillet, 1839.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur et cher Collègue,

UN événement grave vient d'arriver. J'apprends directement et avec certitude que le Capudan Pacha est en insurrection avec sa flotte contre le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse et est parti pour Rhodes prétendant que ce Gouvernement est vendu à la Russie. Il dit avoir reçu un Tatar à Hidir Pacha pour l'engager à marcher avec son armée sur Constantinople pour changer le Gouvernement. Ce Tatar serait parti.

La tentative de Capudan Pacha est folle s'il se borne à rester à Rhodes avec sa flotte jusqu'à ce qu'il ait vu d'abord les succès de la guerre. Mais il peut se livrer à Malte, à Valparaiso, à la prise de la paix. Si l'avis qu'il a donné à Hidir Pacha de marcher sur Constantinople est vrai, nous sommes en danger. Les deux camps des forces de terre et de mer peuvent renverser le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse et organiser la guerre civile.

Il me semble que la conduite de nos Gouvernements ne peut pas être dictée par des intérêts égoïstes. Ils sont amis du Sultan. Le Sultan, Mehdî, et nous nous sommes pour lui; je viens pour le compte du mien, en donnant l'assurance de la loyauté de Sa Hautesse. Comme je ne fais pas un secret de la parfaite intelligence qui existe entre les deux Empires, je vous prie, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur et cher Collègue de m'indiquer à vous pour nous concerter sur toutes les mesures que nous pourrions avoir à prendre et que les conseils à donner au Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse dans cette circonstance.

Agreez &c.  
(Signé) **BARON ROUSSIN**

Inclosure 2 in No. 159

Viscount Ponsonby to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.

(Copy sent to)

Sir,

Therapia, July 7, 1839

I INCLOSE for your information, copy of a letter to me from the French Ambassador, and I have to add, that his Excellency has assured the Sublime Porte that it will find in the Government of His Majesty the King of the French, support, &c.

I have assured the Porte, that Her Majesty's Government will perform all that is incumbent upon a faithful Ally.

I have to add, that intelligence has this day been received of the total defeat of Hafiz Pasha by the Egyptian troops on the 24th June. It is said that Hafiz Pasha acted in direct opposition to the counsel given him by the Prussian officers with his army.

These events place us in a most critical situation. I presume to think that Her Majesty's squadron ought not to be at any distance from the centre of affairs.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) **PONSONBY**

Inclosure 3 in No. 159

Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Campbell.

Sir,

Therapia, July 7, 1839.

I INCLOSE copy of a letter which will inform you of what has taken place. The statement comes from Admiral Lalande, who was visited by the second in command of the Ottoman Fleet, Osman Bey, bearer of a message from Ahmed Pasha.

It seems Ahmed asserts, that the Sultan was murdered by Howrev Pasha, now Grand Visier, and Halil Pasha; that those persons intend to give up this country to Russia; that it is necessary to oblige the Sultan to appoint another Ministry.

The Capudan Pasha proposed to go to Candia; but as Admiral Lalande pointed out to the messenger, Osman Bey, that Candia belonged to Mehemet Ali, and that to carry the Ottoman Fleet there, would be to deliver it up to that Pasha, Osman seemed struck with the remark, and said the Capudan Pasha would go to Rhodes.

Admiral Lalande said he had no orders to interfere by force with the movements of the Ottoman Fleet. He has ordered a French brig of war to observe the motions of that fleet.

The French Ambassador communicated the facts to the Sublime Porte, and has assured the Sultan of the devotion of the French Government to the cause of the Sultan, &c. He has advised the Porte to send couriers in all haste to Hafiz Pasha; and I believe he has advised that orders should be given for the recall of the army back to this neighbourhood. I shall give advice, that the army be left where it is, because that part of the Empire ought not to be exposed to become the prey of Mehemet Ali.

The Ambassador has desired the French Consul-General to place before Mehemet Ali the expediency of his remaining quiet, and to show him that all the Great Powers must interfere in this crisis, and that his part is to be acquiescent.

I have to beg of you to say, that the Pasha will do well to reflect upon the inadequacy of his own means to resist for one hour the force of the united Sovereigns, and that his wisdom will direct him to avoid the consequences that may attend imprudence.

I have assured the Porte of the firm support of the British Government.

I have only the shortest time for writing, therefore I confine myself to the principal facts. It is to be seen whether Ahmed Pasha has taken this step (unless he be mad) without having some support somewhere. But as yet there are no signs here of any disposition to make a disturbance. I think the end may be, that Ahmed Pasha will offer the Fleet to Mehemet Ali. It is to be seen whether or not he will be able to give it to him.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) **PONSONBY**



(No. 169.)

My Lord,

Therap. a. July 9, 1839

Therap. July 8, 1839

COUNT KUNIGSMARCK yesterday received intelligence of the total defeat of the Ottoman Army by Ibrahim Pasha, on the 24th of June. The Count informed Mr. de Montesson of the fact, who told it to me a few minutes afterwards.

From Kongsuarez's information came from the Baron de Vincke, who had received the news from one of the Prussian officers attached to the army of Haliz, and as I understand, that Pasha had reached Marash in his flight.

Count Königsmarck said, that Hafiz Pasha had acted in direct opposition to the counsel given him by the Prussian officers, that he said it was a disgrace to admit he had acted in such a manner, and that he abandoned his position.

The question of the Prussian officers is stated to have been, that Ibrahim Pasha would have been reduced to very great straits had Hafiz Pasha acted with any sort of skill and had avoided the most common fault which Sultan Mahmud had given Hafiz strict orders not to risk a battle in the plain but to refer his position to the mountains. I had no authority or power to cause Hafiz to be subjected to the attack of a skilful man and to bind him to his own policy, so as to deprive him of the power of producing any

I think I have discovered a point on which we may be  
 the more united. We are all alike sensible of the value of the  
 of Russia &c. Both of which are essential to the maintenance  
 of the Treaty of Commerce & Consular Privileges between  
 present policy of Russia to be followed, I think Russia will not  
 The latter policy will perfectly accord with their interest in the  
 of the Empire at the part of it which too naturally ever will fall  
 to their hands in proper time. I do not believe this result will be  
 prevented by any other means than by opening the Black Sea to the  
 fleets of England and France, and securing the Dardanelles against the  
 Russians.

I have before ventured to recommend that the Great Powers should interpose. The interest of England, France and Austria is to keep Constantine out of the hands of Russia, and I care not but Three Powers against One if they meet, and they may then either preserve the Empire entire, or partition it, if that be their will. I am of course it will be vain to expect anything wise or useful from the Turks now, and that it will not be advisable to pay any attention to what the Porte may say. It is more than probable the argument they use will be dictated by Russia. The Ottoman Ministers are no object, a servile set of men. To save the Darb-ul-Hisr from being lost.

Before these late events, and after the death of Mahomet Ali, the Grand Vizier that I thought it very possible the Ottoman Army would be defeated, and I advised him in that case to send with particularity, notice of the Great Powers should be given. He assured me that he would not make any concessions before a general formation of the opinion of the Great Powers. He said, however, that Hosrow knew when he answered me that it had been decided, but I do not state this as a ground essentially of the whole opinion of what his conduct will be. He is a man and a sort of artist has been accustomed always to watched intrigue and does so with great sagacity, and he showed courage on former occasions. He is the best man here for the time; he has authority because of his person and a large following, and he is exposed to fear and like a Pasha of Egypt. Haili is already accused of intriguing against Hosrow for power, to be obtained through the influence of the

young Sultan's sister (his wife), and her mother, whose son the Sultan is. Abdul Medjed is weak in mind, and education is bigotry by a most ignorant Moliah.

I believe that whatever Foreign Power may choose to have weight in the affairs of Turkey, must act and speak strongly and peremptorily. Fear will be the only counselor listened to here.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) **PONSONBY**

No. 161

*Lord Beaconsfield to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received July 26.)

No. 60.

My Lord,

Vienna July 13, 1849

AS there were passengers in your No. 35 which still a high light necessary for my gunner, were likely to lead to needless confusion with the new Meteor and I did not know him the despatch in which I myself took part relating to the verbally such parts of it as it was desirable for me to be acquainted with. Yesterday however he showed me a despatch from Count Ugorsky in which you learned he had found that Neu-Schrode's despatch was printed in so many places that it was quite too false a light, and are mixed up with other ones as which you have been stated but which were intended to you that I thought it best, to make to remove the impression which then had made upon Prince Yermolov's mind, to put your Lordship's despatch into his hands.

As on read it I showed him from the passages adverted to in the Review how even the good faith and fair dealing in which your business has been conducted, and the real purport of that document had been read. It is as clear as day to everybody that the conveying master having begged me to repeat your words up that is you admit that part of the explanation is in my hand and for a repetition of words is as indicating that Russell is not disposed to take into consideration the possibility of making a more pertinent statement, would to that extent that he Peter M. would be a whole man not as a thing of material substance or the realization of what he pledges his whole life in character.

[illegible]

Prince Metternich asked me for an extract of your Lordship's despatch, beginning with the words "The Great Powers are justified in interfering, which I purport giving him down to the words "The Powers would still burn to drive them back into Egypt."

I place this limit to it, because the whole intermediate passage is either a declaration of principle, or an exposition of the necessities of the case.

Prince Metternich remarked, that if there was a Conference, no other basis for their proceedings could be entered upon, the first of which, that the first part of this ~~document~~ which would assuredly be subjected to by the Great Powers. His present object is to communicate it to Russia, to whom Power the communication was in an ~~un~~probable have already been made, but I would I recommend to your Lords ship, that the content of it and effort of Prince Metternich is to prevent the Great Powers from mis understanding each other in which, I think it my duty to give him every assistance in my power. I am sure his intention is sincere, and he is a far better judge of the mode than I am.

I may add to this despatch, that Prince Metternich congratulates himself that no formal Conference had been instituted before the late change of conduct of the Porte towards Mehemet Ali, which he feels would have placed the Powers in a ridiculous position. What is required, he says, is to ~~be~~ <sup>be</sup> out little and do much, not to mount an instrument which shall promise great things, with the chance of being rendered unserviceable by a vagary of the Porte, but to employ one which shall be apt to great purposes, without having excited great expectations.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 162

Lord Beaule to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 26.)

No. 61)

My Lord,

Vienna, July 17, 1839

I THIS day received the inclosed despatches from Lord Ponsonby by an Austrian courier. It appears to me so desirable that Prince Metternich's communications should accompany them to England, that I shall delay a day in forwarding them, to give time for this to be done.

Your Lordship will perceive that the first news of the battle which reached the Corps Diplomatique at Constantinople, was through Count Königsmarck, who received it on the 7th of July, thirteen days after the action had been fought. It is not to be believed that the Turkish Government had not learnt it sooner; and Prince Metternich is in possession of reports which prove to his satisfaction, that the defeat was known before the overture to Mehemet, and that it decided that measure. The hasty manner in which it was carried into effect, and the strange confused letter of the Grand Vizier to the Pasha, indicate the state of feeling under which it was written.

It is called a battle, but in fact there was none, the whole Turkish army having run away as soon as the cannonade grew hot.

Prince Metternich's instructions to the Internuncio will be communicated to your Lordship; there is nothing very salient in them, nor is it easy to give directions for events which so far outstrip all provisions. With regard to the position of the Powers, it does not appear to me to be very changed by what has happened. By the inclosed précis of a report from the Austrian Consul at Alexandria your Lordship will see that the attack was made by Ibrahim upon the camp of Mehemet Ali's order to the effect. Capt. in Chief, who bore the counter-order will have received the camp was a fortnight after the defeat of the Turkish army, so that we may hope that Ibrahim will have halted upon the Euphrates. There seems to be far from a certainty of the fleet having gone over to Mehemet Ali; in which case it is possible that the ultimate loss may only be that of the Turkish army, which is to be considered as totally disbanded. This state of things, with the assistance of the Five Powers, might not be irreparable, but the character of the Sultan, the intrigues of his Ministers, the insubordination of the Capudan Pasha, and the project of employing the forces of the Sultan to serve the ambition of their commanders, show a state of things to which no foreign aid can supply a remedy. In speaking of these things with Prince Metternich I said to him that my own disposition would be to let them fight it out, reserving interference for a moment when something solid and to be relied upon should have presented itself. He eagerly acquiesced in the suggestion, but when I inquired whether it would be possible, he reflected for a short space, and then said, at least the Powers can keep together and firmly determine that whatever interference is called for, shall be made in common, and not by any one Power singly. This is the only chance he sees of avoiding great disasters.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) BEAUVALE

Inclosure in No. 162.

Extract from Colonel Laurin's Report to the Internuncio.

Alexandria, June 26

IBRAHIM received the order to attack on the 15th and a Tatar sent off on the 19th by Husein Pasha to Mehemet Ali, has just brought word that the army would be ready to attack on the 21st, and that this would positively take place on that day.

No. 163.

Lord Beaule to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 26.)

(No. 62, Confidential.)

My Lord,

Vienna, July 18, 1839

PRINCE METTERNICH is so little satisfied with the Internuncio's conduct, which he considers inadequate to the occasion, and with his reports, which appear to him meagre and insufficient, that he is about to send a gentleman of the name of Hiesker from his office to assist him. This gentleman is well acquainted with Constantinople, having passed many years there, and bears the reputation of a very able man. There is always in the Austrian Chancery a class of men instructed in the languages of the East, and employed from an early age in service in those countries.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 164

Lord Beaule to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 26.)

No. 64)

My Lord,

Vienna, July 19, 1839.

IT was impossible not to feel that a new state of things can arise in consequence of the 28th July being so late. The death of the Sultan Mahmud, the arrival of a successor, and the consequent changes in the views of the Powers, the destruction of the army, the election of the fleet, and the rivalry of the leading persons of the empire have already changed the state of things, and may be felt by Her Majesty's Government to require an alteration in our intentions. (Under this impression I thought it would be useful to transmit to your Lordship, the views of the Austrian Government upon the altered position of affairs, and being prevented by indisposition from calling on Prince Metternich on the evening of the 17th, I addressed a letter to him of which I inclose a copy. The next day passed without my being able to obtain an answer, and as I am still unable to go to the Prince, Baron Neumann has this instant come to me from whom I learn that the questions I have put to the Prince are on grave for him at once to make up his mind upon, and that he purposes sending a courier in a few days to London, by whom he will enter into a full consideration of the actual posture of affairs.

I would remark to your Lordship, that it appears highly probable that the Porte and the Pasha will come to an agreement. The overture, of which Akad Effendi is the bearer, having been sent with the knowledge of the defeat of the Turkish Army, it is to be supposed that he is authorized



to submit to the Pasha's conditions; and Mehemet Ali will prefer closing at once with the Sultan in a moment of defeat, rather than await the interposition of the Five Powers.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE

Inclosure in No. 161.

Lord Beaumont to Prince Metternich.

Mon Prince,

Vienne, ce 17 Juillet, 1839

IL y a quelques points sur lesquels je vous prie de donner votre avis à Londres.

1° Si une entente s'établit entre la Porte et Méhémet Ali, que faut-il faire? y acquiescer en se tenant dehors? En ce cas, ne faudrait-il pas tout de même venir à une entente entre les Cinq Puissances sur les principes qui les dirigeraient, et sur la conduite qu'elles auraient à tenir en cas du renouvellement de ces complications qui ne tarderont pas à arriver?

2° Si la négociation entre la Porte et le Pacha se rompt, il faudra un tout autre effort pour faire évacuer la Syrie à Méhémet Ali que pendant l'existence de l'Armée Ottomane. Si nous voulons nous épargner cet effort, il faudrait nous montrer à Méhémet Ali décidés à le faire, et nous concerter dès-à-présent à cette fin. Mais y avons-nous le même intérêt que pendant la vie de Mahmoud? Notre but alors était de sortir de ces inquiétudes toujours renaissantes; y en aurait-il aujourd'hui le même espoir? La Syrie, pays turbulent, livré à des désordres, demande une main ferme pour la contenir. La remettre sous le Sultan actuel ne serait-ce pas ajouter un nouveau foyer à l'anarchie dont l'Empire Ottoman est menacé? Le Sultan n'a-t-il pas assez à faire pour s'asseoir dans les pays qu'il gouverne, et ne sera-t-il pas incapable de gouverner? Enfin, vaut-il un grand effort pour placer la Syrie sous un Gouvernement de femmes et d'enfants servi par des Ministres tels que ceux du Sultan se montrent déjà?

Si ces considérations avaient quelque poids, ce serait plutôt à empêcher l'hérédité en Syrie dans la famille de Méhémet Ali, qu'à la lui arracher par la force.

Je vous prie de m'écrire par le prochain courrier si vous avez quelque chose à me dire sur ces points.

Agredé, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE

No. 163

Lord Beaumont to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 26.)

(No. 65)

My Lord,

Vienne, July 19, 1839

PRINCE METTERNICH has just sent to me, by Baron Neumann, Prince Esterházy's report on his interview with your Lordship, in which you expressed to me your instructions to me of the 25th June, and your views upon the subject of the negotiation at Vienna.

The Prince is highly pleased with Prince Esterházy's account of his conversation with your Lordship, and fully satisfied with your views upon the negotiation. The only thing he begs to suggest in addition, is the necessity of orders to the Ambassadors at Constantinople, and the Consuls at Alexandria, to abide by what they may receive from hence on the part of the Five Powers, and not to act independently of it.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE

No. 166

Viscount Palmerston Lord Beaumont

No. 75)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, July 26, 1839

YOUR Lordship's despatches from No. 46 to No. 57, by Austrian courier, did not reach me till a late hour on the night of the 23rd instant, and after the messenger Kaye had been sent off to Vienna from this office.

I have to inform your Excellency, that the contents of your despatches have afforded the greatest pleasure to Her Majesty's Government.

Those despatches prove that there exists perfect identity between the views of Austria and those of England, upon the Turco-Egyptian Affair, and that full reliance may be placed upon the complete co-operation of Russia with the other Powers in effecting a permanent and satisfactory settlement of these important matters.

I have to express to Prince Metternich the extreme gratification which is felt by Her Majesty's Government at this state of things, and to assure his Highness, that Her Majesty's Government fully appreciate the enlarged and statesmanlike views which he has been the first to sketch out upon these matters, and does ample justice to the ability of the combined arrangements by which he proposes to work those views out.

The Austrian Government shall have the zealous and cordial co-operation of that of Great Britain for the accomplishment of the great purpose which is aimed at; and Her Majesty's Government are perfectly convinced that France will be found to be as zealous and as sincere as Great Britain, in labouring to accomplish an object of such vital importance for the peace of Europe.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 167

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beaumont

(No. 76.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, July 26, 1839

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government fully concur with the Austrian Cabinet in thinking that the death of the late Sultan ought to make no difference in the course which the Five Powers were prepared to pursue for the purpose of effecting a firm settlement between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt; and Her Majesty's Government, from its knowledge of the sentiments and views of the Cabinet of Vienna, is also convinced that Austria will agree with England in opinion, that the objects aimed at by the Five Powers ought not in any degree to be affected by the defeat which the Turkish Army sustained at Nezib on the 24th of June.

The result of the battle of the 24th cannot entitle Mehemet Ali to any greater favour from the Five Powers, but rather the contrary because the battle was fought in defiance of the remonstrances and warnings of the Five Powers, his army being the assailant, and the field of action having been beyond the frontier of Syria.

But neither can the results of that battle diminish the force of those political considerations which have led the Powers to think that the evacuation of Syria by Mehemet Ali is essential for the maintenance of the Turkish Empire, and consequently for the preservation of the peace of Europe on the contrary, the results of that battle must tend to give additional force to those considerations, and to demonstrate the urgent

necessity of not delaying to carry into execution an indispensable arrangement. For the results of that battle, by weakening, for a time at least, the military means of defence possessed by the Sultan, renders it still more incumbent on the Five Powers to interpose, in order not only to rescue the Sultan from present danger, but to protect him from a recurrence of similar danger in future.

Nor, on the other hand, can that battle increase in any sensible degree the difficulties which the Five Powers may have to overcome in the practical execution of the proposed arrangement; for, on the contrary, in whatever degree the effect of the Egyptian forces in Syria may have been diminished by the casualties and expenditure of stores, consequent upon the action and upon the operations connected with it, in the same proportion must the Pasha of Egypt become more sensible how much his military position in Syria might be affected if the communication between Egypt and Syria by sea were to be cut off by the squadrons of the Allied Powers.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 168.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 27)

No. 282.)

My Lord,

Paris, July 25, 1839.

I HAVE only time before the departure of the post, shortly to state the substance of what was this day communicated to me by Marshal Soult of the despatches which were received late last night from Admiral Roussin, from M Cochelet, and from Admiral Lalande, commanding the French squadron in the Levant. The despatches, at the time of my interview with the Marshal, were in the hands of the King at St. Cloud.

The most important part of their contents, namely, the total rout of the Turkish Army in Syria, was made known to the French Government by the Marseilles' telegraph on Monday last, and communicated, I am told, to your Lordship on the following day by M. de Bourqueney. Next in importance to this intelligence is the news of the Turkish fleet having sailed from the Dardanelles in disobedience of the orders issued by the Turkish Government. It appears from Admiral Lalande's report, that the Capudan Pasha sent Osman Bey on board the French Admiral's vessel, to inform him that, in consequence of the ascendancy of Russian interest in Constantinople, he would not risk, by returning to the Sea of Marmora, placing the Ottoman fleet at the disposal of the Russians; and that he was proceeding with it to the island of Candia. Admiral Lalande strongly remonstrated against this attempt, observing, in the first place, that he was acting upon erroneous information; and secondly, that, under any circumstances, he had better go to the Isle of Rhodes than to Candia, which was in possession of the Egyptians, and which, in fact, would be the surrender of the Turkish fleet to Mehmet Ali. The Capudan Pasha apparently yielded to this advice. Admiral Roussin writes, that operations are felt of insurrectional movements in Thessaly, as well as in Albania.

Mehemet Ali, according to M Cochelet's reports, is in a state of great exultation at the success of Ibrahim Pasha, and talks of the necessity of the Sultan yielding to him the hereditary right, not only to the Government of Egypt, but also to that of all the Pashas of Arabia and the whole of Syria; and treats contemptuously all idea of a Russian army being able to thwart his views. Ibrahim Pasha had written to request that vessels should be sent for the transport to Egypt of 6,000 soldiers of the Turkish Army who had enlisted in the service of the Pasha, and for the conveyance to Alexandria, of the trophies of his victory.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

No. 169

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 29.)

(No. 283.)

My Lord,

Paris, July 26, 1839

I ENCLOSE copies of the two telegraphic despatches from Marseilles which were communicated to me this morning by Marshal Soult. The first containing intelligence of the Capudan Pasha having proposed to Mehmet Ali to place under his protection the Turkish fleet which he commanded; and the second, stating that Akif Effendi was arrived on the 10th at Alexandria, sent by the Sultan to announce to Mehmet Ali the death of his father Mahmoud, to confer upon him, with hereditary right, the government of Egypt and of Syria; to propose to him his being proclaimed Governor of the Turkish Empire; and to invite him to Constantinople to preside over the reorganisation of the Administration.

I had not the opportunity of seeing Marshal Soult till nearly 6 o'clock this evening. He was at St. Cloud with the King in the early part of the day, and was obliged afterwards to attend a debate in the Chamber of Peers. In the short interview I had with his Excellency, he sent to me several despatches of Admiral Roussin and of M Cochelet, but as I could find no time to read them, copies of these papers will be sent this evening to your Lordship. As the despatches were communicated to your Lordship, it is unnecessary for me to state their contents. I have, however, before the departure of the messenger, to attempt giving a statement of their contents.

Your Lordship will learn from M de Bourqueney also, that the French Government is of opinion that neither the disastrous overthrow of the Turkish Army, nor the traitorous conduct of the Capudan Pasha, should affect the course which the Great Powers of Europe intended to pursue. The arrangements made between the Sultan and Mehmet Ali at a moment when the advisers of the former were either paralysed with fear or treacherously seeking to promote their own interests by the sacrifice of the Sultan's interests, should be regarded as null and void, and no new arrangements should be made to Mehmet Ali. The Marshal sent this evening to the French Ambassador at Vienna this evening, a letter in which he expresses this opinion of the French Government, and suggests its adoption by the Austrian Government.

I did not test the expression of this view of the French Government entirely coincide with the view he took of this question, and would be prepared to join with the other Powers of Europe in resisting the pretensions of Mehmet Ali to the hereditary government of Syria, and in the Arabian Pashas, because that of Egypt, which I should determined to assert.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

P.S.—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches to No. 304 inclusive.

Inclosure 1 in No. 169

Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles.

L'Agent des Affaires Etrangères à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

Marseille, 25 Juillet, 3 h. du soir

LE 10, arrivée à Alexandrie de Akif Effendi, envoyé par le jeune Sultan pour annoncer à Mehmet Ali la mort de son père, le confirmer dans le gouvernement de l'Egypte et de la Syrie avec l'hérédité dans sa



l'union, et lui proposer l'oubli du passé, en le nommant Généralissime et soutien de l'Empire Turc; et en l'invitant à se rendre à Constantinople pour présider à la réorganisation de l'administration.

L'escadre Anglaise croise dans les parages de Chypre, et communique avec Alexandrie.

La "Gazette d'Agra" du 9 Mai, annonce que Runjeet Singh étant dans un état désespéré.

Ces nouvelles ont été apportées à Malte par le paquebot Anglais "l'Acheron," parti d'Alexandrie le 14, et M. Fabreguette a profité du bateau à vapeur Anglais le "Blazer," qui arrive à l'instant, pour me les transmettre avec une dépêche pour vous, que je vous enverrai par le courrier de demain matin.

Inclosure 2 in No. 169

Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles

1 Agent des Affaires Etrangères à M le Président du Conseil.

Marseille, 25 Juillet, 3 h. du soir.

LE 8, on connaissait à Alexandrie la mort du Sultan. Le 9, arrivée à Alexandrie d'une Corvette Turque ayant à bord Negib Bey, Kiaya du Capitan Pacha, chargé d'annoncer au Vice-Roi la présence du Capitan Pacha à Stankio, se dirigeant sur Rhodes, et de lui proposer de placer la flotte Turque sous sa protection, pour la garantir contre les troubles à venir par suite de la mort du Sultan. Le 10, arrivée à Alexandrie d'Ali Effendi, envoyé par le jeune Sultan pour annoncer à Méhémet Ali la mort de son père.

No. 170

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

No 310

My Lord,

Foreign Office, July 30, 1839

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 263, of the 26th instant, reporting your conversation with Marshal Soult, as to the course which should be followed by the Five Powers in the present state of the affairs of the Levant.

Your Excellency will express to Marshal Soult, the great satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government have learnt that the sentiments of the Government of France upon these important matters coincide so exactly and entirely with their own; and your Excellency will assure Marshal Soult, that Her Majesty's Government fully agree with him in thinking, that neither the overthrow of the Turkish Army, nor the treachery of the Capudan Pacha, nor the timidity or submission of the Divan, ought to alter, in any degree, the course which the Five Powers had previously intended to pursue; and that any arrangements which may have been made between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, at a moment when the advisers of the Sultan were struck down with fear, or influenced by treacherous motives, ought to be regarded as null, and that a declaration to this effect should be made to Mehemet Ali. Her Majesty's Government will immediately instruct Lord Beauvale to make a communication upon this subject, and the French Government has instructed M. de St. Aulaire to make

Her Majesty's Government sincerely rejoice at the complete identity of opinion on these most important matters between France and England, and they consider this identity as being the more valuable, because it has

arisen spontaneously, each Government having been led to the same conclusion by its own view of the great European interests which are involved in these questions.

There can be no doubt, that this perfect union of England and France will confirm Austria in the course which she was herself one of the first to chalk out. With Austria, Prussia will go; and it is impossible that Russia can hold back and refuse to concur in the course agreed upon between the other Four. Russia cannot openly avow herself less the friend of the Sultan than the other Four Powers are; and she will be compelled, in spite of herself, to concur in an arrangement which will essentially defeat her plans.

I am &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 171

The Duc de Dalmatie to the Baron de Bourqueney.—(Communicated by the Baron de Bourqueney, July 29.)

Monsieur le Baron,

Paris, le 28 Juillet, 1839.

J'AI reçu les dépêches que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser jusqu'au No 68 inclusivement. La réponse faite par Lord Palmerston à la déclaration dont je vous avais chargé de lui remettre copie, est de tous points satisfaisante. Les importantes nouvelles arrivées depuis quelques jours de l'Orient, ont donné à l'état des choses un aspect tout nouveau. Quoiqu'il soit difficile de se faire une idée exacte de la situation des affaires, on ne peut cependant pas se méprendre sur le fait que la situation de l'Orient est devenue plus grave que jamais. Les événements qui se passent à Constantinople et à Alexandrie, ont une portée immense. Les intérêts de l'Europe sont en jeu. Les grandes Puissances ont une tâche difficile à remplir. Elles doivent veiller à ce que la paix ne soit pas compromise. Elles doivent aussi veiller à ce que la justice ne soit pas méconnue. Elles doivent enfin veiller à ce que les intérêts de l'Orient ne soient pas sacrifiés aux intérêts de l'Europe.

La situation est donc très grave. Les événements qui se passent à Constantinople et à Alexandrie, ont une portée immense. Les intérêts de l'Europe sont en jeu. Les grandes Puissances ont une tâche difficile à remplir. Elles doivent veiller à ce que la paix ne soit pas compromise. Elles doivent aussi veiller à ce que la justice ne soit pas méconnue. Elles doivent enfin veiller à ce que les intérêts de l'Orient ne soient pas sacrifiés aux intérêts de l'Europe. Vous y verrez également que Mehemet Ali, par le sentiment de la supériorité que lui donnaient les circonstances, n'avait point se montrant disposé à de grandes exigences.

La rapidité avec laquelle marchent les événements peut sans doute faire craindre que la crise ne se dénoue d'un moment à l'autre par quelque arrangement dans lequel les Puissances Européennes n'auraient pas le temps d'intervenir, et où, par conséquent, les intérêts essentiels de la politique générale ne seraient pas pris en considération suffisante. Ce danger est une conséquence inévitable de la distance où nous sommes de Constantinople et d'Alexandrie; il n'y a pas moyen d'y remédier d'une manière absolue. Je pense néanmoins qu'il convient de persister dans la marche suivie jusqu'à présent, et qui consiste en substance, à subordonner à un concert aussi intime et aussi soutenu que possible entre les Cabinets, l'action que chacun d'eux est en mesure d'exercer dans la Question d'Orient. Pour l'Angleterre comme pour la France, pour l'Autriche aussi, bien qu'elle ne le proclame pas aussi ouvertement, le principal, le véritable objet de ce concert, c'est de contenir la Russie, et de l'habituer à traiter en commun les Affaires Orientales. C'est assez dire que dans les conjonctures actuelles, il y a lieu plus que jamais de travailler à la resserrement. A Vienne, on pense absolument de même; et M. de Metternich laisse même voir à ce sujet une extrême préoccupation. Vous en jugerez par la copie ci-jointe de la dernière dépêche de M. de St. Aulaire.





considered very friendly to Russia; and that the personal enmity which Haal Pasha bears to Russia, will probably lead him to oppose the wiser political views of his statesmen; and that Russia therefore hopes that her influence in the Divan will now become supreme.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) CLANRICARDE

No 174

Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 30.)

(No. 6.)

My Lord,

Berlin, July 24, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches Nos. 108 and 109 enclosing copies of a despatch which your Lordship has addressed to Lord Clanricarde, marked No. 108, and one addressed to Lord Beauvale, marked No. 57, on the affairs of Turkey and Egypt.

I read to Baron Werther, *in extenso*, the first of the above-mentioned despatches, and his Excellency was so much gratified at your Lordship's view of the state of affairs in the East, and so struck by the accuracy and exactness of the statement which should be assumed by Great Britain and Russia in the present state of things, that he begged of me to have the copy of the despatch which was sent to him, and to communicate the contents of it to the King of Prussia at Toplitz. Baron Werther assured me that the King would derive much satisfaction from a knowledge of your Lordship's language to Russia on the occasion, and although he had been prevented from taking His Majesty's pleasure on Eastern Affairs before he left Berlin, yet he felt confident that he might enable me to say that His Majesty's Government in Prussia would be fully agreeable in the line of conduct which your Lordship proposed to adopt, in conformity with the views of the Austrian Cabinet.

I showed also to Baron Werther, some extracts of your Lordship's despatch No. 57, addressed to Lord Beauvale, in reply to the observations and suggestions of Prince Metternich on the same subject. The remark that I have made on Baron Werther's opinion of your Lordship's despatch to Lord Clanricarde, will equally apply to your observations to Lord Beauvale.

As your Lordship states that it did not appear advisable to Her Majesty's Government to give the suggestion of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, and of Prince Metternich, that Russia should be invited to send her Black Sea squadron into the Mediterranean, to co-operate with the combined British, French and Austrian fleets, I abstained from touching on this point with Baron Werther. But his Excellency seemed highly surprised at Prince Metternich's proposal, that in the event of the successful establishment of the Five Powers should each make a declaration of their determination to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire, and that none of them will seek to profit by the present state of things, for the purpose of gaining any acquisition of territory.

I had written thus far when Baron Werther sent to me a word which gave me some information of the result of his conversation with respect to the King of Prussia's views on the subject. I received an estafette from Constantinople, and read to me a despatch conveying the alarming intelligence of the total dispersion of the Ottoman Army, and of the revolt of the Capudan Pasha with the whole of the Turkish Fleet, who had sailed from the Dardanelles on the 5th instant, and had spoken with the French Admiral off Tenedos, on the 8th, and had informed him that the Sultan had been poisoned by the Russians through the agency of

Hosrew Pasha, who had been sold to Russia; that Abdul Medjid had been imprisoned; and that he was about to join the fleet of Mehemet Ali, in order that they might concert measures together, for the protection of the Ottoman Empire.

Your Lordship will probably have received this intelligence through earlier sources than the present, but I may as well add, that Count Königs- mark informed the King, that the Turkish Army did not withstand the Egyptian attack above half an hour; that the very first discharge of cannon sent the Turkish Army through the Ottoman ranks, and that the whole army took to flight, not above a thousand men perished in the combat itself, but two-thirds of the army were lost or destroyed in the retreat, or rather flight which ensued.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GEORGE B. HAMILTON

No. 175

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 48.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, July 6, 1839.

ON the 1st instant I received by Government post, a letter from Mr. Pro-Consul Werry, of Aleppo, dated 22d June, in which he informed me, that on Thursday, the 20th June, at noon, Ibrahim Pasha, with all his army, moved forward from Telhassir, and crossing the Sedjour, marched to the village called Mazra, on the right bank of the Nile. A body of the Sultan's Army (cavalry) sent to be commanded by four viziers, two of which are Koord Mahomed Pasha, of Orfa, and Mirza Pasha. Ibrahim Pasha ordered forward the Artillery, and approached; and at about 5 p.m. opened a fire on the Sultan's camp, which was not, however, of long duration, for the Sultan's Cavalry gave way, and fled in the direction of Neuh, where the main army was, leaving behind them all their tents and baggage, besides the military stores, and about 30,000 prisoners.

His Highness the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha then halted his troops to repose, and after a short time moved forward again in the direction of Neuh, and yesterday morning, *chemin faisant*, he met another body of the Sultan's Cavalry and Artillery. His Highness ordered forward his Artillery and Cavalry, and opened a fire on them. The engagement lasted for almost four hours, and the Sultan's troops gave way, and retreated to Neuh, leaving behind them fourteen pieces of artillery, ten light and four heavy guns. His Highness Ibrahim Pasha then told his troops to repose, and ordered two regiments of Cavalry, and one of Light Artillery, with his *annadeh* (a Bedouin tribe), to be ready, as he intended to advance on Hafx Pasha himself, ordering at the same time the rest of his army to follow him.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry adds, that his informant who was present at the battle, stated that the Turkish Artillery did not fire a single shot, and that a general panic seized the Turkish army, as the army of Ibrahim Pasha was so near that it was only a march from Neuh, where the army of Ibrahim Pasha was, to the Viceroy's camp.

On the evening of the 1st instant, when I was with Mr. Pro-Consul Werry, we were informed that Ibrahim Pasha, having camped at Neuh, the 25th June, had received a letter from the Viceroy, who was also present, and the Pasha read to us the letter, which contained a few lines, from the tent of Hafx Pasha, to say that he had on the day attacked the Turkish Army, which had been completely defeated, with the loss of all its artillery, tents, and matériel; and that he should send the details as soon as he could collect them from the generals in command of divisions.

On the morning of yesterday, M. de Laurin received a letter from the Austrian Consul-General at Aleppo, dated 26th June, and of which I have the honour to transmit copy and translation, and by which your Lordship

will perceive that many Turkish prisoners of rank have been made, and also several English amateurs.

I have not the least apprehension for the safety of those luckless gentlemen as I am confident that Ibrahim Pasha will not detain them a moment, and that he will treat them with every regard, and give to them every facility to go wherever they may desire.

The Pasha's steamer has not yet arrived with the details of the action, but it is probable that some of the Turkish prisoners of rank may be sent here by the steamer which will have arrived the day after to-morrow.

It is probable that Captain Caillier will have reached the camp of Ibrahim Pasha on the 27th ultimo; and that, in conformity with the order of which he was the bearer from Mehmet Ali, Ibrahim Pasha will not make any movement in advance after the arrival of Captain Caillier. But I learn from my colleagues here that they have been informed by their respective Ambassadors that the Sultan has so far allowed the Chief of the Marshes to proceed to Constantinople to proceed with any mission to H. E. Pasha to discuss his operations, and this is the more to be lamented, as that officer might possibly have reached in time to prevent the late battle.

As far as regards the issue, no other result was to be anticipated by any of us; but we had seen the Egyptian and Turkish Armies engaged in their decisive battle, and I have no doubt, as I have no doubt to report to your Lordship, and Her Majesty's Representative at Constantinople, that the only result of the battle of Mansiir was that of a Turkish victory. I think who had seen the two armies, and I took the liberty to give my own opinion as to the effect of the battle of the army of Ibrahim Pasha, and I never for a moment had a doubt of the result of the general battle.

As to the hopes generally entertained at Constantinople, of a rising of the Syrian population on the appearance of the Turkish Army, I was never very sanguine on that point, as I had had the experience of personal observation in that country. I was not at all disposed to believe in the reports of Syrian discontent made by Jewish and other agents in that country, and it has now been proved that the efforts of a few emissaries of the Syrian Society have not only failed to excite any rising, but have only succeeded in making the Moslems, for I fearfully say, the most of every sort of Christians, and the Jews, they deny a right to touch the direct road of the Syrian.

The Pasha's fleet is still engaged in sight of the coast, and volutes from the forts and from the fleet have been fired to celebrate the last victory.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure I in No 175

The Austrian Consul-General at Aleppo to M. de Laura

Illmo. Signore,

Aleppo 26 Giugno 1839.

L'ARMATA di Hafi Pasha, dopo una dura lotta, si è ritirata, e ha gettato ess. I armati, e abbandonato le artiglierie, e munizioni. Nessuno potrebbe raggiungere l'armata se Ibrahim Pasha volesse seriamente inseguirla. La città di Aleppo, bruciata e saccheggiata, è stata obbligata a ripassare l'Eufrate, e a stabilirsi in sicurezza di cui godiamo.

La popolazione di questa città, recata in massa sulla strada di Mansiir, per scontrare diversi mustri prigionieri che si attendono. Sul campo furono raccolti diversi dilettanti Inglesi, che la curiosità aveva spinto in quella parte. Sono molto sorpresi di questo poco felice successo.

Il povero Gran Signore dovrà probabilmente far dei nuovi sacrifici per acquistare il suo potente vassallo.

Le poche truppe rimaste qui si sono intradate verso il campo, che è quello precisamente che ieri mattina occupava Hafi Pascià con i suoi.

Domani è dopo domani, l'avanguardia Egizia, comandata da Osman Pascià, tenterà di passare l'Eufrate. Tutto indica essere questa l'intenzione del Seraschiere Egizio.

(Translation.)

Sir,

Aleppo, June 26, 1839, Evening.

THE Army of Hafi Pasha has ceased to exist. Yesterday, after a cannonade of three hours, the Turks threw down their arms and abandoned their artillery and ammunition, flying in every direction. Not one of them could have reached the Euphrates had Ibrahim Pasha wished seriously to prevent it. The city of Aleppo has petitioned Ibrahim Pasha to make arrangements for obliging the disarmed soldiers of Hafi Pasha to recross the Euphrates, so as not to disturb the security we enjoy here. The population of this town is proceeding en masse, on the road to Mansiir for the purpose of meeting several numbers of rank and file expected to arrive. On the 26th 1839, we were taken several English amateurs who had been brought thither by curiosity and who have expressed their great astonishment at the luckless result of the campaign.

The poor Sultan will probably have to make fresh sacrifices, in order to appease his powerful vassal.

The few troops left here have set out in the direction of the camp, which is precisely on the same ground occupied yesterday morning by Hafi Pasha and his army.

To-morrow or next day the Egyptian advanced guard, commanded by Osman Pasha, will commence passing the Euphrates. Everything indicates that such is the intention of the Egyptian Seraskier.

No. 176

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston—(Received July 27)

(No. 49)

My Lord,

Alexandria, July 6, 1839.

THE Pasha's iron steamer arrived here early this morning, and the British steamer of the Pasha, came on soon after, both in three days from Alexandretta.

Ibrahim Pasha had not yet had time to send his detailed report of the late battle, and we are therefore ignorant of the loss on either side, or of number, or rank, of prisoners.

The Pasha read aloud the letters which he had received this morning, and the substance is as follows:—

Ibrahim Pasha writes on the 28th of June from Antab; and it may, therefore, be presumed that Solyman Pasha of Marash had evacuated that city.

Three regiments of Infantry and three of Cavalry had been sent by Ibrahim Pasha to take possession of Orfa and Diarbekir, and he was going to send on troops to Malatia.

Hosrew Effendi, who accompanied Captain Caillier, the Aide-de-camp of Marshal Soult, to Syria, writes from Alexandretta, on the 23rd of June, that they were to leave on the next day for the head-quarters of Ibrahim Pasha, which they expected to reach in six or seven days; but it is evident that the troops of Ibrahim Pasha will have occupied Orfa and Diarbekir, and perhaps even Malatia, before they have communicated the order of Mehmet Ali for them to halt.

3 C



Ibrahim Pasha demands transports to be sent over to Alexandretta to convey to Alexandria, 4,000 soldiers of the army of Hafiz Pasha and who have enlisted in the Egyptian Army.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 177

*Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde.*

(No. 121.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 30, 1839.*

SINCE I wrote to your Excellency on the 23rd of this month, Her Majesty's Government have received intelligence of the defeat of the Sultan's Army at Nezib on the 24th of June, and of the supposed defection of the Capudan Pasha from the authority of the reigning Sultan; but those events, however unfortunate they have been, do not appear to Her Majesty's Government to afford to the Five Powers any reason for altering in any degree the course which they had previously intended to pursue, and those events cannot, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, oppose any insurmountable difficulties to prevent the Five Powers from carrying into effect those arrangements which they may finally agree upon. The union of the Five must necessarily carry with it a moral force which will overcome any obstacles they may meet with.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 178

*Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 31, 1839)*

(No. 13.)

My Lord,

*Aleppo, July 1, 1839.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, copies of two despatches I addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, under the 26th and 29th ultimo, accompanied with copy of a translation of an Arabic report made to me by a person who was in the Egyptian camp, present when the engagement took place on the 24th ultimo between the two armies, as also copy of a letter I addressed to Captain Davis, of Her Majesty's ship "Dido," under the 26th ultimo.

I hope the above, and the steps I have pursued throughout, will meet with your Lordship's entire approval.

Since closing the above copies of despatches to his Excellency the Ambassador, nothing of any interest has transpired worthy of your Lordship's notice.

This morning a post reached this, bringing the intelligence that his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha had reached Aintab with all the forces, from whence it is said his Excellency has started for Mervat.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY

*Inclosure 1 in No. 178.*

*Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.*

My Lord,

*Aleppo, June 26, 1839.*

MR. VICE-CONSUL HAYS having informed me under date 22nd instant, which reached me on the 24th, of the arrival at that port of Her Majesty's ship "Dido," Captain Davis, in pursuance to instructions from

Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Naval forces in the Mediterranean, and further, that Captain Davis was anxious to receive every, and the latest, information respecting the movements of the two armies; I have this day addressed him, transmitting to him the events that have transpired.

I do not know whether Captain Davis will leave Alexandretta on receipt of my letter, but as I am anxious to communicate to your Lordship, a moment sooner the events that I have transpired, I risk these few lines to do myself the honour to inclose herewith for your Lordship's information, copy of my letter to Captain Davis, begging Mr. Vice-Consul Hays in the event of Her Majesty's ship "Dido" leaving to forward this to your Lordship per Austrian steamer, expected on the 2nd or 3rd inst. by which opportunity I shall do myself the honour of again addressing your Lordship with any further information I may have elicited.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY

*Inclosure 2 in No. 178.*

*Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Captain Davis.*

*Aleppo, June 26, 1839.*

Sir,

I RECEIVED on the 24th instant, late at night, from C. W. Hays Esquire, British Vice-Consul at Alexandretta, the intelligence of the arrival at the port under the 21st instant, of Her Majesty's ship "Dido" under your command, in pursuance to instructions from Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Naval forces in the Mediterranean.

As Mr. Vice-Consul Hays informs me that you are desirous of receiving every, and the latest, advice on the movements of the Egyptian and Turkish Armies, I do myself the honour of transmitting herewith, for your information, the latest I have obtained.

I beg leave to inform you, that the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha, with the Egyptian forces, arrived at the port on the 22nd instant, that the Egyptian forces, under his Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha, had advanced on the 24th instant from their encampment at Tel-Bash, two hours on this side of the river Sennar, and had marched on the village of Mervat, opposed by a body of the Sultan's advance guard, composed of regular Cavalry, on up reaching it, a severe engagement took place between them and the Turkish troops, in which the Egyptian forces were shortly after obliged to fly to a village named Nezib, distant three hours from thence where the main body of the Sultan's Army was concentrated under the Seraskier Hafiz Ali Pasha, leaving behind them all their tents, provisions, flags, and some 50,000 piastres.

On the 21st instant, the Egyptian troops advancing from thence in the direction of Nezib, met another small body of the Sultan's advanced guard, which, after a slight skirmish, was also put to the rout, and obliged to join the main army. Since then no official advices of any sort reached this from the Egyptian camp, respecting any further movement, the person, however, employed in the transport of provisions from hence to the camp, reported that the Egyptian troops had advanced, and had completely encircled the Turkish Army at Nezib, cutting off their communication with Birejik.

This morning, the 26th instant, his Excellency Ismail Bey, Governor of this town, received a post from his Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha informing him that on Monday the 23rd instant at 3 A.M., the Egyptian forces were at Nezib where the Ottoman Army was concentrated, and after an engagement of two hours between them, in which the Artillery and Cavalry on both sides alone acted, the infantry not firing a single shot, the Sultan's Army was put completely to rout, and obliged to dismount, leaving behind in the Egyptian hands, the

camp composed of all the provisions, ammunition, baggage, and 120 artillery pieces. I inclose for your information, copy of the Governor's official note to me on the subject, with its translation in French.

The deserters from the Sultan's Army are hourly reaching this, in scores, and taking service under the Egyptian Government, as Bashi Bozuks, Irregular Cavalry: they state that 25,000 of them were taken prisoners, not including many that deserted to this side at the first onset.

They further state that the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha seeing his army routed fled with some of them in the direction of Raman Kale, but that the remainder, and greater part of the Turkish Army were taken prisoners besides; many of whom threw themselves on the mercy of Ibrahim Pasha who it is said pardoned them and sent them forward here. That Mirza Pasha, General of the Regular Cavalry, and Assad Pasha, General of the Spahis with many other officers, such as Colonels &c. fell in the engagement: those that it is reported were killed by the Sultan's troops, though some were a great enemy to the Egyptians, and whose order was given to advance, then and killed their officers, so as to ensure their escape to fly and surrender to the enemy.

I am informed by some of these deserters that among those who fell was a certain M. Turk Bey, Prussian officer in the Sultan's service and attached to Hafiz Pasha with the quality of instructor, against whom it is said the Egyptians great enmity, as I was almost the first person destroyed by them when he was encouraging them on.

It is impossible, for the present, to obtain correct and full details on these events, until the arrival here of some European employe who witnessed the movements that took place.

The success of the Egyptian arms over the Ottoman forces is being celebrated here by the firing of a salute, and the playing of music, a day's market being a going on. Town and bazaar are illuminated, and are to remain so during the whole night.

As regards the news of the Alexandria street and of the movements of the military forces, that is going on, I make no doubt you will receive from Mr. Wood and Hays much fresher information than any I am enabled to communicate to you from here.

I trust, the whole of the district has not been in a very unsettled state, but I think the excess that has taken place on the frontier between the two armies will prove the first that have been of considerable extent, and I hope shortly that this frontier will resume a more tranquil state.

I was informed about a week ago that by the direction of Hamah and Hama a considerable force of Egyptian troops was sent off, but from what I have since learned I doubt if it is so.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 178.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby

My Lord,

Aleppo, June 29, 1839.

I HAD the honour to address your Lordship, under the 26th instant, inclosing copy of a letter which I addressed under that day's date to Captain Davis, of Her Majesty's ship Dido, who had reached Alexandria on the 22nd instant, in pursuance to instructions from Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, informing him of the engagement which took place at Nezib, on the 24th instant, between the Turkish and Egyptian forces, in which the former were completely put to the rout. I now avail of the Austrian packet Sir Percy's express to Alexandria on the 2nd July, to do myself the honour of laying before your Lordship what has further transpired since that date.

I have to inform your Lordship, that the subsequent advices which reached this from his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha stated that the

Egyptian forces were encamped at Nezib, and had taken possession of all that was in the Turkish camp, of which there was a great abundance of everything, and consequently desiring the Government here to send forward no further provisions from hence.

His Excellency the Seraskier does not mention anything at all respecting his movements, but from the personal attacks of the Government arriving from the camp I learn that his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha had sent a Misselim to Orfa and another to Hama, and further that Magasin Bey, Colonel of the Annals, with his troops, Bessan Cavalry, had crossed the Euphrates, accompanied with two regiments of Regulars for the above-mentioned places, and that his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha accompanied with all the army, intended starting about the 27th instant from Nezib for the direction of Marash where it is said the Sultan's Seraskier Hafiz Pasha, with several other viziers, officers, and about 4000 men, the remainder of his army with some Artillery had taken refuge.

It is also today asserted that Soliman Pasha of Marash, who was occupying Aintab with about 12,000 men, on hearing of the retreat and overthrow of the Ottoman army at Nezib, retreated immediately to Marash.

It is supposed by some that the movement of Soliman Pasha's from Aintab to Marash, and the retreat of the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha there, is done with a view of collecting the remainder of the Turkish forces they have left, and endeavoring to make a stand to oppose if possible, a further advance of the Egyptian forces on that line, which is not at all improbable.

It is almost incredible, my Lord, how such a large army as that under the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha, composed of fine strong young men, joining from the deserters and prisoners arrived here of which there are 3,000, who have almost all involuntarily enlisted for the Irregular Cavalry (Bashi Bozuks), should have met in not more than two hours time with such a complete defeat.

The details relating to the engagement on the 24th instant are numerous, and all vary a little. I have compared them all, and I find the most correct one is that made to me by a person who was an eye-witness of the whole affair. Having been constantly in the Egyptian camp from the time it started from Telbasher up to the moment, and after the collision took place between the two armies.

I beg leave to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copy of a translation I have made of these details, as narrated to me by the party, which will, I hope, meet your Lordship's approval.

I beg leave further to inform you that on the 27th instant in the evening, M. Caillier, one of Marshal St. Arnaud's aides de camp, reached this coming from Alexandria in six days. The French Consul here, M. Guys, tells me that he has a letter by him from M. Cochelet, the French Consul-General in Egypt, dated the 19th of June, which states that M. Caillier, bearer of his letter, had reached Alexandria direct from Paris on a mission to his Highness the Viceroy of Egypt, the purport of which is, that he is not to commence hostilities against the Sultan's troops and if he has done so, to cease immediately. Consequently, he leaves this for Aleppo, accompanied by his Highness's second interpreter and bearer of a letter from his Highness the Viceroy to his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, instructing him that wherever the letter reaches his Excellency's hands, at that place he is to immediately cease any hostilities his Excellency may have undertaken against the Sultan's forces under the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha.

M. Caillier, on reaching this, was I am told thunderstruck on hearing of the sad event that had taken place on the 24th instant between the two armies; nevertheless, he left this yesterday afternoon, accompanied by his Highness's second interpreter returning with all speed on quest of his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, who, from all accounts, I dare say he will find between Aintab and Marash.

I have this afternoon seen at the French Consul's here, a M. Petit, Frenchman, instructor in the Sultan's service, who was at Hafiz Pasha's camp during the engagement, and was taken prisoner by the Egyptians.



from whose camp he reached this this morning. The account he gives of the engagement agrees in part with what I have herein transmitted to your Lordship, with the exception as to the amount of troops composing the Sultan's Turkish camp, which he states not to have amounted to more than 40,000 men of all arms; and that Izet Pasha, who was expected with a force of 25,000, had not yet reached the camp when the engagement took place, and that there were no more than 140 pieces of artillery, which were all left on the field.

He further states, that Hafiz Pasha left the camp retreating towards Moush full one day and a half previous to the defeat and overthrow of the Turkish army, and that the cavalry he had was 5,000 men, and the infantry 10,000.

M. Petit also informs me, that a few days previous to the engagement Mr. Ansell and a Mr. Russell (the former was, I mistake not, attached to the late Euphrates Expedition), reached the camp coming from the interior of Asia Minor, where they had been travelling for the Georgia and Socotra, and asking a list of the same. These two gentlemen, he says, he saw very early the day the engagement took place, but that he did not see them until the day after, when he saw or heard nothing of them except that they were at the Egyptian camp; some papers were brought to Sulaiman Pasha, which M. Petit tells me he recognized as the papers and notes belonging to these gentlemen, and mentioned the same to his Excellency Solyman Pasha, to whom I shall immediately write, to obtain the same, and to beg he will cause every search and inquiry to be made to find out the fate of Mr. Ansell and Mr. Russell. M. Petit adds that they may have fallen; Hafiz Pasha with the baggage &c. to Moush, and they are safe, but if not I am very much distressed. Two ladies and a girl were also taken a prisoner in the engagement, between the two armies. I shall also ask a messenger to go to Mr. Ansell to see if I can obtain any intelligence respecting the fate of the party.

By the latest arrival from Alexandrette I find that Mustock Bey had again attempted another descent near Byass, but I hope and trust that the Egyptian army will be successful in driving him off.

I am happy to say, very quiet although the Moslems are still in the habit of committing every kind of atrocity as begun, great enmity to all the Christians; and if Ibrahim Pasha had met with a reverse, I am afraid the rise here would have been a very serious one.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) P. H. S. WERRY.

#### Inclosure 4 in No. 178

*Translation of an Arabic report given by a person who was on the spot at the time the Engagement took place on the 24th June, between the Turkish and Egyptian Forces.*

ON the 18th instant I left Aleppo for Solyman Pasha's camp, which was stationed at the villages Babek and Durbek, some 10 miles distant from Aleppo.

On arriving, I found it had left, and was informed that it was marching to Tarsus six hours further on, a Turkish Pasha's detachment I followed, and when I reached, we were approaching the river Sedjour. I also found that the Sultan's army had left Tarsus, and on asking where we were going was informed that it was marching from Ibrahim Pasha's information. Solyman Pasha that he had left that place, and desired to meet him on the cross of that river, where he would wait for him, to join the two detachments in one.

They met, and crossed the river at a place called Mehadit-el-Tuah; after which a village came, and informed Ibrahim Pasha that there was a detachment of 2,000 cavalry of the Sultan's army encamped at an hour's distance, commanded by Koord Mahomed Pasha, who, on hearing of

the arrival on the Sedjour of Ibrahim Pasha, marched back to the village Mazar, to join another detachment of 4,000 men encamped there, commanded by the Pasha of Moush.

Ibrahim Pasha hearing this, pushed on with his army, encamped at the spot which Koord Mahomed Pasha had quitted, and ordered that ammunition should be distributed to his army.

On the 20th instant we advanced towards Mazar, while Ibrahim Pasha preceded the army with his Annadia, and with them alone gave the attack. This lasted about forty minutes; after which the enemy fled, leaving behind 400 tents and eight pieces of artillery, with ammunition and provisions of all kinds, of which Ibrahim Pasha took possession, and pillaged the village. Two of the Annadis were killed, and twenty wounded, while twenty horses were maimed on Ibrahim Pasha's side.

The fugitives were pursued until they reached the remaining part of the Sultan's army which was at Nezeb, commanded by Hafiz Ali Pasha. Ibrahim Pasha perceiving that he was not attacked, retreated his army back to Mazar.

During three days, for about two hours every day, Ibrahim Pasha advanced his Annadia, to irritate a general attack, but was repelled only by the Irregulars on the Sultan's side.

The two armies, at each of these skirmishes, had reciprocally from twenty to thirty men wounded.

Solyman Pasha having received intelligence from the Egyptian Army was not in a favourable situation, and advised Ibrahim Pasha to bring his army to the east of the Sultan's, which was towards Biregik, which he observed would impede the enemy's intercourse with Biregik, where they had left a portion of their ammunition.

On the 22d we marched there, and reached the bridge called Ghergin, which is between two hills, at four hours to the north-east of Mazar. The pass being very narrow, it was only on the next day, Sunday the 23rd, that all the army had crossed. It appears that if the Sultan's troops had placed only 2 cannons and 1,000 men here, Ibrahim Pasha could not have passed.

The whole of the Sunday was spent on the other side of this bridge, where biscuits and ammunition were given to the army to last three days, and each soldier was ordered to prepare for action, which Ibrahim Pasha announced to them would be on the following day, Monday the 24th.

At midnight we were surprised by an attack from the enemy, which dispersed our camp, while Ibrahim Pasha repelled them with two battalions of Artillery. After an hour, the Sultan's troops retreated, leaving on the field five cannons, which they took back before daybreak, Ibrahim Pasha not being aware of it.

Before sunrise, we marched an hour and a half to meet the enemy, leaving half an hour's space between us. After marching a short way, Ibrahim Pasha again sent forward his Annadia, which again were only repelled by the Bacha Bozaks (irregulars). The two armies remained looking on the scene without either of them attacking with their regulars, for a space of time. Ibrahim Pasha advanced twice, each time approaching nearer to the enemy, without the Sultan's troops firing a gun, and it was only on a third approach that the Sultan's cannons fired, when he ordered up his Artillery against them, and put his Infantry and Cavalry in the rear; the Egyptians twice retreated, when Ibrahim Pasha drew his sword, and cut down twenty-seven of them with his own hand. At this moment half of the 3rd Regiment of the Guards, which is composed principally of Syrians, ran over to the enemy, where they were well received. Ibrahim Pasha then galloped along the line, ordering a general attack. This being executed, the enemy appeared intimated; and after an hour's fire from the first clash, retreated at full speed, blowing up the powder magazines. There was now a general fire given by the Egyptians, with an advanced march, pushing the Sultan's troops before them until they reached the spoil of their enemy's camp and the intrenchments, where we found about 100 cannons, 1,110 1000 tents, and an immense quantity of butter, rice, honey, flour, and provisions of all

kinds, white cartridges, muskets, &c., were to be seen on the ground like pebbles.

When the Regiment of the Guards which ran over to the enemy saw this general retreat, it began to fire on the fugitives.

On arriving I asked one of the surrendered cannoniers whether this is all the cannon they had. He answered in the negative; adding, that Hafiz Ali Pasha, their General-in-Chief, had taken with him in his retreat 200 pieces leaving the military cash chest and his tent upon mules, but it is not ascertained whether the cannons were not left in their flight on the road, for the direction he took is mountainous.

I tried as much as possible to know the exact quantity of killed and wounded of each army, and found that on the Sultan's side there were 1,000 killed and 1,000 wounded, while of Ibrahim's troops 1,000 were killed and 2,000 wounded.

That night they remained on the field; and it was only on the next day that Ibrahim Pasha ordered each regiment to seek their companions, bury those they would find dead, and bring into the camp the wounded, before attending on those of the Sultan's troops.

After this, Ibrahim Pasha marched towards Biregik with three regiments of Infantry and two of Cavalry.

On his arrival on the Euphrates, opposite Biregik, he sent for camels to load the ammunition and provisions he had with him, and ordered Maggoun Bey to cross with his Annadis over to Biregik, at which time I left, and returned to the camp.

I was given to believe that the prisoners taken were from 12,000 to 15,000 men, besides those who fled towards Aleppo, which, I heard, amounted to 4,000 or 5,000.

This is what I have heard and seen.

No. 179.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 31)

No. 14.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, July 1, 1839.

SINCE closing my despatch of this day's date to your Lordship, I have again seen M. Petit-Franchini, the Sultan's secretary, who was at Hafiz Pasha's camp during the engagement on the 23d of June, and taken prisoner by the Egyptians from whose camp he reached this.

I beg to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of the narration made to me by M. Petit of the details of the engagement at which he took part, and which shows the Egyptian forces, whose details I have every reason to believe and hope are correct.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY

Inclosure 1 in No. 179.

Relation sur la Bataille de Néub, par M. Petit, Instructeur à l'Etat-Major de Hafiz Ali Pasha.

LE camp Ottoman était placé au sud de Néub, sur trois lignes, les deux premières d'Infanterie et la troisième de Cavalerie, l'Artillerie se composant de 140 bouches à feu; les troupes étaient de 37,000 hommes, dont 23,000 d'Infanterie sous les commandemens des Pachas Ibrahim, Soliman Pacha et Karo M. et Pacha, 5,000 hommes de Cavalerie sous le commandement de Karo M. et Pacha, 3,000 d'Artillerie par Beir Pacha, et environ 4,500 Bachi Bozaks (irréguliers), étaient commandés par Soliman Pacha.

L'armée d'Ibrahim Pasha, composée de 43,000 hommes, était campée

sur le prolongement de la gauche de l'armée Turque, à 6,000 mètres de distance, le terrain qui couvrait la gauche de camp Ottoman était très-accidenté, ce qui rendait la bataille dans cette direction, extrêmement désavantageuse pour l'Armée Egyptienne.

Hafiz Pacha étant informé que plusieurs régimens composés de Syriens avaient l'intention de passer dans ses rangs, fit canonner le 23 Juin, à 11 heures du soir, le camp Egyptien, pour y mettre le désordre et faciliter la desertion des dits corps. A cet effet quatre batteries d'obusiers, de calibre de 24, se portèrent dans le silence de la nuit à 1,000 mètres du camp Egyptien, et lancèrent 200 obus. Ces projectiles jetèrent le trouble et la confusion dans le camp d'Ibrahim. Les points de direction du camp furent relevés à 5 heures du soir par les officiers d'Etat-Major de Hafiz Pacha, les tentes d'Ibrahim et Soliman Pacha, lesquelles étaient si près à distinguer puisque la troupe Egyptienne n'avait point de tentes. Ces deux Pachas se hâtèrent de monter à cheval pour empêcher la confusion qui était devenue très-grande.

Plusieurs centaines de Syriens desertèrent dans le camp Ottoman, et plusieurs pelotons étaient en marche dans la même intention; mais l'activité de Soliman Pacha déploya aux avant-postes empêcha qu'un plus grand nombre de fugitifs ne sortissent du camp.

Ibrahim Pacha sentit la nécessité de finir par une grande bataille, en conséquence l'Armée Egyptienne prit ses armes à l'aube du jour, et une division en bon ordre sur six colonnes se dirigea sur les derrières du camp Ottoman. La 1re colonne était composée de 60 bouches à feu, marchant par sections; la 2de, d'Infanterie, (colonne de direction), composée de 12 bataillons, marchait par divisions à distance entière; les 3me and 4me colonnes d'Infanterie, chacune de 12 bataillons, marchaient à côté de la 2de, les serrées en masse à distance entière de la 1re, et les 5me and 6me colonnes, composées de fragments de Cavalerie, marchaient en avant de la 1re à distance.

Soliman Pacha avait l'intention d'entrer les distances de l'Infanterie en tête, et de charger les bataillons de Cavalerie de la 1re colonne en masse, pour se porter sur les derrières de la 2de colonne, et ainsi par ce moyen sur la tête ou sur la queue des colonnes, il avait également placé en tête 2 batteries de 12 obusiers de calibre de 36, qui tiraient avec beaucoup de précision.

L'intention de Soliman Pacha fut déviée par un officier d'ordonnance de Hafiz Pacha: ce premier avait l'intention de former une ligne oblique sur l'extrême gauche des lignes Ottomannes. Les lignes avaient fait un changement de direction à gauche sous un angle d'environ soixante degrés; mais les têtes de colonnes d'Ibrahim Pacha n'ayant pu se porter à la hauteur du village de Néub, et voyant que les troupes de l'Artillerie Turque, sous Soliman Pacha, n'avaient pas encore bien formé face à gauche en bataille, et que l'Artillerie Egyptienne tirait sous le feu d'une terrible artillerie Turque, il se décida à se retirer avec autant d'ordre que sur un terrain d'exercice.

Dans ce moment un feu très-vif de 304 bouches à feu s'engagea à 1,200 mètres, le canon d'artillerie dura 1 heure. L'Artillerie Egyptienne, qui était très-précipitamment arrivée, se voyant en danger de perdre la bataille, se contenta de rapporter son feu en attendant que des renforts de la réserve arrivassent; ce moment devint critique pour l'Armée Egyptienne; sans batteries de la 1re et de la 2de ligne, les lignes avaient fait, puis la fuite dans le grand désordre. C'est alors que l'Armée Ottoman, sous le commandement de Hafiz Pacha, commença à exécuter la manœuvre de la bayonnette sur les troupes Egyptiennes, pendant ce moment d'hésitation du dit Hafiz Pacha, Soliman Pacha, avec ses aides de camp, se porta à la main, contraignant les fuyards à rentrer en ligne sous le feu meurtrier de l'Artillerie Turque.

Les artilleries à canons d'Ibrahim Pacha étant arrivées, un feu bien soutenu, la bataille s'engagea de nouveau à 600 mètres.

C'est dans ce moment que les Bachi Bozaks de Hafiz Pacha prirent la fuite dans le plus grand désordre. Hafiz Pacha et ses officiers d'ordonnance s'efforcèrent de les arrêter pour les faire rentrer, mais cette énergie du général-en-chef devint inutile, et les troupes Turques, qui se trouvaient sous un feu terrible de mitraille, commencèrent à lâcher pied.



Le désordre grandissait toujours davantage, malgré l'activité et la bravoure de Hafiz Pacha et le dévouement de ses officiers Européens à son service; une grande partie d'infanterie qui pendant l'action avait montré assez de sang-froid et de courage, quitta le champ de bataille, en abandonnant un grand nombre de fusils. La Cavalerie Turque qui n'avait pas combattu, par son caractère vaillant et le son de ses tambours fut entraînée par la fuite des Bachi Bozuka et de l'infanterie, cependant elle seule exécuta sa retraite avec ordre, et le Séraskier Hafiz Pacha se retira sur Marache avec le reste de son armée.

L'Armée Turque laissa sur le champ de bataille plus de 100 pièces de canons, ses bagages de campement, et ses munitions; le trésor, s'élevant à 45,000 bourses (5 millions et  $\frac{1}{2}$  de francs), fut cependant saisi.

Sur les cinq officiers Européens qui étaient au service de Hafiz Pacha, M. Petit fut fait prisonnier sous une charge de Cavalerie, dans le temps qu'il remettait en ligne plusieurs batteries qui étaient en retraite, voulant éviter qu'elles fussent prises par l'ennemi.

On a de fortes raisons de croire que le Baron de Moske, officier distingué de l'Etat-Major, a été tué.

Les Ottomans ont eu 4,000 hommes hors de combat, entre tués et blessés; dans l'Armée d'Ibrahim Pacha, 3,200 hommes également hors de combat, mais les blessés sont presque tous mortellement.

Il faut rendre justice à l'infanterie Turque, qui montra beaucoup de courage et de résistance, mais qui malheureusement ne fut pas secondée.

La bataille fut très-sanglante, puisque l'Armée Ottomane perdit le huitième de son effectif.

La perte de la bataille est attribuée aux causes suivantes:

A ce que les officiers Européens ne furent pas écoutés dans les conseils qu'ils donnaient; 1°. Que les troupes Ottomanes ne devaient pas quitter un mamelon qui se trouvait à 800 mètres en avant du centre de leur front; 2°. Qu'elles devaient exécuter la charge à la bayonnette lorsque l'Armée Egyptienne avait ralenti son feu et avait quatre régiments en déroute.

A ce que la Cavalerie ne prit pas part au combat, elle aurait pu en se déployant en échelon par régiment, la gauche en tête, former un ordre concave sur les têtes de colonnes d'Ibrahim Pacha, et produire une grande action de force, puisque les deux armées auraient agi de concert sur le point qui était le chef de la bataille.

## No 180

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 31)

No 24)

My Lord,

Beirut, July 1, 1839

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship, copy of a letter addressed to me by Mahmoud Bey, the Governor of Beyrout, announcing a complete victory gained by Ibrahim Pacha over the Ottoman forces under the command of Hafiz Pacha.

The letter of Mahmoud Bey gives no particulars; but from private sources, it is understood that the battle took place on the 24th ultimo, at Neaib, about nine hours from Aleppo, an engagement of minor importance having preceded it the day before, with some advantage, it is said, to the Ottoman arms.

The result of the general battle was, the flight of Hafiz Pacha with the wreck of his army to Roum Kale leaving on the field the artillery (120 pieces of cannon, it is reported), provisions, ammunition, and tents. Most of the troops are said to have laid down their arms.

According to private accounts from the Egyptian army, received by Bahri Bey, an employé of this Government, high in confidence of Ibrahim Pacha, his Highness was marching on Koniah.

Public rejoicings in all parts of Syria have been ordered in celebration of the victory of Ibrahim Pacha.

The country, which was daily falling into a state of disorder in every direction, will doubtless now, on the news of the defeat of the Sultan's forces, return to a state of tranquillity.

I have, &c  
(Signed) N. MOORE.

Inclosure in No. 180.

The Governor of Beyrout to Mr Consul Moore.

Monsieur le Consul.

Beirut, le 24 Rebi-akhir, 1255

JE viens de recevoir à l'instant l'ordre suprême en date du 18 courant, extrait d'un ordre du Généralissime à Son Excellence Chérif Pacha, qui annonce que le jour de Lundi, 13 Rebi, 1255, Son Altesse s'est dirigée à la tête de l'Armée Egyptienne (que Dieu daigne toujours rendre victorieuse) vers l'Armée Constantinopolitaine, et y sont arrivés une heure après le lever du soleil.

L'Armée de Constantinople a été détruite après une bataille qui a duré deux heures, ils ont laissé sur le champ de bataille, canons, munitions, et tentes, et ont pris la fuite; et par la grâce de Dieu nous n'avons aucune crainte. Son Altesse a ordonné la publication partout de cette glorieuse victoire, afin de la célébrer joyeusement, et d'illuminer le pays un jour et une nuit, de la saluer par les salves d'artillerie et l'allégresse, que les habitants s'adonnent à la joie et au plaisir, comprenant votre attachement et votre sympathie, ainsi que l'union du même drapeau, nous vous annonçons cette nouvelle, afin que vous participiez les heureux succès.

(Signed) MAHMOUD BEY.  
Gouverneur de Beyrout.

## No 181.

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 31)

No 12.)

My Lord,

Damascus, July 5, 1839

I HAD the honour of addressing your Lordship my last despatch per Beyrout steamer, No. 11, under the 7th ultimo.

Mr. Pro-Consul F. R. S. Werry, at Aleppo, will doubtlessly inform your Excellency of the important events which have occurred between the armies of the Sultan and Mehemet Ali on that frontier, since I had last the honour of addressing your Lordship.

Having taken the liberty to address unreservedly your Lordship, on the circumstances which have given place to the collision between the two armies, I have only now to describe the prospects which this change of position of the Contending Powers offers, in connection with the immediate interests of this country and its interests, which have been thereby so deeply implicated. The state of the country in the immediate neighbourhood of this city, in the centre and in the south of Syria, is from the result of the defeat of the Sultan's Army, relieved from the effervescence and degree of disorder into which it was thrown; and it is presumable that the malcontents of the north, who had taken so active a part against the Egyptian Government, will also retire, but by the latest accounts from Aleppo, a third of the army of the Sultan is now under the command of Soliman Pacha of Marash, while the battalion of Egyptian Infantry was shut up in the citadel.

The future movements of his Highness Ibrahim Pacha and his army are what now engross public attention, and may equally be an object of

the greatest interest on which your Lordship may wish to receive intelligence. On this very important point I have no positive information to offer your Lordship, none but public rumour, and the appearances of the general state of affairs produced by the untoward event, from which induction can be made. It is reasonable to think, that in the new position in which his Highness Ibrahim Pasha is placed, independent of awaiting fresh instructions from Mehemet Ali, the first objects which will engage his attention are, to look after the debris of the Sultan's Army; the second, to release the parts of the Egyptian territory occupied by the Sultan's troops in its immediate vicinity; the third, to compose the disturbed state of the lower ranges of the Taurus, extending from Marash to Hyass, and the vigilant superintendence of the Adana district menaced by the Sultan's forces from Koniah, embracing the insurrection of the extensive mountains by which that province is bordered. Under such a view of his Highness Ibrahim Pasha's position, it does not appear probable that he will move either to the east of the Euphrates or northwards, leaving that river on his right, apart the greatest considerations which the peremptory commands of the Great Powers may impose on Mehemet Ali in transmitting orders to his Highness Ibrahim Pasha to retreat into the Egyptian limits. It is nevertheless prudent to examine what are the chances for success, should Mehemet Ali and his son, his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, flushed with victory, decide on pursuing a direct line of operations, either north or south from his present position.

By the defeat of the Sultan's Army, the disturbed state of the northern mountains may soon subside; this will permit him, should his views be directed northwards, to march by Kaisarianeh on Koniah, ordering the forces in the Adana district to penetrate the defile of the Taurus, thereby placing the Sultan's Army under Hadji Halil Pasha, between the two, which would insure its surrender, and leave the road open to Ibrahim Pasha to Constantinople, at the head of a large army; and I am not aware that the Sultan, single-handed, can oppose an army to prevent it, or at best, only a weak force, the destruction of which would only aggravate the unfortunate position in which the Sultan is already placed; and it may be here opportunely remarked, that the population of the Sultan's territories, either north or south, to Constantinople or through Mesopotamia to Bagdad and Babylonia, would welcome his Highness Ibrahim Pasha's march in the same sense, and with the same advantage, as the Sultan's Seraskier hoped to possess himself of Syria. The plans to be executed to check such a movement, as a remedy, may be more than the disease. The Sultan can afford to spare troops from all front and distant points of his empire, seconded by his Allies to form a constant guard of the Asian Province and Syria, and I hardly opine that with the exception of employing a British force in such a task, a combination on that emergency or immediately executable, — I might not be compatible with your Lordship's policy, to countenance the employment of either a French or Russian force in such an enterprise. Nor, with the same sense, might it be agreeable to your Lordship's policy, however satisfactory may be the new state of our relations with Russia respecting the Eastern Question, to let a Russian army should be sent from Constantinople to Trebizond to check the march of his Highness Ibrahim Pasha through Anatolia, or that a Russian fleet and army should once more invade the Sultan's capital to form a fresh bond for the maintenance of the *Urkah-Sekness Treaty*.

However, supposing it may appear that Mehemet Ali should hazard the preservation of a northern line of operations I am disposed to think, of his immediate views, he would rather risk facing the measures of Russia, than, to avert it, incur the anger of Great Britain, by directing immediately his views to the south through Mesopotamia, to seize the *Imperial* of Bagdad against which it from an immediate restraint from Great Britain, there is nothing to prevent its being now accomplished. The last advices from Bagdad and Mesopotamia fully authorize this induction being made.

From these hypotheses it would appear deducible, that Mehemet Ali will, to avert the combined anger of the Great European Powers, in

justifying himself for the heavy responsibility he has been necessitated to incur in defeating the Sultan's Army, act with that judgment and moderation which his position demands, and retire within the limits of his territories, to thereby claim at their hands their intervention, for the final adjustment of the question pending between the Sultan and himself.

In respect to the occupation of the points on the Southern Arabian shore, to the Persian Gulf, which formed a preliminary and distinct question between Great Britain and Mehemet Ali but which may have had a considerable and immediate effect in producing the actual crisis, it is presumable from the same chain of reasoning, that he must have already, according to our demands, abandoned those appropriations, on the supposition that the friendship of no European Power is so dear to him as that of Great Britain, with whom he is, if not alone, more closely connected than any other, and on which depends his sole, future, and positive existence.

Seeing my Lord, are the observations with fairness I have taken the liberty of making to your Lordship, and the circumstances which I have arrived at, or the present state of affairs in his country, as I trust as I hope they are in their integrity, so far as your Lordship's pacific policy and reference for maintaining our general interests in the country, than the *imposition* further *imposition* measures which may tend to aggravate them, already inflicted, without the risk of returning to positive hostilities, which our best interests may during a short time be in a state of suffering destruction, to our common prosperity of these countries, and to the higher range of our political relations in the Levant and the East.

The Government here, conformable to the previous instruction from his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, are making extraordinary preparations, great exertions are making to raise 3,000 Irregular Cavalry, under five different chiefs; but the scarcity of horses and money retards its completion. I hear 1,000 Irregular Bedouin Cavalry are arriving from Egypt; 1,000 camels are also being purchased; all these preparations are for the north

I have, &c.  
(Signed) N. W. WERRY

No. 182

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 31)

(No. 50.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, July 11, 1839.

HER Majesty's steamer "Rhodamanthus," Captain Wakefield, arrived here on the 7th instant, having been sent by Admiral Sir Robert Stopford to obtain intelligence.

The "Rhodamanthus" left Malta on the 2nd instant, on the squadron, from which it separated on the 4th, and was to rejoin the Admiral off the south point of the island of Cyprus.

On the evening of the 8th instant, a Greek vessel came in from Constantinople, with positive intelligence of the death of the Sultan; and the Pasha dispatched immediate orders to Ibrahim Pasha to suspend his march, and said that he expected a person from Constantinople to announce the death of the Sultan, and that he would send him to Constantinople to convey the news to the Sultan, and to assure him of his Majesty's sympathy.

At noon of the 9th instant, arrived here a Turkish corvette, sent from offensively by Admiral Stopford, Captain Pasha, on the 7th instant, having been sent by Admiral Sir Robert Stopford to obtain intelligence.

I myself and colleagues, that Achmet Pasha, and announced the news of the death of the Sultan, and the accession of his eldest son the Sultan Abdul Medjed, which took place on the 1st of



July. The Capudan Pasha had demanded at the same time of Mehemet Ali, the purpose of the fleet to Alexandria accompanied by his fleet, consisting of nine sail of the line, twelve frigates, and some smaller vessels, and having on board 6,000 land troops. The Viceroy added, that he came here in quality of a friend, that he had in consequence granted to him the permission to come, and that he would send his large steamer, the "Nile," to convey him; that the Capudan Pasha had at all appear satisfied with the elevation of Hosrew Pasha to the post of Grand Visier, and might perhaps have the wish or intention to leave his fleet (to give it over) in Egypt.

Later in the evening we heard from some of the persons about the Viceroy, that Achmet Pasha was coming to place his fleet at the disposition of Mehemet Ali; that the Achmet Pasha had declared himself ready to co-operate for the elevation of Mehemet Ali to the situation of Vakil of the young Sultan, Mehemet Ali being, in his opinion, the only person capable of governing the Turkish Empire in the present circumstances; they added, that Mehemet Ali had received favourably the offers of the Capudan Pasha, and that he had desired him (engagé) to come to Alexandria; that however he had not consented to go to Constantinople in person, but would send there one of his family, *quelqu'un des siens*, which caused it to be supposed that he meant one of his sons.

The Turkish corvette saluted in passing the Pasha's fleet, which is cruising in sight of this port. On the evening of the 9th instant, Sheriff Aga returned to the Capudan Pasha in the "Nile" steamer.

The "Rhodamantus" left this for the Admiral at day-break on the 10th instant, with the foregoing intelligence, and copies of my despatches Nos. 48 and 49 to your Lordship.

On the morning of the 10th, a Turkish steamer arrived here from Constantinople with letters for Mehemet Ali from Hosrew Pasha, and which were brought by Akif Effendi first secretary to the Viceroy.

Before reading these papers Mehemet Ali, at our dinner, gave us the following explanations relative to the reports which were brought the evening before, that Achmet Pasha was about to give over to the fleet of the Sultan, I will not accept it, and I will send it back to the Sultan; if Achmet Pasha wishes my interference to prevent him from giving Hosrew Pasha's fleet to the Sultan, I will not see him; he may return here and the letter will do what I want him to do. As to the post of Vakil, you may well believe that I have no intention of changing my present situation in Egypt for that of Vakil, and if I cannot see the intention of sending an *ad hoc* means to Constantinople, it is Hali Effendi to whom I alluded and who will be charged to compliment the Sultan in my name."

Having received the letter of Hosrew Pasha, he read it in my presence. It announced the accession to the throne of Sultan Abdul Medjid, and the pardon accorded by the Sultan to Mehemet Ali for the differences which he had had with his father, that he would send to him the Nishan Iffakhar, in token of his especial favour, and would also grant to him the hereditary succession of Egypt and dependencies; in fine, that the troops of the Sultan had received orders to retire from the frontiers of Syria, and that the Sultan engaged the Viceroy to contribute to the prosperity of the Ottoman Empire, &c., &c.

At the reception of this letter, Mehemet Ali caused an order to be prepared for Ibrahim Pasha, by which he enjoins him to withdraw his troops to this side of the Euphrates, and as far as Marash, looking on the war as now at an end. His son is to occupy this military line until further orders.

Mehemet Ali says he wishes to have possession of Marash, which is only about three hours beyond his present frontier, because it gives him the means of keeping in order the mountaineers of Giaour Daghi, who have always, although in his present territory, been very troublesome; and he says that he will pay the Sultan for that accession of territory the tribute which that district pays at present.

The Pasha says that he is confident that all differences will now be firmly settled without the intervention of the Great Powers, and he professes great respect for, and submission to, the young Sultan; and he adds, that so soon as the succession and all other points shall be arranged,

he will call Ibrahim Pasha to Egypt, and he himself will proceed to Constantinople in order to pay his personal homage to his Sovereign.

I hope there will not be difficulty in an amicable arrangement between the young Sultan and his powerful vassal; and I believe that all the persons about the Sultan will contribute and aid in this, as they are all now disposed to court Mehemet Ali, and Hosrew Pasha, who was his most bitter and inveterate foe, now expresses a hope that all old enmities between them may be buried in oblivion, and in fact not only has Mehemet Ali strong friends in the Divan, but he is regarded by all parties as the only person who can help the Sultan to sustain the Ottoman Empire.

The step taken by the Capudan Pasha appears to have been caused as well by his hostility to Hosrew Pasha, and his fear of losing his employment, as also, perhaps, by the wish to supplant Hosrew Pasha; and his knowledge of the enmity between Hosrew Pasha and Mehemet Ali, probably led him to believe that the latter might be induced to join him against Hosrew Pasha.

The forts and the fleet have fired salutes during the last three days in the morning and evening, and the Pasha sent orders to Abbas Pasha to do the same at Cairo, and to illuminate that city in celebration of the accession of the young Sultan.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 163.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 53.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, July 19, 1832.

I HAVE read with great attention the several inclosures in your Lordship's despatch No. 16, dated 11th June, and I am very much interested in your observations on some observations which I have received from a person of standing.

In the letter of the Reis Effendi to Viscount Ponsonby, inclosed in his Excellency's despatch No. 108, dated 1st May, to St. Petersburg, gives us a review of the military preparations and fortifications, the levied troops by the Sultan, and the relations between the Sultan and the Powers. But surely the Sultan must have been aware that Mehemet Ali could not, and dared not to, attack the Sultan, as in such case he would have had arrayed against him all the Great Powers. The Sultan had consequently nothing to fear from Mehemet Ali, and the interest of the Sultan was clearly to allow Mehemet Ali to exhaust his resources, seeing that he had nothing to dread from an attack by the Pasha, and by alleviating the condition of the population of Asia Minor, to contrast their condition with that of the oppressed Mussulmans of Syria. It was, however, clearly the object of Russia to urge the Sultan to weaken himself by useless preparations.

Besides, the preparations of Mehemet were defensive, as he was persuaded that it could not be reckoned on the support of the Great Powers if the Sultan's army were to be attacked by the Powers. Mehemet Ali was therefore to be prepared to stand passively, and to have exhausted his resources; and of which the Sultan played the game of Russia, in all except being aggressive.

In regard to the desire of the Sultan for Mehemet Ali to give up Adana, Damascus, Aleppo, Syria, Jerusalem, and Nablus, I think he would have consented to do so, and at present he will be still less disposed to listen to such a proposal.

In respect to the opinion of the Sultan's officers, as mentioned in Viscount Ponsonby's despatch No. 120, "That all the Syrians are enemies to the Pasha," that is true only in respect to the Mussulmans, on

account of the conscription and the greater favour now shown to Hayahs, but is far from being the case in regard to the non-Mussulman population.

In respect to the inclosure from M. Cochelet, in Earl Granville's No. 209, a similar document was sent to me, and forms Inclosure No. 3 in my despatch to your Lordship, No. 35, of 19th May last.

In regard to what M. Cochelet states (in Earl Granville's despatch No. 213) as the Pasha's reason for having given up his intention to assert his independence of the Porte, namely, "The encroachments of England on Mehemet Ali's dominions, and that if in the character of vassal of the Sultan, and in defence of the Turkish Empire, he claims the assistance of other Powers in resisting these encroachments, his representations will be more favourably received than if as Sovereign of an independent State he claimed their intervention"; I beg to inform your Lordship, that this is a mere gratuitous opinion of M. Cochelet.

The Pasha has more than once told myself and Colleagues, that he would not assert his independence, in order to avoid any direct collision or dispute with any of the Great Powers. I know that he has said the same to M. Cochelet in my presence and in that of his Colleagues, and I am quite sure that Mehemet Ali never specified England alone as the cause, although M. Cochelet may have advanced that as his own opinion.

I have more than once had the honour to mention to your Lordship the real motives of M. Cochelet and of the French Government to persuade the Pasha of the desire of England to possess Egypt, and that our capture of Aden was the preliminary to this object.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 181

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 54.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, July 13, 1839

NO details have yet been received by Mehemet Ali from Ibrahim Pasha of the late general action on Syria, and I have only a report of Mr. Pro-Consul Werry of Aleppo, which I do not send to your Lordship, as the report is so inferior that it is not worth transmitting a detailed account to your Lordship.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

P.S.—I transmit a copy of a letter from Solyman Pasha to the French Consul at Aleppo, giving some details of the late battle.

Inclosure 1 in No. 184.

Solyman Pasha to the French Consul at Aleppo

Nésh, 16 Rebi-Akhir, 1255.  
(25 Juin, 1839.)

Monsieur le Consul,

EN apprenant notre départ du camp de Dombek après qu'Antab eût été pris par l'Armée Turque, et en voyant que l'Armée Turque était prisonnière, lorsque sur tous les points les mouvements de l'Armée Turque étaient hostiles, et obligeaient Son Altesse le Général-en-Chef à se porter en avant, en apprenant notre départ, dis-je, vous avez dû vous attendre à de graves et rapides événements. La journée d'hier a répondu à cette attente. Avec l'intention d'attaquer l'Armée Turque, dès notre arrivée à Mazar, nous avons trouvé sa position trop forte pour l'aborder

de front. Nous avons dû la tourner. Nous nous sommes donc portés vers la gauche par une marche de flanc, de manière à venir ensuite la prendre à revers et tomber sur l'arrière de son flanc droit. Notre manœuvre a été heureuse; et dans la bataille que nous avons livrée hier, et qui a duré de 4 heures à 4 heures et demie, avec une chaleur très-vive, l'Armée Turque a été mise dans la déroute la plus complète. Tous les canons, la plus grande partie de ses fusils, ses tentes, ses bagages, tout a été pris. Je ne puis vous dire encore le nombre des prisonniers: il est si considérable que notre camp en est surchargé. Voilà un grand résultat. Je m'empresse de vous en informer, pensant que vous apprendrez avec plaisir un événement qui prépare la fin de cet état de crise et d'incertitude politique dont souffrent tant d'intérêts.

Je vous prie d'agréer, &c.,  
(Signé) LE GENERAL SOLYMAN

Inclosure 2 in No. 184

Solyman Pasha to the French Consul at Aleppo.

Nésh, 16 Rebi-Akhir, 1255.  
(27 Juin, 1839.)

Monsieur le Consul,

AVANT-HIER, en vous annonçant le résultat de la bataille de Nésh, je ne pouvais encore vous préciser le nombre de nos prisonniers. Il a élève à 10,000. Nous avons en outre pris 100 canons et 2,000 fusils, mais beaucoup restent encore dispersés çà et là ou cachés dans la rivière. Les tentes, les fusils, les bagages, tout a été pris. L'Armée Turque comptait aussi 104 pièces de canon laissées par elle, mais il nous en reste encore. Elle a perdu aussi une Artillerie Turque avec plus d'artillerie que cela, et je ne pense pas qu'elle en ait rien pu sauver.

Je vous prie d'agréer, &c.,  
Le Major-Général de l'Armée Egyptienne,  
(Signé) LE GENERAL SOLYMAN

No. 185

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 265.)

My Lord,

Paris, July 29, 1839.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to No. 308 and 309. No intelligence from Constantinople from Alexandria or from the fleets in the Levant has reached the French Government of a later date than that which was conveyed by the Marseilles telegraph, and which has been already communicated to your Lordship.

Marshal Soult this morning sent me a despatch from the French Agent at Malta containing accounts from Alexandria of the 14th from which it appears that the "Rhodantheos" steam-vessel had been sent by Sir Robert Stoddart to Alexandria and must, upon its return, join the British fleet. It has conveyed intelligence of the intention of the Capudan Pasha to place the Ottoman fleet under the protection of Mehemet Ali.

This intention was communicated to Admiral Lalande on the 8th instant, by Achmet Pasha; and Marshal Soult calculates that the instructions sent to the French Admiral by his Government, in regard to the Turkish fleet, if it should leave the Dardanelles, could not have reached him before the 12th: the Marshal, notwithstanding, is dissatisfied with the conduct of Admiral Lalande, and is of opinion that he ought to have given a more strenuous opposition than he appears to have done, to the traitorous surrender of the Ottoman fleet to Mehemet Ali.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE



Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beaconsfield

(No. 85.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, August 1, 1839

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 64, of the 19th of July, inclosing a copy of a letter which you had addressed to Prince Metternich on the 17th, submitting to his Highness's consideration certain points connected with the present state of affairs in the Levant.

I have to state to your Excellency, with reference to that letter, that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion, all things considered, that the death of the Sultan, and the defeat of the Turkish Army, rather increase than diminish the force of the reasons which had previously led the Five Powers to think it necessary that Syria should be restored to the direct rule of the Sultan, because the end for the attainment of which that measure was introduced is generally important and does not admit of delay. The danger to which the Turkish Empire is now exposed is a danger to which that Empire is exposed in no other case. The danger is, that the possession of Syria will be thought to render Mehmet Ali dangerously strong with relation to the Sultan during the life of Mahmoud, a vigorous and experienced Sovereign, still more must the possession of Syria render Mehmet Ali too strong with relation to his Sovereign, when that Sovereign is a minor, and has been enfeebled by the defeat and dispersion of his army, and by the defection of his fleet.

If indeed the only object of the Five Powers were to determine how Syria could best be administered, and if they had any right to take upon themselves the settlement of such a question, they might, in several ways, as to whether it would be most for the advantage of Syria to be governed by a Pasha appointed directly by the Sultan, or to be governed by a Pasha appointed by Mehmet Ali, or by an authority delegated to him by the Sultan, although it may safely be said that little doubt could exist on this point, if Mehmet Ali were to continue to subject the Syrians to the many and severe oppressions which they have hitherto suffered under his rule.

But this is not the question which the Five Powers have to deal with; the object they have in view is to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and they have a right to maintain that integrity, because its maintenance is necessary for upholding the balance of Power in Europe, and is essential to the preservation of peace in the world. The Five Powers therefore, as it seems to Her Majesty's Government, ought not to consider the integrity of the Turkish Empire as less important, merely because for the moment the throne happens to be filled by a minor. They should look to permanent interests, not to temporary accidents, and as they possess the means of effectually supporting Turkey, they ought to employ those means to accomplish that purpose.

The youth of the Sultan is a temporary inconvenience; his army, his navy, and his finances, may progressively be organized upon a better system, if Turkey shall continue for some years to enjoy peace under protection of the Five Powers. As long as the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire shall be maintained, there is no reason why that Empire should not occupy a respectable position in the Powers of the world; or why it should not be capable of defending itself, if assailed by such and as it would be sure to receive if it were to be attacked.

Signed PALMERSTON

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beaconsfield.

(No. 87.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, August 1, 1839

THE Five Powers appear to be all equally of opinion, that Syria, Cana, and Araba ought to be immediately restored to the direct rule of the Sultan, in consideration of the grant of the hereditary Government of Egypt to Mehmet Ali. But some of the Five Powers appear to doubt whether the alliance would have the means of inducing Mehmet Ali to acquiesce in such an arrangement if he should strongly object to it. It appears however to Her Majesty's Government that such doubts have no sufficient foundation. It can hardly be supposed that so shrewd and sagacious a man as Mehmet Ali, so accustomed to calculate chances, to weigh relative means, and to avoid needless risks, could seriously persuade himself that he was able to cope single with the Five Powers and the Porte united; or that he would prefer the inevitable ruin which a struggle against such odds would bring upon him, to the security which the arrangement of the Five Powers would secure to him. It is therefore hardly to be supposed that the moral force of the union of the Five Great Powers would not be adequate to bring about peaceably a full execution of the intended arrangement; but, if Mehmet Ali should resist, a little reflection will suffice to show what ample means of coercion the Five Powers possess. The fleet of Mehmet Ali, his communication with Syria, his commercial marine, his capital, are all at the mercy of the combined squadron; his fleet might be taken and given over to the Sultan; all communication by sea between Egypt and Syria might be cut off; and though it is no doubt physically possible for him, with time and expence, to send supplies to Syria by land across the Desert, yet there would be no great difficulty on the part of the Allies in cutting off that communication also, by occupying some position on the coast in the line of march.

There are some hundreds of merchantmen under the Egyptian flag sailing in the Mediterranean; these are almost all loaded with the personal property of the Pasha, for he is the great monopolizer of the produce and of the commerce of Egypt, all these would either be shut out of the Mediterranean by the Allies; nor would any difficulty be found in blocking up Mehmet Ali's ports, and rendering his commerce and his communications with Syria impossible. Mehmet Ali, as a Sovereign, and as a Pasha, would be easy for the Sultan to dictate a scheme of amercement of Egypt and Syria, which the Sultan would have a right to demand, and to enforce. The Sultan would have a right to demand that Mehmet Ali should be allowed to keep any of his troops in Syria, if he could not accomplish the intended purpose. It must be recollected that while Ibrahim's Army is in Syria, Egypt is comparatively defenceless; that the defeat of the Turkish Army at Nezb has by no means annihilated all the military means of the Sultan; that a considerable part of the army of Mehmet Ali is in the hands of the Sultan; that the Sultan has a right to demand that Mehmet Ali should be allowed to keep any of his troops in Syria, if he could not accomplish the intended purpose. From these resources, it would be easy to collect a respectable body of Turkish troops for a landing at Alexandria under the protection of the combined squadron; and the troops so landed, if directed, as in that case it might be insisted upon that they should be, by European officers, would be able to overcome all local resistance, and to make themselves masters of Alexandria. That Mehmet Ali by pertinaciously clinging to Syria, might find himself dispossessed of Egypt, and if once such a blow was

struck at the very heart of his power, his Syrian Army would melt away and his Syrian authority would cease to exist.

But Mehemet Ali would be just as able to foresee these operations, as the Five Powers would be to foresee them, and whatever show of resistance he might make, and however high the language which at first he might hold, it is in the highest degree improbable that he would ensure the entire ruin of himself and his family by an insatiable resistance to the force of an overwhelming necessity.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 188.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

(No. 107.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, August 1, 1839.

THE various despatches of which I send your Excellency copies in my despatch No. 105 of this day will explain to you the view which Her Majesty's Government have taken of the present state of affairs in Turkey and in the Levant, and the course which they think it will be most expedient for the Five Powers to pursue with regard to those matters.

The communications from other Governments, of which copies are likewise sent to you in the same despatch, will also show that there exists on this great and important affair a perfect unanimity of opinion between the Five Cabinets; and it is therefore to be presumed that some specific measures will speedily be agreed upon between them with reference to these affairs.

The first step to be taken in consequence of an agreement between the Five Powers will probably be to make some communication to the Porte. Any decision of this kind which may be come to, will be finally concluded at Vienna, and in order to save time will be communicated from thence to the Representatives of the Five Powers at Constantinople. I have, therefore, to instruct your Excellency to carry into execution any measure which you may be informed by Lord Beaconsfield has been agreed to by him on behalf of the British Government, and has also been concurred in by the Austrian Government, and by the Representatives of the other Three Powers at Vienna.

It will be of great importance that in any step to be thus taken at Constantinople or in any communication which is to be made by the Representatives of the Five Powers, those Representatives should act not only simultaneously in point of time, but identically in point of manner, in order that there should not be any appearance of divergence in the execution of a measure in the arrangement of which there has been entire unanimity.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 189.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston (Received August 2.)

(No. 171.)

My Lord,

Therapia, July 10, 1839.

I HAVE received officially from the Sublime Porte, copy of a letter from the Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali, and have the honour to forward it to your Lordship.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure in No. 189.

The Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali Pasha.—July 5, 1839.

(Traduction.)

IL y a déjà quelques jours que j'ai écrit à votre Excellence pour lui annoncer l'avènement au Trône Impérial du très-majestueux, très-magnifique et très-puissant Sultan, Abdoul Medjid Khas, notre Seigneur et Maître, par suite de la mort de celui qu'il a plu à la Providence d'appeler à meilleure vie.

Sa Hauteesse, douée de droiture et de sagesse, qualités dont le ciel l'a favorisée, a dit aussitôt qu'elle fut montée au trône.

"Le Pacha d'Egypte, Mehemet Ali Pacha, s'étant permis certains procédés offensants envers son mon glorieux père, il s'est passé jusqu'à présent beaucoup de choses, et dernièrement on a entrepris des préparatifs. Mais je ne veux pas que la tranquillité de mon empire soit troublée, et que le sang musulman soit versé. Je voudrais que le Pacha d'Egypte se retire et qu'il ne s'occupe que de sa propre affaire, et qu'il ne s'occupe pas de la succession de son père. Je lui donne une députation avec force et semblerai à vous de mes autres illustres Vizirs, et j'accorde la succession héréditaire de son père à son gouvernement de l'Egypte."

Telles sont les paroles gracieuses que Sa Hauteesse a proférées; et comme j'ai été nommé Grand Vizier, il me faut que je le fasse passer, et que votre Excellence est une de mes anciennes connaissances, la volonté que Sa Hauteesse vient d'exprimer n'a pu, vu l'amitié sincère que je vous porte, que me causer une vive satisfaction.

Des ordres ont été sur le champ expédiés au Séraskier de l'Orient, son Excellence Hafiz Pacha, de faire faire halte à son armée; et la Flotte Impériale qui était sur le port d'Egypte, et des Barlaucilles, a été retenue. Conformément aux ordres de Sa Hauteesse, on prépare la décoration qui vous est destinée, et le firman de votre investiture, et nous vous les enverrons plus tard.

En attendant, le très-distingué Akif Effendi, Secrétaire du Conseil de la Porte, est allé au-devant de votre Excellence pour vous annoncer ces nouvelles, et vous faire connaître en détail les sentiments que Sa Hauteesse a bien voulu exprimer à votre égard.

Nous espérons en Dieu que sous les auspices du très-majestueux Sultan régnant notre Seigneur et Maître qui est établi par le ciel, les populations de toutes les parties de l'empire jouiront de la plus grande tranquillité. Mais il est clair que la réalisation de cet espoir dépend de l'union parmi les Musulmans. C'est pourquoi il faut, d'après la prudence et la sagesse qui vous caractérisent, et conformément aux ordres de Sa Hauteesse, que le passé soit enseveli dans l'oubli, et que votre Excellence retire ses armées et mette désormais ses soins à maintenir cette union; et c'est dans cet espoir que je vous écris cette dépêche.

No. 190.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 2.)

(No. 172.)

My Lord,

Therapia, July 10, 1839.

I HAVE heard no more news respecting the Army of Hafiz Pasha, and nothing of the movements of Ibrahim Pasha.

There are no news yet come from the Ottoman fleet, but I hear the Sublime Porte has sent a Hatti Scheriff by some agent to be read to the officers and crews of the vessels, ordering them to return to Constantinople.

Public tranquillity continues.

3 H





Foreign Office, August 2, 1839.

Inclosure 1 in No. 132

*Sketch of the proposed instructions to the two Admirals in the Mediterranean.*

*Foreign Office, August 3, 1839.*

The Admirals should be left a discretionary power to depart from the letter of these instructions, adhering always to their spirit; and they should abstain from employing force if it is possible to accomplish their objects without it.

Supplementary Instruction to the Admirals.

*Foreign Office, August 8, 1839.*

IF, when the Admirals receive these instructions, circumstances should have arisen to render the presence of the combined fleet immediately necessary at the Dardanelles, in the Straits of Monmouth, or at the Bosphorus, the Admirals will of course proceed in accordance with the other instructions in this subject, and they are permitted to suspend the execution of the instructions in this subject, in carrying the other instruction of this date into execution, they should find that the occupation of Constantinople by a Russian force, or any other circumstances, would render it inexpedient to send to Constantinople the Egyptian or the Turkish ships which they are directed to send to Constantinople, the Admirals are authorized to be authorized to send such ships to be held in safe deposit in any other Turkish port.

No. 193

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—Received August 3.*

(No. 290)

My Lord,

Paris, August 1, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship copy of a despatch from the French Consul-General at Alexandria to Marshal Soult, which has been communicated to his Excellency by the Marabites telegraph.

I have, &c.

(Signed) **GRANVILLE**

Inclosure in No. 103

Telegraphic despatch from Marseilles, August 1, 1839.

Le Consul-Général à V. le Président du Conseil des Ministres

Alexandria, 16 Juillet.

L'Armée Égyptienne a reçu l'ordre de se retirer derrière l'Espharine.

No. 194

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received August 5.)

**E. J. DUBOIS**

1874

Итого, 407 шт. 2, 407, 4

I THIS morning stated to Maria W. Scott, that Her Majesty's Government had received great satisfaction, by the report of my conversation with her. I have conveyed to her, that the French Government commended with that of Her Majesty's, the opinion that the late events should not alter the course which the European Government previously intended to pursue, in relation to the affairs of the East. I told her I did not conceal from her, that your Lordship had observed that a dispatch addressed to M. de Bourqueney on the same subject, and that I had said to you was not quite correct, as the same words had expressed a conversation to me. I had not finished my sentence when you



Marshal interrupted me by saying he retracted no opinion he had given to me; he thought now as before that the Powers of Europe should continue to act according to their previous intention, should consider what, under the circumstances, was best to be done for the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire, regarding as now secure any arrangement which the Sultan may have agreed to under the influence of the consternation caused at Constantinople by the late disastrous events. The object of his despatch to M. de Bourqueney was, he said, to elicit an opinion (provoquer une opinion) from you as to the measures to be taken under the actual state of affairs.

A change had certainly been made in the position of Mehemet Ali, which would render much more difficult the obtaining from him his renunciation of possessions which the English and French Governments may think it desirable should be given up to the Sultan.

The Marshal then adverted to the different proposals which had been suggested at Berlin, and at Vienna, as a basis of an arrangement between Turkey and Egypt. If the offer of a hereditary right to the Pasha, which we should propose to negotiate with Mehemet Ali should be, his obtaining the hereditary right to his family of governing Egypt, on condition of his abandoning the other Pachaïics, now under his dominion; but that some latitude must be given to the Representatives at Vienna, to accede to terms more favourable to Mehemet Ali, than he might, however, of concession to the Pasha being laid down with respect to the others.

Intelligence had arrived of the actual surrender of the Turkish fleet into the hands of Mehemet Ali, the French Government had taken into consideration, whether it might not be expedient that the French and English Governments should send new instructions to the Admirals of their fleets, in reference to that event. Admiral Duperré, the Minister of Marine, happening to be at that moment at the Foreign Office Marshal Soult invited him to join us; and a conversation ensued, as to the power and means of the combined fleet to compel Mehemet Ali to restore the Turkish fleet to the Sultan, and to evacuate Alexandria. Admiral Duperré, though by no means disinclined to the adoption of the measure of blockade, doubted the prudence, unless assured that the Russian fleet from the Black Sea would not enter the Bosporus, of the French and English fleet occupying a position so distant from the Dardanelles. He was decidedly of opinion, that precautions should be taken by the Admirals to prevent the Russian fleet from entering the Straits of the Dardanelles, with intentions hostile to the Sultan's Government at Constantinople.

This question, I collected from the conversation of the two Ministers, had already been mooted in the Cabinet Council, and was to be resumed at a Council of the Ministers this evening.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRAYVILLE

No. 195.

*Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 8.)

My Lord,

Berlin, July 31, 1839

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches to No. 114 inclusive, together with their inclosures.

Count Breason has shown me a note which he has been ordered by the Duke of Delmatia to address to the Prussian Government on the present state of the affairs of the East, exactly similar to that which M de Bourqueney had transmitted to your Lordship on the 10th instant, and of which you have furnished me with a copy.

Although not instructed by your Lordship to make any similar formal communication to the Prussian Government on the present state of affairs in the East, I thought it my duty to suggest to Baron Werther, the advantages that

would be gained by an early declaration of the intended policy of Prussia, and that instructions should be forwarded to her Representatives at Vienna, with as little delay as possible, in the spirit of your Lordship's note of the 22nd instant, in answer to that of M. de Bourqueney.

Baron Wether informed me, that he approved highly of your Lordship's views, coinciding with those of the French Government for the maintenance of the balance of Power in Europe, and he stated that he should send the King at Toulon, at the instigation of Her Majesty's Government, and for this purpose he requested that I would send him to take a copy of our Lordship's note to M de Bourqueney with my request I thought it right to send.

Note, and I suppose it will be necessary to enable this Government to communicate with the American people

Signed **GEORGE B. HAMILTON**

2, 17.

Sir George Hamerton to the secret of the on Received August 2

(No. 9.)

My Lord,

$$f_{\text{HET}} = f_{\text{H}} f_{\text{D}} \quad (1, 18-39)$$

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Russian Minister called upon me this afternoon, and read to me a letter from Count Nesselrode, and that I had written to Mr. de Kunczeff, Minister of the Interior, to inform him of the contents of the letter, and to request him to inform the Emperor of the same. I have also made to him a statement of the facts, and of the measures taken by the Government.

[illegible]

His Majesty seemed to rejoice extremely at the Emperor's mode of view-  
ing the matter, and said, "this will be much more satisfactory  
to Europe than the Emperor and the Sultan's view of it. A Black Sea  
squadron is put to sea, with, perhaps, the intention of being prepared  
for any contingencies that might occur between the two powers, and  
the object is to prevent the Sultan from doing anything which might  
lead to a rupture with Mehemet Ali, and that all that the Five Powers can do, is to  
do it at Constantinople than at Vienna."

His Excellency then said, "We understand that the English and French Governments intend to propose that the Five Powers shall make a declaration of their determination to maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, under the present dynasty, and that none of them would seek to profit by the present state of things, for the purpose of gaining any acquisition of territory. As far as the independence of the Turkish Empire is concerned, it is

the latter proposition, that Russia, among the rest, should not seek to profit by the present state of things; that the Emperor would have signed any instrument which would have secured such a determination on his part; but, regarding the integrity of the Empire as another thing, than it possibly might do, upon Russia at a moment most inconvenient to herself to be called upon, as the nearest neighbour to bring back a rebellious vassal under the dominion of the Sultan, and the Emperor in general exposed to numerous inconveniences by entering into such a compact."

I remarked to Baron Meyendorff, that the Emperor was already bound somewhat in this matter by the Treaty of Unkjar Skelessi; but he said, "We are at liberty by that Treaty to do as we please, and interpret it in our own manner; for instance, if the Porte was to make an unjust aggression, we are not bound to protect her from the effects of it, as the inconveniences to which such a position might give rise, were foreseen when the Treaty was made."

The conversation then ended, and I informed Baron Meyendorff that I should report his observations to your Lordship, and he told me that I was perfectly at liberty to do so.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GEORGE B. HAMILTON

No. 197

*The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 77)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1839.

ABOUT two hours after I had dispatched messenger Webster on the 20th instant Count Nesselrode communicated to me the information, as that morning received, that Nouri Effendi had called together the Embassadors of the Five Great Powers at Constantinople, and had submitted to them, upon the part of the Turkish Government, as a plan for the settlement of the difference between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, the same proposition as your Lordship had instructed Lord Beaumont to suggest at Vienna. The news appeared to give his Excellency much pleasure; and he blamed the Ambassadors to whom the proposal was communicated, for having simply stated it, and not having reported to the respective Governments, and not having expressed at once their satisfaction at the proposal on their part.

Count Nesselrode discussed with me the probability that France would desire better terms and more clemency for the Pasha of Egypt, and particularly his return to St. John d'Acre. But beyond the precise terms of the proposal, and the reasons upon the matter would very much depend upon the Ministry of France.

The Russian Cabinet feel quite at ease upon the question.

As you have had the honour lately upon several occasions to meet and converse with the Emperor, His Imperial Majesty has not once touched upon any political matter of general interest.

Count Piquelmont, who left St. Petersburg yesterday for Vienna, on his road to have a concluding conversation with the Emperor, told me, I have no doubt, that the Emperor was very much satisfied with what had passed upon the occasion.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) CLANRICARDE.

No. 198

*The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 79.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1839.

COUNT NESSELRODE communicated to me this morning the latest information he has received from Constantinople and the Levant; giving an account of the defeat and flight to Malatia of the Turkish Army, and of the insubordinate, if not traitorous, conduct of Achmet Pasha, commanding the fleet of the Sultan. I have not seen Count Nesselrode; but I conversed on these occurrences with Count Matuzzevic, who brought for my perusal a copy of the despatch which is to be sent this evening to M. Kisseleff, and to be communicated to your Lordship. The chief and real object of it appears to be, to change the place of anchorage of the Turkish fleet, from the Bosphorus to Constantinople. The Russian Government seem still very confident that a settlement of the disputes between Mehemet Ali and the Porte may, and will, be easily effected, notwithstanding the late success of the Pasha's arms. Russia would not refuse her assent to the Pashalic of Syria being conferred for his life upon Ibrahim Pasha, if the Sultan should consent to such a demand.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) CLANRICARDE

No. 197

*Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.*

My Lords,

Whitehall, August 5, 1839.

I HAVE to signify to your Lordships the Queen's commands, that an instruction, to the following effect, be forthwith addressed to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Naval forces in the Mediterranean.

Sir Robert Stopford will go immediately to Alexandria, and take up a position off the port, so as to prevent the Egyptian fleet from entering, if they should be outside the harbour, or from coming out, if they should be within.

Sir Robert Stopford will then state to Mehemet Ali, that the British Government, which is the Ally of the Sultan, and which is determined to uphold the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, has ordered him to demand from Mehemet Ali the restitution of the Turkish fleet, in order that it may be sent back without delay to Constantinople.

Sir Robert Stopford will say, that no Turkish officer or man who may think that, in consequence of the part he may have taken in carrying the fleet to Alexandria, his personal safety will be endangered, should be required to go back thither; but that all such persons might remain in Egypt. If, however, the assistance of some such persons should be necessary, in order to work the ships, Sir Robert Stopford will require that a sufficient number of hands should be sent to work the fleet, either at Rhodes, or any other Turkish port of deposit, giving his formal guarantee, that all Turkish officers and men who may be sent back thither when the ships should have reached their destination.

If Mehemet Ali should refuse to comply with this demand, Sir Robert Stopford should have recourse to any measures of compulsion which may be within the extent of his power, and advisable, for the purpose of inducing the Pasha to yield.

In such case, Sir Robert Stopford should begin with the mildest methods of coercion, and should progressively increase the severity of the pressure, as circumstances may require; and he should, in the last resort, take possession of the Pasha's fleet, if he should find it necessary to do so, without such a measure. If this should be done, Sir Robert Stopford should send the ships so taken to Constantinople, to be kept by the



Sultan; such parts of the crews as would not be wanted to navigate the ships to Constantinople, should be landed immediately in Egypt, in exchange for such part of the crews of the Turkish ships as might be willing to go back to Turkey; and the rest of the Egyptians, if they should not choose to enter into the Turkish service, should be sent back to Egypt, when no longer wanted to navigate the ships.

The capture of the Egyptian fleet ought not, however, to induce Sir Robert Stopford to desist from exacting from Mehmet Ali the surrender of the Turkish ships; and Sir Robert Stopford should continue to use measures of coercion to produce that result; for which purpose he would be authorized to detain all merchant ships passing under the Egyptian flag. Sir Robert Stopford should recollect that Great Britain, not being a belligerent, he is not entitled to interrupt the commerce of neutrals.

Sir Robert Stopford should have a discretionary power left him, to depart from the above instructions, in any case which he may think it possible to accomplish without it, the object which he is to attain.

Similar instructions will be given to the French Admiral, with whom Sir Robert Stopford should concert and co-operate.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 200.

*Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.*

My Lords,

Foreign Office, August 5, 1839.

I HAVE to signify to your Lordships the Queen's commands that, in addition to the instructions contained in my other letter of this day's date, a further instruction should be addressed to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, stating, that when he receives the above-mentioned instructions, circumstances should be so managed as to render the presence of the combined British and French fleets absolutely necessary at the Dardanelles, in the Sea of Marmora, or in the Bosphorus. Sir Robert Stopford will, of course, postpone acting upon the other instructions until he has received your Lordships' orders. If this day, and after the receipt of your Lordships' orders, he should receive any further instructions, he should be authorized to act upon them, in any case, which he may think it possible to accomplish without it, the object which he is to attain.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 201.

*Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.*

My Lords,

Foreign Office, August 5, 1839.

I HAVE to signify to your Lordships the Queen's commands that, in addition to the instructions for Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, contained in my other letter of this day's date, have been framed in conjunction with the French Chargé d'Affaires, but Baron de Bourqueney could not take upon himself the responsibility of agreeing to them on behalf of his Government. Baron de Bourqueney sent copies of them to Paris on Saturday evening, for the consideration of the French Government.

But I have settled with Baron Bourqueney that these instructions should be sent to Earl Granville, with instructions to Earl Granville to send on the messenger and the instructions to Malta, if the French Government should agree to what is proposed, so that by such means several

days might be gained in the arrival of the instructions. If the French Government should object to any part of the instructions, and should wish for alterations, the messenger will in that case wait at Paris till the two Governments shall have come to an understanding.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 202.

*Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.*

(No. 319.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, August 5, 1839.

I HEREWITH transmit to your Excellency copies of two letters which I have addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, containing instructions for the guidance of the Admiral commanding the Mediterranean Squadron, in the present state of the affairs in the Levant.

These instructions have been prepared by me, in concert with Mr. de Bourqueney, but Mr. de Bourqueney could not take upon himself the responsibility of agreeing to them on behalf of his Government. I sent copies of them, however, to Paris on Saturday evening, for the consideration of his Government; and I have settled with him that these instructions should be sent immediately to your Excellency, in order that the messenger and the instructions, if the French Government should agree to what is proposed; by which means several days may be gained in the arrival of the instructions.

If the French Government should object to any part, and should wish for alterations, then the messenger will wait at Paris till the two Governments shall have come to an understanding.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 203.

*Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.*

(No. 319.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, August 5, 1839.

As there is no foreign service messenger available here at this moment for the journey to Malta, which is the nearest to the Admiralty, I send you by the messenger a copy of the instructions which I have addressed to your Excellency, which will be forwarded on by any foreign service messenger who may be in waiting at Paris. If the instructions are to be sent, the messenger must be at Malabar by the first instant steamer, in order to take his passage by the first steamer to Malta, and your Excellency will instruct him to go on to Constantinople with the despatches on which he will be the bearer for Lord Ponsonby, by the first French steamer from Malta.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 204.

*Viscount Palmerston to Sir George Hamilton.*

(No. 2.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 6, 1839.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 6, reporting the arrival of the messenger with the instructions, and the present state of affairs in the Levant, and I have to instruct you to express to that Minister the sincere gratification which is felt by Her Majesty's Government in finding that the views and opinions of the Cabinet of London and of the Admiralty are in perfect accordance.





Sovereigns, and that his wisdom will direct him to avoid the consequences that may attend imprudence.

I have assured the Porte of the firm support of the British Government.

I have only the shortest time for writing, therefore I confine myself to the principal facts. It is not easy to believe Ahmed Pasha has taken this step (unless he be mad), without having some support somewhere, but as yet there are no signs here of any disposition to make a disturbance; I think the end may be, that Ahmed Pasha will offer the fleet to Mehmet Ali. It is to be seen whether or not he will be able to give it to him.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 205.

Baron Roussin to Viscount Ponsonby.

[See Inclosure 1 in No. 159.]

Inclosure 4 in No. 205.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby.

(No. 14.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, July 16, 1839.

ON the morning of the 14th instant, I had the honour to receive your Excellency's despatches of the 5th and 7th instant, which were sent to me by M. Cochelet, the French Consul-General.

I soon after called on M. Cochelet, who I found had received despatches of the same nature from Admiral Roussin, who had also sent a letter from Baron Sturmer to M. de Laurin; but not any letter had come for Count Mehem.

I then proposed to M. Cochelet, that as his instructions and mine, and probably those of M. de Laurin, were similar, and as also the object and views of Count Mehem were the same, M. Cochelet should give effect to our instructions; and the more so, as our Ambassadors had collectively conferred with Nouri Effendi.

M. Cochelet thought it would be better for us to act separately, and wished to go alone.

About 4 p.m. on the same day, a fleet of nineteen vessels of war came in view, and as this could be no other than the fleet of the Capudan Pasha, I again called on M. Cochelet to urge that we should wait on the Pasha, and should have a communication with him before he could see the Capudan Pasha, who could not possibly enter the port before the next morning (the 15th).

M. Cochelet was unwell and could not leave his house, but he was desirous that I should call on the Pasha with my Colleagues of Austria and Russia, and fix an audience for us and M. Cochelet together on the next morning.

I immediately called on M. Cochelet and Count Mehem, and we proceeded together to the palace, where we had a long conversation with Mehmet Ali, and the result of which is contained in the Report enclosed.

On the following morning (15th), I went early to the palace, and found the Pasha looking at the Turkish fleet, which was about six or seven miles off; whilst his own fleet of eleven sail of the line, two large frigates, and a corvette, which was nearer shore and to the westward, was standing towards the Italian fleet.

The "Nile" steamer was at the same time seen nearer shore, standing for the port, with the Capudan Pasha's flag at the main, and the boat of the Capudan Pasha with his flags towing astern by the steamer.

The Pasha then asked me if I had any objection to defer my conference and that of my Colleagues with him till the evening, as he must receive the Capudan Pasha, and on my reply in the affirmative, he sent off a similar request to my Colleagues. M. Cochelet, however, arrived as the messenger was leaving the room.

I told my dragoman, whom I found at the palace, to remain, to report to me the ceremony of the reception of the Capudan Pasha, and I have now the honour to inclose his report thereof.

On the evening of yesterday (15th), my three Colleagues and myself waited on Mehmet Ali (Inchik Bey and Artin Bey were present), and we remained with him an hour and a quarter.

The whole of this conversation is given so fully in the Résumé, that it leaves me nothing to add, but to express my hopes that your Excellency will perceive that I have endeavoured to carry into effect the desires expressed to me in your despatches of the 5th and 7th instant.

It is clear that the enmity between Mehmet Ali and Hosrew Pasha is too bitter to admit of any compromise, and that Mehmet Ali perceives that there cannot be any security for him, or any good understanding between the Sultan and him, so long as Hosrew Pasha is in power.

Whether the Pasha has had any communication or previous concert with the Capudan Pasha, or whether he has taken the steps which he has taken, I have not ascertained. I think it very far from improbable, at any rate, he was known to have been in correspondence with him, as I mentioned in my despatches Nos. 50 and 53 of 1838 to Viscount Palmerston, when it was supposed that he, Achmet Mular Pasha, was coming here with proposals from the late Sultan to Mehmet Pasha; and besides, Achmet Pasha was known to be hostile to Hosrew Pasha; but indeed, I have never known a Turk who could be said to know or feel love of country, or who was not in all his acts guided by his own interest, or by ambition of power and the desire to overthrow his personal opponents.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL

P.S.—The Captain of the Sultan's steamer which conveyed Akiff Effendi from Constantinople, waited this morning upon the Capudan Pasha to ask his orders, as he was to leave this day on his return. The Capudan Pasha replied,—“I have no orders to give you myself; you are only to follow those already given to you. I did not come here as a rebel, but seeing that the true way to save the empire was to come here, I have done so, as all the nation feels that the counsels of Mehmet Ali, and not those of Hosrew Pasha, can restore the Ottoman Empire.”

Inclosure 5 in No. 205.

Résumé succinct de deux entretiens qui ont eu lieu entre le Pacha d'Égypte et les Consuls-Généraux des Quatre Grandes Cours.

LE 14 Juillet, vers les 5 heures du soir, la flotte Turque avec le Capitan Pasha a paru en vue d'Alexandrie. Sur cette même veille, les Consuls-Généraux d'Autriche, d'Angleterre, et de Russie, se rendirent chez le Vice-Roi, à l'effet de l'exhorter à ne point se laisser aller à quelque mesure irréfléchie, et d'obtenir de la part de Son Altesse des promesses tranquillissantes sur sa conduite future. M. le Consul-Général de France ayant été retenu chez lui par suite d'une indisposition, avait chargé ses Collègues de porter également la parole en son nom. Cette séance, au reste, ne devait être que le prélude de la réunion générale fixée au lendemain suivant.

Nous commençâmes par représenter au Vice-Roi, combien les accusations portées par Achmet Pacha contre Hosrew et Halil Pacha, dans le but de colorer et justifier sa défection, et notamment les bruits répandus sur l'empoisonnement du Sultan Mahmoud, étaient dénués de fondement, et peu conformes avec les dépositions des médecins Européens qui avaient traité Sa Hautesse durant le cours de sa maladie.

Passant en outre à la situation actuelle des affaires, nous lui dîmes que les Représentants des Grandes Puissances, dans le but d'éviter jusqu'au dernier moment une intervention armée, et déclinant la solution pacifique de la Question Orientale, l'engageaient sérieusement à s'arranger à l'amiable avec le Sultan, que déjà Sa Hautesse venait de lui donner un témoignage éclatant de sa magnanimité, en lui concédant l'hérédité de l'Égypte; que c'était maintenant au Pacha à faire





## Inclosure 6 in No. 205

*Detail of First Interview of the Capudan Pasha with Mehemet Ali.*

(Translation.)

ON the 14th of July, at 4 o'clock P.M., appeared the Sultan's fleet off Alexandria, in number of nineteen sail.

On the 14th at 9 o'clock A.M., the Egyptian steamer the "Nile" entered the western harbour, having on board Mushir Achmet Pasha, the Admiral of the said fleet. Immediately, Mehemet Ali's first Secretary, named Houssein Pasha, was sent from the palace in the Pasha's own boat, to meet and bring him on shore. When the "Nile" steamer anchored, Mushir Achmet went into the boat, and immediately a salute of nineteen guns was fired by the "Nile", which salute was repeated by the forts the moment he landed, when he was received by the Pasha's civil officers of rank, and he rode upon the Pasha's own horse; and thus preceded by the said officers, cavasces, and chausches, went to the Pasha's palace between two files of the troops that were placed all the way. As soon as he entered the palace gate, Mehemet Ali walked out of his room to meet him, when the Admiral seeing him, unbuckled his sword, gave it to one of the officers behind him, and walked respectfully towards the Viceroy, and bowed to the ground as if meaning to kiss his dress, while the Viceroy embraced and kissed him, saying "Welcome, brother." After this, they walked arm in arm into the Viceroy's room, all the officers following them. They sat near each other on the middle of the sofa. The Capudan Pasha then told his Highness that, for a long time past, it was his wish to have the honour of seeing him. After coffee and pipes, the Viceroy dismissed all the bystanders, and this was at half-past 9 o'clock; when Sheriff Aga, the Capudan's Pasha's Kiaja, who was still within, walked up to the Viceroy, and, kissing his feet, told him, "Now you are both together, with your leave I retire," meaning that he had accomplished his object, and fulfilled his duty so far. His Highness and the Capudan Pasha remained by themselves in the room till half-past 10 o'clock, after which the Capudan Pasha walked out of the room bare-footed, his own servant not being there to give him his shoes, and was obliged to walk about twenty paces without shoes, until his servant brought them, as well as his sword, upon which he went to the Musoppa Serai (the palace for guests), accompanied in the same way as he had arrived. When he entered the palace assigned to him, all the civil officers, as well as Houssein Pasha, kissed his foot, and he asked them to take seats and gave them coffee, telling them, "Thank God, my wishes in meeting the Viceroy are accomplished, and you may know that I have obtained his Highness's permission for the landing of the Vice and the Rear Admirals."

With the Capudan Pasha ten officers landed, two of whom are Beys (Colonels), and one is the brother of Osman Pasha, the Ex-Egyptian Admiral who deserted to Constantinople more than five years ago.

No. 206

*Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 6.)*

(No. 56.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, July 17, 1839

THE fleets of the Capudan Pasha and of Mehemet Ali are still cruising together in sight of Alexandria.

Yesterday morning, about sixty of the principal officers of the Sultan's fleet came on shore, and were presented to Mehemet Ali by the Capudan Pasha.

Mehemet Ali addressed them and said, "My sons, from henceforward all differences between Constantinople and Egypt must be removed from your hearts, and we must consider ourselves as one entire body. Our Sovereign is a young

and pure jewel, and we must support him and aid our nation with all our hearts, and all fidelity."

The officers expressed much satisfaction, and requested permission to adopt the uniform worn by the Egyptian Navy, instead of the row which is in the Russian form), to which the Pasha replied that they might do in that as appeared best to themselves.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 207.

*Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 6.)*

(No. 57.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, July 17, 1839.

CAPTAIN CAILLIER, the Aide-de-camp of Marshal Soult, reached Ibrahim Pasha on the 1st of July, near Antab, and delivered to him the order from Mehemet Ali to suspend the advance of his army.

Ibrahim Pasha then represented that his actual position was not at all a military one, and moreover, that he could not there procure forage for his horses, on which Captain Caillier consented to his taking a position at Marash.

I have the honour to inclose translation of a letter from Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet Ali; but since then Ibrahim Pasha has received the order to evacuate the country to the east of the Euphrates, and he has in consequence withdrawn all his troops from Orfa and Bir, and has not now a single soldier beyond the Euphrates.

The late victory has been more complete than was at first supposed, and in fact the Turkish Army is now passing the Euphrates.

It is most certain that if Hafiz Pasha had gained the battle, the Turks in Aleppo, in Damascus, and in the principal towns in Syria, had made their arrangements to massacre all the Europeans and native Christians in Syria.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 207

*Ibrahim Pasha to Mehemet Ali.*

Cairo Bazar, le 19 Rebi-el-Akher, 1255.

(1er Juillet, 1839.)

(Translation.)

J'AI pris connaissance de la dépêche que Votre Altesse m'a adressée le 5 Rebi-el-Akher, 1255 (17 Juin, 1839), par M. Caillier, Aide-de-camp de Son Excellence le Marechal Soult, Président du Conseil, et Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de France.

Hafiz Pasha ayant envoyé contre Antab Solyman Pasha de Marache, et s'étant emparé de cette place en y faisant beaucoup de prisonniers, j'ai écrit le 12 Rebi-el-Akher (24 Juin), le gros de l'Armée Turque, et mes précédents rapports ont rendu compte de cette affaire dont les résultats sont aujourd'hui connus de Votre Altesse.

Elle m'ordonne par sa dépêche précitée, de m'arrêter là où je me trouverais et de ne point avancer. Cependant les observations que je vais lui soumettre la convaincront de la nécessité absolue où je me suis vu de quitter mes positions et de me diriger sur Marache.

1°. Le lieu où je me trouvais étant à cinq ou six heures au-delà d'Antab, et une autre portion de mon armée étant campée à Oront près de Nézib, en gardant nos positions, nous aurions péri infailliblement par le manque de vivres. Aussi la nuit que M. l'Aide-de-camp s'est trouvé auprès de moi, c'est avec mille peines que l'on a pu fournir à chaque cavalier la demi ration pour sa monture, et si nous étions demeurés jusqu'au lendemain, nos chevaux seraient restés à jeun.

Sur nos dernières, Alep est la seule ville un peu voisine d'où l'on pourrait tirer des vivres, et elle est encore à une distance de quatre jours. Pour faire transporter des vivres d'Alep, il aurait fallu attendre dix jours quatre pour l'aller, quatre pour le retour, un pour le chargement à Alep, et un pour le déchargement au camp. Je n'avais qu'une seule disposition ni charrois ni bêtes de somme, et il en est fallu pour la subsistance de mon armée 7,000 à 8,000, qui m'ont été impossibles de me procurer.

2°. Ainsi que Votre Altesse a pu le voir par les lettres reçues d'Adana, qui lui ont été transmises par le dernier courrier, l'ennemi fait des dispositions pour marcher sous par Koulek: on ignore encore s'il a opéré ce mouvement ou non; mais s'il veut à l'opérer, de la position où je me trouve il m'est impossible de l'attendre ni à pied ni à cheval.

3°. Enfin, en retournant à Alep, j'aurais l'air (ce qui serait inouï) de reculer après la victoire, mes côtés restant découvertes, et l'ennemi pourrait encore nous inquiéter, en repassant la frontière avec un reste de troupes plus ou moins disposé à revenir.

Maracho et Ourfa étant bien fournis de vivres, il devenait indispensable pour moi le les occuper, afin de faire subsister mon armée, sans compter que dès que l'ennemi attaquerait Koulek, j'aurai de là l'avantage de pouvoir l'attendre.

Tels sont les motifs qui m'ont absolument et irrésistiblement entraînés à Marseilles et Orléans. J'ai fait part de toutes ces explications à M. l'Aide-de-camp, qui a pu juger par lui-même de l'état des choses.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,  
(Signé) **IBRAHIM PACHA.**

No. 304

*Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 6.)*

(Private.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, July 17, 1838

WITH my official letters of 5th and 7th July, from Viscount Ponsonby, I had also the honour to receive a private letter, and as the matter of it is official, and important at this moment, I have thought it my duty to send to your Lordship a copy of that letter, as well as of my reply thereto.

The Pasha will not come to any terms so long as Hosrow Pasha remains in power; and he has written to him to demand his return to office; and I really cannot but think that this concession on the part of Hosrow Pasha is now called for by circumstances.

The only army now in the Turkish Empire is that of Mehemet Ali, and the Porte is also without a fleet. It is true that the want of these could easily be remedied by the Great Powers; but it must be borne in mind as a certain fact that such is the influence of Mehemet Ali on the Turkish Empire, he could raise up in his favour not only Constantinople, but every part of Turkey; and, if he desired it, he could, by those means, overthrow Hussein Pasha at his will.

These facts, and the actual crisis, are so important, that I have deemed it proper, even at the risk of being thought presumptuous, to submit my opinions to your Lordship, trusting to your goodness to excuse the liberty which I have taken.

(Signed) I have, &c.,  
PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 208

Victor Posenbly to Colonel Campbell.

Printed by

Sir,

Therapies, July 5, 1839.

I THANK you for the intelligence contained in your last communication. You will have been prepared by what I wrote to you, for the fatal termination of the Sultan's illness. It is evident that the disease had existed many months, and

it is doubtful if a remedy could have been successfully applied later than in the last Autumn. His life might have been prolonged, had he been taken care of more timely, but the mortals have been so much engaged. He was not aware himself, of his situation, and those about him were also ignorant of it, so that he continued to do everything calculated to hasten a catastrophe. He went off at last rapidly." It is astonishing how much and how generally he is lamented. It is not when a man is dead, and no longer the dispenser of rewards and punishments, that the voice of flattery is raised. It has not the power to soothe the ear or teach and nothing can be gained by the attempt. A testimony is reasonable to believe that a man so abused was really esteemed and loved. It is certainly the greatest loss the Malays could suffer. If I own a protection, I am even at the expense of protecting his own people. He had great qualities derived from nature and as he been educated, he would have known better how to make them use to himself and others. He had great views for the country, he was very busy, he knew what he could not find instruments to do it when we were desirous to have perfection. No man was ever placed in more difficult circumstances but I am entirely convinced he would have succeeded in every thing. His enemies had he lived, and I do not except Mr. Scott, though there are reports here that Ibrahim has gained a victory, and that Pasha has been killed, and I think such an event very probable.

There was no party among the Russians, and I think such an event very probable. The war was very certainly in the hands of the Emperor. Count W. Pashin, a popular General, was not the only one that formed a party to that point. I need not object to the correctness of the report of what took place at a meeting called by the Russian Emperor, in which it was decided that Great Britain was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. I do not know that was a decision, nor do I think that the Russian Emperor was disposed to accept it. The Russian Emperor was not with him, and I do not know of any other aspect to the Russian of being a good thing to have been the Russian Emperor.

[illegible]

(Signed) JAMES FINLEY

Inclosure 2 in No. 208.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby

2<sup>nd</sup> r. winter.

31, 1873

Alexandria, July 10, 1839.

MY official despatches will inform your Lordship of all that has been arranged with the Pasha on the subject of your Lordship's despatches of 5th and 7th instant.

I fully concur in the opinion expressed in your Lordship's private communication of the fact that the late Sultan was far before the age in which he died, and had his energies been better directed, he might have contributed more soc-





addition to the instructions last sent to him, in conformity with my letters to your Lordships of the 5th instant.

Sir Robert Stopford is to be informed, that by accounts received from the Mediterranean, subsequent to those upon which those last instructions were founded, it appears that the Turkish fleet had not gone into the harbour of Alexandria, as had been reported, but was at anchor outside, in conjunction with the Egyptian squadron, and that the Turkish fleet was still in the power of its own officers, and not in the power of Mehemet Ali.

It appears further, that the Turkish officers had been led to go to Alexandria by a false report which had been put out by the Capitan Pasha, that if the fleet returned to Constantinople, it would be given up to the Russians.

Sir Robert Stopford will, therefore, not only call upon Mehemet Ali to deliver up the Turkish fleet, if it should be in any way under his controul, but he will also enter into communication with the officers of the Turkish ships; he will explain to them the falseness of the pretence under which they have been persuaded to sail in their duty towards their Sovereign; and he will use every argument to prevail upon them to return to their allegiance. He will point out to them that the course which they have pursued is calculated to throw the Sultan into the power of the Russians, and to weaken and degrade the Turkish Empire. He will represent to them that England and France have no other object in these matters than to uphold the Sultan's authority, and to maintain the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. He will also point out to them that the course which they have pursued is calculated to throw the British and French squadron in defence and support of the Sultan's authority; and he will make them understand, that any act of hostility against the Sultan, on the part of the Egyptian or Turkish squadrons, either singly or united, would be treated to the utmost by the squadrons of the Allies.

Sir Robert Stopford will avoid any engagement with the Turkish and Egyptian fleets unless in self-defence; because the object of the British Government is to preserve the Ottoman Fleet, and not to destroy it; and therefore Sir Robert Stopford will not use force, unless he is so superior in strength as to put resistance out of the question.

It would, however, be desirable that Sir Robert Stopford should, if he can do it with safety to his ships, take up a position, pending the negotiations, so as to cut off the communication between the port of Alexandria and the Turkish Egyptian Fleet.

The great object of Her Majesty's Government being to persuade the Turkish fleet to return to Constantinople, Sir Robert Stopford will not regard that object as unattainable, even if his first efforts to accomplish it by negotiation should be ineffectual; and he will not hesitate to send a small vessel to Constantinople, if he should think that any communication to be had with the Turkish Government could lead to an amicable arrangement. But, pending the negotiation, he will keep close to the Turkish fleet, and follow it wherever it may go; and he will endeavour to remain master of its movements. There could be no objection to its going to any Turkish port outside the Dardanelles, even before it should have made its submission to the Sultan, provided it were accompanied into such port by the allied squadron.

Sir Robert Stopford understanding from these instructions that the wish of Her Majesty's Government is to restore the Turkish fleet to the Sultan, but not to use force to make it do so, and that he is to use his discretion, if he is called upon to use force against its sovereign, will use his discretion, according to circumstances, in carrying the views of Her Majesty's Government into effect.

Sir Robert Stopford will observe, that the previous instructions of the 5th of August were founded upon the supposition that on his arrival at Alexandria he would find the Turkish fleet within the power, and dependent on the will of Mehemet Ali; and therefore Sir Robert Stopford was ordered, in a certain case, to take possession of the Egyptian Fleet as a means of compelling Mehemet Ali to surrender the Turkish ships. But if Sir Robert Stopford should, upon arriving at Alexandria, find the Turkish ships outside the harbour, and at the disposal of their own officers, and not dependent upon the will of Mehemet Ali, then and in such case there would be no valid reason why Sir Robert Stopford should commit any act of hostility against the Egyptian ships,

and he will in such case consider as cancelled that part of his former instruction which enjoins him in a particular contingency to take possession of the Egyptian ships.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 211.

Vicount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

No. 324.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, August 7, 1839.

WITH reference to my despatch, No. 318, of the 5th instant, I herewith transmit to your Excellency a copy of a further order which I have addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty containing additional instructions for the guidance of the Admiral commanding Her Majesty's squadron in the Mediterranean.

Your Excellency will communicate these instructions to the French Government, and if they concur in them, you will send on the original instructions, translated in your handwriting, to the Mediterranean, together with the former ones forwarded to you with my despatch No. 318.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 212.

Earl Granville to Vicount Palmerston.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 297.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 5, 1839.

MARSHAL SOULT read to me this morning despatches received yesterday from Alexandria, containing a detailed report of two conferences between the Pasha of Egypt and the Consuls of Austria, of France, of Great Britain, and of Russia, relating chiefly to the restoration of the Ottoman fleet to the Sultan.

Your Lordship will have learnt from the paper of which Count Moleme allowed me to take a copy, and which I transmitted yesterday, that the efforts of the Consuls to persuade Mehemet Ali to send back the Turkish fleet immediately and unconditionally to Constantinople, were not successful; and as we will have received from Colonel Campbell his statement of what passed at the conference, it is unnecessary for me to write what I may remember of the proceedings of them by M. Cacheret. I must not, however, omit to mention that the French Government, in conformity with the commanding position which it occupies in the East, has refused to be induced to recede in any essential point from the principle of a restoration of the Turkish fleet to the Sultan, but has agreed to the communication which he requested the Consuls at Alexandria to address to the representatives of their respective Governments at Constantinople.

M. Cacheret states, that the Pasha has at this moment not less than sixty vessels of war, of which more than a third are ships of the line.

The Ministry received a letter from his Aide-de-camp, Captain Caillier, reporting a conversation with Ibrahim Pasha, relative to the execution of the orders which I have just received, from Mehemet Ali, to arrest the march of the Egyptian Army whenever it might be, when those orders reached him. It appears from the letter that Ibrahim Pasha had determined, after his victory over Hassan Pasha, to send a part of his army as far as Koussah, and that he had directed Solyman Bey to proceed with another corps to Mehat, the difficulty of finding provisions and forage for his army in the Aleppo country, rendered Ibrahim Pasha very reluctant



to conform to his father's orders; but Captain Caillier's representations induced him to order the corps which was to have marched upon Koniah, not to go beyond the district of Marash, and to recall Solyma Bey, leaving only a small force in Orfa and in Bir.

General Rousset's last despatches from Constantinople contain but more, Marshal Soult told me than a recital of the ceremonies which took place at the giving of the Sultan with the sword of Osman.

Marshal Soult then asked me, if I had heard from your Lordship this morning, and upon my replying negatively to this question, he said that probably before the evening a courier would arrive with despatches transmitting to us copies of instructions which Her Majesty's Government proposed to be given to the Allied Armies commanding the British and French fleets in the Levant, that he had just received a despatch from M. de Bourqueney informing him, that in a conference with your Lordship at which Lord Minto assisted, you had given him a copy of instructions with a supplement proposed to be sent to Admiral Stopford, directing the measures to be taken by the combined fleet with reference to the Ottoman fleet, which the Capudan Pascha had given up to Mehmet Ali.

The Marshal then put this copy into my hands, observing to me that the question was one of most grave importance, inasmuch as the consequence of its adoption might be the lighting up a general conflagration in the East. After reading the proposed instructions, I said that without doubt the measures proposed were of a vigorous character, but that one's eyes often tended to avert danger and difficulties which a more timid policy might create.

He said, that he should immediately send off M. de Bourqueney's despatch to the King at St. Cloud, and that its contents would afterwards be submitted to the consideration of the Cabinet Council.

It was, however, evident from the tone of Marshal Soult's conversation, that his first impression is not in favour of the adoption of the proposed instructions.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

## No. 213.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 209.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 3, 1839.

A LETTER was received yesterday by Marshal Soult from the General of France at Odessa, stating that no preparations have been made at Sevastopol, or in any other port of the Black Sea, which indicates any intention on the part of the Russian Government to send an armament to the Bosphorus.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

## No. 214.

Count Nesselrode to M. de Kisseff.—(Communicated by M. de Kisseff August 8.)

Monsieur,

St.-Petersbourg, le 1<sup>er</sup> Juillet, 1839

PAR mon courrier du 8 de ce mois, je vous ai communiqué la dépêche de Lord Palmerston, dont le Marquis de Clanricarde a été chargé de me remettre copie, en retour de nos dernières ouvertures relatives aux affaires d'Egypte.

Je vous ai présenté, Monsieur, le Courrier qui a tardé à vous transmettre la réponse que l'Empereur m'ordonnerait de faire à cette communication.

Je me réjouis d'autant plus de ce devoir, le vous l'ayant fait exprimer à Lord Palmerston combien l'Empereur se plut à apprécier l'accueil amical que le Ministère Anglais a fait à nos propositions du 3 Juin dernier, destinées à assurer la paix du Levant, en renfermant l'action du Pacha d'Egypte dans un cercle qu'il

ne lui serait point permis de franchir sans se mettre en état d'hostilité avec l'Europe entière.

Nous nous félicitons sincèrement de voir que nos idées sur cette importante question se soient entièrement réunies avec celles du Cabinet Anglais.

En effet, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique a été pénétré comme nous de l'indispensable nécessité d'un tel accord, et n'a pas hésité en manifestant les vœux qu'il a eus, en empêchant que la lutte entre le Sultan et son plus sûr vassal ne devint une occasion pour la signature de l'armistice. C'est à conjurer ce danger qu'ont été dirigés et axés efforts et les démarches incessantes que l'Angleterre et la France ont jugé nécessaires de faire à Vienne.

Les remontrances que les Représentants des Cabinets Alliés ont été appelés à adresser au Vice-Roi ont pleinement répondu à notre attente. Lord Palmerston a reçu l'ordre d'arrêter la marche de ses troupes. Les deux puissances suspendent leurs efforts, et les Cabinets de l'Europe ont pu pour les résumer.

Le premier résultat que l'on obtient, d'après les Grandes Puissances, que l'on a obtenu, est l'importante récapitulation de ces deux documents, le rapport de l'Ordonnance du 1<sup>er</sup> Août, et le projet de paix, qui est la base de tout arrangement.

Nous partageons en conséquence l'opinion que Lord Palmerston a exprimée, que notre auguste Maître a été en mesure de donner son assent à ces bases, et que les conditions qui ont été proposées n'ont été adoptées par le Cabinet de Vienne. Elles ne diffèrent pas essentiellement de celles proposées par le Ministère Anglais. D'après le plan du Prince Metternich, la lutte reprendrait aussitôt que la paix serait conclue. Mais, si l'on se rappelle que l'Angleterre a été considérée comme la condition absolue de tout accommodement durable entre la Porte et l'Egypte.

Par conséquent, pour nous en tenir à nos principes, nous ne pouvons pas, sans l'autre de ces combinaisons, pourvu qu'elle ait été librement adoptée par la Porte elle-même. Cette condition constitue à nos yeux la base de tout arrangement auquel notre auguste Maître serait appelé à prendre part. C'est ici le seul point où nos opinions semblent différer de celles qui se trouvent exposées dans la dépêche de Lord Palmerston du 9 Juillet. D'après la manière de voir du Ministère Anglais, "ce serait aux Cinq Puissances à échanger d'abord leurs idées sur l'arrangement définitif à conclure entre la Turquie et l'Egypte; et ce serait à la suite d'un pareil échange d'idées, qu'on annoncerait aux deux parties l'opinion des Cinq Cours par leurs Représentants à Constantinople et à Alexandrie; et l'on finirait ainsi par vaincre la répugnance que l'une ou l'autre des deux parties aurait pu manifester dès l'origine, à l'égard de l'arrangement qui leur aurait été proposé."

Ce plan d'action qui établirait une entière parité entre le Sultan et son vassal, ne serait pas sans inconvénient à nos yeux, car il admettrait comme une condition préalable, que les deux parties s'accorderaient à se mettre d'accord, ce qui nous serait opposé de la part du Sultan, tandis que c'est uniquement en sa faveur qu'il se pourrait que pour l'Egypte, l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman.

Par conséquent, pour rester entièrement fidèles au principe de conservation qui fait la base de la position des Cinq Grandes Puissances à l'égard des affaires du Levant, pour pouvoir le résoudre, nous nous trouvons en face d'un dilemme. Nous devons d'abord par nous assurer si le plan de pacification projeté par les Cabinets Alliés est réellement de nature à assurer l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman. C'est pourquoi nous avons acquis la certitude d'une adhésion complète et spontanée de ce Souverain, nous ne pouvons pas nous en tenir à une simple promesse, et nous devons sur les mesures à adopter en commun, afin d'imposer au Pacha d'Egypte les conditions d'un accommodement librement adopté par la Porte.

Telles sont les réflexions que nous allons communiquer à Lord Palmerston, et à Sir George Canning, et à Sir John Lubbock, qui ont été envoyés au Comité de la Paix, en date du 2<sup>ème</sup> (dont je vous ai transmis le résumé par mon dernier courrier), est venue nous annoncer les déterminations que le Divan a jugé nécessaire de prendre pour amener l'affaire d'Egypte à une solution prompte et décisive.

Ces déterminations, dictées par un véritable esprit de conciliation et de sagesse, simplifient de beaucoup la question que les Cabinets Alliés avaient à cœur de résoudre. Guidée par une juste appréciation de ses vrais intérêts, la

Porte est allée au-devant des propositions que les Cinq Puissances étaient à la veille de lui faire. Elle a pris l'initiative des marches qu'il s'agissait de faire à Alexandrie. Elle a résolu d'offrir à Méhémet Ali l'hérédité de l'Égypte en retour de la rétrocession de la Syrie. Enfin, elle a réuni en conférence les Représentants des Cabinets Alliés pour leur soumettre des résolutions, et pour réclamer leur appui moral en faveur des offres d'accommodement qu'elle vient de faire au Vice-Roi.

De cette manière, la base de la négociation a été posée par la Porte elle-même. C'est elle qui a spontanément ouvert la libération, et qui le fait en s'fixant le siège à Constantinople. Elle a convenu de son initiative, et sous son impulsion qu'elle a voulu, et qui l'a voulu, le sort à venir de l'Empire Ottoman.

Après cela, en cette grave détermination vient le souvenir des plus favorables succès qu'elle a eus à la Porte, et avec le concours unanime des Représentants des Cabinets Alliés, nous avons obtenu avec calme les réponses que le Vice-Roi fera aux propositions qu'il vient de recevoir de la part de la Porte.

Les trois éventualités se présentent à notre esprit :

1°. Méhémet Ali peut accéder purement et simplement aux offres qui ont été faites, en ce cas toutes les difficultés s'applanissent d'elles-mêmes.

2°. Le Vice-Roi, sans rejeter absolument les termes de l'arrangement proposé, peut exiger de la Porte des conditions plus favorables. En ce cas, une négociation s'établira à Constantinople entre les deux parties; et ce sera alors aux Représentants des Cabinets Alliés à interposer leurs bons offices, toutes les fois que le Divan en reconnaîtra l'opportunité; enfin

3°. Le Vice-Roi peut se refuser obstinément à toute négociation avec la Porte. Si, contre notre attente, cette dernière supposition venait à se réaliser, le Divan aurait devoir recourir à l'assistance des Représentants Alliés pour réclamer leur appui, afin de vaincre la résistance du Vice-Roi; en ce cas, nous reconnaitrions comme juste et comme nécessaire que les Grandes Puissances fussent leurs efforts pour contraindre le Pacha d'Égypte à se mettre à un arrangement quel qu'il soit, sous peine de voir son indépendance et l'intégrité de la Turquie compromise.

Voilà, Monsieur, le marche qui nous semble à la fois le plus simple et le plus sûr pour arriver à une solution satisfaisante de la difficulté actuelle qui depuis longtemps met en danger la sécurité de l'Empire Ottoman, et tient en suspens la paix de l'Europe.

L'Empereur vous prie, Monsieur, de porter à la connaissance du Ministère Anglais l'ensemble des considérations contenues dans la présente dépêche. Vous voudrez bien en remettre copie à Lord Palmerston, en lui exprimant l'espoir que les opinions de votre Cabinet en faveur de cette démarche vont être agréées par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, avec la même satisfaction avec laquelle votre Auguste Maître a toujours révoqué sa communication dont M. le Marquis de Camille-Castellane vient d'être chargé.

Recevez, Monsieur,  
Signé: NESSELRÖDE.

No 215.

Lord Bunsale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 9.)

No. 74.)

My Lord,

Vienna, July 30, 1839.

PRINCE METTERNICH'S last intelligence from Constantinople is of the 17th instant. Nothing positive was then known here about the fleet. It was in the neighbourhood of Rhodes, and a merchantman had brought the report of its having been seen in company with the Egyptian fleet. This was not credited, but much anxiety was felt upon the subject by the Turkish Ministers.

M. de Metternich has received a fresh instruction for transmission to Constantinople, to address himself again to Méhémet Ali, and renew to him, in the Emperor's name, the menace, that if he overstepped the districts of

Orfa and Diarbekir, a Russian Army would enter Asia Minor to oppose him. Prince Metternich spoke to me of this step with praise, and represented it as an instance of the Emperor's good faith. I told him in reply, that it was part of the separate system which Russia is bent on pursuing, that these threats had no effect, Méhémet Ali not valuing them a straw; and that if Russia meant to carry she had only to sit down here with us, and act in concert instead of swaggering by herself at Alexandria where nobody minds her. He told me I was right, and that it is in fact what she ought to do. Upon reflection, however, it appears to me that I have not said enough. In Asia Minor, I very much doubt, whether Méhémet Ali would not be a match for any force that the Russians could bring against him, but the very commencement of this operation would necessitate the occupation of the communications with Asia from Trebizond; and this probably would be the real object of this expedition. I shall therefore take an early opportunity of pointing out to Prince Metternich that this line of menace on the part of Russia is much more calculated to excite distrust in Her Majesty's Government than to subvert Méhémet Ali, and if attempted to be resisted would certainly have to encounter the opposition of England, and I shall say I have to make what we may please, of this intimation towards the Emperor of Russia.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 216.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 9.)

(No. 75.)

My Lord,

Vienna, July 30, 1839.

A LETTER of the 17th instant from Lord Ponsonby, informs me that Nouri Effendi and his colleagues say, that it is fit the Porte should settle the affairs of their country like Mussulmans, amongst each other, and avoid the interference of the Europeans, for which reason, terms of a more agreeable nature should be offered to Méhémet Ali. Your Lordship will have seen that this distrust of the Christian Powers had been divined by Prince Metternich, and that in the communication enjoined to the Internuncio, he has done his best to counteract it. With a view to second his efforts, I have sent to Lord Ponsonby copies of my declaration of the 27th of July, and of Prince Metternich's answer, requesting his Lordship not to use them otherwise than confidentially, and to give no copies until the step I have taken shall have been sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 217.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 9.)

(No. 76.)

My Lord,

Vienna, July 30, 1839.

ON the 25th instant, I notified to your Lordship that Russia was hanging back.

On the 27th, I sent my declaration to Prince Metternich, and on the following day received his answer. Copies are inclosed. He has fairly redeemed the pledge he gave for the conduct of Russia.

She disappointed him, and he has replied by tearing the bond which bound them together, and has signed a new one with us.

It is still open to her to accede, but if she decline to enter into the Alliance of the Five Powers, it is clear that that of the four is behind. It is indif-



ferent which we arrive at, either secures peace, either preserves the Ottoman Empire. I would request of your Lordship power and instructions for signing either one or the other.

The backwardness of Russia, and the step taken by France, left me no doubt as to the line I ought to pursue.

There is but one word in my declaration which is not authorized by your Lordship's despatch: it is that of reciprocity of declarations between all the Powers. Being in the French note, and highly valuable in itself, I did not hesitate to adopt it. The more nearly the steps taken by the two countries, France and England, can coincide, the better.

I have put Austria more prominently forwards in my declaration than is done in that of France, from two motives:—1st. Because it is the fittest station to assign to her, and the more she is compromised the better. 2ndly. Because Prince Metternich is a little jealous of any appearance of a wish to usurp the credit which is due to himself. Upon this point France often wounds him. I should add to this despatch, that there is no sign in him of timidity or wavering, none of regret at what he has done. He is pleased and proud of himself, and has all the appearance of a man who having the approbation of his own conscience, will persevere in the course he has entered upon.

I have, &c.,

(Signed)

BEAUVALE

P.S.—I annex copy of Count St. Aulaire's note and its inclosure.

#### Inclosure 1 in No. 217

Lord Beauvale to Prince Metternich.

Vienna, July 27, 1839

THE Austrian Ambassador in London having communicated to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a despatch from his Highness the Chancellor of Court and State, wherein the principles which direct the counsels and determine the conduct of Austria in the affairs of Turkey, are laid down, the British Government feels itself called upon to notify its perfect adhesion to the views and intentions therein enounced.

The undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, has in consequence, been authorized to declare and does declare in the name of Great Britain, that it is determined to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire, and to prevent any dynasty, and as a necessary consequence, any determination, that it will not seek to profit by the present state of things for the purpose of gaining any acquisition of territory or any exclusive privilege.

The British Government confidently anticipates that this declaration will be reciprocated by the other European Courts, its friends and allies, which have already given evidence of its wisdom and disinterestedness. It is the wish of the undersigned, in the first instance, by that of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, to which the honour of having originated this proposition belongs.

(Signed)

BEAUVALE

#### Inclosure 2 in No. 217.

Prince Metternich to Lord Beauvale

Vienna, ce 28 Juillet, 1839

L'E. Souverain a l'honneur d'accuser à son Excellence my Lord Beauvale, la réception de l'office qu'il lui a adressé en date d'hier.

L'Empereur, dans les instructions qu'il a fait adresser le 3 de ce mois à son Ambassadeur près Sa Majesté Britannique, a développé avec une entière franchise les principes qui ont invariablement guidé sa politique à l'égard de la Porte

Ottomane, et qui continueront à lui servir de règle. En donnant si explicitement son plein assentiment à ces principes, le Gouvernement Britannique répond non seulement aux vœux, mais également à l'attente de Sa Majesté Impériale. Convaincu que l'heureuse identité de vues dont ont fait preuve, dans la présente crise, les Puissances qui, par une sage politique, sont le plus directement appelées à intervenir sur les destinées de l'Empire Ottoman, offre le moyen le plus efficace d'en assurer la conservation, le Cabinet Impérial a accueilli avec une bien vive satisfaction, l'assurance, qu'à l'égard de cette question, l'une des plus graves du jour, il existe une parfaite uniformité de principes entre lui et le Cabinet Britannique.

Le Souverain a l'honneur d'inviter son Excellence my Lord Beauvale à vouloir bien porter cette assurance à la connaissance de son Cour, et il le prie en même temps, d'agréer pour lui celle de sa haute considération.

(Signé)

METTERNICH.

#### Inclosure 3 in No. 217

Count St. Aulaire to Prince Metternich

Vienna, le 23 Juillet, 1839.

L'AMBASSADEUR du Roi des Français a reçu l'ordre de communiquer à Son Altesse Monsieur le Chancelier de Cour et d'Etat, la dépêche dont ci-joint copie.

En déclarant qu'il veut l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman sous la dynastie actuellement régnante, et qu'il est disposé à faire usage de son influence pour assurer le maintien de cet équilibre politique, le Gouvernement du Roi ne fait qu'adhérer aux sentimens exprimés si souvent, et récemment encore dans des termes également précis, au nom de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale.

Mais il a jugé que les circonstances actuelles donnaient de l'utilité à la France, et à l'Europe, de ces sentimens de paix et de justice, et il a voulu, pour sa part, s'acquitter de ce devoir sans perdre un jour.

(Signé)

ST. AULAIRE.

#### Inclosure 4 in No. 217

The Duc de Dalmatie to Count St. Aulaire.

Monsieur le Comte,

Paris, le 17 Juillet, 1839.

DANS la crise si grave où la mort du Sultan Mahmoud, survenant au milieu des événements qui ont marqué les derniers mois de son règne, vient de jeter l'Empire Ottoman, l'union des Grandes Puissances de l'Europe ne peut seule offrir une garantie suffisante pour rassurer les amis de la paix. Les communications échangées depuis quelques semaines, ont heureusement prouvé que cette union est complète et que l'état possible de la doctrine. Tous les Cabinets ont l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman sous la dynastie actuellement régnante, tous sont disposés à faire usage de leurs moyens d'action pour assurer le maintien de cet équilibre politique. L'Europe ne peut que se féliciter de voir ces principes si souvent et si récemment exprimés, et si récemment encore dans des termes également précis, au nom de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale. Mais il a jugé que les circonstances actuelles donnaient de l'utilité à la France, et à l'Europe, de ces sentimens de paix et de justice, et il a voulu, pour sa part, s'acquitter de ce devoir sans perdre un jour.

ment, et qui nécessairement ne tarderont pas à avoir une publicité plus ou moins complète, l'exposé des intentions que je viens de rappeler. En ce qui nous concerne, Monsieur le Comte, je déclare formellement que ce sont, que ce seront, invariablement les nôtres, et je vous autorise à laisser à Monsieur de Metternich une copie de la présente dépêche, après lui en avoir donné lecture. Je ne doute pas que le Gouvernement Autrichien dans la réponse qu'il croira sans doute devoir faire à la lettre par laquelle vous lui transmettez cette dépêche, n'adhère de son côté, de la manière la plus formelle à cette profession de foi si parfaitement conforme à l'expression souvent reproduite de sa politique. Si, comme j'ai lieu d'espérer, les Cabinets de Londres, de Pétersbourg, et de Berlin, répondent de même aux communications semblables que je vais leur faire parvenir, le but que se propose le Gouvernement du Roi se trouvera atteint.

Sa Majesté voulant donner un témoignage non équivoque des dispositions dont elle est animée à l'égard de la Porte des Ottomans, a envoyé, Monsieur l'Amiral Roussin, sans attendre l'avis officiel, ni même la confirmation directe de la mort du Sultan Mahmoud, les lettres de créance qui l'accréditent auprès du nouveau Empereur.

Agreez &c.  
(Signé) DUC DE DALMATIE.

No. 218

*Lord Bessborough to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received August 9.)

(No. 77 )  
My Lord,

*Fishing, July 30, 1839.*

COUNT ST Aulaire informs me that Prince Metternich has orally (probably) engaged me to make every effort with France in her restoration and to exert her demand on the passage of the Diet at Aix, saying that it would thereby be possible to take advantage of the situation and consequently to cause the evacuation of Italy. St Aulaire is apprehensive that this will create a misunderstanding in the French Government. It was his wish to gain time as much as possible. They have only themselves to thank for it. The demand first made in concert with England, ought not to have been made at all; but they committed the additional error of announcing that I should be instructed to concur in it, they obtained a sort of promise under this expectation, and when it was fulfilled, it of course turned against themselves.

I have reason to apprehend, that in consequence of this incident, the orders to the Austrian squadron to place itself under the command of Sir Robert Stopford will be modified, and that it will preserve an independent position, leaning in doubtful cases more to the British Admiral than the French one.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) **BEAUVALE**.

No. 219

4<sup>th</sup> Brigade to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 9.)

(No. 7B.)  
My Lord,

Vienna, July 30, 1839.

[ THIS morning found Prince Metternich much disconcerted by a despatch he had received from the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, informing him that Sir George Hamilton had stated that the Austrian squadron was to be placed under the orders of Sir Robert Stopford, and that an Archduke was to sail on board the British Admiral.

Prince Metetrnich admitted that the truth had been corrupted in passing from hand to hand, but remarked strongly upon the seriousness and danger of

these unnecessary communications observing that, if this version were carried to St. Petersburg, they would think we had gone mad.

Your Lordship will remark that the maritime war on taken by Austria, between France and England, is capable of exciting much jealousy, and is consequently so delicate a theme, that I have never permitted myself to open my lips upon the subject to any person whatever.

It is hard to have it come back from another Mission

I have, &c.,  
Signed B. ALVARE

No. 220

Lord Nelson & to Isaac Palmer.—(Received August 1)

~~Secret and Confidential~~

Friday, July 30, 1832.

My Lord

NOTHING is more variable than Prince Metrich's mood as to commiseration. He never protests when he is asked to see to it that there are others whom a slight might oppress. Commiseration is repaid. Thus, by a rare combination of circumstances and help of the Emperor and Lord at leisure, I availed myself of it to see a certain number of the books of the station both in order to ascertain the path which, under all circumstances, we might be able to pursue in common, and as a test of his sincerity in the present conjuncture.

As he has a great taste for disquisitions, I began by saying, that whatever might be the disposition of the Emperor at this moment, there was one observation which had been found true through all past ages, and which we, therefore, could not look to see falsified in the present one. It was the tendency of the North to overflow upon the South. The Prince answered, by showing me two very voluminous reports just received from Count Eichelmont, and including many other documents.

The Prince promised to have copied and communicate to me: telling me that they would use the incapacity of Russia to realize the designs we attribute to her; and that we should see therein that neither her military nor financial situation were such as to make her an object of apprehension.

[illegible][illegible]



of my representations and coinciding entirely with my opinion, would be, that Russia was not bound to see any in the question.

To this he answered, that even if it would prove the truth, to which test I assented, remarking that when that truth should be clear we must act in consequence. He then created haste to which I replied that I had never pressed him, as he answered I with much warmth of manner, "you never did you always wanted that man of mine." And do you know what I asked, it is because you are not a man to enter upon a course without seeing whether it leads. When the case is settled we shall arrive at it together and whether the peace be a declaration or a simple power makes no great difference. I heard that his surprise or that although it was better than no reason there was to be had seen, yet it was not everything was entirely ended that the man who was the most cautious as to signing commissions, was also the most ready when they had arrived. Inasmuch as he fully concurred with a settled satisfaction. He clearly understood that I looked to a Quadruple Alliance in case Russia should persist in starting a war, but he still counts upon gaining her, he will perhaps succeed, and while the negotiation lasts, it would be a secret in his or something which to pledge himself towards us to the effect that he will pursue with it until it has failed. I therefore pressed him no further. He understood my meaning and did not contradict me and that was enough for the moment. I should have got on. I had pressed for more. As yet I would venture to urge upon your Lordship that patience is great to be a man or woman, as to time, and manner, and language, nothing is so difficult as not to get either over and

I am the stronger to the trade to have seen Prince Metternich separate himself from Napoleon and the process was precisely as far as that it was taking place at present. He was as best to avoid a separation; he will try to be able to keep Russia with him, but at every failure he will advance a step towards it. The result must be either that she must follow, or that he will be totally a-sided from her. For this it will be necessary to moderate the vehemence of France; she is constantly running g. t. whereas our object should be to have no interval between the two. Whenever we do so, it is so much good to Russia not only in the attitude of the Powers, but as it affects their equanimity. Perhaps the only effect of more of guarding against this would be by establishing with France the no project which has been made. As a matter as has been agreed upon in common. The proposition of Her Majesty's Government would then temper the jealousy of France, and a proposal coming from the French Ambassador and such other concert between us as would respectively justify the plain thing made justly, would have a much better chance of success than when coming by him alone. In such a case it would be equally evident that our Government would have to Mr de St. Armand at any of the greatest attention, as to the manner and terms of a manner, which they could venture to treat as usual.

To reveal to my conversation with Prince Metternich, it continued by his pressing onwards a suggestion which he made. He said that the possession of that Agency by France must be a law for the Republic, not as to the fact and tenure of it at present, as particularly in regard to Sicily, inasmuch as the territory and France being moreover under a promise of cession to evacuate it, that to ask Louis Philippe to turn that engagement would be a demand in him to secede from his throne, that perhaps a version of the same might be made as a pretext to which to oppose with the sanction of the Government of the Porte the necessity of evacuation. But that if Her Majesty's Government was so disposed, he entreated them to do so, that upon a law which he had with him, as there was no reason for it being a present at the Agency to France, and that purchase of it was an object. To this I answered that in the first place if anything was to be done in it, I must reserve the protest towards France to my own Government, and that I must, that here in my turn, request them not to question my stipulation upon the subject, that I would communicate upon it with your Government, but that I must apprise him it was a most delicate matter to deal with; that I knew not how it would be received by the country, and that I must therefore be liberal as expressing no opinion upon it, but as reserving it in a virgin shape for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

It seems to me that there are strong reasons both ways. In the interest of the Empire it is to be remarked, that she has lost the possession of many provinces.

of which Algiers is the least valuable to her, and that if the cession of that one (with whatever reserves) to France could be made the price of the real restitution of such of the rest as she has no other prospect of recovering, the purchase might perhaps be reckoned cheap to her. In our interest, it is to be remarked, first, that we have, I believe, notified to France that we shall not content to her the possession of the Regency of Algiers within its recognised limits, but whether we have or no, such is evidently the state of the case. We shall not trouble her then, unless war come between the two countries, and if war comes, war will decide; but till then a cession by the Sultan, though valuable to France and to Europe as a just deference on the part of that Power to the public law of civilized nations, yet costs us nothing, whereas a strict definition of the frontier and the recognition of the neighbouring countries, as part of the Turkish territory placed under the guarantee of all Europe, would give us at least the moral weight of the European Powers to assist in detaching a one upon which we now stand single in opposition to France. On the other hand, it is to be remarked that the conceding conquests to France has never yet avenged her thirst for conquest, that it grows by indigestion and that the recognition of Algiers as part of her territory may very probably but whet her appetite for extension in Africa. What the tenure by which she holds Algiers is doubtful she is occupied in making it good: secure it to her, and extension will become her object. Again, it will be a sad commentary upon our declarations of respect for the integrity of the Turkish Empire, to begin by a demand for its dismemberment. It will be a strange mode of teaching confidence in the Christian Powers to the Mussulmans, who already mistrust them, to say that their services must be bought by the cession of a province to the leader of these champions of the right.

Into this dilemma, the capacity of France, and her absence of all distinction between right and wrong, have thrown us. Russia herself has not committed such an act. Her conquests have been made in war, and sanctioned by Treaty, she has not descended to a burglary in the night.

These considerations lead me to no conclusion upon the subject. I refer it without an opinion of my own to Her Majesty's Government.

The questions are two. The first is, whether there is any price which can justify an accommodation of the claims of the weaker and less powerful by the Solian. The second is, whether that price is one which France will pay. There is a third which she would not fail to bring forward, upon which, indeed, she is always dwelling, and which I should not be disposed to pass over without making it tell in some shape or other. It is, that no European Power can make an acquisition of territory without entailing all others to such a corresponding extension as shall preserve their relative proportions unchanged.

I hope the importance of the matters treated of in this despatch may excuse its length, and

(Signed) I have, &c.,  
BLAUVALE

P.S.—July 31.—Your Lordship's letters of July 28, which are just arrived, have shown me that it would be unnecessary, and therefore undesirable, to complicate the present affairs by the question of Algiers. I shall communicate this opinion to Prince Metternich, in order to put him still more upon his guard than I have done already.

No. 221

*Lord Beaconsfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 9.)*

No. 79.1

My Lord,

Vienna, July 31, 1859.

WITH reference to my No. 74, I have to apprise your Lordship, that I yesterday spoke at three Meetings upon the 1<sup>st</sup> paper of Russia's threat to Mehmet Ali to march troops, under certain circumstances, into Asia Minor.

Prince Metternich agreed with me that His Imperial Majesty's forces would have the worst of it, if they were to attempt operations in the south, or even in the centre of that country, saying it would require an army of 120,000 men.





Possibilité de maintenir virtuellement à Vienne la réunion diplomatique, pendant le cas nécessaire pour l'entier accomplissement des difficiles actes les, et de ce les qui traitent de l'application des résolutions Européennes.

No. 223

*Lord Beaconsfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 9.)*

No. 82 )

Mr Lord

1 tenth August 1 1533

PRINCE METTERNICH'S latest accounts from Constantinople assure him that the Divan have determined to close with Menemmet Ali and to make no notification to the Representatives of the Christian Powers until peace is concluded.

From this the ambition of Mehmet Ali may save us. He now looks to nothing less than being Sultan. The object of the Divan, in this determination was, to avoid the interference of the Christian Powers. In the same spirit all the Turkish Ambassadors at their Courts are to be recalled, and the Charges d'Affaires reestablished as before. The Internuncios has adopted the notion, that the only thing the Porte can do is, to subscribe to Mehmet Ali's conditions, or they what they may. For this Prince Metternich is much discontented with him and on the other hand well satisfied with Lord Ponsonby and Admiral Roussin who have recommended a reference to the Christian Powers. He has sent a strict injunction to Baron Sturmer to conform to this course.

There are many rumours announcing revolt in other provinces of the Turk empire. The Capuchin Pasha is understood to be at the head of a project of returning to Constantinople, in order, in conjunction with other chiefs to change the Government. The position where his fleet was last seen, is supposed to indicate an intention of going over to Mehemet Ali.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) Bt. AUVALE

No. 224

*Lord Beaconsfield to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received August 9.)

(No. 88.)

My Lord.

Vienna, August 1, 1839.

I HAVE now the honour to transmit copy of Prince Metternich's answer to Count St. Aulaire's note of the 23rd ultimo.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure is No. 224.

*Prince Metternich to Count St. Aulaire.*

17 June, at 24 July, 1839

LE Soussigné, &c., &c., a l'honneur d'adresser à son Excellence M. l'Ambassadeur de France, &c., la réception de l'office qu'il lui a fait celui de lui adresser hier, et il s'empresse d'y faire la réponse suivante :

L'Empereur ayant à cœur de s'expliquer en toute occasion avec nos entières franchise sur ce qu'il croit pouvoir être utile au maintien de la paix générale, et ayant considéré l'événement du décès de Sultan Mahmoud comme pouvant faire naître des chances de perturbations graves dans l'Empire Ottoman, dont la réaction ne tarderait pas à se faire sentir le long des frontières de cet Empire, n'a point hésité à charger le Soussigné, au moment même où Sa Majesté Impériale

a eu lieu de se contraindre que sa vie de Sa Hauteesse etait dans un danger imminent de lui en faire aux Cours de France, de Grande Bretagne, le Russie, et de Prusse, sa fin déterminée son de sauver la ligne portique encrement de ne dans les points sa ans

1. Sa Majesté Impériale a déclaré que le fait décidé à ne pas s'écarter de la résolution qu'elle avait prise, de consacrer tous ses soins et ses efforts à la conservation intacte de l'Empire. Qu'elle en sous la surveillance active et vigilante, et à voter à ce sujet une loi nouvelle et solennelle et l'action continue sera d'apporter

2. Qu'il résulte de cette déclaration, que la Majesté de Dieu se déclare contre toute combinaison qui porterait atteinte à la liberté et souveraineté du Saint-Empire, et à l'unité de son Empire.

Que l'exporteur certifie que les autres assurances passent une déclaration au douanier et que le gaul venant d'être et qu'a cet effet, Sa Majesté Impériale sera constamment prête à s'en tenir, avec elles, au de l'ins-er par ce traité de le est encourus, et moyens d'affaire ne ont et de ne n pose

Il n'est pas possible de servir à la fois le peuple et le profit. C'est pourquoi, dans le monde, il y a toujours eu des gens qui ont choisi de servir le peuple, et d'autres qui ont choisi de servir le profit. Mais il n'y a jamais eu de gens qui ont choisi de servir les deux à la fois.

Le Sous-secrétaire prie M. l'Ambassadeur de vouloir bien transmettre cette assurance à son Gouvernement, et il salue, &c.

(Metter) METTERNICH

No. 225

*Lord Beaconsfield to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received August 9.)

No. 85.)

Mr Lord

Vienne, August 1, 1839.

I COMMUNICATED to Prince Metternich the substance of your Lordship's letter of the 11th, and am happy to say that he concurs in the whole of your Lordship's views, and in the deductions to be drawn from them. At the same time he is waiting for despatches, which he has persuaded himself are on the eve of arriving from Russia, and therefore preached great prudence of conduct in the mean time. I replied that a bold line was sometimes the most prudent; that for two months we had been miserably trailing in the rear of events; that, intending the integrity of the Turkish Empire, we were doing nothing to support it; that it would be much more difficult to restore it after it should have been broken into, than to avert events at the point where they now stand; that the disposition of the Turkish Ministers to get rid of our alliance, and the necessity to resort to an agent in Persia, required that we should show ourselves in a more imposing attitude than we had hitherto taken; that as an application of those reasonings, I had reduced to writing the results which naturally flow from the premises we had adopted in common; and I put into his hands the paper of which I have the honour to inclose a copy. As he read it he agreed with every word, but said he could not sign it without Russia; for that if a collective step were taken at Constantinople without the sanction of Russia, not only the Turks would remark its absence, and would be less likely than now to follow him, but he would propose that the paper should be sent to Russia by himself to M. de St. Aulaire, and by M. de St. Aulaire to the other Ministers at Constantinople in order that they might all sign it together. I represented in vain the uselessness of this course, and its uncertainty, by giving nothing and perceiving a doubt in his mind whether M. de St. Aulaire would carry out the step I had proposed, I asked him whether I should carry from him an invitation to that Ambassador to speak with him upon the subject in the morning. To this he assented. I had already assured myself of the concurrence of M. de St. Aulaire; and upon returning to him, I found in him a warm advocate of the plan, which he considered himself as fully authorized to concur in by his instructions. When I called upon him this morning, I found that he had urged Prince Metternich strongly; representing to him that, although he could sign to-day, he could not answer for doing so to-day hence, since, if peace were made, he would be between the Porte and M. de St. Aulaire, the liberal party who support the inter-

P. S.—August 2. I have just learnt, that immediately after my conversation with Prince Metternich, recounted above, he saw the Russian Charge d'Affaires; and after making him read the paper I had left with him said to him, "Voilà ce que j'aurais pu avoir aujourd'hui signé par l'Angleterre et la France, et c'est la

3 5



assent to take part in the negotiation here to the case of its being assented to by Russia—that I should better have understood it from him, but that he must not expect that we should wait for an indefinite period, as the time must come when we should decide for ourselves.

He said that time must also come for Austria, and that he should then take his own line. What that line will be, I said, cannot be doubtful. You cannot associate yourself with a Power whose object it is to let the Turkish Empire perish, and separate from two whose aim is the same as your own, at the risk of seeing them either accomplish their ends without you, or fail in their efforts.

The form of separation for Russia, he said, may be difficult to find, but in such a case it must be found. As yet, however, I cannot admit that the whole basis of my policy is wrong; and that basis certainly is a confident belief that the Emperor Nicholas desires the preservation of the Ottoman Empire as we do ourselves. Let me suggest your basis, I answered, and still the conduct of Russia is easy to interpret. It is as if it were to be proposed to you in your beautiful garden in the suburb where you take your pleasure and give your orders, that you should never again enter it except in company with four gentlemen, none of them very agreeable to you, nor given an order without their consent. The comparison does not hold, he answered, unless the garden belonged to a third person; it is a question of property. Be it so, I answered; there is not a Russian who does not consider the Sultan as belonging of right to his state. I speak not of the Emperor or Count Nesselrode, but of that general public opinion which the Emperor himself must defer. He is in no other atmosphere, and that public opinion regards those of every other nation who set foot within the Dardanelles as intruders.

I do not deny it, he said, but the Emperor is strong enough to set himself above it. It was in his conversation I went to him to recommend him, having set aside the Treaty of Unkiar Skelewi as inapplicable to the case) to recommend to the Porte, if it should call for assistance, to ask that of all the friendly Powers at the same time, and to notify this at present to all the Powers. Had he taken that advice, he would have saved the Turkish Empire, he would have secured the peace of Europe. You offered him, I said, the greatest part that could fall to the lot of man, and he was incapable of accepting it. What a wretched part is he playing instead. Not daring to face Europe, without nobleness enough to act with her, he is gaining time, inventing delays, and waiting for events in the hope that they may do for him what he does not avow for himself. His agents everywhere are seen to his views. At Berlin, in London, he is procuring secret communications, here you are left without an answer. A Constantinople. M. de Metternich is carrying water with both hands of the Ottoman Empire, but if you are so remaining, you are left to this dead body, but what a worse, to this body which feigns death, do not suppose that we shall remain chained to it also, but expect from us new determinations and a line of our own. In the meanwhile, be assured that all the suspicion which before rested on the Russian policy will be transferred to London. It cannot be otherwise, he said, her conduct brings it upon herself. He then said that this was the sixth day upon which he might have received answers to despatches sent by the Archduke; and that in common cases it was on this very day the answer ought to arrive. That if it was deferred a day longer, there must be some sense of great embarrassment to occasion the delay.

I regret to have nothing to send your Lordship upon which you can form a positive opinion. M. de Metternich's change of situation is the cause of it, but I am now obliged to have your finger in the state of things here.

Your Lordship will probably want to see the result, which can rarely be many days in coming; but if, contrary to my expectation, you should decide to send me an answer, I shall be obliged to you to state in clear and simple terms the latitude as to the moment and manner of executing it.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 227

Lord Beaumont to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 9.)

(No. 87)

My Lord,

Vienna, August 2, 1839.

PRINCE METTERNICH has just communicated to me a despatch from Baron Werther, adhering entirely to the views of Austria, and assenting to the negotiation here, provided it is agreed to by the other Powers.

M. de Bresson had made a declaration similar to those made at London and here, inviting at the same time a reply from the Prussian Government. Baron Werther, however, before assenting to this request, and referring it to Vienna, knew what had been done here, intending to conform thereto. Prince Metternich observes upon this on the 1st of August at the Court of Berlin, as it and the Court of Vienna are sure to act together; and if the latter is secured, the former may be counted upon. He seems apprehensive that this demand of an interchange of despatches, if made at St. Petersburg, will be ill received, but that which was at first proposed to him, and appears to have been received with much suspicion at Berlin, is that M. de Bresson, at the same time he made his declaration, communicated the order which had been given to Baron Roussin to demand the entry within the Dardanelles for the French fleet, in the cases known to your Lordship; and stated, that the assent of Austria to the demand was to be inferred from the terms in which Prince Metternich had expressed himself to Count St. Aulaire. This is useless towards the Court of Berlin, which will not take Prince Metternich's words from the mouth of Marshal Soult. It is alarming and vexatious to Prince Metternich, who is always alive to the sensation liable to be produced by these reports reaching St. Petersburg, and whose first feeling upon an incident of this sort, is always a doubt whether he should not do better to cling close to Russia than to connect himself with such a light-headed Cabinet as that of France; it is compromising to M. de St. Aulaire, who will lose the advantage of confidential intercourse with Prince Metternich; it is startling to all those who are in the habits of intimate communication with that Ambassador, and who see themselves exposed to be shown up by his Government.

Prince Metternich's first exclamations to me were, that it was impossible to act in concert with France, and that a new proof had been hereby given of it. This gradually softened down into the affirmation that three of the Powers, England, Austria, and Prussia, were placed upon the same line, and conducted themselves with equal discretion; that of the two others, one was led astray by the *faute française*,—the endeavour always to be first, and to monopolize the credit of everything; the other, Russia, by suspicion of the intentions of the maritime Powers, and the fear of playing their game to her own detriment.

My observation to the Prince was, that if he did not constitute a central negotiation here, without loss of time, and thereby arrest these separate proceedings, the *amalgam* would go to the winds, and that I almost doubted whether it was not already too late to prevent it.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 228

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 300)

My Lord,

Paris, August 8, 1839.

THE messenger Aspaix arrived here at 1 o'clock yesterday, and delivered to me your Lordship's despatches, Nos. 317, 318, and 319, with their inclosures.

Immediately on the receipt of them, I went to the Foreign Office and communicated to Marshal Soult your despatch No. 318, which directed me to

send on the messenger, provided the French Government agreed to the proposal of Her Majesty's Government.

His Excellency had received on Monday last from M. de Bourqueney, copies of the inclosures in that despatch; and your Lordship will have learnt by the report I read that day of the tenour of Marshal Soult's conversation, that the French Government would, in all probability, object to giving to Admiral Lalande instructions similar to those which Her Majesty's Government propose to send to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford for his guidance in the present state of affairs in the Levant.

The objections, the Marshal told me, were fully stated in a despatch addressed to M. de Bourqueney which he read to me and which had been sent off on the previous evening to London to be communicated to your Lordship.

His Excellency said, that he had written this despatch after the Council of Ministers had maturely deliberated upon the subject to which it related: and he could not but believe, he added, that the accounts from Alexandria, which reached London subsequently to the drawing up of the proposed instructions to Sir Robert Stopford would occasion some change in the view taken of this matter by Her Majesty's Government. From those accounts he was (I appeared that hostilities had ceased between the Sultan and the Pasha, although the conditions of peace had not been settled; and that Mehemet Ali had given orders to Ibrahim Pasha to withdraw the Egyptian troops from the left side of the Bosphorus; and had declared that even if the proposals made by him to the Divan were not accepted, he would abstain from aggressive movements and only maintain the possession of those countries which his troops now occupied. The Marshal thought that during this suspension of hostilities it would be rash and dangerous to have recourse to the extreme measures of bringing upon the Egyptian fleet to obtain the immediate restoration of the Turkish fleet.

The danger to be apprehended was that Mehemet Ali, after the capture or destruction of his fleet, after we had exhausted on an incidental point our means of pressure upon him, would not be restrained from pushing further his views by land, and exciting insurrection in Asia Minor, as well as in the European dominions of the Sultan.

It is, my Lord, the substance of the grounds on which Marshal Soult objected to adopt the instructions Her Majesty's Government proposed to give to the Admirals in the Levant, but there is no doubt that the decision of the French Government on this question has been much strengthened by the well-founded apprehension, that the destruction of the Egyptian fleet by France would raise a clamour in this country, fatal to the existence of a Ministry under whose orders it had been effected.

I have, &c.,  
Signed GRANVILLE.

No. 229.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 803.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 9, 1839.

THE messenger Cookes arrived here this morning soon after 10 o'clock, and delivered to me your despatch No. 324, inclosing a copy of a letter addressed by your Lordship to the Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty, and a copy of a letter from the Admiralty to me, in which I received a copy on the day after the receipt of the Admiralty commanding Her Majesty's Viceroy the Mediterranean.

I lost not a moment in reading in translation to Marshal Soult, these additional instructions, observing to him, that they were conformable to the despatch which he had written to M. de Bourqueney, in reply to the communication of the instructions which Her Majesty's Government proposed to send to Sir Robert Stopford upon first hearing that the Turkish fleet was in the power of Mehemet Ali. The Marshal expressed his concurrence in my observation, and appeared much pleased with the prospect of the French and British Admirals

acting under similar instructions. His Excellency said, that the Ministers were to meet in Council at 2 o'clock; and he requested me to leave with him a copy of the instructions, in order that he might submit them to their consideration, and that he would call upon me after the Council, to inform me of the result of their deliberations.

I have since received from the Marshal a copy of a telegraphic despatch from M. de Bourqueney, stating that the English Cabinet withdraws its first project of instructions, and will concert with the French Government fresh instructions to be drawn up within the limits traced in Marshal Soult's despatch to M. de Bourqueney, and also a note from his Excellency, deferring until 10 o'clock this evening his interview with me.

Marshal Soult, upon my proposing to him to delay by a telegraphic order the departure of the steam-boat from Marseilles, was too late. But that he would at the Council make arrangements with the Minister of Marine, for a steam-vessel to be ready at Toulon for the conveyance of the despatches to the British and French Admirals in the Levant.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

P.S.—Marshal Soult called here this evening, and informed me that the Cabinet Council had heard with much satisfaction, the contents of your Lordship's letter to the Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty, but had determined to wait M. de Bourqueney's report of his communication with your Lordship on the subject, before they could decide upon the instructions they prepared their instructions for Admiral Lalande.

G

No. 230.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 14.)

(No. 307.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 12, 1839.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches to No. 328 inclusive.

M. de Roussin, dated the 22nd of July, for the conveyance of which, the French Ambassador writes that he had availed himself of the services of an English courier. It is to be presumed, therefore, that your Lordship is already in possession of the information they contain, which, in fact, amounts to little more than what that late Commissioner was in a state to have known, that Mehemet Ali had refused to accept a vessel with Mehemet Ali's name, and the proposition of peace made by the Sultan; the Ambassador states that in this answer the Pasha had expressed his willingness to accept the Sultan's offer, and that he had had the coin stamped with the image of his Sovereign; but he requires not only that the hereditary government of Egypt, which had been offered to him, should be conceded, but also the hereditary government of all the other Pashalics in his possession. Admiral Roussin makes no mention of the further demand by Mehemet Ali, that Hosrow Pasha should be dismissed from office, nor does he give any account of the impression created in the Divan, by the Pasha's counter-project of peace.

A telegraphic despatch was also received this morning from Marseilles, stating the arrival of a steam-boat from the Levant, giving intelligence of the British and French fleets, and of the French and British fleets having entered the port of Alexandria.

Marshal Soult read to me a draft of instructions to Admiral Lalande, which had been prepared, and which he purposed to submit to the consideration of the Cabinet this evening. They are drawn up in the spirit of the additional instructions which I received from the Admiralty on the 10th of August.

The Marshal also read to me M. de Bourqueney's report of a conversation with your Lordship, which was held on the 10th of August.





Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 12.)

No. 181.)

My Lord,

Therapia, July 20, 1839.

I COMMUNICATED to the Grand Vizier the account of Achmet Pacha's proceedings, as I received it in a letter from Captain Wakefield to Mr. Consul Lander, which I enclosed in copy. I took this opportunity to inform the Grand Vizier, that some of the Ottoman Ministers had expressed an opinion that the Porte ought to negotiate with Mehomet Ali directly, in order to avoid the interference of the Great Powers. I asserted the impolicy of the opinion, adding, that it could not be carried into effect with success by the Porte, because the Great Powers were too directly interested in the arrangements to be made between the Sublime Porte and Mehomet Ali, to permit it to be effected unless they were in unison with the general good. I said that happily the general good imperiously demanded from the Great Powers, that the integrity of the Ottoman Empire should be maintained, and that the independence of the Ottoman Government should be established upon solid bases. I inclose herewith the Grand Vizier's answer.

I have to acquaint your Lordship, confidentially, that Nouri Effendi is the Minister who expressed the opinion that the Porte ought to negotiate directly with the Grand Vizier. I thought it right to renew inquiries on the subject, because Nouri's opinion is wholly in accordance with the policy of Russia.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure 1 in No. 233.

Captain Wakefield to Mr. Consul Lander

Dear Sir,

"Rhodamanthos," Brusa Bay,

Tuesday, July 16, 1839

I FORWARD the despatches by Mr. Ward, and am happy to hear there is a prospect of their return by Sunday for the answers.

We left the Turkish fleet 100 miles to the southward of Rhodes, steering south, in company with the "Nile" Egyptian war-steamer. Sheriff Aga and his family were on board the Capudan Pacha and was sent back to Alexandria as it was supposed in consequence of the Viceroy's having agreed to the terms of the convention which had been offered by the Capudan Pacha. The small Turkish steamer entered Alexandria as we came out.

The Capudan Pacha had twenty-two sail with him, eight of the line.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) ARTHUR WAKEFIELD

Inclosure 2 in No. 233.

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord,

Paris, ce 19 Juillet, 1839.

J'AI l'honneur de rendre compte à votre Excellence de l'entrevue que je viens d'avoir avec le Grand Vizir, et dans laquelle je lui ai dit exactement tout ce que votre Excellence m'avait ordonné de lui faire savoir.

Son Altesse a appris avec le plus grand intérêt les nouvelles de la Flotte du 13 courant; elle est indignée de la conduite du Capitain Ahmed

Le Grand Vizir, après avoir longuement parlé de la fatalité qui a prévenu à

la nomination d'Achmed Pacha comme Grand-Amiral, et de Hafiz Pacha comme Généralissime, a tenu le langage suivant :—

"Son Excellence Lord Ponsonby nous assure confidentiellement que l'Angleterre prendra des mesures pour faire rendre la flotte au Sultan. J'espère en effet, pour l'honneur des Gouvernemens justes et éclairés, qu'ils ne souffriront jamais le scandale qu'Achmed Pacha vient de donner au monde, et que l'Angleterre sortira, notre meilleure amie, de la situation où elle se trouve, à son maître légitime, d'une flotte dont l'indigne chef croit pouvoir se dispenser. Comment M. l'Ambassadeur peut-il croire qu'il ait passé par la tête à quelques membres du Ministère Ottoman de faire un arrangement avec Mehomet Ali, sans se concerter avec les Grandes Puissances?—et que peuvent faire les Ministres sans moi? Vous savez, qu'à peine le Sultan Abdoul Medjid eût-il pris les rênes du Gouvernement, qu'il a exprimé à l'égard de Mehomet Ali des sentimens pleins de bienveillance que nous nous sommes empressés de porter à la connaissance de MM. les Représentans des Grandes Puissances.

"Après les mauvaises nouvelles arrivées de l'armée, j'ai donné à M. l'Ambassadeur les assurances les plus positives, que si, comme on le dit, l'armée serait venue à Scutari, nous ne donnerions pas à Mehomet Ali un pouce de terrain, sans avoir consulté les Grandes Puissances. Je lui réitére mes assurances à cet égard. Jamais, non jamais, la Sublime Porte n'aura recours à l'intervention de la Russie, seule pour terminer cette affaire, qui doit rester tout-à-fait tranquille là-dessus. Les graves inconvéniens de nous adresser à une seule Puissance pour nous aider à la négociation d'un arrangement avec Mehomet Ali, ne nous échappent point; et nous approchons les uns des autres des Puissances qui ne permettent pas à une autre Puissance de s'en charger toute seule.

"Les détroits de la Mer Noire et des Dardanelles sont très-rigoureusement fermés à tous les bâtimens de guerre étrangers; et les commandans des sorts de l'un et l'autre détroits ont ordre de tirer sur les bâtimens de guerre, de quelque nation que ce soit, qui, plus de deux ou trois ensemble, voudraient forcer le passage. Pour à présent nous restons dans l'inaction, ce qui se combine avec les assurances de Lord Ponsonby, jusqu'à ce que nous pourrions voir plus clair dans l'affaire; alors nous réitérerons sérieusement sur la convenance de cela devenant nécessaire, la médiation des Grandes Puissances. En attendant je dirige tous mes efforts vers deux buts, savoir, de maintenir la tranquillité publique, qui, grâce à Dieu, ne laisse rien à désirer, et de rassembler autant de forces qu'il est possible.

"Je vous prie, M. Pisani, de faire savoir tout cela à M. l'Ambassadeur, avec bien des complimens de ma part.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

(Signé)

FREDERIC PISANI

No. 234

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 182.)

My Lord,

Therapia, July 20, 1839.

I ENCLOSE, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of a despatch to me from Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, and my reply to it, based upon the instructions Her Majesty's Government gave to the Admiral, and which your Lordship communicated to me.

I have, &c.,

(Signed)

PONSONBY



Enclosure 1 in No. 234

Admiral Sir Robert Stopford to Viscount Ponsonby

"*Princess Charlotte*," off the South end of Cyprus,  
July 11, 1839.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency with my arrival here with the Squadron under my command, in pursuance of a private intimation from Lord Minto signifying as to direct the Squadron to assemble in this neighbourhood, and to await further orders.

As the accounts of the Sultan's death, and the defeat of his army, which reached me this morning from Candia, and have been confirmed by the "Rhodamantlia," from Alexandria, may render it necessary for the squadron to take up another position, I have to request your Excellency will be pleased to favour me with such information for my further guidance, as you may judge fit to give me under those altered circumstances.

(Signed) I have, &c., ROBERT STOPFORD,  
Admiral

Inclosure 2 in No. 234

*Viscount Ponsonby to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.*

214

Therapia, July 19, 1859.

I HAD yesterday evening the honour to receive your despatch dated the 14th of July 1839 to which I have to reply that the Major's exertions to suppress the slave trade have proved to be the cause of a battle by the Sultans to a man in Syria, that they also possess or attempt to be done by the Pasha of Egypt who is at present at I presume has not yet, and I do not see any objection was I have known that would induce deviation in the views of Government, that it is a new matter which you I doubt will have regardance, the late deceased Pasha was the Pasha of Egypt, which it is to a great extent, the report and sentiment which has been settled

I think it is proper for me to say that I have no intention of interfering with the legitimate sovereignty of the Egyptian Government, and I think it would be right to take all safe and proper means to prevent that that being delivered up to the Pasha of Egypt. I have said of the Pasha's name and left for so doing, and I am of opinion it will be expedient to restore it to the Sultan.

I have stated my opinion in the presence of your dears, and I have only to add that there is perfect tranquility here.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSOMBY.

No. 235

*Frequent Pensons to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 12.)*

(No. 185)

My Lord,

Therapia, July 21, 1939

COLONEL CAMPBELL will have reported to your Lordship, that the French Consul at Alexandria, who is the Egyptian Consul at Alexandria, and that Ali Effendi, the bearer of the proposals made by the Sublime Porte to the Pasha of Egypt, had left Egypt on his return to Constantinople; I have to acquaint you that he arrived here this day. I cannot tell you what answer he brought, but I hope to do so by the Vienna post.

Your Lordship will have learned from Colonel Campbell the professions of loyalty made by Mehmet Ali, and I need not advert to the subject. I will mention a possible occurrence, that the Ottoman and Egyptian fleets united may come here; I think they would not be opposed at the Dardanelles, I am satisfied they could not be opposed there with any degree of vigour, if they were to come, I think they might be submitted to here, and the Sultan advised to disgrace his Ministers, and throw the administration of the Government into the hands of Achmet Pasha and the dependents of Mehmet Ali.

Your Lordship will judge of the effect of such an event.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSORBY

P. S. July 22.—I have received no intelligence from Colonel Campbell.

№ 236.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 12.)*

(No. 187.)

My Lord,

Therapia, July 21, 1839.

AMONGST the statesmen and the masses of all agencies that govern England, France, and Austria, there exists a large diversity of opinion regarding the settlement of the Ottoman Empire as a whole, but none touches upon the necessity of securing Constantinople against foreign danger; and a special incursion might be immediately adopted for that end leaving all other matters for after discussion and arrangement.

Constantinople, within a certain limited quantity of surrounding territory, containing within its circuit the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, might be placed under the guarantee of the Great Powers by Treaty, and so to defend it against every foreign attack. The position of Constantinople renders its defence extremely easy at a trifling expence, as shown by the plans sent home by General Joachims for fortifying the Dardanelles and Bosphorus; but the opening of the Black Sea to ships of war would be an essential step every project that has for its object to give security to Constantinople. There is no right that can be asserted in opposition to that measure except by the Sublime Porte, who has a right derived from ancient practice and the Treaty of 1809, but the Porte might be induced to consent, if proper support be given it against the threatenings that will come from Russia.

It would be inconvenient to carry interference into domestic matters; and the Porte has no place, in security against foreign attack, no more ample means to support its just authority; and if it should fall under the enormous faults of misgovernment, its place being occupied by those who had overthrown it, a *de facto* government might enjoy the same security as its precursor had against foreign attack, the sole objects of the Allies being to preserve the balance of power in Europe.

I have, &c  
Signed) PONSORBY

No. 237

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received August 12.)

10 144

My Love!

Therapio, July 22, 1839.

I FORWARD reports I have this evening received from the Dragonets. I expected that such reports would be of great assistance and pushed forward by Russia, as I have already told your Lordship. The object of Russia is to prevent a foreign

gress, and by getting the Porte to settle affairs with Mehemet Ali, that end is probably attained.

The plans of Russia upon the Ottoman Empire, will only wait for some accidental favourable moment to be completed. Syria be given to Mehemet Ali, unless vigorous measures of prosecution be taken, which may serve to mitigate the prospect of a partition of the Ottoman Empire for it is vain to disguise the proper name of the transaction. Ali have no great danger to guard against, and that is now imminent, and if it be not arrested, the liberals of Europe will see what may be called the fortress of the world placed in the hands of the chief support and representative of despotism.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSOMBY

Inclosure 1 in No. 237

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsomby.

My Lord,

Père, ce 22 Juillet, 1839.

J'AI l'honneur de rendre compte à Votre Excellence de ce que je viens d'apprendre des Ministres Nouri Effendi et Sami Effendi après le retour d'Akif Effendi, arrivé hier d'Alexandrie.

Mehemet Ali versa des larmes lorsqu'Akif Effendi lui parla de la mort du Sultan Mahmud. Il fit faire ensuite, pendant trois jours, des réjouissances palatiales pour célébrer l'accession au trône du Sultan Abdul-Medjid. Il fit monter le Sultan du trône. Ensuite à cela, le Sultan Mahmud dans la prière souleva son Vaisseau dans les Mosquées. Il prit de suite l'habit d'officier au combat. Akif Effendi protesta de sa soumission au Sultan comme un des serviteurs fidèles, et de sa reconnaissance à la Porte à laquelle il appartenait de rendre par la suite de grands services. Mais Son Altesse demanda en même temps un héritier qui confère le gouvernement héréditaire dans sa famille, de toute l'Egypte et de toute la Syrie, et de tous les pays qui sont sous sa domination.

M. le Comte de V. a envoyé à son Excellence Ibrahim Pacha l'ordre de se rendre sur le terrain compris dans ses confins de la Syrie et d'attendre que la Porte eût une réponse. On a fait savoir sur la rive droite de l'Euphrate. Son Altesse part de venir à Constantinople pour faire ses hommages au Sultan, mais y met la condition sine qua non du Hérat qu'il demande probablement.

Akif Effendi ayant dit à Mehemet Ali Pacha qu'il allait rendre à son Gouvernement pour lui communiquer les demandes de son Vaisseau, le Pacha lui conseilla de venir à Constantinople pour en reformer la Suite et l'Ordre de vive voix, et de retourner à Alexandrie avec les instructions qu'on lui aura données.

Mehemet Ali intercéda en faveur du Capitan Achmet Pacha, et pria la Porte de lui pardonner sa démission qu'il vient de faire en cédant à des craintes imaginaires qu'il était mis dans la tête.

La Porte va délibérer sur cette grande question de l'Orient.

Je suis, &c.,  
(Signed) FREDERIC PISANI

Inclosure 2 in No. 237.

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsomby

(Confidentielle.)

My Lord,

Père, ce 22 Juillet, 1839

La Porte est assez disposée à traiter avec Mehemet Ali sur les bases suivantes, proposées d'abord par le Prince de Metternich, et approuvées par le Cabinet de St. James.

- 1°. Le Gouvernement de l'Egypte donné héréditairement à Mehemet Ali;
- 2°. Le Gouvernement de toute la Syrie donné à Ibrahim Pacha

3°. A la mort de Mehemet Ali, Ibrahim Pacha aura le Gouvernement de l'Egypte, et la Syrie restera de nouveau sous l'autorité immédiate de la Porte, comme cela était autrefois.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,  
(Signed) FREDERIC PISANI.

No. 238.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 59)

My Lord,

Alexandria, July 18, 1839.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch, No. 20, of 25th June.

In reference to Earl Granville's despatch, No. 223, of 15th June, your Lordship will have known how unfounded are the reports of the occupation either of Orfa, or of Bamora, by any Egyptian troops.

In regard to the expulsion from Mecca of two dignitaries appointed by the Sultan to reside in the Sacred City, the facts are as explained in the inclosed paper given to me by the Pasha.

Your Lordship will see by that paper, that the two dignitaries, Osman Pasha and Sheriff, were sent by the Porte to Medina, in place of eunuchs, as had ever been the custom, and that they have been busy in intrigues against Mehemet Ali, and for which purpose, there is reason to suppose, they were sent by the Porte.

Those dignitaries are, however, still in their situations at Medina, from which they have never been removed.

As to the seventeen persons who were brought from Medina to Cairo, they were residents there, and not persons sent there in the employ of the Porte, and they were dealt with, as would have been any turbulent subjects in the parts of Mehemet Ali's Government.

In regard to Viscount Ponsomby's No. 122, it appears, either that Nouri Effendi has been most grossly deceived, or that he was passing up a letter to the Turkish Empire, or that he was writing to impose on Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. And my despatches will have evinced to your Lordship the groundlessness of many of the complaints urged by the Porte, against Mehemet Ali.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 238.

Report of Mehemet Ali relative to Dignitaries of the Porte at Medina.

LES Arabes de Judeide ont tué le général, et volé les provisions de bouche expédiées de Médine au Nodj. Pendant qu'on travaillait à faire rentrer dans le devoir ces pillards, les différentes tribus qui habitent aux environs de Médine se sont soulevées, et sont venues corner la Ville Sainte. La nuit qui suivit cette agression, le Cheik-el-Harem, Osman Pacha, se trouvait hors de Médine dans un jardin. Le Gouverneur de la ville s'empressa de le faire prévenir de ce qui se passait et de l'engager à rentrer; Osman Pacha refusa de le faire. Le jour suivant, ce même Osman Pacha voyant que, contrairement à ses prévisions, Médine allait résister, se rendit à la ville et dit au Gouverneur qu'il n'était pas besoin de préparer la défense et de faire faire des sorties aux troupes; que les Cheiks des tribus insurgées l'étaient venus voir la veille au soir; qu'il se chargeait d'être médiateur, et d'arranger les différends. Cette circonstance fit bien comprendre qu'Osman Pacha était d'intelligence avec les révoltes.

En second lieu, Feyzoul-eh-el-Turki avait fait porter par son frère à Koorchid Pacha, Général-en-Chef de l'Armée du Nodj, une lettre de Pacha de



Bagdad, qui l'exhortait à tenir bon contre le Général Egyptien, et l'assurait qu'il irait à son secours. Osman Pacha et l'Administrateur du Tombeau, Cérif Bey, ayant eu connaissance de cette démarche de Feyssoï, envoyèrent dire à Feyssoï, dans le but d'entraver les opérations de Kourchid Pacha, qu'il se gardât bien de faire sa soumission, et que la Sublime Porte ne manquerait pas de lui venir en aide dans sa résistance. Feyssoï, séduit par cette promesse, réussit à faire échapper d'auprès de Kourchid Pacha son frère, porteur de la lettre dont j'ai parlé, et pervint dans le voie des hostilités : on sait quelle grande perte d'hommes il en est résulté.

Chérif Bey distribuait de l'argent, donnait des honoraires à dix-sept habitants de Médine qui n'avaient aucune espèce de charge. Il faisait aussi des présents en d'autres en peaux de chèvres en argent même aux Chefs de Gebel-Chemus, et à ceux des tribus environnantes, de telle sorte qu'il n'y avait plus à douter que les mouvemens et les révoltes de ces tribus étaient le résultat des manœuvres d'Osman Pacha et de Chérif Bey. Je jugeai dès-lors que, pour mettre fin à un pareil état de choses, il devenait nécessaire que ces deux Envoyés de la Porte fussent déguisés aux yeux des Turcs. J'envoyai en conséquence le Général d'Artillerie Solim Pacha, avec deux régimens d'infanterie et un corps de troupes irrégulières; 1°. Pour apaiser la révolte; 2°. Pour inviter les deux agens de Constantinople à se rendre à Médine, et à demander à la Porte qu'on les remplace par des eunuques, comme les choses se faisaient auparavant. Solim Pacha avait ordre de ne pas obliger les deux fonctionnaires muhtars à se retirer avant l'arrivée des ordres de la Porte à ce sujet. Je me trouvais au Soudan lorsque les lettres de démission venues de Médine parvinrent au Caire; j'en fus informé, à mon retour au Caire, j'appris que les troubles des environs de la Cité Sainte étaient apaisés. Les circonstances dans lesquelles nous nous trouvions ne me permettant guère d'expédier ces lettres à Constantinople, je les retins. Les deux kaysyas résidèrent à leur poste, vaquant à leurs offices comme auparavant; je leur ai même fait parvenir un à compte de mille bourses, conformément à l'intention de la Porte, afin qu'ils ne fussent pas inquiétés.

Je n'ai pu que constater que les deux agens, dans cette partie de mon voyage, ont été, jusqu'au bout, aux ordres, les uns des autres, et au mien, quelques-uns comme par le passé, Osman Pacha et Chénif Bey aux Lieux Saints. Si je n'approuvais pas l'admission de ces deux agens, c'est que je voulais voir où en était et les faits ont pleinement justifié mes prévisions.

La crainte que j'entreteins à si grands frais des forces aussi considérables pour assurer le respect et l'inviolation aux Saints Lieux, et tranquillité dans les pays environnans, dans l'intérêt du peuple Musulman, il n'est pas convenable que la France laissa à son tour par son silence le trouble à profusion. Dieu et ses hommes condamnent une pareille conduite.

Je demande que Osman Pacha et Chérif Bey soient rappelés, et que  
 lors avant tout on s'occupe de la punition des coupables à leur place

Les dix-sept personnes qui servaient à Médine les montes des deux envoyés, ont été mandées au Caire où elles restent en liberté, entretenues par mon trésor. Osman Pacha et Cherif Bey continuent d'exercer sans entraves leurs fonctions aux Lieux Saints.

No. 239.

*Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 12.)*

( 700. 64 )

My Lord,

*Alexandria, July 18, 1839*

In reference to your Lordship's despatch, No. 21, of June 25 and its contents, the Hon. Secy of State for the Admiralty, Lord St. Vincent, writes to me, off Cyprus, July 12, that the subject of his despatches being no longer valid in consequence of the late important events, and the Pasha of Egypt having declared his intention of stopping further hostilities in consequence of the Sultan's death, he (the Admiral) proposes returning with the squadron off the Dardanelles, in pursuance of Admiralty orders.

I suppose that the Admiral was not aware of the arrival here of the fleet of the Capudan Pasha.

(Signed) I have, &c.,  
PATRICK CAMPBELL

No. 240

*The Duc de Dalmatie to the Baron de Bourqueney.—(Communicated by the Baron de Bourqueney.)*

Монзиги.

Paris, le 6 Août, 1838.

[illegible]

qu'elle fût, pourrait bien d'ailleurs ne pas donner un caractère de permanence définitive à l'Empire Ottoman, malgré le partage, pas du moins durable, par le lien puissant des mœurs et de la religion, n'en continuera pas moins à former ou faire des Puissances Européennes, ce grand corps dont l'existence a toujours été jugée indispensable au maintien de l'équilibre politique. Les forces qu'il possède, dans l'une et l'autre de ses divisions actuelles, concourent également à cet effet, et je ne crains pas de dire qu'en fait l'Article Paillard l'a grandement contribué efficacement à la destruction de l'Empire Ottoman. Ne se peut-il, de nos jours, être, comme dès le commencement de cette crise, doit rester avant tout à ce que Constantinople ne reçoive de protection extérieure qu'avec votre concours.

Telles sont, Monsieur, les objections qu'a suggérées au Gouvernement du Roi la proposition de l'achat de la flotte et que ne la commission permet de y adhérer entièrement. Vous les avez fait connaître à Lord Palmerston, en lui indiquant la marche qui nous paraît préférable. Elle consiste, vous le voyez, à réclamer de nouveau la restitution de la Flotte Ottomane, et dans le cas où Méhemet Ali n'y refuserait, à lui déclarer qu'il doit dorénavant considérer les Escadres d'Alger comme uniquement et spécialement chargées de repousser toute tentative dirigée contre les territoires ou l'intégrité de la Porte. Le Cabinet Anglais en y réfléchissant, reconnaîtra, je n'en doute pas, qu'une telle attitude n'est aux yeux du monde, que sans rien compromettre, elle atténue, suivant toute apparence, le but que la France et l'Angleterre ont en vue, et que, placés à notre grand regret dans l'impossibilité d'accéder sans réserve, au projet du Gouvernement Britannique, nous ne pourrions mieux lui prouver notre confiance absolue et l'intime accord de notre politique avec la sienne.

Recover, &amp;c.,

(Signé) **MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE**

No. 241.

*The Duc de Dalmatie to Baron Rousme.*—(Communicated by the Baron de Bourqueney.)

M. le Baron.

Paris, le 7 Août, 1839

DEPUIS la dernière expédition que je vous ai adressée, nous avons appris l'entrée de la flotte Turque dans le port d'Alexandrie, le refus fait par M. de Mehemet Ali, le commandant en chef de la Porte, et les conditions exorbitantes qu'il met aujourd'hui à un arrangement. Je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire que ni la France ni les autres Puissances ne peuvent approuver de telles conditions. Nous sommes tous en ce moment avec le Cabinet de Londres, sur les dispositions que nous pouvons prendre pour rendre nécessaires de notre part; et j'ai chargé M. Cochelet de discuter au Vénitien dans les termes les plus formels, qu'alors même qu'on sacrifierait à la détresse de la Porte des conditions incompatibles avec la dignité du Sultan, on proposât à compromettre l'avenir de l'Empire, elles n'obtiendraient pas l'assentiment des Puissances Européennes, si l'on venait cependant pour donner quelque valeur et quelque solidité à un tel arrangement.

C'est avec vous dire, M. le Baron, que le Gouvernement du Roi persiste dans les vues que vous y avez trouvées, — que la Porte ne se hâte pas de conclure avec Méhémet Ali; qu'elle ne fasse rien surtout sans la concours de ses Alliés. tels sont les conseils que vous ne devez pas cesser de lui faire entendre, les seuls qui se concilient avec ses intérêts éternels; et il lui sera d'autant plus facile de les suivre, que le Vice-Roi, au milieu de toutes ses exigences, annonce pourtant l'intention de ne pas les appuyer par la force des armes. Rien n'oblige donc les Ministres du Sultan à se hâter.

Le vous si transmis par le duc de Richelieu, la réponse de l'Angleterre à notre déclaration en faveur de l'indépendance et de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman. Celle de l'Autriche m'est parvenue depuis: elle est également satisfaisante.

Les Trois Cours sont unanimes à proclamer la nécessité d'un concert Européen pour régler les affaires de l'Orient. La Russie seule, qui avait d'abord paru admettre la convenance de ce concert, cherche maintenant à éluder, sous des prétextes plus ou moins spécieux, les conséquences du principe qu'elle n'ose pas contester directement. Un *status quo* dépourvu de sanction, exposé par

consequent à de nouveaux et prompts vieillards. c'est incontestablement ce qui convertit le mieux dans l'orient. Il se pourrait en effet qu'un arrangement direct entre la Porte et Méhemet Ali entrât dans ses vues, que lors de le contraire, elle y aurait secreté tout la main, et si cela n'arr, comme je le crois, elle devient une de supposer que Nour-Eddin se fait rail. à o p m que de l'ambassade de St-Petersbourg. il y aurait aussi de concert avec les quelques uns ce sens. Il ne doute pas que vous n'y verriez avec vous.

Veillez aussi de ne pas perdre un moment de vue l'attitude militaire et navale de la Russie, du côté de la Mer Noire. Dans le cas où les Turcs menaçaient de vous remonter vers vous paraissant menacer de se porter sur Constantinople, vous en donneriez sur-le-champ avis à M. de la Harpe. Il faudrait aussi prendre position à Jassy avec son escadre, pour se prêt à trancher le sort des Moldaves vis-à-vis les Russes, si ceux-ci l'attaquaient.

[illegible]

Veillet & Co.

(Signé) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE

No. 242

*The Duc de Dalmatie to Amiel Duperré.—(Communicated by the Baron de Bourqueney.)*

Методы анализа сцен

$$f^{(1)}_{n,t} x_i = c(1 - \frac{1}{2} \sigma t_i) \quad (8.3)$$

Il y a donc un accord de principe entre les deux Cours. Il s'agit de le transformer en un acte positif. Le S. M. J. doit faire ses propositions, qui pourront en résulter, et de vous soumettre ces déterminations auxquelles il se sera arrêté, afin que vous puissiez en référer à M. l'Amiral Lalande, et le mettre en mesure de concourir, en ce qui le concerne, à l'exécution du plan convenu entre les deux Cours.

Les Consuls Généraux de France et d'Angleterre, demeurant, en l'occurrence, à l'exécution du plan convenu entre les deux Cours, se réuniront formellement à Méhémet Ali, la restitution ou la renonciation des navires appartenant à la Porte. Dans le cas où il s'y refuserait, ils le notifieront par des navires escadres combinées ont pour mission spéciale de porter la parole de l'Empereur Ottoman qui relève directement de Sa Hautesse, et de toute agression paternelle ou déguisée dont elle serait l'objet de la part des forces navales britanniques.

Pour appaiser la jalousie des Turcs, et leur faire voir que l'Angleterre n'a point d'intention de leur nuire, on leur a fait part de la déclaration de la Grande-Bretagne, et on leur a fait voir que l'Angleterre n'a point d'intention de leur nuire, et qu'elle ne veut que leur bien. On leur a fait voir que l'Angleterre n'a point d'intention de leur nuire, et qu'elle ne veut que leur bien. On leur a fait voir que l'Angleterre n'a point d'intention de leur nuire, et qu'elle ne veut que leur bien.

Les Amiraux se mettront de plus en rapport avec les Capitaines des bâtimens  
 l'usage. Comme il paraît qu'un des motifs de ces décrets est de donner à  
 M. de La Fayette, et à M. de La Rochefoucauld, l'autorité de leur Souverain : ils leur seront remarquer



que la France et l'Angleterre, qui leur donnent ce conseil, sont, de toutes les puissances, les plus intéressées à l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman, et ils ne leur cachent pas que les escadres alliées s'opposeraient par la force à toute entreprise dirigée contre l'autorité du Sultan; ils leur offrent enfin de s'interposer pour leur faire obtenir du Gouvernement de la Porte toutes les garanties qu'ils croiraient devoir exiger pour leur sûreté personnelle avant de rentrer dans l'obéissance.

A cet effet et en général, s'il y avait lieu de croire que quelque communication directe avec le Gouvernement Turc pût faciliter un arrangement à l'amiable, les Amiraux n'hésiteraient pas à envoyer à Constantinople un, ou successivement plusieurs bâtimens légers; mais pendant la cours de la négociation, ils se tiendraient auprès de la flotte Ottomane et la suivront partout où elle pourra se diriger, de manière à rester maîtres de ses mouvemens. Si même, avant d'avoir fait sa soumission au Sultan, elle voulait se rendre dans un port Turc quelconque en dehors des Dardanelles, soit à Rhodes, soit à Marmora, il n'y aurait pas de raison pour s'y opposer. Le principe que les Amiraux ne devaient jamais perdre de vue, c'est que le but des Gouvernemens alliés étant de rendre au Sultan la flotte Ottomane, et non de la détruire, le seul cas où il y aurait lieu d'employer la force contre elle ou contre la flotte Egyptienne, ce serait que l'une ou l'autre de ces deux flottes en vint à des hostilités positives contre son Souverain le Sultan, ou contre les territoires qui relèvent directement de Sa Hauteur.

Si la flotte Ottomane était entrée dans le port d'Alexandrie, et que Méhemet Ali se refusât à la rendre à son Souverain ou à la laisser sortir pour la destination indiquée, les Amiraux se borneraient à laisser des bâtimens pour l'observer, en tel nombre qu'ils jugeraient convenable.

Je vous disais tout-à-l'heure, Monsieur l'Amiral et cher Collègue, que les Commandans de l'Escadre devaient se faire suivre sur la côte d'Egypte par les forces nécessaires au succès de leur mission. Il me semble d'ailleurs évident que tout en tenant sur la côte un nombre de vaisseaux propre à les protéger largement à toutes les éventualités, ils peuvent laisser sur la côte de l'Asie Mineure un nombre de bâtimens pour surveiller aussi, avec toute l'efficacité désirable, ce qui se passera de ce côté, et obtenir dans les cas prévus, c'est-à-dire si les Russes se présentaient à Constantinople, ou si les escadres alliées étaient appelées par le Sultan, la libre entrée de la Mer de Marmara. Il ne faut pas oublier qu'après tout, c'est là la question principale, et par conséquent que de ce côté l'observation doit être incessante.

Soyez en un bon, Monsieur l'Amiral, pour me communiquer les instructions que vous croirez devoir adresser à M. l'Amiral Lalauze par suite des résolutions dont je viens de vous faire part.

Agrez, &c.,  
(Signé) MARSHAL DUC DE DALMATIE

No. 243

*Vicount Palmerston to Colonel Campbell.*

No. 27)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 13, 1839.*

I HAVE the most that you do not express at Alexandria opinions as opposed to the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government, as those contained in your private letter of the 17th of July.

Her Majesty's Government cannot concur with you in considering as reasonable the demand of Mehemet Ali to be allowed to dictate to the Sultan, who should or should not be the Ministers of the Porte, and I cannot express any regret that when you reported to me that demand, you should not also have said that you had on the part of the British Government representatives, Mehemet Ali how unbecoming such a demand is from a subject to his Sovereign.

As far as Her Majesty's Government is informed, you are mistaken in

supposing that the army of Mehemet Ali is the only one in the Turkish Empire; and as to a fleet, the Sultan will not be without one for his defence, as long as the British squadron is in the Mediterranean.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 244

*Vicount Palmerston to Lord Beaconsfield.*

(No. 80.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, August 15, 1839.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch, No. 74 of the 14th ult. upon the subject of a notice which has been conveyed in the name of the Emperor of Russia, to Mehemet Ali, that if the Pasha should advance beyond the districts of Orfa and Diarbekir, a Russian army would enter Asia Minor to oppose him.

I have to instruct your Excellency to state to Prince Metternich, that any such step as this taken by Russia, separately and upon her own authority, and without the previous consent and concurrence of all the other Four Powers, would be considered by England as an event of the most serious nature, as it would be a direct attack upon the Sultan, and as justifying any steps which Her Majesty's Government might think fit to take thereupon.

With reference to the contents of your Excellency's despatch, No. 79, of the 14th ult. I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you have already held to Prince Metternich upon this subject.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 245.

*Vicount Palmerston to Lord Beaconsfield.*

(No. 90.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, August 15, 1839.*

With reference to your Excellency's despatch, No. 77 of the 14th ult. of July, containing a copy of the declaration which your Excellency addressed on the 14th to the Austrian Government, upon the subject of the policy of Great Britain with respect to the affairs of the Levant, I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of that declaration.

Her Majesty's Government likewise approve of your having confidentially sent copies of this declaration, and of Prince Metternich's answer, to Lord Ponsonby, as reported in your despatch, No. 75, of the 30th ult.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 246

*Vicount Palmerston to Lord Beaconsfield.*

No. 92

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, August 15, 1839.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch, No. 87, of 2nd of August, upon the subject of a communication which had been made by M. de Bresson to the British Government, relative to the affairs of the Levant, and which was the cause of some annoyance to Prince Metternich, and I have to state to you

that Prince Metternich will have learnt that the same communication was made by M. de Barante to Count Nesselrode.

The Austrian Government seems to cling rather too much to the old principle of secrecy in regard to the mutual intercourse of Governments. The modern practice of Europe has led to more unreserved communication, and there is good reason to think that, on the whole, this system is the best of the two, and that Governments are more likely to gain their proper and legitimate ends by speaking out, and by explaining to all concerned, their views, objects, and intentions, than by attempting concealment, which can seldom be effectually maintained, and which, if it fails, gives rise to exaggerated suspicion.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 247

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

(No. 332.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, August 16, 1839.

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to draw the attention of the French Government to the fact, that the confidential communications which have recently been going on between the British and French Cabinets, upon the subject of the orders to be given to the two squadrons in the Mediterranean, in consequence of the defection of the Turkish fleet, and its reception by Mehmet Ali, have, by some means or other, been made known to the French newspapers: that this has happened while the matter in question was still undetermined between the two Governments, and that the communication made to the French papers has by the parties to whom it was made, been converted into a handle for misrepresentation, and for hostile and unfounded attacks against Great Britain.

Her Majesty's Government think it only necessary to observe, that serious inconveniences must arise from such breaches of official confidence, and that such premature disclosures of negotiations between the two Governments, must tend to render difficult any combined and concerted action between them.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 248

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 101.)

My Lord,

Therapia, July 27, 1839.

THE Minister of Justice, Hadji Saïb Effendi, is on the point of being sent to the Pasha of Egypt with instructions, which are to be decided upon, to-morrow, at a Great Council. Saïb Effendi is to sail in a Turkish steam-boat the day after to-morrow, at the latest. The Porte has promised me a copy of these instructions. I have been assured that their nature has not yet been determined upon; but the Porte may only wish to conceal it from me until they are actually off.

Ibrahim Pasha is advancing on Asia Minor. Maggias Aga, one of the officers who command the Egyptian army, has written to the Governor of Syria, and has been entrusted to the Porte, and which the Chief of the Egyptian army, Ibrahim Pasha, has the Generals Ibrahim, having confided to me the Government of Orfa, Diarbekir, and Harpoot, I am repassing thither with a considerable body of troops. On the receipt of this letter you will lose no time in finding and sending to me 600 camel-loads of barley, &c."

I have, &c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY

No. 249.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 192, Confidential.)

My Lord,

Therapia, July 26, 1839

M. TIMONI the Russian Vice-Consul at the Dardanelles being on board one of the Austrian steamers, the conversation fell upon Mehmet Pasha's departure with the fleet. M. Timoni said, "that it did not surprise me, for I took his despatches from Gallipoli the night before his departure." My informant said that M. Timoni might have been a little elevated by wine, and off his guard. I mention this fact, because I have suspicions that Russian Agents have a hand in this work, which was calculated to aid in preventing the intervention of England and France in the affairs of Turkey, by producing dismay at the Sublime Porte, and inducing the Ottoman Ministers to consent to almost any terms Mehmet Ali might propose, and to complete the arrangement between the parties at once. I expect it will have that effect; and that, long before this arrives in London, the settlement will have been made. The answer to be given to-morrow to the demands of the Pasha of Egypt may not be satisfactory to him, but I think that either the Pasha will insist upon his demands, and the Porte will yield to them; or the Pasha will take what is offered, and accept exactly of the full measure, and after he has completely established his authority in Constantinople, which he will do with very little delay. Perhaps the latter mode of acting may be the best for him, because the proceeding can be so managed, that the point will have the air and the form of an act springing spontaneously from the Porte, and as such it will be less subject to criticism of foreign Governments. I have little doubt it will be accepted by Russia, and I suspect Austria also. Russian interest will be advanced by it, and Austria appears not to be sufficiently clear-sighted to see the consequences of it. I consider the Ottoman Empire to be a power, and Mehmet Ali is a man that Russia has been the chief director of what has been done, that the government of Mehmet Ali, whatever intrigue or whatever avowed form it may wear, will be weaker and weaker for the ends of Russia, that the same game may be played now and hereafter that Russia has so long played against Mahmud I., that there are circumstances necessarily connected with the government of Mehmet Ali, that will serve the ends of Russia now as fully as they have been served hitherto by the *status quo* at Constantinople, and, in proper time, leading to Russia, unless it can be preserved to Europe by vigorous measures (the using the employment of force, necessary, taken by the Governments of England and France notwithstanding the participation of the Ottoman Empire in the war, that was being done for the so-called interests of the affairs of Turkey. The death of Mahmud I. was a malefactor which would have been easy with him on the throne more difficult as things are now, but still England and France may do as a that would be for the security of Constantinople against Russia, as a consequence, a comparison comparatively small, as the price of the vast advantages sought for.

In the absence of instructions to direct my conduct, and when the power of Mehmet Ali is elevated by the hate subservient I see in the great men of Turkey to their private individual interests, I remain passive, after having taken those steps (reported in my late despatches) which were intended to counteract the policy of Russia, and to delay any settlement that should not be in accordance with the interests and counsels of England and France.

Her Majesty's Government has learned from Colonel Campbell the demands made by Mehmet Ali. I am informed, and I think correctly, a substance that the answer to be given by the Porte is, "The hereditary government of Egypt to be granted to Mehmet Ali, and the government of Syria to be granted to Ibrahim Pasha till the death of Mehmet Ali, when the government of Syria is to be again at the disposal of the Porte."

This answer given by the Porte is a breach of the promises made to me by the Grand Vezir, and it is only a sample of what may be expected from the Porte in all other matters, the truth being, however, that the Porte is to state that the Porte more than disregards the Governments of England and



France, believing them to be afraid of Russia, and incapable of vigorous action. It is useless to say that we are cautious and moderate upon principle, but not therefore the less alive to our interests and to what concerns our honour. Such things are disbelieved, and blows alone will make the Turks understand that we cannot be wronged and insulted with impunity.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) **PONSONBY.**

No. 250.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 17.)*

No. 123.)

My Lord,

*Therapia, July 29, 1839.*

I INCLOSE copy of a Collective Note signed by the Representatives of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, and signed on the 27th instant.

The Note was yesterday presented by the Dragomans of the Five Powers to the Sublime Porte, and cheerfully and gratefully received by the Grand Vizier, on the 28th. I inclose Dragoman Piam's report to me of what took place on that occasion.

Baron Sturmer received Prince Metternich's instructions on the morning of the 27th, and the Note signed was ready in the evening. I have leave to express with much liberty my opinion as to the merits and propriety of the measure, and I am confident the measure itself is due to the exertions of Lord Russell, and I consider it to be the most salutary step that could have been taken. It was also most fortunately well-timed, for the Ottoman Ministers had actually resolved upon concessions to the Egyptian Pasha, which would have been at this moment on their way to Alexandria, and which would have mischievously complicated the affairs of this country, and led, I have no doubt, to the fall of the Grand Vizier, and the establishment in authority of men who have no other guide than their own personal interest which they think, or thought, to be irretrievably connected with their subservieny to the ambition of Mehemet Ali. This measure has given force and courage to the Grand Vizier to resist the Pasha, and maintain the rights and interests of the Sultan. The Grand Vizier is so situated that Her Majesty's Government may completely control his fidelity to his Sovereign for his life, as well as his power and place, depending on the success of the projects of the Pasha. The measure will also, I think, ensure the tranquillity of the Capital, and the security, therefore, of the foreign and Christian populations and inhabitants. It opens the road for all that may be considered right to be done by Her Majesty's Government, and has done more than I have time to detail towards the diminution of the undue power of Russia in this country. It has placed Her Majesty's Government in a position that enables it to secure the future integrity and independence of Turkey. It affords a proof of the fact of this Note having been signed by Russia, that the power of that Government is not equal to an open opposition to the interests and lawful purposes of those who seek a just arrangement of Eastern Affairs. I rejoiced, and I was not surprised at the act of the Russian Minister. I have long been convinced that Russia would yield where every power, and I am persuaded that her triumph over her enemies to exact all that is really necessary for the future, will be certainly successful as the present measure has been in this particular.

I took care to prepare the Grand Vizier for the Collective Note. I sent General Frezwick, who is at 5 o'clock in the morning who saw him, and, in my name, placed the measure in its proper light. The General did this with his accustomed good sense, and with the authority he has obtained over the mind of Hosrew, by the experience the latter has had of the value of his advice. The Grand Vizier felt the benefit of the measure and understood its consequences. He immediately ordered his horse and set out for the Porte.

I fear the state of Asia Minor is very unsatisfactory, but it is natural that it should be so after the late events. It is not to be imagined that Mehemet Ali will neglect any means in his power to augment disorder everywhere, but he is himself the source of all the dangers and difficulties, and if he be forced to

desist from pursuit of his ambitious plans, order will be easily restored to as great a degree as order can exist in such a country. If Her Majesty's Government will secure Constantinople against all attack from Russia, there will be no just cause for alarm from anything that can be done to disturb the peace, or alter the balance of power in Europe, but if this main object be neglected, or evaded, and if half measures be continued, or adopted, there must be, eventually, a complete failure of all that is attempted to preserve the common interests, and to escape a war at some future and probably not distant period. The opening of the Black Sea is an effectual remedy, and I knew enough to be able to warn Her Majesty's Government that it will be called for in England by bodies of men whose voice will not be feeble.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) **PONSONBY.**

P.S.—I inclose a translated copy of the Pasha of Egypt's letter to the Grand Vizier.

Inclosure 1 in No. 250.

*Collective Note of the Five Powers.*

*Constantinople, ce 27 Juillet 1839.*

LES Soussignés ont reçu ce matin de leurs Gouvernements respectifs les instructions, en vertu desquelles ils ont l'honneur d'informer la Sublime Porte, que l'accord sur la Question d'Orient est assuré entre les Cinq Grandes Puissances et de engager à souscrire le dit Acte national définitif sans aucun concours, en attendant l'effet de l'intérêt qu'elles lui portent.

(Signé) **PONSONBY,**

*Ambassadeur d'Angleterre*  
**BARON DE STURMER,**  
*Intendant d'Autriche*  
**COMTE KONGSMARCK,**  
*Ministre de Prusse*  
**BARON ROUSSIN,**  
*Ambassadeur de France*  
**A. BOUTENEFF,**  
*Ministre de Russie*

Inclosure 2 in No. 250.

*M. Frederic Piam to Viscount Ponsonby.*

My Lord,

*Péra, ce 28 Juillet, 1839.*

Je m'empresse de rendre compte à Votre Excellence du résultat de la mission dont mes Collègues les Premiers Dragomans de France, d'Autriche, de Prusse, et de Russie, et moi, avons été chargés auprès de Son Excellence le Moustéchar Nouri Effendi, résultat, comme Votre Excellence va voir, extrêmement satisfaisant.

Nous avons remis la Note Collective signée hier par leurs Excellences les Représentants des Grandes Puissances, et relative à la Question d'Orient au Moustéchar, à qui nous avons, en même temps, présenté une traduction Turque de la susdite Note. Le Moustéchar ayant lu la Note, a fait quelques observations qui dénotaient qu'il en était très-satisfait, et il est allé la faire voir au Grand Vizir, qui n'a pas tardé à nous faire chercher.

Nous avons trouvé Son Altesse avec les Moustéchars Nouri Effendi et Sarim Effendi. Nous avons par conséquent les assurances les plus dignes des offres bienveillantes des Grandes Puissances, et de leurs excellentes dispositions envers la Porte. Nous avons assuré les Ministres que les Grandes Puissances, extrêmement intéressées à la Question d'Orient, sont résolues de la terminer, tout en consultant la dignité de la Sublime Porte et l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman.

Les Ministres ont été on ne peut plus satisfait de ce que nous venions de leur dire, et le Comte V. a surtout, en exprimant toute sa reconnaissance, en disant "voilà en effet, comment des Gouvernemens conviennent d'agir envers les autres Gouvernemens". Après quoi Son Altesse nous a dit que la nuit suivante nous venions de faire à la Sublime Porte par une Note Officielle la remise des signatures des Représentans des Cinq Grandes Puissances, ne s'étant plus assés hâté à envoyer son Plébé à Alexandrie, mais qu'attendant qu'il fait une réponse à la réponse de M. de Mevius, il envoie par le capitaine d'Acuff l'Effendi, qui va à terre, qu'il s'agit après l'arrivée d'Acuff l'Effendi : On voit que la Sublime Porte s'est occupée de cette affaire et qu'elle est à la veille de prendre une décision. On nous a dit que M. de Mevius, les Interprètes des Cinq Grandes Puissances se sont présentés à la Porte avec une Note Officielle, pour l'engager, au nom de M. de Mevius, les Représentans de ces Puissances, de ne prendre aucune décision sans leur concours, ce à quoi M. de Mevius a répondu pour ne pas manquer aux regards qu'exige d'elle la sollicitude témoignée à eux par les Cinq Grandes Puissances.

Le Grand Vicaire nous a chargés, moy l'ard, de prier nos Maîtres respectifs d'écrire des lettres analogues aux vôtres à Alexandre et nous avons assuré Son Altesse que MM. les Représentants s'empromettent d'écrire dans le même sens à MM. les Comtes.

Le Grand Vizir et les deux Ministres ont déclaré, comme mesure très-convenable, que la lettre de Son Altesse sera portée à M. le Comte de Capri par l'Agent de ce Pacha pris en route, qui fera le voyage dans un Latini à vapeur de la Marine Ottomane lequel devra partir après-demain, et Son Altesse a exprimé le désir que ce même Latini, en passant au Capri, doit remettre la lettre Visiriale à M. le Comte de Capri, et que par la même occasion les Représentants soit destinés à se rendre à Alexandrie et par la même occasion, chargés des dépenses de leurs excursions pour les Canaux.

de nous. Nous avons promis au Grand Vierge de porter fidèlement à la connaissance  
de nos Amis respectifs tout ce que Son Amesse venait de nous dire et nous  
nous sommes promis.

(Signé, Je suis, Ac.,  
FREDERIC PISANI

Inclosure 3 in No. 250.

*Mehemet Ali to the Grand Emperor*

### 4. Translation

[illegible]

On ne peut pas en dire autant de la cour de France, car elle est restée la même, et elle a toujours été la même.

Après avoir dit que les choses ne se passent pas comme on le croit, avec les deux personnes citées, je leur ai dit que j'avais vu Paul qui est allé passer une très longue de l'été de 1944 à 1945 à passer ce temps sans

Votre dévoué et son valet, comme tout le monde, tant à son que à la  
 vie des deux frères. Les plus agréables que de la seigneurie et de la  
 leur union et celle d'une même gens, vous votre vassal, par le

suivant mon ancien usage, je recommence à rendre des services à la Sublime Porte et à lui donner de nouveaux témoignages de mon dévouement. Mais lorsque sous le règne du Sultan défunt, Sarim Effendi, alors Beylikgi de la Chancellerie Impériale, vint ici chargé d'une mission, il m'annonça que Sa Hauteur allait me conférer à perpétuité le gouvernement de toute l'Egypte, et ceux de la province de Seyda et du Sandjack de Tripoli de Syrie. Votre Altesse n'ignore pas que considérant mes services passés, je n'ai pas accepté les offres qui m'étaient faites, et que j'ai prié que toutes les provinces et tous les Sandjacks qui se trouvaient déjà soumis à mon Gouvernement me fussent donnés à perpétuité à moi, et après moi, à mes fils et petits-fils.

Sans parler ici de nos anciennes liaisons d'amitié, et de nos relations, qui ne cesseront jamais, j'aime à croire que réfléchissant, d'après l'importance des affaires et la perspicacité que vous caractérisent, sur la position délicate de la Sublime Porte, sur la sincérité de mes sentiments, et sur les avantages d'assurer la tranquillité de la Nation Musulmane, Votre Altesse agira envers moi d'une manière analogue aux circonstances actuelles, amenées par les décrets du Ciel.

La lettre que Votre Altesse m'a écrite parle seulement de l'Egypte : elle ne fait aucune allusion aux autres choses, et je vous en parle par les discours d'Ali Effendi, qu'il n'a aucune mission, aucune autorisation relativement à ma demande, savoir, que toutes les Provinces et tous les Sandjacks me soient donnés à perpétuité. Mais il a dit qu'il vient tout pour lui me ramener moi, et que plutôt que d'entrer en correspondance avec la Sublime Porte, il valait mieux qu'il s'en retournât pour faire connaître à Votre Altesse, de vive voix, mes sentimens ; et c'est ce qui j'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir par cette lettre.

Le 3 Djemazi-ul-evrel, 1255. — (16 Juillet 1839.)

No. 261.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received August 17.)

(No. 194.)

My Lord,

Thessalon, July 29, 1834.

1 ENCLOSE copy of my letter to Her Majesty's Agent and Consul General at Alexandria, enclosing a copy of the Circular Note of the 27th instant.

The French Ambassador also writes to the French Consul General a letter, and Baron Saurer had expressed his opinion, and that of the Ministers of Prussia and Russia, that some efforts should be made by us to obtain the restoration of the Ottoman Fleet. I wrote to Baron Saurer a note, of which I enclose a copy, and state to Ambassador Russia my opinion that the Collective Note having been agreed to by the Porte it was not competent to us to make any arrangements without further consultation from our Governments, in whose hands the affair was now entirely placed; that therefore I could not approve of any proposition being made to Mehmed Ali and had confined myself to the simple notification of the fact of the Collective Note, and the adhesion of the Porte to the proposal therein contained.

I think there might arise inconveniences from any step we might take in present circumstances, and that it is more prudent to avoid giving any loop-hole to Mehemet Ali, or others, for escape out of a position which is excellent for us, and not agreeable to them.

In my despatch to Admiral Stopford, of which a copy is also annexed, one possible inconvenience is mentioned.

The French Ambassador admitted my view, but has acted upon his own. It was not proposed that we should write a collective nor an identic letter to the Consuls at Alexandria; and I thought myself at liberty, therefore, to act as I have done, and Her Majesty's Government thereby is wholly uncommitted.

The French Ambassador was apparently anxious to send his aide-de-camp with the despatches, to which I for one readily consented.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) P. P. PONSOR.



Inclosure 1 in No. 251.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Campbell.*

Bar, Therapia, July 29, 1839.  
I ENCLOSE copy of a Collective Note signed by the Representatives of the Five Great Powers.

It was yesterday delivered to the Sublime Porte, and the Porte, without delay, gave ~~its~~ assent to the proposition therein contained.

You will acquaint the Pasha of Egypt with this fact. The Representatives of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia ~~will~~ demand the Consuls-General of their respective Governments to communicate the above fact to the Pasha; and it is desired by all that the Consuls-General should act conjointly in performing what is desired of them.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 251.

*Viscount Ponsonby to the Baron de Stürmer.*

My dear Baron, July 29, 1839.  
I SEND back Admiral Roussin's letter, and I send you the letter I have written to the British Consul General.

I think it better to avoid saying one word that is not absolutely necessary for making known the fact. I have no authority from my Government to take any measures for effecting any arrangement between the Porte and the Pasha, and our act of the 27th instant has placed the arrangement entirely in the hands of the Great Powers themselves, and our Governments are alone competent to act now. The Porte has acceded to what we proposed. I think it proper to avoid committing my Government; and therefore I say nothing about the restitution of the fleet. I do not like to reduce my Government, in communication with Mehmet Ali, to a level with the Pasha. I cannot treat him as I should treat the Sultan; and it seems to me sufficient to cause the fact of our proceedings here to be notified to him. I offer him no advice. I am not Ambassador near the Pasha of Egypt. You will perceive that I have not the least fault to find with Admiral Roussin's letter. It is not a collective act we have to perform, excepting in so far as the act being officially the copy of our Collective Note to the Porte, and notifying the acceptance by the Sublime Porte of the proposition contained therein.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 251.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.*

(Confidential.)

Sir, Therapia, July 29, 1839.  
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge, for your information, a copy of a Collective official Note, signed by the Ministers of the Five Great Powers, which was yesterday presented to the Sublime Porte, and received by the Ottoman Ministers with the highest satisfaction.

It appears to me that, in accordance with your instructions, the paramount object of Her Majesty's Government is to prevent a collision between the Porte and the Pasha of Egypt, and I presume that the act done by the Great Powers, as now reported to you, is to be considered as an adjuvant reason for the adoption of every measure that may tend to prevent any attack being made by the Egyptians upon the Sultan.

It would be rash to assume that Mehmet Ali may not be induced, by what has now been done, to make attempts to overthrow the Government of this country; and it is possible that he may have recourse to some means that may be furnished him by the Ottoman fleet: for instance, he might at once send back that fleet, having secured for himself the attachment of the officers commanding it, which it is certain he has attempted to do, if not succeeded in effecting; and the fleet, in that case, might be employed at Constantinople to overawe the Sultan, and change the Government, so as to establish in authority men devoted to the party and the views of Mehmet Ali. I should think it may be a question as to the expediency of allowing the Ottoman fleet to come up to Constantinople, before the Grand Vizier shall have had knowledge of the situation of things in it, and time to take such measures as he may think proper. I will communicate confidentially and secretly with the Grand Vizier on this point, and report to you upon it.

There is another eventuality worthy of consideration, namely, the possibility, some say the probability, that Ibrahim Pasha may advance with his army to menace the capital. If that were to happen, it might be considered proper for Her Majesty's servants to offer and give all the protection and support possible to the Sultan and his Government; and I think it would be easily in the power of Her Majesty's servants to make the capital against all attack from without, and from almost every chance of domestic tumult, and the efforts of the partisans of Mehmet Ali to produce revolution.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

No. 252.

*The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 19.)*

(No. 83.)  
My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, August 9, 1839.*

AT my audience on Sunday last, and on two subsequent occasions, the Emperor spoke to me upon the state of affairs in Turkey.

His Imperial Majesty has called my attention to the calm tranquillity with which he awaits the issue and progress of those affairs, and to the absence of all preparations which might indicate a warlike or ambitious spirit. The Emperor expressed a perfect confidence in the good intentions of the British Government, and his satisfaction, and trust, that he is no longer misunderstood or suspected by the British nation. But His Imperial Majesty did not conceal his dissatisfaction at the attempts of the French Government to take the lead in the settlement of this Eastern Question, in which, in His Imperial Majesty's opinion, they had no occasion to take an active part. His Imperial Majesty said, he thought it would be best, that all the Powers should abstain from meddling in the affairs of Turkey, as far as possible, consistently with the preservation of that Empire.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) CLANRICARDE.

No. 253

*The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 19.)*

(No. 95.)  
My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, August 10, 1839.*

THE departure of the steam-boat allows me barely time to inform your Lordship of a conversation which I have just had with Count Nesselrode. His Excellency sent for me to let me know the intelligence he had just received from Constantinople and Alexandria. And as it appeared to us possible that this despatch might reach your Lordship as soon as any news of the same date from Egypt, his Excellency permitted me to take the copies of reports of two interviews between the Pasha of Egypt and the Consuls-General of the Four

Powers at Alexandria, and between the Pasha and the Consul-General of Austria which I have the honour to inclose.

Count Nesselrode told me that his accounts from Constantinople, up to the 30th of July stated that the capital enjoyed perfect quiet, and the rumours we had heard of revolts in the Turkish provinces had not been confirmed.

His Excellency expressed his surprise and regret that Achmet Pasha should not have been met, and stopped by our Admiral before he reached Alexandria, and that the French Admiral Lalande had allowed him to pass with the Turkish fleet unopposed.

Count Nesselrode asked me if I supposed my Government would persist in maintaining the capital as we had proposed, of a definitive settlement of the differences between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, in the altered condition of their affairs, and of the conduct of the Pasha.

I replied that Her Majesty's Government did not see that the recent events that had occurred necessitated any change in the views and conduct of the European Powers, but as a case of vigour and promptitude in their interposition to prevent the Turkish Pasha.

Count Nesselrode assured me with readiness to concur in that view. I made him repeat that assurance, and his Excellency added, that it remained to consider by what steps it should be supported, provided, as appeared probable, our diplomatic exertions at Alexandria were successful.

Count Nesselrode expressed his regret that the French and English combined fleet had departed, leaving instead of remaining all Alexandria.

His Excellency showed me a copy of his reply to the communication addressed by the French Government to each of the four Powers, and proceeded to speak of the demand made by the French Ambassador at Constantinople to pass the Dardanelles. He showed me the dispatch he had written to Count Mehemet Pasha, and he said he had a great deal to say that the whole of the Turkish affairs would be settled quickly and satisfactorily provided the French fleet was kept out of the Dardanelles. He said the demand was ill timed and inadvised, and that he was sorry it had been made.

I reminded his Excellency that it was made only conditional upon one contingency which was very unlikely to arise, and that upon the general system of the power, as regarded Turkey or the rest of Europe, by which the Dardanelles were to be kept closed, I knew the British Government agreed with what he said upon it, however necessary an exceptional case of infringing that rule might be.

On the whole, Count Nesselrode repeated the same assurances I had previously received and reported to your Lordship, and in which I believe, namely, that the Russian Government at no time desisted of assuring its military demonstration, or any execution of the main clause of the Treaty of Unkar Skelessi.

I have to apologise to your Lordship for the hurry which is evident in this despatch.

I have, &c.  
(Signed)

CLANRICARDE.

P.S. Count Nesselrode begged that your Lordship might communicate the contents of the inclosed papers to M. Kisseleff, as he had no other copies of them, or time to have them made.

Inclosure 1 in No. 253.

[See Inclosure 5 in No. 205, p. 225.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 253.

The Consul-General of Austria in Egypt, to the Internuncio at Constantinople

Extrait.)

Alexandrie, le 7<sup>e</sup> Juillet, 1839.

DANS un entretien que j'ai eu hier, 4, avec Mehemet Ali je lui ai posé les deux questions suivantes :

1. Quel serait le parti qu'il prendrait, si la Porte ne consent pas à éloigner des affaires Hosrew Pasha, ni à accorder à Mehemet Ali l'hérédité de toutes ses possessions ?

2. Quelle serait sa conduite, si la Porte accédait à l'une et à l'autre de ces demandes ?

Réponse ad 1<sup>re</sup>. " Dans le cas de refus de la Porte, je resterais tel que je suis, c'est-à-dire, je garderais toutes les provinces que je possède en occupant encore en vos Oufes et Diarbeckir. Je garderais aussi la Haute Ouedon, persuadé que les Grandes Puissances n'emploieront contre moi que des mesures négatives ; mais si elles voulaient recourir à des mesures coercitives, je suis résolu à me défendre à outrance.

Ad 2<sup>e</sup>. " Si la Porte adhère à mes demandes, je laisse la Syrie et les autres provinces à mes enfans pour les gouverner à leur guise, et je me rendrai à Constantinople pour exercer mon droit et mes services au Pacha de mon Souverain. Je n'accepterai pas le poste de Grand Vizir, ni aucun autre emploi actif, je ne veux être que son premier Conseiller, pour l'aider à gouverner son Empire, pour introduire des réformes utiles, remédier aux abus invétérés en Turquie, et pour le bien de son peuple.

En conclusion, Mehemet Ali a prié M. Laurin de porter fidèlement cet entretien à la connaissance de l'Internonce."

No. 254.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 310.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 16, 1839

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches to No. 330 inclusive.

I had an interview with Marshal Soult, and he said that he had received a dispatch from your Lordship, and that he had communicated it to the Emperor. He said that the Emperor was very much interested in the affairs of the East, and that he had given orders to Mehemet Ali's propositions for peace.

M. Cochelet writes, that the Turkish fleet had entered the port of Alexandria, and that a great number of the officers belonging to it, and who were working about the streets, had accepted the terms of the Egyptian officers of marine.

Count Medem, the Russian Consul-General in Egypt states in a letter to his brother at Paris, that the Egyptian fleet is just going to enter the port, and that the apprehension felt by Mehemet Ali at our being attacked by the English and French fleets, if it remained at sea.

This intelligence, Marshal Soult said, made him feel indifferent in regard to sending the instructions to Admiral Lalande which had been prepared.

I told the Minister what he said, but he said that no further negotiations should be made to the Pasha respecting the restoration of the Turkish fleet to the Sultan. He said, far from it; indeed, he had thought of dispatching another of his aides-de-camp to Mehemet Ali to remonstrate against the course in which he was proceeding, particularly with reference to his demand of the dismissal of the Grand Vizier Hosrew Pasha, and to the letters which he had written to seventeen different Pashas to join with him in insisting on a compliance with that demand.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

No. 255

Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 16.)

My Lord,

Berlin, August 14, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches Nos. 2 and 3, together with their inclosures.

I communicated to Baron Werther the contents of your despatch marked

4 B



No. 2, thus his Excellency had agreed with your Lordship upon, that the present understanding between the two Powers has extended to peace. He then said that Prussia would follow the line of conduct pointed out to her by Great Britain and Austria, and that he had entered into agreements in the matters which these Governments stipulated to be upon adopting. He then turned upon my stating to your Lordship, that he was convinced that Russia was acting unfairly and without any reason at this moment. He had received yesterday a courier from St. Petersburg, and he observed to me, that as the Emperor had been obliged, sometimes, and at the moment, to tell the French Emperor, that he had obtained any suspicion of the Emperor as to part of the Emperor, as he thought if such suspicion did exist, it would only cripple and embarrass his action; and he therefore premised upon me the expediency of addressing your Lordship on this subject.

It appears that M. de Tassac has just returned from Constantinople or Vienna, Baron Werther therefore is of opinion, that he will have received the Emperor's orders to concert with Lord Brannvale and Prince Metternich; and he said that the Emperor had lately talked without reserve to Count Fiquelmont, and much to that Minister's satisfaction, on the Turkish Question.

I am informed on the other hand, that when the Emperor came through St. de Barante, that the English and French troops were ordered to join the Porte the entry into the Danube. The Emperor's Majesty ordered great donations of money and that as the compensation came from France, it was a great point to be made. The Emperor's Majesty gave orders for extensive preparations to be made. That the Emperor's Majesty was not partaking of the news of his mother's exalted rank to be long but at the want of a full and complete knowledge of the Emperor's Majesty.

I feel however that I am not in a position to report to the waiting many boys were I to expect term year to say that I find it appropriate to expect to among boys who take a more active interest in the affairs of the times, and who are intelligent with their present state as to the consequences of the war. In general the peace of Europe, and Mehmet Ali's desire to operate by the adoption of more moderate measures against the Greeks, may perhaps have been expected. It was never so, as long as it is an actual war with the two Powers, but a compromise has been made and peace is the desire of both. In three or four years, the war may be stopped by advancing our troops and continuing to exert a very heavy influence on the Balkan Peninsula by direct and indirect power, or by threatening a revolution in Constantinople, or by threatening the interests of a European power.

Such are the opinions that I have heard expressed, and I am sure I need not apologize to your Lordship for reporting them.

(Signed) GEORGE B. HAMILTON.

No. 256.

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received August 20.)

(No. 317.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 18, 1839.

THE inclosed paper\* is a copy of a note which, on the 27th ultimo, was presented to the Sublime Porte, signed by M. de Boutevill as well as by the plenipotentiaries of the Great European Powers, &c.

Marshal Soult received a copy of it this morning in a dispatch from Admiral Roussin, and obligingly lost no time in communicating it to me.

Signed) GRANTVILLE

\* See *Inventory 1* in No. 212, p. 273.

No. 257

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received August 21.)

No 318 }

My Lord,

Paris, August 19, 1839.

MARSHAL SOLIT read to me this morning a despatch from M. de Bourqueney by which I can see that your Lordship has received assurances from the Government of the 2nd Empire and has been duly acquainted with the Collective Note of the Representatives of the German Imperial Powers to the National Diet, relative to the suspension of the application of the Mexican Abolition of Slavery of 1861, and that the Imperial Government

[illegible]

Count Nesselrode put this charge before the London Conference. Dismissing it as a desperate trick, the Allies were able to dismiss the Minister without marks of committal disapproval, only by Mr. Adams, with respect to the urgency of the combined French and English fleets entering the Straits of Marston; he admitted that immediately after the Ambassador had announced the positive intention of the combined Fleet to pass the Dardanelles, and not as contingent upon the Russian Fleet entering the Bosphorus; and proceeding upon this hypothesis, Count Nesselrode expatiates upon the necessity of the Russian Government adopting measures for the repulse of the enemy upon the danger arising therefrom to the peace of Europe.

The Marshal requested Count Moltke to point out to his Government, that it was only in the case of a Russian armament passing into the Bosphorus that the French fleet would proceed to the Sea of Marmora, and that he was perfectly willing that both ends of the canal of Constantinople should be closed against the entrance of foreign ships of war.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

No. 258

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 21.)*

No. 322.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 19, 1839.

WITH reference to the Lordship's despatch No. 412, in which I directed to draw the attention of the French Government to the fact that the continued occupation of the whole of the Adriatic by the French Government would be a serious obstacle to the progress of the work of the Commission, I have to state, that the matter has been brought to the notice of the French Government by some means or other, and it is known to them. For newspaper purposes, I have to state, that the matter has been made an all-Serbian question. Marshal Soult recently told me, and he told me that the Government were in a position to have been satisfied with your Lordship on the occasion. I said to him, that after he had

No. 259

M. le Comte, St. Pétersbourg, le 2<sup>e</sup> Mars, 1839.

AU milieu des événemens qui semblent de jour en jour aggraver davantage l'état des affaires du Levant, l'Empereur a jugé nécessaire, que ses Représentans fassent connaître au Sultan, par une note officielle, que l'Empire Ottoman, et des déclarations qu'il a prises pour prévenir les dangers qui menacent aujourd'hui de compromettre le repos de l'Orient.

C'est d'ordre exprès de notre Auguste Maître, que je me fais un devoir, M. le Comte, de vous faire connaître ses pensées et ses déterminations, de la manière la plus poutive.

L'Empereur a la conscience d'avoir fait tout ce qui était en son pouvoir pour empêcher un conflit entre la Turquie et l'Egypte. Il a adressé au Sultan Mahmoud les représentations les plus sérieuses pour le détourner de l'idée de s'engager dans une lutte dont notre Auguste Maître prévoyait les conséquences déplorable.

L'événement n'a que trop réalisé nos prévisions et justifié nos remontrances.  
L'absence de l'empereur à la cérémonie du couronnement du prince héritier  
l'a entraîné dans une situation qui ne peut être que fatale au régime.

Sultan Mahmoud

Malgré tant de désastres, son fils Abdoul Medjid est monté sur le trône, sans que son avènement ait été accompagné de scènes de désordre et de troubles dont l'histoire de Turquie nous offre de si fréquens exemples. Loin de là, les derniers rapports de notre ministre à Constantinople attestent, que la solennité du couronnement a été célébrée par des témoignages unanimes de respect et de fidélité, au milieu de cette immense population de la capitale de l'Empire Ottoman, dont la sécurité n'a pas été troublée un seul instant.

Dans cet état de choses, l'Empereur ne désespère nullement du maint de la Porte, pourvu que les Puissances de l'Europe sachent respecter son repos, et que par une agitation intempestive, elles ne finissent par l'ébranler, tout en voulant la raffermir.

Je vous envoie ci-joint, M. le Conseiller, pour vous exposer à cet égard notre

Dans le monde de la Poste, il y a toujours, quelque chose qui change, soit, mais pas tout à fait. D'ailleurs, on ne se rend pas compte que les choses changent, car elles ne le font que très peu à la fois, et on ne s'en rend compte que très peu à la fois. Mais, si on y réfléchit, on se rend compte que les choses changent, et on se rend compte que les choses changent, et on se rend compte que les choses changent.

[illegible]

De cette manière, la tâche que les Cabinets de l'Europe sont appelés à remplir, leur a été clairement indiquée par la Porte elle-même. Ils ont appuyer ses démarches à Alexandrie; décider Méhemet Ali à les accepter; ne point permettre qu'il impose au Sultan des conditions, et, au contraire, placer le Vicaire dans la nécessité d'accepter les conditions définitives que l'Europe est autorisée à considérer comme solides, parcequ'il est

Cette conviction a dicté les déterminations de l'Empereur. Au moment de l'agitation générale que la crise du Levant a fait naître, il n'a éprouvé ni inquiétude, ni impatience d'agir. Il n'a fait aucune démonstration. Il n'a envoyé à Constantinople ni un vaisseau, ni un soldat, dans la ferme persuasion, que son calme ferait à la Porte plus de bien que ne lui en aurait fait son armée et sa flotte.

Telle est l'attitude que l'Empereur a prise.

Or, si la leçon que l'empire ottoman a donnée pendant la crise actuelle, et dont les frontières touchent immédiatement à celles de la Turquie, ne se montre aujourd'hui ni inquiète, ni impatiente de paraître sur le théâtre des événements, si elle ne se fait pas remarquer par la saine raison, par le bon sens et qu'elle ne se contente de l'Empire Ottoman, peuvrent, sans la moindre inconvénient, adopter la même attitude, et modérer leur action.

Dans cette attente, notre Auguste Maître ne plait à croire que le Gouvernement Français, guidé par la politique pieuse de prévoyance qu'il a suivie jusqu'à ce jour, ne cherchera point à compliquer la situation de l'Empire Ottoman par un développement de forces navales, qui, au lieu d'imposer la paix à Alexandrie, viendrait la troubler à Constantinople.

[illegible]

Le lendemain, M. le Comte, les conséquences inévitables de l'apparition d'une Escadre Française dans la Mer de Marmara.

(1) Les autres parties de la machine à vapeur se rendent compte des erreurs sur lesquelles on a pu se tromper, et on s'efforce de les éviter. Les autres parties de la machine à vapeur se rendent compte des erreurs sur lesquelles on a pu se tromper, et on s'efforce de les éviter.

En 1812, les Russes, sous le commandement de Barclay de Tolly, envahirent la Pologne. Les Français, sous le commandement de Napoléon, les repoussèrent. En 1813, les Russes, sous le commandement de Blücher, envahirent la Prusse. Les Français, sous le commandement de Napoléon, les repoussèrent. En 1814, les Russes, sous le commandement de Blücher, envahirent la France. Les Français, sous le commandement de Napoléon, les repoussèrent. En 1815, les Russes, sous le commandement de Blücher, envahirent la Belgique. Les Français, sous le commandement de Napoléon, les repoussèrent.

Le Ministère Français est trop reconnaissant la différence de position avons protégé la Porte sans braver les encadres étrangères, sans protéger la Porte, viendront

Il nous suffit d'avoir clairement établi cette distinction, qui nous dispense d'entrer à ce sujet dans de plus amples développements. D'ailleurs, notre intention n'est point ici de provoquer une discussion quelconque sur une éventualité qui,



des Chinois est incontestable et c'est même le plus sûr de nous donner le parti-  
ner si le dossier est mal traité. En fait, nous ne pouvons pas le  
faire car nous ne pouvons pas le faire. Mais nous ne pouvons pas le faire car nous ne  
pouvons pas le faire. La situation est, en fait, la même pour rassurer les  
autres le plus.

« Et dans cet esprit de conciliation et de parfait accord, que vous êtes chargé de vous acquitter auprès de M. le Président du Conseil, de la communauté de la Chambre des députés, et de la Chambre des pairs, de leur donner lecture et remettre copie.

Receved, at  
(Signed) NESSELRODE

No. 210

*Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Conyngham.*

(No. 128)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, August 20, 1939.

M. DE KISSELEFF communicated to me yesterday a copy of the despatch sent to Count Nesselrode to Count Moltke on the 1<sup>st</sup> of June, which appears from your despatch No 85 Count Nesselrode himself has shown to your Excellency.

With reference to that part of the despatch which relates to the passage of the Dardanelles by a French squadron, I read to Mr. de Kussleff the instructions to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, of which I inclose copies,\* in order to show to M. de Kussleff that the Russian Government had misconceived the nature of the demand which the British and French Ambassadors at Constantinople were instructed to make, that in certain contingencies the fleets of their respective nations might be permitted to pass the Dardanelles. I pointed out to Mr. de Kussleff that this demand was not made with any view of hostility against Serazopol or Odessa, but merely for the purpose of securing the passage of the Black Sea for the Russian fleet, and that the demand was not made on the part of England and of France, but for the purpose of maintaining a joint action on the part of the Five Powers.

(Signed) I am, &c.,  
PALMERSTON

No. 261

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Butler

(No 3.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 20, 1830.

I HAVE to instruct you to state to the French Government, with reference to the communications which have passed between the two Governments, about the measures to be taken for restoring to the Sultan the Turkish fleet, that in the course of His Majesty's Government's deliberations upon the subject, the Government have been fully satisfied that the interests of the Empire are best served by the adoption of the measures proposed, and that they will be ready to co-operate with the Government of France in the execution of the same.

The Governments of England and France are friends and allies of the Sultan, and have spontaneously and formally declared their determination to uphold the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire for its present dynasty, and to oppose themselves to any combination which might be calculated to trench upon that integrity and independence. But it is manifest that Mohomet Ali, by retaining the Turkish fleet, avowedly as a means of extorting from the Sultan the concession of certain demands, does openly attack the independent political action of the Sultan, and does, by a combination with the traitorous Commander of the Turkish fleet, endeavour to possess himself of the Turkish Empire. The Government of France and England are therefore of opinion, that the Governments of France and England are bound, no less by a regard for their recent declarations, and a respect

\* See Vol. 38, 125, and 129.

for their own honour than by considerations of sound policy to compel Mehmet Ali to give back his own sons. Save only the sons of the Sovereign, which are new, and not exclusively property of the Sultan, and given up as a ransom for purposes hostile to the Sultan's interests, but as the Sultan's own sons by the sale of the Sultan's property the sons of Mehmet Ali, Mehmet Ali or his mediators between the Sultan and Mehmet Ali, it is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that a further step in the matter ought to be as far as possible effected by direct negotiation, and that the Sultan should send emissaries from Constantinople, which is the central point of negotiation, instead of from London or Paris.

Her Majesty's Government, therefore, are about to send immediately instructions to Lord Beauséjour, to propose to the Representatives of the other Four Powers the steps which, under all circumstances, appear to Her Majesty's Government the fittest to be taken with respect to the Turkish fleet, and to state to the Representatives of those Powers, that it is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that the restoration of that fleet by Mehmed Ali should be insisted upon as an indispensable preliminary to any negotiation whatever upon any other point.

The course which Her Majesty's Government would propose for the attainment of this object is, that the Consular Agents of the Five Powers at Alexandria should be instructed by the Ambassadors and Ministers at Vienna, formally, and in a Collective Note, to demand from Mehemet Ali the immediate restitution of the Turkish ships, together with such of the officers and men as may be willing to return to their allegiance; that if this demand be complied with, the Turkish ships should be placed under the care and custody of the combined English, French, and Austrian squadron; the Admirals of which would take care not to permit any of these Turkish ships to go up to Constantinople, without being first certain by communications with the Turkish Government, that the fidelity of the officers and men could be relied upon, and that there would be no danger of their again revolting against the Porte, in the event of their being sent back to Constantinople.

If any doubt should be entertained on this point, the ships should be kept at Athens or elsewhere outside of the Dardanelles, or they should be accompanied to Constantinople by some ships of the combined fleet; or else they should be sent back with merely officers and men enough to navigate them, and perhaps a guard belonging to the Allies on board each ship.

The Consular Agents should have no power to negotiate as to the surrender of the Turkish ships, nor to allow Mehmet Ali more than a stated period,—twenty-four or forty-eight hours, to give a decisive answer. They should make him aware that, if that answer should be negative, they would be obliged immediately to leave Alexandria, and if he should refuse to comply with the demand made, they ought at once, and altogether, to embark on board the fleet, and to go to Smyrna, or to any other place, from whence they might be able to return to Alexandria, if their departure should have the effect of obtaining compliance with their demands.

It is possible that Mehemet Ali might still persist in retaining the Turkish ships, trusting that the Allied Powers would not follow up the recall of their Consular Agents by any ulterior measures; and in such case it is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that the honour of the Five Powers, a regard to good faith on their part towards the Sultan, and considerations of the highest importance connected with the great interests of Europe, require that further measures should be adopted. The measures which might, in the first instance, be resorted to, are:—

First, To prevent any vessel under Egyptian flag from entering into, or coming out of, the port of Alexandria, and to enforce a similar measure with respect to the ports of Syria.

Secondly, To seize, detain, and hold in deposit, all merchant ships found anywhere under the Egyptian flag, either at sea or in any of the ports of Syria, where they could be captured without any material difficulty.

Thirdly, To take possession of the Island of Candia, in the name of the Sultan, and to re-establish the Sultan's direct authority in that Island.

Fourthly, To declare to Mehemet Ali, that the combined squadron will defend the Turkish Empire against any attack on his part, as effectually as if it were a Turkish fleet.

Her Majesty's Government will give instructions to Sir Robert Stopford to take any, or as many steps as he shall be authorized to do by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, as far as the fleet circumstances will admit, and authorize him to do what he may think proper, or as he may think proper, of any one of the other squadrons, in the event of the circumstances which may take place between Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna and his Government, should read that Ambassador to come to Alexandria to do so, and you are instructed to invite the French Government to send such instructions and authority to their Ambassador at Vienna, and to their Admiral in the Mediterranean.

The French Government will perceive that the measures above proposed apply to the case of the Turkish ships being inside the harbour of Alexandria, and within the power of Mehemet Ali. If, on the contrary, the Turkish ships should be outside of the harbour and within the power of their own officers, the Her Majesty's Government will propose, that the course to be pursued should be such as has already been agreed upon for that contingency by the French and English Governments—that is to say, the combined fleet should interpose, if possible, between the Turkish squadron and the port of Alexandria, so as to prevent them from entering. The Admirals should endeavour by personal communication to prevent the Turkish Ships from entering the port, if necessary, send small vessels to Constantinople, with any communications which might appear likely to be sent thence to its Government. They should abstain from any attack on the Turkish ships, unless necessary in order to prevent those ships from committing hostilities on the Turkish territory, but they would follow the Turkish ships with a sufficient force wherever they might go, in order to watch their movements, and to remain masters of those movements. There could be no objection to allow those ships to go to any Turkish port outside of the Dardanelles, even before they had made their submission to the Sultan, provided a sufficient part of the allied squadrons were to accompany them thither. But Her Majesty's Government are of opinion, that the instructions for this case, like those for the case first supposed, ought to emanate from Vienna; and Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna will, therefore, be desired to communicate also upon this part of the case, with his Colleagues at Vienna.

You will give a copy of this despatch to the Duc de Dalmatie.

(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 252

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

(No 122,  
My Lord,

*Foreign Office, August 21, 1839.*

I HAVE the satisfaction to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government highly approve of the Note which your Excellency, in conjunction with the Representatives of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, addressed to the Porte on the 27th of July, and of which a copy is enclosed in your despatch No. 123.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No 263

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 23.)*

(No. 125)  
My Lord,

*Therapia*, July 30, 1839

BY invitation from the Moustesbar Nouri Effendi, the Representatives of the Five Great Powers met his Excellency at his kiosk this day.

The Moutsehar asked them where it was intended to hold the meeting for the arrangement of the affairs of this country, whether it was to be at Coutao

toople, or Vienna, or elsewhere; and whether an Ottoman Minister was invited? To this it was answered, that the Representatives had not yet received any information on the subject.

fleet has deserted, what can the Porte do if Mehemet Ali should attack? Will the Great Powers defend the Porte?"

It was replied, that the Great Powers had determined to prevent a collision between the belligerents, and therefore the Great Powers could not permit the Pasha to attack the Porte. The French Ambassador, in answering the above question, did not distinctly enough express himself to satisfy it. Mr. de Montebello and I felt it necessary to say, that the instructions given to the French Ambassador, and to the British Ambassador, were to prevent the Pasha from attacking the Porte, and to prevent the Porte from attacking the Pasha, and to prevent the Pasha from attacking the British and French countries against any attack that the Pasha might venture to make, and in this view I was fully supported by the Austrian, and Russian, and Prussian Ambassadors. Mr. de Montebello fully and freely stated, that the Sublime Porte having received the Collective Note of July 27, was under the necessity of not attempting to have any secret communications with the Powers, not to attempt to have any secret communications with the Powers, but to communicate fairly with them and act in accordance with the law.

The questions of the Mountchar were just and natural, and I hope the answers have been satisfactory, and that the last reply removed the apprehension against the Pasha.

I have, &c.  
Signed) **PONSONBY**

*Presented Personally to Viscount Palmerston.—Received August 21*

No. 196 )  
My Lord,

Therapies, July 30, 1839

ENCLOSURE an account given by Dr. Amisworth and his companion of the disposition of the Egyptian soldiers under Ibrahim Pasha, which is based upon the report of deserters from Ibrahim's army, who came to Hulla Pasha's camp, where the Doctor was up in the fatal battle. I think the disposition of the soldiers is of importance when the adoption of measures that may be taken in Syria are in consideration. I beg to recall the fact I stated, from the best authority long ago, that the Egyptian soldiers desired above all things to escape by any means from the military service of Mehemet Ali.

I have &c.,  
(Signed) TONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 264

*Captain Conolly to Viscount Ponsonby*

Ms. A. 9. 2. 4.

Therapia, July 24, 1901.

DR AINSWORTH and his friends, Messrs. Russell and Haman, say, that the least exhibition of military skill on the part of Hasis Pasha, the least chance in the extraordinary mêlée, that ended in his defeat, might have caused the complete defeat of Ibrahim Pasha, as deserters from his camp a day or two before agreed in declaring that their Egyptian comrades, so far from wishing to oppose the Sultan, only desired a fair opportunity of laying down their arms; and that if such an opportunity had been given, they would have been without an open road of retreat. As it is, they represent the rout of Hasis to be complete. The last day was one of the steepest but not the most dangerous of the campaign. It was when he was



cutting down some of his own recruits, who were trying to leave the field. Even at this desperate moment, Dr. Anstworth says, he did not have retreated the day, if he would have attended to the advice of the Prussian officers, to make a good charge with another column of his unbroken men.

The road was covered with fugitives from his army, and retreaters from the corps of Ismet Pasha. Many of the latter were comfortably riding on hired horses, doubtless paying the costs with their shares of Ismet Pasha's military chest.

The Kurds, these gentlemen say, fired upon them and on the Turkish fugitives, and may be considered in a state of complete revolt. "Inshallah," these troubles all coming together will humble the Porte to a point at which they will accept the protection and guidance of the Allied European Powers.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) A. CONOLLY.

No. 265.

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.*

(No. 124.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, August 23, 1839.

I HAVE received this morning, and have laid before the Queen, your Excellency's despatches Nos. 195 and 196.

With reference to the first of those despatches, I have the honour to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the answers which, in conjunction with the Representatives of the other Allied Powers, your Excellency returned to the questions put to you by the Turkish Minister in the conference which you had with him at Constantinople.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 266.

*Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.*

My Lords,

Foreign Office, August 23, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordships, that the Five Powers having agreed to concert together upon the affairs of the Levant, and Vienna being the place where the communications and negotiations on these affairs will center, it may be expedient to have view to the appointment of the Admiral commanding Her Majesty's squadron in the Mediterranean, should be instructed to execute any measures which he may be informed that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna has consented to on the part of Great Britain, as a part of the concert between the Allied Powers. It is therefore to signify to your Lordships Her Majesty's pleasure, that instructions be given to Sir Robert Stopford, that, until further orders be sent, he carry into effect any instructions which he may receive on the above-mentioned affairs from Lord Beaconsfield.

I have to request that your Lordships will send me a duplicate of the instructions which you may give to Sir Robert Stopford, and to the Admiral, in the event of your Lordships' orders being sent to him, so that he may be enabled to carry them into effect. I have to request that you will also send me a duplicate of the instructions which you may give to Sir Robert Stopford, and to the Admiral, in the event of your Lordships' orders being sent to him, so that he may be enabled to carry them into effect.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 267.

*Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.*

My Lords,

Foreign Office, August 23, 1839.

WITH reference to my other letter of this day's date, I have the honour to acquaint your Lordships, that the instructions issued to Sir Robert Stopford in pursuance of my two letters of the 5th and 7th of August, and my former letter of the 7th of August, have been suspended at Paris, and are now to be considered as cancelled, and that Her Majesty's Minister at Paris has been instructed to return the packets addressed to Sir John Lumsden, in which your Lordships' letters to Sir Robert Stopford were inclosed.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 268.

*Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Campbell.*

No. 125.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 23, 1839.

THE Five Powers having agreed to concert together upon the affairs of the Levant, and Vienna being the place where the communications and negotiations on these affairs will center, I have to instruct you to carry into effect any instructions which you may receive on the above-mentioned affairs from Lord Beaconsfield.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 269.

*Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.*

(No. 126.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 23, 1839.

THE instructions to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford contained in the packets addressed to Sir John Lumsden, which were sent to Paris on the 5th and 7th of August, being cancelled in consequence of my letter to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, of which a copy is inclosed, I have to instruct you to return the packets to the Admiralty.

You are to return to me the two packets addressed to Lord Ponsonby, and sent to Paris on the 5th of August, above-mentioned, and numbered on the outside, Nos. 110 and 113; and the two packets addressed to Sir Robert Stopford, and stated in the memoranda sent to Paris to contain copies of the instructions to the Admiralty.

You will retain the remaining packets addressed to Lord Ponsonby, and to Sir Robert Stopford, and stated to contain despatches for the Admiralty, until further orders.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 270.

*Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.*

(Confidential.)

My Lords,

Foreign Office, August 24, 1839.

WITH reference to my letter of yesterday, conveying to your Lordships the Queen's commands, that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford should be directed to carry into effect any instructions which he may receive on the affairs of the

Levant from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, I am to acquaint your Lordships, that it is Her Majesty's pleasure that Viscount de Ligne should not be precluded from executing any instructions given to him by Lord Beauvale, and arising out of the negotiations at Vienna, provided the instructions taken shall be in conformity with the instructions which the French Emperor should not receive corresponding instructions from his own Government, or from the French Ambassador at Vienna.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

P.S.—I have to request that your Lordships will send me a copy of the instructions which you have given to the French Ambassador at Vienna.

No 271

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 86.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, August 15, 1839

I BELIEVE I omitted to inform your Lordship, in my last despatch, of the dissatisfaction which was felt at the despatches sent from Vienna to London, and the determination to be insisted upon, and the defined, or the determinations of the sufficient force. His Excellency said,

"The papers which his Excellency referred to and described, repeated what the Emperor had told me, that he was in a friendly letter to His Imperial Majesty, and that he hoped that they would be extended to himself, and that immediate succour had been made."

Neither Count Nesselrode nor the Emperor appear to anticipate any such result. I am, &c.,

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) CLANRICARDE

My Lord, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 4, together with its inclosures. I have nothing whatever of any interest to communicate to your Lordship by this messenger. Baron Werther has informed me that he has sent to the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires in London, a copy of the official answer of the Prussian Government to the note addressed to him by the French Minister, on the attitude to be taken by the Five Powers in the Turco-Egyptian Question, with orders to communicate it to your Lordship. The contents of this note cannot fail to be highly satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government.

I found Baron Werther much depressed, in consequence of the alarming accounts that have been received at Berlin of the state of Prince Metternich's health.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 86.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, August 17, 1839

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 4, together with its inclosures.

I am the despatches of Lord Beauvale, inclosed in that last despatch, Prince Metternich appears to assume to himself the power of deciding on the Russian question, which the Great Powers are about to discuss.

Prince Metternich is thoroughly acquainted with Russian policy, and with the Russian Cabinet, and the experience and ability of his Highness enable him to foresee with great accuracy the views of Russia, and the arguments which may have weight with her Government.

But your Lordship may be assured that there does not exist here, at present, the least inclination to defer to peace, or to follow the Austrian Government; on the contrary the Russian Government feel a considerable degree of soreness and irritation against Austria at this moment.

As my colleagues agree with me in this opinion, Russia will always be guided by such views, and will only be influenced by her fears. As she is not yet able to pursue a separate course regarding Turkey, she must follow that which the other Powers have adopted. If Austria would separate from France and Prussia, Russia might join to her side in any difference of policy. But such would be the case, I believe, in a still greater degree, if England were to separate herself from France and Austria, or from France alone. Russia fears England more than Austria, and therefore she respects her more, and is more inclined to court her.

Besides, as I have said, the Emperor is displeased with the Austrian Government, and his manner to Count Fiquelmont was evidently changed before that Ambassador's departure from hence.

M. de Tatischeff, who is a consummate courtier, is supposed to have facilitated the arrangement of his own affairs very much, and to have highly pleased His Imperial Master, by upholding the military display at Borelino as wise, in a political view, and as "making all Germany feel the superiority of Russia."

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) CLANRICARDE

No. 273.

Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 17.)

My Lord,

Berlin, August 31, 1839

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 4, together with its inclosures.

I have nothing whatever of any interest to communicate to your Lordship by this messenger. Baron Werther has informed me that he has sent to the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires in London, a copy of the official answer of the Prussian Government to the note addressed to him by the French Minister, on the attitude to be taken by the Five Powers in the Turco-Egyptian Question, with orders to communicate it to your Lordship. The contents of this note cannot fail to be highly satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government.

I found Baron Werther much depressed, in consequence of the alarming accounts that have been received at Berlin of the state of Prince Metternich's health.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GEORGE B. HAMILTON.

No 274

Mr. Baker to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 25.)

No 17.

Paris, August 23, 1839.

HAD the honour of giving Marshal Bault, this morning, a copy of the despatch No. 3, which your Lordship addressed to me, with the instruction that it should be communicated to the Marshal.

I at the same time made him verbally acquainted with its contents. He agreed entirely in considering that the Note delivered by the Represent-





or Mechanics. And various other methods of coercion might be employed, without any positive attack upon the Egyptian ships.

In the first place, all communication might be cut off between Egypt and Syria; and all ships and vessels under the Egyptian flag might be prevented from entering or leaving any Egyptian or Syrian port.

In the next place, all merchant ships under the Egyptian flag, might be seized and detained, to be held in deposit until compliance were obtained.

Thirdly, a detachment from the allied fleet might proceed to Candia, and establish there the direct authority of the Sultan, engaging, on the part of the Five Powers, to obtain for the population of Candia the same privileges and immunities which were granted by the late Sultan to the people of Famagusta.

Any one, or all, of these measures might be ordered at the discretion of the Representatives of the Five Powers at Vienna; and your Excellency is authorized to give to Sir Robert Stophord any instructions to this effect which you may deem expedient.

Her Majesty's Government are most anxious to proceed in this matter in concert with the other Four Powers, and are ready to make some sacrifice of opinion in order to arrive at unanimity. But if your Excellency should find it impossible to obtain a unanimous assent of your colleagues to any course of proceeding on this matter which would be consistent with the principles upon which the British Government is acting, or which could be likely to attain the objects in view, your Excellency is authorized to proceed in concert with a less number than the Four, if you shall find that any reasonable and effectual course of proceeding is assented to by such a proportion of the Five as may give to that course adequate moral weight and sufficient physical effect.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 275

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Bessborough

(No. 109)

156

Foreign Office, August 25, 1939.

[illegible]

The British Government is of opinion that there can be no security for the Empire as long as a power continues to possess the affairs of the Levant. The British Government is of opinion that it is not true of the Sultan that he is so far from exercising influence in the part of the Pasha, which would be to the detriment of Russia in the Levant, and to consequent differences and collisions between the Powers of Europe, and the British Government is therefore of opinion that the Pasha ought to be compelled to evacuate Syria, in exchange for the Egyptian government in Egypt, and that the Five Powers have means of inducing a compliance on his part, without occasioning events that would, as some persons seem to apprehend, bring on the very evil which all parties wish to avert.

And first, with respect to the arrangement itself; if Mehemet Ali is not to give up Syria, what are the alternatives? Why, first, that matters should be left exactly as they now are and lately have been; that is to say, that Mehemet Ali should continue in his present position as established by the arrangement of Kutaya, holding the Pashalicks of Egypt and Syria at the annual will and pleasure of the Sultan, not by the formal tenure of annual appointment, but by the real tenure of the power of the sword. But to continue this

\* This despatch was addressed on the 27th of August, to Lord Clarendon, Sir George Hamilton and Mr. Balfour.

state of things would be to do nothing, except to leave in still greater force all the dangers which have caused of late so much disquietude to the Powers of Europe. I say in greater force, because the Pasha being now stronger as against the Porte than he was last year, he would be more able, and therefore more likely, to execute the intention which he then proclaimed of declaring himself independent; and thus the Five Powers would have taken great pains to establish among themselves perfect unanimity and entire concert about the affairs of the Levant, for the mere purpose of doing absolutely nothing;—result which might just as well have been the consequence of disagreement as of union, and which would justly expose them not only to the derision, but to the censure, of all the world.

The other alternative would be, that the Sultan should give to Mehemet Ali now the grant of the hereditary government of Egypt, upon condition that Ibrahim should promise, that on the death of Mehemet he will evacuate Syria and Candia, and the Holy Cities. But would any man attach the slightest value to such a promise, and would not the grant of the hereditary government be a mere mockery, and a gratification and unsolicited favour, at the recommendation of the

practically be to stand to Mehemet Ali, the Pasha of Egypt, and to let him do as he pleases, for if the Five Powers permit Mehemet to retain Candia, and Syria, and Arabia, because the Five are not strong enough to force him to evacuate those countries now, can it be supposed that the Sultan alone will be strong enough five or six years hence, at the death of Mehemet Ali, to do that which the Five Powers united cannot undertake at present? Or is it probable that the Five Powers will be more disposed then to help the Sultan in this matter than they are now? In the interest Mehemet and Ibrahim will of course be to strengthen their position in the countries which they now possess, and that even if the Five Powers should then be disposed to force him to evacuate those countries, he would have

[illegible]

In fact, the natural and necessary consequence of any arrangement which should leave Mehemet Ali in possession of what he now occupies, must evidently be his casting off his nominal allegiance to the Sultan, and his declaring his independence. It is false to say that his independence cannot be diminished by continuing him in his present extended state of occupation, but his means of asserting that independence will be greatly increased thereby; and thus the Five Powers, having set out in their negotiations on these matters by loudly proclaiming their steadfast determination to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, will be enabled to do so with great effect.

It is absolutely necessary that the Sultan should submit to such terms. Of course, how to stern necessity, but far better would it be that he should do so from his own weakness than from the advice and intervention of friends, who, professing to help, would interfere only to despoil.

But far preferable to such a dismemberment of the Turkish Empire would be a change in its dynasty, by the substitution of the family of Mehemet for that of the Sultan, and it would be wiser for the Powers of Europe to allow Mehemet Ali to march with his army and sail with his fleet to Constantinople, and to depose the Sultan, and to set himself up in his stead, than it would be for those Powers to pursue the course to which I am now adverting. For in



such a case, though the dynasty were changed, the Turkish Empire would remain, with its territory undiminished and its resources unbroken; it would still be a substantive Power, capable of defending itself, and competent to maintain its place in the political community of States.

But such a course is impossible, for many reasons which it is needless to detail; and it appears to Her Majesty's Government that, consistently with the declarations of the Five Powers, and with a due regard for the great European objects which those Powers have in view, there is no other course open for them to pursue, but to carry into execution the arrangement which, giving to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt, would restore to the direct authority of the Sultan all the other portions of the Turkish Empire now held and occupied by the Pasha.

Mehemet Ali would, of course, in the first place object to such an arrangement, he would threaten all kinds of violent proceedings, and would declare that he would fight to the death in order to resist what was demanded.

But he is far too shrewd and sagacious a man not to be able to measure the great disparity between his own force and that of the Five Powers acting in concert with the Sultan and carrying with them Christian strength and Mahomedan feeling.

The Allies would begin by the mildest means of coercion, and would avoid as long as possible, any measures which would place the Pasha upon anything like a footing of equality with the instruments of pressure which they might use; but it is surely impossible seriously to contend that if the Five Powers were united and determined, they would not succeed after a certain time, and probably without any very violent means, in obtaining the full submission of the Pasha to the arrangement which they were resolved to execute.

The fact is, that any one or two of the Five Powers, if acting cordially with the others, would, by great length of time, and without any very great exertion, to compel the Pasha to acquiescence; but that which could not so be accomplished without the employment of a considerable military force, might, probably, if the Five Powers were united, be brought about by little more than the action of moral influence alone.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 277.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beuville

(No. 109.,  
My Lord,

Foreign Office, August 25, 1839.

I TRANSMIT herewith to your Excellency, for your information, a copy of two letters which I have addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, signifying the Queen's pleasure, that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford should be ordered to execute any measures which he may be directed by your Excellency to carry into effect.

I likewise inclose two duplicates of the Letters of Instruction which the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have in consequence issued to Sir Robert Stopford, and which you will see were sent to him but officer with the first orders which you may find it necessary to give to him.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 278.

Baron Werther to Count Bressan.—(Communicated by Baron Werther, August 26.)

Monneur le Comte,

Berlin, le 16 Août, 1839.

JE me suis empressé de placer sous les yeux du Roi, mon auguste Maître, la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser à la date du 24 Juillet, ainsi que la dépêche de M. le Duc de Dalmatie du 17, qui s'y trouvait jointe en copie.

Sa Majesté a daigné me charger de vous exprimer, M. le Comte, qu'Elle a vu avec une véritable satisfaction dans cette communication, un nouveau gage de la sollicitude désintéressée que les Grandes Puissances Européennes vouent à la conservation de la Monarchie Ottomane sous la dynastie actuellement régnante. Comme le Roi, mon auguste Maître, est persuadé que l'Empire Ottoman forme l'un des éléments les plus essentiels de l'équilibre politique de l'Europe, la Prusse usera de toute l'influence dont elle dispose pour contribuer à préserver de toute atteinte l'intégrité et l'indépendance de cet Empire et l'autorité souveraine du Sultan. La Prusse ayant de tout temps suivi cette ligne à l'égard de la Turquie, ne s'en départira pas dans les graves conjonctures du moment actuel; elle n'hésitera donc pas à coordonner son appui moral aux efforts que feront les Cabinets qui exercent une action directe sur l'Orient, pour atteindre le but sur lequel d'ailleurs, d'après l'intime conviction du Roi, mon auguste Maître, toutes les Grandes Puissances sont parfaitement d'accord.

Je suis, &c.,  
(Signé) WERTHER

No. 279.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.

(No. 13.)  
Sir,

Foreign Office, August 27, 1839.

I ENCLOSE herewith for your information a copy of an Instruction which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, respecting the mode of proceeding to be adopted by the Five Powers, in conducting their negotiations, and planning their measures about the affairs of the Levant, and I have to instruct you to communicate the substance of this instruction to Marshal Soult.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 280.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 11.)  
My Lord,

Paris, August 26, 1839.

FROM a conversation I had this morning with Marshal Soult, who informed me at the same time, that he had reasons for apprehending Prince Metternich's indisposition to be serious, I am induced to apprehend, that the French Government will now throw obstacles in the way of the selection of Vienna as the place for settling and agreeing upon the affairs of the East, nor will it allow its Ambassador the power to give instructions to the French Admiral in the Mediterranean. The cause of this is to be sought in the difference which really exists in the views of the French Government as to the manner of dealing with Mehemet Ali, and those which are entertained by the other Powers, and I think, that the Marshal seems to be too

not avowing it, will endeavour to escape from the necessity of either opposing, or consenting to, any resolution to which those Powers, if negotiating together, might come conjointly.

It appears, indeed, possible, that the Cabinet of France may erase a question out of the Note lately presented by Count Medem, and thus endeavour to direct attention from Alexandria to St. Petersburg.

At all events, I fear that no decided measures of a coercive character will be employed by France for limiting the ambition of the Viceroy, or restoring the fleet of the Sultan.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 281.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 29.)

No. 61.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, July 26, 1839.

I WAITED yesterday, in company with the *Admiral*, on Mehmet Ali, whom I found in his Divan with the Capudan Pasha and M. Cochelet.

The conversation was at first general, and the Capudan Pasha, who has now put aside his former dress and adopted one similar to that worn by Mehmet Ali, remarked that he could not be blamed at Constantinople for his change of dress, as there also they had resumed their ancient costumes.

Soon after the Capudan Pasha retired, and Mehmet Ali then entered upon the subject of his relations with the Porte, and of his desires and opinions with respect to Hosrew Pasha.

He told my two Colleagues and myself, that if the Sultan were to send to him the grand decoration, and at the same time to concede to him the succession in his family (*Patriarchate*) of all his present Governments (which, not, I believe, demand the Pashaliks of Mecca and Medina, which are vested in Ibrahim Pasha, and not in Mehmet Ali), he would accept the decoration as a mark of respect and homage to his Sovereign, but he would not accept the succession of his Governments, so long as Hosrew Pasha was retained in power or place, and that he would remain in his present position; but if Hosrew Pasha were removed, he would then immediately send back the fleet of the Capudan Pasha to Constantinople; would recall Ibrahim Pasha to Egypt; and would, without any hesitation proceed, himself, in his steamer to Constantinople, to pay his homage to his Sovereign, and to give his best aid and counsel in what would add to the glory of the Sultan, and to the power and welfare of his empire.

Mehmet Ali has written to the different Pashas of Pashalics (sixteen, I believe, in number), to urge them to be faithful to their young Sultan, and to give their best services for the good of the empire; but calling on them, at the same time, to assist in promoting the removal from power of Hosrew Pasha, as no security for any good can be held out, or can take place, so long as that Seraskier remains at the head of affairs.

From this may be seen the state of feeling between Mehmet Ali and Hosrew, and which is of very long standing, and on this point he is, as may be expected, fully seconded by the Capudan Pasha, who most probably will have written to all his friends and partisans, to the same effect and purpose.

I learn that Ibrahim Pasha is at Marash with the head-quarters of his army, and that the corps which he had sent to Orfa, before the arrival of Captain Canlier, will be withdrawn to the west of the Euphrates, as soon as possible.

The greater part of the Capudan Pasha's fleet are anchored in this port, and the remainder will also be brought in, as will also be the fleet of Mehmet Ali.

Hosrew Pasha has written to the Capudan Pasha to say, that if he will

return with his fleet to Constantinople, no notice will be taken of his late defection; and that a full pardon shall be granted him for the past.

The Capudan Pasha has replied, that he has not been, nor does he intend to be disloyal to his Sovereign; that what he has done has been for the interest of the Sultan and of the Turkish Empire, and to restore the fleet out of the power of the intrigues of Hosrew Pasha; and that he will not return so long as the latter remains in power.

It has been remarked, that in the letter of Hosrew Pasha to the Capudan Pasha, he addresses him as "His Highness," and that the Capudan Pasha has addressed Mehmet Ali as "Sultanem," and those who understand the Turkish language say, that the address to the Capudan Pasha is "His Highness," and the address to Mehmet Ali is "Sultanem."

Perhaps this may have been done expressly in order to show the Capudan Pasha; but I think it is more likely that Mehmet Ali is annoyed by this mark of distinction more than by the address itself, and that he is anxious to see the affairs, and the present position of all the parties.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 282.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 29.)

No. 62.

My Lord,

Alexandria, July 29, 1839.

M. COCHELET, *Chief of the Staff*, arrived by the French steamer *Le Capitaine*, and has been in the Divan of Mehmet Ali, and has been next in command to the Capudan Pasha, of the *Patrona Bey*, of the *Reale Bey*, and of the *Reale Bey*.

He has been in the Divan of Mehmet Ali, and has been next in command to the Capudan Pasha, of the *Patrona Bey*, of the *Reale Bey*, and of the *Reale Bey*.

M. Cochelet gave them to Mehmet Ali, who, after seeing the Capudan Pasha, sent for the four Admirals to whom the letters were addressed, and gave them to them. These letters, which were from Hosrew Pasha, were torn up by those with apparent indignation.

I shall not remark on the conduct of Admiral Roussin, in wishing to impose on M. Cochelet a degrading task, nor on the conduct of M. Cochelet in refusing to do so.

I have now the honour to transmit to your Lordship, the translation of a letter from Mehmet Ali to the Admirals, and by which your Lordship will see the state of feeling between Mehmet Ali and Hosrew Pasha.

I further transmit the translation of a letter sent by Mehmet Ali to the principal Pashas of the Porte, and amongst others to the Pasha of Tripoli, in which Mehmet Ali calls on them to make common cause against Hosrew Pasha.

A courier of the Viceroy has been sent to Salomon, with five of Mehmet Ali's confidential officers, who are charged with these letters for the Pashas of Salomon, of the *Admiral*, and of the *Admiral*.

It is very probable, that Mehmet Ali must be well aware of the state of feeling between him and Hosrew Pasha, and of the state of feeling between him and the Admirals.

Mehmet Ali told me three days ago, that he was having made a translation of the letters of Hosrew Pasha to the Admirals, and that he would then propose to the Sultan some analogous changes, but above all, the most perfect security for property and persons of every class and religion, and also a pure, impartial, and speedy



administration of justice; and that he hoped still to see Turkey sufficiently strong to support itself against any efforts of Russia.

The Pasha appears resolved not to recede from his demand for the removal of Hosrew Pasha, nor will he accept of less than the hereditary succession to his family, of Egypt, all Syria, and Candia, for which he would pay tribute and be a faithful vassal to the Sultan. His hereditary hopes to be able to arrange all this with the Sultan in an amicable manner, provided that his great enemy Hosrew Pasha be removed.

In regard to the hereditary succession to Syria, it is possible that the Porte may refuse it, but I am fully convinced, that if the Porte were now to obtain possession of Syria, on the same footing as before its occupation by Mehemet Ali, that country would for many years be the scene of the direst anarchy and misery, and all European commerce would be destroyed and rendered impossible.

I am, my Lord, that I must not be present at Constantinople, nor, indeed, of all Her Majesty's Consular Servants in Syria; but it is the deliberate opinion which I have formed from what I have seen, and from facts which I have heard, and to take a survey of this opinion I would readily pledge myself.

Ibrahim Pasha has received invitations from all the leading people in Asia Minor, to send troops to protect them from the brigandage which most unfortunately reigns in that country; but he will not send a soldier across the Euphrates.

The whole of the Turkish and Egyptian fleets are now in this port, and some of the large Turkish ships have had part of the guns and stores taken out, as otherwise they could not have entered.

The Pasha has ordered two palaces to be prepared for some personages of distinction who are expected to arrive in Constantinople with a mission to the Viceroy. It is reported that Halil Pasha, the brother-in-law of the young Sultan, is one of those, and that the others are two principal Ulama.

Mehemet Ali is so far from being so much alarmed at Constantinople, and every part of Turkey, that he is very well known to be a man of a very different character from what he has been represented to myself and others, and thus he is always at peace and is reported for every event and circumstance. In fact there is not a secret for action in the Divan at Constantinople.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 282

Mehemet Ali to Hosrew Pasha.

(Suivent les titres.)

(Traduction.)

VOUS m'avez adressé par Akif Effendi, une lettre où vous me dites que les choses sont changées, les gens qui nous tourmentent sont différents, et que nous faisons une autre conquête.

La connaissance que j'ai depuis longtemps de votre nature ne me permettant pas de croire que vous puissiez vous en aller, je vous ai répondu que vous voudriez bien ou changer de sentiments et de conduite, ou offrir votre démission. Mais vous n'avez rien fait de tout cela, et vous n'avez rien dit de ce que vous ne pouvez pas empêcher de manifester son caractère par quelque chose qui prouve qu'il est un homme. Et voilà ce que vous ne pouvez pas empêcher de manifester. En effet, à peine avez-vous eu connaissance de l'arrivée de la Flotte britannique dans le port d'Alexandrie, que vous avez écrit au Général Mustafâ et aux autres officiers supérieurs, des lettres où vous représentez le Capitan Pasha comme traître, et, tout en blâmant leur conduite, vous les exhortez à se tenir de lui et à retourner à Constantinople avec la Flotte. Ce fait seul ne doit-il pas me convaincre que je ne me suis pas

trompé dans le jugement que j'ai porté de vous? Si vous pensez que Méhémet Ali ne vous connaît pas, ou qu'on le trompe sur votre compte, vous êtes dans l'erreur: il ne vous connaît que trop!

La démarche que vous reprochez au Capitan Pasha ne lui appartient pas en propre. Le Général et les trois officiers supérieurs dont il a été parlé, tous enfin, ont agi d'un commun accord, après en avoir délibéré en Conseil.

Ces mêmes officiers supérieurs, et peut-être d'autres encore, ont témoigné par écrit de leur participation à cet acte.

Les quatre lettres écrites par Votre Altesse ont été fidèlement remises à leurs adresses.

Ces officiers ne sont pas passés à l'étranger pour mériter que vous les traitiez comme vous le faites.

Il était plus convenable et plus conforme à votre dignité que vous leur donniez. Qu'on ne dise que vous n'avez pas voulu leur faire plaisir, car c'est un homme qui a été si souvent en un tel état d'humour, qu'il n'a pas pu résister à la tentation de se laisser aller à avoir ses propres idées sur les choses, que vous avez faites. Sa Harassé de lui arriver sur la tête d'Egypte, et qu'il se soit mis à courir dans les rues, se dirigeant vers le port, et qu'il ait été arrêté par les soldats de la garde.

Un pareil langage les aurait rassurés, satisfaits, et aurait confirmé ce que vous avancez dans la lettre que vous m'avez adressée par Akif Effendi; mais, c'est inutile; votre nature ne vous permet pas d'avoir de la fixité dans les idées, et je suis toujours plus fortifié dans mon opinion sur vous.

L'action du Capitan Pasha et des autres personnes sous ses ordres, n'est pas (ce qu'à Dieu ne plaise) un crime de félonie envers Sa Hauteurs. Chacun d'eux avait pénétré, comme moi, votre caractère, et aucun n'avait confiance en vous. Vous voyez donc bien que ce n'est pas seulement Méhémet Ali qui se méfie de vous, mais je pourrais dire la nation entière. Mais sachant cela, j'ai voulu préserver le pays de troubles et de dangers en vous engageant à vous démettre du Vixat et de rentrer dans la vie privée. Cette résolution serait honorable pour vous et avantageuse pour tous. En souvenir de nos anciens rapports, j'ai voulu vous répéter ce conseil.

C'est maintenant à vous de réfléchir sur ce que vous avez à faire. En vous retirant des affaires, consentez à délivrer les grands, et la nation en général, d'une périlleuse méfiance.

Inclosure 2 in No. 282

Circular addressed by Mehemet Ali to the Chief Pashas of the Porte

(Suivent les titres.)

(Traduction.)

13, Djemmad-Evel, 1255.

SANS doute qu'à cette heure votre Excellence est informée que Sultan Abdoul-el-Medjid Khan, notre tout-puissant Seigneur, s'est assis sur le trône de son père, et que nous sommes tous à son service. Cette nouvelle me fut apportée par Akif Effendi, Secrétaire du Haut Conseil de la Sublime Porte, envoyé auprès de moi en mission. Aussitôt après que ce glorieux événement me fût notifié, tous les forts d'Alexandrie et les bâtiments en rade l'annoncèrent à la population, par des salves d'artillerie qui continuèrent trois jours consécutifs, se répétant trois fois entre le lever et le coucher du soleil. Il en a été de même au Caire et dans tous les chef-lieux des pays que je gouverne. J'écrivis en même temps à mon fils bien-aimé Ibrahim Pasha, et aux Gouverneurs des provinces, qu'ils eussent à faire faire dans toutes les mosquées, grandes et petites, les prières usitées en pareille occasion pour notre nouveau Seigneur, très-haut et très-pur.

Le Seraskier d'Orient, Hafiz Pasha, à la tête d'un corps d'armée considérable, a été excité par les intrigues de Hosrew Pasha à passer l'Euphrate, et d'après les instructions qu'il a reçues, ce Général a fomenté des troubles et suscité des révoltes à Payasa, à Ghabour-daghi, et dans le district d'Antab. Abit d'épargner le sang Musulman, je mis tout en œuvre pour ne pas donner

lieu, le premier, aux hostilités, et j'écrivis plusieurs fois dans ce sens à mon fils. Cependant l'espérance de voir Marache lui venir occuper Antab, et que j'eus des motifs de croire que les mouvements séditieux pourraient, à force d'intrigues, se propager dans l'intérieur du pays, si je continuais à rester dans la même inaction, et qu'ainsi seraient compromis et peut-être perdus tous les heureux fruits que mon zèle et mes efforts de tant d'années avaient fait éclore et prospérer sous le soleil bienfaisant de notre Auguste Seigneur, je me décidai, dans cette extrémité, de chauder l'armée avec moi-même, au lieu de la laisser en deux colonies, dont l'une marcherait sur Marache et pousserait en avant, et dont l'autre s'avancerait vers Orfa et Harlicker. Mais à peine ai-je eu connaissance de l'avènement à trône de notre jeune Souverain Abdoul Medjed, que, sans en attendre la notification officielle, je me dis : "Que tout ce qui est passé soit passé ;" et je m'empressai de transmettre contre ordre à mon fils, en lui enjoignant de ne pas poursuivre les résultats de la victoire de Néziç, et de ramener l'armée en-deçà de l'Euphrate, où déjà elle l'avait franchie. Je demandai ensuite à Dieu qu'il protégeât notre honoré Seigneur, qu'il le fit vivre des jours sans fin, et que, sous son ombre tutélaire, tous ses serviteurs fidèles, grands et petits, eussent les biens de la vie et abondance, et jouissent d'une longue et paisible durée.

[illegible]

« Honoreff Pacha, n'obéissant plus qu'à son caprice, va lâcher la bride à ses passions haïssables, et les manifester, sans retenue, par des actes qui doivent conduire la nation Musulmane à sa perte. Telle est sa coupable pensée. Quand on étudie avec réflexion la conduite qu'il a tenue jusqu'à ce jour, il est facile de pressentir celle qu'il tiendra à l'avenir. L'Amiral Achmet Pacha a dû le premier à préjuger de ses actes futurs par ses actes passés. Honoreff Pacha, s'est-il dit, " est un être dangereux et gonflé de venin. La flotte que Sa Hauteurs a formée avec tant de peine, un-je, dans les circonstances critiques où nous nous trouvons, la mettre entre les mains d'un homme

qui bientôt aura détruit tout ce qui a été si péniblement opéré ! Non ! je ne le ferai pas. Je me rendrai à Alexandrie ; les deux flottes de l'Empire s'uniront : c'est le moyen de servir utilement le Souverain et la nation." Les officiers de l'Escadre Ottomane partageaient les sentimens de leur chef, et toutes choses ayant été concertées en commun, le signal du départ fut donné et huit jours avant la date de cette lettre, nos yeux ont vu vingt-cinq voiles Impériales enbellir la rade d'Alexandrie. Les deux escadres, aujourd'hui réunies et confondues, croisent devant les passes du port. Elles appartiennent toutes les deux à Sa Hautesse. Son Excellence le Capitán Pacha, comme vous ne devez pas en douter, a été reçu ici avec la distinction due à son haut rang, et il continue d'être traité avec les mêmes égards. Quant à moi, ancien et fidèle serviteur de l'Empire, je ne pouvais plus me résigner à voir un homme tel que Hosseff Pacha agir dorénavant de la même manière qu'il l'a fait par le passé. En conséquence, mon devoir m'a commandé de lui écrire par l'Envoyé Akif Effendi. J'ai adressé en même tems des lettres à l'illustre Tante et à la glorieuse Mère de notre bien-aimé Seigneur, au Cheikh-el-Islam, l'incorruptible défenseur des lois, ainsi qu'au noble Hahî Pacha, les conjurant de prendre en considération le malheureux état de la nation, et d'agir pour élever Hosseff Pacha des affaires, et lui donner un remplaçant. A cause de l'importance que j'ai toujours portée aux Pachas dévoués aux intérêts de la nation Musulmane, j'ai voulu leur faire part des démarches que j'ai faites ; et comme Votre Excellence compte au nombre des plus grands et des plus fidèles, je lui envoie la présente lettre par un de mes Agas. Lorsque, par la grâce de Dieu, elle lui sera parvenue heureusement, Votre Excellence jugera convenable, si l'on capere, de concourir à l'éloignement de Hosseff Pacha des affaires, et par là, elle aidera à atteindre le but que doivent se proposer les vrais Osmans. — la tranquillité du pays et la prospérité de l'Empire.

No 253

*Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received Aug 29)*

(No. 14.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, July 30, 1839

I DO myself the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, copies of my despatches of the 15th and 23rd instant, to Viscount Ponsonby, together with copies of their several inclosures, in a letter I received from Captain Davies, of Her Majesty's ship "Dido," under the 5th instant; my answer to him under the 15th instant; a letter addressed to Captain Davies by Mr. Vice-Consul Hays under the 3rd instant; and a letter I addressed to his Excellency Solymán Pasha, relating to Mr. Ainsworth and Mr. Russell, an also extract of a letter I wrote to Mr Vice-Consul Hays, under the 10th instant; all of which will, I hope, meet with your Lordship's approval.

Since closing the above despatches to His Excellency the Ambassador, I have to inform your Lordship, that M. Caillier, Marshal Soult's Aide-de-camp, who has been with his Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha, at Maraah, reached this from thence on the 24th instant. He left his Excellency the Seraskier at Maraah, on the 23th instant, at which time the Egyptian forces continued on the frontier, stationed as I had the honour of mentioning in my despatch of the 16th instant to his Excellency the Ambassador.

M. Caillier, I hear, states that a great portion of the forces are suffering very much from fever, occasioned by the late great exposure, the want of water, and the very great heats of this year, which are unprecedented.

I am told that M Caillier remains here until he receives an answer from his Government to despatches he has written; the reason of his leaving his Excellency at Marash, is attributed to his being rather unwell, caused by his late exposure to the great heats of the summer.



I beg leave further to inform your Lordship, that his Excellency Soliman Pasha, (Colonel Séves,) who had obtained leave from his Excellency the Seraskier to come to Aleppo and recruit his health after his late fatigues, of which his Excellency was feeling the bad effects at Aintab, had left that place for this, but half way his Excellency changed his course, and proceeded to Nezb and Birejik; some say that it was in consequence of a post that reached him from the Seraskier, with orders to repair in that direction; others assert that this change of route of his Excellency was voluntary, wishing to again see Nezb and the field of battle, in order to take some notes which he required.

It is further reported, that his Excellency the Seraskier intended to leave Marash soon, and go to Aintab, but his arrival there is not yet positively known.

His Excellency the Seraskier is very much vexed against the inhabitants of Aintab for the late rebellion, and is showing to his vengeance, and in consequence, for a punishment, ordered the French Tax in that town to be taken three times over.

I am happy to acquaint your Lordship that his Excellency Ismael Bey Governor of this town who has undertaken operations against the marauders of Raha and Jassar Nighar on the Latakia road, has successfully terminated the affair and that district is again perfectly quiet. His Excellency has proceeded to Hama and Hama, and from thence returns here.

So that the whole of this consular district is now much quieter than it has been of late, although in the Alexandretta district irregularities continue to be practised from time to time by these marauders.

There are no correct reports at present as to where his Excellency Hafez Pasha is, though it is generally believed that he is in the direction of Mouta with the forces of his army.

I am also informed by a respectable country merchant of this place, who has dealings in the other side of Orfa, that letters have been received here from the caissiers of Diarbekir from the villages of Swerk and Chermok which state that the Kurds and Turkmans in that neighbourhood are all up in arms, and that it is impossible for any person to go from thence either to Diarbekir or Mahatia.

I have also to acquaint your Lordship, that Maggiao Bey who was sent by his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha to Orfa, came to see me there, and has since been seen by his Excellency Soliman Pasha who commanded the forces in the Alexandretta district and has been reported for the time by his Excellency Akme, Minister of War.

The Governor of this town, who the last two or three weeks sent a very large force of irregulars in the direction of Orfa, but I do not hear for the moment of the regular force being increased.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) F. H. & WERRY

P.S.—I am this moment informed just as I am closing my packet that his Excellency Soliman Pasha has reached this, which I hasten to submit to your Lordship.

Inclosure 1 in No. 283

Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord,

Aleppo, July 15, 1830

I HAD the honour of addressing your Lordship under the 1st instant, transmitting copy of a dictated narration made to me by a M. Petit, in the Sultan's Seraskier's service, and who was present at the engagement which took place under the 24th ultimo, between the Turkish and Egyptian forces, which details I hope, ere now, will have reached your Lordship's hands.

Captain Davies, of Her Majesty's ship "Dido," having informed me,

under the 5th instant, -copy of which with my answer thereto, under this day's date, I beg to inclose herewith for your Lordship's information,—that he would, on his return from a cruise on the coast, take any communication I might have for your Excellency relating to the movements of the Egyptian army, I avail of it to do myself the honour of laying before your Lordship the further details of the Egyptian forces under the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha, since the engagement between the two armies under the 24th ultimo, which I have received from a good channel and one that has the appearance of being correct.

I have to inform your Lordship, that his Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha after having taken possession of all the rowers, ammunition, and military stores &c. found in the Turkish camp at Nezb, proceeded with a strong force to the banks of the Euphrates, a point Birejik where the Ottoman army had its encampment when the Seraskier took possession of it, and after so doing, he crossed the river a Mussulman river to take large flat land, and, it is said, ordered another one to proceed to Orfa for the same purpose.

His Excellency then directed Mahomed Bey, Colonel of the Annadia to cross the Euphrates with his troops, and put under his charge four regiments of regulars and some artillery pieces were ordered to leave part at Bir for the service, and advance himself with the rest to Orfa, and there wait for orders.

I beg to inform your Lordship, that it has now been confirmed, by the arrival of several persons who reached this on the 13th instant, with a caravan from Orfa, and who state that, when they left that place, the colonel of the Bedouin Cavalry, with two Infantry regiments, one of Cavalry, and a few pieces of artillery, had reached there; and where, they say, they were very well received; that on passing through Bir, they observed that the force there was composed of about a regiment of Infantry, with some few artillery pieces. They add, that when they left Orfa, the Egyptian forces had not advanced any further forward in that direction.

His Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, with all the army, left Nezb on the 24th ultimo, and proceeded to Aintab, which place he reached without any opposition, Soliman Pasha of Marash, then there, flying when he heard of the approach of the Egyptian army. His Excellency the Seraskier from thence advanced with some of the Cavalry and Light Artillery on Marash, which place he also reached, and was, it is said, very well received.

I beg leave to inform your Lordship, that M. Caillier, Marshal Sault's aide-de-camp, who is on a mission to his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, and was received this, as I had the honour of stating to your Lordship under the 29th ultimo, on the 26th idem, left again on the 26th for Nezb, hoping to find there his Excellency; but on his arrival there, he found that the Seraskier had departed consequently, M. Caillier, however, proceeded after his Excellency the Seraskier, and did not come up with him, but until he reached Marash. No authentic advices have been received here by any person from M. Caillier, as to the issue of his mission, but it is generally supposed that he will be successful in reaching and presenting to his Excellency the letter he was bearer of from his Highness the Viceroy Mehemet Ali, his Excellency immediately acquiesced to its contents, which it is said were, that he was not to advance any further after receipt of his Highness's letter.

The last advices which reached this Government from Marash, state that his Excellency the Seraskier continued to be there, and would not, from all appearances, march any further forward, in consequence, it is said, of the letter he received from the Viceroy by the French Envoy.

I have further to inform your Lordship, that I learn that the French Consul here has received a letter from Soliman Pasha (Colonel Séves,) who says that his Excellency the Seraskier is at Marash with some Cavalry, and that he is at Aintab with four regiments of Infantry; the remainder of the forces, with the exception of four regiments that are at Bir and Orfa,

are *échelonnes* from Aintab along the northern frontiers, as far as Adana, and again from Aintab to Nezh.

I am sorry to have to send to your Lordship that the roads of this district are still very unquiet: a few days back some discontent had run itself in the district of R. and Jessir Soghr on the road from hence to Latakia, at which latter place the inhabitants rose and killed the Musselim with some of his attendants. In consequence of this reaching the Seraskier's ears, the governor of this town received some Irregular Cavalry, and quell the disturbances that had manifested themselves in that neighbourhood.

I was informed yesterday by the Government here, that his Excellency Ismael Bey had reached Richa, and had destroyed 120 of the malcontents of that place, sending here a great many others prisoners, and several loads of arms that were seized; and further, that his Excellency had gone from thence to Jessir Soghr, in search of those who killed the Musselim of that place, whom he is determined to punish, and purposes to destroy that village and its inhabitants, for, I hear, they have at all times shown symptoms of discontent. The 18th Regiment of Infantry reached this yesterday from the main army; they have received orders to co-operate with the Irregulars under his Excellency Ismael Bey, against the malcontents of that district.

By Mr. Vice-Consul Catalini's last advices under the 10th instant from the district of the Taurus, he has received no news of the Egyptian troops that were sent to the district of the Taurus.

I am sorry to have to send to your Lordship that the Alexandretta district, by Mr. Vice-Consul Hays, does not seem to be in a state of quietude, and that the Egyptian troops, who were sent to the district of the Taurus, are still in the district of the Taurus, and that the Egyptian troops, who were sent to the district of the Taurus, are still in the district of the Taurus, which will fully inform your Lordship as to the state of the mountains in that district.

The town of Aleppo is perfectly quiet.

In consequence of the intercepted state of the roads in the direction of Adana, there are no late advices from thence, with regard to the movements of the Egyptian army on that northern frontier and the defile of the Taurus. The Government say, that they have received of late no advices from that quarter, but it is currently reported in the town that, at the time the engagement took place between the two armies at Nezh, the body in the defile of the Taurus advanced also under his Excellency Selim Pasha, and a collision took place between them and the Osmanli column on the Koniah line, under Hadji Halil Pasha, in which some say that the Egyptians met with a reverse and were obliged to retreat back to the Taurus. I am sorry to hear that the Taurus is still in a state of unquietude, but I trust that the roads will soon be open, I hope the first arrivals from thence will be in a few days. I shall not fail to transmit immediately to your Lordship, whatever advices I may receive thereon from Mr. Vice-Consul Jones of that district.

The general and prevalent opinion here among the public is, that the Sultan's Seraskier, his Excellency Hafiz Pasha, after the defeat of his troops at Nezh, directed his course, with several Pashas and Viziers, on Malatia, where it is said, he found Ismet Pasha, who was advancing on that line with 30,000 men.

There have been no arrivals from that quarter since the battle; but I hear, that several persons are soon expected, from whom I shall not fail to obtain every information on that point.

I have not yet received an answer to the letter I addressed his Excellency Solyman Pasha, copy of which I beg to inclose for your Lordship's information, respecting the fate of Mr. Ainsworth and Mr. Russell,

who, according to M. Petit, as I had the honour of informing your Lordship, under the 29th ultimo, were in the Turkish camp the day of the engagement.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY

Inclosure 2 in No. 283.

Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby

My Lord,

Aleppo, July 23, 1839

I HAD the honour of addressing your Lordship under the 18th instant, which despatch I sent to Alexandretta, to be forwarded to your Lordship by Her Majesty's ship "Dido," together with copy of my letter, under that day's date, to Captain Davies in command of that vessel. But by Mr. Vice-Consul Hays, who arrived here on the 18th instant, I am very sorry to observe, that my packet did not get down in time, previous to the departure of the ship, which is a great loss to me, as the delay in its arrival was very annoying and vexatious; for on receipt of Captain Davies' letter of the 5th instant, I wrote to Mr. Vice-Consul Hays, on the 10th instant, copy of which I beg to inclose for your Lordship's information, but which Mr. Hays tells me, must have been lost, or forwarded by mistake to some other place, as it has never reached him. Had it done so, I think Captain Davies would have remained a day or two longer.

I have, however, instructed Mr. Vice-Consul Hays to forward the despatch to your Lordship, per Austrian steamer, expected on the 26th instant; and I avail of the same channel to transmit to your Lordship what has further transpired since the date of my last letter.

I have to acquaint your Lordship, that I learn from M. Clays, the French Consul here, that he has received a letter from M. Caillier, who tells him, that he is still at Marash with his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, and where he will remain, until he receives an answer from Paris to despatches he has written to the Government of Egypt.

The French Consul further adds, that from what he has elicited, Ibrahim Pasha's intention is to continue at Marash, and keep his forces stationed on the frontier for some time longer, in consequence of advices he has, that there are still several bodies of the Sultan's troops moving about Asia Minor, whose direction his Excellency wishes to ascertain previous to moving his troops, and is occupied in vigilantly watching their movements; thus the Egyptian forces who fought at Nezh, having made a junction with the column at Adana and on the defile line, are stationed on the frontiers, so as to form a cordon, extending from Adana along the whole range of the Taurus to Marash, and from that point to the frontiers, besides four regiments of regulars who have crossed the river and have advanced, under Mahomed Bey, as far as Orfa. Some persons of the country say, that a Musselim under the Government is in authority, even beyond Orfa, at a place called Samsat. But I am assured, that his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, after the interview he had with M. Caillier, sent immediately orders to the officer in command of the forces which had advanced to Orfa, to march no further forward on that line.

The last two or three days this Government has received orders from his Excellency the Seraskier, to send all the Irregular Cavalry at present here to Orfa, so that detachments of these troops have been leaving this daily since then.

I also learn from the Government here, that his Excellency Solyman Pasha, who has been at Aintab since the engagement, will be here in the course of a few days. With regard to the Egyptian army, it is currently reported and believed, that his Excellency the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha, after the battle which took place at Nezh, retreated with all his Pashas and the débris of his army, not amounting to 4,000 men, to Malatia, and where, it is asserted, he continues to remain.



having been joined, it is said, by Iszet Pasha with about 30,000 men; and that Hadji Halil Pasha, who had advanced on the Koniah line towards the Defile, had also retreated back to Koniah. And, I am assured by a person of credit, that no collision ever took place on that line between the Turkish and Egyptian forces.

Yesterday a letter was received by the Government from his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha at Marash, inclosing a firman, received from his Highness the Viceroy of Egypt, stating that the Sultan Mahmud had been succeeded by Sultan Abdul Mejid, who had ascended the throne; and ordering that prayers should be read at the different mosques of the city, and that a gun should be fired three times during the day, on Sultan Mejid's ascending the throne.

I am happy to be able to inform your Lordship, that the irregularities that have been lately committed in the Richa and Jessir Soghri districts, on the Latakia road, have entirely subsided. This Government having received advice from his Excellency Ismael Bey, Governor of this town, who went with a force to act against these malcontents, and clear those places that are and contain a considerable number of that district, and that those roads were again tranquil and perfectly secure, that the inhabitants of both these places had given up their seditious, and had come forward for pardon, with a promise of remaining quiet and faithful to the Government. Thus the whole of the Consular district and all the way to Latakia, now after their petty attempts, which it has been, although a severe regular army has been lately committed by the inhabitants of two towns: in one instance, by an insult offered two days ago to a French subject, and who was beaten very severely by the mob, but for which the French Consul has obtained satisfaction, by causing the offenders to be imprisoned and flogged in return, and other similar occurrences, but so trivial that they do not require any further notice.

I have to acquaint your Lordship, that I have received the two firmans and two post orders for Lord Claud Hamilton, and Edward Littleton, Esq., transmitted to me by M. Pisan by your Lordship's direction.

I beg further to inform your Lordship, that I have transmitted to Beyrout, at Mr. Littleton's request, his firman and post order, as he does not intend to visit Aleppo, but proceeds from thence to Smyrna.

I shall keep Lord Claud Hamilton's firman and post order until his Lordship's arrival, or until I receive instructions from his Lordship respecting them.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY

Inclosure 3 in No. 293.

Captain Davies to Mr. Acting-Consul Werry

Her Majesty's ship "Dido,"  
Alexandretta, July 5, 1839

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 24th inst. with the enclosed account of the victory gained by the Egyptian over the Ottoman Army, copies of which I have sent to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford the Commander-in-Chief, by the Austrian steamer.

I beg leave also to inform you, that I shall proceed from this place to Tripoli, and shall return here in about six days, in order to carry any despatch you may have to send to his Excellency Viscount Ponsonby, relative to the movements of the Egyptian Army.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) S. DAVIES, Captain

Inclosure 4 in No. 283

Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Captain Davies.

Sir,

Aleppo, July 15, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to grant receipt of your despatch under date Alexandretta, 5th July, wherein you are pleased to state, that you have transmitted, for the information of Admiral the Honourable Sir Robert Stopford, copy of my letter of the 24th ult. inclosing the account of the victory gained by the Egyptian forces over the Ottoman Army.

I beg leave also to transmit herewith for your information, and that of the Commander-in-Chief, the further account of the same, and that the same be sent to the Commander-in-Chief, the Egyptian Army.

I beg further to inform you, that the Seraskier, after leaving the possession of the Latakia road, and a Nez, sent for the purpose of regular troops across the mountains to Raqqa, with instructions to proceed to the coast, and to be ready to receive the French Army.

His Excellency the Seraskier, having left Aleppo under the 25th ult., and the French Army, having received the same, will proceed to the coast, and will be ready to receive the French Army. The French Army, having received the same, will proceed to the coast, and will be ready to receive the French Army.

I have to inform you, that by the last advices which reached this Government from Marash, his Excellency the Seraskier continued to be there, with some of the Cavalry and Light Artillery, and further, that his Excellency did not intend to advance any further forward.

According to a letter which, I am told, has been received by the French Consul here, from his Excellency Soliman Pasha, who is at Antab, with some four regiments of Infantry and some Artillery, and who, I hear, says that the remainder of the Egyptian forces, with the exception of the four regiments that have crossed the river Euphrates, are detached from Antab along the northern frontier to Adana, and in a similar manner extending to Nerb.

M. Caillier, Marshal Soult's Aide-de-camp, on a mission to the French Government, returned from the 25th ult. from Alexandretta, and left under the 25th ult., to have an interview with his Excellency the Seraskier. Finding his Excellency had left, he followed after him, and only caught up his Excellency on his arrival at Marash. No advices have been received here by any person from that gentleman, since his departure.

That on M. Caillier's reaching and presenting to his Excellency the letter he was bearer of from his Highness the Viceroy, his Excellency immediately acquiesced to its contents, which, it is said, were that he was not to advance any further after the receipt of that letter.

I am sorry to have to say, that at Richa and Jessir Soghri, on the road from hence to Latakia, some disturbances have taken place, in the latter the people rising and killing the Mussulins, with some of his attendants.

The Governor of this town, his Excellency Ismael Bey, has gone with some Irregular Cavalry, to punish the disaffected spirits, and put down these irregularities that they are committing. I am told, that advice has come to the Government, that his Excellency Ismael Bey had reached Richa, and had destroyed 120 of the malcontents, and has, it is said, sent as many more prisoners here, with several loads of arms taken from them, and further, that his Excellency had left that place, for to act also against the malcontents of Jessir Soghri, so that I hope shortly to hear that the roads in that direction will again be free.

I observe, in a letter you addressed Mr. Vice-Consul Hays, under the 2nd instant, copy of which he has transmitted to me, that you are desir-





Inclosure 7 in No. 263

*Mr. Acting-Consul Werry to Mr. Vice-Consul Hoyt*

(Extract.)

*Aleppo, July 10, 1839.*

I HAVE received yours of the 6th instant with its inclosures, as also a letter from Captain Davies, of Her Majesty's ship "Endo," wherein he informs me that after a small cruise on the coast he will return to take from hence the latest intelligence respecting the movements of the armies, to his Excellency the Ambassador, Viscount Ponsonby.

I am anxious to obtain something positive respecting M. Caillier's mission with his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha, previous to addressing his Excellency the Ambassador, will tell Captain Davies that I will send a messenger down to him on the 13th, by which time I hope to hear something new on that subject, but that in the event of my not being able to elicit anything by that last period's Captain Davies may be able to remain, without detriment to the service, a few days longer; but that, at all events, I will send the messengers from hence at the latest on the 15th instant, sooner if possible, but not later, by which I shall have the honour of also addressing him.

No. 264

*Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 29.)*

(No. 63.)

My Lord,

*Alexandria, July 30, 1839*

HAVING seen it asserted in the speeches of some French Deputies that Ibrahim Pasha was only the adoptive son of Mehemet Ali, I mentioned it to him, and asked him if Ibrahim Pasha was his own son, or if he was the son of his wife by a former husband.

The Pasha replied, that his wife never had any other husband but himself, and that she bore to him five children, all born at Cavalla in Roumelia, the native town of himself and of his wife. That the eldest child, a female, who has been dead for some years, was the wife of Moharem Bey (now here). Ibrahim Pasha was the second, and the others were Toussoun Pasha and Ismael Pasha (both dead), and Nayli Hanum, the widow of the late Desteretan.

The Pasha added, that Ibrahim Pasha was the only one of his children who was nursed by his own mother; the reason of which was, that as the plague existed at Cavalla at the time of his birth, his mother was afraid to get a nurse for him.

The Pasha added, that all his other children were the offspring of separate and different mothers.

I have &c.  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 265

*Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 29.)*

(No. 13.)

My Lord,

*Damascus, August 2, 1839*

BY the last Beyrout steamer I had the honour to address your Lordship a despatch, No. 12, on the 5th instant.

I therein alluded to the future operations of his Highness Ibrahim Pasha on the northern frontier. It appears that Bir and Orfa were taken possession of by the Egyptian troops, previous to Ibrahim Pasha having

reoccupied Aintab, and having himself advanced to Marash. Your Lordship will be informed by the Aleppo Pro-Consul, that the Egyptian Government continues to be active in preparing the Egyptian forces on that frontier, by sending to the different points occupied by the forces considerable supplies of ammunition and military stores, I presume with the intention to be in an attitude more effectually to bring to a conclusion the pending Question between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan, which the recent composition of the Sultan Medjid's Ministry would not indicate as likely to be easily accomplished favourably to Mehemet Ali.

I make no doubt your Lordship will be particularly informed on the advantages the present positions occupied by the Egyptian forces offer to Mehemet Ali, either for immediate offensive, or future aggressive, operations. The former viewed simply as a means of defence with the latter, would appear necessary, not only for the defence of the north of Syria, but also for the control of the whole of that border. The malcontents of the lower ranges of the Taurus, extending from and above Marash to Byass and northward along the Adana province, as well as south to Hestan and Alexandretta, never can be kept in check without Marash is placed in the hands of whatever Power is called on to govern the Aleppo Pashalic: and unless this post is put in the hands of the Egyptian Government, a mountain warfare will always exist on those mountains. Bir and Orfa, considered in the same sense, are essential, though not to a parallel extent as the occupation of Marash is, to control the mountaineers, to constrain, control, and govern the Arab tribes east of the Euphrates, and prevent them from passing that river on the line to Dair, which the latter occupation of the two former places by the Sultan's troops rendered the southern desert frontier of the Aleppo Pashalic a continual field for the incursions and depredations of the Arab tribes, and prevented the Egyptian Government, with all the irregular Bedouin Cavalry force employed on that service, from protecting it effectually. The district of Orfa is also one of great agricultural resources, on which at all times the Pashalic of Aleppo, conjointly with its own, relied for its supplies of grain; and notwithstanding the extension of agriculture in Syria, Orfa would derive considerable advantage by the sale of its harvests at Aleppo, which the late occupation of that district by the Sultan's authorities have deprived the population on both sides of availing.

The occupation of Marash, Bir, and Orfa, by the Egyptians, considered as giving aggressive power to that Government, differs in its relative advantage. Marash does not offer, more than Aintab, means to the Egyptians to prosecute offensive operations; both lie on the direct road to Mount Taurus, to the Euphrates, to Mesopotamia, and consequently immediately requisite to the Egyptian Government for the proper governing and protection of the lower ranges of the Taurus; while allowed to remain in the hands of the Sultan, it offers the means of immediate aggression on the Egyptian territory, both on a military and commercial point of view, as the late operations of His Highness Ibrahim Pasha on that frontier showed.

With respect to the aggressive advantage the possession of Bir and Orfa offers to the Egyptians, either to the north of Mesopotamia and Aintab, or to the south of the former to Babyonia, it is self evident, and it may only remain for your Lordship to decide whether it is more or expedient that Mehemet Ali should establish to the east of the Euphrates, having the free passage of that river, his army to enable him to arrive in conjunction with Khorasan, and immediately with Persia, and to pursue aggressive operations towards Babyonia, and thereby enable him to exercise considerable influence throughout the line of country and frontier tract of Mesopotamia, and Arrabia, and to open a view to the recovery of Russia, and the Sultan, or could he rather occupy the district of the Euphrates, unconnected with any views north or south in Mesopotamia, will place him in a position distinct and separate from all other Powers, and more within the control and under the influence of Great Britain. This is supposing Mehemet Ali is, or may be, destined to

be an instrument in the hands of the Governments of Western Europe, or such others as by a defensive pacific policy may form a balance in opposition to the views of Russia in the Levant and the East.

With a view to diminish the burdens levied on the population of Syria, also to prevent both the Sultan and Mehemet Ali endangering the pacific policy of the European Powers, by the presence of imposing armies on the northern frontier, it might be advisable for both Powers to maintain such forces only between Malak and Darrakeh on one side and Aleppo on the other, as are sufficient to hold and govern the intermediate countries in a moderate sense, and that with the exception of the force at Antioch, Marash, &c. which for some should be kept at Brusa or Orfa, leaving the space between the latter cities to Aleppo as it was before without any Turkish troops, might be considered to their interests and the tranquillity of the present of a regular military force which will always constitute the Egyptians to have a strong force at Aleppo and the Sultan for the same reason will require similar forces at Diarbekir and Moussa, otherwise the line of Bagdad will soon be imperilled by the Kurds, Sijaks, and other parties. The destruction of difference would be in keeping up in those countries a force sufficient to govern and control and not one to undertake aggressive operations between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali and to maintain peace. Both the Sultan and Mehemet Ali should be brought to consider that it would be destructive of the establishment and the preservation of amicable relations between them and other Moslem potentates if Syria needs be overburdened with the maintenance of excessive large armies.

Mr. Pro-Consul at Aleppo will, I presume, inform your Lordship of the measures taken by the Egyptian Government to extinguish the insurrectionary movements at Raha and Jisr Saghr. I hear that has been accomplished; and the force of 12,000 men, regulars and irregulars, employed on that service, is on its march hither, first to act against the Mutualis on the Balbec line, which have been now some time in insurrection. The Emir Gawad Harfoush fled from hence, after having made his submission to the Government; and in a recent rencontre between him and the Egyptian irregulars, it is said he has been killed. This force, commanded by his Excellency Ismael Bey of Aleppo, will afterwards, passing through Damascus, proceed to the Hauran, where a portion of the inhabitants of the Agloun district refuse to pay taxes or listen to the Government; and also against a body of Druses who are now in arms at the Ladjee, in consequence of the Emir Guonblate having been recently seized and decapitated here with seven others, for having been found on arms infesting the roads. This Emir was cousin to the one of that family who is at Constantinople, and who has been a long time in intelligence with the malecontent Drusen in these parts. Government will experience no further delay and difficulty in completely extinguishing these insurrections; the population generally disbelieving the death of the Sultan and the death of Abdul Mejid, still less will they listen to the pretence of Hafiz Pasha; in other respects, Damascus, and indeed the surrounding country, is tolerably quiet.

An Austrian Consul, newly appointed to Damascus, is arrived, and has been regularly installed in his functions.

I hear a Russian Consul is also to be appointed for this place.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) N. W. WERRY

No. 24b

*Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received August 29.)

(No. 20.)

My Lord,

Beograd, August 3, 1839

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that his Excellency  
 Serd. Be. of the V. of P. is sending the certificate  
 of the same, and at the same time the same in the same manner. His Excellency

intends to visit Tripoli, and may probably cruize off this coast for a month or two.

On the 23rd ultimo, Mahmud Bey, the Governor of Beyrout, notified publicly the accession of Sultan Abdul Medjid to the throne of Constantinople, and salutes were fired on the occasion during three successive days.

In this immediate neighbourhood all is tranquil; but on the Acre and Caiffa roads assassinations and robberies have been frequent of late. The Mutasim are also in arms in detached bodies, and have committed disorders in various directions. I fear it may be some time ere perfect tranquillity is restored in Syria.

By our latest advices, Ibrahim Pasha was at Marash.

Her Majesty's ship, *Duke of Devonshire*, touched at this place on the 27th ultimo in search of Admiral Stophard. I informed Captain Davies that he would in all probability find the Admiral at Tortuga. I accordingly sailed for that destination.

THOMAS, JR.,  
Sgt. Major

No. 287.

*Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 29.)*

No 64 1

My Lord,

Alexandria, August 7, 1839.

A STEAMER of the Porte arrived here from Constantinople on the 21st inst. (the 18th of May, 1855), the Capt. being George d'Admiry of Mehemet Ali to the Porte, and also Captain Anselme, attaché to the French Embassy at Constantinople.

The latter brought to his communications from his Excellency Viscount Papanza, as also similar communications from the Ambassadors of the Great Powers to their Consuls-General here.

I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship the copy of the despatch of Viscount Ponsonby to me, together with its inclosures Nos. 1 and 2.

I replied to Viscount Ponsonby by the French steamer which left at daylight this morning, and by ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~honour~~ <sup>honour</sup> to transmit copy of my despatch to his Excellency, No. 3, together with copies of the inclosures sent to his Excellency, inclosures Nos. 4, 5, and 6.

and myself with the Pashn yesterday morning, and Inclosures 5 and 6 are the documents alluded to in the Procs-Verbal.

I request to call your Lordship's attention to inclosure No. 6, by which you will perceive that the Porte was ready to accede to Mehemet Ali's demands in respect to the hereditary succession in his family of Syria &c., when the collective communication from the Ambassadors of the Great Powers induced the Porte to leave the entire decision of the Oriental Question in the hands of the Great Powers.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 287

*Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Campbell*

Sir,

Therapia, July 29, 1839

I INCLOSE copy of a Collective Note signed by the Representatives of the Five Great Powers.

This Note was yesterday delivered to the Sublime Porte, and the



Porte, without delay, gave its formal adhesion to the proposition contained therein.

You will acquaint the Pasha of Egypt with this fact. The Representatives of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, have directed the Consuls-General of their respective Governments to communicate the above fact to the Pasha, and it is desired by all that the Consuls-General should act conjointly in performing what is desired of them.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) P. PONSONBY

Inclosure 2 in No. 287

*Collective Note of the Five Powers.*

[See Inclosure 1 in No. 250]

Inclosure 3 in No. 287

*Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby*

My Lord,

Alexandria, August 6, 1839.

I HAD the honour to receive yesterday, by the steamer of the Sultan, your Excellency's despatch of 29th July, together with the Collective Note signed by the Representatives of the Five Great Powers.

The process by which I have now the honour to transmit together with this two inclosures will, at your Excellency's disposal, be the process of my colleagues and myself, with a view to it.

M. Cochelet was of opinion, that we should address a Collective Note to the Pasha; but this was overruled by my colleagues of Austria, and Russia, and myself, and we therefore limited ourselves to the letter of your Lordship's despatch which was, "to acquaint the Pasha with the fact" as we thought that if we gave a note to the Pasha we might fall into the fault of either saying too much or too little.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) P. CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 4 in No. 287

*Procès-Verbal of Interview of the Consuls-General with Mehemet Ali.*

LE 6 Août, à 9 heures du matin, Messieurs les Consuls-Généraux d'Autriche, d'Angleterre, de France, et de Russie, se rendirent chez le Pacha d'Egypte, à l'effet de lui notifier, à l'invitation qui leur avait été adressée à ce sujet par les Représentants de leurs Gouvernements respectifs à Constantinople, la Note Collective adressée à la Sublime Porte le 27 Juillet, de la part de leurs Excellences, et dont ils venaient d'être munis simultanément par leurs Ministres respectifs.

Cette Note portait que la Porte Ottomane d'après l'avis qui lui avait été annoncé par les Ambassadeurs et Ministres des dites Grandes Puissances, avait décidé de suspendre toute détermination définitive sans leur concours dans la Question Orientale et d'attendre l'effet de l'intérêt que les Grands Cabinets en portent.

Le Gérant du Consulat-Général de Prusse se trouvant retenu chez lui par suite d'une indisposition, avait chargé le Consul-Général de Russie de faire connaître au Vice-Roi la participation de sa Cour à cette démarche.

A peine arrivés au palais et en présence de Son Altesse, les quatre Consuls-Généraux s'acquittèrent successivement de la tâche qui leur était

envoyée. Après avoir écouté la lecture de la Note Collective susmentionnée, Mehemet Ali leur annonça qu'il avait déjà en connaissance de cette pièce par les informations qui lui avaient été adressées directement de Constantinople, et observa qu'il n'avait pas eu de peine à reconnaître que la Note contenait quelque variétés; savoir, au lieu de la "Question Orientale," on y avait mis la "Question Egyptienne;" et au mot "d'intérêt" on y avait substitué ceux de "dispositions bienveillantes." Cette pièce, rédigée en langue Turque, nous fut remise en traduction et en copie par le Vice-Roi et se trouve jointe à ce Procès-Verbal. En échange, Son Altesse demanda une copie de la Note Collective telle qu'elle nous avait été adressée, ce qui lui fut accordé.

Les Consuls-Généraux engagèrent ensuite le Vice-Roi à prendre note de cette dernière note, et à lui annoncer que les Grandes Puissances feraient des vœux pour la suite à l'égard des Représentants des dites Puissances qu'elles adopteraient dans leur haute sagesse et d'un commun accord, pour régler définitivement la Question Orientale d'après des principes d'équité, de convenance, et de stabilité pour l'avenir. Qu'en attendant la réception d'instructions directes et précises de leurs Cabinets, Son Altesse approuverait sans doute les sentiments qui avaient dicté cette démarche et la part des Grands Cabinets à prendre sur eux de maintenir et de conserver la tranquillité de l'Orient.

"Oui," répondit Mehemet Ali, "j'aime à croire que les Puissances d'Europe me jugeront avec équité, et en ce cas elles ne trouveront aucune difficulté de ma part à me soumettre à leur décision; d'ailleurs, je n'ai que deux mots à articuler, ils vous sont connus: c'est l'hérédité de la Syrie et l'éloignement de Hossri Pacha; quant au premier point, il m'avait déjà été accordé, et Rosh Effendi était au moment d'être expédié à Alexandrie avec cette nouvelle, lorsque la radiation des Grands Cours fit arrêter son départ. C'est Hossri Pacha lui-même qui m'en donne l'avis, et Moufid Bey en a reçu l'assurance verbale de Sa Hautesse elle-même."

Sur la demande des Consuls-Généraux, on leur donna la lecture du Grand Vizir constatant le fait précité, leur fut remise, et elle se trouve également jointe à ce Procès-Verbal.

Cet entretien n'avait duré guère au-delà d'une demi-heure; le Vice-Roi semblait fortement préoccupé, et sa contenance trahissait l'inquiétude que lui faisait éprouver l'ingérence des Grandes Puissances dans les affaires d'Orient.

Inclosure 5 in No. 287

*Translation from the Turkish, of the Note sent by the Porte to Mehemet Ali, on that received by it from the Representatives of the Great Powers.*

LES Cinq Ambassadeurs des Puissances, Soussignés, conformément aux traités conclus avec leurs Hautes Cours respectives, se tenaient d'avoir à annoncer aux Ministres de la Sublime Porte que l'accord des Cinq Grandes Puissances touchant la Question Egyptienne est certain, et ils prient que la Sublime Porte, en attendant le fruit de leurs dispositions bienveillantes, ne décide absolument rien sur la susdite question sans leur recours.

Inclosure 6 in No. 287

*Hossri Pacha to Mehemet Ali.*

(Suivent les titres.)

Traduction.)

J'AI reçu par le retour d'Akif Effendi la réponse de Votre Altesse à la lettre que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui adresser par cet Envoyé, et j'en ai compris le contenu, ainsi que celui du rapport du même Akif Effendi sur

les conférences qui ont eu lieu entre Votre Altesse et lui. J'ai déposé l'une et l'autre aux pieds de Sa Hautesse, qui en a pris connaissance, et je les ai communiquées ensuite aux principaux dignitaires de la Sublime Porte réunis en Conseil. Nous nous sommes rejoints en apprenant que Votre Altesse qui est un ancien fidèle de l'Empire, qui lui a rendu des services plus réels que tous les autres, qui, pour cette raison, est devenue l'un des plus grands de nos collègues, avait la noble pensée de faire cause commune avec les membres les plus influents et les plus dévoués de la nation Musulmane, et nous avons prié Dieu qu'il exauçât nos vœux communs d'union pour le bonheur de l'Empire. Dans sa réponse, qui renferme une espèce de reproche, Votre Altesse fait observer que dans la lettre que j'eus l'honneur de lui faire remettre par Akif Effendi, je ne parlais d'union que pour les provinces Égyptiennes; mais ce n'était là qu'une forme employée pour annoncer à Votre Altesse son pardon. Du reste, Akif Effendi n'avait pas mission de traiter les affaires; il était seulement chargé de vous porter la nouvelle la plus désirable de toutes, — de votre rentrée en grâce; c'est pourquoi j'osai de donner à Votre Altesse de plus amples explications. Quoiqu'il en soit, nous les grands dignitaires de la Sublime Porte vous ont dit, avec confiance, que vous avez la sécurité et toutes les garanties nécessaires, et étant prêts à associer leurs efforts aux vôtres pour la prospérité de l'Empire, après avoir pris les Ordres Supérieurs de Sa Hautesse, notre Auguste Maître, j'avais donné l'ordre à son Excellence Saib Effendi, Ministre de la Justice, de se rendre auprès de Votre Altesse, à l'effet de s'entendre avec elle sur les demandes qu'elle a présentées, sur les services qu'elle a l'intention de rendre, et sur les mesures à prendre dans les conjonctures actuelles. Cet Envoyé allait partir sur le bateau à vapeur, lorsque les Ambassadeurs des Cinq Grandes Puissances ont remis à la Sublime Porte une Note signée par eux, dont la traduction se trouve dans la présente lettre. Son contenu fait connaître que les Cinq Grandes Puissances se sont mises d'accord pour discuter et régler les Affaires d'Orient. Immédiatement après la présentation de cette Note, les hauts dignitaires de la Sublime Porte se sont réunis de nouveau en Conseil, et ont été d'avis que l'ingérence des étrangers dans une affaire de suzerain à vassal est une chose assez peu convenable; mais considérant que les Cinq Grandes Puissances s'en étant déjà occupées de concert, le refus de leur médiation, contraire aux usages Européens, serait offensant pour elles, et pourrait attirer des embarras et du trouble à la nation Musulmane, vu l'état général des choses; réfléchissant, de plus, qu'à la suite de l'obtention de votre grâce et des projets d'union qui s'effectuent, les garanties d'un concours extérieur deviennent superflues, et que, dès lors l'intervention ou la non-intervention des Puissances dans l'arrangement des affaires n'est d'aucune importance, les Grands Assemblés, tout en faisant des vœux pour que nous n'ayons jamais à recourir aux étrangers, n'ont pas jugé à propos de s'opposer à ce que les Ambassadeurs des Cinq Grandes Puissances, et y ont donné leur adhésion. Nous avons désiré, et nous espérons, que tout cela se terminera par un accord qui ne vient d'avoir lieu. C'est pourquoi le départ de l'Envoyé dont il a été question, se trouve suspendu. J'ai pris la liberté d'écrire la présente lettre, Votre Altesse, à l'effet de lui faire connaître le contenu de la Note. Après que Votre Altesse aura pris connaissance de son contenu, ainsi que des communications adressées par les Ambassadeurs aux Consuls-Généraux, je la prie de vouloir bien me faire connaître son opinion.

(Le 20 Djemazi-el-evvel, 1255.)

P. S. — Les Cinq Grandes Puissances ont été d'avis que l'ingérence des étrangers dans une affaire de suzerain à vassal est une chose assez peu convenable; mais considérant que les Cinq Grandes Puissances s'en étant déjà occupées de concert, le refus de leur médiation, contraire aux usages Européens, serait offensant pour elles, et pourrait attirer des embarras et du trouble à la nation Musulmane, vu l'état général des choses; réfléchissant, de plus, qu'à la suite de l'obtention de votre grâce et des projets d'union qui s'effectuent, les garanties d'un concours extérieur deviennent superflues, et que, dès lors l'intervention ou la non-intervention des Puissances dans l'arrangement des affaires n'est d'aucune importance, les Grands Assemblés, tout en faisant des vœux pour que nous n'ayons jamais à recourir aux étrangers, n'ont pas jugé à propos de s'opposer à ce que les Ambassadeurs des Cinq Grandes Puissances, et y ont donné leur adhésion. Nous avons désiré, et nous espérons, que tout cela se terminera par un accord qui ne vient d'avoir lieu.

No 288

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received August 29.)

(Separate.)

My Lord.

Alexandria, August 7, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship the copy of a letter written by me to Viscount Ponsonby, in reply to two notes from his Excellency, and which may be considered as semi-official.

Your Lordship will perceive that it was reported at Constantinople, that Ibrahim Pasha was advancing to Diarbekir, Harpoot, &c., but I can assure your Lordship that Ibrahim Pasha is not advancing to the reports from Capri and other sources, and in every other direction received by my agents and myself from the Egyptian authorities, and that he was at the time of the report at the Egyptian headquarters, and that Mehmet Ali has ordered me, that Ibrahim Pasha will not send a single soldier in advance, and I have already had the honour to inform your Lordship, that Ibrahim Pasha has refused to attend to the invitations sent to him by different authorities in Asia Minor to act in respect to the different districts.

I have more than once taken the liberty to intrude upon your Lordship my own views on the hereditary succession of Syria to Mehmet Ali, which, I think, would be most advantageous to the Porte itself, and would tend to strengthen the Empire, but the chief reason for my opinion is, the misery which would ensue to the Christian and Jewish population in Syria, if that country were to be constituted as before; and I feel convinced that it only would Syria then become a scene of anarchy and bloodshed, for the Christian population also would be entirely destroyed.

Thus, my Lord, is not my own opinion alone, but it is also that of all my colleagues, and of the British Government. Were Syria to be yielded in hereditary succession to Mehmet Ali, the case would be very different from that of Wallachia, Moldavia, &c., as not only do the Princes of those provinces profess the Greek religion, but they are also, from their geographical position, exposed to the powerful and immediate action of Russia; whereas, on the contrary, Syria is in quite a different point of view, and I cannot but take the liberty of expressing my intimate conviction to your Lordship, that the cession of Syria, in succession to Mehmet Ali, would not only be much to the advantage of Syria and of European commerce, but would also tend to strengthen the Ottoman Empire itself.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 288

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord,

Alexandria, August 8, 1839.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's two notes of the 26th and 27th of July.

Your Lordship informs me (and M. de Bouténeff writes the same to Count Medem), that Ibrahim Pasha is advancing to Diarbekir, Harpoot, &c., &c. I think I can positively assert that Ibrahim Pasha is not advancing, although such a report has been widely spread at Constantinople, where the reports regarding the Pasha are not usually correct, and are often too much exaggerated.

Ibrahim Pasha had, before the arrival of M. Caillier at his headquarters, sent a corps to Orfa, but this corps will be brought (if not already so) to this side of the Euphrates; but he has not sent, nor will he send, any troops to Diarbekir, Harpoot, &c., &c.

It is not improbable (as your Lordship states) that the late successes



of Mehemet Ali may hasten the destruction of the Turkish Empire, if the Government be not sufficiently wise to adopt the only course now likely to ward off such a catastrophe. I mean, by availing itself of the counsels and effective assistance which he has it in his power to afford.

The state of disorganization represented by the late accounts from Smyrna and Constantinople, to exist among the remains of the army in Asia Minor, though partly brought about by the defeat of the main body of the army, must have had its original cause in the precipitate measures resorted to by Sultan Mahmoud for bringing into the field a force greatly exceeding the resources of the country, destitute of officers, and without the elements of military discipline, which can alone keep an army together under difficult circumstances.

The interference of the European Powers in the ultimate settlement of Eastern Affairs, which the Pasha was the first to invoke, will now furnish a satisfactory guarantee against any views of aggrandizement he may have been supposed to entertain; and the army he possesses is in such a state of efficiency as to supply a sufficient force for the immediate protection of the Empire, and ample materials for the reorganization of the Turkish Army on a more improved system.

But unless Hosrew Pasha be removed, it will be in vain to look for any improvement in the management of affairs at Constantinople. He has inherited all the inveterate enmity of Sultan Mahmoud against Mehemet Ali, without any of his virtues, and would not hesitate to plunge the country into all the horrors of civil war, in order to gratify his ambition and revenge. On the other hand, Mehemet Ali and his son Ibrahim Pasha are now looked up to by the nation as the only individuals possessing the means of regenerating the Ottoman Empire. Mehemet Ali has expressed his readiness to support any administration not under the influence of Hosrew Pasha, and the nation would give a strong impulse to the work of reform.

I cannot pretend to judge of the evidence your Lordship may have received of Russian agency in the defection of the Capudan Pasha, but it is a fact which is generally acknowledged here, and I will unhesitatingly assert, that no Russian agent in Egypt has been mixed in it.

The Pasha himself considers the union of the Turkish and Egyptian fleets as the most vital blow that could be struck against the designs of Russia, and it is viewed in that light by all the Sultan's officers here: as two or three more years of training under European instruction would render them quite a match for the Russian Navy, if they are not so already.

I have &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 259.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 29)

(No. 66,  
My Lord,

Alexandria, August 8, 1839

WITH reference to my despatch No 64, I have now the honour to transmit to your Lordship the translation of a letter from Mehemet Ali to Hosrew Pasha, in reply to the letter which forms inclosure No. 6 in my despatch No. 64.

This letter appears to me to be of great importance, inasmuch as it proves that Mehemet Ali has already resorted to Mehemet Ali's resources when the mediation of the Great Powers put a stop to any further proceedings.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 289.

Mehemet Ali to Hosrew Pasha.—(August 6, 1839.)

(Traduction.)

(Suivent les titres.)

J'ai reçu la lettre que Votre Altesse m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser par mon Chargé d'Affaires Mousfi Bey.

Votre Altesse m'a informé qu'elle a pris connaissance du contenu de la dépêche que je lui adressai par Akif Effendi, et du rapport du même Envoyé, qu'elle avait également reçu de la Sublime Porte relative au Conseil d'Etat, et qu'elle avait reçu communication de ma dépêche et du rapport d'Akif Effendi, étaient convenus pour l'accomplissement de nos vœux, tout en tenant compte de la nature des services que je pourrais rendre à l'Empire, et déterminer les mesures à prendre dans les circonstances actuelles, d'envoyer auprès de moi le Ministre Saïd Effendi par le bateau à vapeur, lorsque sur ces entrefaites, les Ambassadeurs des Cinq Grandes Puissances ont présenté à Votre Altesse une note, dont vous me dites mettre la traduction dans votre dépêche, ajoutant que les Consuls-Généraux des Cinq Grandes Puissances résidant à Alexandrie me feroient des communications analogues, et que les rapports verbaux de mon Chargé d'Affaires me feroient mieux comprendre tout ce dont il s'agit.

Messieurs les Consuls-Généraux, qui ont reçu des dépêches de la part de leurs Ambassadeurs respectifs, m'ont communiqué leurs instructions, et mon Chargé d'Affaires m'a aussi fait part de ce qu'il devait me dire.

Mon seul but, mon unique désir, sont de faire ma soumission, et de rendre des services à notre magnanimité et tout-puissant Seigneur et Maître. Mais j'ai très-humblement supplié Sa Hauteur qu'en considération de ma qualité d'ancien serviteur de l'Empire, et de mes services passés, sa générosité voudrait bien remplir deux vœux que j'ose lui adresser. Je prie Dieu qu'il conserve l'auguste personne de notre Souverain sur le trône aussi longtemps que le monde durera!

Lorsque mon Chargé d'Affaires a reçu l'ordre de se rendre auprès de moi, il a obtenu la faveur d'être admis à baiser les pieds de Sa Hauteur notre magnanime Seigneur, qui lui a dit: "Mousfi Bey, fais mes complimens au Pacha, la Porte est disposée à lui accorder tout ce qu'il lui demandera, pourvu qu'il ne soit pas en dépendance, je la lui accorde, et j'ai donné l'ordre qu'on réglât cette affaire."

Ces paroles m'ont fait grand plaisir, et me donnent une grande satisfaction, car ce qu'elles remplissent mon vœu le plus cher, l'obtention de l'hérédité, et me glorifient avec les Grands de l'Empire.

Ensuite, lorsque les membres du Conseil d'Etat ont été réunis en Conseil, ils ont répété à Mousfi Bey: "Notre Seigneur et Maître vient d'accorder tout ce que Mehemet Ali Pacha avait sollicité aux pieds du trône, l'hérédité de l'Empire, et toutes les dignités, et cela parce que les Ambassadeurs des Cinq Grandes Puissances viennent de présenter cette note, dont il est nécessaire que Mehemet Ali prenne connaissance."

En suite de ce qui a été dit et fait, je me réjouis de ce que l'un de mes deux vœux est exaucé, et je prie Dieu pour le succès de l'autre, car il le sera pour le moment, et j'espère que mon Seigneur et Maître voudra bien le faire par sa bienveillance de Sa Hauteur. Dans ce cas, je ne pense pas que l'on ait besoin de recourir à la médiation des Cinq Grandes Puissances.

Votre Altesse connaîtra encore mon opinion par ce que laissent Messieurs les Ambassadeurs, d'après les dépêches qu'ils recevront de Mehemet Ali, et les Consuls-Généraux résidant à Alexandrie. C'est pour ces raisons que j'ai l'honneur de lui faire présenter cette humble dépêche par mon Chargé d'Affaires Mousfi Bey, &c., &c.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston, — (Received August 30.)*

No. 2111

٧٧٩ [١٤٥٥]

Therapy August 6, 1839.

1. INCLOSE translated copy of a letter from the Grand Vizier to Mehmet  
4. translated copy (in Arabic) of July 7

Grand Vizier in reply to the letter sent by Mr. H. J. Ferri immediately after the occasion of the 1st of May.

The substance of this letter is remarkable, and the writer shows the contempt he entertains for our understanding, by the absurdity of his assertions and deductions. To say that Achmet cannot afford us any of his exertions, on account of the Sultan's fleet because it brought out Alexandria where a port belonging to the Ottoman Empire, is an assertion that will hardly pass current even in Europe. To dictate the dismissal of the French Minister is no great violence of his imagination to the Sultan, particularly in the man who has repeatedly applied to European Powers to recognize his independence, and who now demands the hereditary possession of a share of the Ottoman Empire. It would seem that Mehmet Ali has so long duped and deceived people, that he has no apprehensions of their discovering the greatest fallacies.

I have, Sir,

Signed \_\_\_\_\_ WINSLOW BY

Inclusive 1 to 290

*The Grand Vizier Hovsem Pasha to Mehemet Ali July 31 1689*

Translation

J'AI ainsi le sens de la lettre  
jetée à la miennne, par le retour  
Effendi sur les communications qu'il  
eût mises sous les yeux de Sa Haue.  
des lueu dans un Conseil

Le 15 Mars 1891, le Ministre des Colonies a l'honneur de vous adresser ci-joint le rapport de la Commission d'Enquête sur l'Administration des Colonies, lequel rapport a été adopté par le Conseil d'Etat le 15 Mars 1891. Le Ministre des Colonies a l'honneur de vous adresser également ci-joint le rapport de la Commission d'Enquête sur l'Administration des Colonies, lequel rapport a été adopté par le Conseil d'Etat le 15 Mars 1891.

Votre Altesse Royale, par la même occasion, et de son sentiment de  
 respect, que j'ai vu par Aulx Effendi ne parle d'hérédité que  
 l'abolition de la disposition relative à l'hérédité, et  
 être le premier effet du pardon et de la réhabilitation.  
 La loi d'Akif Effendi, qui a été promulguée, n'a pas jusqu'à  
 ce jour, le pardon de Sa Hautesse, c'est évidemment  
 l'accomplissement de ses désirs, et voilà pourquoi on a négligé de  
 l'expliquer l'avantage à donner.

Quand on a vu que le Sultan, par son décret, a nommé le Prince de la Justice actuel, son Excellence El Hafiz Sah Effendi, pour négocier et arrêter les demandes qui ont été faites, on a vu que le Sultan a nommé le Prince de la Justice actuel, son Excellence El Hafiz Sah Effendi, pour négocier et arrêter les demandes qui ont été faites.

Après, lorsque nous reçûmes de la part de MM. les Représentants des  
Finances une Note signée par tous, dont je vous envoie ci-jointe

En conséquence de la note dont je viens de parler un autre conseil a été tenu pour discuter de nouveau cette affaire, et presque est déjà l'assemblée ont commencé à s'occuper de cette affaire. Je regrette seulement que cela agit en opposition au système de l'Europe, et a mes relations amicales avec elle, et comme au reste, la sûreté qu'on avait en vue d'obtenir, est obtenue par le fait du par l'on que Sa Hauteurs vous a accordé, nous avons, uniquement pour correspondre par un trait d'amitié, adhéré à la mesure dont il s'agit, et jugé à propos d'en informer Votre Altesse la première.

Les ordres de notre Auguste Souverain étant conformes à notre façon  
d'agir le Rapport du Commissaire susdit a été ajourné et je me propose de vous  
écrire cette lettre amicale, que je vous expédie par un bateau à vapeur exprès.

Après la réception de cette lettre, s'il plaît à Dieu, et lorsque Votre Altesse aura pris connaissance, et par son contenu, et par les communications des Consuls auxquels MM. les Représentants viennent d'écrire aussi à ce sujet, je vous prie de m'en faire connaître le résultat.

Inclosure 2 is No. 200.

*Mehemet Ali to the Grand Viceroy Hassan Pasha.*

(See Inclosure I in No. 282.1)

No. 291.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 20.)

No. 201.1

My Lord,

Therapia, August 7, 1839

WITH reference to your instructions No. 95, I have to acquaint your Lordship, that the French Ambassador is of opinion that it is not expedient to make the communication to the Sublime Porte at this moment, because the Ministers of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, may not think right to concur in it; and the Ambassador, therefore, would defer the measure until an emergency shall call for it. I have suggested that he and I should make separately a communication to the Grand Vizier, stating that we have authority from our Governments to give the protection of the fleet to the Sublime Porte, if it be demanded; and I offered as my reasons the fact, that Ibrahim Pasha can reach Scutari in twenty days; that Mehemet Ali has now received notice of the Collective Note; that he may direct Ibrahim to march, in order, by the operation of fear, to induce the Sublime Porte to make an arrangement with him; and because I think it necessary to give the Grand Vizier sure ground for relying upon the support of England and France, without which he may yield to intimidation.

I have no doubt that in spite of appearances and overt acts, there may be exertions made by some parties to bring about an arrangement between the Porte and the Pasha. I feel confident that the Grand Visier ought to have our support, to give him the power to repress the action of Mehemet Ali's partisans in this country, and that with our support there is nothing to fear for domestic tran-

I have, &c.

Signed, **PONSONBY**



(No. 204)

My Lord,

*Thetopia, August 7, 1839.*

HAFIZ PASHA has been removed from the command of the army, and is now at his Pashalik of Siraz. Seidullah Pasha, a younger man, commands, and has with him about 8,000 Regular Infantry and 4,000 Cavalry. The position he occupies will not enable him to prevent Ibrahim advancing by Koniah.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) **PONSONBY.**

No. 293

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 31.)*

(No. 206.)

My Lord,

Therapsid, August 7, 1889

I AM happy to state, that the Prussian officers have arrived here safe two days ago.

Count Königsmarck told me that he had learned from those officers a fact which I think is of great importance with a view to future proceedings; it is, that 5,000 of Ibrahim Pasha's troops joined Haïd Pasha after the battle of Nezib, many of them enlisting in the Sultan's Guards, and others elsewhere. This is a striking proof of the feelings prevalent in the Pasha's army. It is also stated that, generally speaking, those subjects of the Sultan who had gone over to the Egyptians, have returned as fast as possible to their proper allegiance.

1 am, &c,  
SIGNED **PONSONBY.**

No. 214

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received August 31.)

No. 2073

My Lord,

Thetoria August 7, 1839

ON the 31st of July, I received a report from the Dragoman stating that Nouri Effendi and Samin Effendi had tried to get out of the Palace and then the officers of the Palace, &c. &c. I was informed that they were taken to the Interior of the Palace, &c. &c. I was also informed that he had found some things, and also I heard that the Palace was in a state of confusion. I report to M. de Sancerre that I saw the same thing, &c. &c. the day after the flight to defend the passage of the City, &c. &c. the authority of the Porte in the city.

[illegible]

he would take a similar step; that this measure was to be executed with the concurrence of the Sublime Porte.

I do not think it necessary to trouble your Lordship with the arguments I used, for it is obvious that if the capital and Government were not saved from the power of Mehmet Ali, all the measures already taken, and all the policy adopted by Her Majesty's Government and by the other Governments would be short of

The French Ambassador saw Baron de Sturmer in the evening, and on his return told me he would co-operate with me if necessary, but wished to have previously a meeting of the Five Representatives, and the meeting was fixed accordingly for the next day.

I received at night a note from the Internuncio, saying that M. de Boutéeff had made inquiries, and found that there was no truth in the report of Ibrahim's advance. (I inclose a note from the Dragoman, in which the affair is stated.) The Internuncio still desired the meeting, and it took place, and what had before been said was repeated; and I renewed my declaration that in case the capital should be threatened by the advance of Ibrahim, I would take upon myself to apply to the British Admiral, and would throw upon him the responsibility of refusing to come up, which I however felt certain he would not hesitate to do. The French Ambassador and the Internuncio both agreed in the necessity for protecting the Porte, &c., &c. M. de Boutéeff said that it would not have been in his power to co-operate in the measure I had proposed, because he had no authority to act, and must have referred to his Government, and could not receive an answer in less than a month.

The motives which directed my conduct were these. I first gave credit to the accuracy of the statement of the Ottoman Ministers, that England and Russia had concluded a secret alliance, but I did suppose that they would not have shown me the original Papers in such a plain way, if I ought to have been deceived. To save for a moment unapplied the only means that can secure us against the multiplied evils of Ibrahim's presence. I was glad also to have an opportunity to manifest my determination to bring up the fleet in case of necessity, first, because it is a step towards the object of Her Majesty's Government, as declared in its instructions, to have the fleet here; and, secondly, because I thereby placed the Russian Minister under a necessity of admitting that such measures might be taken without the permission of Russia, or of at once exposing the policy of the alliance given by Lord Cowley (at St. Petersburg) to the policy that had adopted the Collective Note. The declaration of M. de Bouteneff shows that Russia was prepared to support her old pretensions. The measure I took is an act confirming that of the Collective Note, and it is now an established fact, that Russia is but one of five who are to interfere in the affairs of Turkey from which, previously, Russia pretended to exclude others, excepting with her permission and toleration. It will be difficult, hereafter, for Russia to assert any right to meddle with matters here more than belongs to England or France. Her action will be directed to the advantage of the strategic system that may be proposed, and her best chance will be in the variety of opinions that may be stated by the other Powers.

of Russia, and to set upon views of its own interests independent of the will of Russia. I have directed my efforts to that point; I think the point has been attained by the effect of circumstances.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) **PONSONBY**

Inclosure 1 in No. 204

*M. Frederic Pousin to Viscount Ponsonby.*

My Lord,

*Père, ce 31 Juillet, 1939.*

J'AI parlé hier à Nouri Effendi sur le sage mesure à prendre, savoir, que les Flottes Anglaise et Française viennent dans le Bosphore dont elles sont si peu éloignées, pour empêcher, si le cas se présentait, les troupes Egyptiennes de passer en Europe. J'ai eu occasion de voir ce matin à la Porte, Nouri Effendi et Sarim Effendi, qui étaient ensemble. Ils trouvent cette mesure tout-à-fait

inutile, en même temps qu'elle serait extrêmement nuisible, car elle ne ferait qu'accroître la confusion dans la ville. Mais voici des nouvelles intéressantes reçues ce matin. Six régimens Egyptiens sont déjà à Conia; il ne faudrait que cinq ou six jours, disent les Ministres, pour que l'Armée Egyptienne arrive à Constantinople. La Porte est tranquille quant à la mer, vu que les Flottes Anglaise et Française devant empêcher la Flotte Egyptienne d'entrer dans le Bosphore; mais le langage des Représentans des Cinq Puissances est bien loin de rassurer la Porte sur ses craintes de l'Armée d'Ibrahim. Dans l'opinion de la Porte, aussitôt que les lettres qu'il s'agit d'expédier à Alexandrie y seront arrivées, c'est-à-dire que Mehémet Ali aura vu la réponse du Grand Vizir, le Pacha marchera inmanquablement à Borsah l'ordre de marcher sur Constantinople pour porter un grand coup. La Porte est convaincue que des lettres et des paroles, et même des menaces, ne sont capables d'arrêter le projet de Mehémet Ali. Cela étant, la Porte pense qu'il faut différer le départ du bateau à vapeur, car elle est, dit-elle, sûre que Mehémet Ali, fort irrité de la réponse qu'il s'agit de lui donner, fera marcher son armée de terre contre Constantinople, mesure incalculable dans ses résultats.

Nouri et Sacri ont prié Monsieur Lapierre d'attendre l'issue du conseil qui se tient chez le Montas pour voir si le bateau à vapeur part ou non, ce qui fait voir que ce sera à peu près la fin de l'affaire Egyptienne, mais que les assurances données hier qu'il s'agissait d'une autre affaire.

Je suis, &c.  
(Signé) F. PISANI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 294.

M. Frederic Ponsoby to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord,  
De la maison de Sarim Effendi,  
à Sheikhan Ahmedia, Scudi, 1er Août,

LE paquebot Turc est parti hier à 6 heures du soir.

C'est Sarim Effendi en présence de Nouri Effendi, qui nous a donné à M. Lapierre et à moi, les nouvelles de Conia.

Je viens de voir Sarim Effendi, qui dit aujourd'hui que nous avons mal compris. Il prétend avoir dit que les troupes Egyptiennes sont à Adana, où Méneklî Ahmed Pacha est nommé Gouverneur, ayant sous ses ordres six régimens avec de l'artillerie. Adana est à dix-huit heures de Conia. Ali Pacha de Conia est avec un corps d'armée à peu de distance des gorges du Mont Taurus, Koulek Boghaz.

Le fait est que M. Lapierre et moi nous avons entendu hier de la bouche de Sarim Effendi les nouvelles que nous nous sommes empressés de transmettre à nos chefs.

Nouri Effendi est à sa ferme aux "Eaux Douces." Le Grand Vizir vient d'envoyer un homme aux "Eaux Douces," pour l'inviter à se rendre chez son Altesse à Constantinople, ainsi que Sarim Effendi.

Je suis, &c.  
(Signé) F. PISANI.

No. 295.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 31.)

(No. 298.)  
My Lord,

Therapia, August 8, 1839.

THE Representatives of the Five Powers were invited to meet his Excellency Nouri Effendi this day at Kalender, where we all attended in consequence. The business was to communicate to the Representatives a letter from Mehémet Ali to the Grand Vizir\*, in which the Pacha of Egypt calls for the retreat of that high functionary from the post he occupies.

\* See Inclosure 1 in No. 292, p. 300.

It was asked by the Representatives (the French Ambassador), if it was intended to bring forward this matter as a personal question between the Grand Vizier and the Pacha, or one of a public nature? The Mousteshar replied that it was purely public, being a question of an attempt made by Mehémet Ali to dictate to the Porte the choice of a Grand Vizier. That if the dictation were submitted to now, it would be again extended as interest or caprice might dictate, that it was an insolent and intolerable pretension of Mehémet Ali to supersede by his own will, the sovereign rights of the Sultan.

The Representatives all expressed the same opinion strongly condemnatory of the proceedings of the Egyptian Pacha. They all expressed the hope that the Sultan would treat the demand with contempt; they all spoke of the Grand Vizier as the man the best fitted, by his experience and his qualities, to be at this particular moment the chief of the Ottoman Ministry; and said, that if it should become necessary to give strong evidence of their opinion, they would not be backward to give it. They desired the Mousteshar to make known these things to the Sultan.

In the course of conversation, the Mousteshar stated his wish, that the Representatives should write to the Consuls at Alexandria to have the sentiments of the Representatives made known to Mehémet Ali; but it was thought by the Representatives, that it was not proper for them to take any step in the matter beyond that already taken; and that it was not consistent with the dignity of the Representatives to enter into correspondence upon such a subject with the Pacha of Egypt.

The Representatives were warm in their expression of disapprobation of Mehémet Ali's conduct, and we all agreed that his act was as foolish and ill-judged as it was insolent. There was a good deal of comment upon the doctrine brought forward by Mehémet Ali, in his letter, to rebut the charge of treason made against the Capoden Pacha by the Grand Vizier. Every one treated it as a contemptible absurdity in point of argument.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

No. 296.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 31.)

No. 211.)

My Lord,

Therapia, August 10, 1839.

I ENCLOSE copy of a despatch, dated 7th instant, which I sent on that day to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, in reply to one from him, desiring information.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure in No. 296.

Viscount Ponsonby to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.

Sir,

Therapia, August 7, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your information, copies of two despatches\* from Lord Palmerston to me, and copies of one from me to his Lordship.† I have not yet had an answer from the French Ambassador to the suggestion of making a confidential verbal communication to the Grand Vizier, but I hope I may have one before Lieutenant Stopford leaves this to-morrow. I know, through my private intercourse with the Grand Vizier, that he is prepared to ask for the assistance of the fleets whenever he thinks the measure has become necessary; but I think there is danger that he may hesitate about longer than may be prudent. He will, however, in case of need, as he says, furnish the

\* See No. 29, p. 116; and No. 125, p. 122.

† See No. 291, p. 312.



steamers he has to bring up the fleet, and I hope we might obtain the service of those belonging to the Austrian Company. The service the fleet is likely to be called upon to perform seems to be to prevent the passage of the channel between Asia and Europe by the troops of Ibrahim Pasha; and to give such evidences of the central and powerful support by command of the Sultan's Government, as shall check and prevent the action and success of Mehmet Ali's party in Constantinople. I do not see any chance of a collision with the Russians, whether they be pleased or not with our proceedings, because their naval force is very inferior to that we have at hand. The Black Sea fleet is certainly not stronger than it was when I had the honour to send you a list of it some months ago.

Ibrahim Pasha can be at Scutari with his army in twenty days' march from Koniah. It may be the policy of Mehmet Ali to order that movement when he receives the communication of the Collective Note. He may think it better for his interest to endeavour to frighten the Porte into an arrangement with him without the concurrence of the Great Powers; and I think a movement by Ibrahim will have that effect, unless the Porte should be supported and ensured against the danger. Mehmet Ali may, on the other hand, wait till he learns what terms the Great Powers are likely to agree to give him, and direct his efforts to the creation of differences between them, and of a rupture of the plan of universal co-operation. If Mehmet can force the Porte to treat with him alone (by the effect of fear) it will place the Great Powers in embarrassments more difficult, perhaps, to remedy, than it would be to deal with a difference amongst them as to terms.

I will take the best means in my power to inform you of Ibrahim's motions. I fear he will have the advantage if he acts with promptitude, and that the time will be spent in discussion here which, if employed in acting, would make his attempts wholly useless.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 297.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 2,

(No. 15.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 30, 1839.

I HAD the honour, in my last despatch, No. 11, to express to your Lordship my apprehensions that the French Government might be inclined to the idea of settling the affairs of the East, through the mediation of the Ambassadors of the Five Powers at Vienna; that that Government might possibly, notwithstanding its respect to the Dardanelles, which would prevent the continuation of the European efforts at Alexandria; and that finally, I could not hold out any hopes that Marshal Soult would adopt any vigorous measures of coercion, whether for restraining the ambition of the Viceroy of Egypt, or for restoring to the Sultan his fleet.

I shall now take the liberty of giving to your Lordship my reasons for forming an opinion which may require apparent qualifications, but which I still fear that your Lordship will find substantially correct.

And, as the matter is connected both with the mediation, on the one hand, that it is of importance that your Lordship should know as clearly and distinctly as possible, the real feelings and intentions of this Government; and believing on the other, that these feelings and intentions will not be stated to your Lordship so clearly or so distinctly as would be desirable at the present crisis.

In order to give your Lordship the views which I entertain, and which I venture to submit to your attention, I should begin by doing justice to Marshal Soult, and stating, that I believe he most sincerely entertains an attachment to British connexion, and is most desirous to maintain, in all circumstances, the friendly relations which subsist between the two countries. The desire, however, has a singular consequence, and makes him diminish, and even in a certain manner disallow, the differences which he has not the authority, or may not fancy himself in the condition, to prevent; for Marshal Soult, I need not inform your

Lordship, is little acquainted with the labours of the department over which he presides.

His opinions on foreign policy, therefore, and more especially on the policy of the East, are, in the first instance, taken from M. Dégages, a gentleman long resident at the Porte and who having held for some years the situation in the Foreign Office which would answer with us to that of Under Secretary of State, and being, moreover, a man of ability, exercises great influence in his department.

M. Dégages, as well as the Marshal, is certainly well disposed towards Great Britain, and to what may be considered British policy in general; but M. Dégages is a slow and cautious man by nature, and moreover, feeling that, in their relative positions, he will be almost held responsible for Marshal Soult's opinions, he is peculiarly careful in the suggestion of any likely to incur unpopularity, or to meet with decided opposition.

A policy thus timidly formed, has in the next stage to be submitted to the King who has only one of two objects in view:—that of avoiding any measure of an energetic character, which may compromise his Government with the French nation, or with Foreign Powers. The last proceeding is in the the Cabinet, where Mehmet Ali has decided and energetic partisans, who are sure of the warmest support from a large portion of the Press, partly engaged by national and commercial considerations, partly by more secret and personal objects not connected with the cause of the Sultan.

I have no need, therefore, under the mask of prudence on one side, and from no small determination in a sense hostile to our views on the other, must, I am fearful, result a policy very different from that which your Lordship would desire, but which will always receive its colouring and its varnish from Marshal Soult's own friendly dispositions; friendly not on this particular question, or that particular question, but generally. So that the form in which any objection to your Lordship's suggestions are made, will always rather depend than lay upon the real extent of the differences in respect to them, which, when the moment of action or decision on any practical point may arise, will be found to exist.

For instance, I believe you saw in the plan which your Lordship proposed for obtaining possession of the Ottoman fleet, that the French Government will say, "nothing could be more desirable than the rescue of that fleet from Mehmet Ali, but the means proposed for effecting such an excellent result are objectionable," (nor will it be difficult to give reasons for this, since nothing can be suggested to which objections also will not occur.)

If pressed to give an answer, as to whether they will agree to any plan for coercing the Viceroy, the French Cabinet may first observe, "that that must depend upon what the plan is;" but, if still further pressed, the question of the Dardanelles, to which I alluded, will be resorted to, and this line of argument, already prepared, taken.

"The condition of Mehmet Ali is merely a part of the general Oriental Question, which, in fact, concentrates itself at Constantinople, and is forced on us by considerations of Russian interference with the affairs of the Porte. We do not say that we will not adopt measures towards Mehmet Ali, but in looking to this part of the question, we must not forget the principal and vital one, viz. that of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus."

And we are pressing Mehmet at Alexandria, Ibrahim may march to Constantinople; what then is to occur? The Russian note lately received forces this upon us. Until the Five Powers are agreed upon this point, it is impossible to come to any determination on the other.

It will be useless, I fear, to say what I firmly believe, from some knowledge of the man [Ibrahim], and some experience of the general character of oriental politicians.

"The march to Constantinople, which you apprehend, will never occur; the Viceroy will talk high, but will be found submissive, if he but see the Great Powers united."

I fear it will be useless to urge this argument, so ably stated in your Lordship's despatch No. 14<sup>th</sup>, and which I have already lost no opportunity of





No. 300

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby*

(No. 130)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, September 4, 1839.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 208, I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which your Excellency and your Lordships used in the Turkish Minister on the 4th of August, respecting the demand made by Mehemet Ali that the Grand Vizier should be dismissed from his office.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 301.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 5.)*

(No. 215.)

My Lord,

*Therapia, August 13, 1839.*

LAST night I had a message from the Grand Vizier by a confidential person, desiring me to request the British Admiral to free Salonica from a brig of war sent there by Mehemet Ali, and from which five or six emissaries had been disembarked, sent by the Pasha of Egypt to excite the people to revolt against the Ottoman Government.

The Grand Vizier said that this occurrence had been officially reported by Izet Pasha, the Governor of Salonica. I sent the Grand Vizier word that I would consider the matter and return a reply as soon as possible, that it was necessary I should act in concurrence with my colleagues, &c. &c. This day, whilst the Baron de Sturmer was with me, I received another statement of the effect of the brig of war, which I showed to be false, as he had no personal information. I asked his Excellency whether he did not think that the Five Powers were under obligation to prevent the Pasha of Egypt from sending a ship of war to Salonica, and thereby had left the Egyptian Pasha exposed defenceless to the attempts of that Pasha? The Intermuncio replied in the affirmative, and agreed with my proposition to recommend to the Commanders of the British and French Naval Forces to free Salonica from the presence of the Egyptian ship of war.

I immediately sent to the French Ambassador the account I had received of the affair. I told him my view of the subject, and that the Intermuncio concurred in it. The Ambassador answered that he approved of it and would write to Admiral Lalande. I wrote immediately a letter to the Commander of Her Majesty's squadron, of which I inclose copy, and sent it by the speediest conveyance. As soon as I saw that the vessel had just left the harbour before my letter arrived, and it was to be sent by the first sailing vessel to Besika Bay. Baron Sturmer went from me to the French Ambassador, and his Excellency had the goodness to promise me, that on his return to Buyukdere, he would acquaint M. de Bouteneff with what had been done.

I received this evening a note from the French Ambassador which I inclose in reply.

In my letter to the Grand Vizier, I recommended that he should seize and confine the emissaries of Mehemet Ali at Salonica, but that he should not take any severe measures.

The two inclosed letters contain his Highness the Vizier's answer to my communication.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

P.S., August 14.—I inclose a report just arrived from Her Majesty's Consul at Salonica. I will write to him to put Mustapha Nouri Pasha on his guard against the seductions of Mehemet Ali. I believe Mustapha has some confidence in me; I am sure he is one of the best and most enlightened of the Turks. I have taken pains to make the Grand Vizier sensible of the good services Mustapha has done in quieting Albania, and preventing a rebellion, the effect of which I believe was on the point of breaking out, in consequence of the abominable misconduct of Emin Pasha, who was Mustapha's predecessor.

P

Inclosure 1 in No. 301.

*Viscount Ponsonby to the Senior Officer commanding Her Majesty's Squadron at Besika Bay*

Sir,

*Therapia, August 13, 1839.*

I LEARN from authority, that a brig of war belonging to the Pasha of Egypt is in the neighbourhood of Salonica, and has landed emissaries in the country, for the purpose of exciting the population to insurrection. I bring this matter before you, and take the liberty to say, that it is my opinion, and in consequence of the arrangements made between Her Majesty's Government, in common with the Great Powers, and the Sublime Porte, it is incumbent upon us to take possession of that brig, and thereby prevent the prosecution of designs exactly in contradiction to the declared policy of Her Majesty's Government.

I have communicated the fact herein mentioned to his Excellency the French Ambassador, who has the same opinion I have expressed.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure 2 in No. 301

*Baron Roussin to Viscount Ponsonby.*

My Lord et cher Collègue,

*Therapia, le 13 Août, 1839*

JE viens de recevoir de Salonique le même avis que votre Excellence et M. l'Intermuncio. J'avais déjà expédié ma lettre à M. le Contre-Amiral Lalande pour qu'il agisse exactement comme l'Amiral Stopford, pour détourner le bâtiment Egyptien de sa mission en Albanie.

Ce fait me rappelle ce que nous fîmes, l'Angleterre et nous, en Mars, 1833. Nous fîmes amener nos pavillons à Smyrne à la première nouvelle de l'arrivée des agents de Mehemet Ali dans cette ville. Les circonstances sont les mêmes et notre conduite aussi.

Agreez, &c.,  
(Signé) BARON ROUSSIN.

Inclosure 3 in No. 301

*Mr Redhouse to Viscount Ponsonby.*

My Lord,

*August 14, 1839.*

UPON communicating the contents of your Lordship's letter to his Highness the Grand Vizier, his Highness expressed much interest, and by his thanks for the promptitude with which your Lordship had attended to his Highness's requisition. His Highness in her despatch, but in greater severity than seizure of their persons, against the emissaries, should be permitted by him, as it was not only contrary to prudence, but also to his well-known disposition.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) W. REDHOUSE

Inclosure 4 in No. 301.

M. Etienne Pigeon to Farcourt Ponsard.

My Lord,

Paris, ce 14 Août, 1839.

LE Grand Visir après avoir pris connaissance du contenu de la lettre que j'ai reçue de Mr. R. H. ou, m'a fait, par le porteur, la prière de charger de la à votre Excellence que n'étant de cette lettre, n'a fait le plus grand plaisir; que maintenant il est convaincu plus que jamais des véritables sentimens et du bon vouloir que j'ai pour la guerre, et que de la sorte et par là on peut plus reconnaître de l'intérêt particulier que votre Excellence porte à sa patrie.

Je suis, &c.

EUGENIE PISANI

Inclosure 5 in No. 301.

*Mr. Consul Blunt to Viscount Ponsonby*

My Lord,

Salem, Aug 9, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency, that a Turkish transport arrived here on the 7th inst. from the Dardanelles with letters from the Pasha of that place for the Kaimakan of Salonica. The transport immediately commenced loading rice and robes.

Yesterday, a brig-of-war, to all appearance Turkish, entered the gulf, and grounded on the flats. The boats of the transport immediately went to her assistance, and she was got off, and entered the port in the evening. On coming to anchor she saluted the castles, and the salute was returned. This morning she was supposed to be the brig-of-war was Egyptian, and sent by Mehmet Ali. She is nineteen days from Alexandria, and has been put in

It is reported, my Lord, that there is a person of distinction on board, sent precisely the same scale with M. Anpha Pasha. I regret that I have not been able to learn any more certain particulars relating to the mission of this brig-of-war, to communicate to your Lordship.

I have, Sir,

(Signed) C. BLUNT

18 — I have just been informed that the brig from Egypt has on board Mehemet Ali, for Mustapha Pasha, the Roumeli Valia, Adrianople, Scutari, and other places.

No. 312.

*Vicomte Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received September 5.)

(No. 216)

My Lord,

*Therapia*, August 14, 1838

I HAVE heard from the Grand Vizier, that Ibrahim Pasha is obliged to send his despatches from Marash to Scanderoun under the guard of an escort of nine hundred men.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) **PONSONBY**

No. 303.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston—(Received September 6.)

(No. 67.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, August 15, 1839

HAVING waited yesterday on the Pasha with Captain Wakefield, of Her Majesty's steamer "Rhodamanthus," I found M. Cochelet, the French Consul-General, with Mehemet Ali.

Captain Wakefield having told the Public the following day to go to the M. C. [redacted] in his private letters received that morning from the [redacted] were to be sent to the British and [redacted] proceed with their squadrons to Alexandria, to demand that the Turkish fleet be sent back to Constantinople.

Mehemet Ali replied, that the moment that the two squadrons should appear in sight of this place, he would send immediate orders to his son Ibrahim Pasha to move forward with his army, and he requested M. Cochelet to write that such was his determination; and the Pasha, then addressing himself to Captain Wakefield, requested him to say the same thing to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.

The Pasha then added, that if Hurrew Pasha was dismissed, he would immediately send the Turkish fleet to Constantinople, and that he would send his son, Said Bey, in his corvette along with the fleet.

The Pushia repeated what he had already said, and requested us to consider it as his positive determination.

Mr. Cochelet has written this intelligence to Admiral Izard by Captain W. which will leave this on the 17th instant.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL

No. 304

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston—(Received September 6.)

(No 54.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, August 16, 1834.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch, No. 22, marked "Confidential," transmitting for my information, copies of three despatches addressed by your Lordship to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Vienna and St. Petersburg, and to Her Majesty's Minister at Berlin, explaining the views of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the affairs of the Levant.

It is probable that the death of Sultan Mahmoud, and the other important events that immediately preceded or followed that occurrence, may have produced some change in the views of His Majesty's Government, and that measures will be adopted for establishing the future relations between the Sublime Porte and Mehemet Ali. I nevertheless feel it my duty to submit to your Excellency's consideration, with all deference, some observations on the immediate

[illegible]



upon the occupation of Orfa and Diarbekir as a necessary guarantee, and had instructed ~~the~~ Pasha ~~to~~ ~~send~~ ~~his~~ ~~troops~~ ~~to~~ ~~that~~ ~~direction~~. That disposition may be considered as a confirmation of what I have previously stated to your Lordship, that Mehemet Ali did not entertain any design against Bagdad, and had no ulterior views of co-operation with Russia.

With respect to the event contemplated in your Lordship's despatch of the 9th of August, Lord W. ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~of~~ ~~a~~ ~~conflict~~ ~~between~~ ~~Russia~~ ~~and~~ ~~Mehemet~~ ~~Ali~~ ~~against~~ ~~the~~ ~~Sultan~~, in which case a Russian force from Goumri might unite with the troops of Mehemet Ali at Diarbekir, and invade Asia Minor, I feel myself justified in assuring your Lordship, from the knowledge I have acquired of Mehemet Ali's character and views, that such a combination could never be anticipated with any degree of satisfaction or tranquillity by a man whose constant ambition has been to relieve his country from the yoke of Russia, and who has too much experience of the friendship of that Power, not to feel that, by having the Russians, instead of the Turks, for neighbours, he would have no security for the possession of Syria or even of Egypt.

Her Majesty's Government appears desirous to place the relative territorial positions of the Sultan and Mehemet Ali on such a footing as to guard against ~~the~~ ~~possibility~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~Egyptian~~ ~~forces~~ ~~should~~ ~~evacuate~~ ~~Syria~~, and thus place the Desert between them and the Turkish territory.

Mehemet Ali thinks that the deference he has shown for the opinion of the Great Powers of Europe, in avoiding a conflict with Sultan Mahmoud, as long as his personal safety would allow him to do so, and the moderation he has evinced in the use of his arms, are among the advantages of the success he has lately obtained, or of the general opinion of the Great Powers. He judges that he will not hereafter act in opposition to the pacific views of the Great Powers. His expectations on this point have been considerably strengthened by the promise of the Great Powers, that if he will grant the hereditary succession to the government of the territories he now occupies; and I am fully persuaded that no arguments will induce him to recede from the assertion of those claims, which he is assured would have been acceded to under any other administration than that of Hosrow Pasha, and would have been forced even upon the latter, had it not been for the interposition of the Great Powers at Constantinople.

In my despatch "Separate," of the 7th of August, as well as in previous despatches, I have already taken the liberty to submit to your Lordship some reasons in favour of allowing Syria to remain under the permanent rule of Mehemet Ali and his family, and nothing has occurred to weaken the opinion I then ventured to offer to your Lordship's consideration. By granting those concessions to Mehemet Ali, he may become the means of re-organizing the Turkish Empire, which he has so long and so successfully opposed to so desirable a consummation; and as to any understanding of Mehemet Ali with Russia, I think that, if any such existed, he would not have the influence which he possesses in all parts of Turkey, and over all classes of Mussulmans.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 305.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 6.)

No. 69.)

My Lord.

Alexandria, August 16, 1839

ENCLOSED I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship, a translation of the instructions sent by the Porte to Hafia Pasha, for his guidance in the operations intended against Mehemet Ali during the late campaign.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 305

*Instructions given by the Sultan to Hafia Pasha, found at the Turkish head-quarters after the battle of Nisib.*

*Plan de la marche de l'Armée du Sultan contre l'Egypte en neuf Articles*

Puisque le Gouvernement Egyptien ne se soumettra jamais à son Souverain, l'Empire Ottoman est obligé de lui faire la guerre. C'est la seule voie qui nous conduise à la possession de cette province et qui l'aura à l'Empire des Osmanlis, et pour son exécution et son succès il faut prendre de bonnes dispositions.

#### ARTICLE I.

Pour le bon succès de cette entreprise il faut établir des lois rigoureuses; dans l'armée il sera permis de s'occuper de son service et de son honneur; mais s'ils manquent à leurs devoirs ils seront immédiatement renvoyés du service.

#### ARTICLE II.

D'après ce plan, l'armée doit être composée de 60,000 à 70,000 hommes, avec 120 pièces de canon, ainsi qu'il suit: 40,000 Infanterie, 15,000 Cavalerie, 5,000 Artillerie et corps de Génie; et pour le reste 10,000 de troupes régulières.

#### ARTICLE III.

Pendant qu'un ennemi sera rencontré, il devra être battu par l'Artillerie; il est nécessaire que le Commandant en Chef soit présent avec son Artillerie en ordre de bataille.

#### ARTICLE IV.

Pour empêcher les Egyptiens de faire un coup de main sur Mamache, il est nécessaire que cette ville soit fortifiée et gardée par beaucoup de troupes, après avoir été construite, le Commandant en Chef ira à Acre et de là à Damas, et ensuite à Acre, pour prendre possession de cette forteresse et ne pas perdre les points importants de la Syrie. Après la prise d'Acre, il faut aller dans cette place, et y envoyer un nombre de soldats et de troupes en ordre de bataille sur l'Egypte. La prise d'Acre sera considérée la première conquête de cette guerre; cette entreprise pourra être terminée en six ou sept mois, c'est-à-dire cinq mois; et si le Gouvernement Egyptien ne rentre pas sous la domination de l'Empire, que le Généralissime sache que la guerre sera indéfinie, et il faut qu'il prenne des mesures en conséquence; car la prise de l'Egypte étant la seconde conquête, il faut au moins quatre à cinq mois pour le succès de cette seconde entreprise; à ce compte, l'importante possession de la Syrie et de l'Egypte emploiera en tout onze mois ou un an.

#### ARTICLE V.

Si l'ennemi se retire, le Commandant en Chef ne doit pas se contenter de sa position. Un homme si important doit être éloigné du camp. Il faut donc que le Commandant en Chef s'occupe de son service et de son honneur, et qu'il ne s'occupe pas de son service et de son honneur. Il faut que le Commandant en Chef s'occupe de son service et de son honneur, et qu'il ne s'occupe pas de son service et de son honneur.

## ARTICLE VI

ARTICLE V.

ARTICLE YUJ

Akk. JE 18

\\c 永明

339

No. 457

No. 30A

\* No. 275, p. 291, and No. 376, p. 294.



British Government does, but Count Sébastiani did not seem to be prepared for the statement made in the last passage of my No. 107 to Lord Beaule, that Her Majesty's Government, although most anxious to continue to act in these matters in concert with the other Four Powers, is yet ready, if such unanimity cannot be obtained, to act in concert with a less number than the four, if any reasonable and effectual course of proceeding should be suggested to by such a preposition of the Five as may give to that course adequate moral weight, and sufficient physical means.

Count Sébastiani observed that this was a very important decision, and implied a separation from France, and a dissolution of the alliance of the Five Powers. I said that it did not appear to me to go to that extent: that the Five Powers might continue agreed as to their general policy and ultimate views, but might not all be equally willing to take an active part in each of the particular and successive measures by which the result was to be arrived at: that instances of this kind had happened upon other occasions; as, for example, in the course of the Belgian Negotiation, England and France were of opinion, in 1832, that active measures ought to be taken to obtain the evacuation of Antwerp by the Dutch, while Austria, Prussia, and Russia, did not approve of such a course; England and France, however, took the active measures which they thought necessary, although Austria, Prussia, and Russia, declined to be parties thereto; but that circumstance did not dissolve the Alliance, nor prevent the Five Powers afterwards from taking up the negotiation again, and bringing it to a satisfactory end. So, on the present occasion, England might agree with Austria, Prussia, and Russia, in thinking it necessary to employ against Mehemet Ali active measures to which France, for reasons of her own, might be unwilling to become a party; but the unwillingness of France ought not to prevent the other Powers from moving on towards the attainment of an object deeply important to the general interests of Europe; and I said, that although England is most anxious to continue to act in concert with France, yet England is by no means bound to stand still in concert with France, if France should decline to move forward, while other Powers are willing to advance.

We then proceeded to discuss the objects which the Five Powers have in view, and the measures by which those objects might be attained. Those objects I stated to be, as explained in the two despatches to Lord Beaule, the restitution of the Turkish fleet, and the restoration of the authority of Mehemet Ali to his hereditary government in Egypt.

Count Sébastiani said, that the French Government entirely concurs in thinking these two objects necessary, and is of opinion that the Turkish fleet ought to be restored to the Sultan, and that the smallest possible amount of concession in the way of permanent arrangement, ought to be made to Mehemet Ali with respect to the fleet, the French Government does not think that a restitution ought to be made the object of a separate demand, or a preliminary to negotiation for a general settlement, but that Government would prefer suspending the demand for the fleet, and leaving that fleet in the hands of Mehemet Ali, until the Five Powers should have come to an agreement, both as to the nature of the final arrangement to be proposed to Mehemet Ali, and as to the means of obtaining his assent to that arrangement; and the French Government thinks that then would be the time to demand the restoration of the fleet. The reasons assigned by Count Sébastiani for proposing this, were, that the Turkish fleet would only be a burden to Mehemet Ali, who would soon be tired of paying and feeding its officers and men, that if it returned now to Constantinople it might again become a source of trouble for Mehemet Ali at a place where its return might be much more dangerous, and lastly, because we could only employ the same means to compel the restitution of the fleet, which could be employed to secure the general arrangement, and it would be better to employ the means upon the most important object.

With respect to the fleet, Count Sébastiani said that the French Government would be the first to suggest an extension of the time which Mehemet Ali would be given, but he seemed to imply that France is disinclined to be a party to any active measures of coercion against Mehemet Ali, and he seemed to doubt that any measures which the Five Powers could resort to would be effectual.

I stated that we differ with the French Government as to the time at which the restitution of the Turkish fleet ought to be demanded, and are of opinion,

that the Five Powers are bound in honour not to delay, and to omit no effort to restore that fleet to the Sultan: that so long as Mehemet Ali is allowed to retain that fleet, the Sultan never can believe that the Five Powers are sincere in their professions of friendship and protection; and Mehemet Ali never will think that those Powers are in earnest in their declarations of a determination to maintain the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire: that on the one hand, therefore, the Porte will not place its full confidence in the Allies, and on the other hand Mehemet Ali, who, though he has suspended open war against the Sultan, is actively carrying on secret war against him, and intriguing with all the provincial Pashas to excite them to rebellion, will have an undisputed argument to urge to those Pashas in support of his intrigues; for he will say, with apparent reason, that the Five Powers would never allow him to continue to retain the Turkish fleet, if they were not secretly on his side; he will consequently represent to those Pashas that they would be a great gain to the real wishes of the Allies by following the example of the Capouan Pasha and revolting against the Sultan.

I said, that as to the idea that the Turkish fleet would be a burden to Mehemet Ali, it is plain that if he thought so, and if he did not, on the contrary, that at the possession of that fleet was an advantage to him, he would make a merit of sending it back of his own accord, and would thus lay in a claim to favour from the Sultan, and to consideration from the Allies. But it is suggested from the papers which have been sent to us, that if by taking it into his hands, and by even having a part of its equipment and armaments, that Mehemet Ali would be enabled to use it as a power of negotiation, if not of war.

I admitted that if the fleet were restored to him, there would be practical difficulties attending it at once to Constantinople, but I said that a warship is not the ship and the crew, and that we do not want the crew, and that two or three vessels for two or three squadrons, find such vessels to navigate the straits back to Constantinople, or to other ports, or to some other place where they ought to be kept, is a small matter. With regard to the means of coercion which could be employed to obtain restoration of the fleet, I said that it is true that we could employ the same purpose the same means which we might have to employ afterwards for enforcing a final arrangement, but that did not strike me as a very strong argument, for, in the first place, there is a general likelihood of our being unable to carry out the execution of these means for the recovery of the fleet, as we have even of late seen different opinions as to the expediency of compelling Mehemet Ali to evacuate Syria. I pressed that consideration, or rather the main advantage to be derived from it, that it would be a great gain to Mehemet Ali to consider a fleet which belongs not to him, but to his Sultan, which he has obtained not by victory in battle, but by treason; which he has obtained upon a pretext which he knew to be false, namely, that unless he received it, it would be given up to the Russians; and which, if now delivered up by him to the English and French Admirals, would certainly be in safe-keeping, and would not be handed over to any authority but that of the Sultan.

Thus, then, the necessary means of coercion could be more easily employed for a purpose which all are agreed about, than for one about which some of us may differ, and so far from there being any danger that our means of coercion would be exhausted, and that we should be obliged to employ the larger one, it is apparent, on the contrary, that if our means of pressure, or of coercion, should have succeeded in compelling Mehemet Ali to give up the fleet, we should have gained a great moral advantage over him; and he would be much more likely to be compliant afterwards upon other points.

I said to Count Sébastiani, that he himself, when he was assuring me of the sincerity and earnestness of the French Government in this matter, had reminded me that France had declared that she would consider any hostile act of Mehemet Ali against the Sultan as an act of hostility against France herself; but when I asked, was the forcible retention of the Turkish ships, but an act of hostility against the Sultan? What, for instance, would France say, if the French Fleet were to mutiny and go to Malta: and if the British Government were not merely to refuse to deliver up the crews for punishment, which of course could not be expected, but were to insist upon keeping possession of the ships and all their equipments? Would not the French nation indignantly declare such a proceeding to be an act not only grossly insulting, but essentially hostile to France?

I said, that Her Majesty's Government are for all these reasons of opinion, that the Five Powers ought to demand the restoration of the fleet in the first instance, and without further delay, and not to postpone that demand till the Five shall have come to an agreement as to the nature of the final arrangement. But then, in what way is the demand to be made, and how is compliance to be enforced, if in the first instance it is withheld? I said, that the manner and means had been already pointed out by Her Majesty's Government. We think that the demand should be made by the Consuls-General of the Five Powers at Alexandria, and by a Collective Note, in order that there may not be the slightest shade of difference between the expressions to be used by each of the Five.

That if the demand shall not be fully and unconditionally complied with in twenty-four or forty-eight hours, we think the Five Consuls-General ought immediately to leave Alexandria, and to embark on board the Fleet; and that a certain time, perhaps four or five days, ought then to be given to the Pasha, to enable him to meditate upon the full import of this first demonstration of the displeasure of the Five Powers.

That if after a proper time this step should fail to produce compliance, then the allied squadron should prevent any vessel under Egyptian flag, either of war or of commerce, from entering or leaving Egypt or Syria by port; the squadron taking care not to meddle with any other flag but the Egyptian, in order that no complaints should be made by neutrals; this measure, I observed, would have a double effect:—first, it would cripple Mehemet Ali's pecuniary resources, which depend very much upon a trade in which export and import would cut off at the root all military supplies for the army of Ibrahim in Syria.

If it was thought necessary to render the pressure of this measure more stringent, the allied squadron might seize and detain all vessels bearing the Egyptian flag, of which a good many are to be found in the Levant; and such vessels might be sent to Rhodes, to be there held in safe-keeping.

If after a certain time, perhaps a month or six weeks, this pressure should prove ineffectual, the next step of action upon the occupation of the Island of Candia by a Turkish force, protected by the allied squadron; a clear understanding being previously had with the Porte, that at the moment of occupation, there should be granted to the inhabitants of Candia both Turks and Greeks, the same institutions which have been given to the people of Samos.

I said, that if all these measures were to fail, the Five Powers would then have to consider what further steps they should take, but that there would be ample time for such consideration; and that it did not appear at all necessary to plan beforehand, anything more than the above-mentioned measures.

Count Sebastiani did not seem to think that his Government would altogether like to join in such a course, and that even if it were agreed upon by some of them insufficient, and others as likely to overshoot their mark. He thought the withdrawal of the Consuls-General might indeed be resorted to, if the step were taken by the Five Powers jointly; but he doubted its producing any effect. He thought the blockade would be ineffectual, because he did not believe that Mehemet Ali had many merchant-vessels under the Egyptian flag; and because, even if communication with Syria by sea were cut off, Ibrahim might advance and find resources in the country he might occupy; and, moreover, supplies might be sent him by land.

But Count Sebastiani said, he thought his Government would feel the most serious objections to an attempt upon Candia, because any endeavour to overthrow the Pasha's authority there, and to establish that of the Sultan, would lead to an outbreak among the Greek population of the island, for the purpose of uniting themselves to the Kingdom of Greece. For, he said, the Greeks form a majority in Candia, and the Turkish minority are all for Mehemet Ali, so that nobody would be for the Sultan.

On the 11th of July, that the withdrawal of the Consuls-General would be regarded by Mehemet Ali as a trifling measure; that we knew the Pasha's attitude towards the Five Powers, and that he would not be deterred by the withdrawal of the Consuls-General; that the Collective Note presented to the Porte on the 28th July, by the Representatives of the Five Powers at Constantinople; and that it is probable that the withdrawal of the Consuls-General would induce him to surrender the Turkish fleet. But that the naval measures, if resorted to, would be severely felt by him, that his finances are already much embarrassed, as is proved by the long arrears due to many of his troops, and that those finances would greatly suffer from such a

measure; that it is well-known that, though an irregular army got together in the Orient, it may subsist itself as it goes along, but it cannot be employed and used in the European manner, as that of Ibrahim is, cannot move or act without constant supplies of various kinds, and without having a secure line of communication in its rear for the conveyance of those supplies. The army of Ibrahim in Syria has little to receive its supplies from, but by sea a short and easy, and cheap line of communication; but if the sea line were cut off, all the supplies would have to be sent by land, first across the Desert, and then through a long tract of country infested by marauders and insurgent tribes, through which it would require immense means of transport to convey military stores; and where the convoys would be liable to be plundered at every step, unless escorted by large bodies of troops.

It must be obvious how such a difficulty would cripple the operations of Ibrahim's army, and that if a naval blockade were to be enforced, his advance to Constantinople would much more probably compel him, after a time, to fall back. But even supposing, that Ibrahim should make a dash at Constantinople, at the march of an armed force by the Bosphorus, would make it impossible for him to cross over, and would probably, by its presence, maintain tranquillity in Constantinople; and then if Ibrahim, foiled in his attempt, were obliged to retreat, his army would suffer greatly from all those causes which expose to harassment an army retreating through a long line of unfriendly country.

I stated, that the periodical returns which we receive from our Consuls in the Levant, show that there are a good many merchant ships sailing under the Egyptian flag; and the seizure and detention of them would be a serious inconvenience to the Pasha.

With regard to the occupation of Candia, and the restoration of that island to the direct authority of the Sultan, I said that I did not see how that operation could tend to separate that island from the Turkish Empire, and to transfer it to the Kingdom of Greece: that it is well known that Mehemet has at present a very small garrison there, and that the Turkish and Greek population should prefer the authority of Mehemet with very ample concessions, to the authority of the Sultan with local institutions like those of Samos, which, for all practical purposes of security of person and property, are almost tantamount to absolute independence.

I said, however, that this last measure would certainly require to be well considered before it was resolved upon, and that it should not be undertaken unless we could arrange proper and adequate means of execution, in which, undoubtedly, I did not see any difficulty, but if the Five Powers should determine to demand the Turkish fleet, and upon a refusal on the part of Mehemet Ali, they should resolve first to withdraw their Consuls-General, next to shut up the ports of Syria and the coast of Egypt, and detain all Egyptian merchantmen, they might very well postpone the consideration of any further measures till the result of those first steps should be ascertained.

Count Sebastiani said he would report to his Government the substance of our conversation.

You will show this despatch to Marshal Soult

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 300

Vicount Palmerston to Colonel Campbell

(No. 31.)

Sir,

Farrington Office, September 13, 1830.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatches to No. 69 inclusive.

With reference to your despatch, No. 67, of the 15th of August, I have to inform you that to Mehemet Ali in reply to the letter of the 11th of August, Her Majesty's Government is well satisfied that he is so sagacious and so well able to calculate consequences,



that he will carefully abstain from taking the steps which he is reported in that despatch to have announced his intent on to take in the event of the appearance of the combined squadron off Alexandria.

For the Pasha must be well aware that he is not in a position, which, either geographically or politically, or with reference either to military or to naval considerations, can enable him with impunity to act at defiance the Governments of Europe, and more especially the Maritime Powers.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LA MERSTON

No 30.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 13.)

No. 218.)

My Lord,

Therapia, August 18, 1839

ADMIRAL SIR ROBERT STOPFORD came up to Constantinople in the "Confiance" steamer, on the 15th, and intends to return to the fleet in a few days. Yesterday he had an interview with the Grand Vizier.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY

No. 311

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 13.)

No. 219.

My Lord,

Therapia, August 18, 1839.

I RECEIVED this day a message from the Moustéchar Nouri Effendi, saying, that the Russian Mission had expressed uneasiness at the stay of the fleet so near the Dardanelles, and that the Moustéchar thought that uneasiness might be expressed by the departure of a portion of the fleet, &c. I replied, that the sole object for which the fleet is there, is to secure the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, and that it surprised me to hear of the uneasiness stated to exist in the Russian Mission, and that I cannot but imagine the Moustéchar has been mistaken about it, because the Russian Government has the same object in view, and cannot disapprove of the security thus given to an end common to us all, and therefore I see no reason why the fleet should make any change in its position.

I saw Sir Robert Stopford after I had received the message, and I heard from him that the Grand Vizier had spoken to him somewhat to the same effect yesterday. Sir Robert and I discussed the matter, and I gave my opinion most decidedly against the alteration of the position of the fleets before the arrival of new instructions from Her Majesty's Government. The Admiral was of the same way of thinking, and he determined to remain at Beika Bay.

I had no time to communicate with the French Ambassador, for all the above took place at a late hour, and I did not think it right to defer my answer. I will to-morrow morning acquaint the Ambassador with what I have done.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

P.S. August 19. I hear from the French Ambassador, that he has not yet received from the Porte any message relating to the fleets at the Dardanelles, and that when that communication is made to him he will give to it the same reply as I have given.

Inclosure 1 in No. 311.

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord,

Beyukdéré, ce 18 Août, 1839

JE suis chargé par le Moustéchar Nouri Effendi, de faire savoir à votre Excellence, que la réunion d'une flotte très formidable dans les environs des Dardanelles donne, depuis quelques jours, lieu à la Mission de Russie de tenir à la Porte des propos qui tendent à inquiéter de la part de la Russie, et que l'on demande des explications à cet égard au Gouvernement Ottoman.

La Sublime Porte pense, dit le Moustéchar, que si une partie de la flotte venait des Dardanelles une partie de la flotte se mettrait à faire des inquiétudes que sa trop grande proximité fait naître actuellement. Le Moustéchar prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien faire une réponse à son message.

Je suis, &c.,  
(Signed) FREDERIC PISANI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 311.

Viscount Ponsonby to M. Frederic Pisani.

Sir,

Therapia, August 19, 1839.

I HAVE this moment received the message from his Excellency the Moustéchar Nouri Effendi stating that the presence of so large a British fleet near the Dardanelles has given occasion of late to expression of uneasiness on the part of the Russian Mission, and to a demand for explanations from the Sublime Porte.

That the Sublime Porte is of opinion that were a part of the fleet to leave the Dardanelles, an end might be put to the uneasiness of the Russian Mission.

It appears to me that the Moustéchar can have no difficulty in replying to the Russian Mission, for his Excellency knows that the sole object and end of the British, French, and Austrian Governments, in placing the fleet where it is now stationed, is to protect the Sublime Porte against every danger, and to ensure the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire.

I hear with surprise of the uneasiness expressed by the Russian Mission, and cannot but imagine there must be some misunderstanding on the part of his Excellency of the expression of the Russian Mission; and I must think that it was an agreeable rather than otherwise to that Mission to have perfect security given, by such powerful means, to the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, which the Russian Government is so anxious to maintain. I am, therefore, of opinion, that it is quite unnecessary to make any alteration in the station of the fleet.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 312

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 13.)

No. 220.

My Lord,

Therapia, August 19, 1839.

ON the 17th, in the morning, M. de Boutéoff read to me, by order of his Government, your Lordship's instructions to Lord Clauricarde, expounding the views of Her Majesty's Government for the final settlement of affairs between the Sublime Porte and Mehmet Ali; and also Count Newelrode's reply sent through M. de Kuncleff at London. To the first condition upon which the Emperor of Russia gives his concurrence, namely, "that the consent and approbation of the Porte be given," I observed, that the measure stated by your Lordship is almost identically that which was offered spontaneously by the Porte.





Inclosure 1 in No. 314.

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord,

Péra, ce 19 Août, 1839

J'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que conformément à ses ordres, j'ai communiqué au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères votre réponse à son message relativement aux inquiétudes causées par la réunion des grandes forces maritimes aux environs des Dardanelles.

Son Excellence a dit, que tout en applaudissant le but des Gouvernements d'Angleterre, de France et d'Autriche, savoir, assurer l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman, elle pense que la déclaration de vouloir protéger cet Empire contre tout danger peut faire supposer des soupçons sur la constance de la Russie. Or, en conversant avec son Excellence Lord Ponsonby, d. Nouri Effendi, "que la Russie veut sans l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman dans la question que la flotte combinée a prise est propre à exciter des soupçons et à venir compromettre, tandis que la Sublime Porte est sûre que les Russes ne viendront jamais à Constantinople s'ils n'y sont appelés par elle, et qu'elle est résolue de ne les appeler dans aucun cas."

J'ai, en conséquence, très honoré de commander à Nouri Effendi, pour l'information de la Porte, que l'opinion de votre Excellence est qu'il n'est pas du tout nécessaire d'apporter quelque changement dans la station de la flotte.

Je suis, &amp;c.,

(Signed) FREDERIC PISANI

Inclosure 2 in No. 314.

Viscount Ponsonby to M. Frederic Pisani

Sir,

Therapia, August 19, 1839.

YOU will be pleased to repeat verbatim to his Excellency the Moustachar what I write, as follows:—

His Excellency states, that he partakes in my opinion as expressed in my former Note, that the Russian Government is not to be trusted in the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. His Excellency is well founded in that opinion, for the fact has been many times declared by the Government of Russia. His Excellency is also certain, that the English, French, and Austrian Governments have the same honourable intentions with respect to the Sublime Porte; and to confirm him in it, I send inclosed a declaration made by the British Ambassador at Vienna, of which his Excellency may take a copy for the information of the Sublime Porte. I, at the same time, have the pleasure to tell him, that a similar declaration has been signed by the French Ambassador at Vienna, and that Prince Metternich has given his unqualified assent and approval to these declarations. Under these circumstances I am at a loss to comprehend, why his Excellency makes such applications to me about the combined fleet, and I have a natural curiosity to know and I beg his Excellency will be so kind as to inform me, if the extreme delicacy of his Excellency's feelings on such matters has led him to make any demand for the dispersion of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, at the same time that he has required that of the combined fleet. His Excellency knows that those who are sincere themselves are not apt to be suspicious of others, and I continue to believe, that his Excellency does injustice to the Russians, when he supposes them to have any uneasiness respecting the position of the fleets of England and France.

I have, &amp;c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY

No. 315.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 12.)

No 223

My Lord,

Therapia, August 20, 1839.

I HAVE just received from the Sublime Porte, and inclose to your Lordship, copy of a letter from Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier.

The Porte declares that the assertion made by the Pasha is false, and that the truth is, that the Sultan yielded nothing to him but Egypt alone.

It appears from what I learn, that Mehemet Ali is inclined to adjourn his demand for the deposition of Hosrow, and I have reason to believe he has been advised by the Agents of Russia to do so.

It will appear in this letter that there is a strong desire to settle the question without the intervention of the Great Powers, and that is in accordance with what the Russian Mission has been doing. It cannot be denied that the efforts of Russia are directed to the best end; for an arrangement made as they wish will give them a complete victory, and replace affairs in the same dangerous and precarious situation as that which has led to the present crisis, but with this remarkable addition, that the future success of Russian projects will be certain.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 315

Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier

Introduction

J'ai reçu par l'intermédiaire de mon Capi Chiaja, Moustaf Bey, la lettre que Votre Altesse m'a adressée par son ministre, et que j'ai l'honneur de vous adresser. Cette lettre est sans doute la même que celle que j'ai adressée à votre Excellence, et que j'ai l'honneur de vous adresser. Elle est relative aux communications qu'il avait eues avec moi; que tous les Ministres ont, de commun accord, chargé Moustaf Bey de la justifier. Son Excellence El Hindj Sefik Effendi, un des principaux Membres du Ministère Ottoman, de venir ici pour négocier avec moi et arrêter les demandes que j'avais faites, les services que j'aurais à rendre, et d'autres points essentiels et analogues aux exigences des temps, qu'il était sur le point de faire partir Sefik Effendi sur son chemin, pour aller présenter les propositions des Capi Pashas, ont remis une Note signée par tous, et dont Votre Altesse m'envoyait la traduction; et que comme MM. les Représentants ont écrit à leurs Consuls à Alexandrie dans un sens contraire à la Note susdite, je serais au fait de ce dont il s'agit, et par les communications des Consuls, et par le rapport verbal de mon Capi Chiaja Moustaf Bey, et je devais en faire connaître le résultat à Votre Altesse.

MM. les Consuls m'ont communiqué les instructions que renfermaient les lettres qu'ils avaient reçues.

Mes dévouement à mon Padichah, mon très-puissant et très-Auguste Seigneur et Maître, est sans bornes. Mon unique affaire est de consacrer mes services à la cause de Sa Majesté Impériale. Mais comptant sur mon ancienne renommée, ainsi que sur mes services passés, j'ai humblement supplié Sa Majesté Impériale, Dieu veuille conserver son Auguste personne sur le Trône avec toutes sortes de prospérité pour toujours, de daigner consentir à l'accomplissement de deux vœux.

Lorsque mon Capi Chiaja chargé de venir ici, a pris congé du Sultan, Sa Hautesse lui a dit: "écoute, Moustaf Bey, je salue le Pacha d'une manière particulière, et d'après la prière qu'il a adressée à mon Trône Impérial je lui ai communiqué la proposition, à lui et à son fils, et j'ai donné des ordres que l'on arrange cette affaire de concession à perpétuité, conformément à sa demande."

C'est par ces paroles souveraines que Sa Hautesse a déclaré la concession à perpétuité, m' me fait beaucoup d'honneur parmi les serviteurs de la Sublime Porte. Et cela est si vrai que les Ministres ont dit dans un Conseil : "Voilà que le Padichah, notre Seigneur et Maître, a daigné accorder à Méhémet Ali les demandes qu'il avait faites, en lui concédant à perpétuité à lui et ses fils et petits-fils, l'Egypte avec les pays incorporés à l'Egypte : mais comme après cela une Note a été remise par les Représentans des Cinq Puissances, il faut que cette circonstance soit d'abord portée à la connaissance du Pacha." Je tiens cela de la bouche de Moussé Bey. Cela étant, l'un des objets que je désirais obtenir se trouve obtenu. Quant à l'autre, il peut passer pour ajourné pour à présent, mais j'ai le plus grand espoir que Sa Hautesse me l'accordera aussi. Ainsi j'ai répondu à la seconde question, qui m'a été posée, et je prie Dieu qu'il me fasse encore de nouvelles grâces. Les Cinq Puissances, comme Votre Altesse verra par les lettres des Consuls-Généraux qui ont écrit sur cette affaire à leurs Ministres respectifs

C'est pour faire savoir à Votre Altesse tout ce que j'ai dit plus haut que je lui écris la présente lettre, qui lui sera rendue par Moutou Bey à qui elle sera adressée.

No. 316

Presented by the author to the Library of the University of California, Berkeley, by the University of California Press, 1964.

Nov 22, 1964

## My Land

Therapia, August 20, 1839

I INCLOSE copy of a letter to me from the Prince of Samos, which relates to the draft of the official Note, of which I also inclose copy

I have, etc.,

(Signed) **PONSONBY**

Inclosure 1 in No. 31

*The Prince of Siam to Viscount Ponsonby.*

My Lord,

Aradout Kios, le 20 Août, 1839.

[illegible]

J'ai eu donc soin de voir après le Conseil Son Altesse le Grand Vizir, qui m'a assuré qu'il n'avait observé au Conseil la contradiction qu'il y avait entre les

protestations de fidélité de Méhémet Ali pour Sa Hautesse et sa conduite scandaleuse et perfide, en envoyant partout des émissaires pour exciter l'insurrection contre le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse, et que ces observations ont amené le Conseil à rejeter et à annuler les prétentions de Méhémet Ali et à approuver le projet de Note. Son Altesse a fini par m'engager d'aller voir Sarim Effendi, pour m'informer d'une manière plus détaillée de tout ce qui s'est passé au Conseil.

Reste à voir maintenant si tout ce que Son Altesse m'a dit d'agréable me sera comme par les autres par moi. Je n'en suis sûr. Mais, cher père, vous me reprochez d'être indigne. Votre Excellence connaît bien mieux son fils qu'un pauvre sage. car plus j'étudie le caractère de nos Ministres, plus je deviens dégoûté.

$\frac{d}{dt} \left( \frac{\partial L}{\partial \dot{x}} \right) = \frac{\partial L}{\partial x}$

Sign: ET AL. GORIDES.

Inclosure 2 in No. 316.

*Draft of Note from the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Five Powers.*

LA Sublime Porte s'empresse d'informer leurs Excellences qu'elle a reçu la réponse de Méhémet Ali aux dernières communications qui lui ont été faites : que le Pacha insiste à demander l'hérédité en tout ce qu'il possède actuellement, ainsi que le renvoi de Son Altesse Hosrew Pacha, et que quant à la flotte, il a déclaré ne vouloir la rendre que lorsqu'il aura obtenu les deux premiers points.

Par suite de la connaissance de ces dispositions du Pacha, la Sublime Porte a résolu de ne point accéder à l'offre de cession des Comtes Palatins au Sa Hautesse est fermement résolu d'en accorder à Méhemet Ali ni plus ni moins de ce qu'elle a déclaré vouloir lui concéder lors de son avènement au trône, et qu'elle ne consentira jamais à une prétention qui aura pour résultat infallible la perturbation (au lieu du débordement) de son Empire.

La Sublime Porte est en confiance dans la divine Providence, dans la justice de ses droits imprescriptibles, et dans les sentiments bien connus des Cinq Puissances amies; et Sa Hautesse est convaincue que sa cause est celle de tous les trônes; que toute humiliation qui lui serait imposée par son vassal ne pourait être vivement sentie par tous les Souverains ses Augustes Alliés; et que la première loi de la politique est de ne pas être considérée par eux que comme le premier des vassaux.

Que tu aies revu de M. A. V. et de M. L. V. à Sublime l'ont vu  
dans un prochain de M. A. V. et de M. L. V. et de M. L. V. et de M. L. V.  
de M. A. V. et de M. L. V. et de M. L. V. et de M. L. V. et de M. L. V.  
de ses yeux personnelles.

La somme  $P$  est égale à  $\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n (x_i + y_i)$  car  $\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n (x_i + y_i) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n x_i + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n y_i = \frac{1}{2} P + \frac{1}{2} P = P$ .

1. Sub. le. Pour ce point, le Code de Commerce, l'art. 103, § 1, est applicable. Le Code de Commerce, l'art. 103, § 1, est applicable. Le Code de Commerce, l'art. 103, § 1, est applicable.

No. 317.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)

12

Mr Lord,

Therapia, August 21, 1839

I BELIEVE the Grand Vizier has been overruled and intimidated by the Ottoman Ministers who are in the interest of Russia, particularly Nour Effendi, and that the Note mentioned in my despatch No. 224, will not be sent by the Porte to the Foreign Ministers.

417





Inclosure 2 in No. 318.

Viscount Ponsonby to Nouri Effendi.

Therapia, August 21, 1839.

THE Undersigned, &c., having received from the British Ambassador at Vienna the inclosed copy of a declaration made by his Excellency in the name of his Court, thinks it expedient to communicate officially that document to the Sublime Porte.

The Sublime Porte will perceive that this declaration engages the British Government to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire under the present dynasty, and not to seek to profit by the present state of things for the purpose of gaining any acquisition of territory, or any exclusive influence.

The Undersigned has to state, that his Excellency the French Ambassador at Vienna has made a similar declaration, and that his Excellency the Prince of Court and State, Prince Metternich, has officially approved of and adopted the obligations contracted by those declarations.

The Sublime Porte will receive with satisfaction this incontestable manifestation of the sincerity with which the Three Courts are resolved to support all the rights and interests of Sultan Abdul Medjid and his Empire.

The Undersigned, &amp;c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 318.

Viscount Ponsonby to Nouri Effendi.

Therapia, August 21, 1839.

THE Undersigned &c. has the honour to represent to his Excellency Nouri Effendi, on the part of the Sublime Porte, that he has heard rumours, which he thinks are well founded, that efforts have been made to induce the Sublime Porte to enter into negotiations with the Pasha of Egypt for the purpose of making arrangements with that Pasha for the settlement of the pretended claims of the Pasha, and that the Sublime Porte may have listened to some recommendation that made it possible.

The Undersigned considers it his duty to remind the Sublime Porte that the Sublime Porte is bound by positive engagements to the Five Great Powers not to enter into negotiation, nor to make any arrangement with the Pasha Mehemet Ali without the knowledge and consent of the Great Powers.

The Undersigned &c. has to call to the attention of the Sublime Porte the important fact that the arrangement to be made between the Sublime Porte and the Pasha of Egypt is a matter which concerns the interests of the Sublime Porte and the Pasha, but it is a matter that concerns and touches nearly the interests of the Five Powers, and therefore that the Five Powers are to be present at the settlement of this matter, and that their rights and interests are to be protected by the Sublime Porte, without their special knowledge and concurrence in what shall be done.

The Undersigned, &amp;c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 319.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 227.)

My Lord,

Therapia, August 22, 1839.

I COMMUNICATED to his Excellency the French Ambassador, my Official Notes to the Sublime Porte, of yesterday's date, and of which copies were inclosed in my despatch No. 226.

His Excellency said, that no application had been yet made to him on the subject of the French fleet, and, consequently, that he could not take any official notice of the matter; that he intended to make a communication to the Porte on the subject of the declaration made at Vienna by the Ambassadors, and with respect to the arrangement of the differences between the Powers, and the Porte, without the consent of the Five Powers, he thought it unnecessary at this moment to repeat what had already been signified to the Porte by my despatch No. 226, the object of which I had taken the liberty to repeat.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

P.S.—After I had written the above despatch, I received from the French Ambassador the communication of an instruction addressed to the Chief Dragoman of the French Embassy, in which, amongst other matter, the demand about the combined fleets is touched upon. I have the honour to inclose a copy of this instruction, which bears the date of yesterday.

Inclosure in No. 319.

Instruction from Baron Roussin to the French Dragoman.

Monsieur.

Therapia, ce 21 Août, 1839.

M. l'AMBASSADEUR d'Angleterre m'a fait part de la communication officielle qu'il a reçue du Ministre de la Sublime Porte, relativement aux observations de quelques légations sur la présence des escadres Anglaise et Française au voisinage des Dardanelles, et de sa réponse à ces observations.

Il est que le Ministre de la Sublime Porte ne m'a pas fait la même communication, la réunion d'une escadre Française aux Dardanelles avec l'escadre Anglaise, et l'identité parfaite de ses instructions avec celles de l'escadre Anglaise, non-seulement m'autorisent, mais même m'imposent le devoir de m'associer entièrement à la réponse faite par M. l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre dans cette circonstance. Vous informerez en conséquence Nouri Effendi, que le Gouvernement du Roi a échangé dans les derniers jours de Juillet avec les Quatre Grandes Cours ses Alliées, une Note portant expressément "qu'il veut l'indépendance et l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman sous la dynastie actuellement régnante, et qu'il est disposé à faire usage de ses moyens d'action et d'influence pour assurer la maintenance de cet élément si nécessaire à l'équilibre politique."

Le Ministre de la Sublime Porte trouvera sans doute sans que moi dans cette déclaration, le motif de la présence d'une escadre Française au voisinage des Dardanelles, et y puisera les raisonnements nécessaires pour l'expliquer.

Laissée cette instruction à Son Excellence Nouri Effendi en la priant d'agréer mes complimens.

(Signed) BARON ROUSSIN.

No. 320.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 228.)

My Lord,

Therapia, August 22, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a letter which I received this morning from Admiral Sir Robert Stopford and of my reply.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.



Inclosure 1 in No. 320

Admiral Sir Robert Stopford to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord,

Her Majesty's Ship "Corysfort,"  
Constantinople, August 21, 1839.

ALTHOUGH I have the misfortune to differ very materially from your Excellency upon the question now pending between the Ottoman Empire and Mehemet Ali, and as the wrong step may prove irreparable, I cannot consider it as a duty of my province to raise my warning, but without female voice or endeavouring to avert the dangerous consequences likely to ensue in attempting to free Mehemet Ali to give up Syria to the Sultan. I am certain he will not do so voluntarily, and I do not see the means possessed by the Turks or the Powers of Europe to enforce it by force of arms.

One thing is certain, which Commander Wakefield heard himself from Mehemet Ali in the presence of the English and French Consuls the day before he left Alexandria. Mehemet Ali said that he heard a squadron was coming to blockade Alexandria. I should immediately look up my post by sinking vessels in the canal, and order my army to march to Constantinople. And let me ask you, Sir, what is to prevent him except Russia, and is it desirable that this should take place? Should the Russians come to Constantinople, my orders direct me to come here also, and I am sorry to force the passage of the Dardanelles. All these untoward circumstances may be avoided by ceding Syria to Mehemet Ali, a country very scarce to the rest of the Turkish Government, and though ceded to Mehemet Ali as part of his hereditary Pashalick, would not be lost to Turkey any more than the other parts of the Turkish Empire governed some by temporary and some by hereditary Pashas. It would be held by Mehemet Ali as tributary to the Sultan, the amount of the tribute to be settled by treaty.

It is more than six months that I wrote to Lord Minto stating my opinion. Lord Minto and Lord Keith, the only safety for Turkey was an union between the Porte and the Pasha of Egypt; everything has since occurred to convince me that I was right, and I am now more than ever in the same opinion. With respect to any secret understanding between Russia and Mehemet Ali, your Excellency cannot suppose that he would with his acknowledged signature prefer Russia to Turkey as a neighbour.

The interference of the five Great Powers was intended to keep Russia in the weak ground, but by a letter from Alexander II. to Mehemet Ali, which I suppose your Lordship has seen, the Vice-Roy's secret intention was unmasked for, and makes a sort of apology to Mehemet Ali for drawing foreign troops to interfere in their domestic concerns.

From the moment that any part of the British squadron appears before Alexandria to blockade it, Constantinople will be in danger from the Egyptian Army and a power can stop them but Russia.

I have the honour of 100 letters, I have ventured in my capacity of the Admiral of the British squadron, to submit these remarks to your Lordship's consideration.

I have, &c.  
Signed, ROBERT STOPFORD.

Inclosure 2 in No. 320.

Viscount Ponsonby to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.

Sir,

Therapia, August 22, 1839.

AS you have done me the honour to write a public letter to express the political question about to be settled between the Great Powers of Europe and

the Sublime Porte, I find myself under the obligation to reply to your letter in the same official form as you have adopted.

I regret to have to say the reasons you advance in support of your opinion appear to me to be founded upon a misapprehension of the facts, but were it otherwise, I should consider it wrong to say to you that I have I think done upon instructions from Her Majesty's Government, which are, I repeat for me, completely at variance with the public views.

I must not care to sustain such a discussion of the points you speak of because I consider it would be at a waste of your time to repeat what I have already said to you, and because I think that could be said could be said to a certain degree of conduct, even though it should be a change in those views which I have already mentioned to you.

I am, however, certain my views are not at all in favour of the measure of a blockade of the coast, that the Great Powers agree with the British Government, and that no body possessing influence or any authority has an idea of leaving Syria to Mehemet Ali, but as to the means of carrying upon a party of a blockade, which is an act of war, to be essential to the general good of Europe, I cannot participate in your desire of the expediency, whenever it shall please Her Majesty's and the other Governments to determine their nature, and to employ them.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 321.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 223.)

My Lord,

Therapia, August 22, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a Note, addressed by the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Five Powers, which I have just received. At this late hour of the night, I can only state that this measure which, in my despatch No. 221, I reported to have failed, has been resuscitated by the energy, decision, and activity of the Internuncio.

I regret that I have no time to describe his exertions, though I know I could not do him justice, but his success will declare his merit, when the obstacles he had to overcome are known.

I have the honour to express to your Lordship my regret that the measure proposed in No. 221, in the substance is much the same, except the addition of a few expressions by the Porte, that the measure should be carried on until the five Great Powers should be satisfied that the proposal, lest he should lose the Note. It is not to be doubted that Nouri and Sarim insisted upon it to please the Russians, as well as to keep the settlement as far as possible under their own control. It appears to me, however, that there is no absolute necessity for adhering to the proposal, and I think Vienna is a better place for the negotiation; but at the worst, there may be previously made at Vienna, such arrangements of this affair as are satisfactory, and the instructions given to the Diplomatic Minutemen here can be based upon them.

This Note will, I hope, appear to your Lordship as it does to me, to have placed affairs upon a very different footing, and to have given under the Russians the best ground they had on which to build a concealed opposition to a settlement. It will also tend to make the Great Powers more anxious to assist them in giving protection to Mehemet Ali; and it puts, virtually, an end to the most mischievous parts of the Treaty of Unkar Skelessi. The official report makes to the five Great Powers an announcement of the fact, that the Porte has decided upon a blockade of the coast, and that every act of the Porte is directed to the purpose of carrying it into effect. I think the Internuncio may be said to have produced the effect that I was so extremely anxious for the measure. I do not know that the Internuncio saw that result, and I did not mention it to him. He saw its operation to check

the influence of Russia, and to place us on high and strong ground, and he pursued his point with incompatible firmness and address. He tells me that he was admirably supported and aided by M. le Baron Hussar.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PUNSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 321.

Official Note addressed by the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Five Great Powers.

(Translation.)

TOUT le monde sait qu'au moment après l'avènement du Sultan au Trône Ottoman, Sa Hauteur a proclamé le pardon de Méhémet Ali, et qu'Elle a accordé l'hérédité de l'Égypte dans la famille de ce Pacha.

Le jour même, les Représentans des Cinq Grandes Puissances à Constantinople ont donné à la Sublime Porte une Note Collective, par laquelle ils l'informaient que les Cinq Puissances sont d'accord entre elles d'arranger la Question Égyptienne à l'unanimité.

En conséquence, la Sublime Porte a fait savoir à Méhémet Ali cet état de choses, et elle attendait les communications qui allaient lui être faites par les Cinq Puissances.

Mais sur ces entrefaites, Méhémet Ali a demandé l'hérédité de tous les pays qu'il a en son pouvoir, il retient la Flotte Impériale jusqu'à ce qu'il ait obtenu ce qu'il veut, et il a fait des propositions de changements de territoire et de changements qui ne dépendent que de la seule volonté du Souverain, et il a écrit et envoyé des lettres aux Vizirs dans l'Anatolie et la Roumélie, pour les exciter à la révolte. Telles sont les propositions dures et les procédés violens qu'il s'est permis: manière d'agir contraire à la soumission et à l'obéissance.

Cela étant, il appartient toujours aux Cinq Puissances d'arranger cette affaire, et la Sublime Porte demande qu'il soit pris des mesures pour faire cesser la prétention de l'hérédité de la Syrie; à revenir à de meilleurs sentimens relativement au changement du Vizirat—changement qui dépend de la volonté de Sa Hauteur; à cesser de chercher à susciter des désordres; à ce que cette affaire soit négociée et arrangée par l'entremise des Cinq Puissances; et à ce que les Représentans communiquent tout ce qui a été dit plus haut à leurs Gouvernemens, sans aucune réserve, et sans aucun délai.

Tout cela ayant été porté à la connaissance des Légations d'Autriche, de Russie, de Prusse, et de France, nous en informons aussi Son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de la Cour de la Grande Bretagne, et c'est ce que nous faisons en lui présentant cette Note officielle.

La 14 Djémezi-akher, 1255 (22 Août, 1839).

No. 322

Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 13.)

No. 31

My Lord,

Berlin, September 4, 1839.

I COMMUNICATED to Baron Werther, and have since sent to him a copy of your Lordship's despatch<sup>a</sup>, No. 12, of the 27th ultimo, to Sir George Hamilton. His Excellency said, the principles and opinions set forth in that despatch had his entire approbation; but he contemplated with considerable fear

that the Emperor of Russia would supply either naval or ship had better information on the latter point than he could have, and he consequently relied on success. In the course of conversation, Baron Werther said, that he did not think the Emperor of Russia would supply either naval or

<sup>a</sup> See No. 276 p. 224.

military means to force the Pasha of Egypt to accede to the terms of the Five Powers. He had, however, no information on the subject, and gave this as his private opinion. The Russian Minister remains ignorant of the views of his Government on the Eastern Question.

I have not yet been able to procure a copy of the report of the battle of Nezib, made by the Prussian officers, but the following is the substance:—They state that Pasha was to be heads, and presumptuous, incapable of commanding an army, but personally brave. Had he remained in his entrenched camp, he was secure; but the late Sultan and the Mollahs forced him to expose himself in the plain, and even then he was certain of victory, had he known how to handle his troops; but the soldiers had no confidence in their Chief, and the Chief no power over his soldiers; and their mutual distrust led to weakness and defeat. The Prussian officers further state that there was a serious division amongst the troops of Ibrahim Pasha, and that the Syrian regiments attempted to pass over to the Ottoman Army during the battle. This prevented the Egyptians from following up their victory. The Prussian officers being young, with little practical knowledge of war, were unable to exercise any influence over Ibrahim Pasha.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WILLIAM RUSSELL.

No. 323

The Marquis of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 13)

No. 24. Confidential.

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, August 22, 1839.

COUNT NESSELRODE told me yesterday, that he had that morning received a courier from London; that the English Government took the same view of the affairs of Turkey as that of Russia; that the French Government rejected the proposition made by the latter Government, to be a party to the Convention of 1830, which would accept him, and more respect and justice to his demands than the Sultan.

On the evening of the same evening, I had the honour of a conversation with the Emperor, and the same day.

His Imperial Majesty, who was in remarkably good spirits, and the accounts from England gave him the greatest satisfaction, because the news that he had taken of the position by the latter Government was identical with that which he entertained; and that there appeared a sincere disposition on our part to go to the aid of the Sultan, and to support his rights. He expressed his distrust of his motives. The Emperor proceeded to say, that he was not surprised at the conduct of the French Government, and made some harsh remarks upon the reigning dynasty, which, he said, had enough to do to sustain itself at home, without caring to adhere to a war or to a peace. He said that he had had plenty of opportunities of drawing closer to France, if he had chosen to do so, but that his opinion of the French Government had never changed or wavered; that if England had chosen it, he might have been engaged in a war with her, but never in an alliance with the French. He said Prince Metternich fancied, that by his ability and influence he could lead Louis Philippe, which idea he, the Emperor, had always held to be futile.

I remarked that I saw Metternich yesterday, and that he had told me that he was as he passed the report that was very much to be long known, and had great respect for his Highness, and was inclined to follow him as far as he could, but not so far as to commit follies and absurdities. He said, Prince Metternich was a very able man, but that his ideas did not keep pace with the events of the age; that he was still in the notions and views of the years 1812 and 1813.

I did not clearly understand this observation, but I believe it alluded to a fear of France, and to too great readiness to justify that Power at any price.

The Emperor then said, how glad he was, and how right he had been, to have refused to join in a Conference at Vienna; that if such a Conference had been opened, the Great Powers would now have been placed in a foolish and false





This was only what I expected, but I wished to draw the expression from Count Nesselrode, because some of my colleagues here, have affirmed that the Emperor was so offended at the mistrust of his views that had been evinced, that he was determined not to take an active part in the matter, unless compelled to do so by the occurrence of a clear *casus fœderis* under the Treaty of Ukhr斯克.

Count Nesselrode showed me with evident pleasure, M. de Kisseleff's report of your Lordship's assent to changing from Vienna the seat of communications and negotiations that the Turkish affairs may require. There is certainly a feeling of jealousy or pique entertained here at present, against the Austrian Cabinet.

On the whole, I found Count Nesselrode yesterday more at his ease upon the state of the Turco-Egyptian Question, than he had been, because, although it appeared probable that the Powers would settle without some act or demonstration of armed intervention, there appeared a chance of Russia and England acting in concert, apart from, if not contrary to, the wishes and policy of the French Government.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) CLANRICARDE.

P.S.—Since writing this despatch, I have obtained an extract of Count Medem's report of his conversation with Marshal Soult, to which I have alluded. And I send it to your Lordship, because Marshal Soult is stated to have announced, on the part of the French Government, two principles of action, which I take to differ, *telo celo*, from those adopted by Her Majesty's Government:—the one, that it were better to concede his own terms to Mehemet Ali, than to coerce him by force; the other, that the battle of Nezib, and the defection of the Turkish fleet, justify the Pasha in demanding, and the Five Powers in acquiescing in, terms different from those approved of before the occurrence of these events.

C

Inclosure in No. 325.

Extract of a despatch from the Count P. Medem to Count Nesselrode, reporting a conversation with Marshal Soult.

M. LE MARÉCHAL ne fit part au sein des instructions qu'il venait d'expédier au Conseil Général de France à Alexandrie. Il doit commencer par déclarer à Mehemet Ali, que sa demande concernant le rachat de Horew ne saurait aucunement être prise en considération, et que la France lui donnait le conseil d'abandonner des prétentions de ce genre, ainsi que de restituer la flotte Ottomane, ce qui serait la meilleure manière de se recommander à son Souverain et en même temps à la bienveillance des Puissances qui y reconnaissent un engagement de sa disposition conciliante et du prix qu'il mettait à leur approbation.

Sur une observation que je ne voyais dans ces instructions que des conseils auxquels le Pacha restait libre d'avoir égard ou non, le Ministre me demanda ce qu'il y aurait eu à y ajouter.

Je lui répondis qu'il me semblait que M. Cochelet aurait pu être autorisé, le cas échéant, à tenir au Vice-Roi un langage plus péremptoire, en lui donnant à entendre que la France avait à sa disposition les moyens d'appuyer des conseils bien intentionnés s'il se refusait à les suivre.

Soult.—Et si le Vice-Roi persistait à s'y refuser?

Moi.—Dans ce cas extrême, on aurait recours à l'emploi de mesures coercitives, pour le forcer à accepter les conditions de paix qu'on aurait jugées seules propres à établir d'une manière stable et satisfaisante les relations entre le Suzerain et son puissant vassal.

Soult.—Et qui se chargera d'appliquer ces mesures?

Moi.—Nécessairement ce rôle serait dévolu aux deux Puissances maritimes qui ont dans les mers du Levant des forces navales suffisantes pour

arriver à leurs fins, soit en établissant un blocus, soit en se portant à des hostilités contre Mehemet Ali.

Soult.—Je n'hésite pas à vous déclarer, que nous ne nous porterons jamais à un pareil acte d'agression, déjà par la raison que nous ne voulons pas courir le risque d'irriter le Vice-Roi au point de le pousser peut-être à reprendre l'offensive contre la Turquie, ce qui amènerait des complications trop sérieuses pour ne pas nous engager à éviter tout ce qui serait de nature à les provoquer. D'ailleurs, un blocus ne servirait à rien et serait tout entier au désavantage de notre commerce. Pour enlever la Syrie au Vice-Roi il faudrait y envoyer une armée considérable, ce qui n'est ni dans notre intention, ni dans notre pouvoir. La Russie serait-elle en position de se charger d'une semblable entreprise, mais nous la croyons trop sage pour la supposer disposée à se voir faire un pareil sacrifice sans aucune compensation. N'étant donc est donc d'employer par la voie diplomatique tous les arguments de persuasion, afin de rendre Mehemet Ali plus traitable, mais à l'emploi de la force, nous n'y consentirons point. Et qui oserait prendre sur soi la responsabilité d'avoir tiré le premier coup de canon? Lorsque M. le Comte de Nesselrode signa les dépêches dont vous venez de me donner communication, et dont je m'empressai de porter le contenu à la connaissance du Roi, il ignorait encore les résultats de la bataille de Nézi, la destruction de l'armée Ottomane, et la defection de la flotte. Nul doute que depuis il n'ait modifié ses opinions sur la limite des concessions à accorder au Vice-Roi d'Egypte, vainqueur de son adversaire sur terre et sur mer, et bien décidé à s'assurer les meilleures conditions possibles. Il en résulte que s'il persévère dans sa prétention de conserver à titre héréditaire tout ce qu'il possède actuellement, nous pensons qu'il sera d'une politique prudente de le lui concéder, et d'arriver ainsi au plus tôt à cette transaction qui doit régler définitivement les rapports entre le Sultan et le vassal.

No. 326.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 97.)

(Extract.)

St. Petersburg, August 31, 1839

BARON BRUNNOW called yesterday to take leave of me.

He is the bearer of a letter from His Imperial Majesty to the Queen.

As regards the Turco-Egyptian Question, I believe your Lordship will be perfectly satisfied with Baron Brunnow's language, and your Lordship may rely upon his words, as those of one possessing the entire confidence of his Government, and of a perfectly honourable man.

I do not fear to repeat my entire conviction, that the Russian Government will act in the affairs of Turkey, on the present occasion, in entire accordance with the policy Great Britain has declared, and sincerely for the maintenance of the Sultan's Empire.

No. 327.

Lord Beaconsfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 13.)

No. 105.

My Lord,

Vienna, September 3, 1839

ALTHOUGH it is not probable that the final settlement of the affairs of Turkey and Egypt will come under discussion at an early period, I yet think it desirable to lose no time in calling your Lordship's attention to the difference between the terms demanded by the Porte in its official Note of the 22nd of August, and those dwelt upon in your Lordship's despatch No. 103.

The Official Note makes no objection to granting Syria for life to Mehemet Ali, provided that he surrenders the rest of the Powers were agreed upon obtaining its immediate restitution, this would create no



difficulty; but such not being the case, those who wish to secure it to Mehemet Ali, either permanently or for life, will not fail to take advantage of this demand made by the Porte, to argue that we are not authorized to insist upon better terms for the Sultan, than those which he requires for himself.

The answer to this is to be found in various of your Lordship's despatches. The Powers do not interfere only for the benefit of the Sultan, but to secure peace and a durable state of possession in the East; still the limited demand made by the Porte will not fail to stand strongly in the way of obtaining more. The state of the affair does not warrant me in asking for a further instruction in consequence, but as I think it probable that the first step in any joint negotiation which may be brought to bear at Vienna, would be to apply to the Porte to learn the conditions which the Sultan is willing to accord to Mehemet Ali, it is to be feared that his Highness will find himself hampered by those which have already been enounced on his part; nor will it be easy for me to avoid considering the Note in question as a sufficient authority to proceed from.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 328.

*Lord Beaumont to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 13.)*

(No. 106.)

My Lord,

Vienna, September 3, 1839.

IN thanking your Lordship for the communication of Lord Clanricarde's despatch No. 89, I beg to say, that all accounts we receive here from St. Petersburg, confirm his Lordship's statements of the present feelings of the Russian Government towards that of Austria.

They even go further: for it has not been concealed from Prince Mettrich, that the Emperor felt considerable irritation at his having taken upon himself to answer for the conduct of Russia.

Lord Clanricarde is quite correct in defining the real position of Prince Mettrich with regard to Russia. He has possessed the faculty of foreseeing her views and conduct, but it was while his own coincided with them, and he made a false estimate of his influence, in supposing he could direct them into fresh courses, and of her policy, in having been led to believe that her views with regard to Turkey coincided with his own. Hence his bitter disappointment, when he discovered that his whole policy as connected with Russia had been founded upon a false basis.

The remark of the deference paid by Russia to England is generally made, but the French Ambassador writes that the leading feature in the Emperor Nicholas' mind is a feeling of hostility to France, which has been much embittered by her late conduct.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 329

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.*

(No. 137)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 14, 1839.

YOUR Excellency's despatches to No. 229, inclusive, have been received and forwarded to the Queen.

I have to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government approve of your Excellency having addressed to Nouri Effendi the Notes, of which copies are inclosed in your Excellency's despatch No. 226.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 330.

*Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 15.)*

(No. 45)

My Lord

Paris, September 13, 1839.

I HAVE had the honour of receiving your Lordship's despatches to No. 37 inclusive.

With regard to what your Lordship observes in respect to General Sebastiani seeming unprepared for the statement made in the last passage of your Lordship's despatch No. 107 to Lord Beauvale, I have to remark, that the contents of that despatch were duly, according to your Lordship's desire, communicated to Marshal Soult, and I have on more than one occasion pointed out the importance of that particular passage to the Marshal, and likewise to M. Desages. I send now in conformity with your Lordship's orders, show to Marshal Soult the despatch (No. 27) which I have just received, and which contains the substance of your Lordship's conversation with General Sebastiani.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER

No. 331

*Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 15.)*

No. 46.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 13, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that it is the intention of the French Government to recall Admiral Roussin from Constantinople, on the plea that Marshal Soult is desirous of having some conversation with him on the affairs of the East, but in reality with the view of withdrawing him from the post which he now occupies. M. de Portois, a gentleman who has occupied for some time the situation of Minister at the United States, and who appears to be a person of sense and some capacity, is to replace Admiral Roussin, but with merely the title of Envoy Extraordinary, &c., in order to preserve appearances towards the Admiral.

Many reasons for his being recalled might be assigned, and amongst others, the present Ambassador's want of political experience and ability, but as this will be very often repeated, we may also consider that Admiral Roussin was known best by Lord Mettrich, and as he was in communication with the Russian Government, and received from the Turkish Government orders directed to the ships of the Ottoman fleet at Alexandria, in which letters these officers were requested, as I understand, to seize the Capadocia, and only, and in view to Constantinople, may have had some effect on the Mark's present decision.

In regard to these letters, your Lordship will be aware that, when they were received by M. Cochelet, that gentleman singularly enough, begged the Minister of Mehemet Ali to see that they were properly transmitted according to their direction. It is needless to say, that, on the contrary, they were opened, and never reached the persons for whom they were intended.

Having been acquainted with this circumstance, I asked the Marshal for an explanation of it, and he said that the Admiral had forwarded the letters without stating or knowing their purport, and that M. Cochelet had acted as he did without suspecting what they were. At all events, I have reason to know that the conduct of the Admiral in transmitting any letters without demanding their contents, or transmitting such letters, if he did not know what they contained, has been severely censured; M. Cochelet having been told, on the other hand, that the letters should have been returned to the Admiral, and neither given to the Viceroy, nor sent to their address.

I have also been informed that the French Government are much dissa-

traded with the Admiral, for not having made a communication to the Porte, demanding, that if the Turkish Government found it necessary to require the assistance of any Power, it should demand the assistance of all the Powers. The Admiral having conceived that he was only to do this in the event of some accident threatening the peace and safety of Constantinople, has been considered to have mistaken the spirit of his instructions, which would have implied that he was to obtain some conditional promise of a general application for aid from all the Great European Powers, should any foreign assistance be necessary to provide for the security of the Ottoman Empire.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 332.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 15.)

(No. 47.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 13, 1839.

M. DE LANGSDORFF, a relative of M. de St. Aulaire, and Secretary of Embassy at Vienna, being about to return to his post with particular instructions to M. de St. Aulaire, called on me Wednesday morning last, and read to me a private letter from M. de St. Aulaire, in which it was stated, that whenever there were the slightest differences between the Governments of France and England, the shock, magnified by the distance, was felt most sensibly at Vienna, and that nothing was so essential as complete harmony between the two Governments.

I entirely agreed with this observation, and expressed the hope that such union would prevail.

The Baron said, the views of France and England being identical, in regard to the position of Russia with respect to Constantinople, the only subject of difference that could exist was, the conduct to be pursued between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan; "and I think," said M. de Langsdorff, "that your Government considers this part, which is the minor part of the question, too strongly." I replied that my Government was anxious to produce, not merely for a temporary exigency, but for the permanent position of the Ottoman Empire; and that, considering the present position of the Pasha of Egypt, it was not to be wondered at, that the Government of France, and the Government of England, were in a position of the first importance; besides, the Collective Note lately delivered, placed the Governments who were parties to it, in a decided position, and bound them to pursue prompt and energetic measures. But that this was not all, for that which I especially regretted, looking as he (the Baron) did, at the union of the two Powers of France and England as most desirable, in this and all other matters, was the impossibility, as yet, of arriving at any clear notions of what course the French Government really did deem it advisable to pursue. That the views of Her Majesty's Government were distinct and positive, and had been fully explained.

They considered that by the Note which the Great Powers had delivered to the Porte these Powers had been all the more united, and with the better advantage, as it was to produce better and more consistent results, and that with this object Her Majesty's Government, in the first place, proposed that the Government of France should have had no objection that the Government of England should have been consulted in regard to Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, and the means of effecting them, at Vienna. But as yet, while France knew distinctly what our Government would do, I frankly confessed, that I only knew what the French Government would not do; which rendered it the more difficult to endeavour to combine the united efforts of the two Governments into any common course. The Baron admitted that something must be done to vindicate the honour of the Governments of Europe after their common Note; but could not

state to me anything that his Government had determined to do with this object.

As to Prince Metternich, "he," said the Baron, "will be satisfied, provided anything is done; and with the least done, he will be the most satisfied." I observed that, for my part, I did not so understand the views of the Cabinet of Vienna, but that on the contrary, I believed that Cabinet to be fully determined to support the rights of the Sultan, and to act with vigour towards such an object, should vigour be necessary to attain it.

The Baron said I should not find it so, and the Austrian Government would decline engaging in any decisive course or serious undertaking.

I have thought it right to communicate this conversation, although necessarily it was not of an official character, to your Lordship, as well on account of Baron Langsdorff's position at Vienna, as on account of his being sent there sooner than he had intended to return, in order to carry to M. de St. Aulaire the most recent and complete information in respect to the views of the French Government; while he had requested to see and to talk with me previous to his departure.

From scattered observations, and the general tone of Baron Langsdorff's conversation, I should conclude, that the French Government were most desirous to come to some arrangement with us in respect to the position of the Viceroy of Egypt, to which that personage might be prevailed upon, through a representation that it was for his own interests, to consent, but I still remain persuaded that the French Government do not, and are not likely to feel disposed to aid us in enforcing any conditions upon Mehemet Ali, which he might reject as unfavourable.

I should also think that the Baron imagined that Austria might agree with France in respect to some general plan of pacification less favourable to the Porte than your Lordship would desire. But she might be merely affected.

Upon the whole, the impression which I retained from the conversation alters none of my previous opinions.

The possibility of getting France into some vigorous system of action will entirely depend upon our getting the other Powers to consent to such a system. Even in that case, the French Ministry would wish to stand aloof; but the King, from his dislike to an isolated position amongst the Great Powers, would probably, in such a case, be for joining them.

This seems to me the only chance.

In the meantime, it is not impossible but that Russia from some reasons, and France for others, will do all they can, each respectively, towards urging the Porte and the Viceroy to a settlement of their own affairs.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER

No. 333.

Lord Brunsford to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 111.)

My Lord,

Vienna, September 8, 1839.

THE delay in Count Fiquelmont's arrival, and that which has been necessary in order to transfer affairs into his hands, have rendered it impossible to answer your Lordship's despatches of the 25th August at an earlier period.

Upon the arrival of those despatches, my first care was to inform Prince Metternich through his Secretary of their contents, and by this means I learnt that he persisted in the opinion that the first measure ought to be a demand for the restitution of the fleet.

My next step was to communicate with the French Ambassador, who had at that time received no fresh instructions, but was anxious to co-operate with me as far as those already in his hands would permit. Two days afterwards his instructions arrived, and I then learnt from him that they had restricted rather than extended his powers; that, if he joined in a demand



for the restitution of the fleet, he could not follow it up by any measure of coercion; that he was not authorized even to withdraw the Consul; and that all propositions of the sort must be referred to Paris. Upon this ground he urged me strongly to enter upon the general question, instead of making that of the fleet a preliminary.

I pointed out to him that he was as little authorized to resort to action upon the general question as upon the special one; it was equally evident that our views upon it were entirely different, and I therefore declined according to his proposal. The necessity, on the part of the French Ambassador, was eager and pressing, but the reasons he alleged, when analysed, were reducible to two motives.

The first, to brave Russia and avenge the insult which France conceives to have been offered to her in Count Nemelrode's despatch to Count Mémor.

The second, to avoid doing anything which should compromise the French Government with the party that supports Mehemet Ali.

Neither of these motives were calculated to weigh with me. I therefore told the Ambassador that the mode of opposition to Russia which my Government proposed to itself, was to elevate the Porte to a state of independence of her; that the weakness and dependence of the Ottoman Empire resulted from the strength and attitude of Mehemet Ali; that if he could not go along with me in demanding the restitution of the fleet,—a step which would have the concurrence of the whole world, it would be idle to set out with him upon another road, on which he would be sure to abandon me before we reached the first stage.

He admitted that he must do so, but said, that in the mean time we should embarrass Russia, who must either quit her isolated position, or pronounce her separation from us.

As I saw nothing but wounded vanity in this mode of viewing the question, and no advantage to be derived from it, I persevered in my determination; but not wishing to close the door to an understanding, I desired the Ambassador to communicate with Prince Metternich, and professed my readiness to concur in a common course of proceeding, if any of an eligible nature could be found. Having occasion the same day to write to him, I took advantage of the opportunity to set him the truth of the situation in plain terms than your Lordship's postscript would allow you to employ. I expressed my conviction that this question would resolve Europe into its elements; and as he had assumed England to be passionately hostile to Mehemet Ali, I told him that this was an error accredited by the French Press; that the public is indifferent, having no feeling but one of resistance to Russia, while the Ministry is pronounced for the unity of the Ottoman Empire; that your Lordship's own words, that that unity, if it could be attained under Mehemet Ali, would be accepted, but that this being impossible, we should persist in supporting it under the Sultan; and I added that, if our two countries had been united in their views, they would not have had a difficulty to encounter, whereas, if they remained divided, they would fail in everything. The next morning brought me an answer, from which I judged myself to have made the impression I desired. Having kept a copy of the answer, I inclose copies of both notes. M. de St Aulaire says in his, that he recommends to his Government to satisfy the Porte, even at the expense of Mehemet Ali.

Some days passed after this before I could see Count Fiquelmont. He believes that anything reasonable which is agreed here by the Three Powers, or even by England and Austria, will, at Constantinople, receive the accession of Russia; and he thinks this would apply to the order to the Consuls at Alexandria to withdraw, if their demand for the fleet was rejected.

On great difficulty of engaging Russia to make common cause with us, arises, in his opinion, from the aspect of menace towards her assumed by England and France, and he went into long reasonings to show the expediency of removing the fleets from the mouth of the Dardanelles.

The difficulties I opposed to him were purely of a material nature. Whether I asked, would you have them go? They must not show themselves off Alexandria without orders to act. In all cases, a naval force must be left near at hand to defend the passage into Europe against Ibrahim.

The English fleet is destined to execute the resolves of the Conference

here; where then can it so well be placed for communication as in the neighbourhood of the Ambassador at Constantinople?

He was unprepared with an answer to these statistics, and requested, that at least the attitude of the fleet might be divested of the character of suspicion and menace towards Russia which it had at first borne.

I assured him that this was already done, and quoted your Lordship's No. 126 to Lord Clancarde, and various instructions, in which the passage of the Dardanelles is made to depend upon the call of the Sultan. Count Fiquelmont's request would, in my opinion, under any circumstances, be reasonable, and a compliance with it would offer the only chance of inducing Russia to act with us; that this chance would, under any circumstances, be a good one, is more than I am prepared to assert, but the uncertainty of our relations with France upon this question, it would appear no more than common prudence to leave a door open for a good understanding with Russia, if it can be attained without a sacrifice.

Count Fiquelmont expressed the opinion, that to act with England and Austria, leaving France out, would be a great temptation to the Emperor Nicholas; but he agreed with me, that although the possibility of such a combination might be made use of to determine France to alter her line of conduct, yet it would be a dangerous position to engage in, not only as embittering the disposition of France, even should it not lead to immediate hostilities, but as tending to throw the Porte entirely upon the protection of Russia against the army of Ibrahim.

On the other hand, the Count thought that England, Austria, and France acting together would be sure of the assent of Russia, or might act without it; and he took occasion from this to expatiate upon the little dignity there is in making such a show of preparation against a Power in fact so little formidable.

From these premises we came to the conclusion, that it would be unwise to do anything without having made a further effort to gain the accession of France, and as Count Fiquelmont appeared unprepared to say how this effort should be made, I proposed to him that the Austrian Ambassador at Paris should concert with our Minister there, the language most likely to produce an effect; and that each should employ it separately and without apparent concert. I further stated, that in my opinion it behoved us to represent that we did not look upon the instruments which had been exchanged, as mere waste paper; that we considered ourselves bound by the Collective Note to the Porte, and were determined, as far as our power went, to redeem our pledge, and that we called upon those Powers who had contracted equal obligations with ourselves, to assist us in fulfilling it. He concurred in these propositions, and said, that as soon as he had seen the French Ambassador, he would send orders to Count Appony to act upon them. I then observed to him, that if this attempt should fail, it would be necessary for England and Austria to resolve what course to pursue. He concurred in this, but I attempted to learn from him what that course ought to be, I could not succeed, and as I was unprepared to point one out myself, it was agreed between us, that I should submit the question to my Government, and that it should be taken into consideration in the mean time by that of Austria. I therefore beg to call the attention of Her Majesty's Government to this subject, and shall await your Lordship's instructions upon it.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) BEAUVALLÉ.

Inclosure I in No. 333.

Lord Beaulieu to Count St Aulaire.

LES pièces que vous citez sont précieuses si elles doivent entraîner leurs suites naturelles. Sinon, mieux vaudrait-il qu'elles n'eussent jamais été écrites. Ce qui me touche le plus, c'est la honte qu'en ressortirait pour les signataires.

Des représentations civiles autant qu'on voudra, mais des représentations

où il n'y a rien derrière, sont une pénalité dans laquelle une Grande Puissance ne peut pas durer.

Vous voyez que je ne suis pas beaucoup plus couleur de rose aujourd'hui qu'hier. Mais je suis parfaitement de votre avis de rester ensemble en ne marchant pas. Ce n'est pourtant bon que pour un temps. Dieu veuille qu'à Paris et à Londres on trouve le moyen de marcher ensemble. Pour cela il faudra remplir les obligations que nous avons contractées envers la Porte; et le moyen de la faire en se refusant de toute action, est impossible à trouver. Je me demande comment des gens pratiques comme ceux qui gouvernent la France aient pu y songer.

(Signé) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 333.

Count St. Aulaire to Lord Beauvale.

COMME vous sortiez hier de chez moi, mon cher ami, Hugel m'a apporté cette note. Je ne vous en remercie pas moins.

J'ai parlé de la proposition à Hugo et j'ai demandé si le Prince Metternich n'avait pas dans son sac quelque ressource. Il ne tra, comme de coutume, rien de bon. Un jour et Comte Autrichien. Alexander seules. Cependant, pour la présente, nous ne sort pas restées sans effet sur le Pa. Le cas est trop désespéré de l'avenir.

Au fait, la situation n'est pas belle, mais je vous trouve trop noir. La déclaration des Quatre Puissances sur l'Egypte et l'indépendance reste une bonne pièce au procès. L'intention annoncée à Pétersbourg par l'Angleterre et la France, d'envoyer par les Dardanelles ce qui n'aurait pu être par le détroit, est une action qui n'est pas à dédaigner. Et le traité d'Ukiah Skessie se trouve ainsi au point de vue.

Puis enfin, la Note Collective de Constantinople est un bon commencement dont je me fie à l'Autriche pour nous faire tirer parti.

Ne nous décourageons donc pas. J'écris à Paris et insiste de mon mieux sur la nécessité de donner satisfaction à la Porte, même au dépens de Méhémet.

La situation est en effet tendue et peut craquer d'un moment à l'autre. L'attente lui est peut-être plus pénible qu'à la Porte. L'important me semble être, puisque la France et l'Angleterre ne peuvent pas marcher ensemble qu'elles restent ensemble au moins en ne marchant pas.

Donnez-moi toujours de vos avis que j'apprécie bien, et croyez que je vous suis bien attaché politiquement et autrement.

(Signé) ST. AULAIRE.

No. 234

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 112.)

My Lord,

Vienna, September 8, 1839.

In accordance to your Lordship's No. 111, I have given copy of your despatch No. 108 to Count F. de S. The reasons of that despatch are unanswerable; but how far they will influence the conduct of the Courts with whom we are acting, seems more than doubtful. The first plan traced by Austria did not contemplate the immediate restitution of Syria to the Sultan. She has since adopted our view of the eligibility of such a course, without, however, promising herself to attain it. The official reports from Paris, state Louis Philippe to have pronounced his determination never to fire a shot against Mehemet Ali; and to have canvassed the Representatives of other Powers with the view of inducing them to do the same. He has further stated his opinion to be, that all which Mehemet Ali asks, Syria, Arabia, and Candia,

should be granted hereditarily to his family. Russia, though assenting to the propriety of your Lordship's proposition, has done so with a doubt as to the possibility of carrying it into effect. Instead, therefore, of being able to present it to Mehemet Ali with the joint weight of the Five, it seems more probable that only Four can be induced to concur in it; and of those Four two partly from motives of complaisance and without the intention of making sacrifices to enforce it. Under these circumstances I have to request your Lordship to inform me how far I am to consider your No. 108 as a final instruction, and whether under any circumstances I am to what extent it may be deviated from. As regards Spain, France, I believe at least, will not be so ready to follow the lead which is being put out, and if not so, I shall be dependent rather than exposed to the influence of the other Powers. As to your Lordship's desire to encounter the present dangers and complications which would result from measures to compel the immediate evacuation of Syria without the co-operation of France; or the failure and consequent derision which would attend an unsupported and consequently impotent demand to that effect, coupled with the alienation and ill blood which it would not fail to excite in France.

I am too deeply impressed with the conflicting difficulties and complications with which this whole question is surrounded, to form any very positive opinion upon it; but I think it my duty to submit it to your Lordship under all the aspects in which it presents itself here.

I have &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 335

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 113.)

My Lord,

Vienna, September 8, 1839.

THE details given in a preceding despatch will have acquainted your Lordship with the circumstances which have given rise to the present instructions conveyed in your No. 107. The consequent delay being unavoidable, I profit by it for the purpose of further reference to your Lordship.

Your despatch No. 107 proceeds upon the idea that the Five Powers are acting together. Now this is so far from being the case, that it can only be said of England and Austria. Prussia in this affair is but a name. France and Russia have, for their first view, to insult and injure each other; and, for their second, to thwart the purposes which we propose to attain; and it is remarkable, that being ready to proceed to an open rupture between themselves, they yet play each other's game. Russia, by allying herself from the beginning with Mehemet Ali, has thrown the Porte into the dependence of Russia. Hence I infer, that, however divided by passion, they are united by interest, and that in some cooler moment they will be ready to do so. Your Lordship's despatch partly provides for this situation, authorizing me to act, under prescribed conditions, with a less number. If this smaller number should consist of Austria and France, I should feel no difficulty; but if it were to consist, as is not impossible, of Austria and Russia, how am I then to understand your order? I can conceive that such a combination might deter France from opposing it by open hostilities, but a large party within herself would urge her to them, and there would arise a risk. As to the possibility of Russia's co-operating with us in the Egyptian branch of the question, might concur in a demand for the restitution of the fleet, and yet stand aloof from concert as to Constantinople. Would it be proper to accept that limited co-operation, leaving France out, and disposing her thereby in the rest of the affair, and sacrificing that assistance from her against Russia in case of need, upon which we at present can count? These would be, of course, no doubt as to including Russia in the Egyptian half of

3 B



the affair in addition to France; but the question is as to accepting this limited assistance on her part without France, unless under a previous understanding with her that the whole of the affair is to be treated in common.

If neither France nor Russia can be brought to concur with England and Austria in a common course of action, the two latter Powers will then be called upon to decide for themselves what line they are to take. The period which has already elapsed since the Collective Note was presented, will not allow this to be much longer deferred; and if the return of the present messenger should bring no means of uniting a sufficient number of the Powers to proceed to act, I would submit to your Lordship the propriety of furnishing me with instructions as to the course which you may think fit to direct me to propose to Austria to pursue in common with ourselves. Count Fiquelmont seems to think, that an intimation to Mehemet Ali, that no arrangements made in his favour by the Porte without the assent of the European Powers would be recognized, might decide his conduct. I doubt it, even if made by the Five— from two or three of them he would value it little. Another course might be, to advise the Porte to withhold even the grant of hereditary right in Egypt, remaining rather as she is than submitting to various concessions. This would involve the burthen of the permanent defence of Constantinople, and would leave a wide door open for internal machinations in the Turkish Empire, and for disunion among the Christian Powers. In short, I can see no good solution to the question, and yet the case is, I fear, the one most likely to occur, and for which it behoves the Two Powers to provide.

The best chance perhaps of getting off would be to wait our proposition to France, in the first instance, to a demand for her concurrence in calling for the restitution of the fleet, and in withdrawing the Consuls if it should be refused. She can scarcely deny this; and if she grants it, the Five Powers will, to all appearance, be enabled to protect themselves again to Mehemet Ali, acting in union. Whether this is worth while, whether each further advance, if it is to lead to ultimate disunion and disappointment, is calculated to be other than an aggravation of the exposure to shame and ridicule to which they are already liable, is a question which I would submit to your Lordship's serious consideration. Should you decide to adopt the course I have suggested, the position of Russia would yet be anomalous. The Four would come to an agreement here, and she would have to be recruited at Constantinople. This would have no serious inconvenience, if Austria, England, and France were acting together. In that case, Russia might join or not as suited her best; but if a case were to occur in which Austria and England were to resolve upon acting without France, provided Russia would join them, how could they decide upon measures here in uncertainty as to the answer which might be given at Constantinople? I place these difficulties before your Lordship, because it is possible that your representations at St. Petersburg, if you should think fit to make any, might have weight in causing them to be more.

Your Lordship's representations at St. Petersburg, and the measures of communication which might be expected to result to by the fact.

It is clear that the case which would present itself would be that of the Turkish and Egyptian fleets being both within the harbour of Alexandria. In this case, the measure would be the cutting off of all communication under the flag of the British between Egypt and Syria, and preventing vessels from that port from going to any Egyptian or Syrian port. Count Fiquelmont has already remarked to your Lordship that his private, although a harassing, mission to Mehemet Ali, would exercise considerable influence upon the question. His opinions are, however, very variable, and he is very much affected by the Austrian view of the case. The course which is now being pursued by Austria, whether it is possible by her own action, or by her influence, to be effected with great effect, is a subject which I will therefore not properly discuss in detail. It is, however, such a subject as to be of great importance, and I should be glad to be able to give you a more detailed account of it, which I am sorry to be unable to do. The question of the fleet, however, is the one which I am most anxious to see decided. It would appear to be, in the opinion of the Powers, the one most suited for the purpose. The issue of Cyprus or elsewhere, and give the service of watching the coasts and harbours of Syria and Egypt to the lighter vessels of the squadron. I may here mention that Lord Palmerston has strongly represented the want of

steam-vessels, and the absolute necessity for them if anything is to be done within the Dardanelles.

Upon taking further information with regard to Candia, I find great objections to attempting anything with regard to that island. Austria would object to uniting her troops to those of France in any joint operation. She fears the contact. France would probably object to the employment of Austrian troops alone, and the inhabitants might be expected to seize the opportunity to rise and throw off the Turkish yoke altogether, placing the invaders in the alternative, either of coercing them or allowing the Sultan to be permanently deprived of the possession they came to restore to him.

These considerations induce me to think that it would, in no case, be wise to meddle with it.

I have, &c,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 336.

Lord Beaumont to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 116.)

My Lord,

Vienna, September 9 1849

I LAST night received an invitation from Count Fiquelmont to wait upon me, in order to receive communication of despatches just arrived from St. Petersburg. Being prevented by an indisposition, I am sorry to be unable to do so, but I beg to refer your Lordship to the report of Mr. Champollion, to whose report I beg to refer your Lordship.

According to this document, the conditions which Austria offers for assent are three:—

1. The Five Powers must agree.

2. The conditions must be fixed by the Porte itself.

3. If they are such as would require coercion towards Mehemet Ali, the means of exerting it must be undeniable.

The first of these conditions is the request contained by the Porte in her official Note. The demands therein enumerated came clearly within the scope of the instruction to M. de Montebello. While it is a question of withholding assent to the demands of Mehemet Ali, the Porte is strong. If we are to call upon him to recede from what he possesses, then the difficulty is great. From these premises, I would venture to submit to your Lordship, a plan of conduct to which the assent of the Five Powers could hardly be refused.

The first step in it would be the demand for the restitution of the fleet, to be followed immediately by the departure of the Consuls, and the suspension of diplomatic intercourse with the Pasha, if it were refused. In this case, the Porte would withhold the grant of hereditary succession. The Five Powers would provide for the defence of Constantinople, but to do this effectually, and without danger of disunion among themselves, it would be necessary to regulate with Russia the means to be employed.

If the Pasha, finding his position uneasy, should recommence hostilities against the Porte, then would be the moment to put the fleets in activity by blockading Alexandria, and interrupting the communication between it and Syria. I propose to reserve this operation for the case specified.—1st. In order to obtain the adhesion of France, which I consider indispensable to the doing anything either with safety or effect; 2ndly. Because there are many things which have more weight in expectation than in action.

I do not believe that if Mehemet Ali refuses the fleet to the Consuls under the alternative of their departure, he would surrender it to a blockade, and if your Lordship should adopt this opinion, it will be well to send the order to the Consuls by a single ship, rather than by the fleet.

These measures would complete the first act of the affair. Either the Pasha would give way about the fleet, receiving thereby a heavy blow, and a great discouragement, or he would find himself placed singly in face of all Europe united with the Sultan against him.

There will be time enough to submit the further conduct of the affair to your Lordship, when that of its commencement shall have been determined upon.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure in No. 336

Report of communication made by Count Fiquelmont to Mr. Crompton.

Vienna, September 9, 1839.

HAVING waited upon Count Fiquelmont, his Excellency placed in my hands the copy of an instruction addressed by the Russian Government to M. de Bouteneff, dated St. Petersburg, August 11, and which had been communicated to Count Fiquelmont by Count Tatistcheff.

The following is, as nearly as I can recollect, its substance.

M. de Bouteneff is instructed to state generally the Emperor's full concurrence in the desire of the Five Powers to settle the differences between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, and his readiness to enforce any measures on which the Five Powers may agree for this purpose.

M. de Bouteneff is, however, directed, in the first place, not to adhere on the part of Russia, to any measures to which the Porte herself shall not have consented; more than this,—that he is to consider the Porte herself as the best judge of what her own safety requires, and not to concur in any plan which would oblige her either to ask for more or to accept of less than she herself thinks requisite.

Were this principle not observed, the Emperor believes that his Government would be placed in a similar position with regard to the Sultan, to that in which it has long been with regard to the King of the Netherlands.

In the second place, M. de Bouteneff is instructed not to consent to any measures for the execution of which it would be necessary to coerce Mehemet Ali, unless such coercion shall appear to him to be practicable, and that the means and instruments of it shall have been previously provided and agreed upon by the Five Powers, and that the Russian Government shall judge those means to be sufficient to effect the common object. The instruction does not allude to any particular mode of coercion except that of the blockade of Alexandria by the French and English fleets, to which measure M. de Bouteneff is directed to signify the Emperor's consent.

His Imperial Majesty again alludes to the Belgian Question, as illustrative of the bad effects of the Great Powers of Europe combining to summon a Sovereign to execute measures when they are not agreed among themselves as to the means of enforcing them in case of refusal.

The Emperor expresses his warm assent to the firm language held on this subject by Lord Palmerston, and informs M. de Bouteneff that he has given orders to Baron Brunnow to repeat to the Emperor, in order to express his satisfaction with the position in which the Emperor stands towards the Eastern Question, that he is determined to maintain the principle of non-interference.

When I had read this instruction Count Fiquelmont said, by way of summing up its contents, "vous voyez que la Russie veut se mettre au pas devant la Porte mais derrière elle; l'Empereur, dont on connaît les principes, ne veut pas de demi-mesures; elles ne sauraient, en effet, être efficaces; et pour les grandes, elles seraient si grandes, qu'il serait presque impossible que tout le monde pût être d'accord pour les employer."

(Signed) T. CROMPTON

No. 337.

Viccount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

(No. 120.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 18, 1839.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch, No. 103, of the 3rd instant, I have to inform your Excellency, that the Note from the Porte therein referred to, makes no difference in the views of Her Majesty's Government. That Note is important as an official request of the Porte for the aid and support of the Five Powers, but considering the present circumstances of Turkey and the feelings and fidelity of the Divan, that Note ought not to prevent the Five Powers from endeavouring to obtain an arrangement more favourable to the Sultan, than that described in the Note. The reasons given by your Excellency in your despatch, why the Five Powers should so act without being restricted by the Note are considered unanswerable by Her Majesty's Government, and your Excellency is instructed to recommend and urge such a course to the Representatives of the other Four Powers, for the conclusive reasons which you yourself assign.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 338.

Lord William Russell to Viccount Palmerston.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 16.)

My Lord,

Berlin, September 11, 1839.

THE language held to the Prussian Government by M. de Brunnow, during his visit to Berlin, made a very favourable impression, and much more so than to believe that he carried with him instructions from the Emperor of Russia that would give satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government, and enable the British and Russian Governments to act on the Eastern Question with perfect identity.

Your Lordship may easily imagine how gratifying this information was in the Prussian Government, a Government of a disparity of views between Russia and Austria, who would throw themselves into the dilemma of being forced to turn towards the Government of one of these Powers. Should such have been the case in the recent past, I have no doubt that Prussia would have sided with Austria, and throughout the pending negotiations on the Eastern Question, your Lordship may consider Prussia as a satellite of Austria, taking no part and bearing no weight beyond that assigned to her by Austria. However, as I have had only one voice amongst the Five Powers who have undertaken the settlement of the affairs of the East, it is a fair and polite that your Lordship should show the same deference to the Prussian Government as is shown to the others who act a more important part. In all the conversations I have had with Baron Werther, he has given me to understand that he fully approves the view your Lordship has taken of this question, and is anxious to further its execution by every means in his power.

M. de Brunnow spoke with great frankness, and it struck me that the views of the Emperor of Russia would coincide with those of Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) WILLIAM RUSSELL.



*Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received September 19.)*

(No. 54, Confidential.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 16, 1839.

I DO myself the honour to inclose to your Lordship, copies of the despatch addressed to Count Metem, and of that containing instructions to M. de Bouteneff, which Count Metem was instructed to communicate to Marshal Soult.

The Marshal, I understand, received the communication made to him, as one which was likely to be of importance in influencing his own decision, but has since merely observed, that it would receive his attentive consideration.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 339.

Count Nesselrode to Count Metem

Monsieur le Comte,

St. Pétersbourg, le 16 Août, 1839

LE Prince Gagarin m'a exactement remis l'explication que vous m'avez adressée sous la date du 24. M. le Baron de Bunsen, à Paris, me a communiqué de son côté les instructions que le Comte des Affaires étrangères a adressées à ses Représentans à Vienne, Constantinople et Alexandrie.

Veillez, M. le Comte, exprimer à M. le Président du Conseil, le juste intérêt que nous attachons aux communications que M. l'Ambassadeur de France a été chargé de nous faire. Elles ont été faites avec une parfaite exactitude. D'une part, elles attestent le vif désir que le Gouvernement Français éprouve de voir la crise du Levant promptement terminée par un arrangement pacifique et durable; de l'autre, elles nous font acquiescer la certitude que le Gouvernement n'hésite point à se prononcer formellement en faveur de l'accord qui subsiste ainsi entre les intentions de la France et celles des autres Cabinets de l'Europe, nous autorise à croire que les efforts réunis de tous réunissent encore une fois à éloigner les dangers dont l'existence de l'Empire Ottoman semble menacée.

Quelle que soit la gravité de ces dangers, nous ne désespérons nullement de la sagesse de la Turquie, pourvu que les Grandes Puissances de l'Europe persistent unanimement dans la ferme résolution de soutenir la cause du Sultan, et qu'elles impriment à cet effet aux démarches de leurs Représentans à Alexandrie un caractère d'énergie, qui peut seul réussir à vaincre la résistance du Vice-Roi.

Si en était autrement, les remontrances des Cabinets de l'Europe ne pourraient avoir aucune impression sur l'esprit de Méhémet Ali. Il ne se prêterait à aucune concession équitable. Il resterait en possession, et de la Haute Égypte, et du territoire qu'il a occupé même au-delà des limites posées par l'arrangement de Kutahia. En un mot, il ne tiendrait aucun compte des offres de conciliation dont les Représentans Alliés viennent de se rendre l'organe. Leur intervention en faveur de la Porte, demeurerait ainsi impuissante et stérile, de sorte que l'Europe verrait avec surprise et avec regret, que les Cabinets réunis de Paris, de Londres, de Vienne, et de St Pétersbourg se reconnaissent dans l'impossibilité de vaincre la résistance d'un Pacha d'Égypte isolément opposée à la volonté unanime de toutes les Grandes Puissances.

Nous abandonnons au Cabinet des Tuileries de juger de l'impression

qu'un pareil fait devrait produire sur l'opinion de tous les pays, ainsi que des conséquences regrettables qui en résulteraient pour l'autorité morale de tous les Gouvernemens.

Cette considération est si grave, elle intéresse de si près la dignité des Cours de l'Europe, qu'il nous suffit de l'avoir signalée ici, pour être persuadés qu'elle ne manquera pas de fixer l'attention sérieuse du Cabinet des Tuileries.

Nous ne méconnaissons pas, il est vrai, les motifs que M. le Duc de Dalmatie vous a exposés, M. le Comte, et qui inspirent au Gouvernement Français un éloignement réel pour l'adoption de mesures coercitives contre l'Égypte. Mais une fois que les Représentans Alliés ont spontanément offert leur intervention à la Porte, et que celle-ci l'a acceptée, il serait impossible de découvrir que les Cabinets de l'Europe ont contracté envers le Sultan l'engagement moral d'assurer à ce Souverain des conditions plus avantageuses que celles qu'il aurait pu obtenir, s'il avait conclu un arrangement direct avec le Vice-Roi, ainsi que le Divan en avait eu d'abord la pensée, détermination que la Porte aurait déjà mise à exécution depuis longtemps, si les Représentans Alliés ne l'en avaient empêché, en lui offrant leur intervention.

Il en résulte nécessairement que le Sultan, pour avoir renoncé à l'avantage d'une transaction immédiate, pour avoir consenti à rester sous le poids d'une incertitude de jour en jour plus accablante et plus dangereuse; en un mot, pour avoir placé sa confiance dans les promesses des Cabinets Alliés, se trouve aujourd'hui pleinement en droit d'attendre que ces promesses ne restent pas sans effet.

Or, comment les Grandes Puissances répondront-elles à cette juste attente du Sultan, si elles ne se déterminent point à adopter envers l'Égypte une attitude plus prononcée et plus décisive?

Nous nous bornons, M. le Comte, à livrer cette question à l'examen consciencieux du Cabinet Français.

Je vous prie de m'adresser la copie de la lettre que vous m'avez adressée sous la date du 24. M. le Baron de Bunsen, à Paris, me a communiqué de son côté les instructions que le Comte des Affaires étrangères a adressées à ses Représentans à Vienne, Constantinople et Alexandrie.

Je vous prie de m'adresser la copie de la lettre que vous m'avez adressée sous la date du 24. M. le Baron de Bunsen, à Paris, me a communiqué de son côté les instructions que le Comte des Affaires étrangères a adressées à ses Représentans à Vienne, Constantinople et Alexandrie.

M. le Baron de Bunsen, à Paris, me a communiqué de son côté les instructions que le Comte des Affaires étrangères a adressées à ses Représentans à Vienne, Constantinople et Alexandrie.

Ce but étant d'accord avec les vœux de toutes les Puissances, nous espérons que leurs Représentans à Constantinople recevront de leur Gouvernement les instructions qui les mettront en mesure d'agir dans le même sens que notre Ministère; et que la réunion de leurs efforts, dirigés vers le même but d'une manière conforme à la dignité des Grandes Puissances, ne tardera point à amener la crise actuelle à une solution satisfaisante pour l'Égypte, équitable pour la Porte, et honorable pour l'Europe.

Tels sont les vœux que notre Cabinet n'hésite pas à émettre, dans la ferme persuasion qu'ils s'accordent avec l'intérêt bien entendu de toutes les Puissances amies de la paix.

Veillez, M. le Comte, énoncer cette pensée envers M. le Duc de Dalmatie, en lui donnant lecture de la présente dépêche, ainsi que du résumé des instructions à M. de Bouteneff, qui s'y trouve annexé.

(S. no) NESSELRODE





certain to be successful; that if they met with no opposition as far as the extremity of Asia, they would not be able to cross to Europe, if we guarded the strait; that obliged in such an event to halt, his arms would lose their prestige, and his power very probably be dissipated. All these things being not only possible, but probable I could not but suppose that they would present themselves to the Viceroy's consideration; and that he would not rush headlong upon them.

His Majesty said we could not guard the strait, for if we attempted to do so, we should have Russia to contend with; that he saw nothing in a prolongation of the present crisis, but confusion and complication, ending in war; and that we had no choice but to finish matters in the way he had stated, as soon as possible.

That we should put an end to the present state of suspense as soon as possible, was also, I said, your Lordship's opinion; but you thought that a speedy decision was to be attained by very different means from those which His Majesty pointed out.

Here our conversation, of which it has been impossible to detail more than an outline, concluded. I endeavoured frequently in the course of it to ascertain whether His Majesty would be willing to propose any concessions as absolute on the Viceroy, and must, to the employment of force, on obtaining them, but I could not bring him to state that under any circumstances he would be a party to measures of coercion; and in this respect, His Majesty's language to me was much the same as that which he had used a few nights previously to Count Moltke. Your Lordship will observe that, by the conversation of which I have thus informed your Lordship, His Majesty Louis Philippe has adopted with apparent firmness, ideas very different from those which prevail in Her Majesty's Government. I cannot say however that His Majesty would separate himself from all the other Powers of Europe, were they positively agreed as to any course and ready to accept one; but I am sure there must, at least, be such an agreement, in order to induce him to depart from the line which he has traced out for himself.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER

## No. 341

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 58.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 16, 1839

IN conversing with Marshal Soult, in respect to the position of affairs in the East, and pressing upon him the necessity to act with promptitude and vigour for their settlement, he said that he should shortly be able to communicate, in a precise form, the views of the French Government thereupon; and speaking of his personal sentiments he confessed, that the Pacha of Egypt should neither be allowed to retain the districts of Adana and Marash, nor the Island of Candia. "But," said the Marshal, "to obtain Syria from him is, I believe, out of the question." I asked the Marshal, whether he would consider himself bound to provide for the execution of any arrangement for which the French Government did declare itself, and which the Porte accepted? But although his Excellency did not absolutely say, that should Menemet Ali refuse to accept the conditions of which France approved, force should be employed for such an object; and I still think that Her Majesty's Government can hardly hope that the French Cabinet will, under any circumstances, be persuaded to employ measures of coercion against the Viceroy.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

## No. 342

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 231.)

My Lord,

Therapia, August 26, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship a duplicate translation of the Official Note addressed by the Sublime Porte to the Five Great Powers, on the 22nd instant, as well as a copy of my reply.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

## Inclosure I in No. 342.

Note addressed by the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Five Great Powers.

## Traduction

IL est notoire que Sa Hautesse le Sultan a daigné, immédiatement après son avènement au trône, accorder au Gouverneur d'Egypte, Méhémet Ali Pacha, son pardon Impérial, ainsi que l'hérédité pour l'Egypte. On avait de la peine à croire l'avis d'un tel acte de clemence et de bonté, lorsque MM. les Représentans des Cinq Hautes Puissances présentèrent à la Sublime Porte une Note, par laquelle ils lui annonçaient que, par suite d'un accord qui s'était établi entre leurs Gouvernemens, et respectivement avec le Pacha, ils étaient convenus de régler la Question d'Egypte. La Sublime Porte en fut informée aussitôt le dit Pacha, et lui fit part de l'attitude des ouvertures qui devaient lui être faites de la part des Cinq Puissances, voici que Méhémet Ali Pacha élève des prétentions onéreuses, telles que la demande de l'hérédité pour tous les pays soumis à son administration, l'intention annoncée de faire dépendre le renvoi de la Flotte Impériale de l'accomplissement de ses vœux; l'insistance à exiger divers changements d'emplois, lesquels ne sauraient dépendre que de la volonté Souveraine; enfin, l'envoi de lettres injurieuses aux divers Vizirs Gouverneurs de Roumélie et d'Anatolie, dans le but de les exciter à la révolte. Comme cette manière d'agir du Pacha d'Egypte doit être envisagée comme contraire aux devoirs de la soumission et de l'obéissance, et comme l'arrangement favorable de cette affaire appartient aux Cinq Puissances, la Sublime Porte désire qu'elles veuillent bien aviser aux moyens de faire rentrer Méhémet Ali dans ses devoirs en le décidant à restituer la Flotte Impériale; à renoncer à la prétention de l'hérédité pour la Syrie; à revenir de la demande inconvenante concernant le changement du Grand Vizir, lequel ne peut appartenir qu'au Souverain, à abandonner toute tentative d'insurrection et de soulèvement; et à attendre tranquillement l'effet des dispositions gracieuses qui seront concertées et arrêtées ici sous la médiation des dites Puissances et sanctionnées ensuite par Sa Hautesse le Sultan. La Sublime Porte désire par conséquent, que MM. les Représentans veuillent transmettre à leurs Gouvernemens, avec célérité, la présente communication, demander les instructions nécessaires, et l'en informer en son temps.

Tout ceci ayant été communiqué aux Légations d'Autriche, de Russie, de France, et de Prusse, la Sublime Porte en a informé Son Excellence M. l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre par la présente Note Officielle.

Le 13 Djemazi-ul-ewel, 1255—(22 Août, 1839.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 342

*Official Note from Viscount Ponsonby to the Sublime Porte*

Theraps, August 23, 1939.

**THE** Undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, has had the honour to receive from his Excellency the Most High Nizam-ul-Mulk, a Note from the Sublime Porte, under date of the 21<sup>st</sup> August, which the Undersigned, in accordance with the desire of the Sublime Porte, has this day transmitted to his Court.

The Under-Secretary contented that the British Government will receive, with the greatest satisfaction, this evidence of the confidence reposed by the Siam Government in the Five Great Powers, and that the result of this work may be adopted by the Siam Government will be in every respect advantageous to its rights and interests.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed) **PONSONBY.**

No. 343.

*Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde.*

No. 139 )

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 19, 1839

I RECEIVED, on the 13th instant, your Excellency's despatches from No. 94 to No. 100 inclusive, and I have the satisfaction to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the language held by your Excellency as reported in those despatches.

(Signed) I am, &c.  
PALMERSTON

No 344

*Vicount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde*

(No. 140.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 13 1839.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 95 stating that the Emperor of Russia has determined to send Baron Brunow to London, I have to instruct your Excellency to assure Count Nessetode that Her Majesty's Government have learnt, with much gratification, the motives which have led His Imperial Majesty to send Baron Brunow to this country at the present moment, and your Excellency will state, that Baron Brunow will be received with the greatest cordiality, not only from the high character which he bears, but from the knowledge which Her Majesty's Government possesses that the Baron enjoys the full confidence of Count Nessetode.

(Signed) I am &c.  
PALMERSTON

No. 345

*Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 21.)*

No. 71.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, September 2, 1839.

NO changes have taken place here since my last despatches of 16th August to your Lordship and all ~~is perfectly the same~~, but the Paasha holds the same language as before with respect to Hosrew Paasha and to the Turkish Fleet.

Ever since the communication was made to the Pasha, that the Great Powers had undertaken the settlement of the Eastern Question, I have abstained as much as possible from entering with the Pasha into any of the points connected with it.

The Pasha has, however, told my colleagues, that Ibrahim Pasha had written to him to say that his present position was a bad one during the winter, and that he must either advance or retire before that season; and he asks his father's orders on the subject, and his father has directed him not to move for the present; but I am assured that Ibrahim Pasha has collected supplies, and made every preparation which could be required for a forward movement by his army.

I saw the Pasha four days ago, when he told me that if in the course of a month or six weeks he could learn that the arrangement between the British and himself was a kind of secret, Ibrahim Pasha must advance with his army. I did not write to say that his army could not, in any position, advance to the water and that he must therefore wait for me. I said that his army could not advance to the water from the point of Acre, & that I would have to wait for him at the point of Acre. As I

I did not feel at all sorry that I was going to the  
 army with my friends. I was very happy to go. I had  
 Captain Lee with me and a few other boys. I would be  
 repaid for the money I had given and would be a great help.  
 I was the driver of the horse and I was very happy to be in the army.

I then asked Mr. Parnell what that was. He said it was a reward in the event of such a verdict which the government had offered. He said that as he himself was not arrested with the country with its soldiers, he was ineligible to it. He said that he had a good reason for not accepting it.

[illegible][illegible]

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL



No. 346

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 21.)

(No. 72.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, September 5, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that Captain Caillier, who was sent by Marshal Soult to Ibrahim Pasha, returned to this place on the 2nd instant, on his way to Paris, and says that Ibrahim Pasha occupied his former position at Marash, and has also a corps at Orfa.

Ibrahim Pasha mentioned to Captain Caillier the necessity of changing his position for the facility of supplies, and mentioned that if his father consented, he would propose occupying Diarbekir, but not to move further north than was absolutely necessary.

Captain Caillier has told me, that Ibrahim Pasha professes the strongest affection and obedience to the Sultan, and that he will defend the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and of the Sultan's supremacy, even against Mehemet Ali himself but at the same time that he will not concede any hereditary succession to Syria, even if Mehemet Ali himself should do so.

I have, &amp;c.,

(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 347

Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 99.)

My Lord,

Berlin, September 18, 1839.

BARON WERTHER having been asked me with a patent of nobility why the British desertion of the Crimea was not the subject of any day to assist in your Majesty's Al to comply with the wishes of the Five Powers I was glad to be able to furnish an answer by the possession of Colonel Campbell's despatch to your Lordship dated August 15, No. 67, in which he stated that Mehemet Ali would direct Ibrahim Pasha to march on Constantinople the instant the British and French squadrons appeared in sight of Alexandria. Baron Werther said that if we were deterred from acting against Mehemet Ali, we must not allow it to be supposed that we were the Five Powers. I told him that we were not, and that the French Government positively determined to act with us. He then replied, that he was certain the French Government would not act without us. By what I said we must not let the Power which we were with us, and we have the means of forcing Mehemet Ali to comply with our wishes. "Up to us," he replied, "we will do our best to prevent Ibrahim Pasha from marching on Constantinople, and creating anarchy by the intrigues and intrigues of Mehemet Ali." I told him your Lordship had no distrust of Russia, and I was convinced that you would accept the assurances M. de Brunnow was charged to give you with the confidence and loyalty they merited.

Baron Werther told me that Count Königsmarck's despatches made him uneasy as to the internal state of Turkey. The vitality of the Empire appeared to be declining. The Count's opinion, however, is of little value.

I begged of Baron Werther to instruct the Prussian Minister at Paris to make known to the French Cabinet the King of Prussia's approval of

the policy of the British Cabinet towards the East, and His Majesty's desire that France should not separate from the Five Powers. His Excellency said he had already so done, and would repeat his instructions.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) WILLIAM RUSSELL.

No. 348

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 235.)

My Lord,

Therapia, August 30, 1839.

IT may not be necessary to repeat what your Lordship is already aware of, but I can do so. I mention again the fact, that M. de Bouteneff declared to the Sublime Porte that he would ask for his passports should the Porte ever consent to call the British or French fleet up here.

It may not be opportune to observe that this declaration amounts to a prohibition; that it arrogates for Russia the right to close these seas. This may be proper, and it may be satisfactory, but it is fit it should be known.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 349.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 23.)

No. 236.

My Lord,

Therapia, August 30, 1839.

I ENCLOSE a memorandum I have received from Mr. Alison, attached to this Embassy.

Your Lordship will perceive that the report of the projects of parties here, made by the Turkish gentleman, corresponds in a considerable degree with accounts I have had of the state of affairs, and made known to your Lordship.

I have directed Mr. Alison to exert his best means to obtain more information.

The accounts, dated the 17th instant, from Odessa, state that the Russians had made no preparations. I continue to believe they will not venture to act; at least not whilst the fleets remain so near that an accidental shift of wind might enable them to pass the Dardanelles, and come up here, at an inconvenient moment.

Your Lordship will recollect my late reports to you, of the attempts made by Nouri Effendi, at the instigation of the Russians, to obtain the removal of the British fleet, and my refusal. Your Lordship must be well acquainted with the fact, that the Russians have relations with Mehemet Ali, and an interest in his success. The Russian Government and Mission prove the fact. Mehemet Ali and the Russians exert their united efforts to raise a party against the views of England, Austria, and France. They are aided by the timidity (to use a gentle, but I fear not a correct, expression) of Nouri Effendi, Sarim, and other Ottoman Ministers, and the Grand Vicer may be either alarmed, or deceived, or seduced, to the abandonment of that policy to which he really owes his existence.

The presence of the fleet is the only check upon those who intend to wrest from England, Austria, and France, the arrangement of affairs, and to give it up to the sole power of Russia. It is true that the fleet is, in itself, nearly useless, because it is unprovided with the means for passing the Dardanelles at will, and because the Admiral is so restricted by his

(Signed) **PONSONBY**

Enclosure in No. 349

August 30, 1939

y Russia; that before the fleets of England and France (which were to be called in at the same time) could pass the Dardanelles, it would be announced that any further intervention was useless, as, owing to the urgency of the circumstances, the Porte had been obliged to come to an immediate settlement with Mehmet Ali Pasha. He said, that should the Powers attempt to force the execution of the Convention, he would thwart it, by applying for the support of the English and French fleets, and that the only way in which Hossrew Pasha could save himself, would be by bringing the matter officially under the notice of the Representatives of the Five Powers, and leaving them to settle the question of the descent of the Russian fleet among themselves: but, inquired he, how could the Grand Visier propose a measure to the Divan which militated against the interests and views of the majority? Their only motive for suspense, he concluded, arose from an apprehension of the British and French fleets coming up to Constantinople uncalled for.

No. 3541

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—Received September 23.*

No. 237. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Therapia, August 30, 1839

I ENCLOSE a copy of a Report made by the Austrian Dragoman to the Interimario.

I have had a long conversation with him and M Hussar upon the

The co-operation with Russia has always appeared to me to be an impossibility, and I am confirmed in my opinion, which I think right to state without conditions, that either the Great Powers must resolve to act at once by force, if necessary, in such a way as their own interests require they should act and in defence of the welfare of Russia, or they are bound to retire from the contest, and leave Turkey at the disposal of Russia. Straightforward courageous conduct cannot fail to secure success to the Three Powers without a struggle. Submission will make a future war certain.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) **PONSONBY**

Inclosure is No 350

*Report from the Austrian Dragoman to the Baron de Stürmer.*

31 le Baron.

Mercredi, 28 Août, 1839

AYANT vu ce matin le Moustéchar Nouri Essendi, je lui ai fait part de l'entretien que j'ai eu avant-hier avec Son Altesse le Grand Vizeir Hussein Pacha relativement à la Question Egyptienne; après quoi je l'ai prié de vouloir bien me dire ce qui était décidé dans le conseil de Lundi.

\$ F



"Il s'agissait," m'a dit Nouri Effendi, "d'arrêter notre ultimatum (مولى قري), c'est-à-dire de fixer le dernier arrangement dans lequel le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse pourra entrer avec Méhémet Ali. Mais comme les membres du conseil ne sont pas encore unanimement d'accord sur tous les points, je ne peux rien encore vous communiquer de positif."

"C'est pour cette raison que la Note dont vous a parlé Son Altesse le Grand Vizir n'est pas prête: il faut que tous les Membres du Divan approuvent et acceptent l'arrangement en discussion. Au reste, si M. l'Internonce craint que nous ne détruisions ou altérions l'effet de notre première Note, de celle qui a été envoyée aux Cinq Puissances, ses appréhensions ne sont pas fondées. Nous ne changerons rien au principe. Seulement comme la dite Note est peu détaillée, à cause de la hâte avec laquelle elle a été rédigée, nous mettrons dans celle qui va suivre les développements nécessaires. J'espère vous en faire voir le brouillon; vous en rendrez compte. M. l'Internonce a déjà le droit de faire les observations, nous en tirerons profit afin de conformer notre langage à la pensée de Son Altesse le Prince de Metternich."

Je n'ai pas manqué de remercier Nouri Effendi de la confiance qu'il veut bien nous témoigner; ajoutant que rien ne fait prospérer les affaires tant qu'une confiance loyale entre les parties intéressées.

J'en ai pris occasion de demander si les Représentans des Puissances Amies ont répondu à la Note qui leur a été adressée dernièrement.

"Lord Ponsonby," répliqua Nouri Effendi, "a répondu. Il s'est montré très-satisfait. Il nous a remercié. Il nous a prévenu que la Note est partie sans délai pour Londres. Je vous ai déjà dit que sa manière de penser s'accorde entièrement avec celle de M. l'Internonce."

"Les autres Représentans ont de même envoyé la Note à leurs Gouvernemens, dont ils attendent les instructions."

"Quant à M. l'Envoyé de Russie, il n'attend point d'instructions de son Cour, s'en trouvant déjà muni. Je vous dirai en substance la réponse qui nous a été apportée par le Prince Houtjéri. C'est à la Porte à prendre une décision, dans sa qualité de Souveraine, vis-à-vis de son vassal, et aux Puissances de l'Europe à demander à la Porte ce qu'elle veut décider en vertu de sa Souveraineté. La décision et les pourparlers doivent avoir lieu à Constantinople, et pas à Londres, ni dans un autre endroit étranger. Que si les Puissances prennent ce chemin et sanctionnent par leur assentiment la décision prise par la Porte, la Russie est d'accord avec ses amis. Mais si les Puissances veulent arrêter un arrangement définitif de leur propre autorité, sans l'assentiment de la Porte, et dans un autre endroit qu'à Constantinople, la Russie n'y ratifiera pas."

Donnant à la conversation une autre tournure, j'ai parlé des émissaires de Méhémet Ali.

"C'est vrai," disait Nouri Effendi, "ces émissaires ont apporté un tas de lettres, pour exciter les fonctionnaires de Sa Hautesse ainsi que le peuple contre Hosrew Pacha. Izet Pacha qui les avait retenus, en a fait son rapport à Moustapha Pacha. Moustapha Pacha, embarrassé par le grand nombre des ordres de la Porte, a dit à Son Altesse le Grand Vizir qu'on leur ôte les papiers, mais qu'on les laisse libres de retourner en Egypte. Ils s'en sont retournés en effet à l'exception de deux individus, qui, ayant servi sous Ahmed Pacha, avaient profité de ce moyen pour venir en Turquie, l'un d'eux s'appelle Méhémet Bey, il est capitaine de vaisseau; il a demandé la permission de rester avec son compagnon, et l'autre s'appelle Ismail Bey, il est capitaine de frigate."

J'ai félicité Nouri Effendi d'un procédé si généreux et plein de sagesse. Dans les conjonctures actuelles, ne peut qu'être utile à Hosrew Pacha. Nouri Effendi, flatté du compliment, m'a observé, "que Hosrew Pacha veut faire honte à Méhémet Ali; et que si les émissaires fussent venus à Constantinople, il leur aurait même fourni les frais de voyage pour retourner en Egypte. Il a dit: 'Les émissaires de Méhémet Ali ne sont pas à Constantinople, ils sont en Egypte. Le Pacha d'Egypte porteur des émissaires, parcequ'il s'est trouvé appartenir à Méhémet Ali et non pas à notre flotte.'"

Etant arrivé à ce point, Nouri Effendi se leva, me salua, et se mit en chemin pour aller chez Hosrew Pacha qui l'avait fait inviter dans son

Palais. Sarim Effendi s'y rendit également. J'en conclus que la rédaction de la nouvelle Note est vivement débattue.

Habib Pacha est allé voir les nouveaux phares à l'embouchure de la Mer Noire.

Rien de saillant de l'Egypte.

(Signé)

ED. ADELBOURG.

No. 351

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer

No. 36.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 23, 1839.

WITH reference to your despatch, marked "Secret and Confidential," of the 16th instant, reporting the substance of a conversation which the King of the French held with you on the 15th instant, upon the subject of the present state of affairs in the Levant, I have to inform you, that the language held to you by His Majesty upon this occasion differed essentially from that which was held to me by Count Sébastiani in a conversation which I had with him a week ago.

In that conversation, Count Sébastiani endeavoured to persuade me to consent on the part of Her Majesty's Government, to propose to the Sultan and Mehemet Ali an arrangement, by which Mehemet Ali should become hereditary Governor of Egypt and of southern Syria, as far north as a line drawn from Damascus to Beyrout, leaving, as I understood him, the former city to the Sultan, and giving the latter place to the Pasha; while, on the other hand, Mehemet should evacuate all the other territories now held by him; and the Count stated that France would be willing to concur in coercive measures to enforce the execution of such an arrangement.

To this I replied, that such an arrangement would have the great disadvantage of containing within itself the seeds of future contention; that the line drawn from Damascus to Beyrout would be a mere arbitrary line, and would establish no definite frontier between the Two Parties, that it would give Mehemet Ali a *tête de pont*, as it were, in Syria, which would both tempt and assist him to future encroachments; that the probable differences between him and the Arab tribes would furnish him with a constant pretext for keeping up an army in Syria; and that all the objections which apply to the present state of things, as established by the arrangement of Kutaya, would apply in a proportionate degree to the arrangement thus suggested by Count Sébastiani. I said, that if the Five Powers are to take this matter in hand, and to employ force, or the threat of force, to compel acquiescence on the part of Mehemet Ali, it is on every account most desirable that the arrangement which they may determine to carry into effect should be one calculated to accomplish the great object which they have in view, and to secure the peace of Europe against the dangers by which it would be threatened, if future conflict were to arise in Syria between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt; but that it would reflect little honour upon the alliance, if the Five Powers were to make a great effort to accomplish an evidently imperfect result.

I said, that moreover I did not understand upon what principle France could be ready to co-operate in coercive measures for the purpose of enforcing this incomplete settlement, and should decline so to co-operate. I said, that if France proposed a settlement which was not so far better, and which, because it is far better, she would prefer, if Mehemet Ali could be persuaded willingly to accede to it.

I said, that the main objection put forward by France to coercive measures for the purpose of compelling Mehemet Ali to content himself with Egypt, is, that if such measures were to be employed for such a purpose, Mehemet would immediately order his army to march upon Constantinople, and then would follow all the difficulties and embarrassments which such a step on his part would necessarily produce; but, I said, the

only reason we have for thinking that Mehemet Ali would take such a step is, that he has said he would; but if we are to go by what he has said, it is equally certain that he would order Ibrahim to march for the purpose of resisting the modified arrangement proposed by France; because what Mehemet Ali has really said is, that he will not abandon the smallest part of what he now occupies; and that he will resist by all means in his power any attempt to deprive him of any portion of it. Either, therefore, we are to go by what Mehemet Ali says, or by what we think it is likely he will do. In the former case, the incomplete settlement would be just as difficult of enforcement as the more complete one; in the latter case, we may reasonably expect that, if the Five Powers are united, the complete arrangement will be as easy of attainment as the incomplete one could possibly be.

Count Sebastiani admitted that Mehemet Ali might resist the arrangement he had suggested, and disclaimed, on the part of the French Government, any peculiar knowledge of the intentions of Mehemet Ali, or any authority to negotiate on behalf of the Pasha with the other Powers; but, he said, the decision of the French Government turned very much upon domestic considerations; and that his Government might be able to justify towards the Chambers and the people the employment of coercive measures against the Pasha if it could be shown that the Pasha had not been driven absolutely to despair, and that France had made for him the best arrangement which could be obtained.

I said, that considering what Mehemet Ali is, and from what conditions he is going, I certainly thought that the Egyptian Pashalik of Egypt would at least be a "beau désespoir;" but that, from what the Count had said, it would appear that the first object of France was the Pasha, and not the Sultan; and that although the French Government had made a spontaneous declaration that its leading aim was, "to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire under its present dynasty; and that France would employ all its influence and means of action, in order to maintain the security of this essential element of the balance of power," and that they would not put it in a position to suppose any nation which should be hostile to that independence and integrity," nevertheless, it would seem that the object of France was to uphold Mehemet Ali rather than the Turkish Empire; and I observed, that this tallied with a remark which had been made very early at Vienna, that the views of England and France differed in this respect: that England wished to make the best bargain for the Sultan, and France the best bargain for Mehemet Ali.

Count Sebastiani assured me that I was quite mistaken if I entertained any such supposition; that the objects aimed at by France were nothing more or less than those which she had stated in her declaration.

He then pressed me to come to some practical conclusion which he might be able to communicate to his Government.

I said it was impossible for me to give him any such answer as he wished, because, in the first place, I could not take upon me to do so without consulting my colleagues and ascertaining their decision; and, secondly, because matters were not yet in such a state as to enable the Cabinet to come to a decision. I said, that I thought it likely that we should in the first place ascertain whether the other Three Powers agreed with us, or with France; and, in the former case, whether they would be willing to co-operate with us for the practical execution of our common views, and if we found they were willing to do so, we might possibly accept their co-operation and go on.

He said, if it did not agree with you and I, or if I said at or will not co-operate with you, will you then unite with France to carry into effect the arrangements which I have suggested?

I said it would be time enough for the Government to determine that question when the case arose, and it was impossible to decide it beforehand.

He asked what, then, should be the communication he should make to his Government? I said he had better report exactly what had passed between us; and that it would be for his Government to consider what

course would suit them best. That if the other Three Powers should agree with us, which I thought probable, it would surely be better for France to face all the internal difficulties which keep back its Government, and to join frankly and freely the other Four Powers; but if, for reasons of which the French Government alone can judge, such a course would be impossible, France might stand aloof while the other Four were carrying into execution an arrangement which even France herself has approved of, and she might then join the Allies again in the other arrangements which might require to be made when the territorial settlement had been effected.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 352

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 63.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 20, 1839

COUNT MEDEM informed me this morning, that yesterday, in an interview with Marshal Soltikoff, (who was about to send a courier to St. Petersburg,) he pressed the Marshal strongly to make some statement of the views of the French Government in regard to an arrangement between the Porte and the Viceroy of Egypt, and that Marshal Soltikoff said that he was employed on such a document. "Then," said Count Medem, "your Excellency must know the basis of it; may I request to be informed thereupon?" At last, and by little and little, as Count Medem expressed himself to me, he learnt that the views of the French Government, in respect to such a settlement, were those of which I spoke in my despatch No. 36, viz. the abandonment of all pretensions over Horew Pasha's employment, the restoration of the Ottoman fleet, the resignation of Adana, Marash, and the Island of Candia, on the part of the Viceroy, together with some arrangement in respect to Syria, which would divide that country into Pashalics, of which the sons of Mehemet should have the separate Governments entailed upon their male offspring respectively, with the condition, that these Pashalics, on failure of direct male issue, should fall back, as each such case should occur, to the Porte. I asked Count Medem whether the Marshal had said what he would do, supposing Mehemet Ali should refuse to subscribe to such conditions? He said that he had put this question to the Marshal, but could obtain from him no more direct answer than that if Mehemet Ali positively refused to accept such an arrangement as that he spoke of, that then the French Government would feel less objection to the employment of coercive measures. Count Medem has communicated the result of this conversation to his Government.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 353

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 63.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 20, 1839.

COUNT MEDEM received a private communication from his brother this morning, which he was kind enough to show me.

By Count Alexander Medem's letter it would appear that Mehemet Ali had first proposed to the other Powers, the Czar (General of Russia not being present,) that unless there seemed some probability of an arrangement within a month's time, he should order his son at the expiration of that period, to march on to Constantinople; that in consequence



of this communication, Count Alexander Medem had had an interview with the Viceroy, and requested him to state distinctly his intentions; and that Mehemet Ali had replied, by observing, that if within a month's time some arrangement under the intervention of the Five Powers had not commenced, he could have no doubt that the conclusion of such an arrangement would be a work of much time, and that, unable to maintain his troops where they were, he should then advance them to Orsa and Diarbekir, but that under no circumstances should he pass the Taurus, unless measures of coercion were adopted against him.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER

No 354

*Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 29.)*

(No. 76.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 27, 1839

I HAVE had the honour of receiving your Lordship's despatches to No. 39 inclusive.

With respect to your Lordship's observation, that the language recently held to me by His Majesty the King of the French differed essentially from that which General Sébastiani held to your Lordship about a week ago, I can only assure your Lordship that my conversation with His Majesty was faithfully narrated; and I may also add, that His Majesty has expressed the same opinions with equal force both to Count Medem and Count Appony, —having said to the latter, but a short time since, that under no circumstances which he could foresee, would he become a party to employing measures of coercion against Mehemet Ali. Between the language held by the King and by Marshal Soult, there is, in fact, the same difference which I have endeavoured to make apparent in my communications with your Lordship. On the one hand, His Majesty has seemed to consider it difficult, however desirable, to get the Viceroy to forego any of his demands, and has never promised that the French Government would propose any arrangement contrary to those demands, and has spoken of all measures of coercion, for whatever object employed, as out of the question. On the other hand, the Marshal has generally stated, that Mehemet Ali might make, and ought to make, great concessions; has lately declared that he should propose a plan in which such concessions would be comprehended; and has never declared that force should not be employed, though he would never affirm that it should be so; making this question depend upon the satisfactory resolution of two others, viz., the common accord of the Great Powers as to the conditions that should be imposed upon the Pasha, and an amicable understanding between the said Powers as to the part they should take in the possible contingency of Ibrahim's march on Constantinople. But as the Marshal knew that the Government of Russia had declared that it would not allow the force of any other Government to appear in the Bosphorus, and as the French Government had declared that it would not allow the Russian Government alone to send a force into that strait, an amicable understanding on this point seemed impossible; and being made the necessary preliminary to any discussion of the measures for executing an arrangement between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, did, in fact, indefinitely adjourn the whole question.

As I could never understand the Marshal to express himself more decidedly on this matter, I may confess that I was rather surprised to find that General Sébastiani had endeavoured to persuade your Lordship to propose to the Sultan and Mehemet Ali an arrangement by which Mehemet Ali should become hereditary Governor of Egypt and of Southern Syria, as far north as from Damascus to Beyrout, stating that France would be willing to employ coercive measures to enforce the execution of such an arrange-

I cannot help saying that I am almost inclined to believe that General Sébastiani, although he pressed your Lordship for an answer which he might give to his Government, did not speak according to any positive instructions from his Government,—a conjecture which I hazard with the more confidence since the despatch containing the views of the French Government on the affairs of the East, was not sent to London earlier than last Monday, while that despatch merely expresses the views of which I had the honour to acquaint your Lordship in my despatch No. 50, with, however, this important exception, that Marshal Soult having told me that the Island of Candia ought to be immediately surrendered to the Sultan, now says in his official communications to the different Cabinets, that Candia should be surrendered to the Porte after Mehemet's death. There is nothing said, however, in this recent declaration of the opinions of the French Government, as to any willingness to carry into execution, —a fact which would be of no importance, since the one case would seem implied in the other, were not the King's opinions so little concealed, and so positive, and had not the French Government always placed, as I have had the honour of observing to your Lordship, so many conditions in the way of the ultimate employment of force, as to render the chance of resorting to it almost an impossibility; thereby weakening and almost destroying the effect of any simple declaration against the Viceroy's pretensions.

As your Lordship will, I understand, have transmitted to you a copy of the Note sent to the French Ambassadors in London and Vienna, you will be able to compare the contents of that Note with General Sébastiani's prior communications. But at the same time, I have to beg of you to put up to the time at which I had the honour of writing to you, (September 16th,) His Majesty Louis Philippe entertained and openly professed those sentiments which in my despatch marked "secret and confidential," I had the honour of

And now, my Lord, passing by the incident, and arriving at the general question in its present position, I should state, that in an interview I had this morning with Marshal Soult, we entered into the subject of M. de Brunnow's mission, and the conversation which had in consequence taken place between your Lordship and General Sébastiani. I asked Marshal Soult to inform me of the substance of that conversation, as it had been reported by General Sébastiani. The Marshal said, you will see by reading this despatch, which is an answer to it. I accordingly did read a despatch which General Sébastiani has ordered to communicate to your Lordship, and which, turning entirely upon the part which Russia would take to herself, in sending, in case of need, a force for the protection of Constantinople, declares, as the Marshal did himself personally declare to me that France never would consent to this measure. "I stand," said the Marshal, "by my old declaration, that if a Russian fleet appear in the Bosphorus, a French fleet shall arrive there also. This declaration," continued the Marshal, "has been likewise the declaration of England, and by it I abide."

I observed to the Marshal, that I considered and thought that Her Majesty's Government might consider that there was a great difference between what Russia might do by herself and for herself, and what she might do with the consent and as the agent of the other Great Powers; and that, in fact, by accepting any such mission, she abrogated the exclusive part which she had been hitherto considered to have assumed in Eastern Affairs.

The Marshal did not concur in these observations; but considered, on the contrary, that the mission which Russia would undertake for her own interest might in this new contention be changed, that the attainment of that object was, in his view, the only one which France could acquire in position to which she aspired, of appearing as alone capable of protecting Constantinople, that the Russian Empire from which it had been the object of France to deliver her; while he, the Marshal, had always considered the Question of the East as one which was to be settled, and considered rather with the view of limiting the power of Russia than that of the Pasha of Egypt; the second seeming to him an inferior object to the first. I observed, that Her Majesty's Government were just as much convinced of the necessity of restraining the power of

Russia within just limits as the Marsha, but as he, agreeing with us as to the principle of protecting the Sultan against Mehemet Ali, seemed to differ from us as to the means of doing so, so we, agreeing with him as to the necessity of keeping the power of Russia within reasonable bounds, might also differ from him as to what would be the wisest course for attaining that object. But this I begged the Marshal particularly to observe—that whereas the presence of Russia at Constantinople, if the result of a convention between that Empire and other Powers would, as I had already remarked, be in many other respects different from her entering into the Bosphorus as merely her own right, so more especially would it be different by making the other Powers with which this convention was entered into parties to the proceedings. So that France, by opposing Russia in such a case, would be opposing her Allies—a course which I could not persuade myself that the French Government would willingly adopt.

The Marshal did not answer directly to this remark, and as he seemed rather excited upon the subject I thought it better to let the conversation drop for the moment, since the more the King of the French and the French Government themselves consider the position in which France would be placed by standing alone and aloof amidst the general settlement of a question in which she began by assuming a forward and important part the more likely is it that all parties will endeavour to associate this country with the other Great Powers of Europe in any course of which those Powers may generally approve, and it may be better, therefore, not to take the first word of this Government, or the new position which affairs have taken as the last.

The communication of M. de Brunnow, and the manner in which the French Government seem to think it will be considered by Her Majesty's Government, has, indeed, created such a sensation here, and seems so to have confounded all previous speculations, that it is difficult at this first moment of consternation to say what will definitively be the result. On the one hand, the feeling in the country is very strong against Russia, and the recent speech of the Emperor Nicholas reviving old recollections, has deeply wounded the national vanity. At the same time the opinion of the press, and of the men who control the public journals and general literature of France is decidedly, as I have already had the honour of informing your Lordship, favourable to Mehemet Ali, who is considered—I can hardly say why—as the natural ally of France. At least

The King moreover has expressed in the strongest manner his determination to pursue any measures of coercion against Egypt, and has generally avowed that he does, more, where the expression of the Marsha, than where nothing can be more decided at present, I have the honour of conveying to your Lordship.

Judging from these circumstances then, I should be inclined to say at once that Her Majesty's Government agreeing with the propositions which I understand M. de Brunnow to have made, should enter into a convention with the Governments of Russia and Austria for limiting Mehemet Ali's power to Egypt, and for compelling him to withdraw his forces within such limits respecting Russia as not to affect the means of exercising the protection of Constantinople, that France would not be a party to such convention and therefore would not be bound against a possible Russian force in the Bosphorus, should the case arise of any such force appearing there; in every other respect the position of a neutral. This I think is a very strong saying on the part of France, and I trust I may France as the result of her policy towards Russia, towards Egypt, as the consequence also of her Sovereign's and her Prime Minister's declarations. But when I think, on the other hand, of the alarm which His Majesty is likely to feel at being deprived of the moral support which he has hitherto derived from his alliance with England, and of the situation in which, in an peculiar position, he will be reduced if alone and separated from the other Great Powers of Europe; when I consider also the restless vanity of this people, and the necessity for their Government to consider what course of policy best to pursue in the present conjuncture, I am inclined to think that France, and Russia, and Austria, are scarcely united for any definite object to be pursued in a particular manner, hostile as this Government may be to that object, and opposed as it may remain to the manner specified for attaining that

object, that still, notwithstanding these differences, it may yet become one of the parties to an engagement, of which it disapproves, rather than follow a course more congenial to its feelings, but which would more ostensibly condemn it to inaction and insignificance. A little time must elapse before this can well be determined; but in thus endeavouring to give your Lordship an imperfect sketch of the elements out of which a result is to be anticipated, I should not omit to say, that if Her Majesty's Government should, in conjunction with that of Russia, adopt a line of conduct, of which the Government of France openly disapproved, however much such an act would be inevitable consequence of the hesitation and irresolution of the French Cabinet, it would nevertheless excite a strong feeling against Great Britain in this country, and for a time, at all events, seriously affect those amicable and intimate relations which have lately existed between France and England.

I have the honour of being invited to Fontainebleau to-morrow, when I shall have the opportunity of conversing with His Majesty, and I will immediately communicate to your Lordship what takes place.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 355

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Campbell

No. 34.

Foreign Office, September 26, 1839.

Sir,

YOUR despatches to No. 72 inclusive have been received and laid before the Queen.

With reference to your despatch No. 71, I have to instruct you to state to Mehemet Ali, that Her Majesty's Government feels persuaded that he is so well able to calculate consequences, that he will not expose himself to those which would follow from any further acts of hostility on his part against the Sultan.

I have further to state to you, that the opinion which, it appears from your despatches, you are inclined to entertain of Mehemet Ali in Turkey, and which opinion is probably founded upon statements made to you by Mehemet Ali himself, is extremely incorrect and exaggerated.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 358

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 239.)

Therapia, August 31, 1839.

My Lord,

A DEPENDENT of the Grand Vicer, Reschid Bey, is just come here from Malatia, and he says that 400 officers have deserted from Ibrahim Pasha, and that they are on their route to Constantinople, and may arrive in a few days.

Reschid Bey is a man educated at Paris at the expense of the Grand Vicer, and was sent by Sultan Mahmoud to Hafiz Pasha. His report is believed, and if it prove to be correct, the fact he states must be considered extremely important.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 361



No. 357

*Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.— Received September 26*

(No. 75.)

My Lord,

*Paris, September 23, 1839*

AS I had understood from the French Government that it had been their intention to leave Captain Caillier in Egypt until the settlement of affairs in Egypt, I was surprised to learn that M. Desages, who was the occasion of this change, M. Desages told me that Captain Caillier, seeing that the Government stopped his army and had, moreover, the Sultan's orders to arrest him, and being unwell, resolved to come back to France. And though, on other reasons," as M. Desages, "we might regret this yet if M. Desages should take any desperate course it is quite as well that M. Caillier should not be with him."

I have, &amp;c.,

Signed HENRY L. BULWER

No. 358

*Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.*

(No. 6. Extract.)

*Foreign Office, September 27, 1839*

I HAVE the satisfaction to acquaint you that the Queen has been graciously pleased to appoint you to be Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, in the place of Colonel Campbell who retires from the service on account of his health.

It is essential for the public service, that you should proceed to Egypt with as little delay as possible. I have, therefore, to assure that you will make your preparations for that purpose, and that you will commence your journey to Alexandria with the least loss of time.

Your Commission and Instructions will be forwarded to Alexandria, and on your arrival, you will receive from Colonel Campbell, the whole of the official correspondence of the Consulate, and I have to desire that you will consider the instructions therein contained as addressed to yourself, and will make them the guide of your conduct.

Previously to your departure from Vienna, you will wait upon Her Majesty's Ambassador, and receive from his Excellency, such instructions as he may think it right to give to you for the guidance of your conduct in Egypt.

No. 359

*Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beaconsfield.*

(No. 123.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, September 27, 1839*

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency, that the Queen has been graciously pleased to appoint Colonel Hodges, now Her Majesty's Consul-General in Serbia, to be Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, in the place of Colonel Campbell.

I transmit to your Excellency, a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Colonel Hodges, and which I have to assure that your Excellency will give to Colonel Hodges such instructions as may appear proper, for the guidance of his conduct in Egypt, and that you will place him fully in possession of

the views and opinions of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the affairs of Turkey and Egypt, as explained in the various communications which have been addressed to you.

(Colonel Hodges will leave in your Excellency possession, the originals of the official correspondence of the Consulate in Serbia.)

I am, &amp;c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 360

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 242.)

My Lord,

*Therapia, September 5, 1839*

I ENCLOSE a Report which Captain Walker has made of the occurrences during the progress of the Ottoman fleet from the Dardanelles to Alexandria.

I have, &amp;c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure in No. 360

*Captain Walker to Viscount Ponsonby.*

My Lord,

*Therapia, August 4, 1839.*

I HAVE the honour to state for your information, all the particulars relative to the late extraordinary conduct of the Capudan Pasha, as well as the movements of the Turkish fleet, from the time of its departure from the Dardanelles until its arrival at Alexandria.

On the morning of the 4th of July, the Capudan Pasha received the official notification of the death of Sultan Mahmood, and the accession of his son, upon which occasion, all the ships dressed with flags and fired a royal salute, and in the afternoon of that day, the fleet consisting of eight ships of the line, twelve frigates, one corvette, four brigs, two schooners, three fire-ships, and one steam-vessel, weighed and stood out of the Dardanelles. As we had been for a long time under orders for the coast of Syria, all supposed that to be our destination, and that much was not the case, until our arrival in Beika Bay, when the Capudan Pasha informed me, that the Sultan had been poisoned, and four of the principal officers of his household beheaded; that this had been done by the Russian party, who had assumed the Government, and that to avoid the fleet falling into the hands of Russia, he intended to cruise outside the Dardanelles, so as to be ready to act with England and France. On the following morning, the 5th, he weighed, and when off Tenedos, fell in with Admiral Lalande's fleet, consisting of two ships of the line, and a brig; after the usual salutes had been exchanged, the French Admiral, accompanied by the Prince de Joinville, came on board to visit the Capudan Pasha. I was afterwards informed by him, that he had communicated all to the French Admiral, who highly approved of his plans, and that the Capudan Pasha intended to proceed to Rhodes. I then requested him to allow me to send letters on board the "Vanguard," which was in sight, so as your Excellency, as well as Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, might be made acquainted with his intentions; but his reply was, that the French Admiral had promised to communicate all particulars to your Lordship, as well as to the English Admiral; and that he was anxious that the "Vanguard" should remain with the fleet, as well as the French brig which Admiral Lalande had ordered to accompany him.

Nothing of importance occurred here, except the departure of the King's which we passed on the night of the 7th, except the departure of the King's

Bey, on the 8th, in a corvette, who, I was informed, was sent to communicate with Hafiz Pasha, the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Army.

On the 11th, when off Castel Nesso, we were joined by the French steamer of war "Papin," having on board the Mustashar of the fleet, who was the bearer of the Capudan Pasha's commission under the new Government, which was immediately read, in the presence of the Admirals and crew of the flag-ship, upon which occasion all the Turkish ships saluted, as well as the French brig of war; soon after which both French vessels parted company.

On the morning of the 12th, the Egyptian steamer of war, "Nile," joined us, having on board the Kinja Bey, who, I have since ascertained, was sent to Mehemet Ali, and not to Hafiz Pasha, as I had been informed. He communicated with the Capudan Pasha, and in the afternoon, the fleet made sail to the southward, accompanied by the Egyptian steamer; the "Vanguard" having hoisted a Turkish flag, I was sent to her in a brig, when Sir Thomas Fellowes informed me of his intention of joining Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, who was off Cyprus. On the morning of the 13th, the "Vanguard" parted company to the eastward, after having communicated with the "Rhodantheus," which was passing through the Turkish fleet. So anxious was the Capudan Pasha to get to the southward, that he carried such a press of sail, as obliged him to leave behind a line-of-battle ship and frigate, which were bad sailers; and the "Nile" steamer, being sent to those ships, to order them to rendezvous off Alexandria, was the first intimation I received as to the Capudan Pasha's intention of proceeding there. When I spoke to him on the subject, he told me that he had received by the Kinja Bey, a letter from Mehemet Ali, who offered to put the Egyptian fleet under his command; but before doing so he wished to consult with him as to the best steps to be taken for the good of the Turkish Empire, and that he (the Capudan Pasha) meant to proceed off Alexandria for that purpose. On the following day, the 14th, we fell in with the Egyptian fleet, consisting of eleven ships of the line, three frigates, and two brigs, which were cruising about ten miles off Alexandria, and so ignorant were the Admirals and Captains of the change in the Capudan Pasha's plans, that many of the officers were for action; and my firm belief is, that not more than four officers belonging to the fleet, were aware of his intention of joining Mehemet Ali. No salutes were exchanged, but on the morning of the 15th, when the Capudan Pasha landed at Alexandria, from the steamer "Nile," all the forts saluted, which was returned by the Turkish flag-ship, after which both fleets stood off for the night.

On the 16th, the Turkish fleet anchored off the western entrance of Alexandria, about six miles from the town, when all the Admirals and Captains went on shore to wait upon Mehemet Ali. I also landed, and did not again return to the fleet; and on the 17th, when the Capudan Pasha proposed to me to cruise with the united fleets, I declined, stating as a reason, that I was not authorized by the British Government, to serve under Mehemet Ali, to this he replied, that it was still the Sultan's fleet, but united with the Egyptian for the good of the Turkish Empire.

On the 18th, I communicated to the Capudan Pasha of my intention of proceeding to Constantinople. He then asked me if it were not possible to remain, and on my replying that I could not, he appeared much hurt.

I have now, my Lord, stated, to the best of my recollection, all the particulars respecting this extraordinary affair; and have only to add that I left Alexandria on the 20th, in the "Confiance," and arrived here on the 2nd of August.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) B. W. WALKER, R.N.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 27)

(No. 246.)

My Lord,

Therapia, September 6, 1839

THE party of Mehemet Ali and of the Russians spread abroad the notion, that the Mussulman interest would be sacrificed by the Great Powers, and therefore that an arrangement should be made without their intervention between the Sultan and the Pasha. Lord Beauvale's declaration at Vienna, of August 7th, offered the best refutation of the assertions of the party; and I requested Nouri to have it published in the "Moniteur Ottoman." He refused at first, but consented at last without any intention to perform his promise, and so it proved. The Grand Vizier also promised, but was governed by Nouri, and the thing could not be done. I resolved, therefore, to make the declaration public by other means; and I employed Mr. Alison, who fortunately had good opportunity for doing so; and, I am happy to say, that so far as I can judge of the matter, the effect has been very good; the fact being, that the declaration had been concealed from the knowledge of the officers in the Foreign Office.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY

P. S.—I inclose a report from Mr. Alison.

Inclosure in No. 361

Mr. Alison to Viscount Ponsonby

My Lord,

Therapia, September 5, 1839

IN pursuance of your Lordship's instructions, and in furtherance of your view for promulgating the declaration made at Vienna, on the 27th of July, I proceeded without delay to Constantinople, and put myself in communication with a Turkish gentleman, whom I had met elsewhere, and whom I know. On showing him the Turkish translation of an article embodying the declaration he took me to see a friend of his employed in the Divan, who, while he expressed his pleasure on perusing the paper, could not conceal some surprise, and, it appeared to me, a little discontent at its existence having been so carefully concealed at the Porte. I gave the former a copy of it, and he promised me to make that use of it which was best calculated to render it known amongst his countrymen. Having met him on subsequent occasions, he expressed to me the interest which several persons had taken in it, and asked me for a few copies, which, he said, he was afraid to make himself, owing to the hand-writing of his department being known. These I prepared for him, and was enabled to prove the utility of my labours afterwards by having myself prepared a Turkish copy, which was copied from the same, was a translation from the Greek, into which language some curious person had, I found, introduced some alterations. With the view of making its existence known among the writers at Constantinople, I employed a Turkish scribe, whom I had before dealt with, to make me a copy; and on returning two days afterwards, I was much gratified to find him discussing the merits of the declaration amidst a good-humoured circle of friends.

In further pursuance of your Lordship's instructions, copies in different languages were sent for publication to Corfu, Malta, Athens, Salonica, Smyrna, and other places.

I have no doubt, from what I have since both seen and heard, that these measures, and others too trivial to be detailed, but when connected,









No. 364.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 30.)

No. 104.)

My Lord,

Moscow, September 1<sup>st</sup>, 1839.

WHILE I was at Borodino the Emperor conversed with me more than once upon the affairs of the East. His Imperial Majesty always expressed strong and constant feeling against Mehemet Ali, who he said had not only revolted against his Sovereign, but had set the Great Powers of Europe at defiance, had publicly disregarded their remonstrances, and had treated their Representatives with insolence. He asked me, if we really meant to act, and said it was time for us to act, if we were sincere and in earnest.

The Emperor told me, that the Ottoman Government had asked the English and French Ambassadors at Constantinople, to order the fleets of their respective nations to move to the neighbourhood of Alexandria, from their present station near the Dardanelles; that Lord Ponsonby had replied in a manner that showed he either disobeyed his instructions, or that his instructions were defective; that his Excellency had said he had no power to give such orders, and that if he had, he would not do so; and that the tone and expressions in which this answer was couched, were very disrespectful to the Emperor, and such as he the Emperor would never allow an Envoy of his to use to any Power; that the French Ambassador had returned an answer to the same effect, but in a more polite manner.

Having received your Lordship's despatch No. 133, at the Emperor's desire, I gave Count Orloff, privately, a translation of it, that His Imperial Majesty might become acquainted with its contents, without waiting for the official communication of it through Count Nesselrode, which could not reach him for many days.

Count Orloff has since told me, that the Emperor agreed with the principles the despatch laid down, but was disappointed at the conclusion of it, which, he hoped, would have announced some decision or preparation for action; because if we were to waste time in words, and to wait until the Five Powers were agreed upon every point, Mehemet Ali would retain all his present possessions, and become stronger, or perhaps seize an opportunity to march upon Constantinople.

Count Orloff adverted to that part of the despatch which supposes the effect of a single Power, or two Powers only, acting against Mehemet Ali, and he asked if that meant that England would act alone, or that she would act with France, or with Russia? I answered, as she had refused, to act against the Pasha? I answered, that I had no instructions or information that Her Majesty's Government had fully considered and decided upon the course to be pursued in any one of these contingencies, but that I thought it might be fairly inferred from that despatch, and from the whole tenour of the language held, that the British Government was determined to uphold, at all risks, the integrity of the Sultan's Empire, and to compel the Pasha to accede to reasonable conditions.

The whole gist of the observations of the Emperor and his Minister on this subject was, that France would while away time in negotiations, in order to protect and strengthen Mehemet Ali, and would then laugh at England, whose policy would thus be entirely frustrated.

The Emperor left Borodino, and arrived in this capital yesterday, where, it is supposed, he will remain until about the 24<sup>th</sup> of September.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) CLANRICARDE.

No. 365.

Count Medem to Count Nesselrode.—(Communicated by Baron Brunner.)

M. le Comte,

Alexandrie, le 14 Aadi, 1839.

LA situation des affaires n'a subi aucune modification depuis l'expédition de mon dernier rapport. Le Vice-Roi continue à observer la même attitude, à tenir le même langage, et à persister, comme par le passé, dans ses prétentions hors de mesure.

J'ai eu devoir, vu la face nouvelle que la Question Orientale vient de prendre, par le fait de l'ingérence des Cinq Grandes Puissances, m'abstenir et éluder, autant que possible, d'entrer dans de nouvelles discussions politiques avec le Pacha. Il me semble d'autant plus utile, M. le Comte, d'attacher les résolutions des Conseils d'Europe avant de pourvoir nos pourparlers avec Mehemet Ali, que l'état de nosse et d'embarras dans lequel il se trouve, rendrait aujourd'hui toute argumentation aussi gratuite qu'inutile.

Les dernières nouvelles parvenues de Syrie sont toutes à la guerre. Ibrahim Pacha y fait, dit-on, des préparatifs immenses, et s'approvisionne comme s'il s'agissait très-prochainement d'une expédition lointaine. Il vient d'écrire à son père pour lui demander l'autorisation éventuelle d'avancer avec son armée, alléguant que l'approche de la saison rigoureuse ne lui permettant pas de conserver sa position actuelle, et le mettant dans l'obligation, ou de reculer, ou de se porter en avant. Mehemet Ali n'a point consenti à la demande de son fils, mais il a dit hier à mon Collègue d'Autriche, "qu'il attendrait encore un mois, et que si d'ici là les Grandes Cours n'auraient point adhéré à ses dernières propositions, il ferait marcher son armée sur Konia."

Les émissaires que le Vice-Roi avait chargés de missions secrètes pour les Pachas de Macédoine et de Roumélie, n'ayant point obtenu la permission de débarquer à Salonique, ont dû renoncer à se rendre à leur destination, et sont retournés depuis quelques jours à Alexandrie, avec le même brick Egyptien sur lequel ils s'étaient embarqués.

Depuis quelques temps, des symptômes de mécontentement se sont déclarés parmi les troupes de terre et la Marine Turque stationnées dans cette ville. La nostalgie, les diverses maladies auxquelles elles sont sujettes depuis leur arrivée en Egypte, et plus encore la mauvaise qualité des aliments, comme l'absence d'un bon traitement médical, paraissent avoir contribué à exaspérer la soldatesque Ottomane.

Je suis, &amp;c.

(Signed) MEDEM.

No. 366.

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges

(No. 1.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 3, 1839.

IN addition to Her Majesty's Commission and to the consular instructions with which you are furnished in my despatch No. 1, I enclose to you a letter which, by Her Majesty's commands, I have addressed to the Viceroy of Egypt, announcing your appointment.

You will deliver this letter to the Viceroy in your first audience.

I also inclose for your information a copy of the letter

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON





ing, but that there was no want of distribution of money by Mehemet Ali, to procure creatures and their service.

Most matters of importance were more or less discussed, but I should waste your Lordship's time were I to detail all that passed. Whenever we know here what is decided at home, I will report specially; it is enough for the present to say, that I found Rechid Pasha to be full as well disposed as I could desire.

Rechid Pasha condemned strongly the conduct that had been pursued during his absence by Nouri Effendi, and latterly by Sarim Effendi, and said the latter had been just dismissed from office. I believe it is resolved to place Nouri in some post where he will have nothing to say to the affairs of State.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 371.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 83),  
My Lord,

Paris, October 4, 1834

I HAD the honour of receiving your Lordship's despatches to No. 45. With respect to your Lordship's objection with General Sébastiani, I can only say, with great regret, that he neither holds the language nor speaks in the tone of the Government here.

General Sébastiani first proposes to your Lordship, that the boundary line of the Egyptian Power should be drawn from Beyrout to Damascus, and that the French Government will aid by force, if necessary, to maintain it. A week afterwards he proposes in the name of his Government, that Mehemet Ali's sway should extend as far as the Amanus (that part of the ridge of Mount Taurus which runs from the Bay of Ammus to the Euphrates), making no mention of the employment of means of coercion to enforce even the same concession. Mehemet Ali has been obliged to submit. I say he has submitted, because he has not said a word against the plan, and the other was the difference between a suggestion and a demand, that if the Government has any objection, it must favour one plan or the other, and I must be equally silent. I feel I am sure that at this moment I would not dissent to General Sébastiani's original proposition.

As far then as General Sébastiani is concerned, I venture to observe, that he seems either to be ignorant of the views of his Government, or not to represent them, or to have instructions to hold a sort of language which, making everything uncertain and contradictory, keeps the whole question in a state of confusion and suspense, which the French Cabinet, embarrassed by contending difficulties, may possibly feel disposed to prolong. At the same time, the General is perfectly right in stating that though the French Government has expressed an opinion, that opinion is not to be considered peremptory or conclusive; indeed the time has not yet arrived at which any opinion expressed by the French Cabinet can be so considered. For my own part, I mentioned to your Lordship in my despatch No. 76, that Marshal Soult having first stated to Count Mouton and myself that he was in favour of the immediate restoration of Candia to the Sultan, and that a few days afterwards he had recently declared his intention to propose that the restoration of Candia should not take place until the death of Mehemet Ali.

I understand that this change was the result of the King's interference; and I have no doubt that His Majesty is inclined to join in any proposition to which he thinks Mehemet Ali will consent, and to take part in none to which he believes it will be necessary to force the Pasha's compliance.

Thus, the point of view in which the French Government will regard any conditions to be proposed to Mehemet Ali, is evident and unchangeable.

while its opinion in regard to those conditions is as yet doubtful and liable to alteration. For Mehemet Ali, under some circumstances, would consent to what, under others he would refuse; and there is, consequently, in the French Councils a mixture of positiveness and of vagueness,—positiveness as to what will not be done, vagueness as to what may, which your Lordship will easily understand.

No decision therefore is to be expected from this Government as the result of its own opinions; those opinions depending on the effect of a variety of external causes by which they are to be determined. It is principally by the course which the other Governments pursue, by the concert between themselves that they may establish, that the policy of France will be guided, and it is only when there are decision and certainty elsewhere, that anything like certainty or decision is to be expected here.

Should it be possible for the other Governments to come to any clear understanding respecting the interests of Mehemet Ali, and by the means for carrying such understanding into effect, then the French Government, shrinking in the first place from the isolated state in which by its refusal to join in any general arrangement it would be placed, and considering also that measures of coercion would not be necessary, if Mehemet Ali saw the impossibility of resisting such measures, would, I have no doubt, consider the question very differently from at present.

At all events, I feel, my Lord, that I cannot too distinctly state that the other Cabinets must form their decision in order to obtain a decision from the French Cabinet, and that they must not wait for a decision from the French Cabinet in order to form their own.

In this conviction, I feel sure there rests the solution of the present difficulty, and of the danger of being drawn into a disadvantageous termination.

The project proposed by M. de Brunnow of assigning to Russia in any case a weak position, the project of a Russian occupation, was certainly at first to be discountenanced; it could not indeed come at a more inopportune moment, nor be presented in a less agreeable manner.

The speech of the Emperor Nicholas at Bomdino had produced a deep impression, and the fact, that a proposition had been made to England and not to France, wounded the French Cabinet in the point where it will always be most vulnerable, viz: its amour-propre. But notwithstanding that the language still held on this subject is most adverse to admitting the Russian under any circumstances into the Bosphorus, I do not consider that the repugnance expressed in this matter is insurmountable. He again, the conduct of the French Government will ultimately be guided by its opinion as to whether Mehemet will, or will not, resist the conditions proposed to him. If he do not resist such conditions, the presence of the Russian fleet will not be necessary at Constantinople, and the French Government will then find it easy to justify its sanction of an improbable occurrence for the sake of establishing an important principle, such as no doubt would be established by the fulfilment of the Treaty of Unkar-Sakess, and the tacit admission that Russia could not act in the affairs of the East but as the agent of the other Great Powers of Europe, and not merely on her own responsibility.

In short, the more I consider the subject, the more readily I venture, my Lord, to repeat my conviction, that the acquiescence of France to any course which your Lordship would approve, must be sought for in the union of the other Governments, and in the power thus obtained of acting upon the Council of Mehemet Ali, and thereby removing the cause of France which she looks upon as the cause of her own weakness, and bringing into any active measures of hostility against the Viceroy.

Were it advisable, when the other Governments were agreed upon their course, to state to this Government what that course would be, and to observe, that if France stood aloof such course would be vigorously pursued, but that if the French Government joined in the proceedings of the other Powers, some of the concessions might be made with respect to the limits to be expressed as to the limits to be assigned to the Viceroyalty of Egypt; this, I think, by placing the French Government in a favourable position for replying to those who would attack it for joining a confederation against the

Pasha, would be the most certain mode of obtaining its frank and prompt accession to the common policy adopted, nor do I think, in such case, that the concessions made need be great. As to the policy of making them at all, however, I do not of course venture to express an opinion, and have only been led to make the foregoing remark by the desire that your Lordship should be as fully acquainted as possible, with all the means which my situation suggests to me, for preventing this Government from separating itself from the other Powers of Europe, as well as with all the difficulties which lie in the way of this object.

I should now observe that I had when recently at Fontainebleau, the honour of a long conversation with His Majesty the King of the French, as had also Count Men in and Count Appony, and I think that the general result of our conversation was, that His Majesty was exceedingly mortified by the conduct of Russia, and much annoyed by that of England; that he had come to no positive resolution, but that his present desire was, should Russia, Austria, and England, agree to act according to the propositions of M. de Brunnow against Mehemet Ali, was however with a weighty fleet, the Dardanelles, adopting a neutral position, and refusing to accede to the offer of port, of interfering against a matter as would be popular in France, and that these efforts were of no use. We are of us, however, considered his more widely more of an avowed opinion, is that he imagines that Austria, while favouring the proposition proposed by Russia, will not be so willing to restricting Mehemet Ali to Egypt as Germany, that in this manner few more serious propositions may arise, or that things may even be done in their present position. While such is the state of things, it is not His Majesty who, I have detailed now, and we give you a more positive aspect. Marshal Soult spoke to me, on the morning of my departure, of the conversation which your Lordship had had with General Sébastiani respecting which I had not at that time, received any information. And his Excellency seemed to consider that your Lordship had made some proposition to General Sébastiani for guaranteeing the existence of the Ottoman Empire for ten or twenty years. To this the Marshal objected in the strongest terms, as seeming to imply, that at the end of that period the existence of the said Empire might be raised in question, thereby weakening instead of strengthening a State which we have entered into a treaty as necessary to the balance of power in Europe. On receiving your Lordship's reply, that this morning I had in the evening on M. Desages, the Minister being stated to be in town, and explaining to me what I conceive to be really your Lordship's object, and expressing to me, with the views which the French Government have at various times expressed, namely that, being the advocates of international government for the benefit and protection of the Porte, during that course of its wars and regeneration through which it has for the last few years to struggle, thus by removing it from the sole power of one Power and at the same time, the tranquillity and development of its resources which may result, the Empire can't vary and directed in order to secure to form a powerful and independent Empire.

M. Desages, however, at your Lordship's suggestion in this respect, seemed to me to be in agreement with the French Government, and was very well satisfied, and could not express any feeling of objection, the absence of the Marshal.

I should observe to your Lordship, that I have had, this evening, a conversation with Count Appony, who seems generally to concur in the opinions expressed in this despatch.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

*The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 7)*

(No. 106.)

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, September 28, 1853*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches to No. 138 and 139.

Since my return from Moscow, I have had a conversation with Count Nesselrode upon the engrossing topic of the day,—the Turco-Egyptian Question.

But His Excellency had not seen the Emperor, and I have learnt nothing new, or particularly worthy of your Lordship's attention.

The order of the day issued on the morning of the ceremony at Borodino gave rise to much observation at St. Petersburg. The French Ambassador immediately dispatched a courier with it to his Government.

The feeling of hostility to France in the Emperor's mind, and in that of his subjects, is just what it has ever been, and what it will long continue to be. It may have been, and it certainly has been, heightened by the proposal to bring the French Fleet to Constantinople. But the reason why that feeling is now more openly and loudly expressed is the difference of opinion between the French and English Governments as to the conduct to be pursued towards Mehemet Ali, or, I ought rather to say, the demerits, merits, or evasions of their declarations and professions by the French Cabinet. The Russians think that the French Government has expressed narrow and selfish views of policy which must lower it in the eyes of Europe, particularly of the English nation. And, therefore, they now give more vent to their feelings towards the French, and to their peculiar aversion to the present ruling dynasty of France.

The appointments also of the Mission sent to Persia from Paris, have naturally excited a displeasure, as the persons of whom it is composed have been in this country, and are well known to dislike Russians. All classes and two of those gentlemen have personal reasons to entertain feelings inimical to Russia.

Your Lordship's conversation with Count Sébastiani related in your Lordship's despatch No. 97 to Mr. Bulwer has been reported rather with exaggeration. Count Nesselrode described it to me as an *explication très-vive*.

The result of Baron Brunnow's communications with your Lordship is exactly as expected by the Imperial Cabinet.

Count Nesselrode mentioned to me a report of your Lordship's having recalled Colonel Campbell from Alexandria, and said that he should be sorry if such were the case.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) CLANRICARDE

P.S.—Since the above was written, I have learned that Baron Brunnow's report of his first interview with your Lordship has given Count Nesselrode very great satisfaction.

*Mr. Consul Young to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 7.)*

(No. 14.)

My Lord,

*Jerusalem, August 19, 1859*

I THINK it is my duty to report to your Lordship that this district remains in a very disturbed state. The Saad Abdrahman Aamar has made so formidable an appearance in the neighbourhood of Hebron, that the



Governor and Sheik of that place have left, and are now in this city. Hebron is therefore left without any consular authority, and all intercourse between this and Hebron has for the past ten days been cut off.

I am assured that the above-named Sheik has at his command between three and four thousand armed men, and that he had been endeavouring to raise the Tahyr and Tarabin tribes (from the neighbourhood of Gaza) to join him, but had not been successful; he has, however, succeeded in disturbing the south and more eastern districts.

Three men of his party, with their arms, were taken on the 15th instant, and brought into town. And yesterday, one from a village two hours distant, where there has been a disturbance, and an attempt to kill the Sheik. They succeeded in killing one of his relatives, and then they all fled to the mountains to join Abdurachman Asmar, except the one who has been brought in.

The intercourse between one part of the country and another is much impeded by the insecurity of the roads, which are everywhere infested by the disaffected.

Such, my Lord, is the feeling against the Egyptian Government in this district,—chiefly owing to the conscriptions that have been made for the army,—that it is difficult to conceive how the people are ever to be pacified or governed under the present order of things.

The Syrians are a very different race of people from the Egyptians, and the natural face of their country favours the determined spirit of opposition which they evince towards the present Government, as they find shelter in the mountains, which are not easy of access to regular troops; and as a last resource, many fall back upon the Desert, rather than submit, depending on a future day for a favourable opportunity to return.

A continuance of this state of things must soon depopulate the country of its Mussulman inhabitants; and unless the Government establish some system of colonization, or unless they afford encouragement either to Christians or Jews, the land will literally be left without inhabitants to cultivate it.

The hot weather seems to have checked the plague for the past few days; I am happy to inform your Lordship, that I have heard of no fresh cases in the city.

Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Jaffa reports to me, that his Arabic scribe, with four of his children, fell victims last week to this fearful disease. He also informs me that a French gun-brig, came to an anchor off the town on the 10th instant at sunset. The French Vice-Consul communicated with her commander, by going on board. She got under weigh at sunrise the following morning, and is reported to have come from Beyrout, and to have returned there, calling in at Chiffa.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) WM. L. YOUNG.

No 374.

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 14.)

Damascus, August 30, 1839

My Lord,

THE last despatch I had the honour of addressing your Lordship was under the 2nd instant, No. 13.

Since then the measures taken by his Highness Ibrahim Pasha have tended to reduce the insurgents infesting the country north of this city. Ismael Bey, Governor of Aleppo, and the Castan Bey arrived here, through that line of country, with a force of about 6,000 troops. The Emir Gewad, the Mutual insurgent, was constrained to place himself in the hands of the Emir Becar, who delivered him up to the local Government here and he was decapitated with seven other of his adherents.

Ah Agha Hameh Kealibi, an influential personage of this city and a favourite of Ibrahim Pasha, was put on his trial, convicted of conspiring against the Government here, and was publicly beheaded.

His Excellency Ismael Bey and the Castan Bey have continued their march to the Hauran and Aqlana districts. I hear the former is for the present tolerably quiet; but the inhabitants of the latter, comprising 200 villages, have taken arms, and refuse to pay any kind of taxes, furnish supplies, or acknowledge the Government. Ismael Bey, with his forces, have consequently proceeded there to reduce them to order.

In the other parts of the Damascus district I hear that the state of the country is perfectly tranquil.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) N. W. WERRY.

No. 375.

Mr. Pre-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 18.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, August 24, 1839

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, a copy of a despatch I addressed Viscount Ponsonby, under the 13th instant, and by which your Lordship will perceive, that nothing whatever of any interest had transpired up to that period.

Since the date of the above despatch, I am unable to lay before your Lordship anything further of any interest.

His Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha and the Egyptian forces continue on the frontiers as heretofore. Everything remains as usual, and without any change or movement whatever on any point.

I am happy to be able to state to your Lordship, that this district is now quite tranquil, and the roads are again beginning to become free from the late malcontents that had infested them.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY

Inclosure in No. 375.

Mr. Pre-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby

My Lord,

Aleppo, August 13, 1839.

I HAD last the honour of addressing your Lordship on the 23rd ultimo, and have now to inform you, that on the 25th of the same month M. Caillier, Aide-de-camp of Marshal Soult, returned from Marash, and starts to-morrow for Latakia, for the purpose of proceeding by the Austrian steamer to Smyrna.

I learn that M. Caillier's mission to his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha has succeeded, his Highness having immediately issued orders for the army not to advance beyond Marash, at which place he still remains, although preparations have been made here for his reception.

His army continues to occupy the frontiers between Aintab and Marash, and the force sent to take possession of Orfa has not advanced beyond that point.

His Excellency Solymen Pasha arrived here a short time ago from Aintab and will remain here, and will remain until further orders from his Highness Ibrahim Pasha.

I am sorry it is still out of my power to give your Lordship any satisfactory account of the two Englishmen, Mr. Ainsworth and Mr. Russell who, I hope and trust, may have retreated with Hafiz Pasha after the battle.

M. P. A. Aide-de-camp of Solymen Pasha has delivered into my charge several papers found in the camp belonging to those gentlemen, which I have deposited in the Cancellaria until claimed.

According to Mr. Vice Consul Hays' last reports, his district, as well as

the mountains of Gmour-Dagh and those extending to the Defile of the Taurus, are for the moment apparently tranquil.

I can also report the Aleppo district in the same state, since the departure of His Excellency Ismael Bey, the Governor of this place, for the purpose of chastising the rebels who had committed many robberies and murders in different parts between Aleppo and Damascus. He is now disarming the population in that route; and the road to Latakia, which a short time since was very dangerous, is now perfectly safe.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) F. H. R. WERRY

No. 376.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston—(Received October 10.)

My Lord,

Paris, October 7, 1839.

UNDERSTANDING that General Sébastiani had informed his Government that the propositions of M. de Brunnow were rejected by Her Majesty's Government, I called on Marshal Soult this morning, who informed me in fact that he had received a despatch from London, in which a French General Sébastiani stated that Her Majesty's Government had informed M. de Brunnow that the propositions of which he had been the bearer having been considered inadmissible by the French Government. Her Majesty's Government, in consideration of the relations subsisting between the two countries, had not been able to accept them, but had made counter-propositions to the Russian Government, which M. de Brunnow had accepted *ad referendum*.

I do not think that General Sébastiani had entered into any clear explanation as to what these propositions were, but I could gather from Marshal Soult, that as far as he understood them, there were points therein from which he disagreed.

I need not say, that being myself as yet uninformed of what had taken place, I only listened on this subject to Marshal Soult's observations.

The Marshal then informed me that your Lordship had also, in the conversation which General Sébastiani was reporting, alluded to the territorial division between the Viceroy and the Sultan, and had admitted that Her Majesty's Government might consent to the Pashalik of St. Jean d'Acre being annexed to the hereditary government of Egypt, the fortress of St. Jean d'Acre being excepted therefrom, and assigned to the guardianship of the Porte.

I said to the Marshal, that if such had been the conduct of Her Majesty's Government, I trusted that the French Government seeing how desirous Her Majesty's Government were of maintaining the alliance and good understanding which had so long prevailed between the two countries, would itself act in a similar spirit and meet your Lordship by concessions similar to those which you had made.

The Marshal said, that undoubtedly he was sensible to your Lordship's conciliatory conduct and that he should be most desirous to imitate it, but that with regard to St. Jean d'Acre, there was no power capable of taking it from Mehemet Ali—that, if even in the hands of a simple Pasha, it might resist any army in Europe for three years; and that, therefore, he could not, as he should explain to General Sébastiani, agree with your Lordship in this particular.

I then asked the Marshal if there were any other concessions different from those opinions which the French Government had lately expressed, which he might now be disposed to make, and how he felt as to the proposition which I understood had been suggested by General Sébastiani, for cutting Syria into two divisions, and giving the lower division, which would be formed by a line drawn from Damascus to Beyrout, to Mehemet Ali?

He said that he had never heard from General Sébastiani of such propositions, and that he did not think Mehemet Ali would accede to them; that for his own part, he laid a great stress upon Adana, that Adana was most

important, as connected with the passes of the Taurus, &c. I then said, that Adana had been previously mentioned, but that I now hoped that the French Government, considering what your Lordship was reported to have said with respect to the Pashalik of St. Jean d'Acre, departing thereby from your original idea, would also, and of its own part, make some like concession.

To this the Marshal only replied by saying, that he had sent his propositions to Vienna, and that he must await the answer they would receive from that Court.

In continuing the conversation, the Marshal now observed that as to measures of coercion if the Cabinets were agreed as to the extent of territory to be allotted to the Viceroy they would be agreed as to the mode of enforcing them, and that the Cabinet of France would go with the other Cabinets in this part of the question. But that a course of negotiations and measures of coercion must succeed a territorial arrangement. This is certainly a different language from the Kabak, but it arrives at the same result, since it is a territorial arrangement as Mehemet Ali well knows, be it based upon all measures of coercion to the ground, and nothing is yet as to what it is to take the charge of any coast or any fort or place will not agree to any territorial arrangement that Mehemet Ali is not likely to accept. Here is the essence of the whole question. The Government as a Government are not perhaps deeply concerned as to what the Viceroy of Egypt would be content with the Ottoman, and will not urge him to contend for the latter rather than the former, but the nation having a decided predilection for the former, the Government will hardly dare to force him to a change of the one, if he persist in struggling for the other. But Mehemet Ali, what he contends for, will be guided by a consideration of the means for opposing him of it; every thing that intimidates him, and induces him to yield, will incline the French Government towards making upon him concessions which it would not have been consenting to if he had not. The Union of England with the other Powers, or with a portion of the other Powers, will intimidate Mehemet Ali; and in the same proportion encourage France, which waits for emitting any decided opinion until one of the most important elements, out of which such opinion is to be formed, is brought in a clear shape before it. Up to such time, this Government will probably contend for according nearly all to Mehemet Ali, because it does not know that Mehemet Ali will yield anything. And this is remarkable, that while France has declared herself the partizan of Turkey, and has an arrangement which she has proposed, known of course to the papers,—as all things here are known,—has been at once considered by them all, as favourable to the very party against which the Porte is again by entering the field. I send your Lordship, on this ground, the "Courier" of this morning, which is not less worthy of notice, since it shows the editor, a very able man, to be in immediate communication with the Government, for he knew of the decision of the English Cabinet when his article was written. This casual information may also be useful to your Lordship, as affording no light argument against the propositions which, put forward to support the Ottoman Empire against the Pasha, are taken up by all the Pasha's party, as favourable to him, and against the Ottoman Empire.

If I have made myself clear about the Question of Egypt, I shall have explained to your Lordship my notion, that it is a question which, involving the fears of the French Government, (as to being engaged in hostile measures against Mehemet Ali,) is to be dealt with by removing those fears. Every thing which tends to awe the one party to submission, will tend to strengthen the other as to the terms which it will join in exacting.

The interference of Russia, or rather her protection of the Porte, entered so much into the Affairs of Egypt that it always abided at Alexandria, and at Axbarna by sending forward the post to Constantinople. I am sorry of this however. It was chiefly a question of minor importance. M. de Brunnow's declaration to M. de Barante, the Emperor's speech at Berlin, created difficulties superior to those which political considerations as to the peace or balance of power in Europe might alone have awakened. The French Government do not so much fear what would really happen from a Russian force entering the Bosphorus, as what



Marshal Soult spoke to me again as to the idea of guaranteeing or protecting the existence and independence of the Port for a certain time, which he seemed to object to, as being less than the general guarantee or protection we had already entered into. I stated to his Excellency the manner in which I viewed his proposition as contained in my last despatch; but I did not insist upon the subject, as I concluded, an arrangement of this kind would form part of the general propositions to which the Marshal attached a value which I should better ascertain when I saw him together

The decision of Her Majesty's Government not to accept M. de Broenow's propositions, will have a favourable effect on the public opinion here, as to the general relations between the countries; but the effect it will have on the Oriental Question itself remains to be seen, and will much depend on the line which Austria takes in the present state of affairs.

A communication, however, which Marshal Soult made to me to-day, towards the close of our conversation, ought to have, and I trust will have, an important influence on one portion of the question, and that which has hitherto been amongst the most difficult to provide for. The communication I allude to, was in a despatch from Admiral Roussin to the Marshal, which stated that Reclus Potha had positively assured the Admiral, that in no case whatever would the armed interference of Russia be called for: and that if ~~any~~ ~~new~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~English~~ ~~interests~~, ~~the~~ ~~desire~~ ~~to~~ ~~be~~ ~~in~~ ~~directing~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ entry of the united fleets into the Sea of Marmora, would invite their entry.

This assurance might induce the French Government to consider that no present danger at least exists from Russia, or at Constantinople, and that consequently the attention of France might be undisturbedly directed on Mehmet Ali.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

*Lord Beaconsfield to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received October 12.)

My Lord,

Vienna, September 21, 1839

COUNT FIQUELMONT communicated to me a report from the Austrian Consul at Alexandria by which it appeared that Messrs. Ali Pasha given orders to Ibrahim Pasha to recommence hostilities, and occupy as much of the Sultan's territories as his means will permit, unless peace should be concluded within a given time. The Count proposed to me to join in declaring to Mehemet Ali, that no advantages obtained by these means would alter his situation, as they would not receive the sanction of the Powers.

I had no difficulty in agreeing to this, and requested him to give me a copy of his instructions to the Imperial Commissioner. There might be some difference in our language. This document I transmitted to Lord Ponsonby, with the request, that after concert with his Colleagues, he would send the necessary orders to Her Majesty's Consul at Alexandria. Of these papers I inclose copies. I have not failed upon this occasion to urge the adoption of stronger measures, but find nobody to act with. The French Ambassador has no powers, and is interdicted from doing anything against Mehemet Ali. The Russian Ambassador will not even discuss the affair, his Court referring everything to Constantinople.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE

Count Fiquelmont to Baron de Sturmer

M. e. Bazarov

Vienne, le 29 Septembre, 1839.

[illegible]

Notre parti sera, en conséquence, assigner les positions à prendre dans  
travaux à faire avec les co-équipiers. Mais il se  
sont pas les mêmes. Mais il y a une chose à dire, c'est que  
nous ne sommes pas les seuls à avoir des problèmes. Les  
autres ont aussi des problèmes. Mais il y a une chose à dire, c'est que  
la position est difficile, qu'il faut en dire des choses, vous êtes en la place  
près des causes et des effets; le désir que nous avons c'est de venir au secours  
des embarras de votre position, car ce serait aussi venir au secours de la  
Porte.

La plus grande des craintes de l'opposition est celle qu'on a en bar-  
raque, non pas à l'égard des intérêts de la République, mais à l'égard  
de la personne de M. de La Fayette. On craint que par sa conduite  
il ne se compromette, et que par là il ne se compromette la République.  
C'est une crainte qui n'est pas sans fondement. Il y a eu de la part de  
M. de La Fayette, dans sa conduite, une imprudence qui a été  
la cause de sa démission. Mais, si on se rappelle que M. de La Fayette  
est un homme d'un caractère très ferme, et que son amour-propre  
est très haut, on se rendra compte de la position où il se trouve.  
Il ne faut pas se laisser aller à des suppositions de ce genre. M. de  
La Fayette est un homme d'un caractère très ferme, et son amour-propre  
est très haut. Il ne faut pas se laisser aller à des suppositions de ce genre.  
M. de La Fayette est un homme d'un caractère très ferme, et son amour-propre  
est très haut. Il ne faut pas se laisser aller à des suppositions de ce genre.

Une troisième intention qui donnerait aux escadres la possibilité d'agir selon tous les événements qui pourraient arriver, ce serait les parages de l'île de Rhodes, plus rapprochés des côtes de Syrie. Cette position agiterait bien plus les esprits de Méhémet Ali, et tout ce qui peut nuire à ses communications de l'Égypte avec son armée en Asie Mineure lui montrerait tous les dangers de cette position trop avancée, et ferait bien plus d'effet que l'apparition devant Alexandrie, qui, n'étant suivie d'aucun résultat, serait un triomphe pour lui.

Mais ceci, M. le Baron, est une opinion et rien de plus, puisqu'il le reste même. Nous devons donc attendre une mesure qui viendrait bientôt, assentiment et coopération de nos Alliés. Les entretiens que nous avons eus ici avec MM. les Ambassadeurs nous ont montré la seule chose que nous puissions faire en attendant que de nouvelles instructions des Cours impériales nous parviennent.

Méhémet Ali est un homme qui a fait preuve de plus de sagesse qu'on ne le croit ordinairement. On peut donc s'adresser à son intelligence avec la certitude d'être compris. Je vous prie donc, M. le Baron, de vouloir bien charger M. Laurin de lui parler de la manière suivante de sa situation.

Les fautes de la Porte et l'habileté qu'il a su mettre à en profiter lui ont donné des forces supérieures; il peut en abuser; il peut dans le moment actuel enlever encore à la Porte de plus grands territoires; personne n'est là pour s'y opposer; il peut garder la flotte Ottomane; les Alliés du Sultan n'emploieront pas la force pour la reprendre, car sa destruction serait la suite probable du conflit.

Méhémet Ali peut donc s'il le veut se complaire dans la conviction et dans l'abus de la puissance matérielle; les Puissances ne feront rien pour le combattre. L'Europe possède une arme plus forte contre Méhémet Ali, c'est, comme nous l'avons dit ailleurs, celle de son avenir. Que veut-il en effet? il ne cesse de repêcher, que tout ce qu'il fait n'a d'autre but que celui de fonder l'avènement de sa famille. Contait peut-être que la haute personnalité qui ramène contre Hussein Pacha soit une bonne base à donner à l'établissement de sa famille? A-t-il jamais vu un trône de cette nature fonder quelque chose de durable? Puis il a fait d'efforts pour rapprocher l'Égypte de l'Europe par sa administration, par les arts et par le commerce, par son agriculture, et il se voit confronté, que la sanction de l'Europe est nécessaire à son règne régulier et à la durée d'une position pour lui qui n'est que le fruit de sa trahison. Il ne peut donc pas sur la nature de la supériorité de ses forces, et les ne s'agit pas pour lui fonder l'avenir qu'il veut fonder. Si même le Sultan lui accordait toutes ses concessions qu'il demande, elles ne suffiraient pas pour le rendre indépendant, car l'Europe ne la sanctionnerait pas. Il y a un siècle que Méhémet Ali, Chef de Musulmans révoltés, aurait pu fonder un nouvel Empire; il aurait existé dans cet état de séparation et d'isolement qui rendait alors l'Europe peu attentive à des événements de cette nature; Méhémet Ali lui-même a voué sa vie à l'établissement d'un autre ordre de choses, il a obtenu, sous peine de passer comme un météore, de la sanction de l'Europe, et l'Europe ne sanctionnera que ce qui laissera intact le principe de la Souveraineté du Sultan. Si Méhémet Ali fonde l'espoir du succès de sa résistance sur la conviction qu'il parait avoir de la difficulté qu'auront les Puissances d'adopter de concert des mesures actives contre lui, il doit sentir qu'elles se mettraient facilement d'accord pour refuser leur sanction à un ordre de choses qu'elles trouveraient trop dangereux pour la Porte. Une mesure négative n'est jamais difficile à prendre.

C'est à rendre cette position intelligible à Méhémet Ali que M. Laurin doit mettre tous ses soins, nous ne doutons pas que les Agents des Puissances à Alexandrie ne soient autorisés à lui tenir le même langage.

Le but des Puissances après des événements aussi désastreux que ceux qui ont vu la mort du Sultan Mahmoud a été d'empêcher la Porte de succomber dans ce premier moment si difficile, à des conditions trop dangereuses pour sa survie et de lui donner le temps de reprendre confiance et courage. La moindre des obligations morales que nous avons contractées envers le Sultan, est donc celle que l'arrangement que fera la Porte ne soit au moins pas plus désavantageux que celui dont nous avons empêché la conclusion; et si la Porte se voit forcée par sa situation à souscrire à cet arrangement, nous aurons déjà repoussé au lieu d'en accepter un, un mauvais encore. Vous pouvez, M. le

Baron, l'instruire de la déclaration que nous faisons faire à Méhémet Ali, qu'un tel arrangement n'obtiendra jamais la sanction de l'Europe. Les Puissances abandonneront cette position à toutes les incertitudes toujours inséparables de ce qui n'a pour base, ni la nécessité, ni le droit, ni la justice; nous disons la nécessité, parce que nous ne tenons pas une ambition qui serait sans mesure, pour une nécessité.

L'avènement au trône du Sultan Abdoul Medjid, si paisible et si régulier au milieu de tous les désastres du moment, est une preuve qu'il existe encore pour son Empire un principe de vie bien supérieur à tout ce qui existe dans les camps Égyptiens. Méhémet Ali n'a donc pas pour lui ce principe de nécessité que son esprit Oriental aime quelquefois invoquer sous le nom de fatalisme.

Vous voudrez bien, en donnant connaissance de cette dépêche à MM. vos Collègues, vous entendre avec eux pour lui donner exécution; si, contre toute attente, vous ne trouvez pas un concert unanime, vous n'en prescrivez pas moins à M. Laurin le langage que nous avons indiqué, et vous en instruisez la Porte. Nous devons vous prévenir que M. le Ministre de Prusse a été obligé de s'absenter pour deux semaines pour une affaire de famille pressante; nous ne doutons pas que M. le Comte de Königsmarck trouvera dans l'unanimité des Représentants des Puissances ici un motif suffisant pour se réunir à la démarche à laquelle vous voudrez bien l'inviter.

Recevez, &c.,  
(Signed) FIQUELMONT.

No. 378.

Lord Beuvalle to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 12.)

No. 120

My Lord,

Vienna, October 3, 1839.

THE French Government have made to that of Austria the same proposition for the settlement of the affairs of the East which they have made to Her Majesty's Government.

Count Fiquelmont considers the immediate restitution of Adana and the defiles of the Taurus as a great object to the Porte. He also considers the division of Syria into Pashalics to be conferred at Méhémet Ali's death upon his younger children, as ensuring the reversion of that country to the Sultan; but he thinks that Candia ought to be immediately given up by Méhémet Ali, and that France may probably be induced to extend her proposal to that amount.

The answer of Austria will consist, 1st, Of an inquiry whether France is prepared to enforce her demands, in case Méhémet Ali should decline agreeing to them; and if this is answered satisfactorily, she will then renew the declaration of her adhesion to the smallest amount of concessions by the Porte upon which the Two Powers shall agree.

The instructions, however, to Count Appony and to Prince Esterhazy, will be to favour the conclusion of the agreement traced above. Austria inclines to this course from several reasons. She thinks that it is a great object to finish quickly. She conceives that under this arrangement the Sultan will ultimately inherit the whole possessions of Méhémet Ali, and that in the mean time the Ottoman Empire will be saved from the danger of Russian assistance.

I think, also, that Count Fiquelmont holds that nothing can give strength and vitality to that Empire, unless the intelligence of Méhémet Ali and the Mahomedan feeling still existing in Egypt, can be rallied to it, and combined in its defence.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.



No. 379.

*Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beaule.*

(No. 131.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 16, 1839.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch, No. 120, of the 3rd of October, I have to state, that it would, no doubt, be a great source of strength to the Turkish Empire if Mehemet Ali would in the character of a faithful subject, exert all his energies, and apply all his means, for the purpose of supporting the power and authority of the Sultan; but it is manifest that Mehemet Ali's object is, and long has been, not to support the power and authority of the Sultan, but to extend his own power and authority to the detriment of the Sultan; and no real support can rationally be expected for the Sultan's throne, from a person placed in the situation in which Mehemet Ali stands, and actuated by the motives by which he is inspired.

It is further a great mistake to suppose that there is more Mahomedan feeling in Egypt, than in those parts of the Turkish Empire which are under the direct authority of the Sultan. For, on the contrary, Mehemet Ali has in many ways gone further to break down Mahomedan ascendancy than the late Sultan did; and as an instance there are many more Christians employed in offices of emolument and command under Mehemet Ali than in the other parts of the Turkish Empire. It is indeed remarkable how contradictory are the assertions which the partisans of Mehemet Ali are driven to have recourse to; for while at one time and for one purpose they represent him as the great champion of Mahomedan feeling, at another time, and for another purpose, they extol him as the subduer of Mahomedan prejudice, and as a man who has had energy enough to coerce that religious fanaticism which rendered the Mahomedans so overbearing and intolerant to the Christians in all the transactions and intercourse of life.

It would, moreover, be desirable to know by what process of reasoning Count Fiquelmont arrives at the conclusion, that if the whole of Syria is now left in the possession of Mehemet Ali, upon the condition that at his death it is to be divided into Pashalicks for the benefit of his younger children, such an arrangement would secure the reversion of all Syria to the direct authority of the Sultan? For Ibrahim, at the death of Mehemet, would stand precisely in the same situation in which Mehemet now stands; and it is not apparent why he would be more willing than Mehemet now is, to renounce Syria. But as he would then have the entire command of the resources, military and financial of all the countries which Mehemet now governs, he would be as strong then as he is now, and just as able to refuse to evacuate Syria. Nothing, then, would be more easy than for Ibrahim, on the death of Mehemet, to persuade the younger children to agree to some other arrangement, to accept some different provision, and to renounce their claim to the Syrian Pashalicks; and thus the arrangement recommended by Count Fiquelmont would probably have just the opposite effect from that which he

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 380

*Lord Beaule to Viscount Palmerston. (Received October 17.)*

(No. 123.)

My Lord,

Vienna, October 8, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch with its inclosure from Lord Ponsonby.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 380.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Lord Beaule.*

(Confidential.)

My Lord,

Therapia, September 26, 1839.

I INCLOSE for your Excellency's information, the project of a Note to be sent by the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Five Powers, which has been communicated to me by his Excellency the Internuncio.

I hope there will be found in this Note a relief from any doubts that may have arisen, in consequence of the passage in a preceding Note from the Porte, dated August 22, 1839, which is as follows: "La Sublime Porte désire qu'elles (les Puissances) veuillent lui faire connaître leurs intentions relatives à la Flotte Impériale, et à la réorganisation de l'armée." &c.

It appears to me that this Note refers solely to the demands made by Mehemet Ali, which it refuses; that the government of Syria is not one of the demands, and therefore the Note has no bearing upon that question, and the Sublime Porte is not engaged by it in any degree upon that point.

The Note, of which I inclose the project, declares explicitly what the Sublime Porte consents to grant to the Pasha, and the right of the Sultan to act according to his pleasure on all other points.

It is certain that the Sublime Porte is, in the greatest degree, opposed to leaving the government of Syria in the hands of Mehemet Ali, or of his Representative or Dependand; and I must venture to say, that I think the Porte is fully justified by sound policy.

If Syria be left in the hands of the Pasha, the late state of affairs will obviously be restored, but with a large addition of power conferred upon the Pasha, and that too by the act of the Great Powers. The integrity of the Ottoman Empire will be destroyed in fact, though it may be nominally preserved by a quibble. The independence of the Empire must be violently endangered by its partition. The Great Powers, England, Austria, and France, have publicly declared they will maintain the integrity and independence of the Empire.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 380

*Project of a Note from the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Five Powers.*

DANS la Note que la Sublime Porte a eu l'honneur d'adresser à MM. les Représentants des Cinq Puissances, elle a exprimé le désir que, puisque les Hautes Puissances s'étaient chargées de l'arrangement de la Question Egyptienne, elles voulussent bien aviser aux moyens de faire rentrer Mehemet Ali dans ses devoirs, en le décidant à restituer la Flotte Impériale, à renoncer à ses prétentions exagérées, et à attendre l'effet des dispositions qui seraient concertées sous la médiation des Cinq Cabinets, et sanctionnées ensuite par Sa Hautesse.

Depuis lors, la Sublime Porte a constamment reçu des preuves des dispositions bienveillantes des Cinq Cours à son égard. Aussi est-elle prête à rendre pleine justice à leur bonne volonté, tout comme elle est loin de méconnaître les difficultés de plus d'un genre qu'elles peuvent avoir rencontrées dans l'exécution de leurs généreux desseins.

Néanmoins, plus d'un mois s'est écoulé depuis la remise de la dite Note, sans que l'accord qui, grâce à la Divine Providence, s'est établi entre les Cinq Cours, se soit manifesté par aucun acte positif propre à remplir le but qu'elles se sont proposé. Les Hautes Puissances Médiatrices sont trop connues par leur sagesse et leur équité, pour qu'elles ne sentaient pas à quel point il est désirable pour le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse de voir cesser au plus tôt un état de choses pernicieux pour l'Empire Ottoman, et qui, en y jetant tous les

jours de nouveaux germes de trouble et de désordre, menace de compromettre la paix du monde.

L'avènement au trône du Sultan Abdoul Medjid a été signalé par un grand acte de clémence qui accordait à Méhémet Ali le pardon de ses fautes passées, ainsi que l'hérédité pour l'Egypte.

Le Pacha a payé ce bienfait avec la plus noire ingratitude. Tout le monde sait qu'il a non seulement refusé de restituer la Flotte Impériale, qui lui a été livrée par la plus lâche des trahisons, mais qu'il a cherché à révolutionner les pays soumis au Sultan, et qu'il agit en général d'une manière hostile envers la Sublime Porte.

Toutefois, Sa Hautesse persévérant dans ses intentions généreuses, est encore prête à accorder à Méhémet Ali l'hérédité pour l'Egypte, ainsi que le pardon pour tout ce qu'il a commis jusqu'à ce jour d'indigne et de criminel. C'est à ces conditions que le Sultan et Sa Hautesse sera toujours disposé à souscrire à un arrangement avec ce vassal. La conduite de celui-ci après la conclusion d'un pareil arrangement décidera à quel point il est digne de faveurs ultérieures, lesquelles cependant ne sauraient être que l'effet spontané de la clémence souveraine.

En communiquant tout ceci à M. l'Ambassadeur de la Sublime Porte le prie de vouloir bien exprimer à son Gouvernement l'espoir qu'elle nourrit de voir les Hautes Puissances Méditerranéennes prendre au plus tôt des mesures que dans leur équité elles jugeront propres à amener l'Affaire Egyptienne à une solution satisfaisante.

No. 381.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 18.)*

(No. 256.)

My Lord,

*Therapia, September 22, 1839.*

ADMIRAL STOPFORD wished that the Porte should be informed, that a violent wind from the south might force the British squadron to anchor under the White Cliffs, and that if it so happened, it must not be considered as an unfriendly act.

I replied, that I thought it would be inconvenient to mention the subject to the Porte, and that, should a real necessity arise for the movement, it could be made and explained more successfully than now discussed.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure 1 in No. 381.

*Admiral Sir Robert Stopford to Viscount Ponsonby.*

My Lord,

*"Princess Charlotte," Besika Bay,  
September 11, 1839.*

AS the season is fast approaching, in which this anchorage at Besika Bay will be no longer safe for so many large ships, I beg leave to acquaint your Excellency, that in the event of any bad weather coming on which may endanger the squadron under my command, it is my intention to run up the Dardanelles off the place known by the name of "the White Cliffs," where I understand the ships may anchor in safety.

But if political circumstances do not require the presence of the squadron at Besika Bay I should recommend its removal to Vourla before the second week in October. It is, moreover, to be taken into consideration, that owing to the extensive marshy grounds bordering upon the sea coast, this anchorage is proverbially unhealthy as soon as the rains begin.

In the course of a month the ships will require a supply of provisions, for the conveyance of which I must send two ships of the line to Malta.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) ROBERT STOPFORD

Inclosure 2 in No. 381

*Viscount Ponsonby to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.*

(Private.)

*Therapia, September 19, 1839*

My dear Sir,

YOU are already acquainted with the wise arrangement that the Eastern Affairs should be settled at Vienna, and that Lord Beaumont is directed to correspond with you. The messenger who arrived here this morning brings nothing more.

I sent your letter to Vienna, in which you speak of bringing the fleet to the "White Cliffs." I think it highly inconvenient to speak of that movement to the Porte, without having the authorization of Her Majesty's Government, or that of Lord Beaumont from Vienna. I think it would be much better to make the movement, if a real necessity for it should arise, than to talk of it beforehand.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 382

*The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 21.)*

(No. 110.)

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, October 12, 1839.*

A COURIER has arrived here from Paris, and I am informed that he has brought instructions to the Baron de Barante, to propose this arrangement of the Turco-Egyptian Question: that the Viceroy of Egypt shall continue to hold Syria, with the exception of the district of Adana and the defiles of the Taurus, which are to be restored to the Porte, together with Candia.

After the death of Mehemet Ali, the Pashalik of Egypt to revert to one of his sons, and that of Syria to another.

As I have not yet received the Emperor's answer, I am unable to inform your Lordship how he received this proposition; but I cannot think it possible that the Imperial Cabinet will accede to it.

Every day I am informed of the same story, and I have given no satisfaction. Count Nesselrode showed me a long despatch from that Minister, in which he expressed regret only at the British Cabinet's not having yet decided upon a course of action to be immediately adopted.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) CLANRICARDE.

No. 383.

*M. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 21.)*

No. 1013

My Lord,

*Paris, October 18, 1839*

COUNT MEDEM showed me to-day the communications he had received from M. de Barante, which contained first, M. de Barante's general account of his mission, with reasons why it had been especially



directed to Great Britain, which Count Medem read to Marshal Soult, who received the communication rather ungraciously.

Secondly, M. de Brunnow's more unreserved account of his conversation with your Lordship.

Thirdly, The plan, which he, Count Brunnow, had proposed as the means of imposing suitable conditions on the Viceroy.

In both of the two former communications, M. de Brunnow spoke in a fair and sensible manner of the spirit of friendliness with which his propositions to the British Government had been received, as well as the difficulties which attended the entire acceptance of them. Count Medem, at the same time, informed me that he had heard from his brother at Alexandria, that M. Cochelet had officially informed Mehemet Ali, on the part of the French Government, that that Government would never join in employing coercive measures against him. I think, however, that Count Medem was misinformed as to any official communication of this kind having been made to the Pasha.

I should observe, that in the communications which I have had with the Marshal and M. Duquesne, as well as in a short conversation which I had the honour of having the other evening with the King, I have remarked the adoption of a more conciliatory and less positive tone than heretofore; but I have never heard anything inducing me to believe that the French Government would not still have resolution, however reluctantly that resolution may be expressed, of not joining in any plan of arrangement which it thought Mehemet Ali would resist, and which consequently, it might be called upon to enforce.

As far as this general resolution is concerned, I still think no alteration likely to take place, but as to the arrangement itself, I believe no positive decision is come to, because a variety of causes on which the strength of Mehemet's resistance depends are still undetermined. The opinion of Austria on these matters is, I believe, the circumstance now especially expected; and on that opinion, which His Majesty Louis Philippe generally declares will be in favour of his own notions, though without any reason of which I am acquainted for such anticipations, the bias of the French Cabinet will depend.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER

No. 384

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 21)

No. 1061

My Lord,

Paris, October 18, 1839

IN a conversation I had a day or two since with Marshal Soult on the state of affairs at Alexandria, he informed me that he learnt from M. Cochelet, that Mehemet Ali was more determined than ever on other matters, but that with regard to Hosrew's dismissal he would probably abandon his original pretensions.

I bring this more especially to your Lordship's attention, having just learnt from Count Medem, that he entertained great hopes of arriving at a favourable arrangement of existing difficulties, through an amicable arrangement between Mehemet Ali and the Porte.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 385

Lord Beaumont to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 126.)

My Lord,

Vicenza, October 14, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch from Lord Ponsonby

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure in No. 385

Viscount Ponsonby to Lord Beaumont.

My Lord,

Therapia, September 30, 1839.

I RECEIVED this day your Excellency's despatch dated Vienna, September 19, 1839, and inclosing copy of Count Fiquelmont's despatch to Baron de Stürmer. I have seen the Baron, and agreed to do whatever he thinks proper to be done on the points to which your Lordship refers; and I will, when a letter is received from Admiral Sir Robert St. John, forward the orders to the British Consul-General at Alexandria.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 386

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 22.)

No. 2381

My Lord,

Therapia, August 31, 1839

THE Admiral has sent me copy of your letter (secret and confidential) under date June 2, to the Lord High Admiral, and I must admit of a doubt, whether the squadron would be justified in coming up here if the Russians made their appearance for the purpose of stopping the progress of the Egyptian Army.

There may arise the greatest detriment to Her Majesty's service, if the Admiral be not fully acquainted with the real intentions of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

No. 387

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 254.)

My Lord,

Therapia, September 21, 1839.

MR. THURBURN, lately Her Majesty's Consul at Alexandria, called upon me this day. I knew his object was to learn my opinions respecting Egypt, and I thought it right to state them very strongly, because he is one of the most vehement of the supporters of Mehemet Ali in the wildest of his pretensions. I thought it not undesirable to show him that I was not the dupe of the fallacies upon which it has been, and is attempted to establish a belief in the power of the Pasha of Egypt to secure the independence of the Empire, &c., &c., in order to obtain security for Turkey against Russian dominion. He was obliged to admit that the settlement he desired should be made, as the

partition of the Turkish Empire, and to argue in support of the good effects of that measure.

I mention this matter because Mr. Thurburn is on his route to England, and will probably endeavour to spread at home the doctrines to which he intended to make me a convert.

I have, &c.,  
Signed) **PONSONBY.**

No. 358.

*Viscum Pouzouxy to Viscum Palmerston.*—(Received October 22.)

(No. 258, Confidential)

My Lord,

Therapia, September 22, 1939

I ENCLOSE copy of a note from the French Ambassador to me. I replied, that I believed the intrigue to which he alluded had been defeated, that I should be sorry were it to appear that Akiss Pasha had so acted as to prevent his Excellency from being satisfied with satisfaction and thankfulness the services he had rendered to his Excellency before my arrival in this country, and to the common cause after I came here, and in the difficult affair of the Treaty of Ukiar Skelessi, that I fully concurred in the desire of the Ambassador to give the best support to the existing Ottoman Ministry. I also stated that I had received the report of the intrigue was sent to the Ambassador for the purpose of leading him to make some formal declaration that would facilitate the execution of the design already formed by the Ministers of getting rid of troublesome persons; and that the report was at the least a very highly coloured representation of efforts such as are being made every hour in this country by every man of sense. I expressed my confidence that what was being done would be successful, and that the Government would be able to do all that was necessary to be done; and I know that Said Pasha escaped being removed with the others through the want of readiness and firmness of the Grand Vizier, who failed to make the concerted reply to the Sultan's inquiry, "Why Said Pasha was to be removed?"

I have, &c.  
(Signed) **PONSONBY**

Inclosure in No. 368

Baron Roussin to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord et cher Collègue,

Thérèse, ce 19 Septembre, 1639

JE crois savoir d'une source assez certaine, que le Ministère Turc actuel est menacé par une intrigue puissante, la Légation Russe en est naturellement le centre, C'est le Prince de Saxe-Cobourg, S. I. P. (deux) ou trois Grecs, dont l'un est Logothetti, c'est par la Sultane Valide qu'on se propose de venir à l'oreille du Sultan pour dénouer la combinaison ministérielle actuelle, qui s'est renforcée d'Abmed Pacha arrivé de Paris.

Votre Excellence a pensé comme moi que ce Ministère est favorable à nos vues autant que nous pourrions le désirer; il nous promet 1°. De ne pas appeler la Russie. 2°. D'appeler nos escadres si celle de la Russie arrive, si l'Armée Egyptienne s'avance, ou si une insurrection a lieu contre le Sultan ou contre nos nationaux. Notre intérêt est donc de soutenir ce Ministère contre les intrigues du Sérail et de la Russie.

Je me propose en conséquence de faire une instruction à ce sujet à mon Nougan pour exprimer ma sympathie pour le Ministre actuel, et joindre. My Lord et cher Collègue, que vous soyiez du même sentiment

Je sais que nos Ministres sont divisés par une nuance dans la manière d'agir contre Mehemet Ali, mais soyez sûr que cela ne touchera pas ~~un~~ nous du monde au principe de notre alliance, qui est à tout égard

(Signed) **Agribet, &c.,**  
**BARON ROUSSIN.**

No. 359

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received October 22.)

(No. 260. Secret.)

Mr Lord.

Therapia, September 23, 1839.

I HAVE this day received positive and indubitable information, that the Russian Mission has again insisted that the Sublime Porte should demand the removal of the fleets, and the Ottoman Ministers have secretly requested me not to be dissatisfied if they yield to the importunity of the Russians as it is necessary that the Sublime Porte should keep upon good terms with them, adding, that I may give the same answer I made lately to a similar demand or application from Nuri Effendi, and again refuse compliance. I refer to what took place as reported in my despatches Nos. 219, 228, and 226.

This Russian demand may perhaps give some weight to the observation contained in my despatch No. 255, upon the advance of reinforcements into the Crimea, and also to what I have said of the tenure by which influence is held in this country, and the certainty of its entire loss by the removal of the fleet.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) **PONSONBY**

No. 390.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received October 22.)

(No. 261. Secret.)

My Lord,

Therapia, September 23, 1879.

A FAVOURABLE opportunity was afforded me, for touching on the subject mentioned in Admiral Sir Robert Stopford's letter inclosed in my despatch No. 256. Rehid Pasha will prefer seeing the fleet at the White Gulf to being abandoned by it for he is fully aware of the importance of having its support; and if the weather should be such as to make it appear necessary for it to pass up there, he will only remonstrate against it, to cover himself against the reproaches of the Russians, and will accept the excuse of necessity. I believe the Grand Vizier feels as Rehid Pasha does, and will concur with him.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) **PONSONBY.**

No 351

Guanoat Porosoby to Viscount Palmerston.—[Received October 22

(No. 262 Secret.)

My Lord,

Therapia, September 24, 1839.

THE following is an extract from a private letter I have written to Admiral Stirling, September 23, 1854:—I have not considered what you said about coming to the White Cliffs, in case of stress of weather, and I am convinced it might be done without any real disadvantage on the part whatever it might say. Two divisions of the Russian Army, 32,000 men, have been ordered to march for the Crimea, and there may be 15,000 effective



men already there. The Russian fleet that can be sent to sea in twelve sail of the line and five frigates. The ships, generally, are as bad as can be, and several of them barely fit to leave the harbour. I am certain no attempt will be made by sea, whilst you are within reach; but I would not answer for what may be the case if ever you retire; and I think it would be tempting Russia to make a move which, if made, will bring on a war, and give to Russia an enormous advantage."

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSOMBY

No. 392.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 263. Secret.)

My Lord,

Therapia, September 24, 1839.

I HAVE already reported the situation of the Ottoman Ministry, and some of the measures taken to get rid of certain persons who deserved its overthrow. I have now to acquaint you with an act of boldness very little to be expected from a despot, but which seems at present to have succeeded.

The Sultan's mother had shown a disposition to meddle with affairs, as I before mentioned, and Rechid Pasha ventured to speak to the Sultan on the subject, saying, that he believed His Imperial Majesty's servants were so happy as to be approved of by their Sovereign, that they were willing to lay their heads at his feet; but it was their duty to tell His Highness that it would be impossible for them, or for the wisest men on earth, to serve His Majesty successfully, unless he was graciously pleased to place confidence in them, and to refuse to listen to the suggestions of any other persons, even those of his mother, that if he was not pleased so to do, it would be better for his service that he should dismiss his Ministers from their posts, and place there such other men as he did confide in. The Sultan listened to these

words calmly, and said he was content to be guided by his Ministers. We must be careful, however, not to let the Sultan know that they were his Ministers, by saying as we have just done, that they were his Ministers, and that we have not the disposal of his Ministers. That we may be such intrigues and divisions, we will be necessary.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSOMBY

No. 393.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 264.)

My Lord,

Therapia, September 24, 1839.

A FRIEND of mine had some conversation three or four days ago with one of the chief Mollahs, one who has filled very high posts, and he said, "Tell the Ambassador that the Porte must be forced to improve the administration of affairs and relieve the people; otherwise, not even the restoration of Syria and the other measures will be availing. The Porte will do nothing unless it be obliged."

I consider the above worth reporting, because it proves that there is at present a feeling of discontent in the Ottoman Empire, and who hopes from interference for amelioration in the situation of his country.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSOMBY

No. 394

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 22.)

No. 369.)

My Lord,

Therapia, September 30, 1839.

I ENCLOSE copy of an official Note I this night received from the Sublime Porte. (The project of this Note was forwarded to Lord Beaumont by last post.) I hope it will relieve any doubts or difficulties at Vienna, arising from uncertainty as to the desires of the Sublime Porte.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSOMBY

Inclosure in No. 394

Note from the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Five Powers.

Paris, 10 Oct.

DANS la Note que la Sublime Porte a eu l'honneur d'adresser à Messieurs les Représentans de Cinq Puissances, le 13 Djemazi-ul-akhir (22 Août) dernier, elle a exprimé le désir que, puisque les Grandes Puissances s'étaient chargées de l'arrangement de la Question Égyptienne, elles voulussent bien aviser aux moyens de faire cesser les troubles qui agitent l'Égypte, et de rendre la Flotte Impériale, à renoncer à ses prétentions exagérées, et à attendre l'effet des dispositions qui seraient concertées sous la médiation des Cinq Cabinets et sanctionnées par Sa Hautesse.

Depuis lors la Sublime Porte a constamment reçu des preuves des dispositions bienveillantes des Cinq Cours à son égard; aussi est-elle prête à rendre pleine justice à leur bonne volonté, tout comme elle est loin de méconnaître les difficultés de plus d'un genre qu'elles peuvent avoir rencontrées dans l'exécution de leurs généreux dessein.

Néanmoins, plus d'un mois s'est écoulé depuis la remise de la dite Note, sans que l'accord qui, grâce à la Divine Providence, s'est établi entre les Cinq Cours, se soit manifesté par aucun acte positif propre à remplir le but que se proposent les Hautes Puissances. Messieurs les Représentans de Cinq Puissances, par leur sagesse et leur équité pour qu'elles ne sentissent pas à quel point les troubles qui agitent l'Égypte sont nuisibles à la tranquillité de l'Europe, et qui, en y jetant tous les jours de nouveaux germes de trouble et de désordre, menacent de compromettre la paix du monde.

L'avènement au Trône du Sultan Abdoul Medjed a été signalé par un grand acte de clémence qui accordait à Méhémet Ali le pardon de ses fautes passées, ainsi que l'hérédité de ses enfans pour l'Égypte. Le Pacha a payé ce bienfait avec la plus noire ingratitude. Tout le monde sait qu'il a non seulement refusé de restituer la Flotte Impériale, qui lui a été livrée par la plus lâche des trahisons, mais qu'il cherche à révolutionner les pays soumis à la Sublime Porte.

Toutefois, Sa Hautesse, persévérant dans ses intentions généreuses, est encore prête à accorder à Méhémet Ali l'hérédité à ses enfans pour l'Égypte, ainsi que le pardon pour tout ce qu'il a commis jusqu'à ce jour.

Cependant, comme il est évident que la conduite de celui-ci après la conclusion d'un pareil arrangement décidera à quel point il est digne de faveurs ultérieures, lesquelles cependant sauraient être que l'effet spontané de la clémence souveraine.

En communiquant tout ceci à Monsieur l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, la Sublime Porte le prie de vouloir bien exprimer à son Gouvernement l'espoir

qu'elle nourrit de voir les Hautes Puissances Médiatrices prendre au plus tôt les moyens que, dans leur équité, elles jugeront propres à amener l'Affaire Egyptienne à une solution satisfaisante

(Signé) RECHID.

Constantinople, le 19 Redjeb, 1255.  
(28 Septembre, 1839.)

No. 395.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 22.)

No. 270.)

My Lord,

Therapia, September 30, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a Report of an Official Message I have just received from His Excellency Rechid Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I will report my reply after having communicated with the French Ambassador.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 395.

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord,

Péra, ce 29 Septembre, 1839.

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence, le message officiel dont Rechid Pacha vient de me charger pour elle. Le Pacha m'a parlé dans les termes suivants :

"Nous sommes convaincus que les flottes combinées qui se trouvent à présent à Besika Baie, se disposent à se rapprocher des Dardanelles pour être à l'abri de tout événement. Les Ministres de la Sublime Porte; non qu'ils se méfient le moins du monde de l'Angleterre ou de la France, mais ce que l'on dit, se vérifiant, nous croyons que la mesure dont il s'agit ne ferait qu'augmenter les soupçons d'une Puissance qui ne voit pas de bon œil aux flottes combinées à une distance des Dardanelles. Le Pacha d'Egypte s'obstine à garder notre flotte que la plus lâche des trahisons lui a livrée; il fait mine de rejeter les propositions qui lui seront faites par les Puissances amies; la Sublime Porte n'a la moindre intention de recourir à la Russie, et il n'y a absolument aucun motif pour devoir demander des secours à la Russie qui, de son côté non plus, à dire vrai, ne fait aucuns préparatifs qui donneraient lieu de supposer qu'elle a le projet d'intervenir militairement dans nos affaires. Pour toutes ces raisons, la Sublime Porte pense que les flottes combinées ne peuvent que nuire à sa cause en se portant sur Alexandrie, mais la Porte ne veut pas non plus que les flottes combinées s'éloignent trop de ses côtes, et elle croit que les flottes combinées eussent à choisir pour leur station, soit le port de Smyrne, soit celui de Vourla, ou enfin quelque rade sur la côte, près de Tchessmé."

Je suis, &c.,  
(Signé) FREDERIC PISANI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 395.

Viscount Ponsonby to M. Frederic Pisani.

Sir,

Therapia, September 30, 1839.

I REG you will inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that having this day received his Excellency's official message of the 29th instant, I will immediately forward it to my Government.

His Excellency is acquainted with the fact that the British squadron has been stationed where it is by the order of the British Government, for the sole purpose of securing the Sublime Porte against the occurrence of any danger, and his Excellency may also know, that by a recent arrangement made for ensuring unity of action amongst the Great Powers, the Admiral is to receive his orders from the British Ambassador at Vienna. This being the case, his Excellency will see that no Power has a shadow of cause for suspicion or alarm; and that I have not authority to direct the Admiral, but that I have full and adequate the only means within my power to demonstrate my desire to perform whatever his Excellency demands of me.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 396.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 271.)

My Lord,

Therapia, September 30, 1839.

I INCLOSE copy of a letter from Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier. It arrived here by the French steamer on the 24th, and is said to have been written about the 15th of the month.

I do not know if Hosrew Pasha has continued to carry on his correspondence with the Pasha of Egypt since the return of Rechid Pasha, and the defeat of that party to which Nour and Sarim belonged.

The inclosed letter marks that Mehemet Ali has begun to feel his own fault in attacking Hosrew in the way he did, and that he may not be so disposed to buy Hosrew's services at the price of promises to maintain him in his post. At the time Hosrew assumed the office of Grand Vizier, I stated my opinion of his character, and of the effects of the attacks of Mehemet Ali upon his conduct. I have no doubt that the conduct of Hosrew, as a consequence of Mehemet Ali will alter the question, and it may alter Hosrew's conduct. There is still a large party desirous of excluding the interference of the Great Powers. That party unquestionably is favoured by Russia, for if it should succeed, the Russian influence will be all-powerful. I shall not be surprised if it do succeed. Rechid Pasha is exposed to the attacks of all those who are interested in the preservation of abuses, and his best support is the goodwill of England and Austria and France. It is not that goodwill must cease to have power to serve him if the Porte and the chief ministers see that the Russians are able at any time to exert force with that success which experience shows they may so easily obtain.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 396.

Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier Hosrew Pasha.—(Received at Constantinople, September 24, 1839.)

Translation.)

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre responsive de votre Altesse, dans laquelle, en me disant qu'elle n'a d'autre but que le bien du service, elle m'exhorte à réunir nos efforts, et à tâcher d'arriver au bonheur tant dans cette vie que dans l'autre. Dans cette même lettre, votre Altesse m'annonce qu'elle a bien voulu se charger de m'adresser de la part de son Altesse le dictionnaire suivant: "On aime pourtant toujours à servir les intérêts de ses compatriotes." Très-illustre Seigneur! j'ai été très-étonné de voir qu'après avoir ainsi l'honneur de vous adresser ce dictionnaire, vous ne parliez pas de ce qui a eu lieu jusqu'ici, vous veuillez tout-à-coup servir les intérêts de vos compatriotes.

Lorsque feu le Sultan Mahmoud, de glorieuse mémoire, a daigné promettre de m'accorder à perpétuité, l'Egypte ainsi que la Province de Saïda



et Tripoli, j'ai humblement et respectueusement décliné cette proposition, en le suppliant de m'accorder à perpétuité, la totalité des provinces et districts placés sous mon administration. Votre Altesse savait parfaitement tout ceci, et cependant, dès son avènement au poste de Grand Vizir, elle s'est bornée à m'offrir seulement l'Egypte. En outre, votre Altesse, qui avait été Gouverneur d'Egypte durant dix-huit mois, connaissait très-bien à quel point on respecte parmi les Arabes le principe d'intercession. Néanmoins, lorsque son Excellence le Grand-Amiral Ahmed Pacha est venu ici, vous n'avez pas jugé à propos d'agir avec douceur, et de dire: "Un de mes Collègues s'est fâché contre moi, et s'est rendu auprès d'un autre Collègue. Prenons celui-ci pour médiateur, et cherchons à apaiser celui-là et à rétablir l'union entre nous." Au contraire, vous m'avez écrit de saisir l'Amiral et de vous l'envoyer, et avez, en même temps, adressé aux officiers de la Flotte Impériale des lettres auxquelles on ne se serait pas attendu. Ces procédés de votre Altesse, qui dénotent un manque total d'égard pour une amitié de quarante ans, ainsi que pour la position élevée à laquelle je suis parvenu sous les auspices de la Sublime Porte, ont eu l'effet d'exciter au suprême degré, et c'est pour user de représailles que je vous ai invité à donner votre démission. Mais, sans trop m'appesantir sur ces circonstances, je me bornerai à dire, qu'après le retour d'Akif Effendi, votre Altesse a placé l'affaire en question sur un tout autre terrain, en m'écrivant qu'au moment où Said Effendi, devait être expédié vers moi, les Représentans des Cinq Puissances avaient remis à la Porte telle et telle Note. Le fait est que depuis quelques années ces Puissances ont toujours engagé la Porte à arranger elle-même ses affaires. Dans la lettre que je viens de recevoir de votre Altesse, il est dit qu'il ne peut advenir la volonté de notre Prophète que de servir le bien et pour le bien de notre Vénérable Souverain, Vicar du Prophète, et pour celui de notre nation. Je ne révoque pas en doute que ces paroles ne soient extrêmement convenables et masquées au com de la vérité. Dieu sait que cette croyance est aussi la mienne! Mais les procédés indiqués de votre Altesse ne sont pas en harmonie avec ses paroles. Il devrait nous suffire, ce me semble, d'avoir été pour cette affaire la cible de tous les journaux. Toutefois, puisque vous déclarez que votre cœur ne recèle pas même une ombre d'animosité, ni d'esprit de vengeance, je dois vous recommander et le Très-Haut et moi-même, que vous ne puissiez pas vous contenter de celui de signaler ma soumission à la Sublime Porte, et de témoigner de l'amour et de l'attachement à des Ministres qui, comme vous, sont étrangers à toute haine et à tout sentiment vindicatif. D'après ceci, nos intentions ne trouveraient être les mêmes et il n'y aurait de divergence que dans la manière dont elles se manifestent.

Pour décider donc notre différence et prononcer là-dessus conformément à la loi religieuse et politique, comme aussi pour délivrer la nation Musulmane d'un pareil scandale, il nous faut un juge habile, versé dans les lois, pénétré de sentimens religieux, et connu pour sa droiture et son impartialité. Voilà donc que je vous fais aussi cette proposition, ou comme je le suis par mon zèle pour la religion, et par ma sincère amitié à votre égard. Si, par la volonté de Dieu, il eclorra dans votre cœur des sentimens conformes à vos paroles; et en accomplissant l'œuvre salutaire de délivrer les Musulmans de ces embarras et de rendre à tous une sécurité parfaite, vous serez bien par tout le monde, et votre nom, inscrit dans les annales de l'histoire, sera répété avec éloges jusqu'au jour du dernier jugement.

Si votre Altesse est disposée à accéder à cette proposition, elle voudra bien avoir la bonté d'envoyer ici un ou deux Oulémas et Ministres à la Sublime Porte, qui, joignant l'expérience à l'amour du bien, n'aient des regards personnels ni pour vous ni pour moi, et qui, mettant de côté les considérations politiques, soient exclusivement inspirés par leur dévouement à la Sublime Porte et leur attachement pour la nation Musulmane.

Une pareille mesure serait en tout cas utile à la marche de l'affaire et répondrait en même temps à l'intention de votre Altesse, de rendre dans les circonstances actuelles un service salutaire à notre Religion et à notre Gouvernement.

(Translation.)

YOUR letter has reached me, stating that my family being bountiful in good offices, that we ought to be zealous and studious to become the object of worldly happiness; and that co-nationalists have not been enabled, according to their mutual zeal, to arrange the actual state of affairs. The contentious correspondence which had from an beginning about this matter being known, after things have been brought to this pitch, your patriotic zeal somewhat surprises me, because when our late master promised to grant me for ever the kingdom of Egypt and the provinces of Syria and Tripoli, I did not think proper to accept them. I did not know of my services and obedience. When I lately became acquainted with my boon and request for the perpetual conferment of all the provinces and districts which are under my present jurisdiction, you, my Grand Vizier, only offered me the kingdom of Egypt; and having been ruler of Egypt for eighteen months, you decided how far it was customary for interference to be had in the affairs of Arabia. In the mean time, Ahmed Capudan Pasha came here, and you did not use conciliatory measures for gaining his affection and co-operation, by making me the means of conciliating a colleague taking refuge with me a colleague, as colleagues are in the habit of doing with each other. But you said, take and send him; and expressing your request to have the fleet and other letters, you thus disregarded the forty years friendship between us and the Emperor, which I enjoy at the Porte. I was therefore much offended at this; and in return, begged to be pardoned (excused from giving the fleet?).

Without any regard to the state of affairs here, after Akif Effendi's return, and while Said Effendi was about being sent in answer to the letters received from you, we were told that the Ministers of the Five Powers say we have no business to concern ourselves with some years ago, "Look ye to your own concerns." In your present embarrassments, you say, that we are bound to do the approbation of the Prophet by serving to our last breath the interests of the Prophet's successor, our Sovereign, and our race. I have no doubt of the justice and propriety of the words of this proposition; and that I hold this creed the saints know. But it is needless to state that your counsel, as above, is not in accordance with your words; and I think that what is recorded in the Gazettes on this subject is enough. However, as you say that you are not actuated in this matter by any bad or selfish views, God knows that I am equally free from such, both towards the Sublime Porte and to your Highness. And I therefore entertain no wish or desire beyond that of the sincere affection of the illustrious Ministers; both our objects are the same, while to appearances there is a discrepancy in our measures.

To settle, therefore, in this case our dispute, and to ascertain, according to law and custom, on whose side right exists, and to remove this contention from among Mahomedans, we are in need of a judge, known for his uprightness, religion, and justice, and behold, according to my religious faith and zeal, that I remind thus your Highness of these matters. If your heart be sincere as your professions, this contention, please God, will be removed from among Musulmans; and, by being the cause of their happiness, you will become the object of praise and glory, and your name will be handed down to all persons, and you will thus be handed down to eternity by the bounteous tongue of fame.

However similar the wishes expressed by your Highness on this matter may be, yet give no weight to the political calumnies with regard to me, but turn your attention to sending to this place one or two able and well-disposed persons from among the illustrious Ulema or Ministers, (who necessitate unity and obedience of the Government and the Mahomedans,) which under all the circumstances is congruous; and thus great service will be rendered to our country and religion, according to your benevolent views, &c.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 272.)

My Lord,

Therapia, September 30, 1839.

I AM well assured, though not by any one belonging to the Porte, that the Russian Mission has very lately proposed, in case Ibrahim Pasha makes one step to enter the Sultan's territories to march 30,000 men against him, adding, that Constantinople and the Bosphorus are the objects of fears and jealousies of the other Powers, the Russian force by its direction to Asia Minor, will remove all danger of those points being occupied by it; and that the Sultan and the Empire being thus secured against the encroachments of Mehemet Ali, there will be no need of the protection of the fleets of England and France &c., &c.

I entertain no doubt of the truth of the foregoing; and I consider it is a part of the development of that plan which I, as well as others, have so often described. The Russians have acted upon the principle of this plan in the attainment of all their successes over their neighbours.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

P.S.—The above may possibly account for the march of the two divisions mentioned in Mr. Consul General Yeames's letters, which form the inclosures of my despatch No. 255.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 22)

(No. 273.)

My Lord,

Therapia, September 30, 1839.

I HAVE very positive information, that the Dragoman of Russia has been active in inducing those Turks who he served in the concert, and to exist among the Great Powers for an arrangement of the Egyptian Question. He said, no such concord existed between England and France, and that it was rather to be feared the other Powers would be found opposed to France, than that they would concur for the arrangement between the Porte and Mehemet Ali.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 274.)

My Lord,

Therapia, September 30, 1839.

THE French Ambassador acquainted me with his being recalled, and that a frigate would be sent for him without delay. I heard this fact with regret.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 277.)

My Lord,

Therapia, October 1, 1839.

I HAVE heard this day from a well-informed person, that there is the greatest disposition to make an arrangement with Mehemet Ali, and that it will probably be made if he shall show any signs of concession, such as consenting to restore the fleet.

If this take place, the probable result will be the fall of Rechid Pasha, and the complete restoration of Russian ascendancy. It is said, that the Sultana Valide favours the immediate arrangement.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 22)

(No. 74.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, September 26, 1839

ON the 14th instant the French Consul-General received a despatch from his Government to inform him that it had been resolved on by the British and French Governments, to exert very strong remonstrances to be made by myself and M. Consul-General Mehemet Ali respecting the detention of the Turkish fleet, and to exert upon the Pasha to release it.

M. Consul-General Mehemet Ali had written to me to say that I was to exert very strong remonstrances, and that it was probable we should have some success. I have not yet received any news of success.

M. Consul-General Mehemet Ali has also received a despatch from his Government to inform him that it was resolved on by the British and French Governments, to exert very strong remonstrances to be made by myself and M. Consul-General Mehemet Ali respecting the detention of the Turkish fleet, and to exert upon the Pasha to release it.

The French Consul-General here as also these French remonstrances and remonstrances will have success. M. Consul-General Mehemet Ali has also received a despatch from his Government to inform him that it was resolved on by the British and French Governments, to exert very strong remonstrances to be made by myself and M. Consul-General Mehemet Ali respecting the detention of the Turkish fleet, and to exert upon the Pasha to release it.

The Pasha appears to have relinquished his intentions to press for the removal of Hosren Pasha from his post of Grand Vizier, but he seems resolved not to accept less than the hereditary succession of the provinces which were placed under his government and that of Ibrahim Pasha, at the Peace of Kutaya in the year 1833.

The Pasha left this yesterday for an excursion on the Nile for the benefit of his health, and will return on the 2nd or 3rd of October.

Captain Caillier, who returns to-morrow by the French steamer to France, told me that the Pasha had yesterday said to him that if he would remain eight days longer in Egypt, he might carry the intelligence to France of an amicable arrangement having been concluded between the Porte and himself, as he expected almost daily to receive the final settlement of the affair from Constantinople.

The state of the country is tranquil, and the rise of the Nile being the best which has taken place for many years, affords the certainty of a most abundant harvest of every sort.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.



No. 402

*Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—Received October 22.)*

(No. 76.)

My Lord,

*Alexandria, October 2, 1839.*

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch No. 27 of the 13th of August.

It is with the deepest regret that I find that I should have expressed, in any of my despatches or letters to your Lordship, opinions in any manner opposed to the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government.

It is, however, but due to a just state that my opinions have been confined to my correspondents, and that I have ever strictly followed in my communications with the Pasha, the course and language which your Lordship directed me to pursue.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 403

*Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—Received October 22.)*

(No. 76.)

My Lord,

*Alexandria, October 6, 1839.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 31 of the 13th of September, relative to the declaration of the Pasha's intentions, in the event of the appearance of the combined squadrons off Alexandria, I am the honour to transmit to your Lordship the copy of a note which I have written in obedience to your Lordship's instructions.

Hoghos Bey informs me that he has sent a translation of it to the Pasha, who is at present in the Delta, and that he will communicate the reply to me as soon as he shall receive it, but as Her Majesty's steamer leaves to-morrow for Malta, I shall not be able to communicate the reply by that opportunity.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 403.

*Colonel Campbell to Boghos Bey.**Alexandrie, le 20 Octobre, 1839.*

LE Soussigné, Agent et Consul-Général de Sa Majesté Britannique, a l'honneur de vous adresser le N. 1 de la déclaration faite par Son Altesse le Vice-Roi de l'Égypte, le 10 Octobre, sur les intentions de Sa Majesté Britannique, et Française par rapport à l'expédition d'Alexandrie, et d'ordonner à Ibrahim Pacha d'y répondre avec son armée.

Le Soussigné a été par conséquent chargé par Son Excellence le Vicomte Palmerston, Principal Secrétaire d'État de Sa Majesté Britannique pour les Affaires Étrangères, de faire savoir à Méhémet Ali par écrit, que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique ne peut se dispenser de déclarer qu'il n'est pas capable de calculer des conséquences, qu'il s'abstiendra soigneusement de prendre les mesures qu'il est dit dans la dite déclaration de prendre, en cas que les évènements conduisent à l'apparition d'une armée devant Alexandrie. Car le Pacha doit bien savoir qu'il n'est pas dans une position laquelle, soit par sa situation tant politique que géographique, ou soit sous le rapport des considérations militaires ou navales, peut le mettre en état de défier impunément les Gouvernements d'Europe, et plus particulièrement les Puissances Maritimes.

Le Soussigné prie Son Excellence Boghos Jousouff Bey de vouloir bien communiquer cette Note à Son Altesse le Pacha et d'en accuser la réception par écrit.

Le Soussigné profite de cette occasion, &c.,  
(Signé)

PATRICK CAMPBELL.

No. 404

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby*

(No. 153.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, October 23, 1839.*

YOUR despatches to No. 277 inclusive have been received and laid before the Queen.

With reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 277 stating that you have been informed that there exists, in the Seraglio, a great disposition to make a private arrangement with Méhémet Ali. I have instructed your Excellency strongly to urge the Turkish Government to abstain from taking any such step, and to place confidence in the friendly intentions and promised support of the Powers of Europe.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 405.

*John Backhouse, Esq., to Sir John Barrow.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, October 24, 1839.*

I AM directed by Viscount Palmerston to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, in which it appears that a verbal declaration has been made by the Pasha to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, Secret and Confidential, of the 25th of June last.

In laying this letter before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, I am to request that you will be pleased to move their Lordships to cause Admiral Sir Robert Stopford to be set right in this matter.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) J. BACKHOUSE

No. 406.

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 24.)*

(No. 326.)

My Lord,

*Paris, October 21, 1839.*

I ARRIVED at Paris yesterday, and I this morning called at the Foreign Office to a great Marshal See. I arrived at the Foreign Office at 10 o'clock.

His Excellency received me with great personal cordiality; but upon our entering on political questions, I found with regret, that the language of the Marshal manifested a less anxious desire to act in union and concert with Her Majesty's Government than appeared in his communications with me on his first undertaking the duties of Minister for Foreign Affairs.

On speaking of the Turco-Egyptian Question, he expressed his regret that the propositions, which the British Government was the bearer from the Court of St. Petersburg, had been so favourably received by Her Majesty's Government, and considering the jealousy which was felt in England of the views and policy of Russia, he was surprised, he said, at your Lordship's having been willing

(Signed) **GRANVILLE**

*Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde.*

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 25, 1839

6 T





that in that part of the proposed Convention, which would do to each Power its appropriate share of the measures of execution, it should be stipulated, that if it should become necessary for a Russian force to enter the Bosphorus, a British force should at the same time enter the Dardanelles. I said, that this was no proof of any want of confidence in Russia; for, in truth, the very fact of the Emperor becoming party to the proposed Convention, would make it impossible for any one to doubt as to His Imperial Majesty's good faith; and that as the bulk of the British squadron would probably be required off the coasts of Egypt or Syria, the necessity of the Russian ships that could be spared for going up the Dardanelles, would of itself show that their presence was intended to record a principle, and to manifest union, and not to proclaim distrust or to exercise control.

Baron Brunnow expressed great regret at the decision of Her Majesty's Government, which must have surely expected for a time the progress of the negotiation, because I had instructed him to provide for this case, at the time and therefore he ought to have been prepared to meet the decision of his Government, and much valuable time would have been lost, when he ought to be employed in action. But he pressed much to know whether this question might not be put aside, and be reserved for future consideration without preventing the two Governments from proceeding to act upon other points, with respect to which they were agreed, and he expressed a strong desire that the Allied Powers should make an immediate demand for the restoration of the Turkish fleet, or at least for a territorial arrangement; or for any other thing upon which they might be agreed; and that if their demand should be refused they should begin by putting in force those measures of coercion in which they might all concur, leaving the question about the fleet, as to be settled afterwards.

I said, that Her Majesty's Government had indeed proposed that the fleet should be restored, but that I had been instructed to leave the decision of this matter to the Allied Powers, and that I had been instructed to say, that whatever differences of opinion might exist as to the territorial arrangement, there could be no difference as to the propriety and justice of demanding and compelling the restitution of the fleet. But Austria and France were against such a course; and both recommended that the question about the fleet should be left until we had reached a satisfactory understanding as to the final arrangement; and Her Majesty's Government had at once yielded to the wish of those two Powers.

But certainly, Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain, being agreed as to the arrangement which ought to be enforced upon Mehemet Ali, might at once, and without France, if France should be unwilling to join them, compel Mehemet Ali to submit; and they might begin to execute the progressive measures of coercion, if he should refuse. But in that case, Mehemet Ali might order Ibrahim to march to the Bosphorus; and then would come upon us, in the most inconvenient manner, and without our being prepared for it by any previous agreement, the very difficulty which we were at present unable to solve; and I said, that unless we should come to a satisfactory understanding as to what was to be done in such a contingency, it would not be wise to take steps which might directly tend to make that contingency happen.

He, Baron however, still pressed upon me the great anxiety of his Government, that something should be done; and the strong conviction of that Government, that some act or other would become necessary on the part of some of the Powers of Europe, within a very short period of time, and from himself, but not by any instruction from his Government, he pressed me to submit to the Cabinet, that Great Britain might by herself, take some preliminary measures, which either as demonstrations, or as a commencement of coercion, could not fail to have a decisive influence on Mehemet Ali.

I said that I knew that, in the present state of things, Her Majesty's Government would not begin to act alone in these matters. That we attach very great importance to the attainment of an European concert upon these questions, and that we by no means as yet despair of arriving at such a result, that if it should be found impossible to unite the Five Powers, or a sufficient portion of them, in a common course of action, it would be necessary for the British Government then to consider what it might be fitting for Great Britain to do; but that till the present negotiations should have come to some conclu-

sion it would be premature for Her Majesty's Government to take into consideration a contingency which has not yet happened.

It was then agreed between Baron Brunnow and myself, that we should each draw up a report of what had passed between us; he, for the information of his Government; I, for the information of your Excellency. I was, however, prevented by a heavy and continued pressure of business, from preparing my despatch; and Baron Brunnow's Report, of which he gave me, confidentially, a copy and of which I herewith inclose a copy, contains so full and so faithful a report of the conversations to which it relates, that I felt it unnecessary, at the time, to add anything thereto; and my reason for writing this despatch is, that I am desirous of furnishing your Excellency with a statement which, though less full in detail, embraces a greater range of time.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 408.

Baron Brunnow to Count Nesselrode.—(Communicated confidentially by Baron Brunnow.)

Monsieur le Comte, Londres, ce 10 Octobre 1839.  
LE jour même où le Conseil du Cabinet se réunissait à Windsor pour prendre en délibération l'Affaire d'Egypte, j'ai reçu la dépêche du 9 Septembre par laquelle votre Excellence m'a recommandé de lui faire connaître un moment plus tôt les déterminations que le Cabinet Britannique allait arrêter relativement à cette grave question.

Je me suis empressé aussitôt de demander une entrevue à Lord Palmerston. Le billet que je lui ai écrit à ce sujet s'est croisé avec l'invitation qu'il m'a adressée de son côté, de me rendre chez lui en ville, où il allait arriver le lendemain, 2 Octobre.

Je me fais un devoir de soumettre à votre Excellence le résumé de cet entretien, que nous avons repris le jour suivant, 3 Octobre, et dont l'ensemble vous mettra à même, M. le Comte, de vous former une opinion exacte de la nature des vues que le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Etrangères a bien voulu me communiquer avec une sincérité à laquelle je ne saurais assez rendre justice.

Il a commencé par me dire que le Conseil avait pris en mûre considération les ouvertures dont j'avais été chargé.

Qu'il n'avait pas hésité à reconnaître et à apprécier vivement la loyauté des intentions qui les avaient dictées.

Que sous ce rapport, l'opinion de tous les Membres du Cabinet s'était prononcée unanimement, de manière à rendre l'hommage qui est dû à la droiture des intentions de notre Auguste Maître.

Que le désir manifesté par Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'en venir à une entente amicale avec l'Angleterre relativement aux Affaires d'Orient, répondait entièrement aux vœux du Cabinet Britannique. Mais que celui-ci, placé comme il l'est, en face d'une forte opposition au sein du Parlement, se voit obligé de ne point perdre de vue bien des considérations qui lui recommandent d'user d'une grande circonspection dans sa marche, afin de ne point heurter de front des opinions qu'il lui importe de ménager, et afin de ne point donner à ses adversaires les moyens de combiner leurs efforts pour renverser l'administration actuelle.

Lord Palmerston a ensuite exposé les motifs des propositions que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous adresser, et toutes confidentielles, que je chercherai, M. le Comte, à reproduire ici, en vous rapportant les termes dans lesquels les vôtres ont été présentés. Mais je m'arrête, car je ne puis que vous en donner une idée.

"L'opinion de mes Collègues," m'a-t-il dit, "s'est prononcée hautement en faveur des mêmes principes que vous avez exposés au nom de votre Cabinet pour le maintien de l'indépendance et la conservation de l'Empire Ottoman. Nous





qui m'empêchaient de passer outre. Il m'a annoncé qu'il informerait incessamment le Marquis de Clarimonde de tout ce qui venait de se passer entre nous, ainsi que des difficultés qui ne nous avaient point permis d'en venir à un arrangement définitif sur la Question d'Egypte. De mon côté, je l'ai prévenu que je soumettrai à ma Cour un récit fidèle de notre entretien. Et pour m'assurer d'avantage de l'exactitude avec laquelle j'aurai suivi ses idées, je lui ai annoncé que je placerais sous ses yeux, avant de l'expédier le rapport que j'allais adresser à votre Excellence. Il m'a promis à son tour que me communiquant d'avance ses observations, il n'en adresserait à Lord Palmerston que celles qu'il jugerait utiles.

Après vous avoir indiqué, M. le Comte, le point d'arrêt qui a mis obstacle à la poursuite, le marquis d'Almeida a je n'oserais dire dans de plus amples développemens sur les explications que nous avons échangées sur la question théorique et pratique d'une co-opération navale, ou en d'autres termes d'un point d'union entre la France et l'Angleterre.

Les observations faites de part et d'autre sur cette combinaison n'ont présenté d'ailleurs rien de nouveau. A mes yeux, cette question est totalement épuisée. Chacun est resté de son avis sans convaincre et sans faire céder l'autre. Il n'a certainement pas dépendu de moi de résoudre cette difficulté à la satisfaction de l'un ou de l'autre. Mais ce que j'ai pu faire, c'est d'empêcher qu'elle ne devint entre eux un sujet de controverse, et d'éviter par là que ma mission ne fût compromise dans l'esprit de votre Excellence. De la part de notre Vice-Roi, il n'y a eu que l'expression d'une conviction profonde que la Russie et l'Angleterre devaient se rapprocher.

Cet écueil je crois heureusement l'avoir évité; je dirai plus, j'ai tout lieu d'espérer que nous n'en aurons plus à le bien servir. Les deux Gouvernemens ont pu se convaincre que la coopération navale est une question de fait, et que la Grande-Bretagne ne peut que s'y conformer.

Il ne faut pas penser que cette impression continuera à agir favorablement sur les deux Gouvernemens.

Sur le moment, ce qui m'a semblé de la plus grande urgence, c'est à faire cesser les suspensions de l'Armée anglaise en Egypte, et à faire cesser l'arrêt de nos affaires de l'Orient, au profit d'une cause d'ajournement pour retarder et pour entraver les mesures de salut que réclame impérieusement la situation présente de l'Empire Ottoman.

Sous ce rapport, j'ai tiré un grand parti des réflexions que Sa Majesté l'Empereur a adressées au Marquis de Clarimonde. Elles ont été de telle sorte que j'ai pu en tirer tout ce qui me fallait pour faire passer l'opinion de votre Excellence.

Les informations qu'elle m'a communiquées sur l'état d'incertitude et de désaccord qui régnait dans le Cabinet britannique, ont été pour moi une confirmation de l'opinion que j'ai émise sur la nécessité de prendre en quelques mesures énergiques pour réprimer les projets audacieux du Pacha d'Egypte, et pour le disposer à souscrire à une transaction basée sur des conditions équitables.

Il est évident qu'il y a d'abord à cet effet une attitude des premières en matière de diplomatie, et que par le Ministère Anglais même. Mais en outre à une attitude d'attente, et d'attente énergique, c'est qu'il a à lutter en réalité contre une situation.

La première est, qu'il ne voudrait pas courir la chance de pousser Méhémet Ali à marcher sur Constantinople tant que l'Angleterre n'est point parvenue à s'entendre préalablement avec nous, sur le mode d'une action commune destinée à mettre Constantinople à l'abri d'une invasion ennemie.

La seconde est, qu'il préférerait que la France ne restât point en dehors des mesures prises par l'Angleterre, et qu'elle ne se contentât pas de se tenir à l'écart, mais qu'elle se joignît à elle pour l'engager à se porter contre le Vice-Roi à l'emploi de la menace et de la force.

Ami placé dans la double incertitude, d'une part de ne pouvoir pas compter sur une entente préalable, et d'autre part de ne pas encore d'acquiescer à la co-opération du Gouvernement Français lorsqu'elle a été obstinément refusée jusqu'ici, le Cabinet Britannique éprouve une hésitation qui neutralise les mesures qu'il voudrait prendre pour appuyer et défendre les intérêts de la Porte.

Les motifs de cette hésitation, M. le Comte, expliquent pourquoi l'Angleterre s'est abstenue jusqu'à ce jour d'adopter une attitude décisive à l'égard de l'Egypte.

Cependant il m'a semblé que le moment était venu où cette hésitation devrait céder à des considérations plus graves. En effet, dans un moment où chaque jour de perde en discussions stériles contribue à aggraver la situation de l'Empire Ottoman et peut le conduire vers sa chute, j'ai pensé qu'il était de mon devoir de faire un appel à la sagesse de votre Excellence, et d'Angleterre pour le décider à ne point différer plus longtemps d'interposer les moyens d'action en son pouvoir, afin de briser la résistance de Méhémet Ali.

C'est sur cette nécessité que j'ai appelé l'attention du Principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Etrangères dans un second entretien que j'ai eu avec lui dans la journée du 3 Octobre.

Je lui ai fait sentir que le temps qui s'écoulerait pour écrire d'ici à Lord Palmerston et pour en recevoir des réponses à la suite de notre entretien de la veille, pourrait devenir mortel pour la Porte; que dans l'état où elle se trouve chaque heure semble la rapprocher de sa ruine; et qu'il n'y a qu'une mesure prompte et énergique de la part de l'Angleterre qui puisse la préserver d'une catastrophe imminente.

A l'appui de cette vérité, j'ai placé sous les yeux de Lord Palmerston les cartes de l'Asie Mineure, et lui indiquant les deux points de Tocatli et d'Alexandrie, je lui ai dit: «voilà où votre escadre se trouve aujourd'hui, et voilà où elle devrait être pour sauver l'Empire Ottoman».

Après prélever d'avantage les réflexions que j'avais à cœur de soumettre de cette grave conjoncture à l'examen approfondi de Lord Palmerston, je lui ai demandé la permission de lui donner lecture d'un aperçu rapide que j'avais tracé dans le but de rendre clairement compte au Ministère Anglais lui-même de la situation actuelle des choses en Orient, et des mesures qu'il me semblaient urgent de prendre pour abattre l'audace du Vice-Roi.

Cet aperçu, entièrement dégage de toute considération liée à notre propre politique, est rédigé avec une parfaite impartialité, comme s'il avait été conçu dans l'intérêt seul de l'honneur et de la dignité de la Grande-Bretagne.

En traçant ce travail, je n'ai pas hésité un seul instant à croire que notre Auguste Maître daignerait approuver les intentions dans lesquelles je l'ai rédigé, persuadé comme je le suis, que je serai assez heureux de mériter toujours son approbation, lorsque, mettant de côté toute considération personnelle d'intérêt et d'amour propre, je consacrerai mes efforts à la cause commune du maintien de la paix générale, et de la bonne intelligence entre la Russie et l'Angleterre. C'est dans cette persuasion que j'ose soumettre à votre Excellence le travail ci-joint, que je l'ai communiqué à Lord Palmerston.

Ce Ministère, sans me dissimuler l'impossibilité où se trouverait l'Angleterre de se charger à elle seule d'une action décisive à l'égard de l'Egypte, est convenu pourtant envers moi, qu'il ne serait guère possible non plus de rester dans une inaction absolue, et qu'il fallait faire quelque chose pour venir au secours de la Porte, afin de ne pas exposer les Cours Européennes au blâme d'avoir promis au Sultan une assistance qu'elles n'ont pas le moyen de lui prêter, — avec de faiblesse et d'impuissance qui serait aux yeux du monde une véritable atteinte portée à la dignité des Grandes Cours.

Les idées que nous avons échangées sur l'urgence d'entreprendre et de faire quelque chose pour la Porte, ont été si bien comprises, et si bien accueillies, que d'accord, Lord Palmerston m'a témoigné le désir de communiquer à Lord Melbourne mon travail, que je lui ai remis d'une manière toute confidentielle, et dont j'ai eu soin de donner également lecture à M. l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche.

Quant au point de vue personnel, j'ai pu me convaincre que votre Excellence, M. le Comte, n'a pas eu de peine à saisir l'importance de la situation, et que vous n'avez pas hésité à vous joindre à moi pour l'Angleterre. J'ai eu l'honneur de vous adresser, par le Marquis de Clarimonde, un rapport sur l'état de la question, et de vous en avoir fait lecture. J'ai eu l'honneur de vous adresser, par le Marquis de Clarimonde, un rapport sur l'état de la question, et de vous en avoir fait lecture. J'ai eu l'honneur de vous adresser, par le Marquis de Clarimonde, un rapport sur l'état de la question, et de vous en avoir fait lecture.



Maitre, à l'époque où Sa Majesté a daigné se prononcer à ce même sujet un an, lors de son séjour à Tégis.

Je dirai plus, si l'Angleterre peut réussir à écarter l'opposition que la France a élevée jusqu'ici contre l'emploi des forces navales anglaises, elle pourra, par la force de son armée, et par la coopération des forces navales anglaises, empêcher le Vice-Roi de faire exécuter ses projets de conquête en Syrie, et de porter la guerre dans la France. L'Angleterre, en effet, a une flotte puissante, et elle peut, par la force de son armée, empêcher le Vice-Roi de faire exécuter ses projets de conquête en Syrie, et de porter la guerre dans la France.

Si je pouvais quitter Londres avec la certitude que ces difficultés ont été heureusement vaincues, et que le Cabinet Britannique a réussi d'imposer à la France la nécessité de se joindre à une action efficace dirigée contre Méhémet Ali, je me féliciterais de pouvoir contribuer à la cause de la France, et de la cause de l'Europe.

Si je pouvais quitter Londres avec la certitude que ces difficultés ont été heureusement vaincues, et que le Cabinet Britannique a réussi d'imposer à la France la nécessité de se joindre à une action efficace dirigée contre Méhémet Ali, je me féliciterais de pouvoir contribuer à la cause de la France, et de la cause de l'Europe.

La Haye, le 10 Octobre 1839.  
G. L. N. N. O. W.

Incluse in No. 406.

#### Baron Brunnow's Memorandum on Eastern Affairs.

October, 1839.

DANS la crise actuelle de l'Orient il est un fait qui mérite d'être remarqué. C'est que, d'une part, qu'il y a désaccord entre les Grandes Puissances; de l'autre, indépendamment de la part de l'Angleterre elle-même.

Le Vice-Roi, en effet, a porté sa main sur la Syrie, et les forces navales anglaises ont été envoyées pour empêcher cela.

Le Vice-Roi, en effet, a porté sa main sur la Syrie, et les forces navales anglaises ont été envoyées pour empêcher cela.

Le Vice-Roi, en effet, a porté sa main sur la Syrie, et les forces navales anglaises ont été envoyées pour empêcher cela.

Le Vice-Roi, en effet, a porté sa main sur la Syrie, et les forces navales anglaises ont été envoyées pour empêcher cela.

Le Vice-Roi, en effet, a porté sa main sur la Syrie, et les forces navales anglaises ont été envoyées pour empêcher cela.

Le Vice-Roi, en effet, a porté sa main sur la Syrie, et les forces navales anglaises ont été envoyées pour empêcher cela.

Le Vice-Roi, en effet, a porté sa main sur la Syrie, et les forces navales anglaises ont été envoyées pour empêcher cela.

Le Vice-Roi, en effet, a porté sa main sur la Syrie, et les forces navales anglaises ont été envoyées pour empêcher cela.

Le plan qu'il s'agit d'adopter, serait donc destiné à agir simultanément sur Constantinople, sur la Syrie, et sur Alexandrie.

Selon le plus ou moins de vigueur que l'on voudra employer à l'exécution de ce plan, on peut y procéder de trois manières différentes.

#### Maximum du Plan d'Operation.

##### CONSTANTINOPLE

Declarer à la Porte qu'elle peut compter sur la ferme résolution du Gouvernement Britannique d'appuyer efficacement ses vrais intérêts, qu'elle ne doit ni se livrer à un fatal découragement, ni se prêter à des concessions humiliantes; qu'elle doit, au contraire, avec confiance, et en collaboration avec l'Angleterre, se livrer à un parfait accord avec ses Alliés; lui annoncer que dans ce but, l'Amiral Stopford est allé reconnaître les côtes de la Syrie, et qu'il a été convenu que le Commodore Stopford, qui se trouve à Constantinople, se rendra à la Porte pour représenter les intérêts de l'Angleterre.

##### Syrie

Donner à l'Amiral Stopford l'ordre:—1°. De se porter avec son escadre sur les côtes de la Syrie, en établissant sa station selon que la saison et les circonstances locales le lui conseilleront, dans la baie de Iskenderoon, ou sur tel autre point qui lui présentera le plus de sécurité.

De détacher un nombre de vaisseaux qu'il jugera suffisants pour aller occuper, soit par surprise, soit de vive force, les ports sur la côte qui servent de principaux dépôts militaires et de communication entre l'Egypte et l'Armée. Plus importante que leur voisinage des villes d'Alep et de Damas est fait pour agir sur les populations de la Syrie, et pour leur inspirer une confiance plus de mécontentement contre l'administration oppressive du Vice-Roi.

3°. D'envoyer un officier supérieur au quartier-général d'Ibrahim, pour lui déclarer, que s'il fait un seul pas en avant, au mépris des engagements que Méhémet Ali a données aux Puissances Européennes, l'Angleterre, de son propre mouvement, et sans attendre l'ordre de la France, occupera la Syrie toute entière, et qu'elle ne se retirera que lorsque l'Angleterre aura obtenu satisfaction qu'il aurait faite aux conditions de la France, et de l'Angleterre, et de l'Europe.

4°. De capturer tous les vaisseaux sous pavillon Egyptien, et de les envoyer dans les ports de guerre destinés à l'Armée d'Egypte.

##### Egypte.

Envoyer simultanément un officier supérieur à Alexandrie pour faire exactement la même déclaration à Méhémet Ali, en y ajoutant de plus, que si Ibrahim marche, l'Angleterre, sans jalousie et sans méfiance aucune, sera la première à appeler la Russie au secours de la Porte.

Ces mesures si elles sont prises avec une entière certitude; d'abord, elles ont pour effet de mettre l'Angleterre en second lien, que l'Angleterre pourra se défendre par elle-même.

Un état de choses qui, sans la domination de la Porte, et sans l'Angleterre, ne pourrait pas exister, et qui, dans tout état de choses, est un état de choses qui, sans la domination de la Porte, et sans l'Angleterre, ne pourrait pas exister.

Déclaration rassurante à Constantinople conçue dans les mêmes termes ci-dessus indiqués;—Ordre à l'Amiral Stopford de se porter sur les côtes de la Syrie pour intercepter les communications entre ce pays et l'Egypte,—capturer les vaisseaux sous pavillon Egyptien;—envoyer un officier à Ibrahim chargé d'un message comminatoire dans le même esprit que nous avons ci-dessus indiqué faire une déclaration analogue à Méhémet Ali.

Declaration rassurante à Constantinople :—Ordre à l'Austral Steepford d'aller sa station à l'Île de Rhodes ou à celle de Chypre, — d'envoyer un détachement pour croiser sur les côtes de la Syrie et renvoyer les bâtimens qui portent des munitions de guerre à l'Armée d'Égypte, expulser au besoin à l'étranger tout individu qui pourrait nuire à l'Angleterre rebelle à Vœu No. 1 et toute sa famille responsable des conséquences que pourra entraîner la reprise des hostilités. Même déclaration à Alexandrie.

17. Exécuter toutes ces mesures avec la plus grande promptitude et le plus grand secret. Il est possible que l'ennemi se soit aperçu de nos mesures, mais il faut le surprendre, parcequ'il faut frapper d'abord le coup avant de l'annoncer.

2°. En déclarant à Méhémet Ali que si Ibrahim marche, l'Angleterre sera la première à inviter la Russie à venir au secours de la Porte, le Gouvernement Britannique ne compromet et ne préjuge rien. Il annonce ce qu'il pourrait faire le cas échéant, mais il ne le fait pas encore. Il demeure donc entièrement libre de ses actions; mais en conservant cette liberté, il produit l'effet qu'il importe essentiellement d'obtenir, car il fait croire à Méhémet Ali que l'accord entre l'Angleterre et la Russie existe, bien que cet accord n'existe pas encore quant aux mesures militaires qu'il conviendrait de prendre pour mettre à couvert la sûreté de Constantinople, dans le cas où l'Armée d'Ibrahim viendrait à menacer la capitale de l'Empire Ottoman.

37. Si le Gouvernement Britannique le juge indispensable, l'Amiral Stapford  
préférable qu'il ait à sa disposition toutes ses forces réunies, que de les diviser.

4°. En ce qui concerne la France, l'Angleterre en adoptant la marche diplomatique, n'empêcherait en rien que le Cabinet des Tuileries vint à son tour à le jouer à propos. Le Gouvernement Britannique commencerait par agir d'abord sans se laisser retenu d'avantage par la crainte que le Ministère Français se oppose depuis trois mois à toutes les propositions qui lui ont été successivement adressées par le Cabinet de Londres. La France serait libre de suivre le mouvement de l'Angleterre, mais celle-ci serait assurément libre de ne pas le suivre en montrant la main qu'elle a son tour en avant sans se laisser paralyser par une opposition qui, en dernière analyse, n'est que par son effet la protection de la France, et le moyen de sa ruine et la ruine de la Porte.

D'après un mûr examen, le plan tel qu'il vient d'être exposé ci-dessus, semblerait révéler de grands avantages sans présenter le moindre inconvénient. L'Angleterre en l'adoptant agirait avec la dignité et l'énergie qui appartient à une Grande Puissance. Elle ne se laisserait pas entraîner par les calculs de la prudence humaine, pour préserver l'Empire Ottoman d'une catastrophe qui deviendrait inévitable, si les Cabinets de l'Europe continuent encore à discuter comme ils l'ont fait jusqu'ici, sans probabilité aucune d'en venir à une conclusion positive ; et s'ils hésitent encore plus longtemps à prendre une attitude forte pour imposer un frein aux projets ambitieux du Vice-Roi.

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 28.)*

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to No. 339 inclusive. Marshal Soult this morning read to me despatches dated the 7th, which he had just received from Alexandria and from Constantinople. The first mention rumours of Ibrahim Pasha having withdrawn his head-quarters from Marshah to Aleppo, and of insurrections having broken out in parts of Syria, but add, that the truth of these rumours was very doubtful. Mehemet Ali had removed to Cairo, as he says, for the benefit of his health by the change of air, and as said by others, to be out of the way of further discussions with the European Consuls.

Admiral Rousin transmits copies of notes that have passed between Rechid Pasha and himself, relative to the French and British fleets retiring from the mouth of the Nile to the Dardanelles, so near that they may not encounter the necessity, in tempestuous weather, to seek shelter within the Straits, and also reporting the delay which has occurred in the fulfilment by the Great Powers of the engagement they made in their Collective Notes of July last, to bring to a settlement the Egyptian question. He states, that he had concerted with Lord Ponsonby the answer given by them respectively to these communications from Rechid Pasha. The French Ambassador in one of his despatches transmits a copy of a letter addressed by Mehemet Ali to Hosrew Pasha, written with the intention of inducing the latter to enter into negotiations for peace without the intervention of the European Powers; and the Ambassador also reports the substance of a despatch received by the Intermunio from Count Riquelmont, recommending that a peace should be concluded upon the basis of the Sultan conceding to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt, and the government of Syria, and of Candia, during the life of Mehemet Ali, holding out the hope, that at his death these Pashalics may be divided among his children.

A courier arrived this morning at the Austrian Embassy from Prince Metternich; he is also charged with despatches to Prince Esterhazy, and will proceed immediately to London. Count Appony read to me a despatch from Prince Metternich in which he expresses his opinion, that although his wishes are always for the least possible concession being made by the Sultan to the demands of Mehemet Ali, yet that the Austrian Government can now only wait until the French and English Governments arrive at an agreement as to the conditions of peace which the Great Powers shall propose to the respective parties.

5 Y



No. 410

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 28.)*

(Confidential.)

(Extract.)

Paris, October 25, 1839.

I WAS prevented by indisposition, during the two first days after my return to Paris, from paying my respects to the King and the Royal Family at St. Cloud.

On Wednesday evening, however, I went there, and was as usual most graciously received by His Majesty, who expressed great satisfaction at hearing from me that the Queen was in excellent health, and who requested me to convey to Her Majesty the expression of his most affectionate regard, and of his earnest wish that the strict union between the two crowns may ever continue. The King then said, that he was impatient to speak to me fully and frankly upon the questions in which the French and British Governments were equally interested.

The King then turned the conversation to the affairs of the East, and began the subject by saying, that if it were supposed that either he or the Government had any desire to aggrandise the Pasha of Egypt, such supposition was utterly groundless. His Majesty said, he should be well content not only to accede to an arrangement which should deprive the Pasha of all the dominions he governed, excepting Egypt, and also to one which should restore to the Sultan the possession of Egypt itself. The question, however, he maintained was not what is desirable, but what is feasible; and he saw not the means of driving Mehmet Ali out of Syria by force, or of so embarrassing him by naval operations as to induce him to make the sacrifice of such extensive and important dominions. France, he said, whatever might be the intention of its Government, could not furnish a military force for this purpose. England, he believed, was not prepared to send an army to Syria, nor were the Austrian and Prussian Governments willing to employ their troops in such an enterprise. The execution of it, therefore, could only be undertaken by Russia; and considering the difficulties which a Russian army would have to encounter, and the force which Ibrahim Pasha could bring into the field, he had doubts of the success of its operations, but he had none, as to the remedy being worse than the disease.

The moral power of the Sultan would be far more seriously impaired by having his empire and his capital protected by the arms of Russia, than by the undue aggrandisement of his vassal; and he said he never had been more surprised than at the favourable consideration your Lordship had given to the Baron Brunnow's proposition, that the troops of the Emperor Nicholas should occupy Asia Minor, and the defence of Constantinople be confided to a Russian force.

I here took occasion to observe, that the proposal made by Baron Brunnow implied an assumption of the power of Russia to be asserted and acted upon by the Russian Government, of not considering the affairs of Turkey as foreign to it, and of claiming to have a direct interest in all the relations of the Ottoman Empire with Russia; and that it was only under a Convention specially obliging the Russian Government to withdraw its troops from the territories of the Sultan when called upon to do so by the other Great European Powers, that the protection of the Sultan from the Egyptian army would have been confided to Russia.

I then interrupted me by observing, that whatever confidence the English Government may be disposed to place in the proposed Convention, he could not see how such confidence could be justified, if that Convention would not be an abrogation of the Unkjar Skeless Treaty, but a sanction given by the other Powers to the carrying that Treaty into execution, against which both England and France had protested. In the present state of things, added His Majesty, the French Government have only to wait the progress of events. It

has communicated to the other Powers its views in regard to bringing about a peace between the Sultan and Mehmet Ali. The conditions proposed are such as the Pasha may be expected to accept, and which the Sultan might concede with far less danger to the Turkish Empire than might result to it from an attempt to enforce greater sacrifices from Mehmet Ali.

No. 411.

*Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.*

My Lords,

Foreign Office, October 29, 1839.

AS it appears that Ibrahim Pasha has retired from Marash, and as he does not seem to indicate any intention of advancing upon Constantinople, Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that it would be expedient that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford should be ordered to proceed with the squadron under his command, to Smyrna, or to any other convenient anchorage on the coast of Asia Minor, if the weather should compel him to leave Besika Bay.

This course would be better than that he should proceed to the White Cliffs, unless some reason with which Her Majesty's Government is at present unacquainted, should render it preferable for the squadron to go to the White Cliffs.

I have, therefore, to signify to your Lordships the Queen's commands, that instructions to the above effect may be given to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.

If, however, when those instructions reach Sir Robert Stopford, the squadron should already have anchored at the White Cliffs, and should find itself safe in that anchorage, it may remain there until further instructions, or until Sir Robert Stopford, with a view to his own arrangements, may find it more convenient to go to Smyrna.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 412

*The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 29.)*

(No. 112.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, October 18, 1839.

THE proposition of the French Cabinet, to which I referred in my last despatch, is the same that has been made through M. de St. Aulaire to the Austrian Government, and has been communicated to your Lordship.

M. de Barante tells me that no answer has been given to it by Count Nemelrode; and he concurs in my opinion, that the Russian Government will obey the wishes of England, as far as possible, in the Turco-Egyptian Question, in order to avoid the effect of a direct interference of the French and British Cabinets, and of lowering the influence and credit of the French in the Levant, the increase of which the Russians fear.

I cannot learn that there is any truth in the reports lately circulated in England, that the Russian troops on the Turkish frontier has been augmented. But I am informed that the number of troops usually withdrawn during the winter months from the neighbourhood of Odessa and Sevastopol, will be continued in their present station during the winter: so that there will always be 20,000 men ready for embarkation at a short notice. It is, however, to be expected that they will be so far scattered as to require a fortnight, or at least ten days, to muster them at a sea port. I

hope shortly to procure the most correct list of the Russian Army, which will probably afford means of judging accurately upon this matter.

Of the means of transport in the Black Sea, I can give your Lordship no intelligence at present.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) CLANRICARDE.

No. 413.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

(No. 348.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 29, 1839.

YOUR Excellency will find in my despatches to Mr. Bulwer, an account of the communications which have passed between Count Sebastiani and myself, upon Turkish affairs up to a certain point of the negotiation. Subsequently to the period to which those dispatches relate, I had a conversation with Count Sebastiani, in which I stated that Her Majesty's Government regretted extremely that it was quite impossible for them to concur in the final arrangement between the Sultan and Mehmet Ali, which the Government of France recommended, and which was to consist in granting to Mehmet Ali an hereditary tenure in the government of all the territories and places which he now occupies, except the small district of Adana, which the French Government proposed should be immediately restored to the Sultan, and the island of Candia, which the French Government thought might, at the death of Mehmet Ali, be given to one of his younger sons.

I said that such an arrangement would be a virtual dismemberment of the Turkish Empire, the integrity of which France had spontaneously avowed her intention to maintain. I said that such an arrangement would give to Mehmet Ali independence in all but the name; it would leave him stronger than the Sultan, and in the immediate possession of the resources, financial and military, of the best part of the Sultan's dominions. Mehmet Ali, therefore, would require nothing in order to make himself independent but the will to do so, for the Sultan would be entirely unable to prevent him from so doing. But Mehmet Ali announced to the Powers of Europe very early last year, that he was independent and sovereign, that he would never give up his determination to attain that object; and that he was firmly resolved to accomplish it. If, therefore, the Five Powers were to help him half way on his road, by advising the Sultan to grant him hereditary tenure of what he now occupies, they could have no just reason to be surprised if, in the course of a very short period afterwards, he were to withdraw his troops from the Egyptian Kingdom, and the Arabs, instead of being a part of Egypt, and thus dismember the Ottoman Empire, were as well as independent.

I said that Her Majesty's Government, therefore, could not concur with the Government of France in a proposal which would not only lead to results so diametrically opposite to those which both Governments have pledged themselves to obtain, and which are necessary for the best interests of Europe.

But I said that, as the French Government seem so anxious to procure better terms for Mehmet Ali, we would endeavour to see if it were not possible to render the proposed arrangement somewhat more favourable to him, without injury to the fundamental principle upon which the arrangement ought to rest.

I then pointed out upon the map a line which would extend the hereditary Pashalik of Mehmet Ali from the Nile to the Mediterranean Sea, and I suggested that, instead of the line which the French Government at Edirne proposed, which is the proper boundary of Egypt, his Pashalik might be made to continue along the sea-coast, as far north as the cape formed by Mount Carmel, that the boundary might from thence run in a straight line to the southern extremity of the Lake Tiberias, thence down the River Jordan to the Dead Sea; thence along the whole of the western shore of the Dead Sea to its southern

extremity; and from thence to the head of the Gulf of Akaba, and along the western coast of that gulf to Cape Ras Mahomed; and so round by the eastern shore of the Gulf of Suva to Suva. Thus excluding from the hereditary Pashalik the Fortress of St. John of Acre and the caravan road from Damascus to the Holy Cities. The Fortress of Acre, I observed, is the key of Syria, and on that account ought to be held by the Sultan; and the possession of the Holy Cities, as was very justly pointed out by the French Government in the early part of the negotiation, is essential for the Sultan; and therefore it is necessary that the authority of Mehmet Ali should not extend over the road which leads to those cities.

I said that the arrangement which I had thus suggested would certainly be objectionable, because it would bring the territory administered by the Pasha too closely in contact with that administered by the direct authority of the Sultan, and because it would not interpose any adequate barrier between those territories, but, nevertheless, it might be recommended to the Sultan, if all the Five Powers were prepared to employ whatever means might in any case be necessary to carry it into execution.

I said that if such a modification of our original plan would obtain for Her Majesty's Government the concurrence and co-operation of the Government of France, we should be willing to agree to it; but I begged Count Sebastiani to understand that this was the utmost extent of modification to which Her Majesty's Government could be a party; and that it appeared to me that it would be far better for the Sultan to let things remain as they are, and to take the chance of future events, than to consent to grant to Mehmet Ali an hereditary tenure in the government of any greater extent of the territory of the Ottoman Empire.

I observed, that Her Majesty's Government had afforded repeated proofs of its willingness to modify its own opinions for the purpose of obtaining the co-operation of France.

First, Her Majesty's Government had given up one part of the restoration which it had proposed should be sent to the admirals, for obtaining the restoration of the Turkish fleet; next, Her Majesty's Government had waived the proposal which it had made, that the restoration of the Turkish fleet should be demanded and enforced, without waiting for a general agreement among the Five Powers as to the final arrangement to be made between the Sultan and the Pasha; and now Her Majesty's Government is willing, if, by so doing, it can obtain the co-operation of France, considerably to enlarge the boundary which we had proposed for the hereditary Pashalik of Mehmet Ali. I expressed a hope that the suggestion of such a modification by the Majesty's Government would be very appreciated, and that the French Government would accede to the suggestion now made, and would consent to join with the other Powers in such measures as might be necessary for carrying the arrangement, so modified, into effect.

Count Sebastiani said he would report to his Government what I had proposed, and the statements I had made; and that he would let me know as soon as he should have received a reply.

After the proper time had elapsed for the arrival of an answer from Paris, Count Sebastiani came to me and showed me a despatch from Marshal Soult, which stated that the French Government could not agree to the suggestion which Her Majesty's Government had made, but still adhered to its own proposal, namely, that Mehmet Ali should have hereditary tenure in the government of everything which he now occupies, except Candia and the district of Adana; Candia to be retained by him during his life, with reversion to one of his younger sons; Adana to be immediately evacuated by him and to be restored to the Sultan. Such an arrangement the French Government thought would probably be agreed to by Mehmet Ali; but as the despatch did not distinctly say that France would be a party to coercive measures to enforce even this arrangement if it were rejected by Mehmet Ali, and as, on the contrary, the French Government appeared to be in favour of the greatest degree of leniency in any case coercion against the Pasha, the natural inference to be drawn was, that even these conditions, inadmissible as they were, were not to be proposed to Mehmet Ali as an ultimatum, but were to be considered liable to extension if Mehmet Ali should not spontaneously and voluntarily agree to them.





Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 2.)

(Separate and Secret.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 8, 1839

I LEARNED this day from indubitable authority, that the Grand Vizier acquainted the Serasker Halil Pasha and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Rechid Pasha, that the Grand Vizier had discovered a plot amongst certain of the Ulema for the overthrow of the present Administration, and the establishment of another favourable to the ancient order of things in this country. I was asked, "If there should be an attempt by violence to produce such a change, can the Ottoman Government hope for aid from the British ships of war to maintain the authority of the Sultan against such persons as shall attempt to employ it?" I replied, certainly, "Yes, and I will be the first to give the best assistance he can to the support of the Sultan's Government against insurrection of the sort described."

The above is in no degree official, and has not committed me to any act whatever. I do not believe that any attempt at violence will be made. I think the Government will send out a strong force of the Ulema whose plans have been discovered, and that everything will remain in quiet. I suspect the Grand Vizier has only exaggerated the affair, and I think it would be well to be aware fully that the Porte may not be left without friends at a moment of need. The support of Austria and England is at this moment sufficient, as I believe, to maintain Rechid Pasha and Halil in authority; and whilst those Ministers remain we may have a considerable confidence that nothing will be done exclusively contrary to the policy and law of the Ottoman Empire by Her Majesty's Government. Rechid Pasha has completely gained Halil to support his views and system, and Halil has constant access to the Sultan. He has aided Rechid in his efforts to put an end to the constant interference of the Serail in the administration of affairs, and to give to the known and ostensible Ministers, power to originate the measures they are to carry into execution. The Serail was everything in the time of the Sultan Mahmud. The young Sultan has agreed not to consult with or listen to the men who surround him as domestic officers.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 415

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 2.)

No. 278.)

My Lord,

Thessalonica, October 8, 1839

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of an instruction addressed by his Excellency the Internuncio to the Austrian Consul-General at Alexandria, and also copy of a letter from myself to Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Egypt.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure 1 in No. 415

Baron Stürmer to M. de Laurin.

Monsieur,

Constantinople, le 5 Octobre, 1839

S. A. LE GRAND VIZIR m'a fait communiquer la dernière lettre que lui a adressée le Pacha d'Egypte. Le ton qu'y règne est à la vérité un peu plus modéré que celui qu'il avait pris jusqu'ici dans ses ouvertures envers le Divan

de Sa Hauteur. Mais ce que m'y a frappé, c'est que Méhémet Ali paraît se flatter toujours d'attirer la Porte à son arrangement avec les grandes puissances de l'Europe, sous l'égide desquelles elle se trouve placée, restreint étrangères. Est-il possible qu'un homme qui dans sa longue carrière a fait preuve d'une sagacité peu ordinaire, puisse s'aveugler à ce point, lorsqu'il s'agit de ses propres intérêts? Je ne doute pas, Monsieur, qu'en en appelant à cette même sagacité, vous ne parveniez à lui faire comprendre l'erreur où il se trouve, et à l'éclairer sur sa véritable situation. Voici les réflexions qui vous aident à lui remettre.

Les fautes de la Porte et l'abus qu'elle a fait de son pouvoir, ont donné lieu à des réformes. Il n'y a eu de réformes que par la force, et non par la persuasion. Il peut arriver que la Porte, par son attitude, donne à l'Europe l'impression qu'elle est disposée à se soumettre à la volonté de la Porte, mais elle ne peut pas le faire sans se détruire elle-même. La destruction serait la suite probable du conflit. Mais peut-être, si le veut, ne complaire dans la conviction et dans la puissance matérielle. Mais où tout cela le mènera-t-il si l'Europe lui est hostile? En supposant même qu'elle ne le soit rien pour le combattre, elle possède contre lui une arme redoutable: c'est celle de son avenir.

Que veut-il en effet? Il ne cesse de répéter que tout ce qu'il fait n'a d'autre but que celui de fonder l'avenir de sa famille. Croit-il, par exemple, que la haine personnelle qui l'a animé jusqu'ici contre Houssein Pacha, soit une bonne base à donner à l'établissement de sa famille? A-t-il jamais vu un homme de cette nature fonder quelque chose de durable? Plus il a fait de fautes, plus il doit apprendre et mieux il comprendra que la situation de l'Egypte est nécessaire à l'existence régulière et à la durée d'une position politique. Qu'il ne se trompe donc pas sur la nature de la supériorité de l'Europe. Il ne peut pas pour lui donner l'avenir qu'il veut fonder. Si même le Sultan lui accordait toutes les concessions qu'il demande, elles ne suffiraient pas pour consolider sa position, car l'Europe ne les sanctionnerait pas. Voilà ce dont il doit se pénétrer surtout, et ce que je vous autorise, Monsieur, à lui dire au nom de la Cour Impériale.

Il y a un siècle que Méhémet Ali, Chef des Musulmans révoltés, avait pu fonder un nouvel Empire: il aurait existé dans cet état de séparation et d'isolement qui rendait alors l'Europe peu attentive à des événements de cette nature. Mais l'Europe a vu que Méhémet Ali avait voulu se faire reconnaître comme un prince de choses: il a besoin, sous peine de passer comme un voleur, de la sanction de l'Europe, et l'Europe ne sanctionnera que ce qui laissera intact le principe de la souveraineté du Sultan.

Méhémet Ali fonde l'espoir du succès de sa résistance sur la conviction qu'il paraît avoir de la difficulté qu'auraient les Puissances d'adopter en son nom des mesures actives contre lui, il doit sentir qu'elles se mettront d'accord pour refuser leur sanction à un ordre de choses qu'elles trouveraient trop onéreux pour la Porte: une mesure négative n'est jamais difficile à prendre.

En mettant tous vos soins, Monsieur, à rendre cette position intelligible à Méhémet Ali, vous servirez ses intérêts aussi bien que ceux de la Porte. Je vous donne connaissance de cette dépêche aux Ambassadeurs de France et d'Angleterre, ainsi qu'aux Envoyés de Russie et de Prusse, et je ne doute pas que MM. vos Collègues ne reçoivent l'ordre de tenir au Pacha le même langage.

Recevez, &c.,  
(Signé) STURMER

Inclosure 2 in No. 415.

Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Campbell

Sir,

Thessalonica, October 5, 1839

YOUR Colleague, the Austrian Consul-General, will have received an instruction from his Excellency the Internuncio, dated Constantinople, 5th of October, 1839, which he is desired to communicate to you, and to request your co-operation with him in his efforts to expose to the Pasha of Egypt the impolicy and the inutilty of all the attempts the Pasha may make to resist measures which it shall be the interest and the duty of some of the Great Powers, and



perhaps of Europe as a whole, to carry into execution; and I have to beg that you will do what is proper for that end, making use of such arguments as Her Majesty's Government would use, founded upon the opinions they entertain of the comparative resources and power of the Pasha, and upon their views of political exigencies and interests, of which you are well-apprend.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSOMBY

No. 416.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 2.)*

No. 270.)

My Lord,

*Therapia, October 8, 1839.*

HIS Excellency the Intermuncio has been so good as to give me a copy of the information he received by the late French steamer of the 11th instant from Alexandria, and which he sent in to Rechid Pasha for the Porte. I have not received any communication by his post nor by the preceding steamer from Her Majesty's Consul-General at Alexandria, and it is from other sources I have learned the malady of Mehemet Ali, and such other matters as ought to be known by the Ambassador here.

I yesterday received from Mr. Consul Werry, at Damascus, a despatch of September 25 and from Mr. Vice-Consul Werry at Aleppo of September 20, and a private letter from Mr. Consul Morris at Beirut of the 21st September, and I gathered from these reports very important information, tending to show the correctness of the accounts given by the Austrian Consul-General to the Intermuncio (inclosed), of the impediments that prevent Ibrahim Pasha from marching this way.

I gather from the examination of the reports of these Consuls, that it will not be possible for Ibrahim to arrive in the neighbourhood of the coast of December, and that probably it will not be in his power to come then; and that were he to come, he could not well have a larger force than about 15,000 men.

If this be correct, it will be apparent, that what I have so much insisted upon, is true; namely, that the real force of Mehemet Ali is magnificent, instead of being of a magnitude before which the Great Powers of Europe are obliged by prudence to bow down with submission.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSOMBY

*Inclosure to No. 416*

*Extract of Reports from Alexandria, of September 26, 1839*

MEHEMET ALI va mieux, mais dès qu'il se met à parler d'affaires, son pouls bat avec violence et devient fiévreux.

On lui a conseillé de changer d'air, en qu'il a refusé à l'absenter pendant une huitaine de jours pour faire un voyage en Syrie.

Les troubles en Syrie continuent, surtout dans le Liban, où les chrétiens et les musulmans se font la guerre. Les troupes de Mehemet Ali ont fait de grands ravages parmi les chrétiens, et à lui faire reprendre les cantonnemens d'Antioche et de Kilia.

Mehemet Ali a envoyé 120,000 ardebs de blé aux trois quartiers-généraux de Damas, de Alep, et de Marache, pour prévenir la famine dont ils sont menacés. Les troupes de Mehemet Ali ont fait de grands ravages parmi les chrétiens, et à lui faire reprendre les cantonnemens d'Antioche et de Kilia.

Quant à la flotte Ottomane, le Pasha dit toujours qu'il veut la garder jusqu'à

la paix. Mais tout faisait croire qu'il pourrait modifier incessamment son langage. Achmed Pacha ne le voit pas ainsi. Il a quitté sa maison de campagne pour s'installer sur son Vaisseau Amiral; Mehemet Ali commence à le traiter avec froideur.

Mehemet Ali, interpellé sur les projets de faire avancer son armée, et de marcher sur Constantinople, lui a répondu qu'il n'a pas abandonné cette intention. La vérité est qu'il a fait effort pour se porter en avant, mais que celui-ci lui a représenté que l'armée manque de vêtements et de vivres; que les maladies en ont enlevé une partie considérable; que les Vixirs de l'Asie, auxquels il s'était adressé, avaient tout d'un coup manifesté des intentions peu amicales envers les Egyptiens; que des troubles avaient éclaté en même temps sur plusieurs points de la Syrie qui ne pouvaient être réprimés avec succès par des troupes irrégulières; enfin, qu'il se voyait obligé d'opérer une dislocation de l'armée, et même d'évacuer les endroits situés autour de Marache.

No. 417.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 2.)*

No. 280

My Lord,

*Therapia, October 8, 1839.*

I enclose copy of an Official Note sent in this day to the Sublime Porte, as a reply to the Note of the 28th of September, from the Porte to the Representatives of the Five Powers. I had previously answered in the usual way through the Dragoman; and I have taken this additional step, because Rechid Pasha received an Official Note, and because it seemed necessary to come forward in support of Rechid Pasha, and of the policy we have pursued here, which is attested by the French Ambassador in his communication to Rechid Pasha, dated the 5th instant, of which I inclose copy. My note is intended to manifest the opinion that I think due to the conduct of the Minister and to the policy of the Porte, and thereby to mark strongly a dissent from the opinions stated in the Ambassador's instruction, though I make no allusion to his communication.

I have, since sending off the Official Note, heard from Rechid Pasha: he is at a loss to understand the Ambassador's drift; but it seems to me evident enough that the French are dissatisfied with the restraint the Note of the Porte imposes upon the arrangement of the question with Mehemet Ali, according to the present views of the French Government.

I beg to call attention to the following sentence:—"On observe encore que l'intérêt du Sultan est moins dans la quantité plus ou moins grande de cette concession, que dans la forme, &c." I marked the passage in the instruction.

It is difficult to understand what is meant by the French Government, when stating in one place that the arrangement of this affair of Mehemet Ali is to be managed solely by the Great Powers, and in another, that the Porte is to "faire cesser par une réconciliation avec le Vice-Roi ce que la situation a de trop violent et menaçant pour la paix de l'Europe," &c.

Rechid Pasha asked the Ambassador, what is the meaning of "on croit qu'il y aurait du danger dans l'emploi des moyens violents?" The Ambassador replied:—"M. le Vice-Roi ne veut pas la guerre."

I inclose copy of a Note, dated October 2, 1839, from the French Ambassador to the Porte, which bears directly upon the matter of this despatch.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSOMBY





(No. 281.)

Therapia, October 8, 1839.

I enclose copy of the message for your Lordship's information.

I have &c,  
(Signed, **POINSON**)

At Frederic Pirani to Vincent Penzance.

1700, or 8 October, 1679.

et Française ont le droit, ou non, de s'établir à l'entree, pour ainsi dire, des Dar-  
danelles. S'en tenant au seul fait de la presence des flottes dans leur station  
actuelle, la Porte exprime de rechef son opinion qu'elles lui auroient rendu vrai-  
ment service si elles se presentaient sur les cotes de l'Egypte et de la Syrie. La  
Porte sait que c'est aux Gouvernemens Francais et Anglais à diriger les flottes,  
et espere que ces Gouvernemens ne tarderont pas à donner à leurs Amiraux  
respectifs des ordres conformes aux desirs de la Porte, avoit, de se montrer et  
agir sur les cotes Egyptiennes. Mais, en attendant, on dit que les deux Ami-  
raux sont convenus de venir mouiller dans la baie dite "les Taches Blanches,"  
mouillage situe dans les Dardanelles. La Sublime Porte represente à leurs  
Excellences les Ambassadeurs d'Angleterre et de France, qu'elle se content pas  
à ce que les flottes viennent mouiller aux "Taches Blanches." Je vous prie de  
renvoyer fidelement mon message à son Excellence Lord Ponsonby, et de lui  
presenter mes complimens. J'attends M. Lapierre, et je le chargerai du même  
message pour M. l'Amiral Roussin."

Je suis, &c.,  
(Signé) **F. PISANI**

Lecture, Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty

Foreign Office, November 3, 1892

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordships, that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople has reported to me, that he has been informed that the Turkish Ministers have discovered the existence of a plot for the overthrow of the present administration in Turkey, and for the establishment of another administration favourable to the ancient order of things in that country; and Her Majesty's Ambassador adds, that he was asked whether,

(Signed) PALMERSTON

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 4.)

Tampara, October 12, 1840.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 281, I have the honour to inclose copy of an official Note which I sent to the Porte on the subject of the fleet.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) **PONSONBY**

18. October 13th.—Rechid Pasha has thanked me for the note enclosed  
+ despatch.

1

*Note from Firconut Pousonby to Rethid Pasha*

Therapia, October 12, 1839

THE Undersecretary, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, hastens to reply to the communication he has had the honour to receive from his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, relating to the British squadron now at Benic Bay.

This is the fourth time that the Ottoman Ministers have manifested anxiety that does not seem very reasonable, the object of it being an Asly engaged in making most costly exertions, directed solely to aid in maintaining the integrity and independence of the Sublime Porte, but as his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs has listened to the vague rumour of which his Excellency speaks, the Undersigned is called upon to say, that his Excellency has not assigned the least reason why any credit should be given to the rumour, and the Undersigned imagines the rumour to be unfounded.

The Undersigned has several times acquainted the Ottoman Ministers that he has not authority to direct the movements of the British Fleet. It would all become the Undersigned to interfere with the duty of the British Admiral, when there is nothing in his conduct that can be construed so as to give a shadow of appearance of any design that is not in perfect accordance with the most friendly feelings towards the Ottoman Government, and the Undersigned must decline assuming an unauthorized power, but as the Undersigned desires to relieve his Excellency from every uneasiness he may

feel, the Undersigned has a great satisfaction in being able to acquaint his Excellency that the British Admiral seems to have the intention of going ere long to Vourla.

The Undersigned, &c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY

No. 421.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 4.)

No. 286.,

My Lord,

Therapia, October 13, 1839.

I HAVE this morning received from the Sublime Porte the inclosed communication.

I believe Ibrahim Pasha is driven by the necessities of his army, to commit the aggressions mentioned, and that those necessities will multiply greatly every day.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 421.

Substance of Despatches received by the Sublime Porte.—(Communicated to the Representatives of the Five Powers, October 13, 1839.)

TOPGI OGLU, commandant un corps de troupes Egyptiennes qui fait partie des troupes cantonnées à Ourfa, se porta, il y a peu de temps, dans le voisinage de Sourik; s'empara des provisions de bouche qui y trouvaient, prit possession des districts de Tzermik et de Erghana, d'où il y avoir séjourné quelque temps, il en sortit, emmenant avec lui quelques familles de ces districts, et retourna à Ourfa.

On a vu par les moyens d'établir des autorités, au nom de Sa Hauteur, dans ces districts ci-dessus mentionnés, pour assurer par là la tranquillité des habitants et des pauvres; mais Shukri Bey, Général de division de l'Armée Egyptienne, se présente tout récemment dans les environs, à la tête de trois régimens d'infanterie, d'un régiment de Cavalerie, et d'un corps de troupes irrégulières composé de mille hommes; il somma le Gouverneur de Sourik, Omer Bey, d'en sortir, et fit ses dispositions pour le contraindre, en employant la force, et de ce district, et de celui de Tzermik.

Omer Bey, considérant qu'il n'était pas autorisé par la Sublime Porte à opposer de la résistance, sortit de la place, bon gré mal gré, et se porta à M...

Ces agissements des troupes Egyptiennes non seulement troublent la tranquillité des habitants et des pauvres, mais peu après ils agissent dans une sphère plus grande ils feront que les tribus Curdes s'attacheront à leur parti, et ils feront naître une foule d'autres inconvénients.

Voulant rétablir la sûreté du pays et des routes, et protéger les habitants et les pauvres, on expédia à Erghana, Rustem Bey, Colonel de la Garde Impériale, et l'on écrivit en conséquence au Calmacam de Diarbékir.

L'Inspecteur des Mines Impériales, Son Excellence Saadettin Pacha, vient d'adresser deux dépêches à la Sublime Porte, pour qu'on lui fasse savoir sans délai comment il faut agir dans ces circonstances, et dans le cas que cet état de choses empirât.

Le Pacha a envoyé en même temps à la Porte une lettre de Shukri Bey, accompagnée de plusieurs pièces.

Ibrahim Pasha, établi aujourd'hui à Marache, sème le trouble et la division dans les environs. Il a même expédié un corps de plus de 500 hommes contre Solyman Pacha, Ex-Mouhassil de Marache, sous le com-

mandement de Carî Murad Oglou, Ahmed Bey, et Durzi Bey Chérib, et Carî Bairactar, Hassan Jazigé. Solyman Pacha évitant de combattre avec les siens, se retira à Caissar.

Depuis le jour de son entrée à Marache, Ibrahim Pacha livre à ses soldats tous les produits des fermes et des terres, &c., que Solyman Pacha possède, soit dans la ville, soit dans les villages de Marache, ce qui cause à ce dernier beaucoup de préjudice.

No. 422.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 287.)

My Lord,

Therapia, October 14, 1839.

IN reply to Admiral Stopford's communication to me, that he thought of going to Vourla, I said that I did not think the British could take any maritime measures now, that I thought Ibrahim Pasha in too great difficulties to make an attempt at present upon this place; but that I thought it would be highly imprudent to leave unexecuted any measures calculated to defeat an attempt, if made by him.

I transmitted to Sir Robert Stopford copy of my official Note to the Porte in reply to the demand, made by the Porte, for the removal of the fleet.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 423.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 288.)

My Lord,

Therapia, October 14, 1839.

I AM assured by Rechid Pasha, that the copy\* of the instructions to Haliz Pasha transmitted to me in your Lordship's despatch No. 132, and which I communicated to his Excellency for the purpose of ascertaining their authenticity, is very incorrect.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 424.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

No. 163. Secret.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 4, 1839.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government have received from the Sublime Porte, on the 1st of October, your Excellency's return to the application made to you relative to the maintenance of the authority of the Sultan against any attempt, by violence, to produce a change in the present administration.

I inclose, for your Excellency's information, a copy of an instruction\* which I have been commanded by the Queen, to address to the Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty in consequence of your despatch.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.



(No. 163. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, November 4, 1899.

With reference to this matter, I have to inform your Excellency, confidentially, that Baron Brunow stated privately and unofficially, before he left England, that he thought that the easiest solution of the difficulty which has arisen between Russia and England, about the entrance of the British squadron into the Dardanelles, would be the advance of Ibrahim Pasha towards Brussa because in that case, the Porte would invite the British squadron, as well as the Russians, into the straits, and all dispute upon this matter would be at an end.

London,  
Signed, PALMERSTON

No. 426

(No. 164)

Foreign Office, November 4, 1832

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government approve the instruction which appears by your despatch N. 215, you addressed to Colonel Campbell, on the 5th of October, direct ing him to co-operate with the Austrian Consul-General in pointing out to Mehmet Ali the impolicy and inutilty of any attempts on his part to resist the measures which the Great Powers may determine to adopt.

Signed) **L. M. & C. PALMERSTON**

No. 427

(No. 165.)

*Foreign Office, November 4, 1839*

Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the Note, of which a copy is enclosed in your despatch No. 240, and which you may fix as you see fit to the ~~Parliament~~ on the 20th of October, in reply to the Note communicated by the Porte, on the 28th of September, to the Representatives of the Five Powers.

I have to instruct your Excellency to state confidentially to the Porte, that the Turkish Government must not attach too much importance to the apparently unfriendly and sh-shing conduct of the French Government upon the matters in dispute between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, nor must the Porte give up the hope of seeing France ultimately come back to the party with which she started, and of finding her again join the other Powers in a sincere and honest support of the Sultan. The French Government is tired, ~~but~~ of temporary expedients and cannot afford to show weakness at home. Mehemet Ali has, by a judicious employment of money and other means of persuasion, won over to his interests a number of individuals at Paris, who

100, &c  
PALMERSTON

428

No. 191

1 sent, October 27, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch which I have just received from Lord Ponsonby.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure in No. 428.

My Lord,

Therapsid, October 14, 1839

I HAVE had private information from Vienna, that the Emperor's Government has agreed to the Ministry's Ministers, that Melnik should have the sole possession of Egypt, that Syria should be left to the Holy See, and that the Sultan should be deposed amongst his children, and the death and that the Emperor's Government should at that point the death of Melnik be passed under the name of the Sultan's son, but Austria and the other powers of the East should be restored to the Porte.

No subject is more easily misunderstood than the one restored to the public arena by the late Mr. Gladstone's paper. In the first place, no arrangement is made in the original English, and, secondly, the political conditions of England, France and Austria. The French Government, however, has taken the pains to put the language in a more particularly definite path, so as to make it more clear. Mr. Gladstone's Secretary of State has stated in the French language, and in Her Majesty's Ministry, the following before the public that might come from unfounded jealousies of our desires upon Egypt, and he has proposed to give that country to Mohammed Ali.

I presume Her Majesty's Government desire to carry its own views into execution. But if it should be necessary to request the French Government, they must be, of course, presented to the Sublime Porte for approbation, and I will be happy to send the Sublime Porte the necessary military consent to its own destruction, though it may make no attempt to resist the will of England and France.

But the Emperor of Russia announced formally through his Minister, that His Imperial Majesty will not consent to such a proposition as a treaty with the Emperor and all his cabinet and the Sublime Porte will support the Sublime Porte in its liberty of action and judgement. If the Sublime Porte reject the propositions, will the French Government attempt to force them upon the Porte, and will England aid France?

W. RUSNA D. W. FRANKLIN, the character of protector of the most important portion of the Ottoman Empire; and can it be disputed that if

The views of Her Majesty's Government, if carried into effect, would secure a breathing time for the country, that would enable us to establish a permanent security. It will be due to the wisdom of France if this good shall be prevented, and the elements of confusion and war be perpetuated.

No. 429

(No. 114.)

St. Petersburg, October 25, 1839

From what passed between His Imperial Majesty and me, I do not think the Emperor could have entertained sanguine hopes, that His Majesty's Government would entrust the defence of Turkey to the hands of a man who had experienced from Her Majesty, and the tone of your Lordship's conversation

Count Nesselrode informed me of the suggestion made by the Emperor to Baron Lewinsky, and by him transmitted to his Government, that if it were found expedient for a Russian force to defend the Bosphorus, a British force should appear simultaneously within the Dardanelles. He said that the

I must however inform your Lordship, that Count Orloff, in speaking of this proposition, has said that it was impossible that I could ever be acceded to by Russia; but he had not then discussed the matter with the Emperor.

Count Neasebrode seemed very anxious for the arrival of the instructions, which he says your Lordship promised to send to me; and he endeavoured to draw from me an expectation of the arrival of a special messenger before the return of the bearer of this despatch.

In speaking of Baron Brunnow's departure and his journey through Belgium, I endeavoured to draw from Count Nemelrode some observation upon the existing state of the relations between that country and Russia, and in speaking of the French Government I alluded to Don Carlos. But upon both these matters, Count Nemelrode preserved the strictest silence.

No. 434.

(No. 335.)

Paris, November 4, 1839.

I this day communicated to Marshal Soult the instructions sent by Her Majesty's Government to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, relative to the anchoring the fleet under his command near Smyrna. The Marshal expressed his obligation to me for the communication he told me that similar instructions had been given by the French Government to Admiral Laalande, of which he would send me a copy.

6 D



Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 8.)

No. 289.)

My Lord,

Thessalon, October 16, 1839

I HAD yesterday the honour of presenting Her Majesty's letter to the Sultan and my credentials also.

His Imperial Majesty expressed his great satisfaction with Her Majesty's letter, and the high value he attaches to Her Majesty's friendship.

His Imperial Majesty was pleased to honour me with a very gracious reception.

I presented the Secretary of Her Majesty's Embassy, and the other members of it to His Majesty.

The Grand Vizier and the Seraskier, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs received me on my arrival with at the Palace, the said Seraskier where Sultan Abdul Medjid resides. At the usual formal demonstration of respect to Her Majesty's Ambassador were observed.

I had a conversation with the Grand Vizier and the Secretary of State—the latter interpreting. The Grand Vizier said, that were the army of Ibrahim on the opposite coast, the Porte would not yield that the Porte relied upon the friendship of England. He made an allusion to France. I replied, that the Porte might depend upon the friendship of England and of Austria, and that those countries were not likely to be deceived. The conversation was of some length. I afterwards conversed with the Pasha and he said, the Grand Vizier was not going, but they were convinced that they would follow his advice. I then conversed with the Grand Vizier of the connection between Syria and the Khivaat. He said there were persons taking the Sultan to task to convince the Pasha, that these persons were the instruments of Mehemet Ali. The Grand Vizier recommended the subject was not to be taken up, when I said that resistance at present to the demands of the Pasha would not do to the Sultan, that the Porte was able to reduce its expenses, whilst Mehemet Ali must continue to increase them. He had any means to support, that his information from Syria showed the bad and disorganised state of the army and country under Ibrahim; that on the side of the Porte there was not any danger from an open attack from the Pasha, and that if it were a surprise, I would be assisted by all the Powers. I then said, I believed I might have better fortune, and I stated distinctly, that that for the Porte should be in the position of not taking the views of the Powers of its enemies should be known, that at least those views should not be what the Porte thought consistent with its interest, would not be to make to Mehemet Ali those concessions which would be made to him in the past, and of now asking the Government of the Powers at that Pasha's feet, and asking if not going up the best interests of the Sultan and of necessity.

The Grand Vizier said that he wished me to write to the Powers, and to the Powers such counsels as might be communicated to the Sultan.

I then said to the Grand Vizier, that I was not an officer of the Porte, and that I was not a power, but that I was a messenger, and that I was at Alexandria, and that I was not a messenger from the Sultan, but a messenger from the Sultan's state of things.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 341.)

My Lord,

Paris, November 8, 1839.

COUNT MEDEM has called upon me this morning, and made me acquainted with the contents of a despatch from Count Nesselrode, which he has communicated to Marshal Soult, and which is in answer to the proposition made by the French Government, with respect to an arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali.

The substance of this despatch expresses an opinion less hostile to the views of the French Government than I should have anticipated, considering the conversations which passed between your Lordship and M. de Brunnow, in London. For although the Russian Cabinet does not positively approve of the plan which the French Government suggests, it speaks of that plan as affording facilities for bringing the present precarious position of affairs in the East to an end.

Count Nesselrode however states, that it is essentially necessary that the French Government should be ready to enforce whatever arrangement is definitively determined upon by the Five Powers, should such arrangement be refused or opposed by the Pasha.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

No. 433

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 292.)

My Lord,

Thessalon, October 22, 1839.

I INCLOSE copy of a Note from the Sublime Porte, dated 21st instant.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure in No. 433.

Note from the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Five Powers

Constantinople, le 13 Chaban, 1259  
(21 Octobre, 1839.)

(Traduction.)

ON sait qu'au moment après l'avènement au trône du Sultan Abdul Medjid, le pardon que Sa Hauteur daignait accorder à Méhémet Ali, Pacha d'Egypte, à condition que les hostilités cesseraient par terre et par mer, fut publié, et annoncé à tous les hauts fonctionnaires de l'Empire; et que, bientôt après, les Cinq Puissances Alliées se chargèrent de l'arrangement et de la conclusion de la Question Egyptienne.

On sait aussi qu'en attendant la décision des Cinq Puissances, et pour laisser les choses dans l'état où elles étaient, la Sublime Porte fit savoir à ses généraux, dans leurs campemens respectifs, qu'il fallait éviter absolument, la circonstance arrivant, tout conflit avec les troupes Egyptiennes, et qu'elle ne cessait encore de faire les mêmes recommandations.

Il était donc nécessaire, qu'en attendant l'heureuse issue de la médiation des Puissances, Méhémet Ali Pacha s'abstînt aussi de tout mouvement hostile. On voit cependant par les dépêches successives communiquées aux Représentans des Cinq Puissances, que les troupes du Pacha, sous prétexte, tout d'abord de prendre les mesures pour l'été, ont été peu à peu portées en avant des lieux qu'elles occupaient et se sont établies

dans diverses villes, bourgs et villages. Les commandans de l'Armée Ottomane, se conformant aux instructions de la Sublime Porte, ne se sont pas opposés à ces envahissemens de territoire; ils se sont contentés d'en informer le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse, et de demander à cet égard l'expression de la volonté impériale.

Or, il serait contraire à la déclaration officielle de la Sublime Porte qu'elle autorisât ses sujets à repousser par la force l'agression Egyptienne. D'un autre côté, il est impossible d'empêcher aux habitans des lieux dont les Egyptiens veulent s'emparer, des instructions pour qu'ils les y reçoivent.

En conséquence, outre la difficulté qu'éprouve pour la Sublime Porte de se faire en lui-même, il ne lui paraît pas convenable, après l'acceptation de l'intervention des Cinq Puissances, de pourvoir, sans les consulter, aux mesures qu'exige une affaire aussi délicate.

La Sublime Porte se regarde donc comme obligée par la nature de l'affaire aussi bien que par celle de ses rapports d'amitié avec les Cinq Puissances, d'en faire part à leurs Représentans et de s'en référer à eux quant à la marche qu'elle doit adopter.

La présente Note est adressée à M. l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, de même qu'elle l'est à M. l'Intervenant d'Autriche, à MM. les Ministres de Russie et de Prusse, et à M. le Chargé d'Affaires de France, et c'est pour nous une occasion de lui renouveler l'assurance de notre haute considération.

(S. gnc) RECHID

No. 434.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 31.)

(Extract.)

Alleppe, September 23, 1839

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, a copy of my despatch of the 20th instant, to Viscount Ponsonby, which I hope will meet with your Lordship's approbation.

Since the date of my inclosed despatch to his Excellency the Ambassador, nothing of any interest has transpired on this frontier, or within the jurisdiction of this Consulate, which merits your Lordship's attention.

Inclosure in No. 434.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.)

Alleppe, September 20, 1839

I HAVE further to inform your Lordship, that during my stay at Biregick, I had occasion to see a very respectable Christian from Aleppo, who stated that the whole country round is perfectly quiet, and that the only Egyptian troops that had crossed the river were two regiments of Infantry under Selim Pasha, who continued to remain at Ota, as was also a Regiment of Cavalry and Turkish Irregulars (Hochi-Bozaks) under Colonel Maggum Bey. He added, that this latter, with the Bedouins and Turkish Irregulars, had only just returned to Ota, for he had heard they had gone on a reconnoitring tour along the Desert, in which they had advanced to a place called Ambra, the object of which, he says, is not known, though generally rumoured and believed to be Souffouk Bey and that tribe of Arabs.

I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that the Egyptian forces continue to occupy on the frontiers between Aintab and Marash, the same position as when I last had the honour of addressing your Lordship, with the exception of several regiments, which have been ordered as here under.

Towards the south, for Hamah, Hama, and Damascus, two regiments of Infantry, two idem of Cavalry, and one of Artillery.

To Antioch, two regiments of Infantry; and there are at present forming the garrison of Aleppo, two regiments of Infantry, and one idem of Cavalry, the Dragoons.

His Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha continues to occupy Marash, and has with him about five regiments, four of which are Infantry, and one Cavalry, with a few batteries of Artillery.

At Aintab there are four regiments of Infantry, and two of Artillery.

I have not received lately any advices from the Adana district, but I am assured that Achmet Menekli Pasha continues to be there with a corps of Cavalry.

From the latest advices I have from the Alexandretta district, I am happy to be able to say that the mountains of the range of the Bysas along that range to Adana, are now perfectly quiet and secure; and I am confident that at present no danger threatens the tranquillity of the greatest tranquillity.

I have further to inform your Lordship, that on my way back to Aleppo, from Port William, I passed through Aintab, and I there learnt that his Excellency the Seraskier had ordered the Cuirassier Regiment to proceed forthwith to Albistan, said to be about eighteen hours from Marash; and upon my enquiring for what reason, I was told that one of those mountains, called "Guguk Dagh," had risen, and was completely revolted, in consequence, they added, of his Excellency having demanded their arms and conscripts.

I was further informed that the inhabitants of this mountain were the same who had some short time back advanced on the Ginour Dagh mountains and who committed the late many depredations on the caravans, &c., towards Bysas, and all that neighbourhood, and who had also, some time back, taken the Government oxen employed in the mountains for the timber cutting in the same direction.

I was also told by many, whilst at Aintab, that the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha had still the intention of bringing the River Sedjour to Aleppo, and that he had sent for all the colonels of the regiments there, to combine measures for the execution of the same. Since my arrival here I learn that the Government has ordered a large quantity of baskets, spades, &c., to Aintab, by order of his Excellency the Seraskier, said to be for the purpose of working the canal which is to conduct the River Sedjour to this place.

In consequence of there having been no arrivals from Malatia and that direction, I am sorry I possess no interesting or correct information to lay before your Lordship with regard to the movements of the Sultan's Seraskier Sedullah Pasha, who I am assured is at Malatia.

It has been reported, to me that Sadullah Pasha has collected in the direction of Malatia, Diarbekir, &c., a force of 20,000 Regulars, and that 10,000 have reached Malatia from Constantinople, which, together with Solyman Pasha's force of Irregulars, form a body of 35,000 to 40,000 men. But this report requires further confirmation, as it does not appear to be at all authentic, nor is it mentioned from any other quarter.

His Excellency Solyman Pasha (Colonel Syra) is still here, though hourly expecting, he says, to obtain leave from his Excellency the Seraskier to repair to Sidon.

His Excellency Ismael Bey, our Governor, is still in the Damascus district, and is employed with his Excellency Sheriff Pasha in the settlement of the Hauran affairs.

No. 435

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 32.)  
(Extract.)

Damascus, September 28, 1839.

I HAD the honour of addressing your Lordship on the 30th ultimo, despatch No. 14.

The insurrection in the Agloun district has been pacified by his Excellency Ismael Bey and the forces under his command, not however without first destroying two villages. The tribe of Saffor Arabs who, it was apprehended, would have made common cause with the Agloun population, were previously defeated by Ismael Bey's forces, our Chief Sheikh, and twenty-



five Arabs, were taken and decapitated; they lost also, it is said, 25,000 sheep and 2,000 camels, which became booty to the Egyptian soldiers. Ismael Bey and the Caftan Bey, with their forces, have since proceeded to the Hauran district, the Fellah population of which have hitherto refused to pay taxes, furnish supplies, and recognize the Government. I hear the chief Sheiks of Hauran, with the major part of the population, carrying with them their effects, provisions, &c., have fled to the Ledges, and have once more entered the Ledges. His Excellency Sherif Pasha left Damascus on the 15th instant, with his suite, taking with him one battery of field-pieces, a regiment of light regular cavalry, and 500 irregular foot, which arrived here the day previous from Aleppo, and is to be joined with 500 foot from the Emir Bechir's, under his son, the Emir Halil, at the Ledges, to form a junction with Ismael Bey's forces. Nine redoubts, to cover the springs, are to be erected, in order to render the position of the Ledges untenable to the insurgents. All the masons, builders, and carpenters have been put into requisition for this undertaking, and sent off to the Ledges. Not only the subjugation of the Hauran population may be a permanent affair, but the chief object of rendering the Ledges a refuge and bulwark for the disaffected and insurgents of the south of Syria, may be of doubtful issue; still it is the only plan which promises success to the Egyptian Government.

Your Lordship will receive from the Aleppo Pro-Consul, advices on the measures taking by his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, either to advance, or to maintain his forces in the positions he occupies, until the solution of the question between the Sultan and the Viceroy. But from general appearances there is not an appearance that the Egyptian forces are intended to return immediately to their old cantonments. The only indications which I have observed from hence to maintain the Egyptian forces in the north, are the sums of money which have been sent to Aleppo; and the medical men which have arrived from hence, have received orders to rejoin the forces, even at Orfa. Ibrahim Pasha has also sent orders, that the depot of clothing at Acre should furnish the supplies to the army on the northern frontier. These, with the operations going on at the Ledges, denote that the Government is intent on keeping the army on that frontier, and, at the same time, is taking measures here to prevent, in case of an advance of his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, a reaction in the south of Syria.

In the Palestine jurisdiction, I hear there has been, in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem, great uneasiness at the disaffection of a Sheik, having at his command a large population who can find arms. In other parts of Syria tranquillity exists, but the commercial interests are in a languid state.

The Government here is taking measures to keep down and regulate the incessant rise and variation of specie, which is a grievance of long standing, which seems likely still to frustrate the intentions of Government.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) N. W. WERRY

No. 436.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 16.)

No. 81.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, October 20, 1839

ON the 13th instant I received a despatch (inclosure No. 1.) from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, informing me, that the Internuncio had sent instructions to the Austrian Consul General here to make a communication to the Pasha, and which I was directed to support.

As the Pasha was still absent, I merely informed Viscount Ponsonby of the receipt of his despatch (inclosure No. 2.)

M. de Laurin gave to me a copy of the communication received by him from the Internuncio, and which forms the inclosure No. 3; and he, at the same time, received a Turkish translation of it, which he was instructed to give to Mehmet Ali.

The Pasha arrived here on the evening of the 16th, and on the following morning, M. de Laurin saw him, and gave to him the paper in Turkish alluded to.

On the morning of the 18th, I waited on the Pasha, and my despatch to Viscount Ponsonby (inclosure No. 4.) will inform your Lordship of the details of my interview.

Inclosure No. 5 is copy of a letter from Hosrew Pasha to Mehmet Ali, and inclosure No. 6 is the reply thereto.

Your Lordship will see by those two documents, that Hosrew Pasha did not, as Mehmet Ali says, offer to negotiate directly with him without the knowledge or sanction of the Great Powers, but that the proposition to that effect proceeded from Mehmet Ali; and that Hosrew Pasha, so far from listening to it, immediately addressed to the Representatives of the Great Powers at Constantinople a Note, dated September 28, translation of which forms inclosure No. 7.

I have further the honour to inclose copy of a Note (No. 8) from Baron Stürmer to M. de Laurin, transmitting another Note (inclosure No. 9) from the Porte to the Representatives of the five Powers and which M. de Laurin was authorized to communicate confidentially to the Pasha.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 436.

Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Campbell.

(See inclosure 3 in No. 415, p. 459.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 436.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby.

(No. 29.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, October 16, 1839.

I HAD the honour to receive, on the 13th instant, your Excellency's despatch of 5th instant, directing me to co-operate with the Austrian Consul-General, in the representation to the Pasha, which he is instructed by the Internuncio to make.

M. de Laurin has fully communicated to me the instructions which he has received, and I have assured him of my most zealous and cordial co-operation in such manner or form as he may deem best calculated to obtain the desired end.

As the Pasha is still absent, although daily expected here, no steps have yet been able to be taken in the affair.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 3 in No. 436.

Baron Stürmer to M. de Laurin.

(See inclosure 1 in No. 415, p. 458.)







and the Porte, and as to the measures to be adopted to effect that settlement. But his Excellency is reconciled to the longer delay than he had anticipated in the arrival of such a communication, by the hope that your Lordship will have ascertained the views of the French Cabinet, and obtained, if possible, its assent to the line of conduct which Her Majesty's Government may desire to adopt.

Count Nesselrode has always shown himself sensible of the advantages which would be gained by securing the assent of France to the settlement desired by the other Powers; and I think his opinion on this head, and perhaps his wishes, differ in some degree, if not more essentially, from those of his Imperial Master. His Excellency repeated, what he had frequently remarked to me before, that the French journals were entirely wrong in asserting that M. de Brunnow's mission was intended to exclude France from acting in concert with Russia and England upon this subject; and he seems sincerely to hope that your Lordship will succeed in conciliating the spirit of the French Government towards the policy of the British Cabinet. He laid much stress upon the opinion of the Duke of Wellington that *Caïffa* was the portion of Mehemet Ali's possessions which it was most desirable for the Sultan to regain, with a view to his own security; leading me to infer that, in his opinion, a compromise, granting to the Pasha any portion of Syria, was comparatively harmless. His Excellency told me that the Duke of Wellington had expressed a decided opinion, that if a fleet should intercept the communications between Syria and Egypt, and act offensively against Mehemet Ali, Ibrahim Pasha would not dare to attempt a march upon Constantinople, and that he would even have great difficulties in maintaining his army in its present position; because a hostile army can make no progress, and can have no security in Syria, without support and communications from without by sea. But this last reflection did not lessen Count Nesselrode's desire that the French Government should prove, at least, not hostile to the arrangement which the other Powers may desire to effect.

I have still no doubt that Russia will agree to whatever arrangement your Lordship may definitively propose, and in almost any mode of carrying it into effect which Her Majesty's Government may desire, except the introduction of French ships of war within the Dardanelles.

I have, &c.,  
Signed CLANBICARDE

N 118

*Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 18.)*

No. 24.)

My Lord,

Berlin, November 13, 1839.

I READ to Baron Werther the copy of your Lordship's despatch, No. 166, dated the 25th of October, to the Marquis of Clanricarde, relative to the mission of Baron Brunnow in England, and his Excellency expressed his entire approbation of it, more particularly of the view taken by Her Majesty's Government with respect to the Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles; and that the best arrangement would be, that while Turkey is at peace, both of those straits should be shut against ships of war of all Powers; and he considered that this arrangement would be more conducive to the maintenance of peace, than an understanding that the straits in question should be open at all times to the ships of war of all countries.

With regard to the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that if for a particular emergency, one of those straits should be opened for one party, the other ought at the same time to be opened for other parties, and for instance, if it should become necessary that a Russian force should enter the Bosphorus, a British force should at the same time enter the Dardanelles, and for which case it appears that M. de Brunnow's instructions did not

provide,) his Excellency observed, that however right and necessary it would be at a future period to come to some distinct understanding on this point, he regretted that any time should at present be lost in the negotiation of this question, as he considered that no such emergency as that contemplated by the advance of Ibrahim Pasha on Constantinople could possibly arise, that all the accounts he had received from Asia Minor, and this morning from Athens, confirmed him in the opinion of the impossibility of Ibrahim's advance, from the present state of Syria and of his own army; but that Her Majesty's Government must be even better informed on this head than he could be. Convinced, however, as he was, of the impossibility of Ibrahim's advance, he begged me to convey to your Lordship his opinion, that it would be more advantageous to leave the question of the Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles for a matter of future negotiation, (more particularly as happily at this moment, the British and Russian Governments seemed to have abandoned all distrust of each other on Turkish Affairs,) and that all the energies of Her Majesty's Government should be turned to the settlement of the Syrian Question.

Baron Werther added, that he believed the French Government would see with great satisfaction any discussion that may arise between Her Majesty's Government and that of Russia with reference to the straits, as a means of deferring for a time the final settlement of the Egyptian Question.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GEORGE B. HAMILTON.

No. 439

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 19.)*

(No. 350.)

My Lord,

Paris, November 15, 1839.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to No. 360 inclusive.

I have communicated to Marshal Soult your Lordship's despatch No. 348, in which are recapitulated the proceedings which have taken place between the two Governments on the Affairs of the East, and in obedience to your instructions, left a copy of it in his hands.

His Excellency this morning informed me that the French Consul at Alexandria writes, that the language of Mehemet Ali is pacific; and although the Pasha said, that in the case of his giving up Adana, it ought to be held by one of his sons under the Porte, still he believed that the Viceroy would conclude a treaty of peace with the Sultan on the conditions stated in the project of the French Government. On my asking the Marshal whether he had any reason to suppose that the Turkish Government were disposed to accede to those conditions, his Excellency replied that the despatches of M. Pontois merely announced his arrival at Therapia, and at the time of their date, M. Pontois had not had any conversation with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Marshal, at the same time that he expressed his hope that a peace would be concluded between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, seemed desirous that I should not imagine that the French Government felt any anxiety on the subject. He told me that the reports he had received from the French Consuls at Beyrout, at Damascus, and at Aleppo, contained no intimation of any insurrection being apprehended in Syria, of a nature to give uneasiness to Ibrahim Pasha.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

G G





temporary evils they may sustain by submission to the temporary power of an invader. It is not necessary that the Porte should give any instructions to the inhabitants upon the subject, and prudence requires that nothing should be said upon the matter to them, and, whenever it is in its power, the Porte will apply the remedy to the evils they are exposed to.

The Undersigned, &c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY.

Therapia, October 25, 1839.

No. 442

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 296.)

My Lord,

Therapia, October 27, 1839.

I INCLOSE copy of a report from the Austrian Consul-General at Alexandria to the Intermuncio. It contains interesting information upon several subjects, illustrative of the means possessed by the Egyptians. I have since heard that Ibrahim has made some arrangement with his adversaries in the Ledges, by which he grants them large privileges. I believe this arrangement if it be made will prove to be of the nature of more than one or two previously made between the same parties. A mere expedient to gain time.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 442

M. de Laurin to Baron Sturmer.

(Traduction)

(Extract.)

Alexandrie, le 15 Octobre, 1839.

DEPUIS mes rapports du 24 du mois passé et du 6 du courant, les affaires de la Syrie semblent avoir considérablement empiré.

Dans la nuit du 25 au 26 Septembre, les insurgés du Haouran attaquèrent les troupes de Chérif Pacha et les repoussèrent jusqu'au-delà des Puits de Barack sur la route de Damas. Le chef des troupes irrégulières, Hassan Agha el Yazer, fut porté blessé à Damas et on donna l'assurance d'une suite de succès militaires de cette ville de renforcer sur le camp les troupes du Haouran et d'envoyer des détachements de bouche et de guerre.

Ce succès des insurgés, quoiqu'il soit peut-être paraissant inquiéter beaucoup Méhémet Ali. Il appréhendait que les troupes de l'Egypte et ne soient pas en état d'autres progrès. Cette anxiété du Pacha est parvenue à Londres. La crainte de Hassan Agha et de toutes les conversations, et depuis lors plusieurs districts de la montagne ont refusé l'impôt et se trouvent être en état de révolte contre le Gouvernement.

Pour ce qui regarde la dislocation des troupes, Ibrahim Pacha en a écrit avant que Karam Bey ait apporté au Sublime Porte les communications dont j'ai mentionné dans mon rapport du 6 de ce mois. Ibrahim Pacha se trouve maintenant en contact avec les troupes de Marash et de Hama. Son rapport d'Alexandrie du 25 Septembre a été adressé au Sublime Porte d'occuper Beasra et Diarbeck.

Méhémet Ali semble à présent approuver la première de ces mesures de son fils, mais il ne s'est pas donné l'ordre d'occuper Beasra et Diarbeck. Les travaux des fortifications de St Jean d'Acre et aux passes d'Alexandrie se continuent avec assiduité.

La flotte Ottomane a reçu une grande quantité de biscuit et d'autres munitions de bouche. On en infère qu'elle pourra bientôt partir d'ici. Les équipages le désirent si ardemment, qu'il faudra à la fin adhérer à leur demande pour ne pas les pousser à la révolte. Même le paiement de la solde arriérée qui est due il y a quatre jours, n'a pu apaiser cette demande énoncée d'une manière presque impétueuse.

Méhémet Ali n'a pas encore répondu à la Note du Consul-Général Britannique concernant l'évacuation du Yémen.

P.S.—16 Octobre, 1839. J'expédie ce rapport par le pyroscaphe de guerre Anglais "Rhadamanthus."

Le Pacha est attendu d'une heure à l'autre. Mr. Campbell et le Comte Medem se sont déclarés prêts à appuyer de leur mieux le Mesage que je dois faire au Pacha d'après la dépêche de votre Excellence du 5 de ce mois. M. Cochelet n'a reçu, à ce sujet, aucune instruction positive, et il paraît même avoir parlé à Karam Bey dans le sens des autres Français plutôt que dans celui de nos Cabinets. Il a démontré que la non-application de mesures coercitives était le résultat de l'opposition de la France.

No. 443

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 21.)

No. 297.)

My Lord,

Therapia, October 28, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of Baron Sturmer's reply to the official Note of the Porte, dated October 21, which was forwarded to your Lordship in my despatch No. 293.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

P.S.—The reply of the French Chargé d'Affaires, Count de Lamoignon, was much to the same purport.

P

Inclosure in No. 443

Note from Baron Sturmer to the Sublime Porte.

24 Octobre, 1839.

LE Soussigné a pris connaissance de la Note que son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères lui a fait l'honneur de lui adresser, en date du 21 de ce mois.

Il regrette plus vivement que personne les pénibles embarras que sont à la Sublime Porte ces révoltes des troupes Egyptiennes dans l'Asie Mineure; mais il croit superflu de faire observer au Divan, que ces embarras sont inhérents à la situation du moment, et que, les circonstances ne permettant point d'y remédier promptement, il est d'une sage politique de s'appliquer du moins à ne pas les aggraver.

Laisser fraterniser les troupes Ottomanes avec celles d'Ibrahim Pacha entraînerait, sans contredit, de graves inconvénients; de l'autre côté, une lutte entre ces deux forces armées pourrait amener les complications les plus fâcheuses, car on ne saurait se dissimuler que tout nouveau succès des Egyptiens produirait en leur faveur un effet moral incalculable, et pourrait soulever des peuplades dont leurs émissaires n'ont pas réussi jusqu'ici à ébranler l'attachement à leur souverain légitime.

Le Soussigné est donc sûr de remplir les intentions de son Auguste Cour en conseillant à la Sublime Porte d'enjoindre itérativement à ses Généraux et Commandans dans l'Asie Mineure, d'éviter soigneusement tout contact avec les troupes Egyptiennes, et de se retirer chaque fois que celles-ci feraient mine

6 H



de vouloir se rapprocher des positions qu'ils occupent. En agissant ainsi, la Sublime Porte prendra l'attitude la plus propre à maintenir la confiance qu'elle place dans l'appui des Grandes Puissances. Le moment d'ailleurs n'est pas loin, j'espère, où elle sentira toute la valeur de cet appui, et le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse n'aura pas à regretter de l'avoir attendu avec patience.

La Sublime Porte n'ignore pas que le gros de l'Armée Egyptienne n'est nullement en mesure de se porter en avant; mais quand même il le pourrait, Mehemet Ali est trop bien avisé pour ordonner un mouvement qui deviendrait pour les Grandes Puissances de l'Europe le signal de leur réunion instantanée contre lui.

La perte temporaire de quelques portions de terrain dans l'Anatolie n'a pas assez d'importance dans la conjoncture actuelle pour balancer les grands intérêts qui sont en jeu, et faire dévier le Ministère Ottoman du système de temporisation et de calme qu'il a suivi jusqu'ici avec tant de sagesse. Le Souverain est d'avis que les empiétements mêmes des Egyptiens peuvent tourner au profit de la Sublime Porte, en levant d'un côté l'opinion publique contre Mehemet Ali, et en accélérant les effets de l'union qui existe entre les Grandes Puissances.

En soumettant ces réflexions au jugement éclairé du Divan de Sa Hautesse, le Souverain saisit cette occasion de renouveler à son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères l'assurance de sa haute considération.

(Signé) STURMER

No. 444

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby

No. 109.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 22, 1839

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Excellency's despatches to No. 298 inclusive.

I have to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the Note which you addressed to the Porte on the 25th of October, of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch No. 295, in reply to the official Note of the Porte, of October 21, respecting the continued encroachments of the Egyptian Army upon the Turkish territory.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 445.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston—(Received November 21.)

(Secret and Confidential.)

(Extract.)

Paris, November 18, 1839.

I PAID my respects last night to the King and the Royal Family at the Tuileries. His Majesty's conversation with me on the Turkish and Egyptian Question. His Majesty did not conceal from me, that he felt the necessity of having been previously apprised of your Lordship's despatch, which I had communicated on Friday last to Marshal Soult, with having, at the commencement of the communications between the two Governments, professed a determination to preserve the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire, and with having subsequently, and on a sudden, changed its policy, and become, to all practical purposes, the protector of Mehemet Ali. His Majesty avowed that he was as desirous as ever to maintain the independence of the Turkish Empire, and proceeded to make a statement of the conduct of the French Government. When accounts arrived here of the hostilities being imminent between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, the French

Government, being strongly impressed with the great danger which might result to the independence of Turkey from the breaking out of war, was anxious to concert with the British Government the best means of preventing a collision of the Turkish and Egyptian Armies, or at least, as had actually commenced, of concluding an armistice between them. As long as both parties were in the field, and as long as no decisive advantage had been gained by either army, with the Turkish and Egyptian fleets were nearly of equal force, and when the slightest naval assistance given to one might ensure victory over the other, it was not unreasonable to expect that the warring voice of the British and French Governments would be listened to, and that their intervention might be effectual. But after the total and complete surrender of the Turkish Army, and after the treacherous surrender of the Commander-in-Chief, Pasha, of the fleet under his command, and the capture of Mehemet Ali, the position of affairs was entirely changed, and we had to consider what it was possible to do, as well as what arrangement it was desirable to effect. His Majesty was not disposed to deny, that the arrangement proposed by the British Government, if it could be carried into effect, afforded a better security to the Turkish Empire than the course which was proposed by the French Government. It was not, however, of compelling Mehemet Ali to evacuate Syria, and we were not without some doubts, of a blockade could not effect that object. I have had enough of blockades, and the King and I have with us at Vera Cruz, and at Buenos Ayres, which were forced upon the French Government by the rash impatience of its own Agents; and how, added His Majesty could the two Governments undertake a blockade, which, if the blockade were to be carried into effect, would be carried into effect, would have to execute it, the fleets of the two Governments would have to execute it upon the coast of Egypt and of Syria without great risk, and which would not have been effective? If there continued His Majesty's naval means are inadequate to the task, and if the British Government were to undertake the blockade, it cannot, or will not, be undertaken by France, or by Austria, there remains then only Russia, and if that risk be assigned to Russian troops, His Majesty had no hesitation in saying that a far more irreparable blow would be inflicted upon the independence of the Sultan and of the Turkish Empire, by the Russian occupation of Constantinople and of Asia Minor, than by the occupation of the administration of Mehemet Ali even all the territory which the Egyptians now occupy.

It is, my Lord, in my opinion, the substance of the grounds on which His Majesty's Government is justified from the imputation of inconsistency in its conduct in the Eastern Question.

No. 446

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville

No. 371. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 23, 1839

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch of the 18th instant, marked "Secret and Confidential," reporting a conversation which your Excellency had held with the King of the French on the subject of the Turkish and Egyptian Question, I have to observe to your Excellency, that the upshot of the remarks of His Majesty upon that occasion appears to be, that in proportion as the course of events has rendered the active assistance of the Powers of Europe necessary for maintaining the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire, exactly in that proportion, and precisely for that reason, the French Government has become unwilling to afford to the Sultan any assistance at all.

With respect to the notion, that the Five Powers acting in union with the Sultan, have not the means of compelling the Pasha of Egypt to evacuate Syria, that opinion is one which it can scarcely be worth while seriously to argue, the disparity of forces between the two parties in such a contest

being so infinitely great, that resistance on the part of the Pasha must necessarily be vain.

The King of the French, however, seems to be of opinion, that the Sultan would be more seriously injured by his independence by receiving assistance from Russia, than by having his Empire practically dismembered, and by being deprived permanently of the resources of a large portion of his own territories. In this opinion Her Majesty's Government cannot concur. It is undoubtedly a misfortune for a Sovereign to be under the necessity of receiving military or naval aid from a other Sovereign to defend him against hostile attack. The receiving of such aid is a public and undeniable proof of great weakness on the part of him who receives it, and real independence is not compatible with great weakness. Such aid also, if given by the single act of the Sovereign who affords it, entails that Sovereign to ask in return favours and influence which must trench upon the future independence of the Sovereign who has been protected. But if Russia were to give assistance to the Sultan not as acting upon her own single decision, but as acting in pursuance of a concert between the Five Allied Powers, such assistance would of course not bring after it any favours or concessions from Turkey to Russia that would be injurious to the independence of Turkey; and then the only question would be, whether the independence of the Turkish Empire would, permanently and for the future, be most affected by the temporary occupation of some part of the Turkish territory by a friendly Russian force, which would be to restore that territory to the Sultan, and which would go out again when that purpose was accomplished, or by the permanent occupation of such territory by a hostile Egyptian force, which, having come in to conquer, would stay in to retain and would by retaining, practically sever such territory from the Turkish Empire. But surely there can be no doubt how that question must be answered.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 447

Baron Werther to Viscount Palmerston.

(Confidential)

My Lord, 3, Lower Berkeley Street, on 22 November, 1839.

JE viens de recevoir la copie d'un rapport de notre Légation à Constantinople. Comme les données qu'il contient vous eussent été utiles, je me permets de vous transmettre ce rapport avec la prière de le renvoyer après en avoir pris connaissance. Ce rapport du Comte Koenigsmarck confirme ce que vous avez eu la bonté de me communiquer, à savoir que Méhémet Ali ne veut pas même se contenter des territoires que le Cabinet Français propose de lui abandonner, mais qu'il veut que le Vice-Roi obtienne le district d'Adana et les dépendances du Laurus.

Veuillez agréer, &c.,  
(Signed) WERTHER

Inclosure in No. 447

Count Koenigsmarck to His Majesty the King of Prussia.

Sire, Boulogne-sur-Mer, on 30 Octobre, 1839.

PAR mon très-humble rapport, No. 83, j'ai eu l'honneur de rendre compte à votre Majesté de la démarche que M. l'Intendant d'Autriche a faite à la Cour de Prusse, et de la réponse que M. le Comte de Manteuffel a faite pour déclarer au Pacha d'Egypte qu'il ne parviendrait pas d'amener la Porte

à un arrangement avec les Grandes Puissances, sous l'égide desquelles elle s'était placée, resteraient étrangères, et pour faire comprendre à Méhémet Ali, qu'une supériorité de forces matérielles ne suffirait pas pour lui donner l'avenir qu'il veut fonder dans l'intérêt de sa famille, puisque, quand même le Sultan accorderait toutes les concessions qu'il demanderait, elles ne consolideraient pas sa position, si l'Europe ne les sanctionnait pas. Je me suis permis de joindre au dit très-humble rapport l'office que j'avais adressé à M. le Comte de Médem, chargé, durant l'absence de M. Roquerbe, de la gestion du Consulat de France à Alexandrie, pour l'inviter à appuyer, au nom de mon Auguste Cour, le langage de M. le Consul-Général d'Autriche, et à délimiter le Vice-Roi sur sa véritable position.

M. le Comte de Médem vient de m'informer de la manière dont il s'est acquitté de cette commission, et comment le Pacha l'a reçue, par un rapport qu'il m'a adressé en date du 30 du courant, et que j'ai l'honneur d'annexer ici en copie. Votre Majesté daignera voir entre autre par cette pièce, que Méhémet Ali a déclaré aux Consuls Généraux, qu'il n'avait jamais cherché à établir des négociations avec la Porte dans le but de terminer ses différends avec elle, mais le concours des Grandes Puissances; qu'il avait pris ample connaissance de la dépêche de M. le Baron de Stürmer, et qu'il appréciait beaucoup les considérations qu'elle renfermait, mais qu'il n'avait rien à y répondre, sinon qu'il se tenait à sa dernière déclaration, et que ce ne serait que lorsqu'il connaîtrait les résolutions définitives des Grandes Cours sur la Question Orientale, qu'il pourrait émettre une réplique positive, l'issue de la question reposant sur des faits et non sur des raisonnements.

Il résulte en outre de ce rapport, que M. le Consul-Général de France, au lieu de s'associer à cette démarche, est allé jusqu'à faire sentir au Pacha, que si dans la dépêche de M. l'Intendant d'Autriche il n'était pas question de moyens répressifs, ce changement de langage était dû à l'influence de la France seule, qui s'était opposée à toute mesure coercitive; qu'à la suite de cette communication, M. le Consul-Général de Russie avait eu devoir faire part au Vice-Roi du projet d'accommodement présenté par le Cabinet des Tuileries, en lui observant que ce serait là dans tous les cas le maximum des concessions auxquelles il pourrait s'attendre, et qu'il devait être préparé à obtenir moins que plus; que l'idée des mesures coercitives n'était nullement abandonnée, et que ses prétentions relativement à la destitution de Hosrow Pacha avaient été jugées complètement inadmissibles, observations auxquelles Méhémet Ali a répondu, que la Question Orientale ayant changé de face par le fait de l'intervention des Grandes Puissances, il reconnaît à la demande du renvoi de Hosrow Pacha; que quant à l'île de Candie, il se déciderait aussi à s'en désister, mais que, pour Adana, il ne consentirait jamais à la restituer à la Porte, les défilés du Mont Taurus (Koulek Boghas) fermant la porte de sa maison et le mettant à l'abri d'un coup de main de la part des Turcs.

Le rapport que M. de Laurin a adressé à M. le Baron de Stürmer sur ce sujet renferme à peu près les mêmes détails, mais le rapport ci-joint du Comte de Manteuffel étant plus précis, M. l'Intendant en a fait un extrait pour sa Cour. Je n'ai pas encore appris ce que M. le Colonel Campbell a écrit à Lord Ponsonby, ni la réponse que M. le Consul-Général de Russie a mandé à M. de Bouteneff sur leurs entretiens avec Méhémet Ali à l'occasion de la démarche Autrichienne; mais d'après ce que MM. de Médem et de Laurin en rapportent à M. de Stürmer et à moi, on ne saurait cependant douter qu'elle n'est fournie une nouvelle preuve que le Pacha d'Egypte, aussi longtemps qu'il se croira soutenu par la France et à l'abri de moyens coercitifs, ne se desolera pas de ses prétentions.

Je suis, &c.,  
(Signed) KOENIGSMARCK



No. 448.

*Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 25.)*

(No. 2.)

My Lord,

Vienna, November 11, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that his Excellency Lord Beaumont informed me on the evening of the 9th instant, that Prince Metternich would be happy to see me on the following morning at 12 o'clock. I called on the Prince at the hour appointed, and his Highness immediately entered on the subject of the Eastern Question; he assured me emphatically, that the interests of Austria were completely identified with those of England, whatever might be the difficulties that obstructed the realisation of their joint views. He stated it as his confident opinion, that Russia and Prussia were in perfect unanimity with England and Austria in their determination to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and that the professions of France were of the same tenour, although a disposition to give countenance to the pretensions of Mehemet Ali was manifestly evinced.

"It would probably," said Prince Metternich, "be of some advantage to you to tell Mehemet Ali that I have, *vis à vis*, acquainted you with the views of Austria, and that you can bear your own personal testimony to their complete accordance with those of your own Government. Endeavour to point out to the Pasha the magnitude of the risk he is incurring, and that at his advanced period of life, it would be the height of impolicy to sacrifice the prospects of the future to the assumed exigencies of the present. That no unreasonable conditions, such as the surrender of Egypt, will be imposed on him; that if he professes himself to be the faithful and obedient Sovereign of the Sultan, deeds and not words must prove his sincerity; and that he would undoubtedly concur in his own interests in supporting the Ottoman Empire as any further encroachment would be contrary to the resolution of the Great Powers of Europe, and could have no other result than the aggravation of his embarrassments."

Prince Metternich then passed to the consideration of those difficulties which would seriously engage the attention of the Great Powers. Although he gave to me, and by no means undervaluing questions of territorial boundary, he gave the undoubted pre-eminence to those which involved the final settlement of hereditary rights and duties. Is, for instance, the right of succession to devolve on the eldest son alone, or on the family jointly or severally? Is the right of succession in case of their decease to revert to the Sultan? Are the Sovereign or Sultanas to maintain an army and navy independent of the Sublime Porte, and not bound to support the Sovereign Power in the case of a foreign war? These, and similar questions, the Prince pointed out as not having been much dwelt upon, but in giving them the attention to which they were entitled, he by no means wished me to suppose that he did not attach great importance to the question of territorial boundary.

The Prince then read to me the despatch most recently received from the Austrian Consul-General at Alexandria, the purport of which was the continued obstinacy of the Pasha in his territorial pretensions, as well as the detail of a conversation held with him on the subject of the surrender of the Turkish fleet. Prince Metternich concluded from the tenour of this despatch that there was a disposition to give way, and thus the Prince evidently wished to impress upon me as his opinion.

Before taking leave I expressed my impression that in reference to the earlier part of our conversation, his Highness was, no doubt, aware that candour of communication and union of action with my future Austrian Colleague at Alexandria, would be in perfect accordance with the instructions I had received from my Government, and that I had already, during my residence of nearly three years in Serbia, given his Highness ample proofs of my desire to co-operate with Austrian authorities, in furthering the interests of an empire whose destinies I believe intimately associated with those of Great Britain.

Prince Metternich expressed himself quite aware of the circumstance alluded to, and said he would acquaint the Austrian Consul-General at Alexandria with the purport of the above conversation, assuring me, at the same time, of receiving from him cordial support in the fulfilment of the object of my mission.

I forward this despatch to your Lordship under flying seal, through his Excellency Lord Beaumont.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 449

*Lord Beaumont to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 21.)*

(No. 138.)

My Lord,

Vienna, November 10, 1839.

BEING uncertain whether a copy of Lord Ponsonby's despatch to me of the 28th ultimo has been sent to your Lordship. I have the honour to transmit one with its inclosure.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUMONT.

Inclosure 1 in No. 449.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Lord Beaumont.*

My Lord,

Therapies, October 28, 1839.

I ENCLOSE a despatch I received this day from Colonel Campbell. It reports a conversation between the Pasha and him. I do not understand what is said about Adana. I know of no propositions having been made to the Pasha; there was a demand made that he should give up the fleet.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSOMBY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 449.

*Colonel Campbell to Viscount Ponsonby.*

[See Inclosure 4 in No. 436, p. 478.]

No. 450.

*Lord Beaumont to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 25.)*

(No. 141.)

My Lord,

Vienna, November 16, 1839.

IN reference to my despatch, No. 138, of the 10th instant, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship the copy of a despatch which I have received from Viscount Ponsonby, together with its inclosures.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUMONT.





The Albanians are on the verge of outbreaking into revolt, and were it not for Mustapha Pasha's party a five league war, this way, have occurred before. The greatest want prevails, owing to the total failure of the crops, and it is apprehended, that not even the influence of the said Christians will avail in preserving order, unless Mustapha Pasha should resolve on succouring the Albanians.

No. 451

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 25.

(No. 257)

My Lord,

Therapia October 30, 1839

RECHARD PASOLA has returned the many thanks for my Official Note of the 20th inst. and has also expressed his intention to communicate it to the Envoy of France at Rome, with the assurance that he will take every opportunity to do so.

It is, I think, a common error to regard me as what passed between him and M. de Lamoignon, say, in 1789. A very proper remedy, of course, I suppose, is to be made more informed by seeing, as I do in the French papers, that the case was with a very M. de Lamoignon, which contradicts the impression I have received of his services, and, as the Highness of the French is a great deal better than that of the National Assembly, and of its will to execute, I am not inclined to see on the Continent any more

say. The Government has at heart the interests of the Sublime Porte, and is strongly disposed to do what may be useful to it.

*The Pasha.*—The interests of the Sublime Porte demand that nothing should be granted to Mehemet Ali, except the hereditary government of Egypt alone; but France has proposed to the Great Powers an arrangement by which Adana should be given up now to the Porte, and Candia restored to it after the death of Mehemet Ali, and Syria be divided amongst his children, at the same period, and that the hereditary government of Egypt should be given to him. To give Syria to the children of Mehemet Ali as an hereditary possession after the death of that Pasha, is the same thing as to cede the hereditary possession of it to him now.

The *Times*—The French Government is of opinion that the Sultan's Porte should grant to Mehmet Ali, independent of the hereditary Government of Egypt, some other favour for life. France disagrees with England only on one point, namely, as to the means to be employed. France, in communicating her ideas to the other Governments, has not given them as her ultimatum; it is only a project. The employment of force against Mehmet Ali is considered by the Government of France as the signal for his march to Constantinople, and therefore of the march of the Russians, which might bring on an European war. If it is decided that we go to Alexandria to burn the Egyptian fleet, the Ottoman fleet will be burnt also.

*The Pasha.*—The combined fleets by going to Egypt might do other things than burn the fleet.

*The Envoy.*—The season is too far advanced for the fleets to go to Egypt. We have not the advantages that Russia has; the Russians are at the door of Constantinople, they have the winds for them and the currents, and our fleets are at a distance from Constantinople, and they might find many obstacles in approaching it.

The ~~French~~ The two fleets together consist of a large number of ships, and one-half would suffice for Egypt, and the other half for these parts (Jerusalem). The Egyptian Army is not in a state to march forward, for money is wanting, and there are troubles to be quieted in different parts of Syria. Hence ~~the sea~~ the sea is bad for the French and English, but on the coast, it is too far advanced also for the Egyptian Army to march forward; but at the worst, if the army should advance, and the Russians should come here, let the English and the French come also; but, to conclude, I wish to know if you are already informed of the resolutions of the French Government?

*The Envoy.*—The Baron Brunnow, sent by the Emperor of Russia to

London, was the bearer of propositions that have been rejected by England, it is therefore very probable that after that having, ~~expected~~ and particularly as Prince Metternich is on the point of returning to Vienna, the Governments will not long delay coming to an understanding and sending me and my colleagues instructions on the Egyptian Question, and the Russians will fail in all their efforts to divide France and England.

I had a long conversation with M de Portois two days before his visit to Rechid Pasba, when he said to me nearly what he said to the Pasba as reported above. He was anxious to disclaim all partiality for Mehemet Ali and all jealousy of England, and to attribute the wishes of the French Government, as expressed in its propositions, to the opinion entertained that Mehemet Ali would bring on a war, &c. I examined, one by one, the reasons assigned for that opinion: he made no replies that seemed satisfactory to himself; and the impression made upon me by the conversation, is, that the French feel it to be their interest to back out of the position they had taken, and that they will yield if Her Majesty's Government show firmness of purpose.

It will be evident from the language of Rechid Pasha that we say so much of the complete co-operation of the Porte. I need not trouble Her Majesty's Government with reports of the steps I have taken to keep the Sultan on the right road, from which, it seems, many persons, including his mother, thought it would be better that he should deviate.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) **PONSONBY**

No. 452

*Lord Beaumont to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received November 25.)

No. 1443

My Lord,

Picking, November 16, 1835

CONCERNING HIS DEPARTURE FROM ALEXANDRIA. During his stay here I communicated to him, according to your Lordship's orders, the correspondence upon Turkish and Egyptian affairs, and before his departure I addressed to him an instruction of which I have the honour to inclose a copy. It has been communicated to Prince Metterrich, who fully concurs in its contents.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure in No. 452

*Instructions from Lord Beauchamp to Colonel Hodgers.*

512

YOKO arrives at Constantinople from Vienna, the supposed centre of the negotiation upon the affairs of Turkey and Egypt,—will probably excite expectations of a result the failure of which may lead to an increase of animosity. The existence of an understanding between the Powers,

You have seen by the correspondence which has been placed in your hands, that from the first past the date of your arrival in London, and you will not conceal the fact.

From Vienna, therefore, nothing is at present to be expected upon them, but it is to be remarked, that upon ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~celebrating points~~ <sup>the</sup> preservation of the integrity of the Turkish Empire under the reigning dynasty; upon the defence of Constantinople; upon the conditions on which the right of hereditary succession may be recognized in the family of the Pasha; the Five Powers are already agreed. Nothing remains to be ascertained between them out of the way of deliberation and some other points of detail, upon which there is every prospect of their coming to a sufficient agreement.

If, therefore, Mehemet Ali were to build upon your arrival without definitive instructions, a hope of security to himself from discussions among the Powers.

he would be deceived. A rash step taken by him would at once lead to consequences which would make him sensible of his error.

It is probable that England will have been represented to the Pasha as his enemy, as exciting and leading the opposition to him, and as aiming at his destruction.

If these doctrines have gained credit with him, he will be little accessible to the truth, nor will it be desirable to attempt to force it upon him; but as occasions may offer, it will be well that you should state that the British Government has no feeling of enmity or hostility towards him; that the order and security which he has established in Egypt are more valuable to England, by opening a short communication with India, than to any other nation; that the commercial prosperity of Egypt reacts upon us; and that for these reasons the continuance of the system which Mehemet Ali has created in that country, is of high value and importance to us.

In Africa we are friendly to his power, friendly to its development, and its increase; if we are less so in Asia, it proceeds not from any hostility to his person, but because in Asia his presence acts as a solvent to the empire of the Ottomans, — an empire which his conquests in that quarter of the globe can neither support nor replace, which they can only weaken and destroy, and which we are bound to sustain.

If the object of Mehemet Ali be really the establishment of his family in Egypt and Africa that that establishment can be solidly fixed. There he will be secure from all attack; and, reconciled to the Porte, may pursue the consolidation of the empire of the Ottomans with very little risk to himself, and with the certainty of transmitting it to his descendants.

In Asia, on the contrary, there can never exist between him and the Sultan but an armed truce. He must either overthrow or be overthrown. But the chances are not equal; the loss of a battle expels Mehemet Ali from Asia, the gain of one opens at most to him the road to Constantinople, which is too strongly guarded for him to make an impression upon it. Full and final success is therefore impossible to him, the utmost he can gain in Asia is the temporary occupation of some additional districts; the utmost he can lose may be read in the history of all conquerors when checked in their career. And let him not deceive himself by supposing that the defence of Constantinople is but a paper wall, which he can take at his pleasure, or a paper wall which he can take at his pleasure. He will find it so: their defence of it results from no personal feelings, from no transient motives. It is founded on their interests. Aiming at the preservation of peace, they cannot risk that so great a spoil should become an object of contention, and to avoid this they unite their efforts to secure it to its present possessor. Mehemet Ali can never occupy it. His power can take no root in Asia unless he does. If, then, he is willing to pass away, as he has seen Buonaparte pass before him, let him continue his present career.

If he aims at bequeathing his power and station to his family, let him accept what has been offered. In Africa these objects can be secured to him, while in Asia his reign is but for a day.

If he will accept of Mehemet Ali he will be but little accessible to these or similar reasons, and he will not come when they can with propriety be made to him, — less he should not have given occasion for it.

You will perceive a great deal from all this, and I shall not say whatever upon these subjects, as they are not of our Government, but from the ascendancy which Mehemet Ali appears to exercise upon all who approach him, it is possible that these facts may as yet have been unheard and even uncommunicated to Egypt, and it will be for the reason that I repeat them to you leaving it to your tact and discretion to state the fact if they open to any opportunity of doing so with advantage. We are prepared to receive any information however pledging your Government to any particular measure or course of conduct beyond the engagements which it has already taken. These are public, but the mode of rendering them available must be left to the Government itself.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Lord Beaumont to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received November 25.)

No. 145.

Ms. 145.

Vienna, November 16, 1830.

I COMMUNICATED to Prince Metternich your Lordship's despatch, No. 145, and he has been very much pleased with it, and has been very much pleased to receive, requesting me to assure you, that there is no difference between England and Austria upon this question, and that these two remaining united would be sure to draw the other Powers into their system. So much error has arisen from general assurances of this sort, that I feel it incumbent upon me to examine their real value in the present instance, and in doing this, I shall found myself partly on what I have heard from the Prince, and partly upon what I have learnt from other sources.

Prince Metternich expects that the difficulty about the Constantinople will be got over, and that England, Austria, and Russia, thereby enabled to act together, France will be deterred from any action to their detriment.

He will accede to the plan of settlement, be it what it may, which shall be agreed upon between England and Russia. The more favourable it is to the Porte, the more he will profess to be pleased with it; but will make no difficulty from the conditions proposed, if additional facility can thereby be brought to a conclusion. He is already laying a ground for this, by a declaration, saying, that in proportion as the latter is made favourable to the Porte, the more he will be pleased to accede to it.

He is also very much pleased with the conditions which it may be desirable to propose to the Pasha. He considers the delay which has taken place in the communication to the Porte. He is in no hurry to terminate it.

Five Powers upon one line, and to carrying through their interests without a blow being struck. During Prince Metternich's visit to the French Ambassador that Austria was a man for operations against the Pasha, and since the Prince's visit has confirmed this impression. The fact of these two causes having been given would not weigh a feather if the question should ever come practically before him for a decision, but they show the bent of his mind. If it were proposed to him to take part in an enterprise upon a large scale, I have no doubt but what he would find motives for declining it. A similar one proposed by England and Russia with a defensive object, would stand a chance of a better reception, if the reimbursement of the expenses were to be secured, but even would be reluctantly taken into consideration, the main object of Austria being to get through this affair without the employment of force. To make these statements complete, I should add, that Prince Metternich does not believe that any settlement that may be made between the Porte and the Pasha will be final. Be it what it may, he considers the renewal of the struggle between them as inevitable at no distant period, and only to be terminated by the destruction of one of them, that one, according to his calculations, being the Pasha. This of course renders him comparatively indifferent to the terms of the arrangement now to be made, and unwilling to make sacrifices for objects which, according to him, are to be contested anew at no distant period.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) BEAUVALE



No. 147. Confidential.)

Vienna, November 18, 1839

[illegible]

I have, &c.,

Signed) **BEAUVALE**

(No 37.)

(Extract.)

Berlin, November 20, 1939.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Letter of despatch marked No. 133, inclosing despatches under flying seal to the Marquess of Clanricarde.

Barrington-Wentworth read to me yesterday a despatch he had received from Count K. ~~Reuss~~ <sup>Reuss</sup>, ~~Grand~~ Constantinople, October 30th; and as I considered that some of its contents might be interesting to your Lordship, I requested his Excellency to give me a short abstract, which he wrote down in my presence, a copy of which I have the honour herewith to inclose.

Inclosure in No. 455.

*Abstract of Despatch from Count Künigsmarek to Baron Werther.*

Constantinople, le 30 Octobre, 1839.

LE Consul-Général de France à Alexandrie a fait sentir à Mehmet Ali que, si dans la dépêche de l'Intendance d'Autriche, il n'était pas question de moyens répressifs, ce changement de langage était dû à l'influence de la France qui s'était opposée à toute mesure répressive.

Mehemet Ali a dit aux Consuls, qu'il consentait à la cession de Candie, mais que pour Adana et les défilés du Taurus, il ne consentait jamais à les restituer au Grand Seigneur.

No. 456

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received November 27.)

No. 303.)

My Lord,

Paris, November 25, 1839.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to No. 375 inclosure.  
In reference to No. 368, in which your Lordship desires, for my information and for communication to the French Government, a copy of Viscount Ponsonby's reply to an Circular No. 1111, dated 12th June, viz the 21st of October, to the Representatives of the Five Powers, on the subject of the continued encroachments of the Egyptian Army upon the Turkish territory, I have to state that upon my mentioning Lord Ponsonby's Note to Marshal Soult, this morning, His Excellency said, that a copy of it, which he had just read, was at that moment on his table; and he was sorry to observe that the language of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople was calculated to excite hopes in the Divan, which the real state of things could scarcely justify. I replied, that the statements made by Lord Ponsonby in his Note, of the advantages which the Porte had derived from its compliance with the request of the Representatives of the Five Powers, not hastily to submit to the conditions of peace imperiously prescribed by Mehemet Ali, appeared to be well founded. The discontent existing in Syria is stated by the Austrian Consul at Alexandria to give considerable uneasiness to the Pasha of Egypt, and the report seems to be true, that Ibrahim Pasha has represented to Mehemet Ali, that in consequence of that discontent, it would be imprudent to march his army into Asia Minor. The

Marshal answered that from the last accounts received by him of the state of the Empire, it appeared that the country was perfectly tranquil. He said that he had received a great many letters from the various provinces, and that he was very much pleased to hear that the country was so quiet. But with respect to the Eastern Question, he hoped to transmit in a day or two to Count Sebastiani, a despatch which he had addressed to him, and which would to-morrow be submitted to the Cabinet Council, containing observations on your Lordship's despatch to me upon the same subject, as well as full explanations of the opinions of the French Government on the present state of affairs in the East.

The Marshal said he was in momentary expectation of the despatches which were brought to Marseille by the steam-boat, of which the arrival had been notified by telegraph, and his Excellency seemed very desirous to receive the confirmation of the report which prevailed on board the packet, that the Turkish fleet had been restored to the Sultan, and that the Turkish Government was in a state of peace; but I observed to him, that the dissatisfaction which had manifested itself among the officers and crews of the Turkish ships, and the difficulty the Pasha had in satisfying their demands for pay, might sufficiently account for his restoration of the fleet, even though no progress had been made towards a peace with the Porte.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 457

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 305.)  
My Lord,

Thessalonica, November 7, 1839.

I AM ignorant what may be the intention of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the affairs of this country in their actual state, but there are many reports coming from persons who I may suppose to be in possession of information, which are of a nature to induce me to believe that the Government of Her Majesty's Government to possibly intend to give assistance to the Porte. I have heard that the Russian Government would like to see the Porte restored to its former position, and it is possible that the Porte might prefer calling upon Russia for aid, to giving assent to the establishment of that Pasha in Syria at the present time, and it might be argued that the Porte would do wisely, for giving Syria, or a portion of it, to Mehemet Ali, to raise up competitors for the Khalifat, and to shake the very foundation of the Ottoman Empire, and probably, to make its destruction certain; and the Protectorate that would fall to Russia as the price of assistance, would be a minor evil, because it would necessarily be exercised mildly for a length of time, and with great attention to the wishes and feelings of the Sultan, in order to prevent, as much as possible, occurrences that might oblige the European Powers to interfere. Russia, probably, would not demand any sacrifice of territory from the Porte, but would be content with the establishment of her influence upon a sure and solid foundation.

I have heard that the Russian Government is expected from England and France, and that they will be able to give the authority of Russia, which is a great advantage, and that they will have a chance (however small) of being able to incur the evils that must

be incurred by the Porte, if it is not restored to its former position. I have heard that the Russian Government is expected from England and France, and that they will be able to give the authority of Russia, which is a great advantage, and that they will have a chance (however small) of being able to incur the evils that must

Porte itself. I have information of approaches having been made here by the Russian Mission, to the subject of a renewal of the Treaty of Unkiar Skeless, and I think it may be correct.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

No. 458.

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.

(No. 3.)  
Sir,

Foreign Office, November 28, 1839.

I HAVE received your despatch, No. 1, of the 14th November, reporting what passed in an interview which you had with Prince Metternich on the previous day, and I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held on that occasion with reference to your intercourse with the Austrian Government.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 459.

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.

(No. 4.)  
Sir,

Foreign Office, November 28, 1839.

I HAVE received from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, a copy of the instructions which he gave to you on your departure from Vienna, for the guidance of your language and conduct at the Congress of Vienna. I have also received from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, with one single exception, the instructions which he gave to you on your departure from Vienna, for the guidance of your language and conduct at the Congress of Vienna. I have also received from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, with one single exception, the instructions which he gave to you on your departure from Vienna, for the guidance of your language and conduct at the Congress of Vienna.

You will conform yourself in other respects to the instructions given to you by Lord Beaconsfield.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 460.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beaconsfield.

(No. 149.)  
My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 28, 1839.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 144, of the 16th instant, transmitting a copy of the instructions which you have received from me, I have to inform your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government most approve of the general tenor of those instructions with one exception, which I have explained in a despatch to Colonel Hodges, of which I enclose a copy.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.



No. 461

*Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beaconsfield*

(No. 150.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 26, 1839*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 143, of the 10th instant, regarding what passed between Prince Metternich and your Excellency, relative to the arrangement of the Eastern Question which has been proposed by France I am to state that it is most unquestionably true that any such arrangement would lead to the consequences which Prince Metternich anticipates, that is to say, to an easy removal of the struggle between the Sultan and the Pasha; and it is precisely for that reason that Her Majesty's Government are so adverse to such an arrangement; but the arrangement proposed by Her Majesty's Government would not be liable to that objection because it would reduce the power of Mehmet Ali, without proportionally increasing the condition of the Sultan, and would leave to the Sultan resources of a kind, sufficient to enable him to make him strong enough to resist any encroachment on the part of the Pasha; and moreover, it would, at all events, from the nature of things, be far easier for the Allies of the Sultan to come to his assistance, in order to stop the first attack of the Pasha, than if the Desert were interposed between the two parties, and if the present proportion of their respective strengths had been materially altered in favour of the Sultan.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 462.

*Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde.*

(No. 172. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 20, 1839*

I ENCLOSE for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople acquainting him confidentially with an observation made by Baron Brunnow before he left England, on the question of the entrance of a British squadron into the Straits of the Dardanelles.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 463

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.*

(No. 180.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, December 2, 1839*

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to continue to urge the Turkish Government to remain firm, to make no concessions to Mehmet Ali, but to trust to the support of the Allies. The British Government has taken to itself the course of negotiation during the last few months ought to remove the Turkish Government with confidence in Great Britain. For it has been the British Government which has prevented the Porte from being pressed by the Five Powers to grant Mehmet Ali the demands which he has made. France has for some time declared that she will not support a settlement which only one that is practicable, and she has assumed to persuade the other Powers to adopt her views. If Great Britain had given way to France, and had consented to support the French proposals, Austria and Prussia and Russia would probably have acquiesced in them also, because those Powers have inti-

See No. 425, p. 468.

mated that they would support any arrangement which England and France should have agreed upon. But England has stood firm to the principles which she laid down in the outset of the negotiation; and her steadiness has encouraged Austria to adhere to the same line, while it has made it impossible for Russia to adopt the views of France, even if she had been disposed to do so; because Russia, having contracted special engagements to protect Turkey, could not appear to be less friendly to that Power than England is. In like manner, the avowed desire of France to support the pretensions of Mehmet Ali, has led to no result, and will lead to none as long as the Porte is true to its own interests.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 464.

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 2.)*

(No. 366)

My Lord,

*Paris, November 20, 1839*

MARSHAL SOULT this morning read to me his despatch to Count Sébastiani, in reply to that which your Lordship addressed to me (No. 348), respecting the conduct of the French Government on the Turco-Egyptian Question.

As your Lordship must have by this time received from the French Ambassador a copy of Marshal Soult's despatch, it is unnecessary for me to report its contents. The despatch appeared to me to contain little that has not been before adduced and already answered, and I did not feel myself called upon to enter into any extensive argument upon the subject. I contented myself with pointing out several inaccurate statements that occur in the course of the despatch; and in regard to the insinuation that Her Majesty's Government in their anxiety to restore to the Sultan the territories now in possession of Mehmet Ali, had lost sight of the more important European Question, I observed that the European Question, as understood by the Powers of Europe, would be best accomplished by the course which England had proposed, and that a combined operation concerted by all the Five Powers for the defence of the Turkish Empire, would be, in fact, to annul the Treaty of Unkar Skelessi. Marshal Soult, after he had finished reading his despatch, entered into the question of the conditions of peace, to which Mehmet Ali had proposed. He said that Mehmet Ali was willing to give up Adana which he had possessed ever since the arrangement of Kutaya, he was willing also to withdraw from Diarbekir and Orfa, in short, from the eastern side of the Euphrates; he was ready to accept only a life interest in the occupation of Candia, and perhaps might be induced to do so at the present time. He said that Mehmet Ali was willing to give up the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina, and that these Holy Cities would be again exposed to the same danger, if the Egyptian troops were to be withdrawn from them.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

(No. 125, Confidential.)

My Lord,

St Petersburg, November 18, 1839.

In consequence of a delay in the arrival of the post at Berlin, the messenger Fenevay was detained nearly four days in that capital, and only brought me your Lordship's despatches of the 25th and the 29th of October, on Wednesday night, the 13th instant.

On the following day I saw Count Neuweirde, who was surprised and glad to find that I was not instructed to make any more visits to the sick at the Lazarett. He said that we must not have been in some misunderstanding, because Baron Brunnow had reported to him that I should be charged by your Lordship with a further suggestion to induce Russia to act in perfect union with Great Britain. I showed his Excellency your Lordship's dispatch No. 152, and drew his attention to the passage in it which relates your Lordship's communication of the modification proposed by His Majesty's Government to remove a difficulty, which would otherwise had been insurmountable, in the plan of operation submitted to the Emperor, and I assured him that the Government were anxious to obtain the Emperor's concurrence in that proposition, to which no reply had yet been given.

such was the state in which Baron Brunnow's departure had left the negotiation, and the existence of the expectations with which he might, as he was believed to be sincere, and that he was prepared to consent to what England desired, I mentioned

your hope that His Imperial Majesty would agree to the modification in question, and I subsequently wrote to his Excellency a private note in which I inserted a paragraph to that effect from your Lordship's letter, and I added some arguments from myself, that I thought might have weight with the Emperor. I also allowed Count Nesselrode to see your Lordship's despatch No. 348, to Lord Malmesbury upon the subject of the French Government, as a further proof of the sincerity of our views. Her Majesty's Government pursued the way: not more disposed to concur in or to palliate a departure from right principles and from an honourable course by France than by any other Power, and ready to unite with Russia cordially and in entire confidence for the execution of a just and wise policy.

Thus prepared, Count Nemelrod went to Cranbrook-Celso on Saturday and told me the whole story, calling upon me ~~for~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~ask~~ <sup>ask</sup> ~~him~~ <sup>him</sup> ~~for~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~give~~ <sup>give</sup> ~~me~~ <sup>me</sup> ~~any~~ <sup>any</sup> ~~official~~ <sup>official</sup> ~~answer~~ <sup>answer</sup>; but he told me confidentially that "we should agree."

He said that the Emperor was in the best possible disposition toward England, and he should prepare a reply to be submitted to His Imperial Majesty in a day or two, which he hoped would be approved of, and which would give satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government. He said that the Emperor's attitude toward the modification of Baron Brunnow's project, insisted upon by your Lordship, will be decided in a few days, and he would then be able to report the result to your Lordship. He said that the next steps to be taken in consequence, without delay.

Count Nesselrode promised me to despatch a messenger, at the end of the week, with a letter to the Emperor, in which I should be contained in a despatch to M. de Kiseleff.

It was agreed between Count Neuhaus and the Emperor that they must be kept as secret as possible. He was to demand of the Third Power the pledge of a *Prinzipalvertrag* for it, and say as little as possible about it, which has been the great secret of the *Prinzipalvertrag*. The Emperor has removed from Constantinople, and he has not come to a settlement with the Sultan. He has not yet asked the Sultan for the Sultan's consent or the Sultan's consent. The Russian

It appears that the Emperor was enchanted at learning the contents of your Lordship's despatch to Lord Granville, in which His Imperial Majesty's own sentiments are admirably expressed.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) CLANRICARDE

P.S.—I have omitted to state above, that the Pasha of Egypt declared positively to Count Medem, that he would on no account give up Adana and the passages of the Taurus;—a declaration that shows the justice of the objection made by your Lordship to the proposition of the French Government, without any offer of carrying it into effect by force, if necessary, when agreed to by the Allied Powers. I now enclose a copy of an extract of the despatch of the Russian Consul-General in Egypt, which Count Nesselrode has given me.

Inclosure in No. 465.

Count Meadows to Count Newscode

(Entrée.)

Alexandrie, le 1<sup>er</sup> Octobre, 1839

J'AI dit au Pacha : " il n'estre dans la pensée d'aucune des Grandes Cours de vous égarer, toutes veulent au contraire vous assurer un avenir d'autant plus certain, qu'elles resteront moralement responsables de la fidèle exécution des bases de la transaction qu'elles tendent à amener. Elles ont toutes le même droit et le même intérêt à une pacification honorable,—équitable pour l'Egypte et sans être désavantageuse pour la Porte, en d'autres termes, une solution compatible avec la sécurité future et l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman. Aucune d'elles n'a considéré vos prétentions relatives à la destitution de Hosren Pacha admissibles; ce serait vous accorder une ingérence dans les affaires intérieures du pays et intervenir les rôles de suzerain et de vassal."

Méhémet Ali me répondit : — " Si j'ai insisté dans la teme sur le renvoi de Hoorew, c'est lui qui m'y a contraint par ses intrigues et sa duplicité, c'était là le seul moyen pour moi d'en venir à un arrangement définitif et stable. Depuis que les Grandes Cours d'Europe se sont chargées du rôle de Médiatrice, les affaires ont changé de face, et cette question est aujourd'hui pour moi d'un intérêt secondaire. Ce n'est plus sur le renvoi de Hoorew que j'insiste, et je renonce entièrement à cette prétention. Pour ce qui est de l'île de Candie, la possession, quoique importante pour moi comme position maritime, loin de m'avoir servi à la restitution d'Adana, qui forme la porte de ma maison, qu'on ne me la laisse pas. Je ne suis pas disposé à mettre à la merci d'une attaque de la part de la Turquie

*Mou.*—La garantie des Grandes Cours vaut plus que ces fortifications, et vous offre plus de sécurité pour votre avenir que toutes les fortifications du monde.

Mehemet Ali — Puisqu'il en est ainsi, quelle nécessité y a-t-il de rendre Adana à la Porte, elle trouvera la même caution contre une attaque de ma part dans la garantie de l'Europe.

Moi.—C'est précisément parceque cette cession n'est des vôtres plus d'aucune valeur, qu'on insistera sur le retour de la province d'Adana au territoire du Sultan. Ce district, ayant été donné à ferme à Ibrahim et non concédé à vous, vous ne pouvez le réclamer comme propriété. Si vous y avez fait des fortifications et dépensé des sommes immenses, personne ne vous y obligeant, n'est à vous-même qu'il faut vous en prendre et non à la Porte, et cette considération ne saurait influencer les décisions des Grandes Cours.

*Ménestrel Al.*—Je ne me déciderai jamais à remettre la clef de ma maison, que la Porte augmente son tribut, j'y consens, mais on ne me portera point de respect à l'aise.



*St Petersburg, November 22, 1839*

The Russian Government propose to regulate, by previous agreement, the amount of force to be employed within the Turkish Straits, and the limits within which their action shall be confined.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) CLANRICARDE

Count Nesselrode to M. de Kisselef.—(Communicated by M. de Kisselef,  
December 5.)

St. Petersburg, ce 19 Novembre, 1839.

Il faut que les puissances européennes que l'Empereur avait fait adresser par le Baron de Pruthi au Caire et de Londres et qui ont eu avec l'Angleterre, la France et de Hollande, par l'exposé à ses notes les avantages qu'il offre à la Russie, lui fassent espérer, ont subi l'effet de l'avis de l'Empereur. Sa Majesté Impériale a eu de puissantes raisons pour désirer l'accomplissement de ses vues, et l'Empereur de Russie, le Comte de Lomaxov y a répondu avec une franchise et avec un égal désir de faciliter entre toutes les Puissances une entente qui tendrait à ce moment à assurer la paix et le salut et l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman. C'est là en effet la seule pensée qui a servi constamment de base à la politique de l'Empereur, et c'est là encore la règle invariable qui déterminera sa conduite à l'avenir ; guidé par ces principes, étrangers à toute vue d'influence ou de prépondérance exclusive, désireux de faire cesser un conflit qui pourrait entraîner la chute du trône du Sultan, notre Auguste Maître n'hésitera jamais à mettre de côté toute considération d'amour-propre, pour atteindre le but élevé que les Puissances ont en vue, et pour écarter, autant qu'il dépendra de lui, les obstacles qui seuls semblent aujourd'hui s'opposer à la solution de la Question d'Orient.

La manière distinguée avec laquelle le Baron de Brunnow s'est acquitté de la mission que l'Empereur avait daigné lui confier, l'accueil bienveillant dont Sa Majesté la Reine l'a honoré, et la justice éclatante que le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat s'est plu à rendre à l'esprit de conciliation et au sentiment de modération dont il a été constamment animé, nous sont garants que le choix de ce Plénipotentiaire ne pourra qu'être agréable au Cabinet de Londres.

Veuillez donner lecture de la présente dépêche à Lord Palmerston et lui en faire copie, s'il vous en paraît le désir.

**Kereven, &c**

Londres, ce 4 Décembre, 1839

Le Comte Sebastian, capit. de

*The Duc de Dalmenie to Count Sébastien*

Paris, le 25 Novembre, 1839

AINSI que vous me l'avez annoncé, Lord Granville m'a communiqué une longue dépêche de Lord Palmerston, relative à la Question d'Orient, dont l'objet est de discuter la réclamation française. Le Gouvernement anglais a dressé un plan d'accommodement proposé par la France. Sans reprendre, un à un, des

détails bien souvent reproduits dans ma correspondance. Je crois devoir répondre les accusés mis devant vous et de ce qu'il en résulte. Le marche sera par le Gouvernement du Roi et répondre à quelques assertions erronées qui se méritent contre.

Je commence par protester de la manière la plus formelle contre l'idée qui y est exprimée que la France s'est constituée la protectrice de Malines et Al. Cette idée a été gravement mise en avant pour qu'elle soit passée de la place sous le ciel. N'en à la France responsable pour Malines et Al. ni protection partielle. L'Europe ne peut exister sans l'intégrité territoriale des États d'Orient sur des bases sûres et stables. Qu'on se rappelle nos efforts incessants pour avoir exercé notre influence dans ce sens et la France sans exposer à pareille épreuve son caractère et ses intérêts. Quant aux propositions qui nous ont convaincu, comme nous l'avons toujours été, que le plan de l'Angleterme ne menait pas avec elle au Vœu Républicain, nous n'avons pu accepter, à des mesures extrêmes, impraticables peut-être, et en tous cas bien dangereuses, nous n'avons pu l'accepter, et nous avons dit hautement quel était celui qui nous paraissait le plus propre à assurer tout à la fois l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman et le maintien du paix.

Lord Palmerston prétend, il est vrai, que nous avions commencé par approuver les propositions du Cabinet de Londres. J'ignore absolument sur quoi peut reposer une pareille affirmation, qui se produit pour la première fois, et que je ne puis admettre. Je désire que vous me fassiez savoir d'où peut provenir un pareil malentendu.

Ce n'est pas d'ailleurs sur ce seul incident que Lord Palmerston appuie le reproche de contradiction qu'il adresse à notre politique. Rappelant l'engagement avec lequel, au commencement de la crise actuelle, nous avons pris l'initiative de l'appui à accorder à la Porte, il prétend démontrer que notre attitude a complètement changé, et qu'en proclamant le principe de l'intégrité de l'Empire ottoman, nous avons en réalité abandonné les bases que maintenant nous voulons donner à la réconciliation de la Porte avec son vassal.

Il m'est impossible, M. le Comte, d'admettre cette manière de poser la question. Il me paraît tout à fait vrai, et le Gouvernement du Roi ne peut que se plaindre de le voir rappeler, qu'il a le premier invité les Puissances à sauver la Porte de l'outrage qui lui avait été fait. Mais il est également certain que tandis que les Puissances ont hésité sur la proposition qu'il leur présentait, le Gouvernement du Roi était déjà parvenu à arrêter la guerre. Les armées françaises, victorieuses dans toutes leurs opérations et incessamment trop faiblement appuyées par ses Alliés, il avait indiqué à l'Ambassadeur de Vienne, M. de Metternich, la nécessité d'une suspension des hostilités. L'invitation faite à la Porte par l'Ambassadeur de France, de concert avec ses Collègues, de ne conclure rien avec le Vice-Roi sans avoir consulté les Cours Européennes, l'engagement échangé, sur notre demande, entre les Cours de Londres, de Vienne, de Berlin, et de Paris, pour la protection de l'indépendance et de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, sont des faits également constants et que je n'entends certes ni dénigrer ni révoquer en doute; mais si, au lieu de commencer par établir que les stipulations de notre projet d'adhésion ou aucune façon

Sans doute, c'est une situation fâcheuse pour un souverain que la nécessité d'accorder à un sujet trop puissant l'investiture héréditaire des territoires. Mais, pour rendre responsables, Lord Palmerston la reconnaît lui-même puisqu'il propose aussi en faveur de Méhemet Ali, cette investiture héréditaire, appliquée seulement dans de moindres proportions. Le différend existant entre la France et l'Angleterre ne roule donc pas, cela est évident, sur une question de principes, mais bien sur le mode d'application, sur des appréciations de détail. Lord Palmerston admet

le démembrement n'aura pas lieu davantage si l'Egypte en ajoutant la

et en vainceux qu'il serait tenu de lui fournir. Encore un coup, il y a là, entre les deux Cabinets, non pas diversité de principes, mais dissentiment sur leur application; et aucun des deux n'est autorisé à pousser dans ce dissentiment le droit d'accuser l'autre d'inconséquence et de contradiction.

Lord Palmerston dit, il est vrai, que pour en arriver à accorder à Mehemet Ali la totalité de ses demandes il n'était pas nécessaire d'annoncer l'abord l'intention de donner secours à la Porte contre ses exigences. Pour répondre à cette objection, il suffit d'établir quelles étaient d'abord ces exigences, et à quel point nos sommes parvenus à les réduire. Mehemet Ali, dans la journée, non seulement repoussait avec emportement l'idée d'abuser l'hérédité par les maudites concessions territoriales, mais déclarait qu'il entendait garder aussi les districts nouveaux occupés par son fils après la bataille de Nezib. Il réclamait de plus, comme condition absolue d'une pacification, le renvoi du Grand Vezir. Aujourd'hui, non seulement il renonce à ces deux clauses exorbitantes, mais il consent, sauf des restrictions qui ne sont probablement pas son dernier mot, à abandonner l'île de Candie, le district d'Adana, et il offre encore d'élever la somme du tribut qu'il paie à la Porte. Pourrait-on soutenir que des modifications de cette importance ne méritent pas d'être prises en considération ?

Une autre objection élevée par le Cabinet de Londres c'est que nous aurions rendu nos propositions plus inacceptables encore en repoussant et de la façon la plus péremptoire, la pensée d'en venir jamais à les appuyer sur le terrain des négociations dans le cas où elles ne seraient pas accueillies par le Sultan. Mais il n'y a rien de plus de portée aujourd'hui que Mehemet Ali qui se fonde sur une allé- gation de l'absence de tout intérêt personnel pour lui-même et son pays, dans sa conduite victorieuse. Les motifs qui nous faussent préférer une semblable marche sont évidens. D'une part, l'intérêt vraiment important pour l'Europe est celui de la défense de Constantinople, et on peut même dire que tous les autres intérêts sous le point de vue Européen, sont subordonnés à celui-là. D'un autre côté, tant qu'on n'était pas certain de s'accorder sur les conditions à proposer à Mehemet Ali, il eût été plus qu'inutile de se livrer prématurément à la discussion des vœux de contrainte auxquelles il pourrait devenir nécessaire de recourir sans son consentement. Nous avons, d'ailleurs, la conviction que si nous

la négociation actuelle. C'est que la possession des Vilâes Saintes de l'Arabie est nécessaire au Sultan. Si, par sa possession, il entend le droit de souveraineté, de l'Islamisme, perdrait une portion du prestige religieux sur lequel s'appuie sa puissance. Nous en sommes convaincus, et nous mettons un si grand prix à la conservation de tous les élémens de cette puissance, que lorsqu'il y a quelques mois on répandit le bruit que les agens entretenus par le Sultan en qualité de chef de la religion, à la Mecque et à Médine, avaient par le Vice-Roi, je chargeai le Consul-Général de France de lui faire à ce sujet de vives représentations; c'est probablement le fait auquel Lord Palmerston veut faire allusion. Je remarquai en passant, que ce bruit, aussi bien que tant d'autres répandus à Constantinople contre Mehemet Ali, était complètement faux. Quoiqu'il en soit, aujourd'hui comme alors, je reconnais que la Porte doit garder son droit de souveraineté sur les Vilâes Saintes et sur l'Arabie tout comme sur la totalité des autres territoires gouvernés par le Roi d'Arabie. Je ne vois pas et je n'ai jamais dit qu'aucun intérêt de l'Europe puisse être lésé par ce que l'Arabie continuerait à être placée sous l'autorité du Sultan. Et j'ajouterais, que l'idée de changer cet état de choses établi sans contestation depuis vingt ans, se présente à moi comme une combinaison toute nouvelle qui ne pourrait que compliquer au détriment même de la Porte, une question si difficile.



ne. Le fait est que jusqu'ici cette idée n'avait pas été mise en avant, et que l'Arabie était universellement considérée comme une dépendance de l'Égypte, comme liée au sort de ce dernier pays.

J'ai parcouru en quelque sorte le cercle des objections élevées par Lord Palmerston contre cette politique. Je crois avoir prouvé quelques-unes reposant en général sur des malentendus ou des erreurs de fait. Il en est encore une dont j'hésite presque à parler. Dans l'opinion du Cabinet Britannique, le rappel de M. l'Amiral Robinson a eu pour effet d'atténuer la force morale de l'acte qu'il avait signé pour promettre à la Porte l'appui de la France. Je ne comprends pas, je l'avoue, comment le changement d'un agent diplomatique pourrait amener ce résultat en présence de la déclaration sans cesse renouvelée par le Gouvernement du Roi qu'il persiste dans sa politique bienveillante pour le Sultan. Je n'en aurais pas l'avantage et l'autorité de la Commission que je rencontre pas dans des explications qui prendraient un caractère personnel.

Lord Palmerston, dans la dépêche à laquelle je réponds, exprime le regret qu'il éprouve du différend survenu entre la France et l'Angleterre. Il énumère tout ce que son Gouvernement a fait pour le prévenir. Au nombre des témoignages de la reconnaissance qu'il nous a rendus, il compte l'abandon de mesures de rigueur auxquelles il avait proposé de recourir pour forcer Méhémet Ali à restituer par amiablement la Syrie Ottomanne. Peut-être M. le Comte, peut-être serais-je en droit de remarquer que ces mesures n'ont pas été seulement repoussées par la France; que toutes les autres Cours les ont jugées dangereuses, impraticables et à l'opposé de nos propres principes, et que, suivant l'usage, le Gouvernement Britannique même, livré à sa seule impulsion, les eût écartées après y avoir mûrement réfléchi. Au reste, il est loin de ma pensée de contester les intentions conciliantes que le Cabinet de Londres a portées dans cette grande affaire. Mais se sont arrêtées, j'en suis bien convaincu, que devant une conviction erronée à mon avis, mais sincère et profonde. Une conviction non moins énergique, quoique contraire, a dû également surmonter, dans notre esprit, l'impulsion de sentiments tout aussi bienveillants pour nos Alliés; elle nous a réduits à la nécessité de persister dans la ligne que nous suivons, mais on nous rendra cette justice que nous avons fait aussi longtemps que possible, tout ce qu'a dépendu de nous pour éviter, pour le dissuader aux yeux des autres Cours.

Je suis souvent demandé, M. le Comte, comment il se faisait que les deux Cabinets ne fussent venus à se pas s'entendre sur la question qui semblait la mieux faite pour les mettre d'accord. Je vais vous dire toute ma pensée. Cela tient surtout à ce que la France a principalement eu en vue le côté Européen de la Question, tandis que l'Angleterre s'est trop préoccupée des considérations relatives à la position respective de la Porte et du Vice-Roi. Nous nous sommes proposés avant tout, de faire sortir de la crise actuelle l'Europe dans la plus grande paix et l'entente, et nous nous sommes attachés à faire passer sur la Porte, au lieu de l'empêcher que ce protectorat, qui n'est que l'occasion de s'entendre et de se lier, en Europe, nous avons eu constamment présent à l'esprit que nous ne pouvions important de sauver à Constantinople l'indépendance de ce qui est cette dépendance sans laquelle l'Europe n'est plus ce qu'elle est. L'Angleterre avait pu d'abord se proposer le même but que nous, et aboutir à une même pensée. Mais elle ne l'a pas, elle a un peu perdu de vue. Je n'ai rien de plus à dire sur ce que je remarque dans la dépêche à laquelle je réponds, il ne se trouve pas un mot de l'un ou de l'autre que le Cabinet de Londres soit prêt à donner la solution à donner à la Question d'Orient qu'un règlement territorial plus ou moins à la convenance du Sultan et du Vice-Roi.

Veillez, M. le Comte, donner lecture de la présente dépêche à Lord Palmerston et lui en laisser copie.

Agidez, &c.,  
(Signed) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE

No. 468

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 306.)

My Lord,

Therapia, November 18, 1839.

HIS Excellency the Internuncio acquainted me that M. de Pontois had said to Namik Pasha, "que la Porte serait bien de s'arranger directement avec Méhémet Ali." The Internuncio added, that he had redoubled his efforts to keep things in the state in which they are, and that he did not doubt of my doing the same.

I know also that the French Minister stated to an acquaintance of mine, not many hours ago, that the French Government disagreed with the English upon the question of Méhémet Ali, because the time was not propitious for settling the great question with Russia; and was of opinion that the Porte ought to put up with the present state of affairs with Méhémet Ali, that there should be then established a protectorship for the security of Constantinople by the Great Powers.

I think it my duty to co-operate with the Internuncio in the support of that policy in which we have acted together under the sanction of our Governments, and I have done so to the best of my power. I told Rechid Pasha, that I doubted M. de Pontois acted under instructions from his Government, when he advised the direct arrangement should be made with Méhémet Ali; because I doubt if the French Government would give such instructions at the present time, without the concurrence of the British Government; and I had no knowledge that any such concurrence had been given by the latter. I said the Sublime Porte must be satisfied with the present state of affairs, to act as it should have correct information of what the Governments of England and Austria have decided to do. That, were it the fact that the Egyptian had the power necessary to attack the Porte, he could not exert it at this season of the year. That it would always be time enough for the Porte to consent to the partition of the Empire, and that no present danger existed to hurry on the adoption of such a measure.

I have nothing better than rumour in evidence of any change in the former policy of Her Majesty's Government, and of the adoption of French views of the question of this country; and I cannot consider myself authorized by such rumours to deviate in the least from the old track.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 469.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

No. 307.

12-1

Foreign Office, December 6, 1839.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the language which you held to Rechid Pasha, as reported in your dispatch No. 306. I am, however, advised that M. de Pontois stated to have given to the Turkish Government, to come to a direct arrangement with Méhémet Ali.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 470.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 9.)  
(No. 378.)

My Lord,

Paris, December 6, 1839

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to No. 387 inclusive. Marshal Soult, this morning, told me that he had received despatches yesterday from Constantinople and from Alexandria, but that they contained no very interesting information; nothing, in short, which could lead him to form any opinion whether peace was likely to be soon concluded between the Sultan and Mehmet Ali by a direct negotiation between the two parties. It is believed, he said, at Constantinople that the Russian Minister is strongly urging the Turkish Government to make an arrangement with the Pasha without the intervention of the Allies of the Porte; and Rechid Pasha complains of the danger of the present uncertain position of affairs.

The French Consul at Alexandria writes, that the attempt at insurrection in the Haouran has been entirely put down, that the whole of Syria is in a state of tranquillity, and that Ibrahim Pasha is employed in collecting tribute from the country; that the Egyptian Army had been paid a considerable portion of the arrears which were due to it, and that the officers and crews of the Ottoman fleet had received a month's pay from Mehmet Ali.

M. Cochelet writes, that Colonel Campbell was ill, and unable to attend to business, and he does not mention that Colonel Hodges had as yet arrived at Alexandria.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 471.

Mr. Consul Young to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 32.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, October 16, 1839

I HAVE the honour to apprise your Lordship that active steps are being taken to remove the arms and other warlike stores, which have been discharged there, and all the artisans that could be found here have been sent down to work there.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) W. T. YOUNG.

No. 472

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 16.)

My Lord,

Damascus, October 25, 1839

THE last despatch I had the honour of addressing your Lordship was No. 15, under the 25th ultimo, which will be a long time in reaching your Lordship's hands, as will be henceforward all the intelligence from Syria, the consequence of substituting a sailing vessel for a steamer, to be employed in the conveyance of the mails between Alexandria and Beyrout. The interruption and delay will be still greater, with regard to the communication and intelligence with Bagdad and the Persian Gulf.

It is stated by the Government here, that the insurgents in the Ledges have made their submission and returned to their avocations in the Haouran. Only four redoubts, in lieu of nine, have been erected by the Egyptians, on the border of the Ledges, said to be a condition stipulated with the insurgents;

but I have heard that the chief cause of the pacification is by orders from his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, to settle this affair as speedily and in the best manner possible. Neither his Excellency Sheriff Pasha nor Ismael Bey have yet returned here with their forces; I am informed that the former will proceed to the southern Druse Haouran districts, to regulate affairs there and to regulate the agricultural preparations for the season, which have met with interruption; and his Excellency Sheriff Pasha and Ismael Bey will proceed to the Agloun district, which was suddenly, and but partially, pacified when the Haouran insurrection was renewed, to regulate affairs there and forward the agricultural preparations, which have been, in a great measure abandoned.

The Castan Bey has been recently employed with his irregular Anasir Cavalry to defeat the Arab tribe Zein of the Desert, bordering the Leugea and Haouran district, from whom very considerable captures of flocks and animals have taken place, which cannot fail to tend, with the former captures, to impoverish the supplies of this city.

The Mutual Chief, Shink Hussein Shebib, in the neighbourhood of Soor, who is at the head of 300 horsemen, which numbers have collected from the remnant of the late Emir Gewad, continue to interrupt the roads and disturb that part of the country.

Such is the state of this part of Syria; what is going on further south I am not perfectly informed on; and the measures of the Government and complexion of affairs generally, confirm the observations I had the honour of making to your Lordship in my last despatch, that his Highness Ibrahim Pasha is anxious to put the south of Syria in a state to enable him to be at liberty to act with his army on the northern frontier, accordingly as circumstances may require.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) N. W. WERRY.

No. 473

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 22.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, October 31, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, copies of two despatches I addressed Viscount Ponsonby, under the 11th and 29th of this month, both of which will, I hope, meet your Lordship's approbation.

Since closing the last despatch to Viscount Ponsonby, nothing further of interest has transpired in this Consular district meriting your Lordship's attention.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure 1 to No. 473

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby

My Lord,

Alep, le 11 Octobre, 1839.

ME trouvant indisposé à ne pouvoir pas écrire moi-même pour le moment, j'ai l'honneur d'adresser à votre Excellence, par le canal de votre Excellence, la lettre ci-jointe, sans donner à votre Excellence connaissance de ce qui s'est passé dans nos contrées depuis la dernière dépêche que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous adresser en date du 20 Septembre passé.

J'ai l'honneur maintenant de vous soumettre, que les forces Égyptiennes sont toujours dans les mêmes positions à vous marquées précédemment, à l'exception de la garnison des redoubts, qui a été renforcée par les troupes de l'armée à Adana, l'ordre a été donné de disperser ce corps dans les environs.



d'Antioche, et l'on dit que Achmet Ménékli Pacha a reçu l'ordre de Sa Hauteur de se rendre ici.

Nous avons appris aussi depuis quelques jours, que le Séraskier Ibrahim Pacha réunit à Marache un nombre considérable d'ouvriers en maçonnerie et menuiserie, et la voix court que c'est pour y construire des redoutes et d'autres fortifications; cependant il y a des personnes qui assurent que ce n'est que pour y bâtir des hôpitaux et des casernes: dans peu de jours nous pourrions savoir au juste ce qu'il en est. J'ai aussi par une source sûre que Son Excellence le Séraskier compte de faire son quartier d'hiver à Marache avec le corps de troupes qu'il a avec lui.

L'esprit de sédition qui s'était manifesté dans une des montagnes d'Albestan dont j'ai eu l'honneur de vous parler par ma dernière dépêche, se trouve, à ce que l'on dit, à cause des forces que Son Excellence le Séraskier a dirigées contre les habitants de cette montagne.

Aussi une espèce de révolte s'est manifestée de nouveau dans les montagnes de Payas, près d'Alexandrette, mais d'après les derniers avis que j'ai reçus de la place, les forces de Sa Hauteur ont suffi pour la réprimer, et tout fait croire que cela n'aura aucune suite; de même dans les montagnes de Lattaquié il s'était déclaré un esprit de révolte parmi les Euzars; mais par les mesures prises par le Gouvernement, le peuple est rentré dans l'obéissance et commence à payer les impôts qu'on leur demandait. A l'exception de ces petits événements, tout le reste du district de ce Consulat est assez tranquille.

J'ai aussi l'honneur de vous dire, que depuis que les mesures de guerre ont cessé dans nos contrées, le commerce a repris un peu de faveur, et si cela dure, je pense que les intérêts de nos nationaux iront de mieux en mieux.

Son Excellence Soliman Pacha se trouve encore ici, mais ayant demandé à Sa Hauteur un congé pour aller voir sa famille, cette permission lui a été accordée sous la condition de retourner ici sous peu de jours.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY

Inclosure 2 in No. 473.

Mfr. Pro-Consul Werry to Vincent Ponsoby.

My Lord,

Aleppo, October 29, 1839

I HAD the honour to address your Lordship on 11th inst. by a communication, in consequence of indisposition, I was obliged to dictate to Mr. Ponsoby, Pro-Consul, the enclosed.

I now do myself the honour of transmitting to your Excellency the little that has further taken place since that period, on events in this district meriting your Lordship's attention.

His Excellency the Séraskier Ibrahim Pacha continues to occupy Marash with the same force; and the Egyptian troops on that northern frontier, and within this district, continue to hold with little or no change the same positions as I had the honour of noting to your Lordship in my last communication. But it is generally supposed that his Excellency the Séraskier will, on the approach of winter, withdraw his army to Aleppo, leaving, however, the troops in the same positions they now hold.

His Excellency has caused a second "Salyan" to be taken from the inhabitants of Marash.

I had the honour of stating to your Lordship, in my last communication, that his Excellency the Séraskier had ordered to Marash all the principal masons, carpenters, and workmen, supposed to be either for the erection of fortifications, or for that of barracks and hospitals for the forces.

About five days ago the chief Government architect of this Pashalik, M. Vincent Germain, received an order from his Excellency to repair immediately in that direction, for which district he has left.

I have from persons who have been that frontier that some redoubts and other fortifications have already been erected at Marash, and that the chief

architect's presence in that quarter has for its object to superintend the erection of barracks and hospitals at Amlab; and it is said, that probably the same buildings will be required at Marash, as the forces there are to hold, during the winter months, that position, which contains at present no suitable quarters for that season, from which it appears that his Excellency the Séraskier has the intention of keeping during the winter season, the whole of the forces concentrated in the same positions they now hold, all along the northern frontier of Syria.

I beg also to observe to your Lordship, that the Government here and throughout this country, have always been in the habit of storing a large quantity of grain of all sorts, as also of ammunition of both, much greater than has ever been practised in former years by this Government, and ever since its occupation of this country.

The Egyptian force at Orfa has not been increased in any way. It is reported in town, and, from all I can elicit, appears correct and authentic, that the Government have ordered the Governor of the country by the Sultan's authority, to furnish conscripts for the army, rose and decreed the Governor of the town, Cash, and other officers of the place, and then sent a deputation to the Egyptian commanding officer at Orfa, inviting him to take up that place and the surrounding country to the Egyptian authorities.

I have made very strict inquiry respecting this circumstance, and find it confirmed through other channels. The Dragoon has also had some conversation with a Christian who has just arrived here from Diarbekir, of the Gadban family, whose account of the affair corroborates with the above report which I have had the honour of noting to your Lordship, and further adds, that he met General Mouton, who was on his way to Aleppo, and that he had just reached from Orfa, and that it was reported they were on their way to Marash.

Chermook, as your Lordship is aware, has, ever since the occupation of Orfa by the Egyptian forces, a Muselman named there under that Government, and is distant about three days from Marash, and two from Diarbekir.

The information that I have been able to elicit from this person, who has been in the service of the Government, and of the Sultan's troops and officers is, that the force at Malatia, under Sad Allah Pacha, said to be of about 10,000 men, has been withdrawn from that place, and marched to Carpoet.

I have no late advices from the Adana district, but I believe everything there remains without any further change since the last time I addressed your Lordship.

I informed your Lordship, in my last, that resistance to the Government had taken place in the mountains near Byssa, on the continuity of the range of the Taurus, between the mountains of the Taurus and the mountains of the Anti-Taurus. I have no fresh advices from the Alexandretta district respecting the issue of that undertaking; but I learn from different local sources here, that the malcontents of those mountains had begun to give in their submission, and to pay the taxes in the same manner as the Euzars in the Lattaquié district, who had also some time back evinced symptoms of discontent, in consequence of the demand made for the taxes, but who, I learn from our agent there, have returned to their duty, and altogether, I may say that the whole of this consular district is at present pretty tranquil.

Although the malcontents in Syria against the Egyptian Government are general among the population, it may be said that the whole of the population of this country is inimical to this Government; arising from the forcible conscription, the heavy taxes, and the excessive and cruel manner in which the Government has proceeded in the execution of its measures, and a train of circumstances growing out of the wants of a too grasping Government inconsistent with the means of the people.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY

*Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 10.)*

(No 32.)

My Lord,

*Beirut, November 7, 1839.*

THE information I have the honour to transmit by this month's packet, and Alexandria, is but limited.

During the last fifteen or twenty days, the communication between Tyre and Acre has been interrupted by a party of insurgent Mutawalis (an heretical sect of Mahomedans) to the number of about 400. These lay in wait for travellers whom they rob and murder, as well as plunder the caravans which pass that way. Three lately seized upon a Christian, after robbing him, and gave him life on condition of his conveying a message, on their part, to the Governor of Tyre, demanding 50,000 piastres, and a supply of ammunition and provisions from that town. In the event of a refusal, they threatened to massacre him and the town. The inhabitants of Tyre are without the means of defence, and have applied in great alarm to the Mudir of Acre for protection. It is doubted however, whether he has a sufficient force at his disposal to keep the Mutawalis in check. Meanwhile our communications with the south are interrupted.

Trade is almost entirely suspended at this place, and is principally attributed to the anxiety and suspense which exists generally to respect the present state of the relations between Mehemet Ali and the Porte.

Accounts have reached Beirut, that Ibrahim Pasha has directed troops to march towards Malatia, Diarbekir, and Martin.

Solyman Pasha arrived at Sidon from Aleppo on the 24th ultimo, and has since visited Acre, at which place considerable military stores have lately arrived from Egypt.

On the 22nd instant, Mahmoud Bey, the Governor, communicated to the European Consuls here an order from his Excellency Sheriff Pasha, prohibiting the introduction of arms into Syria as an article of commerce.

On the 31st ultimo, an Egyptian brig-of-war touched here, bearing treasure for the payment of the troops in Syria, and on the 1st inst. a steamer, supposed to be the Egyptian frigate "Nile," passed within sight of this port steering northward.

I have, &c.

Signed N. MOORE.

*Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 10.)*

No. 29. Confidential.

My Lord,

*Berlin, December 4, 1839.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches to No. 19, together with their inclosures.

The French Consul at the Porte has read to me part of a despatch addressed to him by Marshal Soult, in which was inclosed a copy of your Lordship's despatch to Lord Granville of the 27th of October marked No 348.

The Marshal began by stating, that although the language held by your Lordship to the French Ambassador at the Porte had become less strong (and as tranchant) than formerly on the Turkish and Egyptian Question, yet the views taken by Her Majesty's Government of the state of affairs in the East, and of the means to be employed for bringing about an arrangement between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, were still too exaggerated and too inadmissible to coincide with those of the French Government.

The Marshal commented in rather severe terms on some of the passages in your Lordship's despatch to Lord Granville, saying, that some of the sentiments were exaggerated and others wounded, and that he was preparing to

answer them in the most peremptory terms (dans les termes les plus péremptores). I merely observed to M. Humann, that the Marshal seemed to find some difficulty in putting his intentions into execution, as a considerable time had elapsed since the despatch in question had been in his hands, and no answer had as yet been returned.

M. Humann then read to me extracts of a despatch from Marshal Soult to the French Consul-General at Alexandria.

I was much struck with the language of this despatch, for whilst it reprimanded in gentle terms the conduct of the Consul-General in having gone too far at different times in his conversations with the Pasha of Egypt, in his assurances of the protection of France, and of the interest she took in Mehemet Ali's welfare, thereby perhaps contributing to the Pasha's obstinacy in making him believe that France was more disposed to the aggrandizement of Egypt than to the maintenance of the Porte, yet this slight expression of disapprobation at his conduct was so interwoven with flattery for the Pasha personally, and the Marshal was so profuse in his assurances to the Pasha of the French Government, which his "genius and glory" inspired the French nation, that I am disposed to think M. Cochelet's report has not in reality been so strong as Marshal Soult, and that, in fact, the despatch means nothing. It however terminated with orders to M. Cochelet to state to Mehemet Ali, that if the French Government had been aware of the present state of the Turkish Empire and the aggrandizement of the Pasha, their choice must inevitably be the former; and that the Pasha would best insure the continued protection of France by the moderation of his demands.

Although evidence was not before wanting to prove that the complaints which had been received at Vienna and Constantinople of M. Cochelet's language at Alexandria were well founded, yet the existence of the despatch I have had the honour of quoted to your Lordship, and the French Government have even thought it necessary to take notice of it.

Baron Werther informed me yesterday that he had received news direct from Alexandria, containing renewed complaints of M. Cochelet's language.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

GEORGE B. HAMILTON

*Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 10.)*

No 33.

My Lord,

*Berlin, December 4, 1839.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that the Russian Minister has this moment informed me that a Russian Cabinet messenger has arrived at Berlin on his way to Stuttgart, bearing instructions to Baron Brunnow to proceed to London without delay, to negotiate with Her Majesty's Government the so long delayed question of the Russian troops in the East, and of the means to be employed for bringing about an arrangement between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, which is a subject of great importance required for the protection of the Porte.

The messenger has not been detained a moment, but has been desired to proceed to Stuttgart without delay.

I have seen Baron Werther this evening, since the reception of this welcome intelligence, and his Excellency has begged me to congratulate your Lordship on the success of your policy, at the same time that he takes no little credit to himself for having invariably predicted that Her Majesty's Government would have reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the Emperor on the Turkish Question.

Baron M. de Schurz has further informed me that Count Neumann has been chiefly instrumental in bringing about this happy event, but that he had also the assistance of the Emperor's private secretary, and that the Russian Government has been very anxious to bring about this happy result.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

GEORGE B. HAMILTON



Vicomte Palmerston to Earl Granville.

(No. 394)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, December 10, 1839.

IN a conversation which I had with Count Sebastiani on Thursday last, I took occasion to remark, but in a friendly manner, upon the considerable naval preparations which the French Government is making at Toulon. I observed, that there is now in the Levant a French squadron of nine sail of the line, all heavy and powerful ships, and that we learn that an additional squadron of eight sail of the line is fitting out at Toulon, which, when complete, will give France a fleet of seventeen sail of the line in the Mediterranean. I said that this great armament cannot fail to attract attention and to produce remarks in this country, and that it will inevitably become the subject of discussion when Parliament meets; that people will naturally ask who it is that so large a force is intended to act against?

It will be said, that such a fleet is not wanted against the Russians, who have only twelve indifferent sail of the line shut up in the Black Sea; that it cannot be meant against the Turks, because they have no fleet left; that it is obviously not directed against Mehemet Ali, because France not only declares that she will not coerce him, but of late has in her negotiations openly protected him; that, consequently, there remains only England and the English fleet against which these great preparations can be made. I said also that persons who are disposed to believe that the tone and language of the French press is calculated to countenance the notion, that in France, at least, these naval preparations are believed to be destined to support some system of policy adverse to Great Britain, and I mentioned an article which appeared lately in the "Journal de Paris," and which openly boasted, not only that England would be forced by France to submit to, and even to sign and guarantee the independence of Mehemet Ali, but that Gibraltar was to be wrested from us and to be transferred to the Spaniards. I said, that I myself attached no importance whatever to such newspaper articles, but they were at least indications serving to show which way public opinion and public feeling in France are travelling.

Count Sebastiani seeming to entertain some doubts of the accuracy of the report which had reached Her Majesty's Government as to the naval preparations at Toulon, I gave him the details, and stated that the French force now in the Levant consists of—

The Montebello 120 Guns.		The Diademe 86 Guns.	
Hercule	100 "	Généreux	80 "
Jéna	90 "	Triton	80 "
Jupiter	86 "	—Trident	80 "
Santo Petri	80 "		0

that the squadron which is equipping at Toulon is to consist of—

The Souverain - 100 Guns.		
Amiral	80 "	
Maréchal	80 "	
—	80 "	
Vice-Amiral	80 "	recently brought from Brest.
Nature	66 "	ditto.
Océan	120 "	expected from Brest.
Satan	90 "	ditto.

I said that we are going to put three line-of-battle ships into commission, in order to relieve three others now in the Mediterranean, and whose time of service is out; but that if the French should make so large a naval armament, it is obvious, that we may be obliged to convert this relief into a reinforcement, and perhaps even to make a still further addition to our ships in commission.

Count Sebastiani said he would certainly report to his Government what I had said to him, and would not fail to mention the friendly spirit in which my remarks had been made; but he assured me, in the most positive manner, that the main wish and guiding principle of his Government, in regard to its foreign relations, was to maintain unimpaired its alliance with England, and to render that alliance as close and intimate as possible; and that, consequently, he could not think it possible that any squadron of line-of-battle ships towards England could by possibility have entered into the motives which may have induced his Government to order the equipping of this squadron of reserve.

I think it will be desirable that your Excellency should take an opportunity of adverting to this matter, in conversation with Marshal Soult, in the same manner in which I touched upon it in my interview with Count Sebastiani. For, notwithstanding the friendly professions and declarations of the French Government, it is impossible for Her Majesty's Government, not to bear in mind the conduct of the Tuileries bears in mind, with respect to Mehemet Ali, the views and policy which have in past periods actuated the Monarchical, the Republican, and the Imperial Governments of France.

The desire of possessing Algiers and Egypt is not a recent ambition on the part of France. In 1801, when Napoleon Bonaparte was at the height of his power, having intended, if he could have retained Egypt, to have added Syria and Mesopotamia to the French Empire, it is also certain that when the war broke out in 1803, he contemplated an attack upon Algiers, with the Government of which he was, for that purpose, endeavouring to pick an unjust quarrel. Algiers is now in the possession of France; and the French Government is labouring to establish an Independent State, consisting of Egypt, Syria, and Arabia, to be placed under the protection, and to be subject to the influence, of France; to be, in short, to France what the Cabinet of St. Petersburg wishes Turkey to be to Russia.

If these plans were accomplished, it is easy to see that Tunis and Tripoli would soon be absorbed in the same political system; and France would become practically mistress of the whole of the southern coast of the Mediterranean.

Undoubtedly, the full execution of such a vast plan would be attended with difficulties hardly to be surmounted; and when once its nature and extent came to be generally seen and understood in England, any British Government would be compelled by public opinion, to resist the further progress of such a scheme by war, if remonstrances should prove ineffectual. But in matters of this kind, prevention is easier than remedy, and the earliest steps are always the wisest and the most effectual; and therefore it is that Her Majesty's Government have deemed it expedient to lose no time in noticing this apparently uncalled-for augmentation of the French fleet.

Her Majesty's Government do not believe that the Cabinet of the French Government are so much influenced by the French Government for the purpose of increasing their naval power, as to think that the French Government probably thinks, that if the French naval force in the Mediterranean were very much superior to that of Great Britain, such a circumstance would tend to give great weight to the demands of Mehemet Ali; and that France would be able to negotiate in favour of the Pasha, at the expense of England, which is the only way in which the line in the Mediterranean. France were to have seventeen, besides the whole of the Turkish and Egyptian fleets, which now, by a train of circumstances of which the history yet remains to be fully explained, are in the possession of Mehemet Ali.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 12.)

No. 390.

My Lord,

Paris, December 9, 1839.

I HAD an interview this morning with Marshal Soult, and was immediately on my entrance into his apartment. I was informed upon the communication he received yesterday from General Sébastiani, of the Russian Government having notified to your Lordship, to the Russian Imperial Government, and expressed its wish that the Russian force should enter the Bosporus, and that the other Powers shall enter the Dardanelles. Notwithstanding the Marshal made no more satisfactory than this communication, he considered it as the removal of the great obstacle to the satisfactory solution of the Eastern Question, and when I observed that Mehmet Ali, being aware that the Powers of a new Congress would be united in defence of Constantinople, would no longer interfere the hope of sowing dissension among them by the advance of the Egyptian Army towards the capital of Turkey, and be therefore disposed to accept of more reasonable conditions of peace than those on which he now insists, the Marshal fully concurred in the justice of this observation, the Marshal had to be should write by a courier this day to Count Sébastiani, instructing him to express the satisfaction with which the King and the French Government had received this communication.

His Excellency mentioned to me, that the French Minister at St. Petersburg had written to him that the Baron de Brunnow had received on the 6th of this month, instructions to proceed directly to London, and that on the 8th he purposed setting off for that destination.

I have, &c.  
Signed GRANVILLE.

No. 479

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville

No. 395, Confidential.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, December 12, 1839

WITH reference to your despatch No. 390 of the 9th instant I have to inform your Excellency that Count Sébastiani read to me yesterday a despatch from Marshal Soult in which the Marshal expressed the great satisfaction with which the French Government had learnt that the Russian Cabinet was disposed to accept of the conditions proposed by Her Majesty's Government on the 1st of December. The Marshal also stated that Baron Brunnow was expected to return to London for the purpose of negotiating the Convention, and the Marshal stated, that it was his opinion that it would appear that the Russian proposals were such as to be acceptable, and that it was not necessary to give any more information to your Excellency. I am, however, in doubt whether the Russian proposals are such as to be acceptable, and I am therefore prepared to reserve for the whole of the Eastern Question, not even excepting those portions which I have just communicated to your Lordship, views so different as to render further negotiation upon them apparently useless.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville

(No. 396.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, December 13, 1839

IN your despatch, No. 391, marked "Confidential," of the 9th instant, your Excellency reports, that Marshal Soult had stated to you on the morning of that day, that, in the same despatch in which General Sébastiani had apprized him of the communication which has been received from Her Majesty's Government from that of Russia, about the return of Baron Brunnow to London, Count Sébastiani had stated that he had received from the Russian Government the intended equipment of a reserve squadron at Toulon, and that passage contained very nearly the same statement which Marshal Soult made verbally to your Excellency as above referred to.

I have to state to your Excellency in reply, that in the despatch relative to the Affairs of the Levant, which Count Sébastiani showed me a few days ago, and which I mentioned in my preceding despatch No. 395, there was a despatch relating to what I had said to Count Sébastiani the other day upon the subject of the intended equipment of a fleet of reserve at Toulon, and that passage contained very nearly the same statement which Marshal Soult made verbally to your Excellency as above referred to.

But this explanation leaves the matter much as it was before, and entirely evades the real point. Your Excellency should, therefore, ascertain from Marshal Soult whether the Russian Government intend to equip a squadron of reserve of eight sail of the line at Toulon, in addition to the nine sail of the line already in the Levant; for it is the equipment of such a squadron which is the subject of the communication from the Russian Government to which the observation of Her Majesty's Government has been directed, and if it should be the intention of the French Government to carry its active naval force in the Mediterranean to the amount supposed, Her Majesty's Government would be glad to know that fact before Parliament meets.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 481

Lord Beaumont to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 15)

(No. 151.)

My Lord,

Vienna, December 4, 1839

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship the copy of a despatch which I have this day received from Viscount Ponsonby.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure in No. 481.

Viscount Ponsonby to Lord Beaumont.

My Lord,

Therapia, November 15, 1839

BY the last post, I informed your Excellency of what it was said had passed between the French Envoy and Namick Pasha. I have since heard as follows (through the Dragoman) from Rechid Pasha, "that as soon as he (Rechid) knew it from Namick, he made known to M. de Pontons his surprise that a French Minister had given advice which the Porte could have expected only from the mouth of the Representative of Russia."

6 H





under the pretext of taking possession of the fortune of her late father, the Cazaquier Arif Bey; but the chief object is to try what she can do for her father-in-law the Pasha. She has the reputation of possessing great abilities, and to have formerly had great influence in the Harem of the late Sultan, and to be well with the Sultana Valide. I cannot learn whether or not she was employed when the Valide wrote to Egypt. I spoke to Rechid Pasha on the subject of her services, and the view of her position of the Harem, and at the Galhane. The Intendant has spoken to him lately on the subject, and the Pasha is well on his guard.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

No. 483.

*The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 17.)*

(No. 130.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, November 30, 1839

I HAD the honour of a conversation with the Emperor on Sunday last which naturally turned upon the Affairs of Turkey.

I found His Imperial Majesty in the best possible disposition towards England. He expressed the lively satisfaction he felt at the prospect of drawing closer the relations between Russia and England, and of perfecting harmony and in concert with Her Majesty's Government. He said, he rejoiced in the good understanding that had been brought about, and did me the honour to pay me some personal compliments.

The Emperor was of the opinion which prevails here, that Ibrahim Pasha cannot attempt a march upon Constantinople, and that the question of a foreign force going to the defence of the Turkish Straits will not arise.

The Emperor, indeed, seemed to think it probable that the Sultan and Mehmet Ali would settle their differences, without waiting for the advice or interference of the European Powers, and that such a conclusion of their differences was desirable.

But this opinion is not shared by Count Nesselrode, who assures me, that he feels confident that the Sultan will rely upon the efforts of his Allies, and will not settle his disputes with the Pasha without their intervention, and his Excellency considers this necessary.

It should be determined by the Great Powers, as to what extent they will be called upon to interfere, and how far they will be bound to do so, and the settlement of the question will depend upon the result of their deliberations.

His Imperial Majesty spoke in reprobation of the conduct of the French Government, which, he said, had not surprised him, inasmuch as that Government had only acted towards us in this, as it had done on all past, and as it would do on all future occasions.

Baron Brunnow had been so well received on his late visit to London that he thought no person would be more acceptable to the British Government; that he had perfect reliance upon him, and that he had therefore sent him orders to resume his negotiations with your Lordship.

I assured His Imperial Majesty, that I had no doubt Baron Brunnow's return to England would afford great satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government, and that he would be received in a manner satisfactory to His Imperial Majesty.

In talking of Turkish Affairs the other day, Count Orloff asked me what would be done in the following case, viz., if France should hold aloof from the Convention for the coercive measures of the Allies against Mehmet Ali, and the Porte having called for the Allied Forces to guard Constantinople, and those forces being in the Bosphorus and in the Sea of Marmora, if she, France, should also insist upon her ships of war passing the Dardanelles?

I replied, that I did not know, but that I took that to be a question which the Sultan ought to determine, upon which Count Orloff agreed with me.

The news of the cessation of negotiations between your Lordship and Count Sébastiani having been spread abroad, the Russians in general express their pleasure at the prospect of an estrangement of the British Government from that of France, and of the alliance between Russia and England being drawn more close.

The French Ambassador, although he has seen your Lordship's despatch, No. 34, to Lord Granville, persists in asserting, that his Government will ultimately come to an understanding with that of Her Majesty, and he says that Mehmet Ali's positive rejection of the French proposition affords a fair excuse and reason for his Government to announce that proposition, and not to persist in upholding and pending against the judgment of the other Great Powers the cause of one who is utterly unreasonable.

Although I have no positive grounds upon which to rest it, I think it right to state to your Lordship my opinion, that the Russian Government will wish to continue Mehmet Ali to Europe, and at El Arish. I think the British Government will wish to see the boundary of his territory to be drawn as once proposed by General Sébastiani, by Beyrout and Damascus, or as once suggested by your Lordship, from the fortress of Acre and by the Dead Sea.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) CLANRICARDE

No. 486.

*M. Wagner, Prussian Consul at Alexandria, to Count Kanigsmarek.*

M. le Comte,

Alexandrie, le 26 Novembre, N. S., 1839

L'ARABIAN rapport du 7 du courant, a eu l'honneur de vous rendre compte des arrangements que j'ai pris pour mon installation ici, ainsi que de ma première entrevue avec M. le Pacha.

M. le Comte de Mecklenbourg m'ayant présenté il y a quelques jours à Boghos Bey, le Pacha, qu'on appelle le Pacha d'Alexandrie, et les Relations Extérieures, et l'ayant informé que j'étais venu pour ma légitimation, comme Secrétaire provisoire du Consulat Général, d'un firman impérial, d'une lettre Vénérable, et d'une patente, Boghos Bey m'a prié de lui envoyer ces pièces pour les faire enregistrer, et conformément à l'usage établi ici, je les lui ai transmises par une note dont j'ai l'honneur de joindre ici une copie.

Aucun fait marquant n'étant survenu depuis mon arrivée ici, je n'ai à vous adresser, M. le Comte, rien d'intéressant aujourd'hui.

Le Pacha, après avoir itérativement tenté en vain d'amener la Porte à un arrangement direct de ses différends avec elle, et fatigué de l'état actuel d'incertitude, parait attendre aujourd'hui avec autant d'impatience que le Corps Consulaire d'Alexandrie, une décision définitive des Grandes Puissances dans la Question Orientale.

Malgré la brièveté de mon séjour ici me permet de jeter des vues sur le Pacha, et sur les choses qui pourraient lui être imposées et des négociations qui pourraient en résulter, ainsi qu'il a été porté à croire par les entretiens que j'ai eus avec MM. les Consuls, qu'on ne saurait tirer aucun avantage positif des déclarations et des propositions auxquelles le Pacha s'est laissé entraîner à l'égard des concessions territoriales, par suite des communications que MM. les Consuls ont faites au Pacha, et le Pacha lui-même a fait de ce projet d'arrangement mis en avant par le Cabinet des Tuileries.

La question qui se pose maintenant est de savoir si Mehmet Ali a tenu aux différents points de vue qu'il a exprimés, et si, par conséquent, parait-il probable qu'il regarderait les concessions territoriales comme une chose de peu d'importance, et ne les accepterait que sous certaines conditions. Mehmet Ali a élevé à cette occasion, ainsi que déjà précédemment, des prétentions qui paraissent inadmissibles, mais on ne saurait croire qu'il y persiste, et il est même probable qu'il ne les a mises en avant que dans l'espoir d'obtenir de cette manière des conditions plus favorables.

Ce qui a augmenté jusqu'à un certain point la position du Pacha dans ses discussions avec les Consuls, c'est que les Grandes Puissances ont été avisées qu'il s'aperçoit qu'il ne sont autorisées à rien proposer, et qu'il se livre à l'attente des cinq Puissances, bien que les affaires du jour ne dépendent d'un commun.









When Alick was at the hotel, Captain Ford said: "If you can manage to get off I will take you to meet him. What reason have you for attending your gun on?" He said he feared that Ahmed Pasha had been deceived by Isander and now that Mehmet Ali had got him he would only use him as far as he would help, and then would turn him off, and the Circassian Pasha was doing as well as he could in the same way. "I am here as a war-bell prisoner, and I am now I shall be next time further. I will tell you what happened, some time ago I expressed a desire to go to Constantinople and they said: 'What you want to go back to Constantinople to betray us and,' and one of them said:

It is thought to escape you will be shot there is a price set upon you at  
Canton. If you do get there, such means will be employed against you  
as, you may remember, were used against — who went over to the Russians.  
Letters to him were written and left to be intercepted by the Russians, by which  
it was made to appear that he was a spy, and the Russians shot him."

The Captain said, "All this is naturally said by those persons, for they wish to terrify you. But, to come to the point, you wish to go to Constantinople. As you are afraid I can aid you, I will give you a passage, on condition that I shall deliver you up to the Ottoman Authorities, but I will promise you all my influence to save you from danger, provided you will give a faithful account to Harew Pasha of all that took place - and it is only by so doing that you can hope to be in security."

Captain Ford continued, "You mentioned France. What part did the French take in the affair? Would the Capudan Pasha have ordered the fleet to Alexandria, if the French Admiral had not, as it is said he did?" Avidick replied, "If it had not been for the French Admiral Capodaglio, never have brought the fleet to Alexandria. It was his intention to have run down with the fleet about 100 miles from the Dardanelles, there to have waited for accounts from Constantinople, and if they were unfavourable to him, then to have taken a ship and made his escape."

"When the Ottoman fleet arrived at Bes-ka Bay the French Admiral ordered  
will and closed the Ottoman fleet. The *mirza* Bey was sent to the  
Pasha to communicate with Admiral Ledyard and I A-bek was the Dr

[illegible]

The Bey returned, and Ahmed Pasha was overjoyed with the news. He immediately passed the order to make up his mind to go with the whole fleet to Alexandria and made sail, and so as far as the blockade. A day or two afterwards a French brig was seen in the distance and within the day was captured by Admiral Lalage. The French brig was the Captain Pasha's ship. The French ship was taken to Mustajir Pasha's camp in Egypt, and the French ship was given by the H. B. and the D. of A. to the Mustajir Pasha. The Mustajir Pasha had sent the ship to Alexandria. The Mustajir Pasha had sent the ship to Alexandria.

It was not thought prudent to put it into that Pasha's power to use it against the

\* That in the story of Hower and Flit having the  
+ It is not intended to indicate that the friend  
Flake had, as here described. The effort was solely to try to  
the Rule Boy—P

signers if he should not consent to act as they desired and exacted. The Khata Bey Sheriff was then sent off in the fastest mail corvette to Alexandria to invite verbally ~~the Pasha~~ to accept the fleet, and two hours later he arrived. The Nile steamer was sent to Ahmed Pasha with Sheriff, taking back Mehemet Ali's answer. The corvette returned at Alexandria. It may be observed here that a British frigate arrived at Alexandria the next day after the corvette, and just two days afterwards a French steamer belonging to the French fleet "Le Papou," I believe, brought to Alexandria the Dragoman Avia.

The Ottoman fleet arrived and Avduch says that the appearance of the Rhodanar was occasioned the lifting the blockade of the Ormanian fleet into the port and that it was said that the French Consul M. Cichet approved of it and that the English fleet would make an attack. This is hearsay reported by Avduch. It is not stated that French was known.

Captain Ford was so vexed by the circumstances, which it was evident Atwick might use, to take every means to bring the Confederates, and he succeeded in persuading them to escape the watchfulness of the Confederates; and Atwick fled away and came to Confederates. He was taken by Captain Ford to the Great Vicer who, after having been taken to the other, ordered Atwick to attend him in the evening, when he was seen by Atwick. Atwick has since called at Captain Ford's, and told Mrs. Ford that he wished to see the Captain, that he was perfectly content with the Confederates. Captain Ford has heard from Captain Walker, that Atwick was in the hands of the Confederates, and that the Great Vicer had given him a horse and money, which he received from Atwick. Atwick has been to bring the Confederates to Confederates.

I have, &c  
(Signed) THOMSON BY

In case of No. 100

Mr. Redhouse to Viscount Ponsonby

MR. REDHOUSE begs to present his respectful compliments to Lord Palmerston, and to inform him that he has just received a letter from Mr. Waghorn, of Alexandria. In a note to Mr. Redhouse, Mr. Waghorn states his opinion, that the Pasha of Egypt is softening, and that peace will soon be made, so that before the end of five months, Mehemet Ali and Hosrew will be reconciled, and at about the time Mr. Waghorn will bring his wife to spend a few days here, and see the place himself with her.

He says the French Admiral actually advised the ship that was taken, saying, "and a man to send to the French. How far the water is, it is considered on is another matter. It would, perhaps, be worth while to go down to see the person who took the French ship, and what was the cause of the trouble between the French and the Turkish vessels. And as for the thing I advised was that no communication should take place between the Turkish Fleet and the Americans, and that should be expressed at any rate that she should not be interfered with the determination taken by the Capitan Pasha of going over to Mehmet Ali.

No. 491

*Instructions from Count Nezelrode to Baron Brunnow.*—(Communicated by Baron Brunnow, December 29, 1839.)

(Private and Confidential.)

(Excerpt.)

### Definition

VOUS pouvez être convaincu d'avance que tout ce qui vous sera possible de voir dans l'œuvre du S<sup>er</sup> Ministre sera l'œuvre d'un homme et d'un homme de notre Auguste Maître. L'Angleterre paraît déterminée de renfermer la juu-

Mes, jusqu'à présent, l'Australie est pour moi et l'île n'a rien de moins positif sur les mesures qu'il s'agit d'appliquer contre le P. m. à l'Egypte, si ce n'est de rendre aux habitants de ce pays, si dévastés par les Puissances, la possibilité par l'organisation de la défense de la paix et de la sécurité. La situation de la région de la Méditerranée, si elle est si grave, nécessite des mesures d'exécution nécessaires pour parvenir au but que nous nous proposons en commun.

Vous m'annoncez d'une détermination si exacte notre Auguste Maître  
vient de m'arrêter. Sa Majesté le Roi a eu en son conseil la haute importance de  
conduire par lui-même les négociations de sa sainte cause et de  
de mettre ce principe à l'abri d'une équivoque pour l'avoir de nous dans  
les circonstances présentes et dans le futur. Sa Majesté le Roi a d'une  
courageuse et pleine confiance se confier à lui et s'est approprié personnellement une  
mission si importante. Il a voulu et a voulu que ce Roi, ce Roi de France et de  
des autres possessions qu'il a eues et les autres que L'Empereur a  
indigné. Il n'en a pas les autres, mais qu'il a eues, ainsi que dans la  
d'après ce qui est l'intérêt du Marquis de Courville. Il a été ainsi le  
determ. et le Roi de France et de l'Empereur qui ne peut dire adieu à son  
la diplomatie et qui lui serait assés. Il a été ainsi le Roi de France et de l'Empereur  
traitant ce point de vue que les autres d'un Auguste Maître et de l'Empereur  
notre et l'Empereur et de l'Empereur et de l'Empereur et de l'Empereur et de l'Empereur  
constater l'accept. et l'accept. et l'accept. et l'accept. et l'accept. et l'accept. et l'accept. et l'accept.

Je vous ai fait part des intentions de l'Empereur relativement à la situation des possessions Allemandes pendant les dix prochaines années. Il veut tout confier avec les Russes à la disposition de l'Empereur. Il sent qu'il est impossible de faire autrement, et qu'il faut profiter de la nécessité pour que les Russes ne puissent pas faire avec eux ce qu'ils se sentent en droit de leur en demander.

L'ar réciproité, Sa Majesté consent d'avance à la même disposition, si des vainqueurs Russes étaient appelés à recueillir l'héritage de l'Autriche sur les cotes de la Syrie, du Liban et de la Palestine.

Vous voudrez bien M. le Baron, ne pas perdre cet objet de vue, dans vos explications avec le Ministère Anglais.

*Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston.—Received December 25.*

Berlin December 14, 1939

[illegible]

I communicated to his Excellency the copy of Marshal Soult's answer of the 25th November, to your Lordship's despatch to Lord Grouchy. Baron Weyher considers that the observation is such that it is not to be taken into account in the conduct of the French Government, with respect to France and its interests.

At any rate, the result of Baron Brunnow's present mission to England is likely to do away with the objections raised in the latter part of Marshal Soult's despatch against the policy of Her Majesty's Government, where the Marshal says, that whilst England considered the Oriental crisis more as a territorial than an European Question, and whilst her attention was too much drawn to the respective positions of the Porte and the Viceroy, France on the contrary proposed to avail herself of that crisis for annulling the exclusive and dominant protection which Russia had begun to exercise over the Porte, or, at any rate, to prevent that exclusive protection from (in a manner) legitimizing itself. It will probably appear hereafter that France has neither been the only nor the most successful Power in preventing such a protectorate.

No. 423

No. 405.

Paris, December 28, 1839

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship a copy of the speech which His Majesty the King of the French delivered this day upon opening the Session of the Chambers.

Enclosure in No. 4971.

*Speech of His Majesty the King of the French at the opening of the Chambers,  
December 23, 1839.*

[illegible]

No. 454

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received December 20.)

Mr Lord,

Paris, December 23, 1899.

I HAVE the honour to inclose an extract from the "Eclaircissement de la Méditerranée," which is confirmatory of the answer I received from Marshal Soult, in reply to the question I put to him, by your Lordship's directions, respecting the number of French ships of the line in commission to the Mediterranean.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE



Inclosure in No. 494.

*Extract from the "Eclaircissement de la Méditerranée."*

L'ESCADRE de l'Amiral Lalande ne se composera plus que de six vaisseaux. Le trois ponts "le Montebello" est de nombre de ceux qui devaient opérer leur retour en France, mais on apprend au même jour que ce vaisseau reste dans le Levant. Au moment où le Gouvernement Anglais augmente son escadre de trois vaisseaux de plus, et donne ordre à l'Amiral Stopford de se maintenir en Orient, nous faisons rentrer une partie des nôtres.

M. le Vice-Amiral Ducaup de Rosamel, Commandant supérieur de l'escadre de réserve, n'est attendu à Toulon que dans la première quinzaine de janvier prochain. A cette époque, les vaisseaux de vent être réunis au port, savoir: les trois vaisseaux attendus du Levant, les deux de Brest, ensuite "le Neptune," "l'Alger" et "le Marengo," plus les deux frégates "la Belle-Poule" et "l'Amazone."

No. 493

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 26.)*

(No. 410.)

My Lord,

Paris, December 23, 1839.

THE attendance upon the ceremony of the presentation of the Chambers prevented my seeing Mr. Marchais yesterday. I had, however, a short interview with his Excellency before dinner, when he expressed to me his belief that I was satisfied with the French language of the speech which I had heard delivered by the King, and of which he had lost no time in transmitting to me a copy.

I answered, that the expressions respecting the advantages to both countries of the union between France and England, and the declaration in regard to its being the policy of the French Government to secure the preservation and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, could not but be most satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government, as it would be so that part of His Majesty's speech which was the most important. His Majesty took to the stability of the constitutional throne of Isabella and the pacification of Spain.

I have &c.  
Signed GRANVILLE.

No. 496.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 26.)*

(No. 316.)

My Lord,

Therapia, November 28, 1839.

DIRECTLY after receiving Mr. Redhouse's letter sent home to my despatch No. 115, and having last night seen Lord Ponsonby's letter from Reisch, I was informed of the presence of the British Admiral, and I added that he would report into the report that it was said to have passed what took place when the Ottoman fleet passed from the Dardanelles to Alexandria. I have now received his Excellency's answer as follows:—

"When he, Rechid Pasha, saw Admiral Lalande in the Archipelago, the Admiral told him that at his interview with the Capudan Pasha the latter said he was going with the fleet to Rhodes, and that, perhaps, he might go to Candia. That he, the Admiral, made no opposition to the project of the Capudan Pasha, for three reasons:—1. He had no instructions respecting an event entirely unforeseen. 2. That if he had instructions respecting an event entirely unforeseen, he would have been bound to oppose the project, he had not the force necessary to do so. 3. That the Pasha declared that he had no other object but to go to Rhodes, or at most to Candia. But it

appears," continues Rechid Pasha, "that from the report of the Dragoman of the Capudan Pasha, who has found means to embark by stealth at Alexandria, and is arrived here, that the Admiral Lalande had not spoken the truth to him (Rechid Pasha), for the Dragoman declares that Ahmed Pasha informed Admiral Lalande of his project to join the Egyptian fleet, and that Admiral Lalande approved the project, and that he encouraged its execution, saying, that when the two fleets should be united, the French fleet would join them, and then what could they have to fear?"

I report everything I have heard, and your Lordship will judge of it; but I wish to observe, that it is possible Admiral Lalande may have said what it is stated he did say, and have had in contemplation only the danger to which Ahmed Pasha asserted the Ottoman fleet was exposed of being given up by Hostens and Hala to the Russians. The Admiral may have approved of and encouraged the project of the Capudan Pasha to guard against that danger. It must, however, strike one that what the Admiral said to Rechid Pasha does not correspond with some expressions the Admiral makes use of, and which it is obvious that the Ottoman fleet was not in any perfect safety at Rhodes, where it might have been joined by the British fleet and the French squadron, and the danger, that is, put in way that the Russian fleet could not be reasonably supposed to have been in any danger for its preservation, and it is to be asked why Admiral Lalande resorted to that there should be no communication with the Admiral.

I do not say what crime may be due to Avidick, but Avidick knew that what he said was a gross fabrication to the British Ambassador, as well as to the Ottoman Ministers, and it is natural to suppose that he was aware of the glaring falsehood upon such a serious matter, and to expect that it would come to the knowledge of detection in it by the British who were charged with the duty of being long ignorant of such things as were serious to him, and to his people. It appears further, that Avidick was not content with his own story, as his voluntary return would have been sufficient to secure him against capture.

There are, I think, many things that give a strong appearance of truth to Avidick's statement, but I cannot feel that it is true of an honourable man like Admiral Lalande.

Why did the Capudan Pasha communicate with Admiral Lalande, and avoid the "Vanguard?" The Capudan Pasha had told (before) Captain Walker, that he would communicate with the "Vanguard."

I have, &c.  
Signed PONSONDY.

No. 497

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 26.)*

(No. 318.)

My Lord,

Therapia, November 30, 1839.

THE charge brought against Admiral Lalande, of a sort of complicity in the defection of the Capudan Pasha, appeared to me to demand close investigation, and I have not failed to use my best efforts to obtain the best materials to be submitted for your Lordship's judgment to act upon.

I inquired the opinion of the Intermunero as to the moral character of the Dragoman Avidick, upon whose veracity much depends, and his Excellency has replied as follows:—

"Avidick Schuan, Arménien de naissance, a servi pendant dix années comme secrétaire en qualité de premier interprète au Consulat Impérial d'Autriche à Smyrne, où il a constamment fait preuve de loyauté, d'intelligence et d'une probité irréprochable. Sa position extrêmement précaire, et le peu d'espoir qu'il avait d'être nommé employé effectif du Gouvernement Impérial, le décidèrent en 1836 à donner sa démission, et à venir dans cette capitale, où sur ma recommandation il fut admis au service de la Porte, comme Dragoman de l'Amirauté. Ses services zélés et fidèles, ainsi que ses manières insinuantes, lui valurent bientôt l'estime et la confiance du Capudan Pasha. Lorsque celui-ci

prit en dernier lieu la funeste résolution de se rendre auprès de Méhémet Ali. Avidick employa en vain toute sa rhétorique pour le faire renoncer à son coupable et sinistre dessein. Condamné plus tard à partager la captivité de la flotte Ottomane, et vivement pénétré de tout ce qu'il y avait de faux et d'atrocité dans sa position à Alexandrie, il commençait à être atteint d'une grave affection morale, lorsque le Capitaine Ford, une de ses anciennes connaissances, lui offrit les moyens de partir furtivement pour Constantinople. Dès son arrivée ici, il fut appelé chez le Grand Vizir, et avec beaucoup de hâte, et qui, sur la recommandation de Fethi Pacha, et ayant eu les rapports dans lesquels le seigneur Avonick avait été avec moi l'admit au fait de ce que Sa Majesté avec un traitement de 2,000 piastres par mois, et la promesse de lui assigner une maison pour sa famille. Le seigneur Avonick écrivait maintenant à un Rapport détaillé sur la défection de la flotte, qui est destiné pour le Grand Vizir. Dès qu'il sera achevé je vous en enverrai une copie."

Your Lordship will observe that his Excellency the Internuncio gives his testimony to thirteen years of good conduct, and shows his continued esteem and regard for Avidick.

I applied to Captain Walker, who furnished me with a report, which I enclose in original, and which corrects an error in the statement of Captain Ford, and corroborates some facts mentioned by Avidick.

I applied to Récid Pacha, and I enclose the report of his Excellency's reply. His Excellency has promised to send me the official report to be made to the Grand Vizir.

I regret to say that this affair of Admiral Lalande and the Capudan Pacha has been public from the first. Récid Pacha has been so private that he intends to send a copy of the Report of the Dragoman Avidick to M. de Pontoux, and will attack him on the subject of the conduct of Admiral Lalande.

It is said in Pera, that the Prince de Joinville hurried away upon hearing that the affair of Admiral Lalande was likely to become public, when he may have learnt from Smyrna, where Avidick was on his way here.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

#### Inclosure 1 in No. 497

#### Captain Walker to Viscount Ponsonby

My Lord,

Constantinople November 24, 1839

This account given by Avidick, Dragoman to the late Capudan Pacha, who was arrested from Alexandria, throws a great light upon the circumstances connected with the statement I have formerly the honor of forwarding to your Lordship, and I beg to state to your Lordship the particulars relative to the same, for although I was at the time unable to comprehend the statement, they appear to be well stated for the person's statement.

I was accompanied by the English ships, the morning, we were Bebek Bay, where appeared to have been a very sudden determination being done at the command of the fleet was given. The reason Avidick assumed for this is, that the Capudan Pacha, who should the reports he had received from Constantinople gave him cause to believe abandoned the fleet, for which purpose he hoisted his flag in the "Fevze," the fastest sailer, and a ship built by himself, with the intention of proceeding to Alexandria.

The next part of my statement I have to remark on, is that relative to the refusal of the Capudan Pacha to allow me to communicate with the "Vanguard," which change took place immediately after his interview with Admiral Lalande, though I had previously proposed to allow me to send letters on board for your Excellency, as was the case with Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, this is accounted for by Avidick, in the following way: that the French Admiral approved of his going to Alexandria with the fleet, but strongly advised him not to acquaint me with his intention, and on no account to allow me to communicate with the "Vanguard," which was then in sight.

I must here beg to point out an omission in the statement made by Captain Ford to your Lordship, in which the part relating to me has not been

noticed. I may also be allowed to point out another error, which is, that the *Kaya Bey* left the fleet in a Turkish corvette on the morning of the 7th the day previous to the French brig of war joining, which took place about noon on the 8th and not after the French commander had communicated, as stated by Captain Ford to your Lordship.

I can corroborate that part of Avidick's statement, relating to the French commander being accompanied by himself and Osman Bey, the Rear-Admiral, when he visited the *seigneur* in command, for I remarked to the Rear-Admiral on that occasion, that it was quite uncalled for, it not being customary to visit junior officers, with a fleet under weigh; this took place on the afternoon of the 8th.

The "Payon" French steamer, joined the Turkish fleet on the morning of the 11th and parted company the afternoon of the same day, having Avidick on board and returning to Alexandria on the 10th. I found that this person had been absent for some days.

I have now my Lord remarked upon all those points in my former statement, which bear upon the communication made by Avidick.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) J. W. WALKER, R.N.

#### Inclosure 2 in No. 497.

#### M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby

My Lord,

Therapia, ce 29 Novembre, 1839

J'AI déjà eu l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence, de la part de Son Excellence Récid Pacha, de ce qu'Avidick, le Dragoman du Capudan Ahmed Pacha, raconte de la conversation qui a eu lieu entre le Capudan Pacha et M. l'Amiral Lalande, lorsqu'ils se sont rencontrés sur mer.

Votre Excellence a été content avec raison de ce qu'elle venait d'apprendre et a conseillé Récid Pacha de bien s'assurer de la vérité du rapport qu'on lui a fait.

Son Excellence après avoir appris l'exactitude positive de Son Altesse le Capudan Ahmed Pacha, le Dragoman Avidick a raconté à Son Altesse, m'a chargé de vous en faire connaître les détails.

Le Flotte Ottomane et l'Escadre Française se sont rencontrés et se sont approchés l'un de l'autre pour aller à bord du vaisseau Amiral Français, pour voir le commandant. L'Amiral Lalande est arrivé à bord du vaisseau Amiral Ottoman. Avidick servait d'interprète dans la conversation qui eut lieu entre les deux Amiraux. Avidick raconte par son propre témoignage, de la mort du seigneur Malouin, et des événements qui ont suivi la suite de son départ de l'Egypte. L'Amiral Lalande approuve cette version et engage beaucoup le Capudan Pacha à mettre son témoignage à l'épreuve, en attendant que l'Escadre Française se joindrait aussi aux flottes Ottomanes et qu'on s'en serait assuré. Il en a grand besoin.

Récid Pacha m'a chargé de répéter mot à mot à votre Excellence, ces paroles du Dragoman.

Je suis, &c.,  
(Signed) FREDERIC PISANI.

#### No. 498

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston — Received December 26

No. 319)

My Lord,

Therapia, November 30, 1839

I HUPARD, yesterday, from Her Majesty's Consul at the Dardanelles, of the arrival of three British line of battle ships in Bebek Bay, where they cast anchor. The news had reached town early and rumors were made by some of



No. 459

*Viscount Parnsey to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received December 26.)

Therapies November 30 1839

I COMMUNICATED your Lordship's instructions No 14 to General  
Chrapowski, and I am happy to report that he will return, and that he is  
highly satisfied by the course our Lordship has taken  
and General will very soon be well as it may be responsible of  
prince to enquire for his knowledge and his presence. When I should  
not have asked of pulling him at once of an office and I have  
would have asked him, and I have not asked him to return to  
with your last instructions and I have not asked him to return  
Reverend Lord should have asked him to return to the service of Russia  
with a proposal of a new and revised which was established upon solid  
foundations of the success of the system of policy he has induced the Sultan  
and the Emperor.

from the seat of his power, and his distance from this capital.

No. 500

*Submitted Personally to Account Commissioner. (Received December 25.)*

Thorpia, November 20, 1839.

With reference to Match No. 309, I have to inform your Lordship, that I was directed by the Government to ascertain that if the Government of France would support the measures of Her Majesty's Government, be they what they might, for the settlement of Egyptian Affairs, provided there were a positive certainty that Austria would act fully and fairly in the

3. de Pontres has sought conversations with the General several times, and in one of them he distinctly stated that France was ready to unite with

I have General doubts, as I myself do, if M. de Pontoux has solid authority for saying what I have above reported, but however that may be, it is proper to acquaint your Lordship with it.

No. 501.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston, — (Received December 26.)*

Therapia, November 30, 1839

LAST night General Czerwinski had a long conversation with M. de Pantoja, who was on his house on a visit to me.

At Constantinople, on the 14th of May, 1854, the General the contents of a Note written by Count Nesselrode to the French Government, in the following effect:— "That as the Sultan had been notified, he must take the consequences, that the measures proposed by the Imperial Government could not be accepted; that the measures proposed by the French Government for the arrangement of affairs seem to be appropriate, but nevertheless the rights of the Sultan could not be abandoned; and that Russia would therefore reserve her freedom of action in consequence." He observed, in reply, that the concluding part of this Note was in contradiction to its commencement.

The General asked, what is the date of Count Nesselrode's Note? He replied, that he did not well recollect, but believed it was subsequent to the departure of Baron Brunow from London, adding, "the whole was written in an ambiguous manner, but in a very clever style."

M. de Pontonis next said, that the Russians had written to the Turkish Ministers that Count Modetz, at Paris, had informed the Russian Government that Murshid Soult has said to somebody, that the Ottoman Government had given consent to the entrance of the English and French fleets into the Sea of Marmora, that the Russian Government would not give entire credit to it, but they warned the Porte that they would never consent to the execution of such

M de Pontois then turned to the old project of the French, of which he had before spoken both to the General and to me, namely, that the Sultan should declare that he grants Egypt as an hereditary government to Mehemet Ali and his heirs, and Syria as a government for life<sup>o</sup>, reserving to the Sultan all his rights on the Holy Cities.

The General asked, what will be done if Mehemet Ali refuse to accept the grant? M de Pontois said, that Mehemet was a clever man, and would not refuse, for he will see that the Sultan "nous force la main," and will oblige us to abandon him (Mehemet), and to join the others in opposing him, if he should threaten the Sultan.

The next subject was Austria. M. de Ponton d'Audoubert said that the Austrian Government was the great cause of the difference of views between France and England. The Austrian Government told the English that it was right to attack the Turks and to demand the evacuation of the Balkans. But the French told them that they are right not to concern in the measures of coercion against Mehmet Ali, and declared, that not one Austrian soldier should be sent to aid in such measures.

The General observed, that it was necessary to await till the opinion of Prince Metternich could be fully known since his resumption of the reins of Government. He expressed but a great aversion to any great alteration in the views of Austria, because Prince Metternich, speaking very lately to a person (who was not named), said, "The best thing the Sultan can do is to make concessions to Mehemet Ali, and arrange the affair with him, but who shall propose this to the Sultan?—certainly not I."

M. de Ponton then said, "In our official correspondence we see that Rechid was sent to England to arrange a Treaty offensive and defensive between Turkey, France, and England. France is quite ready to accede to such a Treaty but now all trace of that transaction has disappeared. It appears to me that it would be advisable that Rechid renew the proposition."

The General replied, "You have just told me that the Russians complained to the Porte against a supposed consent given by Reşid Pasha to the admission

\* I wish to observe here that M. de Pontou did not speak of the succession of Syria being left to the children of V. Virent All. The General does not know whether this was the effect of damage or not.

of the French and English fleets into the Sea of Marmora, and it is impossible that such a step as that you now propose can be taken by Reclid without his having a positive certainty that his proposition will be instantly accepted by the French and English Governments.

M. de Lamoignon asked the General if he had read the report of Baron Bismarck to his Government of what took place in London. The General replied he had not.

I do not see any need for comments upon the matter contained in this Report. Your Lordship will easily detect the yellow clay under the plaster of Paris.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PUNSONBY

No. 502

Viscount Punsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 26)

No. 326.)

My Lord,

Therapia, December 1, 1839

I HAVE this moment received a Report from the Dragoman, of which I enclose an extract, thinking it important enough to be transmitted without delay to your Lordship.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PUNSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 502

M. Frederic Pissani to Viscount Punsonby.

(Extract.)

Péra, ce 1 Décembre, 1839

"Hier au soir, m'a dit Reclid Pacha, j'ai vu M. de Pontius au Serail, ou il est allé avec M. de Seray qui a eu son audience la nuit. J'ai dit à M. de Pontius que je vois clairement que la France a des motifs de Mécontentement. Je rends justice à l'Angleterre et à l'Autriche, ces deux Puissances défendent chaudement les intérêts de la Sublime Porte. La France tâche de nous engager à nous arranger directement avec Méhemet Ali, mais je vous déclare que la Porte est résolu de ne pas traiter avec Méhemet Ali d'un rectement avec lui, ne par l'intermédiaire d'une seule Puissance. La Porte veut traiter cette question avec le concours des cinq Grands Puissances. M. de Pontius a répondu que c'est une erreur. Je crains que la France veuille que la Porte s'arrange elle-même avec Méhemet Ali, et n'a pu dire à Pacha de lui envoyer ce matin M. Cor qui voulait parler sur cette affaire. M. de Pontius a dit cependant à M. Cor que la France ne voulait pas employer la force contre Méhemet Ali, parce qu'il est persuadé que la conséquence sera l'arrivée des Russes à Constantinople, que l'Autriche fera tout ce qu'elle pourra à propos qu'il soit fait. Mais l'Autriche qui est très-ami avec la France, ne veut pas que l'on emploie la force contre le Pacha d'Égypte. Si l'Autriche consent à employer la force, alors on peut l'employer sans aucun danger de la part de la Russie. L'Autriche s'est engagée à mettre d'accord la France et l'Angleterre, et la France devra se conformer aux propositions de l'Autriche.

Réclid Pacha considère l'opposition de l'Autriche à l'emploi de la force comme ayant pour but de ne pas heurter la Russie. Voici maintenant de quoi il s'agit: "La Porte desire savoir si elle doit nommer M. d'Internonce de ce qui s'est passé avec M. de Pontius?"

No. 503

Lord Beaule to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 26)

No. 161.)

My Lord,

Vienna, December 17, 1839

I HAVE this day shown to Prince Metternich, Marshal Soult's despatch, No. 64, to General Sebastian.

He considers it as a very weak production, the reasoning of which is imposed upon the Marshal by the necessities of his position.

Some time ago the Austrian Consul in Egypt reported that Colonel Campbell had notified to the Viceroy, that the occupation of the Yemen by the Egyptian troops regarded England alone, and that in cases wherein she had not to act with her Allies, her action was apt to be more prompt and decisive than where she was bound up in an alliance.

In reading Marshal Soult's reasoning about the Holy Cities, Prince Metternich says, "If I state to your Lordship, I have seen the British Consul at Constantinople, to push the evacuation of the Yemen, we should take from Méhemet Ali the only motive he has for continuing to hold them, they having no other value for him than as leading to the occupation of the more valuable district to the south of them. At the same time he begged me to remark to your Lordship, that of the three Holy Cities, Damascus and Jerusalem, if restored to the Sultan, would be accessible to pilgrims, but that Mecca could not be made so, unless by the consent of Méhemet Ali, as it is undoubted that he exercises a much greater controul over the Arab tribes than is possessed by the Porte; so that the forced restitution of Mecca to the Sultan against the will of the Pasha might become in its consequences a source of mortification to His Highness, and of future dissension between him and Méhemet Ali."

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 504

Lord Beaule to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 26)

(No. 162.)

My Lord,

Vienna, December 17, 1839

WITH reference to your Lordship's No. 149, I have to state, that the idea of giving the Pashalic of Tripoli to Méhemet Ali, in exchange for Syria, was suggested some time back in a report from Constantinople. Prince Metternich mentioned it to me at the time, as a plan which might possibly be made available in the course of the negotiations; and having to-day reverted to it in the same sense, I apprized him that it was not likely to meet the views of Her Majesty's Government, and requested him to express no opinion in its favour, without having come to a previous understanding with your Lordship. He will conform to this recommendation.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 505

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 28)

(No. 133.)

My Lord,

Berlin, December 21, 1839

YOUR Lordship's despatches to No. 169 inclusive, have been received at Her Majesty's Embassy.

In consequence of my temporary absence from St. Petersburg, Mr

6 Y





s'empêcher de lui insinuer dont j'étais sûr, sont pour laisser le Capoulan Pacha dans l'ignorance de ce qui se passait. Mais le Capoulan Pacha ne changea pas d'avis. Au contraire, il continua ses préparatifs de départ. Cependant, le 20 le Bey s'aperçut que les deux, et après qu'ils eurent parlé ensemble, ce fut le Capoulan Pacha qui déclara qu'il ne savait ce qu'il fallait faire, mais qu'il lui fallait songer à retourner à son pays pour attendre des nouvelles de Constantinople par le bateau qui venait de Smyrne et qui allait passer

Après cette rude épreuve, le Lapoulika l'aida jusqu'au cratère encore plus vivax. Les uns disaient que Horro Pacha avait une grande haine contre lui, les autres que le d'Almeida n'avait pas su se servir de son pouvoir, avait fait que s'il avait une journée de pouvoir dans sa vie, il en profiterait pour se venger d'Ahmed Pacha. Enfin, le Lefraya alla et qu'on n'était plus capable de se servir d'une machine à vapeur.

On décida d'envoyer le Moustechar Moubain Efendi à Constantinople pour annoncer qu'il y avait eu un attentat contre Mehmed, le sultan, et la mort du Sultan. Par ce moyen, l'Empereur espérait de l'écarter de son port, pour aller à terre et voir les troupes et les vaisseaux pour surveiller les équipages. On craignait beaucoup que Tahir Pacha ne reçût l'ordre de venir prendre le commandement de l'Escadre et de surveiller ses vaisseaux, pour empêcher qu'ils ne fussent surpris par les Anglais. On craignait aussi qu'il ne fût à terre, pour empêcher qu'il ne fût surpris par les Anglais. On craignait aussi qu'il ne fût à terre, pour empêcher qu'il ne fût surpris par les Anglais.

[illegible]

un résultat satisfaisant. Alors il me répondit qu'il n'était pas en état de redire, inquiet et préoccupé qu'il était, mais que vers une fin des Dardanelles il

et penseraient plus à loisir, que d'ailleurs le bateau qui avait paru du côté de Ténouze avait apaisé à ses appréhensions.

Dans cet intervalle il s'était écoulé plus de quatre heures, et le bateau n'arrivait pas encore. Alors on commença à soupçonner qu'il était caché derrière quelque roche pour continuer la nuit avec l'escafre. Trois heures après le coucher du soleil le principal en question vint passer tout près du vaisseau de l'Amiral et s'arrêta vers les Dardanelles. Le capitaine n'ayant pas pu se distinguer de quelle nation il appartenait, on passa la nuit dans la plus grande agitation et on attendait impatiemment le jour pour sortir des Dardanelles et se mettre en marche vers le point de destination, qui se trouvait être

neux et se mettre en mesure d'aller.  
A l'aube du jour on pensa que le bateau en question, qui se trouvait être un paquebot français, était venu des Dardanelles qu'il n'avait pu passer par le détroit. On se mit à courir le radeau chercher à lui et de demander s'il y avait eu des passagers ou des marchandises. Je n'avais rien vu et cependant on m'apporta une cambuse et j'avais vu à bord un grand nombre de personnes. Je m'enquis de leur destination. On me dit qu'ils étaient de la garnison de la ville de Tatar et qu'ils allaient à la prison. C'est la première fois que les Tartars ont été de Constantinople et ils ont été accueillis avec de la curiosité. Je les fis dans un échange et ils m'ont dit que le grand Amiral à qui ils ont leurs dépêches renfermant le nouveau décret de l'Empereur le Sultan Abdoul Medjid. Sur cela, tous les bâtimens français et les vaisseaux turcs et à peine les Tartars étaient-ils partis, qu'on leur a fait passer le décret de mettre à la voile et que le Capoulan Pacha passa avec toute sa suite au bord du "Feyz," qui est le meilleur voilier de toute l'escadre. On fit voile avec l'intention d'aller mouiller à Bezbikler (Beuca Bay) et de voir ensuite ce qu'il y avait à faire. Comme le commandant de la frégate M. Anastas Pacha (vice Amiral), en lui faisant peur de l'arrivée de Talur Pacha, il se conformait aux ordres du Grand-Amiral, et tous les autres faisaient la même chose sans trop savoir de quoi il s'agissait.

[illegible]

Faire à la fois tous les préparatifs à Bechibler où fut tenu un conseil entre le Grand Vizir, Mustapha-Pacha et le Rual Bey. Dans ce conseil il fut décidé : que si possible on se mettrait en communication avec l'escadre, on se le procurerait par un croiseur commandé par un capitaine d'environ 150 milles des Dar-Jamaleh pour observer les événements, et que, si cela devenait nécessaire, on se porterait en aide aux avant, c'est-à-dire en Egypte. Ayant approuvé cette résolution, par et par Capoussa-Pacha qui était avec nous jeter dans la mer que d'aller au lieu de combat au sud du Rual Bey, parce que probablement l'ennemi ne nous y verrait pas. Nous nous dirigeâmes vers le Capoussa-Pacha, et en sortant nous aperçûmes le Rual Bey de se soulever pour s'exposer à les chasser. Nous nous en allâmes sans nous arrêter. Le Capoussa-Pacha parut persuadé, et il nous dit : « Ne vous inquiétez pas, nous sommes en Egypte. Nous nous en irons à la fin de la guerre et nous verrons. » Il lui vint le Rual Bey et lui dit : « Vous savez que si nous étions à la mer, je vous qu'il a raison ; nous ne ferions pas de mal à personne. » Alors le Rual Bey nous répondit qu'avant de changer ainsi d'avis, il ne le ferait pas la tête, et qu'il était prêt à tout ce qu'il voudrait. En entendant ces mots je me levai et dis :

Il ritournait son oïd — le bey Bey — appeler et je me retournais la  
 au je trouvais son père le kaysa Isak Cher Aga, et le (colonel) les Reza.  
 Hassan Bey — les commencentent — et dit qu'il était impossible de changer de  
 projet parcequ'il n'avait pas d'autre chose à prendre, et que 'Tahir Pacha ne



pourrait tarder à venir prendre le commandement de l'escadre. Je leur signalai tous les inconvéniens auxquels ils s'exposaient et leur rappela le caractère faible et constant du Capoudan Pacha, ainsi que la finesse et la perfidie de Mehmet Ali. Ils paraurent un peu persuadés, mais après le coucher du soleil, le Rulia Bey son père et le Colonel Hassan Bey vinrent chez le Pacha et l'on décida, à ce jour, parait-il, de ne pas charger le projet principal. Après cela, le Pacha m'ordonna de passer avec mes effets à bord du Rulia Bey, ce que je fis avec quelque répugnance, craignant qu'il ne se vengeât de ce que je l'avais contraindit.

Le lendemain Vendredi l'escaadre fut à la voile. Le Rula Bey et moi nous remontares sur le pyroscaphe "L'Es et Har" pour aller à bord de l'Amiral Foulon qui venait du côté de Menta à la rencontre de l'escaadre. Nous nous avançâmes vers le vaisseau de l'Amiral l'attendant dans celui que nous eûmes en barque et vint à bord de notre bateau à vapeur au son jargne de Priet de Joinville, de l'Aide-de-camp de l'Amiral et de dix autres officiers.

[illegible]

Nous lui avons dit alors que nous craignons de rencontrer l'escadre Anglaise, mais que si cela arrivait, nous ne voulions pas lui dire toute la vérité, puis, l'Amiral a dit : « Vous avez raison, car c'est de laquelle l'Egypte acquerra une nouvelle force. L'Amiral Labouchère répondit : — "L'Angleterre est aujourd'hui assez unie avec la France, toutefois j'apprécie les raisons qui vous déterminent d'en agir ainsi." Il nous demanda après jusqu'où nous comptions aller, et ayant eu pour réponse que nous n'avions encore rien décidé, mais que probablement nous nous dirigerions sur l'île de Candie, il nous fit observer que cela ne lui paraissait pas prudent, parceque notre intention n'étant pas encore connue aux Egyptiens, nous pourrions trouver une mauvaise réception en y arrivant avec une escadre si forte. Nous énonçâmes alors l'idée d'aller à Rhodes, ce qui lui parut plus à propos. Nous le priâmes

ensuite de nous donner un de ses vaisseaux pour nous accompagner. Il nous répondit qu'il ne pouvait pas nous donner un vaisseau, parcequ'il aurait pu lui faire l'air de vouloir nous renforcer, mais qu'il nous adjoindrait le brick le "Bougainville," pour le cas où nous voudrions l'expédier avec des lettres, ou pour le cas d'une réponse à ce l'Escadre l'après-midi vers laquelle il s'avançait pour lui expliquer les intentions du Capoudan Pacha. Étant convenu de cela, le Riala Bey pria l'Amiral Lalande qui voulait voir le Capoudan Pacha, de ne pas lui parler de ces affaires à cause de son entourage. En effet, l'Amiral vint faire au Capoudan Pacha une visite qui fut très-courte, et pendant laquelle il parla presque exclusivement de feu Sultan Mahmoud.

A peine l'Atural était-il parti que nous mîmes à la voile. Arrivés dans les eaux de Rhodes, on décida d'envoyer le père du Rula Bey (Hadjî Chérif Aga) à Alexandrie avec une dépêche pour Méhemet Ali, et une autre pour Hadj Pacha. Avant de partir, le Capoudan Pacha m'appela pour que je lui fisse un adieu. Celle pour Méhemet Ali commençait par ces termes :

" Les mêmes individus qui depuis si longtemps excitaient le Sultan Mahmoud à la guerre contre Musulmans, ont commis en dernier lieu l'atrocité d'empoisonner notre Auguste Maître. Horrez Pachas s'est emparé du poids de Grand Vizir et Halil Pacha de celui de Séraskier. Moi, me trouvant hors de leur atteinte, je n'ai pas cru à propos de remettre les forces navales entre les mains de ces deux tyrans. C'est pourquoi j'ai écrit au Sultan de ne pas se laisser influencer par la religion qui se trouvent aujourd'hui à la merci de ces deux cruels perses. Le Sultan a répondu qu'il ne pouvait pas le faire, mais qu'il s'efforcerait de tout pour se débarrasser de ces deux tyrans. J'ai écrit au Sultan de me faire part de ma résolution à Hafiz Pacha, et j'attends vos dispositions pour venir à Alexandrie avec toute l'escadre."

Quand le Capitouan Pacha se fut observé au Capouan Pacha qu'il n'était pas possible d'aller à Alexandrie sans être vu, il se permit à ce sujet de lui dire qu'il ne pouvait pas aller à Alexandrie ou s'il n'était pas obéi par ses généraux et officiers qui pour tous étaient des cheus de Hossrev et de l'Etat. Pacha répondit qu'il n'était pas conduit l'escadre à Alexandrie; enfin, que dans ce cas Mehmed Ali ne pouvait pas faire marcher son fils sur Constantinople comme un espion, car alors la Russie enverrait des troupes dans cette Capitale, et par là Mehmed Ali serait la victime de toutes ses passions. L'autre répondit qu'il ne voudra pas accepter l'escadre pour ne pas se gêner de nouvelles difficultés au moment où l'Etat est en guerre. Pacha vint à ces affaires une tournure favorable. Le Capouan Pacha convaincu par ces arguments, voulut que cette lettre fût envoyée et qu'on n'en fût plus de rien dire. Ce qui se fit.

[illegible]





saquer le château ensuite il a changé de discours. Enfin, aujourd'hui tous, même au dernier moment de l'escorte, sont mécontents et profondément affligés, mais ils ne peuvent rien faire, car ils se trouvent comme en prison. J'ai même eu la dire à plusieurs officiers que lorsqu'ils étaient prisonniers en Russie ils étaient mieux qu'à Alexandrie, où ils sont condamnés à vivre sans argent sous un mauvais climat, &c., &c.

Quand il m'a abattu et souffrant de corps et d'esprit, je demandai à plusieurs reprises qu'on me laissât aller à Mada ou à Syra pour me reposer. N'ayant pu obtenir cette permission, je gardai l'occasion de m'évader, et fus enfin assez heureux pour trouver celui-ci, Capitaine Foru, qui me fournit les moyens de venir à Constantinople et de me placer de nouveau sous les glorieuses auspices de mon Souverain légitime.

No 507

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 30.)

No 411.

My Lord,

Paris, December 27, 1839.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to No. 410 inclusive.

I learn from Marshal Soult, that the despatches which arrived this morning from M. de Pontonis & M. Cochet contain no information of any importance.

No change had taken place in the situation of affairs either at Constantinople or Alexandria. M. de Pontonis states, that the influence of M. de Bligny still predominates at the former place, that Ruchoud seems well content with the present provisional state of things, and is not impatient to conclude peace.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No 508

Propositions made by Baron Brunnow for the Settlement of the Turco-Egyptian Question, January, 1840.

1. D<sup>ts</sup> déclarent que les Cabinets Alliés considérant que la situation actuelle des affaires entre la Sublime Porte Ottomane et Méhémet Ali Pacha, l'Egypte, menace de troubler la paix de l'Orient, et peut être par suite une éventualité qui entraînerait de graves complications pour l'Europe entière, et craignant en outre qu'ils ont formellement promis à la Porte Ottomane une assistance que celle-ci a acceptée, ont résolu d'arrêter entre eux les bases d'une pacification par laquelle cette assistance serait efficacement prêtée et l'indépendance ainsi que la sécurité de l'Empire Ottoman seraient mises à couvert du danger d'une agression à laquelle le Pacha d'Egypte pourrait se livrer de son côté.

Et être que les Cabinets Alliés, en se tenant sur les déterminations et les résolutions d'aujourd'hui, ont déclaré de la part du Sultan dans le but de faire cesser à l'avenir tout sujet de discussion et de mécontentement admettent en principe que la Sublime Porte accorde à Méhémet Ali Pacha la possession de la Syrie toute entière, avec le droit de transmettre à ses descendants l'administration de cette province, la Sublime Porte louant à Méhémet Ali Pacha et à ses successeurs les droits et les prérogatives dont la jouissance est actuellement au Pacha d'Egypte vassal de la Porte.

Les limites de la Syrie seront déterminées.

Méhémet Ali et ses successeurs s'obligent à reconnaître la Souveraineté du Sultan et à lui payer un tribut que la Porte percevra jusqu'ici du Pacha d'Egypte.

5°. Les Pachaïques de la Syrie, Damas, Alep, et autres, ainsi que le district d'Adana, de même que l'île de Candie, seront évacués par les troupes Egyptiennes.

enues, et immédiatement restituées à la Porte, qui continuera à les posséder en toute propriété comme de tout temps.

6°. La flotte Ottomane, actuellement dans le port d'Alexandrie sera immédiatement replacée sous l'autorité des propos. Turcs que le Sultan chargera de la recevoir et de la ramener à Constantinople avec ses équipages et tout le matériel y appartenant.

7°. Les dispositions ci-dessus, après avoir été préalablement communiquées à la Porte comme résultat de l'appui qui lui a été formellement promis par les Représentants des Cinq Cours, et après avoir obtenu l'adhésion du Sultan, seront mises à exécution par les Cabinets Alliés, lesquels se chargeront de notifier ces conditions à Méhémet Ali Pacha, en le sommant d'y souscrire.

8°. Si contre toute attente, Méhémet Ali refusait d'accepter les termes de cet arrangement, et si au lieu l'intention de soutenir des prétentions plus étendues, les Cours Alliées sont résolues de procéder à une série de mesures coercitives, spécialement destinées à vaincre la rébellion du Pacha d'Egypte et à lui imposer l'arrangement pacifique qui aura obtenu la sanction préalable du Sultan et que toutes les Puissances de l'Europe auront reconnu comme juste et comme irrévocable.

9°. En conséquence, les Cabinets Alliés procéderaient à l'emploi des mesures ci-dessus (ici suivrait l'indication des moyens d'action dont le Ministère Britannique a été le premier à nous suggérer le plan). En adoptant ces mesures on mettrait d'abord à exécution celles qui généralisent le moins le conflit, tout en agissant énergiquement sur les déterminations du Vice-Roi et détournant sa position sous le rapport politique et militaire.

A cet effet, on commencerait par diriger les Escadres Anglaise et Française dans la Baie d'Alexandrie pour y prendre une position et une attitude qui menaceraient Ibrahim Pacha dans son flanc, intercepteraient toutes ses communications par mer, et l'exposeraient au danger de voir éclater des troubles sérieux parmi les populations mécontentes qu'il retient à peine dans l'obéissance aujourd'hui, et qui se soulevaient à son pouvoir dès qu'elles auraient une chance de le faire impunément en se fondant sur l'appui des forces militaires de l'Alliance.

Si cette première démonstration était insuffisante, on procéderait à rétablir l'autorité du Sultan dans l'île de Candie, mesure qui ne manquerait point de réagir sur toutes les provinces soumises au Vice-Roi et y ébranlerait fortement son pouvoir.

Dans le cas où cette mesure ne parviendrait pas encore à vaincre la résistance de Méhémet Ali, il faudrait en venir au blocus des côtes de la Syrie et de l'Egypte, — démonstration qui imposerait amèrement au commerce Européen une certaine gêne, mais ne serait aussi que momentanée, parce que le Vice-Roi ne résisterait pas longtemps à l'emploi de moyens coercitifs qui paralysaient toutes ses ressources financières.

Je m'abstiens de ranger ici le rappel des Cours au nombre des mesures dont je ne permets pas de suggérer l'adoption, d'une part, parce que l'absence de ces agents diminuerait les moyens d'action morale que nous avons sur le Vice-Roi; de l'autre, parce que les espérances de ce dernier pourraient se fortifier de nouveau si les Cours de toutes les Puissances Européennes ne se trouvaient pas rappelées simultanément de leurs postes.

10°. Après avoir présenté dans leur ordre graduel les mesures coercitives qu'ils ont résolu de prendre, les Cabinets Alliés établiraient comme une éventualité possible la chance que Méhémet Ali, venant de rejeter le plan de pacification ci-dessus, recommencerait les hostilités contre l'Empire Ottoman, en faisant marcher ses troupes par l'Asie Mineure pour menacer Constantinople.

Dans ce cas, la Cour Impériale de Russie, invariablement résolue comme elle l'est d'aller au secours de son voisin et de ne point permettre que le trône du Sultan fût mis en péril par son vassal, s'engagerait à agir dans un but de conservation et au nom de l'Alliance Européenne, en consentant à la demande du Sultan, à envoyer sa flotte de la Mer Noire avec des troupes de débarquement pour défendre la capitale de l'Empire Ottoman contre l'agression de l'armée d'Egypte, pendant que de l'autre côté les flottes combinées des autres Puissances opéreraient sur les côtes de l'Egypte et de la Syrie pour forcer Méhémet Ali d'arrêter la marche de ses troupes. De plus, afin de mieux constater aux yeux de l'Europe entière l'intime et franche union qui s'est établie entre les Cours Alliées dans la poursuite du plan salutaire qu'elles ont adopté, il serait

expressément entendu, que pendant que la flotte et les troupes Russes seraient appelées dans le Bosphore, afin de pourvoir à la défense de Constantinople, l'Angleterre, la Grande-Bretagne, et la France, sur l'invitation qui leur en serait également adressée par la Porte, feraient entrer de leur côté chacune deux ou trois bâtimens de guerre dans la Mer de Marmora, où ces vaisseaux établiraient une croisière entre Gallipoli et le Golfe de Mondania pour empêcher toute entreprise des troupes Egyptiennes de ce côté-là.

11°. Il serait convenu que la présence des forces Russes dans le Bosphore, de même que celle des vaisseaux de guerre des autres Puissances dans la Mer de Marmora, cesserait aussitôt que le but de sûreté qu'ils avaient momentanément été appelés à atteindre, aurait été obtenu, et que le danger dont Constantinople aurait été menacé n'existerait plus.

12°. Il serait expressément entendu en outre, que l'admission des pavillons étrangers dans le Bosphore ainsi que dans la Mer de Marmora ne serait considérée que comme une mesure exceptionnelle, adoptée à la demande seule de la Porte elle-même et uniquement dans le but de sa défense; mais que cette mesure ne porterait pas la moindre atteinte au principe existant, en vertu duquel la Sublime Porte a toujours considéré le détroit des Dardanelles et celui du Bosphore comme devant rester fermés en temps de paix comme en temps de guerre aux vaisseaux de guerre de toutes les Puissances étrangères. Ce principe ayant invariablement servi de règle à l'Empire Ottoman de tout temps comme un droit inhérent à la souveraineté du Sultan, comme maître et gardien des deux détroits, les Cours Alliées, pour manifester le respect qu'elles portentent à la Sublime Porte, et en reconnaissance de sa réputation, s'engageraient à reconnaître aujourd'hui formellement la fermeture des détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore, et s'engageraient à considérer désormais la Mer de Marmora et la Mer Noire comme mers closes, en consacrant à jamais ce principe comme faisant partie du droit public Européen.

No 509.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

No. 3.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 3, 1840.

IN reply to your despatch, No. 407, of the 23rd December, 1839, inclosing an extract from the newspaper the "Eclaircisseur de la Méditerranée," relative to the amount of the French naval force in the Mediterranean, I have to observe to your Excellency, that the statement contained in that extract is vague, and can scarcely be taken as a contradiction to the enumeration of ships which I sent to you in my despatch, No. 394, of the 10th ultimo.

If the ships named in the list which I sent to your Excellency are not all to be commissioned, it would be very easy for the French Government to specify which of them are to continue to be laid up in ordinary.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No 510.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 5, 1840.)

No 329.)

My Lord,

Therapia, December 11, 1839.

I HAVE this day received a report from the Dragoman, which is as follows—

"His Excellency Reclud Pasha has charged me to thank your Lordship for the instructions of the 8th instant; and he has desired to have a translation of them. The Pasha also charges me to assure you, that the Sublime Porte is firm in the system it has adopted, and that there is no question of an accommodation with Mehemet Ali, direct or indirect, either under the auspices of

France or any other Power. The Pasha says, the Sublime Porte hopes for the best results from the perfect union that exists between England and Austria, and he says he will not take any steps for an arrangement with Mehemet Ali, without the concurrence of those two Powers. The Pasha added that Mehemet Ali has not recently made any communication to the Porte relating to the Egyptian Question.

It is above was said by Reclud Pasha last night.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No 511.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 3, 1840.)

(No. 330.)

M 12-1

Therapia, December 11, 1839.

THE Count de Kouschewsky has been so kind as to communicate to me a report from Alexandria, dated 1st of November, which has been received by the Dragoman from the Pasha, and which I think is very important. It says that the Pasha has been very much affected by the news of the death of the Emperor, and that he has been very much affected by the news of the death of the Emperor, and that he has been very much affected by the news of the death of the Emperor.

After having spoken of the effect produced upon Mehemet Ali, by his knowledge of the views and opinions amongst the Great Powers, Mehemet Ali has been very much affected by the news of the death of the Emperor.

Mehemet Ali has been very much affected by the news of the death of the Emperor, and that he has been very much affected by the news of the death of the Emperor.

L'essai d'exciter à la révolte les populations des provinces restées fidèles à Sa Hautesse a complètement échoué; l'armée d'Ibrahim Pacha se trouve paralysée par les rigueurs d'un climat auquel elle n'est point accoutumée, ainsi que par le manque de vivres et la difficulté de ses communications avec la Syrie. La présence de la Flotte Turque à Alexandrie, qui avait été regardée au premier abord comme un succès, est devenue un échec pour Mehemet Ali, qui manque de tout d'offrir des inquiétudes au Pacha, qui s'est vu obligé, pour calmer le peuple, de lui faire distribuer de l'argent.

Tandis que la position de Mehemet Ali devient de jour en jour plus difficile, celle de la Porte paraît s'améliorer, &c."

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 512.

Viscount Palmerston to Count Sebastiani.

Mon cher Comte,

Holland House, le 5 Janvier, 1840.

EN réfléchissant sur notre conversation d'hier, je pense que je n'ai vraiment pas le droit de donner au Gouvernement Français copies ou extraits de documents qui ne sont pas encore communiqués que confidentiellement. Mais puisque ce que vous désirez est de connaître les intentions du Gouvernement Anglais, je ne puis en peu de mots vous donner les renseignements que vous me demandez, et je pense que de cette manière je vous en donnerai plus que d'expliquer l'affaire à votre Gouvernement mieux et plus clairement qu'en vous envoyant les extraits dont il a été question hier.

7 B



En effet, la chose est de la plus grande simplicité: vous savez parfaitement de quel côté s'est passé entre le Gouverneur d'Alexandrie et le Baron de Brunnow au mois d'Octobre passé. Vous savez que l'Angleterre et la Russie se sont trouvées d'accord sur toutes les questions qui ont été discutées par rapport à l'Affaire Turco-Egyptienne, excepté seulement la distribution des rôles entre les Puissances Alliées pour la défense de Constantinople, dans le cas où Ibrahim Pacha pourrait marcher sur Broussa pour menacer Constantinople.

Le Baron de Brunnow nous a proposé un certain arrangement pour ce cas, nous lui en avons proposé un autre; ses instructions n'avaient pas prévu notre proposition, et il ne s'est pas cru autorisé à y accéder sans en référer à sa Cour.

Il est par conséquent à l'entière disposition de votre Excellence, et par ses instructions quel a reçu de sa Cour, il est maintenant revenu à Londres pour nous annoncer l'adhésion de l'Empereur à l'arrangement que nous lui avons proposé; et le Baron est aussi chargé de négocier dans le but d'amener une solution définitive et permanente de la Question Turco-Egyptienne, afin d'assurer l'indépendance et l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, et de mettre un terme aux dangers dont l'état existant des relations entre le Sultan et le Pacha, et la position militaire de ce dernier, menacent la paix de l'Europe.

Je n'ai pas pu encore communiquer au Cabinet la réponse du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, mais le Conseil se réunira demain et je leur ferai cette communication. Le Baron de Neumann est arrivé de Vienne, chargé, comme nous l'avons vu, de négocier avec l'Autriche, et par ses instructions quel a reçu de sa Cour, il est maintenant revenu à Londres pour nous annoncer l'adhésion de l'Empereur à l'arrangement que nous lui avons proposé; et le Baron est aussi chargé de négocier dans le but d'amener une solution définitive et permanente de la Question Turco-Egyptienne, afin d'assurer l'indépendance et l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, et de mettre un terme aux dangers dont l'état existant des relations entre le Sultan et le Pacha, et la position militaire de ce dernier, menacent la paix de l'Europe.

Agreez, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 513.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 6, 1840.)

No. 3.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, December 18, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches, Nos. 1 and 2, with inclosures, of the 3rd and the 14th of October.

Having left Trieste on the 1st of this month, I reached here on the evening of the 14th instant in the French steamer "Mentor." I landed in the barge of the Egyptian Admiral, which Her Majesty's Consul had procured for that purpose, and immediately proceeded to the residence of Colonel Campbell, who received me with great kindness and cordiality. Colonel Campbell immediately reported my arrival to his Excellency Boghos Bey, as well as to the Agents and Consuls-General of the different Foreign Powers resident at Alexandria; and I have been this day informed through Boghos Bey, that his Highness Mehmet Ali has fixed Saturday next, the 21st instant, as the day for my official reception.

I yesterday afternoon had the honour of waiting upon Boghos Bey, and experienced from him a warm and courteous reception. He assured me of Mehmet Ali's anxious desire to maintain the best understanding and the most friendly relations with Her Majesty's Government, and at the same time expressed his own readiness to be of any utility in furthering this end. In reply, I assured Boghos Bey, that nothing should be wanting on my part to promote the same object, and that it was the sincere desire of Her Majesty's

Government to bring to a favourable and equitable termination those differences that have unhappily existed between Mehmet Ali and the Sovereign of the Sultan.

Thus did my interview with Boghos Bey terminate, nor did I consider it judicious in my first conversation to enter more largely on the subject of your Lordship's instructions.

As Colonel Campbell continues in the discharge of those duties to which I am appointed, I shall not be able to communicate to your Lordship those political events that come under his notice until my formal assumption of the duties of Agent and Consul-General; and he has given me to understand that his intention is to return to England by the steamer that is expected to leave this place for Malta in January next.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 514.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 9, 1840.)

(No. 23.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, November 20, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of my despatch of this day's date to Viscount Ponsonby, together with extract of a letter from Mr. French Consul Gillet of Tarsous, under date October 31, the whole of which will put your Lordship in full possession of every thing of interest that has transpired within this Consular jurisdiction to this period, and mentioning your Lordship's notice.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 514.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord,

Aleppo, November 20, 1839.

I HAD the honour of addressing your Excellency under the 29th ultimo, per Austrian steamer, *via* Beyroul.

I now avail of the same channel to do myself the honour of communicating to your Lordship the little information since circulating within the jurisdiction of this Consulate, and worthy of your Lordship's notice.

M. Vincent Germain, the chief government architect of this Pashalic, who, I stated to your Excellency, on the 29th ultimo, was the architect of the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha's residence, has just completed the construction of a new residence for the Pasha, which will be very visible in the Aleppo River, which will be considerably raised. This statement as to the object of M. Germain's mission to Aleppo, and the result of his mission, is the subject of my communication to your Lordship.

The Egyptian forces within this district, and stationed on the northern frontier of Syria, have undergone but little change since my last communication to your Lordship.

The two Infantry Regiments that have been in garrison here, the 11th and 17th of the Line, left this on the 11th instant, said to be for Orfa, to change

quarters with the 9th and 14th stationed there; the cause given for this movement is, that as the two regiments of this place have their depôts here, and consequently their clothing for the winter season at the same place, it is necessary that the regiments of this place have not their depôts at a distance, at Falla, which place they visit in the summer season. Consequently to avoid expense and also loss of time it is better to send the clothing to the place where they are stationed here to perform garrison duty, where they may later receive their clothing.

that a change of opinion of these facts has never taken rise to a great many conjectures with the public, and as my reports are almost respecting the same. Some say that they proceed to Orel, and from thence are to be sent forward to Bialabak, where it is said, Magdon Bey commands, others at Orel. As our men are ordered to follow have the idea that these troops are sent to the place where at Orel they are to be met and sent on, and with a rally on the way to advance the direction of the march. But in respect to these latter cases, in the opinion of the people, is short of the road and to throw more weight on the side to the troops, but the first affair is from that side, and in the appearance of the fact, reports that are said to be on their way from Orel to us, are those that let us and which, since the first expedition generally believed, of the sudden change.

I shall vigilantly watch all these movements and see if any of these reports get confirmed, and immediately report to the proper authorities.

[illegible]

The subject of this paper is the study of the effect of the line of sight of the observer on the results of the measurements of the distance between two points. The results of the measurements are compared with the results of the measurements of the distance between two points by the method of the intersection of the lines of sight.

[illegible]

Although the various countries do not hold one advantage over any other, their main advantage is a common language, which is spoken in all of them. Despite

I have further to inform your Lordship, that a native merchant who has resided thus from Mufatia, states, that at Busneh, although the authority there is a Muezzin appointed by the Sultan's Seraskier, still the Egyptian irregulars, Bashi Bazuks and Anapalis, frequently advance on that line to that place, and obtain from the inhabitants what they required. Busneh is two days beyond Murnah, situated east.

This merchant further states, that while he was at Bunch, he heard say that the Executive Board had ordered the Chumash Regiment to leave from Ancho to a place called Summit, about twenty miles from Bunch and at a later date, he saw a box of tools that was there, they comprised a pair of saws, a set of 200,000 matches, 1 pair of boots, the same Commissioned man that was in the Adana District was, in the same manner, except the pair of boots mentioned. The boxes comprised a 4 tab and well as material change, comprised of four elements of Executive and two of Artillery.

Since the death of Mr. B. B. Jones, who held the post of Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Tientsin, my residence in that quarter have not been very different and the same holds good.

The French Consul at Cairo is a however braked in order the 21st of October, to give me some advice on the position of the Egyptian troops in that district. I extend it which I owe the honor to these interests for your Lordship's information.

The last advices I have received from Alexandretta are under the 16th

The Governor of that State, Rashuman Effendi, had received orders to get brought down immediately from the mountains, the following quantity of timber 1,700 trees, part of which had

already arrived on the beach, and had begun to be shipped, to be conveyed from there to Acre, for the Artillery service there.

The disaffected in the direction of Byass had, not of late, and since the force sent against them, evinced any further symptoms against the Government which was vigorously exacted from all classes of the population the taxes, and I am told in many instances particularly the lower order, taken in two-fold,

This measure, my Lord, is being in a similar manner exercised both here, at Auzopo, and throughout this district generally; which, in consequence of the rigorous steps pursued and in many instances with force has of late caused general discontent among all the population, among the lower classes of the Indian tribe this measure is greatly felt, and causes great oppression, to such an extent that many are said not to be able to stand against it.

I beg to inclose for your Lordship's information an extract of Mr Vice Consul E. A. S. Jern's under date Latakia 31st October, which will fully acquaint your Lordship with the measures pursued by this Government, in exacting the taxes and the consequences arising therefrom.

I am sorry I have no confidential or interesting advices to offer to your Lordship respecting the Sultan's Semakur dahlan. Pasha's movements, beyond that his Excellency was a short time back at Malacca, with about 20,000 men and forty pieces of Artillery, but his advices received here in town, I fear, had been mixed with but little to be trusted.

From the arrival there K... I also saw that Hadj. Ali Pasha of that place was here, but expected soon to be replaced by a person whose name was ... It was reported that the new Pasha of that district was to bring with him a force of about 2000 men. The ... men say, to be composed of four ... .. two of the ... and about thirty pieces of Artillery.

And I shall be glad to personally convey to your Lordship any letter  
which you may wish to be transmitted.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY

Inclosure 2 in No. 514

Mr. French Consul Gallet to Mr. Pro-Consul Merry.

(Extract.)

Toronto, le 21 Octobre, 1839

C'EST avec bien de plaisir, Monsieur, que je viens satisfaire à votre demande pour avoir des nouvelles politiques sur cette province; mais elles sont bien insignifiantes.

Il y a deux mois que le corps d'armée qui était dans cette province pouvait s'élever à 20,000 hommes, le corps armé n'en comptait que 20,000; plusieurs régimens formant cette différence ont été envoyés à Antioche, A. , Hama et Lattaquié, parce que cette province ne pouvait autrement pas nourrir autant de monde, ni près de 10,000 chevaux de cavalerie qui s'y trouvaient.

Maintenant voici l'énumération des régimens qui s'y trouvent sous les ordres directs d'Achmet Meneck à Pachal.

Trois régiments d'Infanterie avec un Général de Brigade, quatre régiments de Cavalerie avec deux Généraux de Brigade, un régiment d'Artillerie à cheval, avec son Colonel, et deux batteries d'Artillerie à pied.

Toutes les troupes sont encore campées aux environs de Adana, à l'exception d'un régiment de Cavalerie qui est ici.

En outre, il y a aussi 1 500 Artilleurs réguliers aux batteries de Koulik Boghez, et 700 à 800 d'ingénieurs.

Un bataillon de Baltagi dans ce même lieu et aussi des troupes de Gênes et enfin des troupes irrégulières, Cavalerie et Infanterie, réparties sur toutes les provinces, qui, avec les troupes ci-dessus, forment le total général de 20,000 hommes.

Il n'y a nul doute que tout ce corps d'armée ne passe son quartier d'hiver dans la province.



Le long de cette frontière, depuis la mer jusqu'à Marache, on pourrait dire qu'il n'y a personne car il n'y a que quelques troupes réparties sur les points ou passages qu'on a voulu fortifier et qu'il y a encore quelques canons.

Inclosure 3 in No. 514.

*Extract of Mr. Vice-Consul Eliot's Journal, dated Latakia, October 31, 1839.*

L'ORDINE è l'istesso per la riscossione dei denari del territorio di Latakia continuata a fare tutti d'istesso, e di più il Generale Selim Bey ebbe l'ordine di mandare in persona con l'occasione delle truppe del reggimento, e mandare quegli Ufficiali per altri luoghi, e così sono sparsi in tutti i cantoni.

Il Campo del Nudur è sempre trasportato d'una provincia all'altra facendo pagare tutto a forza di bastone, ma gli abitanti sono già scarsi di moneta e non possono soddisfare a loro debiti, avendo venduto i loro grani, orzo, bovi, montoni, buitero, &c. &c., a vil prezzo, ed anche s'imprestano sempre della moneta a 4. 5. p. c. al mese, ed altri hanno preso a 35. 40. p. c. per otto mesi o sia alla raccolta del tabacco per prendere questo genere al prezzo che sarà fissato dai negozianti, e non si vede altro che gente girare in città cercando che li da moneta col cambio, e molti del paese hanno guadagnato bene in questa circostanza.

## No. 315.

*Mr. Consul Young to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 9, 1840)*

(No. 39.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, November 25, 1839

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship, that the state of this part of the country is daily becoming more unsettled. The Fellahs are assuming a very determined position against the Government, and their attitude towards the authorities is materially changed. The severe measures that have lately been pursued to obtain money, have caused whole villages to be abandoned, and many of the Sheiks have sent word to the Governor in my district, to say that they consider themselves no longer responsible to the Pasha. Unless some steps are taken by the Government, the whole of this part of the country will be in a state of open revolt. Helwan has formally declared itself independent; and a messenger sent last week by the Governor of Jerusalem on some business there, was ordered to return without delivering his message.

Sheik Abdurrahman Azzam continues to increase the number of his followers.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) W. T. YOUNG.

## No. 514.

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 9, 1840.)

(No. 17.)

(Extract.)

*Dumastia*, November 28, 1839.

THE affairs in the Haouran and Agloun districts have been settled since the date of my last despatch. His Excellency Sherif Pasha and Ismael Bey are returned here, with the regular forces employed on that service.

All the taxes and imposts due in those districts have been rigorously collected, and the same is being carried on in excess in the Damascus district, and I hear also in every part of Syria. His Highness Ibrahim Pasha orders, by his Excellency Sheriff Fasha and I, Ibrahim Bey, are

said to be very severe, menacing that in case the taxes are not collected by the end of Ramadan in their respective districts, they will be charged with the deficiency and have to pay it up from their private purses. It is stated that these funds are destined wholly for the payment of the army. There is at present about 5,000 porses in the treasury here, but I believe a great part of the total amount being collected in Syria, will be required for Egypt, as I understand the income collected during the month is chiefly sent to the seat of the Government in that country though we want for the expenditure in Syria an almost as important and urgent nature; and it may be also that these funds will not be employed, until the Egyptian Government decides whether, or not, they may be required to forward offensive operations on the northern frontier. The 18th Regiment Infantry has been paid within these three days; it is said the irregulars are also to be paid in a few days. 2,000 porses have been sent the last week to his Highness Ibrahim Pasha. 1,000 porses are reserved for the Pilgrim Mecca Caravan. Orders have been issued to collect the Caratch due three months hence, in Mohazem, for the year 1256. Many of the Cluefs in the different quarters of this city, appointed and charged by the Government to collect the Ferdeh tax, fail and become bankrupts, the deficit is again charged to and collected from the inhabitants; the Government appears to be in a very difficult position. It seems to be the object of the Government that, whatever may be decided on, as regards the future possession of this country, or any other eventual circumstance occurring, no taxes shall remain to be collected.

I hear that the French Soliman Pasha, who has been on an expedition at Acre, is expected here on his way to Aleppo. Part of a regular Cavalry, employed on the Latakia service, has been sent to Acre. The Infantry and Artillery employed in the same service are here for the present. But a small contingent of men that is to stay at the frontier fronting at Marash and the two salt lakes. His Highness Ibrahim Pasha, by report, however, from his son, Saad Pasha was at Marash. I recollect on some rigorous practices in the Desert, and the Syrians have been employed to collect taxes on the newly occupied lands, including Akko and the Artah salt lake, on the Orta Suurk and Chirak salt lake, a large radius of country on the ranges of mountains on the frontier, and a fourth way by the coast, paying taxes as due several years, on the plea that they have never been subject to or paid taxes to the Sultan's Government.

The Emir Bechir has sent a detachment of 4000 men, the Emir Mehemmed with a force to reduce the Mutah Chief, Sheik Shebib, who, with about 500 men, is continuing to infest the roads between Acre, Soor, Tyre and Sidon. This Sheik has been joined with other Mutahs from the debris of the force of the late Emir Gawad, some of which have shown themselves on the Balbec line, against which a force has also been sent by the Emir Bechir, but I believe the whole of that affair will very soon terminate in the pacification, or in the destruction, of these brigands.

The new French Consul, the Count de Rattimenton, is arrived at his post here. I find he visited Solyman Pasha at Sidon, he says, to ascertain from Solyman Pasha the position now of the French in that country, for the interests of French subjects in his Consular district are to be addressed to him and to his adjoint M. Lapi, which seems to be in opposition, not only to his own opinions on this subject, but also to that of the French Government and of the Consul-General at Alexandria. His visit also to the Emir Bechir, denotes the desire of the French Government, that their Damascus Consul should be on terms of advantageous footing with the quasi Independent Prince of Lebanon. The Count de Rattimenton was previously employed at Tiflis, and I learn from him that he was actively engaged in transmitting reports to the French Government on the state of Georgia, both as to its political and commercial relations, and on the governing of that country by Russia. I also hear that the Prince de Joinville is expected to visit Damascus, it is said, early in the spring. These circumstances show that the French Government aims at increasing its influence in these countries, and that at a moment when its actual political position is uncertain, to derive any advantage which its consequent prospects may permit. The French Consul seems in his predilections and views to be much opposed to the policy of the Russian Government in the











(No. 337)

My Lord,

Therapies, December 18, 1839.

M. DE PONTOIS having spoken to Reisch Pasha, and to other persons, of a letter he had received from M. de St. Aulaire at Vienna, I took measures to inform myself on the subject, and I report a part of M. de St. Aulaire's letter.

M. de St. Aulaire writes, that the Prince Metternich thought the end aimed at by the British Government is just, but he did not approve of the means proposed for attaining it; and on the 20th of November, the Prince sent propositions of his own to London, to Paris, and, as M. de St. Aulaire supposes, to St. Petersburg also.

The propositions sent by the Prince are:—

1. That Mehemet Ali be allowed to treat with the Sublime Porte, and that it be notified to Mehemet Ali that the Great Powers will not recognize any arrangement he shall make unless his terms be moderate.

2. If Mehemet Ali should violate the existing *status quo*, and threaten the Porte, measures of coercion shall be employed against him by the Great Powers.

Upon these propositions the observation of M. de St. Aulaire is, "Vous voyez que le moyen n'est pas héroïque."

M. de Pontas told an acquaintance of mine, that when he talked over the state of affairs with Rechid Pasha, the latter said, "If the Great Powers will do nothing for us, the Porte must throw itself into the arms of the Russians." I hear that if Prince Metternich's propositions be adopted, it is necessary to bring about what was mentioned by Rechid Pasha.

I have, &c  
signed **PUNSONBY**

No. 345

*Lord Beaconsfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 14.)*

204

My Lord,

Vienna, January 5, 1840

PRINCE METTERNICH has written to Berlin, to decide the Prussian Government to take part in the arrangement about to be concluded in London, for the settlement of the Turco-Egyptian Question. I need give your Lordship no account of the contents of the Prince's despatches, as they are sent to London to be communicated.

I have &c  
Signed \_\_\_\_\_ REV. J. VALE

No. 523

Viscount Palmerston to Sir George Hamilton.

No. 34

514

Foreign Office, January 14, 1840.

I HAVE to instruct you to invite the Prussian Government to give full powers to Baron Werther, the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires, to negotiate with the Representatives of the British, Austrian, Russian, and French Governments. I have also to instruct you to inform the Prussian Government that we are willing to negotiate, and to conclude a Convention between the negotiating Powers, or between them and the Porte, for the purpose of arriving at a final

I inclose, for your information, a copy of a despatch which I have received this morning from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, stating that Prince Metternich has urged the Prussian Government to take part in the proposed negotiation.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 529.

*Lord Beaconsfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 14.)*

(No. 5, Confidential.)

My Lord,

Вісник, Жовтень 5, 1840.

THE same application which has been made through Lord Ponsonby for the guarantee by England of a loan of two millions sterling to the Porte, has also been made through the Intendant to the Austrian Government: Prince Metternich has, in consequence, spoken to me upon the subject. He conceives that a refusal would be detrimental both to the interests of the Porte and to our own; that the Porte would thereby be abandoned to the extravagant demands of the bankers, and her reforms crippled by the insufficient amount of the assistance she could obtain from them, while her confidence in the friendly intentions of the Christian Powers would be shaken, and their salutary influence lowered at Constantinople. At the same time, the guarantee if given by a single Power, or by two out of the Five, would throw into their hands such a powerful weapon as might be fatal to the rest of Europe. The first of these evils would be avoided, according to Prince Metternich's opinion, by a serious evil, and is only to be averted by dividing the guarantee equally between them. Austria will not originate the proposition; but if it is proposed to her to take part with the other four Powers, or even with three of them, in such a guarantee, it may be expected that she will not withhold her assent.

Count Fiquelmont has observed to me, that Russia, in pursuance of her system of averting all intimate relations between the other European Powers and the Porte, will probably attempt to throw cold water on the proposition, but she could hardly permit in this opposition, if England and Austria should agree. Prussia may be expected to follow Austria, so that the success or failure of the cause will apparently rest upon the decision of Her Majesty's Government.

I have &  
 Signed BEAUVALE

No. 530.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville

No. 19, Confidential.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 14, 1840.

I HEREBY transmit to your Excellency, for your information, a copy of a dispatch which has been received from His Majesty's Consul at Marseilles, enclosing a report respecting the naval preparations in the Arsenal at Toulon.

Signed) I am, &c.,  
PALMERSTON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 530.

*Mr. Consul Turnbull to J. Backhouse, Esq. — (Received January 7, 1840.)*

(No. 30, Confidential.)

*British Consulate, Marseilles,  
December 31, 1839.*

Sir,

IT was only this afternoon that I had the honour of receiving your confidential despatch, dated 29th November last, conveying to me the instructions of Viscount Palmerston, that I should procure certain information therein specified respecting the movements in the Arsenal at Toulon, and that I should transmit the same to you by a sure channel.

I regret that so much delay should have occurred in this despatch reaching me, as it has prevented me from attending sooner to these instructions. I am, at the same time, happy to be able to remedy it in some measure by having it in my power to transmit to you at once, without further delay, all the information required by his Lordship, and which you will find in the Note that I have the honour of enclosing herewith, and on the accuracy of which, in every essential particular, I have every reason to believe, that his Lordship may fully depend. I have not yet received any other news from Toulon, and I shall, on my return, make to you any further report, as may appear to me to be necessary.

I have been anxious to prepare this Note without any loss of time, in order to comply with the expectation of the arrival of the mail from Malta, and who will be the bearer of this despatch.

The messenger will also be the bearer of a private communication which I made to you under the date of yesterday, on this same subject, anticipating in great measure the present instructions of Viscount Palmerston.

I have, &amp;c.,

(Signed) ALEX. TURNBULL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 530.

*Note of the Ships of the Line and Frigates building in the Arsenal at Toulon, of those lying in Ordinary and of those fitting out for service, in the Roads, on 31st December, 1839.*

## SHIPS ON THE STOCKS

		Keel laid down
Fleurus	100 guns	April 1825
Edouard	92	May 1827

These vessels remain as they have been for many years past, at the degree of 22-24 in their building, and are as far advanced as is necessary previous to the intention of launching them.

Navarin	100 guns	May 1832
Isle	80	June 1833
Isidor	90	November 1835
Castiglione	20	November 1835
Sceptre	20	December 1835

These ships are all advanced as far as one-half of their building, and the three first more so. They are all in the dock, and have their two masts and their gangways. Owing to the great occupation of the workmen in the dockyard in fitting out ships, no shipwrights have been employed on these vessels for some time.

Poursuivante	52 guns	May 1827
Zephyre	52	April 1829
Synole	52	June 1829

These ships have remained in their present state for many years past, being as far advanced as is necessary until it is intended to launch them.

## SHIPS LYING UP IN ORDINARY

## Ships of the Line.

Algebras	90 guns	Requires a thorough repair
Nestor	80	Requires repair
Couronne	80	In good condition.

## Frigates

Palas	60 guns	Requires repair
Independante	50	In good condition.
Messidor	60	
Uranie	60	
Belise	46	Requires repair.
Aurere	46	Ditto
Proserpine	46	
Victoire	40	Requires slight repair.

## SHIPS FITTING OUT

Souverain	110 guns	More or less advanced, but will be all ready for sea by the Spring.
Argus	80	
Mirango	80	
Saphir	80	

*Ships attached to the Toulon Squadron, but temporarily employed in conveying Troops to Africa.*

Neptune	80 guns	Recently fitted out at Brest.
Aster	80	Ditto at Toulon.
Amazon	52	

## Ships lying in the Roads

Teton	80 guns	Recently arrived from the Levant and under quarantine
Belin Poite	60	

## Ships expected from the north-west Ports of France

Océan	120 guns	Recently fitted out at Brest.
Suffren	90	Recently repaired at ditto.

These two ships must be now on their voyage to Toulon, but will probably be sent previously to Port Vendre, to take troops to Africa from thence.

Inflexible	90 guns	Fitting out at Rochefort, and presumed to be destined for the Mediterranean
------------	---------	---

## Ships of the Line forming the Squadron in the Levant

Montebello	120 guns	Part of this squadron is expected to be detached to join the squadron of reserve at Toulon, under Admiral Rosamel
Jura	110	
Hercules	100	
St. Peter	86	
Diademe	80	
Jupiter	80	
Trident	80	
Géogreux	80	

There are no frigates in the Levant





that effect, but that as I had confidentially communicated your Lordship's No. 548 to Earl Granville, his Excellency might, with the same confidence, be made acquainted with the French answer; Count Nesselrode observed that as yet they were not officially acquainted with this document, but he knew it so far that it would be incumbent on him to answer it. Mr. Bloomfield then said that he could easily understand what prompted this feeling, and read to his Excellency the part on the last page but one, beginning, "Nous nous sommes proposés avant tout de faire sortir de la crise actuelle," to the end.

Count Nesselrode showed considerable excitement at this passage, observing that it was not likely that Russia at last of Mr. Bloomfield in what manner he thought he should reply to it when once it reached him officially. Mr. Bloomfield's impression is, that Count Nesselrode wished to be guided by your Lordship's opinion on the subject, and with a view to gaining time, observed, that his Excellency might have further light thrown on the subject in a few days, and that as he had not received any official communication of the despatch, nothing need yet be done; that he, therefore, withheld it, assuring him that the British Government would anxiously avoid becoming the cause of any misunderstanding between two of the Powers interested in the settlement of the Eastern Question, and, finally, that he had brought the paper to his Excellency as a mere matter of information.

Count Nesselrode here observed, that M. de Barante had never alluded to the subject with him, but that as the despatch would reach him shortly from Vienna or Berlin, he would, in the meantime, think over the best mode of answering the allusions to the domineering protectorate of Russia over the Porte.

Mr. Bloomfield mentioned to Count Nesselrode, that Marshal Soult is displeased with Lord Ponsonby's support of the pretensions of the Porte, and inquired whether matters remained the same at Constantinople, hoping that M. de Bouténil had not been urging the Porte to yield. To which his Excellency merely replied "no," and changed the subject as if desirous not to be pressed upon it.

Count Nesselrode appeared anxious for the arrival of Baron Brunnow's report of his first interview with your Lordship, thinking you would probably have had some conversation with him on Marshal Soult's answer, which subject seems for the moment to engross the whole of his Excellency's attention.

Mr. Bloomfield then observed that good could only result from his mission; and that, by the late French communication, we had at all events gained a point, as Marshal Soult had now bound his Government, if not to assist at least not to impede our operations in removing the difficulties with which the Eastern Question is surrounded.

Mr. Bloomfield inquired how the French Government had learnt the readiness of M. de Barante to give up Adana. Count Nesselrode explained that France had pressed the point at Alexandria, without confiding her intention to the other Powers.

Mr. Bloomfield took the opportunity to read to Count Nesselrode Lord Beaconsfield's letter to Colonel Hildes, on leaving Vienna, and your Lordship's No. 548 and Hildes' (both of which documents his Excellency commented upon, alluding to the enormous quantity of sentiment which prevailed between the Powers, and the fact that where a new war would be settled but for France, and the unfair support given by her to the pretensions of Mehmet Ali, adding that if there were a popular movement at Constantinople, nobody could calculate the consequences.

M. de Barante appears to have been very reserved towards Count Nesselrode. He has however, in his interview with Marshal Soult's despatch generally to the Foreign Ministers, characterizing it as a dispassionate and conciliatory reply.

The effect on Count Nesselrode is to create a still wider breach between Russia and France, and to improve our position with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) CLANRICARDE

P.S.—I shall reach St. Petersburg on Saturday, 4th, and shall see Count Nesselrode on Monday; and I shall persuade his Excellency to take no step in reference to Marshal Soult's despatch, which might dispose the French Government, if at present so inclined, to unite herself to the other Great Powers in the pacification and permanent settlement of Turkey.

No. 533.

*The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 15.)*

(No. 2. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Engelhardtshof, January 2, 1840.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1, I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that Mr. Bloomfield had a subsequent conversation with Count Nesselrode on the 29th of December, when his Excellency begged he would let him have Marshal Soult's despatch.

Mr. Bloomfield writes me word that he has complied with Count Nesselrode's request, but that he deemed the communication should be considered as a private one, made without any instructions from Her Majesty's Government.

Count Nesselrode assured Mr. Bloomfield that he did not intend at the present moment to make any remarks on the subject to the French Government; that M. de Barante had never mentioned it to him; and further, that in any explanation that might hereafter be required, he should take care that the communication did not appear as having reached him through British Agency.

I have the honour to inclose a copy of the letter with which Mr. Bloomfield accompanied the transmission of Marshal Soult's despatch to Count Nesselrode, and of his Excellency's reply in returning it to him.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) CLANRICARDE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 533

*Mr. Bloomfield to Count Nesselrode*

Monsieur le Comte,

*St. Pétersbourg, le 11 Décembre, 1839*

D'APRES le désir que votre Excellence vient d'exprimer de voir la dépêche du Maréchal Soult, je m'empresse d'en transmettre confidentiellement la copie ci-jointe.

J'ai l'honneur de prier votre Excellence de vouloir bien regarder cette communication comme particulière et faite sans instruction de mon Gouvernement.

Je suis, &c.,  
(Signé) J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD

Inclosure 2 in No. 533.

*Count Nesselrode to Mr. Bloomfield.*

*St. Pétersbourg, le 11 Décembre, 1839*

J'AI l'honneur de vous restituer, Monsieur, la dépêche du Maréchal Soult, et de vous offrir mes remerciements pour une communication que je regarderai comme strictement confidentielle.

Recevez, &c.,  
(Signé) NESSELRODE.



Inclosure 3 in No. 533.

*Mr. Bloomfield to the Marquess of Clanricarde.*

(Private.)

Dear Lord Clanricarde,

St. Petersburg, December 29, 1839.

THE messenger Johnson arrived on the morning of the 25th, and according to your desire I have prepared a despatch in his signature, which contains the narrative of my last interview with Nesselrode. I have scarcely anything to add privately.

I found his Excellency very much annoyed at that part of Marshal Soult's despatch which intimated the protestation exercised by Russia over the Porte, and evidently wishing to draw opinions from me on which he could ground an answer. I tried to make it clear that he was not to make any case with me in repelling the insinuation, or, at all events, to drag us along with Russia in hopes of a change in French policy that already separates France and England. It will not be easy for Count Nesselrode to answer the part that offends him and his Eastern policy, though at present he talks very big.

He will not do anything, however, until he gets the first despatch from Baron Brunnov, and in the mean time, our position between the two is admirable, and must turn to good account.

I agree with Count Nesselrode in thinking M. de Barante will not communicate the French answer, and presume the copy, or knowledge of its contents, must have been intercepted through the Russian messenger.

My communication of the French despatch is considered *non-secum*, for seeing the humour Count Nesselrode was in, I carefully avoided being the organ of communication, in order that France might not throw it out as an intrigue on our part against her. We could gain nothing by another course, for it is clear that France enjoys as little favour here as her worst enemies can wish.

Count Nesselrode's answer about M. de Bouteneff's urging the Sultan to yield, was positive in words only, certainly not in manner.

December 30.

Since writing the foregoing, I have seen Count Nesselrode, and you will perceive that I have detailed the subject of my conversation with his Excellency in a second short despatch.

I at first made some difficulty about sending him the French despatch, saying you would be back in a few days, but he pressed me for it, and I concluded to send it. I was, however, very much surprised to find that I only hesitated as we did not wish to be parties to a communication which appeared likely to lead to a disagreeable discussion with the French Government. He assured me that he should not at present write to Paris, and that, at all events, we should not appear in the business. I send a copy of my letter to Count Nesselrode, and of his answer returning me Marshal Soult's despatch.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD.

No. 534.

*The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.*

(Extract.)

Engelhardtshoff, January 2, 1840.

BLOOMFIELD has acted about the despatch from Soult in entire accordance with my directions.

There is no fear of the Emperor's breaking out into acts to disturb the prospect or hopes of general harmony and concert. He is more a man of words than of deeds. I shall see him very soon after my return; and I hope your despatches subsequent to the announcement of His Imperial Majesty's agreement in your modification, will reach me in two days after I get to St. Petersburg.

No. 535.

*Count Nesselrode to Count Mader at Paris—(Communicated by Baron Brunnov.)*

M. le Comte,

St. Pétersbourg, le 26 Décembre, 1839.

J'AI reçu la dépêche que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser pour m'accuser la réception de mon expédition du 22 Novembre, et dans laquelle vous rendez compte au Ministère Impérial des plaintes que vous avez faites le Chef du Cabinet Français, relativement à la nature incomplète et tardive de nos dernières communications au sujet du retour de M. le Baron de Brunnov en Angleterre. Bien qu'il ne nous soit pas absolument démontré qu'en cette occasion, nos communications aux Cours de Vienne et de Berlin aient été plus détaillées, puisqu'il ne s'agissait que de leur annoncer un seul fait, l'adoption de la modification demandée par l'Angleterre à l'égard de nos propositions, bien qu'également, le retard de peu de jours qu'a subi la dépêche qui vous était adressée, n'ait pu être évité, nous ne pouvons que vous remercier de l'attention que vous avez portée au départ de nos courriers; néanmoins, M. le Comte, nous admettrons la réclamation comme fondée, et nous allons y répondre avec une entière franchise.

Nous conviendrons donc que dans les derniers temps nos explications avec la France ont été empreintes d'une certaine réserve, et que celles que nous avons données à nos autres Alliés, portaient, peut-être, un caractère plus marqué d'empressement et d'abandon. Cette réserve avait ses motifs, et nous ne pouvons point les dissimuler. C'est que nous nous sommes aperçus que la France apportait dans ses jugemens sur notre politique, une certaine réserve, et que nous nous sommes aperçus que c'était que celles-ci nous témoignaient plus de confiance et d'équité; qu'à l'égard de l'Egypte, leurs vues s'identifiaient davantage avec les nôtres, et que, comme nous, elles pensaient trouver dans la conduite du Gouvernement Français, plus de penchant pour le vassal que pour le souverain légitime. C'est que dans la question du différend à régler entre le Sultan et Méhémet Ali, la France ne semblait voir qu'une question purement secondaire. Elle mettait à la représentation comme Européenne avant tout, — une affectation dont le but nous était palpable. C'est qu'en un mot le langage qu'elle adressait à nos Alliés, et celui que tenaient les feuilles plus particulièrement destinées à soutenir à l'intérieur la popularité de son Ministère, portaient ouvertement l'empreinte d'un sentiment peu juste, peu amical, envers la Russie.

Ce qui n'était qu'une présomption, vient de se convertir en fait, par la dépêche que le Maréchal Soult a récemment adressée au Gouvernement Anglais, pour défendre contre les objections de celui-ci, son opinion sur le plan de pacification à effectuer entre l'Egypte et la Porte. Dans cette pièce, qui se rapporte exclusivement aux divergences qui se sont manifestées entre les deux Cabinets, celui des Turcs a cru devoir gratuitement nous faire entrer dans l'arène d'une discussion, en appelant sur nous particulièrement la vigilance et l'attention de l'Angleterre. Il y avoue explicitement que l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman le préoccupe pour le moins autant que son intégrité même; et qu'à

ses vœux il est peut-être plus important de protéger l'une contre nous, que d'assurer l'autre contre l'égypte. Il y reproche à l'Angleterre de perdre de vue ce qu'il appelle le côté Européen de la question, pour ne s'occuper que de la partie égyptienne. Il y ajoute encore que l'existence d'un accord entre la Grande Bretagne et la France au dissentiment sérieux, ce dissentiment vient uniquement de ce que, dans la pacification du Levant, la Grande Bretagne ne voit autre chose qu'un arrangement territorial, plus ou moins avantageux, à obtenir en faveur du Sultan, tandis qu'au contraire la France s'est constamment proposée d'en faire avant tout sortir l'annulation du protectorat archaïque et domineux que nous faisons, suivant son expression, peser sur la Porte Ottomane.

Voilà, certes, des aveux nettement articulés; et si nous pouvons reprocher au Cabinet Français de méconnaître nos vraies intentions, il ne nous accusera sûrement pas de nous méprendre sur les siennes.

Comme la dépêche qui renferme les allégations que je viens de citer, ne nous est point adressée, nous ne nous sentons point autorisés à y répondre directement. Mais puisque, d'un autre côté, le Maréchal Soult a pris vis-à-vis de vous l'initiative des réclamations, il ne nous sera pas défendu de lui faire entendre les nôtres.

**Le protectorat exclusif de la Russie.** Nous l'avons vu. Après toutes les preuves de désintéressement qu'a données l'Empereur dans ces derniers temps, nous avons été surpris de voir se reproduire un pareil fantôme. Le Gouvernement Français paraît-il de vue à un tel point ou nous paraît-il, l'Empereur n'a malheureusement en mouvement ni un seul de ses vaisseaux, tandis que les armées françaises se tiennent sur les côtes de la Méditerranée, et ancrant encore, il y a peu, dans le portage des Dardanelles? Est-ce donc ce protectorat exclusif que nous étions parvenus à éliminer en 1830, avant que le despotisme du Sultan eût pu être à l'appui de notre assistance nous avons adjoint les Puissances Maritimes de le secourir contre le Pacha? Est-ce celui que nous voulons conserver lorsque déjà le commencement de la crise actuelle nous avons été les premiers à éveiller sur la situation l'Orient à cotiser la solennité de ces armées Puissances, à les engager à entourer Mehmet Ali dans les limites infranchissables qu'il les pressent, et la France en particulier, d'employer au besoin contre lui des mesures coercitives? Si, comme on a tant de fois soutenu, le Traité d'Unkiosch avait eu pour but de nous assurer cette protection exclusive, aurais-je nous, comme nous l'avons fait, employé nos conseils et nos efforts à prévenir l'apparition de ses clauses? La France ne sait-elle pas que, si elle n'avait pas de cet acte nous nous sommes spontanément retirés, et si elle n'avait pas, si nous obtenions en échange la reconnaissance d'un principe de droit public Européen, qui, à la vérité, fermerait bien aux pavillons étrangers l'accès de l'un des deux détroits de Constantinople, mais qui à nos propres latitudes interdirait l'entrée de l'autre? Faut-il enfin rappeler au Gouvernement Français que même antérieurement aux dernières concessions que nous sommes parvenus à faire, nous avons, spontanément encore, proposé, que si, devant l'insuccès de faire avancer nos troupes et nos troupes au secours de la capitale du Sultan, cette mesure serait dépourvue de tout caractère isolé, qu'elle ne serait point Russie exclusivement, mais proclamée solennellement comme une mesure Européenne?

Les faits devant être pour la France aussi patents qu'ils le sont pour les autres Cabinets, on serait presque tenté de se demander, M. le Comte, si c'est bien véritablement qu'elle a pu élever contre nous des allégations pareilles à celles que je termine en l'épique du Maréchal Soult, ou si elle a voulu les répéter en faveur de son plan de pacification, comme un moyen de négociation dans ses discussions avec l'Angleterre, en réveillant sur notre compte d'anciennes appréciations.

Si, comme nous sommes sûr de l'être, elle avait été effective, ment l'intention du Cabinet des Tuileries, on conduirait en cette occasion présenterait avec la nôtre un contraste bien remarquable. Lorsque se sont manifestés les premiers symptômes d'un dissentiment entre les deux Puissances Maritimes sur les moyens de concilier la sécurité du Sultan avec les prétentions du Pacha d'Egypte, qu'aurions-nous fait, nous le demandons à la France, si, comme elle le suppose si gratuitement, notre intention avait été de l'isoler en la séparant de l'Angleterre? Evidemment, nous aurions cherché à envenimer ce dissentiment, à l'exploiter, à le convertir, s'il eût été possible, en méintelligence. Nous nous serions efforcés d'exagérer encore aux yeux du Cabinet Anglais la partialité qu'il reproche à la France en faveur du Pacha d'Egypte.

Nousussions abondé avec empressement dans le sens de ses idées, et soutenu énergiquement son plan de pacification contre celui mis en avant par la France. Bien loin de la nous avons parlé aux cabinets Russes le langage de la conciliation. Quoique à la vérité le Plan de Lord Palmerston nous semblât plus favorable que celui du Gouvernement Français, à la sécurité future de la Porte Ottomane, bien qu'il fût certainement aussi plus conforme à la dignité des Cinq Cours intervenantes, après les offres de médiation qu'elles avaient, de leur propre mouvement, adressées au Grand Seigneur, nous nous sommes bornés à engager les deux Cabinets à chercher à rapprocher leurs idées. Nous leur avons déclaré, que si elles parvenaient par des concessions réciproques à se rencontrer à mi-chemin, et à convenir d'un moyen-terme, nous étions prêts à adopter le plan dont ils pourraient tomber d'accord, pourvu seulement que ce plan fût accepté par la Porte et par le Sultan, et qu'il ne leur imposât aucune condition d'exécution.

C'est pas plus pour isoler la France, et pour nous passer de son concours, que lorsque les propositions ont nous avons vu, à Paris, de Brunnow, nous nous sommes en premier lieu adressés à l'Angleterre. C'est parce que comme nous l'avons dit et le répétons au Gouvernement Français, l'Angleterre nous a fait tenir que les conditions des propositions, c'est pour nous une affaire de conscience, et que si elle était d'avance déterminée à les appuyer par des moyens d'action.

Mais de ce que nous avons pris vis-à-vis d'elle l'initiative d'ouvertures préalables sur un arrangement à discuter plus tard avec les autres Cabinets, s'en suit-il donc nécessairement que notre dessein fut d'en exclure la France? Si on comme on le dit, on ne peut pas dire que cette exclusion soit une chose, pourquoi la France, ne l'ont-elles pas ainsi interprétée pour elles-mêmes? D'ailleurs, si on comme on le dit, on ne peut pas dire que cette exclusion soit une chose, pourquoi la France, ne l'ont-elles pas ainsi interprétée pour elles-mêmes? D'ailleurs, si on comme on le dit, on ne peut pas dire que cette exclusion soit une chose, pourquoi la France, ne l'ont-elles pas ainsi interprétée pour elles-mêmes?

Il est évident que les cabinets Russes et les autres cabinets ont placé enfin à une plus haute appréciation de nos vues politiques. L'Empereur a la haute main sur la situation, et il a le droit de l'en obtenir quelques uns en échange. Sa Majesté ne s'est pas bornée à de pure exécution d'opinion, elle a offert au bien commun des concessions de fait, autrement importantes. C'est bien le moins que l'on renonce d'un autre côté, à des préventions qui n'ont plus de fondement. Si malgré tant de preuves de désintéressement et d'abnégation, l'Empereur continuait à voir ses intentions méconnues; si, tout en acceptant ses concessions ou essayant de les exploiter dans un but de popularité, en les représentant comme dérivant d'une autre source que de sa spontanéité libre et entière; si dans l'arrangement qu'il s'agit de conclure, on s'efforçait de compliquer la négociation par de nouvelles exigences, on ne pourrait pas dire que l'Empereur n'ait été étranger à la crise actuelle, ni, enfin, sous prétexte de faire entrer la Turquie dans le système Européen, on tentait de nous enlever, non cette prépondérance exclusive que nous avons eue jusqu'à présent, mais cette prépondérance d'influence à laquelle la Russie ne renoncera point; alors, M. le Comte, ayant épuisé la mesure de la modération et de la conciliation, notre Auguste Maître pourrait se voir forcé de se replacer sur le terrain qu'il occupait avant ses premières propositions, et il ne resterait plus à Sa Majesté qu'à attendre avec calme les événements, ne prenant conseil, pour les régler, que du sens de sa dignité et des intérêts de son Empire.

Tel ne sera point le cas, nous aimons à l'espérer. Quand le Cabinet Français s'exprimait comme il a fait dans la dépêche précitée, il était encore dans l'ignorance de l'importante modification que nous avons consenti à apporter à la teneur originelle de nos ouvertures. Il pouvait donc à la rigueur lui rester un doute sur nos intentions définitives. Mais après le sage éclaircissement que l'Empereur vient de donner de sa loyauté, Sa Majesté n'admet pas la possibilité qu'il en puisse exister encore. Que la France apporte donc à la négociation qui va s'ouvrir des dispositions conformes à cet acte de conciliation, et nous nous féliciterons sincèrement de la voir y prendre la part que son rôle et sa position lui assignent. L'Empereur vous a déjà chargé, et il vous charge itérativement d'assurer le Cabinet Français de tout le parti que nous prenons à une co-opération qui, aux yeux de la majorité, ne peut que contribuer à assurer la pacification du Levant sur des fondements plus solides.



Veuillez, M. le Comte, exprimer cet espoir et cette opinion au chef du Cabinet Français, en lui donnant communication et copie de la présente dépêche

Recevez, &c.,  
Signé) NESSEL RODE.

No. 536

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 13.)

My Lord,

Paris, January 13, 1840.

MARSHAL SOULT told me this morning, that he had heard from the King, that in my conversation with His Majesty, on Saturday last, I had expressed the hope, that the French Government would communicate to that of Her Majesty the exact number of the French ships of the line now in commission, in order that Her Majesty's Ministers may be enabled to reply with confidence and certainty to any questions which might be put to them in Parliament regarding the reports of considerable naval armaments being prepared in the ports of France.

The Marshal said, that he had also received from Count Sébastiani the copy of a letter addressed to me by your Lordship, enclosing a list of French ships, which I had been requested to send to your Lordship, as well as to the British Admiralty, which were to constitute the Fleet of France in the Mediterranean.

The Marshal read to me your Lordship's letter, and then went over with me the inclosed list of ships. His Excellency said that, by a courier of this evening, he proposed answering Count Sébastiani's despatch; and that the French Ambassador would be furnished with such information respecting the naval force of France, and the exact state of the French ships of the line, as would enable him to answer satisfactorily your Lordship's inquiries, and show that the French Naval Force in the Mediterranean did not exceed the number of ships, (namely, fifteen,) which, at the time that the communication took place between the two Governments relative to the junction of their fleets in the Levant, it had professed its intention to equip; and that, independent of the two British ships of the line now in the Tagus, which might be considered as part of the British Mediterranean fleet, that fleet was now superior to that of France. It was not intended, he said, to send the two ships of the line now in commission at Brest into the Mediterranean; and that, if any circumstances should arise which appeared to render it advisable to order them to sail to that station, it would be necessary to send them to the Mediterranean, and not as intended for immediate service.

He dwelt much upon the difficulty experienced by the French Government in manning their ships, and of the inconvenience of the short period of service of the maritime conscripts, who had scarcely time to learn any part of their duty, when they were replaced by others.

This is the substance of Marshal Soult's conversation with me relative to the subject of your Lordship's letter to Count Sébastiani; but the answer to your inquiries will be given, I hope, more explicitly and in detail by the French Ambassador.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 537.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 15.)

My Lord

Paris, January 13, 1840

MARSHAL SOULT this morning, after questioning me relative to the progress made in the negotiation between your Lordship and Baron Brunnow, and after learning from me that I knew nothing of the subject, but what I had collected from your Lordship's remarks after the visit to Count Sébastiani, intimated to me that I had received from the French Ambassador a report of a conversation he had had with your Lordship, from which it appeared that you were proposing to discuss the necessity of Baron Brunnow's communication respecting the proposed British Alliance for the consideration of the other Powers interested in the settlement of that question.

The proposals of the Russian Government, he understood, were to the effect that two or three British, and two or three French ships of the line, should be permitted to enter the Dardanelles, but not to proceed beyond Gallipoli; that the Russian fleet, having troops on board, and unlimited in number, were to be stationed in the Bosphorus, and opposite to Constantinople; that the Black Sea should be considered as *mare clausum*. To this latter condition Marshal Soult told me that he understood the British Cabinet objected. Indeed, added the Marshal, it is strange that the Russian Government could make so extravagant a proposition, of which the effect would be to exclude from the Black Sea the ships of the line of Great Britain, Russia and Turkey.

The Marshal gave no positive opinion as to the acceptance or rejection of the arrangement proposed by Russia for the defence of the Straits of Constantinople; but from the manner in which he spoke of the superiority in numbers as well as in position, assigned to Russia in Baron Brunnow's propositions, I am led to conclude that the French Government will not be a party to that arrangement.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 538

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 17.)

My Lord,

Paris, January 14, 1840

THE Marquis d'Eyragues, the Chef de Cabinet of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was called to me this morning for the purpose of appearing before your Lordship's Excellency and me, in conversation with me yesterday, when he stated that the "Ocean" and "Suffren" were still in the Port of Brest, and that they would not be ordered to proceed to the Mediterranean, without the intention to issue that order being previously notified to Her Majesty's Government.

The Marquis d'Eyragues said, that upon further inquiry at the office of the Minister of Marine, it appeared that these two ships were actually at sea on their way to Toulon, but that after their arrival at that port, the whole number of French line-of-battle ships in the Mediterranean would not exceed fifteen, including the "Neptune" and "Alger," which were armed *en flûte* for the transport of troops between France and Algiers.

The ships whose names are inserted in the list your Lordship gave to Count Sébastiani, and which are not in the list inclosed, which was put into my hands by the Marquis d'Eyragues, he said were under repair, for the purpose of being ready to receive the crews of such ships of the line as may return from the Levant in a state unfit for service.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Inclosure in No 588

*Last of French Ship employed, or to be employed, in the Mediterranean.*

Le Mon chello	-	120	à Saverne	Le Océan	-	120	sout-en route
Le Juba	-	90	"	Le Sauron	-	90	pour Toulon
Le Hercule	-	90	"	Le Neptune, à Toulon	-		
Le Démocrate	-	90	"	Le Vainqueur	-		
Le Saint-Pierre	-	90	"	Le Marengo	-		
Le Jupiter	-	90	"	Le Triomphe	-		
Le Triomph	-	74	"	Le Suffrage universel	-		
Le Généreux	-	74	"		-		

No. 539

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 17, 1840)*

( No. 398 )

My Lord,

Therapia December 21, 1839

I TRANSMIT a report of a message to me from Roshid Pasha which I received yesterday, and a copy of my answer. The Pasha has to day thanked me for it, and he adds that England will really be disappointed in acting on such propositions, but he has spoken to Sir A. Sturmer, the terms of which he has written to me, and that the Baron said he knew nothing whatever of the proposition, but if the Powers were to adopt them that would not themselves be wrong.

In Rezaid Pasha's message to me, under date of the 21st instant, he alludes to a treaty between the Muscovites and us of a recent agreement with Mehmet Ali. I have before me nothing at the time of your leaving and would answer that I say I have no fear of its preferential as long as Her Majesty's Government supports Rezaid Pasha in his policy.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSOMBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 539.

M. Frederic Pisoni to Viscount Penzance, 1884

My Lord,

Però December 21 1839

I HAVE the honour to inform you that His Excellency Reshid Pasha has just said to me he is determined that the Austrian Government will be persuaded to give the Powers to leave the Sublime Porte to make a arrangement directly with Mehemet Ali, under the influence of the friendly Powers), and that at the same time to Mehemet Ali that if the Sublime Porte should grant him the same thing, the Powers will oppose it. His Excellency has charged me to ask your Lordship to show me at a Council of Embassy on the part of Austria and to represent to your Excellency that if I believe that our Government has any serious disposition to the other Great Powers, and that I represent the same disposition, it will be better a proposition of that kind would be made directly to them, than it would give cause to the Highness of the Austrian Court to as Highness the Seraskier Effendi Pasha, and to his Excellency Reshid Pasha, who form the party most hostile to those who wish to make a direct arrangement with Mehemet Ali. A serious question between the Powers of Christendom and the Powers who wish themselves harm with the Mussulman people, who would ask on this occasion, and on future occasions, what reliance can be placed upon the promises of the Powers of Christendom.

I hate, &c.  
S. then. I. Pissant.

Inclosure 2 in No. 539

Viscount Ponsonby to M. Frederic Pium.

Sir,

Therapia, December 21, 1839

I HAVE received your Report of this day, containing a message from his Excellency Rechid Pasha relating to propositions said to have been made by the Austrian Government to the other Great Powers.

You will tell his Excellency, that all I know about the matter is, that M. de Pontons has received a letter from M. de Saint Aulaire, French Ambassador at Vienna, in which, as M. de Pontons has stated, is contained an account corresponding with what his Excellency has heard, and repeated in his message to me. I have not had the least information on the subject from any other source than that I have mentioned, and I cannot give it credit, but must suppose there is some mistake that gives an undue colour to some other step Prince Metternich may have thought it desirable to take. If however, the account be correct, I will not believe that the British Government will consent to the proposition; but if I should be mistaken, I shall then have nothing to say in reply to the observations with which his Excellency terminates his

I think his Excellency will do well to send a message to the Internuncio in similar language with that sent to me.

I do not think the Internuncio gives credit to the report such as it apparently is. He may know more on the subject than I do.

I entreat his Excellency to act with his accustomed prudence and wisdom and to be very very certain of the precise situation of affairs, before he allows himself to form any decided opinion.

I have, &c.

No. 540

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 17, 1840)

(No. 341.)

My Lord,

Therapia, December 24, 1839

RECHID PASHA, after expressing the pleasure the communication of your Lordship's Instructions (No. 180) gave him, says, that it has augmented the confidence of the Sublime Porte in the good will of Great Britain, and has hopes that English influence will triumph over all difficulties, that the Sublime Porte will remain firm, and will not make any concession to Mehemet Ali without the concurrence of its Allies.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) P'ONSONRY

No. 341

Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde

No. 9

My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 18, 1840

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatches Nos. 1 and 2, containing reports of Mr Bloomfield's communications with Count Nesselrode upon the subject of Marshal Soult's despatch to Count Sébastien of the 25th of November, from which it appears that Mr. Bloomfield was ultimately persuaded by Count Nesselrode to give his Excellency a copy of that despatch



I request your Excellency to state to Mr. Bloomfield, that he ought not to have given Count Nesselrode a copy of that despatch, without being instructed or authorized to do so.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No 542

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 20.)

No. 20

My Lord,

Paris, January 17, 1840

I HAD an interview this morning with Marshal Soult. His Excellency had received, yesterday, despatches from the French Consul at Alexandria, stating that Mehemet Ali manifested no impatience regarding the delay that has taken place in concluding a peace with the Sultan, and that the Pasha suspected was more detrimental to the Porte, than to himself,—that Mehemet Ali had lately issued pay to his army, and to the Turkish as well as to the Egyptian fleet.

Marshal Soult mentioned that Albania was in a disturbed state

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

No 543

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 21, 1840.)

No. 341.)

My Lord,

Therapia, December 28, 1839

I FORWARD copy of the letter from the Grand Vizier to the Pasha of Egypt, which was carried to Alexandria by Kiamil Pasha, of whose mission I have just received news.

The Government of the Sultan is aware of the extreme importance of the question, what are to be the prerogatives of the Sultan when the Pasha is named hereditary Governor of Egypt? Is he then to be under the authority of the Sultan, or is he to be exempt from it, and free to make law to bind Egypt, &c., &c., and to make treaties with foreign States? If the latter, he may make treaties in opposition to his nominal Sovereign. If he be entitled to make laws, he may counteract or defeat the capitulations and treaties, at present in force, in those particulars that affect most intimately the security of British subjects with regard to person and property.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure in No 343

The Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali

AINSI qu'il est connu à votre Altesse, on ne peut jamais établir une bonne constitution dans un Etat, ni assurer la tranquillité des peuples que par une loi stable et sage, et sous le règne des lois équitables.

Mais on n'a pu s'occuper d'institutions en Turquie, malgré le besoin extrême qu'elle en a, à cause d'une foule d'affaires embarrassantes dont elle a été depuis quelque temps successivement accablée.

Sa Majesté Impériale, animée de sentiments pleins de clémence et d'intention les plus salutaires, veut faire prospérer l'Empire et la nation, et assurer le repos et le bien-être de ses sujets, et un Hatti Chériff ayant été émané

dernièrement de Sa Hautesse à cet égard, des firmans analogues ont été publiés dans toutes les parties de l'Empire. Il est par conséquent devenu nécessaire que la Sublime Porte adresse aussi des firmans de la même teneur à votre Altesse, ainsi qu'à votre fils, son Excellence Ibrahim Pasha, et voilà pourquoi deux firmans ornés en haut d'un Hatti Chériff vous sont envoyés avec le très-illustre Kiamil Pasha, Général de Brigade dans l'Armée Impériale.

Votre Altesse verra par la teneur de ces firmans, quelle est la volonté souveraine, et comme les lois dont on s'occupe, et qu'on va établir, devront donner une nouvelle vie à la religion, au Gouvernement, à l'Empire, et à la nation, et que cela est précisément ce que votre Altesse a toujours désiré, d'après la sagesse et le zèle qui la distinguent, et à quoi elle a constamment appliqué ses soins, tout le monde a la conviction qu'elle agira conformément aux ordres souverains.

J'espère donc que votre Altesse s'empressera de publier les firmans qui vous sont envoyés dans les lieux qui se trouvent dans votre Gouvernement, et dans celui de votre fils sus-mentionné, et qu'elle mettra en pratique les principes salutaires qu'ils renferment.

7 Sheval, 1255 (13 Décembre, 1839.)

No 544

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 21, 1840.)

(No. 345.)

My Lord,

Therapia, December 29, 1839

I HAVE the honour to enclose copy of a report from M. de Laurin to the Interuncio, which his Excellency has had the goodness to communicate to me.

Rechid Pasha was made acquainted with the contents of that report, and I took occasion to recommend to him the perfection of the means most proper for defence against any enterprises that might be attempted by Mehemet Ali. Mehemet Ali is as likely as any man to mistake the nature of his own position; and he may risk attempts that cannot have success against the power opposed to them, and which failing, will, at last, put in danger those advantages he can secure by a prudent submission. He may march his troops towards the capital, and make a great effort to raise confusion there, and give rise to serious inconvenience though his ultimate defeat be inevitable. I have long believed that a British maritime force, acting in conjunction with the Sultan's flag on the coast of Syria, cutting off the communication with Alexandria, and closing that port would paralyze the whole body of Mehemet Ali's power.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure in No 544

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Sturmer.

M. le Baron,

Alexandrie, le 16 Décembre, 1839

LES nouvelles sur les manœuvres des mécontents dans l'Asie Mineure, que j'ai eu l'honneur de mander à votre Excellence en date du 5 de ce mois, ont été communiquées le lendemain à mes Collègues par Méhémet Ali. Celui-ci se ne l'a pas comme ces choses ne le regardaient point. Il a déclaré à mes Collègues et à moi, qu'aucun de ses commandans de troupes ne s'était approché des insurgés, et qu'il avait même fait dire à ceux de Diarbékir d'être tranquilles, vu qu'il ne voulait et ne pouvait rien faire pour eux. Mais sous main on ne néglige rien pour entretenir la fermentation et même pour préparer une révolte qui viendrait à éclater par la suite dans un moment favorable.

Méhémet Ali m'a dit dernièrement qu'il n'était pas inactif, qu'il travaillait journellement et se préparait à toutes les éventualités. En effet, on remarque une activité extraordinaire dans le Divan des Muavin. Mercredi dernier

expédia à Ibrahim Pacha des ordres relatifs à la concentration de l'armée. Ces mouvements doivent commencer au mois de Février et être exécutés avant la Lune de Safer.

Les confidens du Pacha prétendent savoir qu'il a le projet d'occuper l'Asie Mineure. D'autres, au contraire, pensent qu'il ne s'agit que de faire prendre à Ibrahim une forte position défensive à Marache, afin de mettre à couvert Tarsous et Adana. D'autres encore, partisans du Pacha, et Français pour la plupart, le poussent à prendre l'offensive et garantissent le succès le plus brillant pour le cas où il attaquerait Constantinople par mer et par terre. Les masses, disent-ils, sont contre le Sultan et le Grand Vizir, et sympathisent tellement avec Méhémet Ali, qu'elles sont prêtes à l'accueillir comme le plus fort et le plus heureux. Une fois Constantinople prise, les Puissances Européennes cesseront aussi de défendre un trône qui n'a aucun soutien dans les sentimens de la nation.

Méhémet Ali loue beaucoup ce langage qui convient parfaitement à ses intérêts et à ceux de son fils. Tous deux seraient disposés à commencer la lutte présente. Mais, d'un côté, l'armée n'est nullement en mesure d'entrer en campagne avant trois mois, de l'autre, le Pacha craint fort de rencontrer les Russes qui sont redoutés par les Musulmans et contre lesquels la France ne pourrait accorder aucune protection efficace.

Le parti modéré pense que le Pacha causera à la Porte un dommage plus sensible en se tenant sur la défensive qu'en se portant à l'attaque. C'est pourquoi ce parti cherche à le dissuader d'avancer. Il dit au Pacha qu'il se trouve maintenant dans une position inattaquable, et que pourvu qu'il puisse s'y maintenir durant l'hiver, il ne rencontrera plus aucun obstacle à devenir le maître de la Turquie Asiatique.

Par le dernier bateau à vapeur on lui écrit de Constantinople de se tenir tranquille et d'attendre les événemens, bien persuadé que les Puissances n'oseraient pas l'attaquer s'il ne fait point d'invasion en Europe.

On ignore encore quel parti prendra le Pacha. Mais dans tous les cas il est certain qu'il se prépare très activement à faire de grands préparatifs de guerre. Il menace d'armer au pis aller les corps de métier et les ouvriers des fabriques (17,000 hommes), et de les réunir à l'armée de Syrie.

Mr. Hodges vient d'arriver ici. Il m'a remis aussitôt une lettre de Son Altesse le Prince de Metternich, et m'a dit avoir l'ordre d'agir dans l'accord le plus intime avec moi et de donner toute son attention à mes conseils.

Agréz, &c,  
Signé) LAURIN

No. 545

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 21.)

No 7)

My Lord,

Vienna, January 12, 1840.

PRINCE METTERNICH having received nothing by Lord Ponsonby's courier, I communicated to him the inclosure in his Lordship's despatch No. 545, and he has requested me to delay the messenger, so as to give him time to write his sentiments upon its contents to Baron Neumann for communication to your Lordship. I am to see him this evening, when he will show me what he reads, but in the mean time I can state, that his ideas revert to his proposition of November last, and that he considers it advisable that no time should be lost in declaring to the Porte and to Méhémet Ali, that an attack made by the latter would encounter the opposition of the Powers. If no arrangement has yet been signed in London, the necessity of this is, in the Prince's opinion, self-evident; if one has been signed, still there will be delay in obtaining the accession of the Porte, whereas the proposed notification should be made without the loss of a moment, whereby no prejudice will be caused to the plans for the final settlement of the question.

I asked the Prince, if he was prepared to make the declaration in the name

of the Four Powers only without France, to which he answered, that if France did not accede to this proposition, neither would she do so to the more extended one; and that the real question therefore was, whether, in case she should refuse to go along with us, we should proceed without her. Thus, he said, is a matter for the consideration of the Four Powers, and Austria is for doing so.

I have, &c,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 546.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

(No. 12.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 24, 1840.

WITH reference to the observations in your Excellency's despatch No. 544 on the subject of the Government of Egypt, I have to state to your Excellency, that it never has been contemplated by Her Majesty's Government that Méhémet Ali should have, as hereditary Pasha of Egypt, any other, or different, powers and authorities than those which he now possesses. All that has been proposed is, that the Sultan shall engage to appoint Méhémet Ali's lineal descendants as successors to Méhémet Ali, in the post of Pasha of Egypt, but that Egypt should remain as it now is, an integral part of the Ottoman Empire: that all treaties and laws made by the Sultan, should apply to Egypt as much as to any other part of the Empire, and that the troops and ships of the Pasha of Egypt should be as much at the disposal of the Sultan for the service of the Empire, as those kept by any other Pasha of the Ottoman Empire.

Your Excellency will find a statement to this effect in my despatch to the Marquis of Clanricarde, No. 108, of the 9th of July, 1839, of which a copy was transmitted to your Excellency in my despatch, No. 94, of the 13th of that month.

I am, &c,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 547.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Separate.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 25, 1840.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that the negotiations on Turco-Egyptian Affairs in which I have for some time been engaged with the Plenipotentiaries of Austria and Russia are now at an end. I have to expect that they may end in an agreement between the Powers, having to assist the Sultan in restoring the authority of Méhémet Ali to Egypt. The Austrian and Russian Plenipotentiaries have received full powers to sign a Convention for that purpose, and the Plenipotentiary of Prussia expects shortly to receive the like authority from his Government. I cannot speak with equal certainty as to the course which the French Government may pursue in this matter; but in any case, the presence of a Turkish Plenipotentiary will be required, and I have therefore to instruct your Excellency to urge Rechid Pasha to send off immediately to Nouri Effendi, the Ambassador of the Porte at Paris, powers and authority to sign a Convention with the Powers, or by those of Four out of the Five, provided it be a Convention securing advantages to the Sultan in the shape of support and assistance from the Powers of Europe.

I am, &c,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.



No. 548.

*Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beaconsfield.*

No. 4

My Lord

*Foreign Office, January 30, 1840.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's confidential despatch, No. 5, of the 21<sup>st</sup> instant, reporting what passed between you and Prince Metternich on the subject of a guarantee of a loan of two millions sterling to the Porte, I have to inform you that the Government will not guarantee the loan, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, be a matter well deserving consideration whether a Treaty should have been entered into with the Porte, or whether the Government should have been asked to guarantee the loan, or whether the Government should have been asked to guarantee the loan, or whether the Government should have been asked to guarantee the loan.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 549.

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 23.)*

(No. 24.)

My Lord,

*Paris, January 30, 1840.*

COUNT MEDEM this morning gave to Marshal Soult a copy of a despatch he received yesterday from Count Nesselrode relative to the Oriental Question, and the negotiation upon that subject with which Baron Brunnow has been charged by the Russian Government.

The Marshal read to me this despatch, commenting upon parts of it as he read them. The despatch does not state what are the propositions of which the Russian Envoy to London is the bearer, and Count Nesselrode accounts for his communications with the British Government being more unreserved than those with France, on the ground that the Court of St. Petersburg, in respect to the conditions of a pacific arrangement between Turkey and Mehmet Ali, and the means of enforcing them, coincides more with the Court of St. James than with the Court of the Tuileries.

It is, however, unnecessary to trouble your Lordship with a relation of the entire contents of this despatch. It is enough to say that the tenor of it is not conciliatory, and that the tone of the Marshal's remarks upon it betrayed much dissatisfaction.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

No. 550.

*The Duc de Dalmatie to the Baron de Beron.—(Communicated by Count Sebastiani.)*

M. le Baron,

*Paris, le 24 Janvier, 1840.*

J'AI l'honneur de vous envoyer le texte d'une dépêche écrite par M. de Nesselrode à M. de Medem, qui, ainsi qu'il en avait l'ordre, m'en a remis copie, après m'en avoir donné lecture. La forme et le fond de cette dépêche m'ont, je dois vous le dire, également surpris. Dans les observations que je vous vous présenter à ce sujet je ne tiendrai compte que du fond.

La marche suivie par le Cabinet de St. Petersburg dans l'incident de la Mission de M. de Brunnow, n'avait pas causé une telle surprise au Gouvernement du Roi, que j'en aie eu devoir en faire l'objet d'une réclamation. Aussi n'étant-ce nullement à titre de plainte que j'en avais parlé à M. de Medem.

\* See No. 533, p. 5.

J'avais voulu seulement bien établir que ce qui s'était passé dans cette marche de paix conforme aux protestations des autres puissances et le désir d'arriver à une solution pacifique ne devait pas échapper. Dans l'hypothèse que M. de Medem avait mal compris ou n'avait pas comprise, et en la transmettant à son Gouvernement, en avait mal rendu la portée, j'en suis sûr, car c'est la mesure de la portée de la protestation. Or bien dans je crois que le Cabinet de St. Petersburg, sans s'occuper de la vérité ou non de mes paroles, a ainsi le premier fait ce qui est offert à lui de nous faire parvenir, sous forme de protestation, l'expression d'un mécontentement d'ailleurs bien peu fondé. Je sens porté à admettre pour cette dernière supposition, en voyant combien peu cette prétendue réponse se réfère à ce qu'elle semble avoir pour but de réfuter.

Quoiqu'il en soit, il est certain que le Cabinet de St. Petersburg, en venant à la connaissance de la protestation, a voulu, je vous en supplie en peu de mots sur quelques uns des points principaux traités dans la dépêche de M. de Nesselrode.

Le Gouvernement du Roi n'a jamais songé à enlever à la Russie sa part légitime d'influence dans les affaires de l'Orient. Il sait qu'il ne peut être en accord avec la nature des choses, et qu'il ne peut être en accord avec nous, nous voulons encore, c'est que les autres Puissances, et nous, nous ne pouvons pas uniquement dans la modération, mais dans la mesure, mais bien dans un ensemble de mesures, mais dans un ensemble de mesures efficaces de tous les droits et de tous les intérêts.

Demander que ces droits et ces intérêts ne soient pas à la merci d'une puissance à laquelle il ne manquerait pour abuser de sa prépondérance que la volonté de le faire, exiger d'autres sûretés que la générosité et la sagesse d'une des parties, ce n'est certes pas, quoiqu'on en dise, lui témoigner une injure, c'est tout simplement faire acte de prudence et de dignité. Je ne puis donc reconnaître que dans la surveillance attentive, inquiète si l'on veut, que nous portons sur la situation de Constantinople, il y ait rien dont le Cabinet de St. Petersburg ait le droit de s'offenser.

Le Gouvernement du Roi serait bien autrement fondé à réclamer contre les assertions sans cesse renouvelées, qui le présentent comme se préoccupant exclusivement, dans la Question d'Orient, des intérêts du Pacha d'Egypte, et y sacrifiant ceux de la Porte. Après les dénégations appuyées d'arguments convaincants, qu'il a tant de fois opposées à ces imputations malveillantes, il devrait peu s'attendre, peut-être, à les voir reproduites dans la dépêche de M. de Nesselrode. Ce n'est pas d'ailleurs sans une satisfaction réelle qu'il y trouve l'assurance que M. de Brunnow a la mission de lui offrir la médiation.

Les informations que j'ai reçues de St. Petersburg, et que j'ai communiquées à votre Excellence, ont été purement et simplement fausses. Elles ne tendent à rendre plus difficile un rapprochement entre la Russie et la France, de Londres et de Paris. Nous en sommes convaincus, et le Gouvernement Impérial, en manifestant son mécontentement, n'avait pas laissé au mois de Juillet, d'adhérer sans peine même à la proposition de M. de Nesselrode, de se réunir à la Paix, que celles-ci, qui sont purement et simplement fausses, ont été reproduites dans la dépêche de M. de Nesselrode.

Je vous prie de dire sur la lettre de M. de Nesselrode, et sur la lettre à ce Ministre la présente dépêche et fin en lui.

Agreez, &c.,  
MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

*The Duc de Dalmatie to Count Sebastiani.*—(Communicated by Count Sebastiani, February 4.)

Monsieur le Comte,

Paris, le 26 Janvier, 1940

J'AI reçu la dépêche que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire sous le N. 3. L'importance des informations qu'elle contient a fixé la plus sérieuse attention du Gouvernement du Roi. Vous comprendrez que je ne m'explique pas sur le caractère confidentiel de cette communication, dont les bases mêmes et la plus forte raison la rédaction n'étaient pas encore définitivement arrêtées par le Cabinet Britannique, appelle d'autant moins de notre part une réponse immédiate et officielle que, dans une pareille matière, le fond ne peut guère être apprécié indépendamment de la forme. Quoiqu'il en soit, et sans m'arrêter à des points de détail qui pourraient demander des éclaircissements, je n'hésite pas à dire qu'en ce qui concerne le mode de la protection à accorder à la Porte contre un nouvel attentat contre l'Église et le Palais Constantinople, les modifications proposées par Lord Palmerston au plan du Cabinet de St. Petersburg, me paraissent constituer une amélioration considérable. L'idée de faire intervenir la Porte dans le traité qui réglerait ce mode de protection, est surtout une conception très-heureuse et d'une grande portée.

La regrette de ne pouvoir approuver également dans le projet de Lord Palmerston, ce qui se rapporte aux arrangements territoriaux à conclure entre le Sultan et le Vice-Roi. Nous persuadons à croire que ce Ministre ne tient pas suffisamment compte des ressources de Méhémet Ali, de l'énergie de son caractère, et de l'impossibilité morale qu'un homme de cette trempe accepte, sans résistance, des conditions qui lui tiennent avec une si grande partie de sa puissance matérielle, toute la force d'opinion dans laquelle repose son principal appui. Plutôt que de les subir, je suis convaincu qu'il s'exposerait aux plus grandes extrémités, et que, tout en s'abstenant peut-être de marcher sur Constantinople, il n'hésiterait pas à envahir la Mésopotamie, à enlever à la Porte des provinces dont les ressources lui permettraient d'opposer aux résolutions des Puissances la résistance la plus énergique.

Contre de telles entreprises que pourraient les moyens de coercion indiqués par le ~~gouvernement~~ projet de loi? ~~Q. Pourrait-on lui l'interdire?~~ R. Sans les limites où il tend à la contenir? n'est-il pas évident qu'une fois entrées dans cette voie, les Puissances n'auraient d'autre alternative que de reculer devant l'audacieuse attitude de Méhémet Ali ou de recourir au seul moyen réel de protéger la Porte en autorisant l'intervention Russe dans le sens le plus étendu? à moins d'abandonner le Sultan à sa faiblesse, ne seraient-elles pas forcées de souffrir qu'une armée Impériale traversât l'Asie Mineure et la Syrie, pour refouler jusqu'en Egypte les soldats du Vice-Roi? Je ne pense pas que cette extrémité pût convenir à l'Angleterre, plus qu'elle ne nous conviendrait à nous-mêmes.

En vous signalant l'insuffisance des voies coercitives proposées par le Cabinet de Londres, j'ai voulu surtout vous faire remarquer ce qu'il y a de contradictoire entre la grandeur des concessions demandées à Mehmet Ali et la faiblesse des moyens par lesquels on se propose de les lui arracher. Sans doute le Cabinet de Londres se persuade que ce Pacha cédera à la première démonstration des Puissances, et que hors d'état de suffire longtemps aux charges d'un *status quo* rendu plus gênant et plus onéreux pour lui par l'espèce de blocus qu'on établirait sur la côte de Syrie, il s'empressera de s'y soustraire en acceptant l'arrangement qui lui sera offert. Je crois fermement que c'est une erreur, et que même en admettant, ce qui n'est guère probable, que Mehmet Ali ne se fit pas un jeu de jeter l'Europe dans les complications les plus effrayantes plutôt que de se soumettre aux injonctions des Puissances, la prolongation du *status quo* actuel avec ses incertitudes et ses dangers, serait tout au moins la conséquence de sa résistance passive. Il faudrait étrangement méconnaître la situation respective des deux parties pour croire que cette prolongation fût plus désavantageuse au Vice-Roi qu'au Sultan.

Dans l'état où la Porte est aujourd'hui réduite, elle a particulièrement besoin pour se remettre, pour reprendre le degré de consistance et de solidité exigé

par l'intérêt général de repos, et pour le bon sentiment de confiance dans l'avenir. De tels avantages sont bien autrement importants pour elle que celui de recouvrer immédiatement la possession de quelques provinces qu'elle serait peut-être fort enclignée à céder à un vainqueur et dont en tout cas la souveraineté lui serait conservée. Mais la Porte ne peut recueillir ces avantages que par une prompte réconciliation avec M. de Latour, et pour qu'elle ne soit ni trop au pas ni trop chancelante de durée, il faut qu'elle repose sur des bases qui soient dans une juste proportion avec la force et la puissance des Parties Contractantes.

Tous ces motifs, M<sup>rs</sup> Canning les résume qui sont fort considérés comme dangereuse et impraticable la tentative d'imposer à M<sup>rs</sup> Metcal Ah les conditions énoncées dans la communication de Lord Palmerston. Il n'y a de notre part ni obstination, ni prédilection aveugle, ni engagement d'aucune sorte. Nos motifs sont tous puisés dans l'intérêt général, dans la force des choses, et dans des convictions profondes. Que Lord Palmerston les considère surtout comme inspirés par le plus vil desir de nous entendre, et d'établir entre nos deux Gouvernemens cette identité de vues et de tendances qui serait la meilleure garantie de la paix du monde comme des intérêts des deux pays.

Le n'a pas besoin de vous dire que le Gouvernement du Roi a l'honneur de vous en adresser un exemplaire. Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur, l'assurance de ma haute et respectueuse considération.

Agrées, &c.,  
(Signé) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

P.S.—Je reçois votre dépêche du 24, No. 10. Les détails qu'elle contient sur l'attitude de MM de Brunnow et de Neumann sont d'une importance réelle; je me rends facilement compte des difficultés que trouve Lord Palmerston à rédiger son Contre-Projet. Je désire trop voir sortir de ces difficultés même des moyens de rapprochement entre les Cours vraiment intéressées à la pacification de l'Orient, pour que je ne l'espère pas un peu.

No. 553.

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston—(Received January 27.)*

(No. 26)

My Lord,

Paris, January 24, 1840

ON Wednesday last a rumour reached me that a despatch had been received here from Count Sebastiani, containing a report of a confidential conversation your Lordship had held with him, in which you had communicated to him the project of Convention between the Five Great Powers of Europe, and the basis of Baron Brunnow's propositions, for the settlement of a new war with the Sultan and the Afghans.

I was informed that Mr. de Montebello, at a meeting given by the Duke of Orleans at his residence on the 12th inst. very soon after the rupture between us, that the rumour above-mentioned was not without foundation, I this day, at an interview I had with his Excellency at the Foreign Office, inquired from him what was the view taken by the French Government of the communication received from the French Ambassador in London, observing, at the same time, that I had not received any instruction from your Lordship upon the subject.

The Marshal immediately sent for Count Sebastiani's despatch, which begins by saying that the communication made to the Ambassador by your Lordship was merely a sketch, and directed to the effect of obtaining from which you were desirous to have the opinion of the French Ambassador before you submitted it, in a more finished shape, to the consideration of the Cabinet. Count Sebastiani then states the propositions made by your Lordship in this sketch, for bringing about the settlement of the Turco-Egyptian Question.

I did not enter into any discussion with the Marshal regarding those propositions, but I did express my opinion that the two former propositions were not separate from France upon the Affairs of the East, and that I had no doubt



this early and frank communication of your Lordship's present views of this question, under the alteration of circumstances caused by the Court of St. Petersburg's admission of the principle of the defence of the Straits of Constantinople being confided to other Allies of the Porte as well as to Russia, would be duly appreciated by the French Government.

The Marshal unhesitatingly expressed his obligation to your Lordship for this mark of confidence, but he appeared to be in expectation of receiving an official communication from the English Government to the same effect; I observed to your Lordship that I had only been able to convey to him the substance of your Lordship's views, and that I was not authorized to deliver any official communication. I was, however, not without some success in this respect, and I had been able to convey to him the substance of your Lordship's views, and that I was not authorized to deliver any official communication.

The Marshal did not seem particularly attached to any one of the Articles of the proposed Convention, but he seemed to be particularly attached to the First Article, which provided for the evacuation of Syria. He was, however, not without some doubts as to the acquiescence of the Emperor Nicholas in the Convention, inasmuch as it would annul the Treaty of Unkar Skelessi, and make Turkey a component part of the European system, from which it had hitherto been the policy and endeavour of the Russian Cabinet to exclude it.

His Excellency did not believe that the interception of supplies by sea from the Egyptian Army under Ibrahim Pasha, and he considered that the result of the proposed arrangement would be only to prolong the actual relative position of the two parties.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 553

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 30.)

No. 32.)

My Lord,

Paris, January 27, 1840

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to No. 26, inclusive. Marshal Soult informed me this morning, that a despatch would be sent by a courier this evening to Count Sebastiani, in reply to your Lordship's communication to the French Ambassador. The Marshal said to me, that by the acquiescence of Russia in a Treaty between the Five Powers and the Porte, a Convention would be concluded, which would be a great step towards a Convention.

The Marshal did not communicate to me what answer his despatch would contain relative to the other points of your Lordship's Proposition.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 554

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 30.)

My Lord,

Paris, January 27, 1840

THE King, last night, when my conversation with His Majesty on the marriage of the Duc de Nemours had ended, adverted to the outline of the Convention between the Five Powers and the Porte, which you had lately communicated to Count Sebastiani, and His Majesty requested me to assure your Lordship how much he had been gratified by this confidential communica-

cation, and that he was most desirous that his Government should reply to it in the same friendly and confidential spirit; his Ministers fully agreed with him in thinking that a great point would be gained in obtaining the accession of Russia to a Convention between the Five Powers and the Porte, because such Convention would be an abandonment of the pretension set up by Russia, and against which England and France had protested, of considering the affairs of Turkey as out of the pale of the European system. But he was not without apprehensions that Marshal Soult had got into his head, that diplomatic etiquette would not allow him to commit to writing an unreserved answer to the verbal communication made by your Lordship to Count Sebastiani, and that in consequence, the Marshal's despatch to the Ambassador, would not be as explicit and satisfactory as he, the King, wished it should be. I said to the King, that I did not comprehend the crotchets of Marshal Soult. Your Lordship had, I observed, confidentially communicated to the French Ambassador, the first rough sketch of a Convention you had prepared, in order to have the opinion of the French Government upon it, and in the hope of arriving at some common understanding upon the matter; and it seemed strange that the Marshal should not return an answer equally frank and unreserved. The King agreed to this observation, but nothing dropped from His Majesty in the course of a long conversation which ensued upon this subject, which led me to think that the opinion of His Majesty was at all changed in regard to the impossibility of the French Government joining in any measures of coercion against Mehemet Ali. He spoke to me of the partiality of the French public to Mehemet Ali as absurd, being founded upon French military and civil officers being employed by the Pasha, and upon the false supposition that the British Government were endeavouring to weaken the Pasha's power, for the purpose of making him more subservient to British interests; but though the grounds of this partiality might be absurd, he said, it did exist, and in great force, both in the public and the Chambers, and he appealed to me whether it were possible for any Minister of the Crown in France, to act in defiance of this feeling. His Majesty insisted as he has always done, on the inefficiency of any coercive measures that could be adopted by the Five Powers to compel the Egyptian to evacuate Syria. Candia, he said, may perhaps be wrested from the dominion of Mehemet Ali, but the advance of Russian troops into Syria, would excite a Mahomedan insurrection against the invaders, of which the consequences might be fatal to the Russian Army. His Majesty did not believe that Mehemet Ali would allow Ibrahim Pasha to march into Asia Minor, and give occasion for the Sultan calling upon his Allies to defend the Straits of Constantinople, the result then would be the continuance of the *status quo*,—a state of things more onerous and dangerous to the Turkish Government than to the Pasha, the Sultan would not receive the tribute from his vassal which, under a pacific arrangement, the Pasha would have to pay, and the danger of insurrection in the provinces of Turkey was greater than in those under the dominion of Mehemet Ali, and with less effective force to repress them.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 555

Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 30.)

No. 5.)

My Lord,

Berlin, January 20, 1840.

THE French Charge d'Affaires at this Court has communicated to Baron Werther, the Russian Minister, and myself, part of a despatch which he received on the 18th instant, from Marshal Soult, informing him that Her Majesty's Government had rejected M. de Brunnow's propositions, as they were found to be inadmissible both in form and substance, and that your Lordship was about to bring forward counter-propositions. This information astonished both Baron Werther and myself, more particularly as his letters from London made no mention of such a fact.

Should there be no foundation for these assertions, the view with which

they have been put forward at the present moment, during the debates in the Chamber of Deputies, must be evident to your Lordship.

I am informed that it was likewise stated in Marshal Soult's despatch, that the territorial arrangements proposed by M. de Brunnow did not meet with the approbation of Her Majesty's Government, as they were more favourable to Mehemet Ali than those contemplated by your Lordship.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GEORGE B. HAMILTON

No. 556.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 31 ;

No. 2.)

My Lord,

Thessalon, January 7, 1840

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of the correspondence which has passed between the French Envoy, Rechid Pasha, and myself, on the subject of the statements made by Avidick, the Dragoman of the Ex-Capoudan Pasha.

I have thought it right, in my reply to M. de Pontois' communication to me of his first letter to the Turkish Foreign Minister, to state the fact that it was at my request that Rechid Pasha sent me Avidick's declaration.

It appears to me that M. de Pontois' letter of the 3rd January gives all the advantage to Rechid Pasha, as it admits that the declaration made by Avidick "est effectivement de nature à faire naître de fausses interprétations contre l'Amiral Lalande."

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure 1 in No. 556.

M de Pontois to Viscount Ponsonby.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

Péra, le 2 Janvier, 1840.

AYANT appris qu'une déclaration faite par l'interprète de l'Ex-Capoudan Pasha, au sujet de l'attentat du Vice-Amiral Osman Bey avec le Contre-Amiral Lalande, avait été communiquée au Corps Diplomatique par Son Excellence Rechid Pasha, je crois devoir vous envoyer copie de la lettre que je viens de lui écrire à ce sujet.

Je profite, &c.,  
(Signé) E. DE PONTOIS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 556.

M de Pontois to Rechid Pasha.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Péra, le 31 Décembre, 1839

Comme votre Secrétaire particulier est venu, il y a quelques jours, me remettre en votre nom, une communication faite par l'interprète de l'Ex-Capoudan Pasha relativement à l'entrevue du Vice-Amiral Osman Bey avec le Contre-Amiral Lalande, je l'ai chargé de vous dire que j'attendrais, pour répondre, une communication officielle, et me bornais, pour le moment, à consulter les documents qui doivent exister à cet égard à la Porte. Mais ayant appris depuis, que votre Excellence avait cru devoir, par ses motifs, que je ne cherchais pas à approfondir, donner connaissance de cette pièce au Corps Diplomatique, je ne puis me dispenser de lui adresser, dès à présent, et en me réservant de revenir plus tard sur ce sujet, quelques observations sommaires : elles ont pour but, non de défendre M. l'Amiral Lalande contre des imputations qui ne peuvent l'atteindre, et auxquelles, d'ailleurs, il

n'a pas à répondre, mais simplement de rappeler à votre Excellence quelques détails qu'elle semble ignorer, ou avoir perdus de vue.

Si vous avez, M. le Ministre, pris la peine de vous faire rendre un compte exact et approfondi de ce qui s'est passé à bord du *Capoudan*, vous savez vu que c'est par le rapport même de l'Amiral Lalande, expédié à M. le Baron Roussin par le bateau à vapeur Français "le Papin," et immédiatement communiqué par cet Ambassadeur aux Représentants des Grandes Cours, ainsi qu'à la Porte, que celle-ci a eu la première connaissance des projets du Capoudan Pasha, et a été mise en mesure de faire ce qui pouvait dépendre d'elle pour en prévenir l'exécution, ou en neutraliser l'effet.

Vous auriez reconnu, j'espère, qu'en donnant au Capoudan Pasha le conseil de se rendre à Rhodes au lieu de Candie, pour ne pas livrer la flotte à Méhémet Ali, et en s'empressant de porter à la connaissance de l'Ambassade du Roi, pour l'information de la Porte, tout ce qui venait de se passer, et les confidences qu'il avait reçues, l'Amiral Lalande a fait tout ce que sa position et les circonstances lui permettaient de faire, et ce qu'on était en droit d'attendre du Commandant des Forces Navales d'une Puissance Amie et Alliée de la Turquie.

Vous vous seriez peut-être enfin épargné la peine de communiquer au Corps Diplomatique, au sujet de l'attentat du Vice-Amiral Osman Bey, un rapport déjà connu de tout le monde, rien que l'Amiral Lalande n'ait lui-même appris le premier à la Porte, au mois de Juillet dernier. Quant à la prétendue approbation et aux prétendus encouragements donnés par cet Amiral aux projets de défection d'Ahmed Pasha, votre Excellence me permettra de croire, qu'aux yeux de tout homme impartial, un rapport rédigé au moment même où les faits venaient de s'accomplir, adressé par un Officier-Général à l'Ambassadeur de son Gouvernement, et destiné à lui rendre un compte fidèle et circonstancié de tout ce qui lui importait de connaître, méritait plus de crédit qu'une déclaration faite de mémoire quatre ou cinq mois après l'événement, et inspirée peut-être à son auteur par le désir de se donner quelque importance, ou l'espoir d'être gracié en flattant d'injustes prévention.

Si vous en jugez autrement, M. le Ministre, et trouvez dans la lettre dont il s'agit, matière à accusation contre la loyauté et l'honneur de M. l'Amiral Lalande, je vous serais obligé d'en faire l'objet d'une communication officielle, destinée à être transmise à mon Gouvernement : la réponse ne peut pas longtemps attendre.

J'ai l'honneur de vous annoncer que je donne copie de la présente lettre à MM. les Représentants des Grandes Cours, et je profite de cette occasion, &c.,  
(Signé) E. DE PONTOIS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 556

Viscount Ponsonby to M de Pontois.

Monsieur l'Envoyé,

Thessalon, January 5, 1840

YESTERDAY evening I had the honour to receive your Excellency's letter, dated January 2, inclosing your letter, under date of December 31, 1839, to his Excellency the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs. I have to acquaint you that, having heard of M. Avidick's report to his Government, I asked his Excellency Rechid Pasha for a copy of it, which his Excellency was good enough to send me, and which, it seems to me, he could not well have refused doing. I believe others of our Colleagues, as well as myself, made a similar request. It was natural, and I think right, to endeavour to know what actually was said, when there were so many reports in circulation.

I avail myself, &c.

(Signed) PONSONBY



Inclosure 4 in No. 556.

M. de Pontois to Rechid Pasha.

M. le Ministre,

Pera, le 3 Janvier, 1840.

JE reçois à l'instant la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire en date du 1er de ce mois, pour me transmettre un extrait du rapport fait par le sieur Avidick, Drogman du Capoudan Pacha, au sujet de l'entrevue qui a eu lieu entre le Riala Bey et M. le Contre-Amiral Lalande.

J'ai l'honneur de vous dire que votre Excellence en faisant cette communication, se montre personnellement disposée à ne pas accueillir les fausses imputations qui ont été faites sur la conduite de M. le Commandant des Forces Navales Françaises dans le Levant. Mais comme du reste cette pièce ne me donne lieu de rien ajouter aux observations que j'ai eu, M. le Ministre, l'honneur de vous adresser le 31 du mois dernier, je me borne à vous annoncer que je vais la transmettre à mon Excellence, ainsi qu'à M. le Contre-Amiral Lalande, et je la prie de communiquer à votre Excellence les réponses qui me seront faites à ce sujet.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,  
(Signé) R. DE PONTOIS

Inclosure 5 in No. 556

Rechid Pasha to Viscount Ponsonby

M. le Vicomte,

Sublime Porte, le 4 Janvier, 1840

SON Excellence M. le Comte de Pontois m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser par son courrier la lettre que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous adresser le 31 du mois dernier, au sujet de l'entrevue qui a eu lieu entre le Riala Bey et M. le Contre-Amiral Lalande. J'ai l'honneur de vous dire que j'ai reçu la lettre que vous m'avez adressée, et que j'ai l'honneur de vous adresser ci-joint les deux pièces.

Je serais charmé d'apprendre qu'elles aient pu mettre votre Excellence à même d'apprécier à leur véritable valeur les motifs qui m'ont dirigé dans la circonstance dont il s'agit.

Veuillez, &c.,  
(Signé) RECHID

Inclosure 6 in No. 556

Rechid Pasha to M. de Pontois.

M. le Comte,

Le 1er Janvier, 1840.

J'ai l'honneur de transmettre ci-joint un extrait du rapport présenté par le Sieur Avidick, Drogman du Capoudan Pacha, au sujet de l'entrevue qui eut lieu entre le Riala Bey et M. l'Amiral Lalande.

Les faits articulés dans ce rapport me paraissent de nature à pouvoir fixer l'attention de votre Excellence. J'espère moi-même à me persuader, M. le Comte, qu'un Amiral de la Puissance que la Sublime Porte se flâte de regarder comme sa plus ancienne amie et alliée, ait paru approuver une résolution qui, de quelque motif qu'on la colore, n'en présente pas moins le caractère d'une odieuse trahison. Toutefois, j'ai pensé qu'en portant à votre connaissance le rapport précité, je vous mettrais à même de dispenser si vous le jugez convenable jusqu'au moindre doute qu'il ferait naître au sujet de la part attribuée à M. l'Amiral Lalande dans la circonstance dont il s'agit.

Je serais moi-même heureux, M. le Comte, de voir ainsi justifiée aux yeux de tous mon opinion personnelle.

Je vous prie d'agréer, &c.,  
(Signé) RECHID

Inclosure 7 in No. 556

Rechid Pasha to M. de Pontois.

M. le Comte,

Le 4 Janvier, 1840

J'ai reçu la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 31 Décembre, et je dois regretter qu'elle se soit croisée avec celle que je vous ai moi-même adressée.

Peut-être m'est-il permis de penser que si cette dernière vous fût parvenue plus tôt, vous auriez jugé inutile de donner suite à la vôtre.

En fait, vous paraissiez disposé à croire que le Ministère Ottoman n'a pu se dispenser de reconnaître M. l'Amiral Lalande pour la part que lui prête le rapport de l'Interprète de l'Ex-Capoudan Pacha à la résolution de ce dernier.

Ma lettre vous faisait connaître mon opinion personnelle là-dessus, et mon désir de vous mettre à même par la même occasion de vous faire part de cette opinion aux yeux de tout le monde. Je ne saurais donc vous adresser aucune excuse à cet égard. Je ne saurais donc vous adresser aucune excuse à cet égard.

Je ne saurais donc vous adresser aucune excuse à cet égard. Je ne saurais donc vous adresser aucune excuse à cet égard. Je ne saurais donc vous adresser aucune excuse à cet égard.

La Sublime Porte ayant adopté pour principe de ne pas se mêler de ce qui ne regarde que les autres, elle ne saurait donc vous adresser aucune excuse à cet égard. Je ne saurais donc vous adresser aucune excuse à cet égard.

Je ne saurais donc vous adresser aucune excuse à cet égard. Je ne saurais donc vous adresser aucune excuse à cet égard. Je ne saurais donc vous adresser aucune excuse à cet égard.

Je ne saurais donc vous adresser aucune excuse à cet égard. Je ne saurais donc vous adresser aucune excuse à cet égard. Je ne saurais donc vous adresser aucune excuse à cet égard.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,  
(Signé) RECHID

No. 557

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 31)

No. 6.

My Lord,

Therapia, January 8, 1840

I ENCLOSE reports from Alexandria, for which I am indebted to the Internuncio. They may be interesting to your Lordship as confirmatory of other information.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure 1 in No. 557.

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Sturner.

M. le Baron,

Alexandrie, le 23 Décembre, 1839.

LE bateau à vapeur du Grand Seigneur, le "Peili Chewket," arriva ici dans la matinée du 18 Décembre. Il nous amena Kiamil Pacha, ci-devant Ministre à Berlin. La curiosité que l'apparition de ce dignitaire excita à Alexandrie était telle qu'on sût le motif de sa mission avant qu'il n'eût mis pied à terre.

Tandis que le bateau jetait l'ancre, Kiamil Pacha fut questionné par les amis de Mehmet Ali s'il était porteur de la nouvelle de la destitution de Hosrew Pacha, ou bien de celle de sa mort, et d'un arrangement définitif de l'Affaire Egyptienne.

Aussi des bruits dans ce sens coururent incessamment en ville. Mais dès que Kiamil Pacha eut déclaré franchement qu'il n'avait rien de semblable à mander par rapport à Hosrew Pacha, et que sa mission n'avait pas trait à la Question Egyptienne, l'émotion causée d'abord par son arrivée se calma, d'autant plus qu'il se répandit bientôt la nouvelle qu'il n'apportait que le Hatti Chérif de Goulhané, et qu'il se rendrait, après l'avoir transmis au Vice-Roi, au Caire, pour y faire proclamer solennellement le contenu de ce document.

Le Président du Conseil des Moavins, Houssein Pacha, eut l'ordre d'aller au-devant de Kiamil jusqu'en bas de l'escalier du Palais, et de l'introduire à Méhémet Ali. La cérémonie se passa tout simplement. Le Vice-Roi reçut le Hatti Chérif de la main de Kiamil Pacha, le porta à son front et à sa bouche, et après un entretien confidentiel d'une demi-heure dans lequel il fut arrêté que Kiamil Pacha partirait le 21 Décembre pour le Caire, accompagné de Habib Effendi, ancien Chinja de cette ville, que le Hatti Chérif y serait proclamé, enregistré et communiqué en copie à toutes les autorités provinciales, le Ministre de la Porte se rendit dans la maison du Divan Effendi où on lui avait préparé les appartemens.

Méhémet Ali ne parut ni se réjouir ni s'embarrasser de la mission de Kiamil Pacha. Il fit accrédiiter l'opinion parmi le peuple, que ce Hatti Chérif n'était autre chose que l'ibka ordinaire par lequel on le confirmait dans sa dignité.

Le départ de Kiamil Pacha et de Habib Effendi pour le Caire eut effectivement lieu le 21 Décembre à 9 heures.

Le 19, Kiamil Pacha garda ses amis qu'il trouva à son arrivée. Méhémet Ali, en le traitant en Vizir, sujet de la Porte, sans faire semblant de s'apercevoir de ses prétentions, réjouit extrêmement les Musulmans dévoués au Grand Seigneur; il encouragea beaucoup les officiers de l'escadre Ottomane.

La veille de son départ, Kiamil Pacha dîna chez le Vice-Roi. Le Capouan Pacha, Ahmed Pacha, Sami Bey, Habib Effendi, et l'ex-Consul Campbell, furent parmi les convives. A en juger d'après la conduite de tous ceux qui assistaient à ce dîner, on aurait dit que la société n'était composée que de fidèles sujets du même Souverain.

Agréé, &c.,  
(Signé) LAURIN

Inclosure 2 in No. 557.

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Sturner.

M. le Baron,

Alexandrie, le 28 Décembre, 1839.

LE changement d'uniforme de la Marine de Sa Hauteur est en rapport avec une autre disposition que Méhémet Ali vient de faire. Ce changement n'a rien moins pour but que la fusion de tous les équipages du Sultan avec ceux de Méhémet Ali. La flotte Egyptienne doit passer à bord des vaisseaux Ottomans, et vice versa. Mais il est à prévoir que cette mesure, qu'on met

déjà à exécution, sera suivie d'une fusion générale des équipages les que les hauts commandés seront prêts.

Le but avoué de cette disposition est d'apporter plus d'unité dans les manœuvres et dans l'action. Cette mesure doit avoir été proposée par Ahmed Fevzi Pacha, qui pense d'ailleurs que la flotte du Sultan ne peut servir que par le 1<sup>er</sup> ordre du service d'aller, en observant l'attitude d'un Arabe qui sort plus adroit et plus agiles.

Mais ce n'est pas ce but que s'est proposé Méhémet Ali. Il paraît avoir remarqué que la flotte Ottomane n'est pas soumise à son regard des semences les plus pures. Il sait même qu'il y aurait probablement une émeute dans le cas où le paiement de la solde éprouverait les délais qui ne sont ni un temps d'arrêt. C'est pourquoi il cherche à prévenir, à temps, un sentiment exagéré et se fait d'abord plus sûr avec sujet qu'il n'est. Son but est de faire aux équipages que sa flotte est appelée avec celle du Sultan. Il n'a pas d'autre but que de faire passer la permission et le respect du Sultan à la flotte de son qualité de Père commun de la Patrie et de Chef de l'Etat.

Aujourd'hui, Ahmed Fevzi Pacha donne à dîner à Méhémet Ali et aux Etats-Majors des Flottes Turque et Egyptienne. Les officiers et les capitaines y ont pris part de sorte qu'il y a eu environ 1000 couverts. Ce dîner aura lieu sous la voûte de Mahomet, de 130 pièces de canon. L'effet que ces dîners ont produit sur les Français et les Turcs de cette ville est que Méhémet Ali a été reconnu le maître et s'est formellement approprié la flotte du Grand Seigneur.

Agréé, &c.,  
(Signé) LAURIN

No. 558.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston - Received January 11.

(No. 9, Confidential.)

My Lord,

Therapia, January 8, 1840.

CONSIDERING it my duty to learn as much as I could of the opinions of M. de Pontas, I requested General Clarke to make an inquiry.

M. de Pontas talks freely to the General, and says to him such things as he wishes me to know when he may not choose to speak to me himself. I begged of the General not to contradict him, but to let him go on.

I forward the General's report of the conversation as your Lordship may like to know what a French Minister says here, although you are fully acquainted with the subject of his conversation.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure in No. 558.

General Chresonovici to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extrait.)

Le 7 Janvier, 1840.

CONFORMEMENT aux ordres de votre Excellence, je me suis rendu chez M. de Pontas. Il m'a raconté la conversation qu'il a eue avec le Général Clarke. Je ne puis que vous dire que cet homme qui apparemment apporte quelques renseignements là-dessus. Il m'a dit que le Gouvernement Anglais a annoncé au Cabinet Français, que la Russie consentait à l'entrée dans la Mer de Marmara des flottes des autres Puissances, en cas où elle serait appelée pour préserver Constantinople.



contre une attaque d'Ibrahim en l'invitant en même temps de punir l'Angleterre et la Russie. Les négociations. Que le Gouvernement Français, avant que ce point principal de la Question Orientale était résolu, a demandé au Gouvernement Anglais, qu'il était prêt de procéder à un examen des propositions réciproques sur l'arrangement entre le Sultan et le Pacha.

Après avoir lu les parties des dépêches du Maréchal Soult adressées à lui et à M. Sebastiani, où cela était statué, il a ajouté que le mal venait de ce que les deux Gouvernements avaient formulé trop positivement leurs propositions, néanmoins, qu'il espérait qu'on viendrait à s'entendre. Que si la chose était ainsi, le pacha lui-même à Lord Melbourne et au Roi Louis Philippe il ne pouvait pas qu'il annonçât un arrangement. Que M. Sebastiani avait empêché de le faire par son refus, mais qu'il avait envoyé de Paris M. de Bourqueney, qui était très capable. Que Lord Palmerston avait fait des concessions trop grandes à la Russie, et qu'il était certain que la Russie ne viendrait dans le Bosphore, ce qui lui donnerait la possibilité d'attaquer Constantinople et de s'en emparer. Que si les deux Gouvernements de France et d'Angleterre parvenaient à s'entendre, on en fera ce qui sera convenu, au rapport à l'occupation en commun de Constantinople, et que cette occupation ne sera pas nécessaire. Qu'il avait aussi entendu dire que la mission de Brunnow ne réussira pas, si elle n'est appuyée par la Russie, car les concessions à elle faites ne passeront pas pour les autres Puissances. Que ce cas échéant, la France, l'Angleterre, l'Autriche, seraient contraintes de quelques mesures, et de se retirer de la Porte. Que M. Metternich voyant et apprenant ce qui se passait, se serait efforcé d'empêcher par les Prussiens, et la Russie, de ne pas laisser le commandement de l'armée d'occupation à la Russie, et de ne pas laisser le commandement de l'armée d'occupation à la Russie.

Je lui ai répondu que cette déclaration Russe pourrait bien n'être pas tellement innocente et inoffensive comme elle en a l'air. La Russie, si alors elle ne réussit pas à encourager la résistance du Pacha, pourra trouver des moyens à pousser le Sultan à ne pas y donner son consentement, et obtenir un prétexte pour l'attaquer. Il lui a dit que les conditions qu'on dictera au Pacha, mais qu'il fallait aussi réunir les moyens pour mettre ces conditions en exécution par force, et que ce n'est que par là qu'on s'opposera à ce que peut faire la Russie à Alexandrie et à Constantinople pour contrarier la décision des Trois Puissances.

M. de Ponthieu a parlé ensuite des propositions du Prince de Metternich, il a dit qu'elles ne répondaient pas à ce qu'on en attendait; qu'il était visible que l'Autriche voulait ménager tout le monde; que M. de St. Aulaire, dans une lettre particulière, disait que le Prince, en lui parlant, appuyait sur ce que l'Autriche était contrainte à l'emploi de la force, et en parlant à Lord Beauvale, que l'Autriche était prête à faire usage de moyens coercitifs. Il a ajouté, que l'Empereur Nicolas était en courroux contre le Prince, qu'il l'avait déjà témoigné, et que maintenant il en donne une nouvelle preuve en envoyant l'Empereur contre le Prince de Metternich d'ici l'année 1827.

No. 559.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 31.)

No. 37.

My Lord,

Paris, January 29 1840.

MARSHAL SOULT last night informed me that the Baron de Bourqueney would be dispatched this day to London, for the purpose of appraising

the duties with which he was now charged at the Court of Her Majesty, and that it was the King's intention to mark his sense of the services of Count Sebastiani, by advancing him to the dignity of Marshal of France.

Marshal Soult at the same time told me that M. Guizot would be named Ambassador to England, if the choice of that gentleman should be agreeable to Her Majesty.

In reply to this communication, I said that Her Majesty's Government would certainly regret the departure of Count Sebastiani, who was animated with the most sincere desire to maintain the best understanding between France and England, and whose personal character, and the high position which he occupied, were from which he was about to be relieved, and had by his honourable and straightforward conduct conciliated the good opinion and respect of those with whom he had to do; but that they would learn with pleasure His Majesty's gracious intention to confer the high dignity of Marshal of France upon Count Sebastiani.

That with respect to the appointment of M. Guizot to the vacant Embassy, his high reputation could not fail to secure to him a most favourable reception by Her Majesty and by Her Majesty's Government.

M. Guizot has just called upon me, and said he was glad to have the opportunity of assuring me that Count Sebastiani could not have been more anxious than he will be, to maintain the most intimate alliance between the British and French Governments.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 560.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

No. 37.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 31, 1840.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch, No. 26, of the 24th instant reporting a conversation which your Excellency had held with Marshal Soult on the subject of a confidential despatch which the Marshal had received from Count Sebastiani, relative to the negotiations now carrying on in London upon the affairs of Turkey and Egypt, I have to state to your Excellency, that I have made no communication to you as yet upon this subject, because I have had no time to communicate.

I will send Count Sebastiani confidentially on paper a sheet of paper which had suggested itself to me as one to which all the Five Powers might agree. But I have not yet decided upon it, and I have not yet made any formal proposition to any of the Plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 561.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 31, 1840.)

No. 7.

My Lord,

Alexandria, December 27, 1839.

IT has been for some time known at this place, that great discontent exists among the crews of the Turkish and Egyptian squadrons, and that the circumstance has caused considerable anxiety to Mehemet Ali, and led him to the determination of amalgamating the crews of the Turkish and Egyptian squadrons.

M. de Laurin, the Austrian Consul-General, called upon me this day, and confirmed what I have stated to your Lordship, adding that Mehemet Ali had ordered 15,000 Egyptian uniforms to be made for the Turkish sailors, who are all well disposed to exchange their present Frank costume for that of the Ottomans. M. de Laurin further informed me that Mehemet Ali is assigning an equal number of Egyptian and Turkish officers on board the Sultan's squadron, expecting thereby to avert the dangers that are already impending.

The Viceroy gives this day a dinner on board the "Mahmoudieh," the flag-ship, to the officers of all ranks of the combined Turkish and Egyptian fleets, and I hope, in a subsequent despatch to be enabled to acquaint your Lordship of any event of interest that may have taken place at that meeting.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES

No. 562.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 31, 1840.)

My Lord,  
Alexandria, December 27, 1839

I HAVE the honour to enclose for your Lordship a despatch transmitted to me under the signature of Mr Consul Werry.

I have just learnt that a considerable military movement has just taken place in Syria. The garrison of Marash, which is now 9,000 strong, is to be increased to 12,000, and the works of St. Jean d'Acce which are already formidable, are to be put into a perfect state of defence.

I have been here for too short a period and my means of obtaining information are too scanty but it is to be regretted that the state of the country is such as to prevent the feeling in this country or at the court of Constantinople of the necessity of a more active policy.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES

No. 563.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 1)

No. 4.  
My Lord,  
St. Petersburg, January 14, 1840.

UPON my return here I found the Russian Government in great agitation at the despatch to Count Schouvaloff which Mr Consul Werry has forwarded to your Lordship's place, and the course of conduct of the French Government in the Treaty of 1839.

Count Nesselrode complains at the introduction at all of Russia in a reply to a communication relating solely to the course pursued by France; 2ndly, at the assertion that Russia has aimed at the exercise of an exclusive influence in the East, and of a conquest of the whole of Asia; 3rdly, at the French policy in view of the fact that the Russian Empire is situated in the East of Europe.

But Count Nesselrode appears also very sore at the colour given to the French Ministerial Journals to the language in which the French Government has treated the Russian Government. These papers represent as a matter of course the Russian Government as a matter of course as a matter of course. I have seen the Russian papers and they are very full of the same kind of language. I have seen the Russian papers and they are very full of the same kind of language. I have seen the Russian papers and they are very full of the same kind of language.

The Russian Government are very anxious to see the terms of the Treaty of 1839, and the course of conduct of the French Government. I have seen the Russian papers and they are very full of the same kind of language. I have seen the Russian papers and they are very full of the same kind of language. I have seen the Russian papers and they are very full of the same kind of language.

proceed with the vigour and consistency with which they had hitherto acted, and which the conduct of the Emperor was so well calculated to inspire and deserved to meet with.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) CLANRICARDE

No. 564

Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde

No. 15.  
My Lord,  
Foreign Office, February 3, 1840

HER Majesty's Government approve the language which your Excellency held to Count Nesselrode, as reported in your despatch No. 4, respecting the course which Her Majesty's Government would pursue in the Torco-Egyptian Question.

With reference to the irritation which your Excellency states is felt by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, at the language of Marshal Soult and of the French press respecting Russia, I have to observe to your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government are aware that the Emperor of Russia is too sagacious and quick-sighted not to perceive that the articles in the French Journals, to which your Excellency alludes, are specially intended to peck the Russian Cabinet, and, if possible, to prevent it from uniting with Great Britain and Austria, in support of the Sultan, and in opposition to Mehmet Ali, in whose interest those papers have been engaged.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 565.

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 3, 1840.)

No. 18.  
My Lord,  
Damascus, December 23, 1839.

I HAD the honour of addressing your Lordship, my last despatch, No. 17, on the 28th ultimo, per Beyrout sailing packet.

His Excellency Ismael Bey proceeded from hence on the 17th instant, to the N plous district, with rather a considerable irregular force of foot and cavalry, ostensibly to collect taxes due to the Government.

A regiment of Cavalry and one of Horse Artillery have arrived here from the north, and remain in garrison. One regiment of Infantry is also arrived at Hamah. The 18th Infantry has marched from hence to Acce, the Government here says it is to garrison that fortress, but I am told it is destined for Egypt. The cause stated for these troops having been marched from the north, is that they have suffered from sickness, and their removal from thence became indispensable, and that they are merely to winter in the Damascus district and the south; whether the stations they will occupy may have been decided on from any political motive connected with the future state of this country, your Lordship can best judge. Nothing at present denotes that the troops on the Marash frontier and at Orfa will fall back, or that those in the environs of Aleppo will retire to the south.

I hear that the Emir Bechr has succeeded in reestablishing order on the roads between Acce, Tyre, and this place, infested by the Mutazils under Sheik Hussein Sbeib, but he with his partisans, now reduced to about twenty persons, have not been apprehended; the Government has threatened to destroy the houses of all those who are found absent from, or suspected of being so, to join this Chief, which strong measure has produced, for the present, the effect of reducing these insurgents.

The country, in other respects, is quiet, and as winter is setting in, it may



be hoped that it will remain so, as the country is not adapted for marauding or insurrectionary movements during the inclement season.

The Pilgrim Mecca Caravan is on its departure. The number of Turks is very small, not above 600. The Persians are about 800. A combination of circumstances seems to tend to deter yearly the Muslims from undertaking this religious journey.

Commerce and the industrial branches of all kinds, are in a very languid and depressed state, arising chiefly from the limited extent of operations with Bagdad, whose markets are influenced by the state of Persia, and the great influx of goods to them. The uncertain political position of this country materially increases the paralysis which pervades the whole system in Syria, and the late increase in the price of the Government bonds, and the consequent rise in the price of the cotton, has tended to prevent, in many parts, the cultivation of lands.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) N. W. WERRY

No. 566

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 3.)

No. 38.)

My Lord,

Paris, January 31, 1840.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to No. 36 inclusive.

Marshal Soult has been informed of the despatches received yesterday from your Lordship, and he has been instructed to inform the Emperor that the Convention to be concluded between the Sultan and the Five Great Powers, and not as had been intended, by a Convention to which the Sultan was not previously invited to be a Contracting Party, and that Her Majesty's Council had unanimously approved of this proposal.

The Marshal said, that his own opinion entirely coincided upon this point with that of Her Majesty's Government, and that this communication from the French Ambassador gave him great satisfaction. He doubted, however, very much that the Court of St. Petersburg would agree to a proposition by which it was proposed to give a preference to the French flag in the Mediterranean, and that the Court of Vienna would agree to a proposition which France had insisted upon when it was first put forward by the Treaty of London.

The Marshal calculated the time that must necessarily elapse before a Plenipotentiary from Turkey could arrive in London, and he seemed to rejoice that during the next few months the French Government would not be under the necessity of refusing assent to be a party to a Convention of the Five Powers regarding the Affairs of the East.

I suggested to the Turkish Ambassador at Paris, whether he would be prepared to sign a Convention in which he should undertake to do so for the purpose of executing an agreement which must otherwise be delayed for a great length of time. His Excellency said that he had no orders from his Government which would justify him in taking such a step, and he quitted London upon his own responsibility.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

No. 567

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 11.)

No. 9.

My Lord,

Alexandria, December 30, 1839.

IN reference to my despatch No. 7, of the 27th instant, I have been given to understand by Mr. de Lamoignon, a French officer, that a very particular importance took place on the occasion of the dinner given by Mehemet Ali on

the 27th, on board the "Mahmoudieh." Mehemet Ali made great professions of loyalty and devotion to the Sultan before the Turkish officers, saying that it would afford him great satisfaction to renew similar occasions of cementing those sentiments which were happily now in common amongst them all for the good of their country.

The Austrian and Russian Consuls-General called upon the Pasha yesterday: the former questioned him in rather a jocular manner as to his object in placing an equal number of Egyptian and Turkish officers on board the Turkish squadron. Mehemet Ali replied, "that he had done so at the request of Ahmed Capudan Pasha and the two other Admirals, who, seeing the superiority in the discipline and manœuvring of the Egyptian squadron, thought it advisable to adopt this system for placing the crews of both squadrons on an equal footing of efficiency." The Austrian Consul-General inquired his object in changing the uniforms of the Turkish sailors. "This measure I have also resorted to at the suggestion of the Capudan Pasha," replied Mehemet Ali, "and I know it will be popular among the sailors themselves who are anxious and willing to change the Muscovite costume for that of the Turkish." "But all this," replied M. de Laurin, "coincides badly with your assurances that you only detained the Turkish squadron for a time, without intending to keep it at all as forming part of your own forces." "What I am doing," replied Mehemet Ali, "is but natural and just. I shall give up the Turkish squadron as soon as the differences between the Porte and myself are arranged; and if, in the interim, I am attacked by any Foreign Power, I will use it as a means of defence, which my present position would fully justify." Count Medem informs me that his conversation with the Pasha was of a similar nature.

A slight attack of fever has confined me to my house, but I hope to be able in a few days to wait upon Mehemet Ali, and afford him an opportunity of speaking upon public matters; not that I think this delay in any way militates against the execution of your Lordship's instructions to me.

I send this despatch under flying seal to Viscount Ponsonby, requesting him to forward it to Lord Beaumont for his perusal.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES

No. 568

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 11.)

No. 1.

My Lord,

Alexandria, January 4, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 27th instant, which, as you are well aware, is a very important one. I have been in the habit of seeing the Pasha, Ahmed Capudan Pasha, and the two other Admirals, and the best of them, and I have seen that he had always received with pleasure the presents of the late Sultan announcing the appointment of British Agents, and that the circumstance of his present youthful Sovereign being a particular friend of the British Government enhanced it greatly on this occasion. The Capudan Pasha then retired, although I had met him at Constantinople in two or three days before, and I could avoid recognizing him.

The Pasha opened the conversation by saying, in reply to a desire which I expressed of seizing the opportunity of accompanying him to see Cairo, that that depended not on him, but upon the English Government, in whose hands now rested the option of good or evil in the settlement of his question with the Porte. I begged to assure his Highness of the friendly intentions of Her Majesty's Government; and assured him, that whatever his own opinions might be, no Power could be more interested in his prosperity and the preservation of his legitimate power, but at the same time announced to him the positive determination of Her Majesty's Government to adhere to the line of policy which it had definitively adopted on this subject, and of which an additional proof was afforded to his Highness, by the nomination of a new Agent to enforce it. His Highness might rely upon my faithfully expressing the intention of

[illegible]

Although my personal knowledge of the Pasha is of a very short duration, it was evident to me, from the anxiety he expressed by his manner and gesture, that he was labouring under great anxiety of mind, and uncertainty of action; and I believe that I may, even after so short a residence in this country, assure your Lordship that Mehemet Ali will submit, as soon as he sees a force able to compel him to do so at hand, but not until then.

Have &c  
Signed G. LEYD HODGES

No. 569

*Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received February 11.)

(No. 21)

My Lord,

Alexandria, January 4, 1840.

AFTER my interview with Mehmet Ali yesterday, a Council was summoned at 11 a.m. by Mr. W. R. to the War Office and his troops and the H. I. for the reinforcement of the garrison of Alexandria, was taken into consideration. This force, I am told, does not exceed 4,000 men, and it has been

decided to hold them in readiness to march upon this point. Instructions have been given to the squadrons and telegraphs, to bring into use and familiarize themselves with the French Code of Signals.

These circumstances may be deemed worthy of notice, and I therefore beg leave to report them for your Lordship's information.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 570

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 21)

My Lord,

Alexandria, January 6, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that a few hours after the arrival here of the French steamer from Marseilles, M. Cochelet, Consul-General for France, waited upon the Pasha, and made to him the following communication :—" That Russia had made many concessions to the other Powers, and was about to identify her policy with that of England and Austria by uniting her force to theirs for the termination of the Egyptian Question ; that to such an union France could not object, and that it was even one to which she herself might possibly become a party : that it was necessary for the Pasha to be convinced, that the arrangement of the Egyptian Question, upon the basis proposed by France, was no longer attainable. M. Cochelet went on to warn the Pasha of the dangers to which he would expose himself by a perseverance in his present course. To this the Pasha replied, that having exercised moderation in preventing his army from advancing upon Constantinople after the battle of Nezib, he relied upon the Great Powers taking this circumstance into consideration ; that even the oppressed were entitled to justice ; that he would await events, and place his confidence in Divine Providence.

Count Modern, Russian Consul-General, called upon the Pasha soon after and made a similar declaration on the part of his Government; adding, "If you should attempt to move on Constantinople, you may expect to have a Russian force opposed to you." The Pasha answered, "I have no thoughts of moving upon Constantinople, for I am not able to contend with one Power, much less with all."

I have since learnt, from a source on which I can place reliance, that the Pasha has declared to the people about him, that he will surrender his just rights only with his life; using the words, "they must first trample on my body."

In addition, I have only to state that, from everything I can hear and learn, Mehemet Ali will only submit when he sees the danger near at hand.

I have, Sir,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 57.

*Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston.*—Received February 11.

— 113 —

My Lord,

Braka, February 6, 1840

[illegible]

2 P



M. Lane, however, adds his impression, that Ibrahim would not have it in his power to muster such a large force at the Bosphorus stronger than 15,000 men, and that the Turkish garrison of Constantinople, together with 2,000 Artillerymen withdrawn from the Danube, would be sufficiently strong to resist the passage of the Bosphorus, and an attack upon Constantinople by the Pasha, whose success in the event of his attempt would probably end to the total destruction of his army.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GEORGE B. HAMILTON

No. 572

Sir George Hamilton to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 11.)

No. 13. Secret and Confidential

My Lord,

Berlin, February 5, 1840.

BARON WERTHER conversed with me confidentially at some length this morning on the state of the Eastern Negotiations, and on M. Guizot's appointment to succeed Count Sebastiani in London.

With regard to the former of these subjects, I may report to your Lordship Baron Werther's opinion, that Her Majesty's Government must have too recently been informed of the result of the negotiations with France, to have been able to recourse to the same means of acting at present, and he doubted not that the same happy result would ensue. He considered that the nomination of M. Guizot as ambassador to London, was a step of great consequence, and that, as although M. Guizot was a man of firm purpose and of sound judgment and capacity, and what was of great consequence, his views were all in favour of the English Alliance.

Baron Werther considered that M. Guizot's reputation at home would act most favourably on the French nation and Government, and that he had no doubt that firmness, combined with a due regard on the part of the Queen's Government, to the national sensitiveness of the French (*monayer les susceptibilités Françaises*), would bring the final negotiation to a favourable termination.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GEORGE B. HAMILTON

No. 573.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 11.)

No. 10.

My Lord,

Theraps, January 15, 1840.

I ENCLOSE a letter from Mehmet Ali to the Grand Vizier. It is remarkable for boldness and audacity.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure in No. 573.

Mehmet Ali to the Grand Vizier

Translation.)

AI eu l'honneur de recevoir des mains de Kiamli Pacha, General de l'Armée, et adressés l'un à votre serviteur, et l'autre à mon fils, son Excellence Ibrahim Pacha, dont la substance est: que Sa Majesté Impériale, animée de la

pensée du bien public, a exprimé dans un Hatti Chériff qui vient d'être publié, sa volonté souveraine d'établir de nouvelles institutions tendant à l'amélioration de l'état des provinces et du sort des peuples. Les conséquences du Hatti Chériff, dont les conséquences nécessaires ont été développées, sont: la garantie de la vie et de l'honneur; le mode d'assoir les impôts, et la règle à observer dans le levée des soldats et dans la durée de leur service; qu'attendu la difficulté qu'il y a à exécuter tout de suite les mesures relatives à la perception des impôts et à la durée du service militaire, on doit continuer de percevoir les impôts et d'employer les soldats comme à l'ordinaire, jusqu'à ce que des dispositions calculées à faciliter ces deux objets aient été arrêtées dans les Conseils; et que quant aux autres points déjà développés, on doit commencer à les mettre à exécution dès-à-présent.

J'ai reçu les bruits que l'Empereur a fait publier par ses ordres, et portant sur mes lèvres et sur mon front, et afin de remplir à cette occasion toutes les formalités, j'ai convoqué une grande assemblée et l'y faire lire, j'en ai communiqué les chefs-lieux des provinces et des sandjacks de la Syrie, et j'ai fait lire publiquement à Adana, et qu'il en envoyât une copie à Djeddah.

Effectivement, une assemblée a été tenue au Divan du Caire, à laquelle ont assisté le Cadi, les Moulans des quatre Rats Orthodoxes, tous les Oulémas, Imams, Hatibs, les principaux des habitants, tous les serviteurs de Sa Hautesse, les Vice-Consuls des Puissances Amies, et les Patriarches et les notables des autres Nations Chrétiennes. La lecture a été ouverte et lu avec toutes les démonstrations de la vénération et du respect, et aussitôt la lecture terminée, tous les assistants ont ben le Sultan et fait des vœux pour la conservation de ses jours précieux et pour la prospérité de son Empire.

Il est tout loué! C'est dans le tems du très-grand, très-puissant, et très-Auguste Sultan régnant que vont revivre les Lois Divines et la Loi de Dieu, à cause des circonstances, se trouvant depuis nombre d'années tombées dans l'oubli. Cette sollicitude Souveraine fait voir que la Providence Divine veille sur la conservation de l'Empire, et sur le bonheur et la prospérité de Sa Hautesse. Mais tant que les réglemens de justice dont il s'agit n'auront pas été établis, c'est en vain que les Ministres de la Sublime Porte, honnêtes, doués de loyauté, de dévouement, de zèle, et de pitié, s'efforceront et prendront mille de ses fonctions; car il est clair que là où un bon principe n'existe pas, il n'y a aucun bon effet à attendre.

Le pays où je me trouve est à l'extrémité de l'Empire, et c'est avec de grands efforts que j'ai réussi, il y a déjà plusieurs années, à y établir la garantie de la vie, de l'honneur et de la fortune. Les lois n'ont été mis à mort qu'il n'y ait été légalement condamné. Les puissances ne molestent en aucune manière les faibles, ni dans leur honneur ni dans leurs biens. La confiscation, la condamnation à l'amende, et les payemens à faire aux Maubashirs (officiers chargés du recouvrement des monnaies) ont été supprimés et remplacés de tems à autre par d'autres réglemens. Nul n'est condamné à subir par la loi du talion une peine encourue par un autre. On fait toucher exactement aux héritiers, quelle que soit la nation à laquelle ils appartiennent, la part qui leur est échue, et l'on ne les en prive en rien, et lorsque l'occasion se présentait, rédigé des Codes de peu d'étendue et à la portée de chacun, qui sont, sous les auspices du Sultan, maintenus en vigueur.

Il existe surtout des codes militaires pour l'armée et la marine lesquels ont été sanctionnés par la signature des Oulémas, et doivent, ainsi que la résolution en a été prise, avoir toujours force de loi.

Tels sont les réglemens qui ont été établis et dont on ne s'est jamais écarté. Après cela, on avait fixé à cinq ans, à compter du jour de l'enrollement, le terme du service militaire. Mais plus tard, en considérant de l'exigence des tems, et par des raisons locales, le service a été fixé à quatre ans. D'autres excellentes dispositions de ce genre ont aussi été faites et suivies. Mais attendu la difficulté qu'il y a à faire ces sortes de réglemens, aucune branche de ces institutions n'a pu être portée à sa perfection.

Que Dieu daigne conserver la prospérité de l'Empire de Sa Hautesse jusqu'à la consécration des siècles. Fort de la volonté que Sa Majesté Impériale vient

manifestes, je mettrai désormais tous mes soins à exécuter, avec l'assistance de toutes les dispositions que renferme le susdit noble Firman; et sous les ordres de Sa Majesté Impériale, toutes auront sous peu de tems été mises à exécution.

Et pour exprimer toute ma reconnaissance ainsi que pour renouveler les assurances, que j'écris à votre Altesse la présente lettre, que je lui envoie par Kioski Pacha qui s'en retourne à Constantinople.

No. 574.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 11.)

No. 12

My Lord,

Thessalon, January 15, 1840.

I ENCLOSE two reports from Syria, as also a list of the forts in each Castle and Battery situated within the Straits of the Dardanelles.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 574

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby

Extract.

Aleppo, December 24, 1839

H. H. the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha continues to occupy Marash, and, from all appearances, has not the intention for the present of abandoning that point, or retiring the force he has with him from that position.

The forces at Orfa remain without any further change than that noted in my last despatch to your Lordship, that the 11th and 17th Regiments of the Line in garrison here left this for Orfa, and since then the 9th and 14th Regiments of the same, who were at Orfa, have replaced them here, where they continue to remain.

The 13th Regiment of Cavalry stationed here has also received orders to proceed south to Acre, for which place it has left; and the 2nd Regiment of Artillery has returned to its post here, from Antab.

It is rumoured, that some of the other regiments that are at present at Antab are soon to come to this place to winter; and the Government here, I understand, has already prepared and emptied several khans for their reception.

I have further to inform your Lordship, that I learn from several quarters, that some of the regiments from the Adana district, and some of those that have occupied the north-eastern frontier, have also been sent to the south, to their respective posts. This movement, and the disposition of the forces retiring south, is generally supposed to be for the purpose of placing all the troops into quarters suited for the severe months of the winter season which has approached.

By the latest advices from the Alexandretta district, I learn from Mr. Vice-Consul Hays, that for the present everything continues quiet, and that the inhabitants of the neighbouring mountains have not evinced any further symptoms of discontent against the Government, which continues to exact the taxes.

Inclosure 2 in No. 574.

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby

No. 4

My Lord,

Damascus, December 28, 1839

I HAD the honour of addressing your Lordship, per Austrian steamer, despatch No. 44, on the 4th instant.

The 16th Regiment of Infantry, which arrived here from the north, has pro-

ceeded to Acre. A regiment of Horse Artillery, and one of Cavalry, has been stationed here; and one regiment of Infantry has arrived at Hamah.

I hear the Mutassil Naki, Hussein Shebib, who inhabited the environs of Tyre, has with a few followers entered the Ladsen. The Government here expects that the Scut Arab, Sheik Antash, will cause them to be seized and delivered up to this Government. Twenty-two Mutassils have been brought here and delivered to the Government, by the Emir Debar, who is a leading part of Hussein Shebib's followers. Two of them killed a Cavalry Officer at Karsheya, and have committed various depredations in the country. They are to be sent to Acre, and the rest are to be sent to Acre. In other respects the country is in a peaceful state.

Our Haggad post, which arrived here on the 17th, bringing advices to the 2nd does not contain any new intelligence. I hear that the Egyptians are as active as ever, as they were previously represented to be, in Arabia.

I do not observe any fresh measures of Government which is indicative of its future policy. Affairs remain in the same state which I had the honour of notifying to your Lordship in my last despatch.

You will be informed by the Aleppo Pro-Consul of the expected arrival of a large force of troops from the frontier. Ibrahim Pasha was still at Marash. The troops are said to be expected at Aleppo from that point, and are to be sent to the frontier. I hear, however, that the troops are preparing at Aleppo for the present. Whether this intelligence is correct or not, I cannot say. I have, however, from the state of the troops, and the state of the frontier, between the Sultan and Michael Ali, that the frontier is in a state of peace.

The number of pilgrims who are going to Mecca is about 800 Persians and 600 Turks. The favour of the Mahomedans seems to diminish annually for this pious journey.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) N. W. WERRY

P.S.—Ismael Bey has proceeded with a considerable force of Irregular Cavalry and Foot, to collect Marash in the N. province.

Inclosure 3 in No. 574

List of the Forts in each Castle and Battery situated within the Straits of the Dardanelles.

	Marmara	Bosphorus	Bozaz	Trakia
1. Fort of St. George				100
2. Fort of St. Andrew				100
3. Fort of St. Peter				100
4. Fort of St. Paul				100
5. Fort of St. John				100
6. Fort of St. James				100
7. Fort of St. Philip				100
8. Fort of St. Mark				100
9. Fort of St. Luke				100
10. Fort of St. Stephen				100
11. Fort of St. Basil				100
12. Fort of St. Constantine				100
13. Fort of St. Helena				100
14. Fort of St. Agatha				100
15. Fort of St. Euphemia				100
16. Fort of St. Sophia				100
17. Fort of St. George				100
18. Fort of St. Andrew				100
19. Fort of St. Peter				100
20. Fort of St. Paul				100
21. Fort of St. John				100
22. Fort of St. James				100
23. Fort of St. Philip				100
24. Fort of St. Mark				100
25. Fort of St. Luke				100
26. Fort of St. Stephen				100
27. Fort of St. Basil				100
28. Fort of St. Constantine				100
29. Fort of St. Helena				100
30. Fort of St. Agatha				100
31. Fort of St. Euphemia				100
32. Fort of St. Sophia				100
33. Fort of St. George				100
34. Fort of St. Andrew				100
35. Fort of St. Peter				100
36. Fort of St. Paul				100
37. Fort of St. John				100
38. Fort of St. James				100
39. Fort of St. Philip				100
40. Fort of St. Mark				100
41. Fort of St. Luke				100
42. Fort of St. Stephen				100
43. Fort of St. Basil				100
44. Fort of St. Constantine				100
45. Fort of St. Helena				100
46. Fort of St. Agatha				100
47. Fort of St. Euphemia				100
48. Fort of St. Sophia				100
49. Fort of St. George				100
50. Fort of St. Andrew				100
51. Fort of St. Peter				100
52. Fort of St. Paul				100
53. Fort of St. John				100
54. Fort of St. James				100
55. Fort of St. Philip				100
56. Fort of St. Mark				100
57. Fort of St. Luke				100
58. Fort of St. Stephen				100
59. Fort of St. Basil				100
60. Fort of St. Constantine				100
61. Fort of St. Helena				100
62. Fort of St. Agatha				100
63. Fort of St. Euphemia				100
64. Fort of St. Sophia				100
65. Fort of St. George				100
66. Fort of St. Andrew				100
67. Fort of St. Peter				100
68. Fort of St. Paul				100
69. Fort of St. John				100
70. Fort of St. James				100
71. Fort of St. Philip				100
72. Fort of St. Mark				100
73. Fort of St. Luke				100
74. Fort of St. Stephen				100
75. Fort of St. Basil				100
76. Fort of St. Constantine				100
77. Fort of St. Helena				100
78. Fort of St. Agatha				100
79. Fort of St. Euphemia				100
80. Fort of St. Sophia				100
81. Fort of St. George				100
82. Fort of St. Andrew				100
83. Fort of St. Peter				100
84. Fort of St. Paul				100
85. Fort of St. John				100
86. Fort of St. James				100
87. Fort of St. Philip				100
88. Fort of St. Mark				100
89. Fort of St. Luke				100
90. Fort of St. Stephen				100
91. Fort of St. Basil				100
92. Fort of St. Constantine				100
93. Fort of St. Helena				100
94. Fort of St. Agatha				100
95. Fort of St. Euphemia				100
96. Fort of St. Sophia				100
97. Fort of St. George				100
98. Fort of St. Andrew				100
99. Fort of St. Peter				100
100. Fort of St. Paul				100
101. Fort of St. John				100
102. Fort of St. James				100
103. Fort of St. Philip				100
104. Fort of St. Mark				100
105. Fort of St. Luke				100
106. Fort of St. Stephen				100
107. Fort of St. Basil				100
108. Fort of St. Constantine				100
109. Fort of St. Helena				100
110. Fort of St. Agatha				100
111. Fort of St. Euphemia				100
112. Fort of St. Sophia				100
113. Fort of St. George				100
114. Fort of St. Andrew				100
115. Fort of St. Peter				100
116. Fort of St. Paul				100
117. Fort of St. John				100
118. Fort of St. James				100
119. Fort of St. Philip				100
120. Fort of St. Mark				100
121. Fort of St. Luke				100
122. Fort of St. Stephen				100
123. Fort of St. Basil				100
124. Fort of St. Constantine				100
125. Fort of St. Helena				100
126. Fort of St. Agatha				100
127. Fort of St. Euphemia				100
128. Fort of St. Sophia				100
129. Fort of St. George				100
130. Fort of St. Andrew				100
131. Fort of St. Peter				100
132. Fort of St. Paul				100
133. Fort of St. John				100
134. Fort of St. James				100
135. Fort of St. Philip				100
136. Fort of St. Mark				100
137. Fort of St. Luke				100
138. Fort of St. Stephen				100
139. Fort of St. Basil				100
140. Fort of St. Constantine				100
141. Fort of St. Helena				100
142. Fort of St. Agatha				100
143. Fort of St. Euphemia				100
144. Fort of St. Sophia				100
145. Fort of St. George				100
146. Fort of St. Andrew				100
147. Fort of St. Peter				100
148. Fort of St. Paul				100
149. Fort of St. John				100
150. Fort of St. James				100
151. Fort of St. Philip				100
152. Fort of St. Mark				100
153. Fort of St. Luke				100
154. Fort of St. Stephen				100
155. Fort of St. Basil				100
156. Fort of St. Constantine				100
157. Fort of St. Helena				100
158. Fort of St. Agatha				100
159. Fort of St. Euphemia				100
160. Fort of St. Sophia				100
161. Fort of St. George				100
162. Fort of St. Andrew				100
163. Fort of St. Peter				100
164. Fort of St. Paul				100
165. Fort of St. John				100
166. Fort of St. James				100
167. Fort of St. Philip				100
168. Fort of St. Mark				100
169. Fort of St. Luke				100
170. Fort of St. Stephen				100
171. Fort of St. Basil				100
172. Fort of St. Constantine				100
173. Fort of St. Helena				100
174. Fort of St. Agatha				100
175. Fort of St. Euphemia				100
176. Fort of St. Sophia				100
177. Fort of St. George				100
178. Fort of St. Andrew				100
179. Fort of St. Peter				100
180. Fort of St. Paul				100
181. Fort of St. John				100
182. Fort of St. James				100
183. Fort of St. Philip				100
184. Fort of St. Mark				100
185. Fort of St. Luke				100
186. Fort of St. Stephen				100
187. Fort of St. Basil				100
188. Fort of St. Constantine				100
189. Fort of St. Helena				100
190. Fort of St. Agatha				100
191. Fort of St. Euphemia				100
192. Fort of St. Sophia				100
193. Fort of St. George				100
194. Fort of St. Andrew				100
195. Fort of St. Peter				100
196. Fort of St. Paul				100
197. Fort of St. John				100
198. Fort of St. James				100
199. Fort of St. Philip				100
200. Fort of St. Mark				100
201. Fort of St. Luke				100
202. Fort of St. Stephen				100
203. Fort of St. Basil				100
204. Fort of St. Constantine				100
205. Fort of St. Helena				100
206. Fort of St. Agatha				100
207. Fort of St. Euphemia				100
208. Fort of St. Sophia				100
209. Fort of St. George				100
210. Fort of St. Andrew				100
211. Fort of St. Peter				100
212. Fort of St. Paul				100
213. Fort of St. John				100
214. Fort of St. James				100
215. Fort of St. Philip				100
216. Fort of St. Mark				100
217. Fort of St. Luke				100
218. Fort of St. Stephen				100
219. Fort of St. Basil				100
220. Fort of St. Constantine				100
221. Fort of St. Helena				100
222. Fort of St. Agatha				100
223. Fort of St. Euphemia				100
224. Fort of St. Sophia				100
225. Fort of St. George				100
226. Fort of St. Andrew				100
227. Fort of St. Peter				100
228. Fort of St. Paul				100
229. Fort of St. John				100
230. Fort of St. James				100
231. Fort of St. Philip				100
232. Fort of St. Mark				100
233. Fort of St. Luke				100
234. Fort of St. Stephen				100
235. Fort of St. Basil				100
236. Fort of St. Constantine				100
237. Fort of St. Helena				100
238. Fort of St. Agatha				100
239. Fort of St. Euphemia				100
240. Fort of St. Sophia				100
241. Fort of St. George				100
242. Fort of St. Andrew				100
243. Fort of St. Peter				100
244. Fort of St. Paul				100
245. Fort of St. John				100
246. Fort of St. James				100
247. Fort of St. Philip				100
248. Fort of St. Mark				100
249. Fort of St. Luke				100
250. Fort of St. Stephen				100
251. Fort of St. Basil				100
252. Fort of St. Constantine				100
253. Fort of St. Helena				100
254. Fort of St. Agatha				100
255. Fort of St. Euphemia				100
256. Fort of St. Sophia				100
257. Fort of St. George				100
258. Fort of St. Andrew				100
259. Fort of St. Peter				100
260. Fort of St. Paul				100
261. Fort of St. John				100
262. Fort of St. James				100
263. Fort of St. Philip				100
264. Fort of St. Mark				100
265. Fort of St. Luke				100
266. Fort of St. Stephen				100
267. Fort of St. Basil				100
268. Fort of St. Constantine				100
269. Fort of St. Helena				100
270. Fort of St. Agatha				100
271. Fort of St. Euphemia				100
272. Fort of St. Sophia				100
273. Fort of St. George				100
274. Fort of St. Andrew				100
275. Fort of St. Peter				100
276. Fort of St. Paul				100
277. Fort of St. John				100
278. Fort of St. James				100
279. Fort of St. Philip				100
280. Fort of St. Mark				100
281. Fort of St. Luke				100
282. Fort of St. Stephen				100
283. Fort of St. Basil				100
284. Fort of St. Constantine				100
285. Fort of St. Helena				100
286. Fort of St. Agatha				100
287. Fort of St. Euphemia				100
288. Fort of St. Sophia				100
289. Fort of St. George				100
290. Fort of St. Andrew				100
291. Fort of St. Peter				100
292. Fort of St. Paul				100
293. Fort of St. John				100
294. Fort of St. James				100
295. Fort of St. Philip				100
296. Fort of St. Mark				100
297. Fort of St. Luke				100
298. Fort of St. Stephen				100
299. Fort of St. Basil				100
300. Fort of St. Constantine				100
301. Fort of St. Helena				100
302. Fort of St. Agatha				100
303. Fort of St. Euphemia				100
304. Fort of St. Sophia				100
305. Fort of St. George				100
306. Fort of St. Andrew				100
307. Fort of St. Peter				100
308. Fort of St. Paul				100
309. Fort of St. John				100
310. Fort of St. James				100
311. Fort of St. Philip				100
312. Fort of St. Mark				100
313. Fort of St. Luke				100
314. Fort of St. Stephen				100
315. Fort of St. Basil				100
316. Fort of St. Constantine				100
317. Fort of St. Helena				100
318. Fort of St. Agatha				100
319. Fort of St. Euphemia				100
320. Fort of St. Sophia				100
321. Fort of St. George				100
322. Fort of St. Andrew				100
323. Fort of St. Peter				100
324. Fort of St. Paul				100
325. Fort of St. John				100



No. 575.

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 12.)*

(No. 51.)

My Lord,

Paris, February 10, 1840.

I RECEIVED, yesterday, your Lordship's despatch No. 48, with its enclosures.

The appointment of M. Guizot to be Ambassador at the Court of London is notified in the *Moniteur* of the 11th.

I, as yet, say nothing to M. Guizot, as well as to Marshal Soult, that your Lordship thought it essential to ascertain the state of things when he was in Paris, or an arrangement with the European Powers about the affairs of Turkey, was a possibility. But a French Ambassador should be the agent with whom we might come to an understanding on this subject, and I learn from them that two days after the arrival of Count Sebastiani, with whom M. Guizot was conversing, he would be prepared to leave Paris. Count Sebastiani is expected here on Saturday, M. Guizot will, therefore, set off probably for London the beginning of next week.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

No. 576.

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 12.)*

(No. 52.)

My Lord,

Paris, February 10, 1840.

I have just received from M. Guizot a statement, that since the last interview which took place between Colonel Hodges and Mehemet Ali, the Pasha has expressed his determination to decline all verbal communications with the Consuls of the Great European Powers, and that he is occupied in preparing a military map of the country. This statement is confirmed by letters which have been received here from the Russian Consul at Alexandria, who, however, subsequently to the audience of Colonel Hodges, had a conversation with Mehemet Ali, in which the Pasha observed to him, that if the Egyptian garrison quitted Candia, the island would not fall under the domination of the Turks, but would be the property of the native Greeks, and that with regard to the Holy Cities in Arabia, if they should be evacuated by the Egyptians, they will fall an easy prey to the tribes of the Wahabites.

Count Modem, the Russian Consul, is of opinion that the arming of the workmen at Alexandria and in the adjacent cities, will not give to Mehemet Ali an efficient military force, but he agrees in opinion with the French Consul, that the Pasha will not be induced by any fear of the hostility of the European Powers, to abandon the possession of Syria, and that from the crops in Egypt having been last year abundant, he has still considerable pecuniary resources.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

No. 577.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 13)*

(No. 16.)

My Lord,

Therapia, January 18, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith an abstract of Kiamil Pasha's report of his mission to Egypt, which has been communicated to me by the Porte, and also a copy of a letter from Mehemet Ali to the Consul-General of France, relative to his Arabian possessions.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

P.S.—It is striking that Mehemet Ali, in his letter to M. Cochelet, relating to his affairs in Arabia, treats this matter as if all his exertions were to be considered to have been made by an independent Sovereign, and not by a subject and officer of the Sultan, and as if the means, military and civil, employed, belonged to Mehemet Ali by right, and not to the Porte.

Inclosure 1 in No. 577.

*Report of Kiamil Pasha.*

(Translation.)

KIAMIL PACHA a été chargé de porter à Mehemet Ali et à son fils Ibrahim Pacha, les Firmans Impériaux qui leur avaient été adressés relativement aux institutions salulaires qu'on est maintenant occupé à établir et à exécuter dans les Etats de la Sublime Porte.

A son arrivée à Alexandrie, lui-même ainsi que le Firman dont il était porteur ont été parfaitement bien accueillis par le Gouverneur qui leur rendit tous les honneurs d'usage. Ensuite Mehemet Ali envoya le dit Pacha au Caire, où il fut reçu avec les mêmes honneurs. Cette réception si marquée au coin de la justice, a été pour tous les habitants de l'Egypte le sujet de la plus vive et la plus légitime satisfaction. Mehemet Ali a été espéré par son père, qui a annoncé qu'il en enverrait aussi des copies dans les divers districts de la Syrie.

Voici, en substance, ce qu'a dit Mehemet Ali dans les entretiens qui ont eu naturellement lieu sur la question du jour. Parlant de ce qu'on avait lu dans les *Papiers Européens* au sujet de la démission de la France par voie d'allusion, qu'elles ne pouvaient pas, sans raison, s'imposer tant de dépenses et d'embarras, qu'elles devraient avoir des vues particulières et agir en cela selon leurs intérêts politiques. Cela l'affecta profondément. Il dit que pourvu qu'on lui laissât l'Egypte et la Syrie, ses intérêts à lui ne seraient pas compromis si on donnait à un autre les contrées situées au nord de la Syrie. Il ajouta que si on donnait à un autre la province de Djida en faveur d'un autre, mais qu'il ne se démentait pas de la Syrie. Mais Kiamil Pacha n'ayant point de mission relative à des objets politiques, n'est entré dans aucune espèce d'explications qui auraient eu l'air d'une réponse.

Le ci-devant Grand-Amiral Ahmed Pacha que Kiamil Pacha eut mission de voir, affecta de ne témoigner aucun repentir de sa conduite, qu'il voulait expliquer par quelques interprétations futiles. Néanmoins le seul aspect d'Ahmed Pacha traça les remords qui lui déchirèrent le cœur. Les généraux et officiers de la Flotte Impériale déplorent unanimement d'avoir été trompés, et ils cherchent par leurs instances à hâter le moment de leur retour à Constantinople.

Voici ce que contient le Rapport de Kiamil Pacha.

\* Mehemet Ali said: "Russia wishes to obtain Constantinople, and England Egypt." The Porte would not allow this to appear in the translation.—P.

Translation:

[illegible]

L'Assur, dit à grande voix les braves et vaillants une  
 armée considérable pour aller à la conquête de la terre d'Assur  
 à l'aventure la tranquillité de l'Assur, les W...  
 du Yomen, Peruadé que...  
 à troubler la paix de l'Empire, je...  
 amener leur soumission complète. C'est pour parvenir à les dompter la  
 Yomen qu'il fallait y envoyer une armée et...  
 pables de les soumettre. L'éloignement de l'Assur, si étendu...  
 nécessitait de vastes moyens de transport pour les armées...  
 et ses bagages. Le Nedjid pouvait seul fournir...  
 et...  
 Le Nedjid...  
 l'Assur...  
 l'Assur...  
 et mon souverain.

A la fin du dernier exil, l'Etat n'a plus de dette. Il n'a plus de dette venue en mission en Egypte, mais une dette nationale, une dette nationale bilieuse. A quoi pensez-vous, lui dit-il, le gouvernement de l'Etat ? D'un Etat qui ne peut pas payer ses dettes, qui ne peut pas payer ses dettes en se chargeant de gouverner. Vous ne pouvez pas payer une dette annuelle de 135.000 à 140.000 heures qui pourront servir à me fortifier le cœur-ci. Ce n'est pas là, répondit-il, l'unique erreur que nous ayons commise.

En définitive, si par suite de mon dévouement à ma nation et à mon Souverain, l'Arabie m'est accordée temporairement, je continuerai à faire mes efforts pour la défendre, mais j'ai trop mon pays et mon Gouvernement pour d'abandonner de moi-même cette province. Seulement si l'on désire la soumettre par la force, je ne résisterai pas, et je ne rappellerai jamais mes troupes sans faire la moindre difficulté pour l'évacuer.

No. 574

Colonel Hodge to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 13.)

No. 43

My Lord,

Alexandria, January 12, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that the two frigates and having sailed from this port for St. Jean d'Acre, returned here yesterday, and brought with them 1,930 regular troops. It is reported that 2,000 more are expected here from the same quarter, and that 3,000 Irregular Cavalry had left Syria by land for Cairo, where it is said Mehmet Ali is now about concentrating a formidable force. The above 1,930 men have already left Alexandria for Cairo, to join the garrison of that place.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G LLOYD HODGES

No. 579

Colonel Heddes to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 13.)

No. 7)

Mr Lord.

Alexandria, January 12, 1840.

I HAVE just been informed, that on Mehmet Ali's taking leave of Kiumi Pasha, on his return to Constantinople on the 3rd instant, he requested the latter to tell Hahi Pasha, that it was his intention to accompany the Turkish fleet to the Bosphorus early in the spring, in order to have the satisfaction of showing to his youthful Sovereign, the alterations he had made in the discipline of the squadron; and the consequent superior precision they had attained in their evolutions.

This intention on the part of the Viceroy is here considered as unlikely to be realized but I am not disposed to treat it as altogether impossible. I will take into account his fertility in expedients, and the serious dilemma to which he is verging.

I have, &c  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 580.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 13.)

No. 8, 1

My Lord,

Almond, January 13, 1840

MEHEMET ALI has ordered the immediate formation of two regiments of National Guards, to be formed from the inhabitants of Alexandria, to consist of 4,000 men. Ahmed El Garbi, an influential and popular Chieftain, has this day been raised to the rank of Bey, and is entrusted with the command of this force.

A National Guard is also to be formed of the inhabitants of Cairo, Damietta, and Rosetta, and it is, I believe, decided to carry out the same system throughout all parts of the Ottoman Empire over which Mehemet Ali holds dominion or control.

I have, &c.,  
Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES

No. 581.

*Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston,—(Received February 18.)*

(No. 9.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, January 14, 1840

INTELLIGENCE has come to me from a source on which I can rely, that Mehemet Ali has been for the last week incessantly talking to the British Turkish squadron, telling them their faith and liberties were menaced, his having reason to apprehend an attack from the Allied Powers of Europe. That Great Britain was foremost in the measures towards him, but that he wanted all true Mussulmans not to be blinded by professions of support from Powers who only sought their own aggrandisement. That as for the Sultan he was in the hands of designing men, but, that as God was great, he, Mehemet Ali, would try to rescue him from his danger, and maintain him upon his throne; that he would await the Allies patiently and repel them in case of attack; that should he be successful in his repulse of the enemy, he would unite both fleets and give battle to the invading squadrons, and if he were victorious, would carry war into the very heart of those countries that had tried to disturb the peace of Egypt.

7 F





your Lordship will perceive, on reference to my correspondence, that I gave no positive or geographical interpretation of what I expressed as the Pasha's 'due limits.'

Your Lordship will clearly see that words make no impression whatever on the Pasha, and that nothing short of an actual array of military or naval strength will bring him to terms. He may even go the length of allowing himself to be attacked, under the impression that, should he be worsted, the least that the Allied Powers would offer him would be Egypt alone. However, the more diffidently and accurately he informs himself of the strength of the squadrons of England, the greater will be his apprehensions for himself, and the greater his readiness to treat with us, if even at the eleventh hour.

Among other symptoms of things taking the turn I have alluded to, I cannot omit mentioning the partial failure of some of his plans of defence, for instance, of the imposing array of National Guards, the formation of which has been so widely trumpeted, only 3000 had been up to yesterday evening, nor can he place such implicit reliance upon the Turkish fleet as he would fain have believed. Deli Mustapha Pasha has declared that he will never give up alive that ship which was entrusted to him by the Sultan. In spite of this, my Lord, I believe nothing will bring the Pasha to reason but the appearance of an imposing force off this city to demand and enforce compliance with the terms that may be offered to him.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 585.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 13.)

No. 15.)  
My Lord,

Alexandria, January 21, 1840.

I AM not aware that your Lordship has been made acquainted that, about a month previous to my arrival in this country, the Consul-General for France was instructed by his Government to demand of Mehemet Ali an explanation in writing as to the intentions regarding the occupation of the Hedjaz.

I have herewith the honour to inclose to your Lordship a copy of the reply sent by the Viceroy to M. Cochelet.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 586.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 13.)

No. 16.)  
My Lord,

Alexandria, January 23, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that Mehemet Ali has received serious interruption in the progress of his warlike preparations. The levée en masse that he had attempted to raise under the name of a National Guard, has dwindled into a force hardly worth naming, he is evidently much depressed and disappointed, and has assumed a tone very different from that which he held a few days ago.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

\* See Enclosure 2 to No. 577, p. 614.

No. 587.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 19.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, January 24, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that Omer Bey, Rear-Admiral of the Turkish fleet, has refused to accept or wear the new uniform which Mehemet Ali has desired to be prepared for the officers and men of the Turkish squadron.

I this morning had a conversation with M. d'Anastasy, the Swedish Consul-General, who is one of the Pasha's confidential friends and advisers, and who is residing on the coast and attending to the affairs of the Turkish fleet. M. d'Anastasy replied, "Why, what will you do when he fears that discontent may manifest itself amongst his men?"

I have to acquaint your Lordship, that Mehemet Ali has been forced to abandon his hostile views for several arguments, to wit: the impossibility of carrying them into effect, the expense he has incurred, and he is just now reluctant to start the Pasha with any extraordinary occupations until that he determines to project a more considerable movement.

M. d'Anastasy, however, is warning us many men as he is at Alexandria. He was not to expect that a force would be raised of 2000, whereas he has been able to command, up to this date, only 1,600 men.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 588.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 13.)

No. 8.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, January 29, 1840.

YOUR Lordship's despatches to No. 6 inclusive, were delivered to me on the 20th instant, by the messenger Johnson.

The Imperial Cabinet are highly pleased by the reports Baron Brunsow has sent to the Emperor in London and of the commencement of his negotiations with your Lordship.

The Emperor is much interested by the manner in which Her Majesty received his Minister, by the particular interest which she took of the health of different individuals of the Imperial family, and by the expressions of interest by Her Majesty to the Emperor.

The extent of the powers granted to Baron Brunow having been made known to the Emperor, the Russian Government has concluded upon the terms of a new settlement, and there is no longer any apprehension of war, although the recent negotiations with the Emperor have put an end to any expectation that France was to be herself in this matter to the other Great Powers.

Count Orloff, however, has more than once, in conversation with me, dwelt upon the possible contingency of the Sultan's having occasion to demand the assistance of the Turkish fleet, and of a French Admiral, with or without direct instructions from his Government, insisting upon also entering the Dardanelles uninvited, and having a fleet sufficient to enable him to force an entry. And Count Orloff said, that if any collision occurred between the Turkish and French fleets, he feared that His Imperial Majesty would look upon any attack or injury done to our ships as an insult to the Emperor.

As far as I can judge, this was said, not from any anticipation of such a case





or the Dardanelles by Ibrahim's Army, should he ever reach the coast. And I requested Captain Walker to send me a report upon the subject, which I have received, and now forward inclosed.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure in No. 592.

Captain Walker to Viscount Ponsonby

My Lord,

Pera, January 27, 1840.

IN compliance with your wish that I should report the practicability of preventing the Egyptians from crossing the Bosphorus, in the event of their army reaching Constantinople. I have to propose for your Lordship's consideration the following measures, which might, in my humble opinion, keep them in check for some considerable time.

The removal of every description of vessel and boat from the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, Sea of Marmora, and Dardanelles; or of the cannon, which I should also recommend to be employed in batteries erected on all the most prominent points on the European shore.

That men-of-war be stationed in all the small harbours on that side, and steam-vessels at the entrance of the Golden Horn, Stenai, and Buyukdéré, and that gun-boats be placed at all these stations, and in the intermediate spaces. I should also recommend the same precautions to be taken along the shores of the Dardanelles, and that a certain number of vessels be stationed in the Sea of Marmora, for the purpose of preventing any communication from the opposite coast.

It would also be highly desirable to establish signal stations, from the entrance of the Black Sea to the Dardanelles, so as any attempt the enemy might make to cross should be speedily known to the Capital.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) B. W. WALKER R. N.

No. 593

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 23.)

No. 22

My Lord,

Therapia, January 28, 1840

M. DE PONTOIS and common report circulate the news of the non-conclusion of the arrangement said to have been agreed between your Lordship and the Baron de Brunnow. I cannot speak with certainty as to the effect it has had upon the Ottoman Ministers. I have heard from his Excellency Rechid Pasha very strong expressions of the impatience the Ottoman Ministers feel for the termination of affairs. He adds, the Porte has entirely confided in the Great Powers, and it will never believe they will abandon the interests of the Sultan.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

No. 594

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 23.)

No. 24)

My Lord,

Therapia, January 29, 1840

I HAVE ascertained that M. de Pontois does not say positively that the arrangement is abandoned. His Majesty's Ambassador said that it has been abandoned, but he says, that on the 5th instant it was the opinion of the French Government that the arrangement would not be made.

I learn further, that M. de Pontois has powers to call the French Admiral to the assistance of the Porte, if Mehemet Ali should make an attack. I think it right to put your Lordship in mind that I have no instructions upon the subject. I am, however, of opinion that Mehemet Ali will take advantage of the prevalence of southerly winds at this season to come here with the fleet. I hope it is an erroneous opinion.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

No. 595

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 67.)

(Extract.)

Paris, February 21, 1840.

WITH reference to your directions given me in No. 66, to take an opportunity of endeavouring to ascertain whether the order for the reinforcement to be sent to the French squadron in the Levant has originated in any intelligence received from Egypt, I have to state, that Marshal Soult, in reply to an observation I made this morning upon the "Alger" and the "Suffren" ships of the line having sailed from Toulon for that destination, said, that these two ships had orders to go, in the first instance, off the coast of Greece near Athens, and would afterwards proceed to join Admiral Lalande, whose squadron had, by the return to Toulon of vessels wanting repair, been reduced to only four ships of the line.

No. 596.

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.

(No. 1.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 25, 1840.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatches to No. 19, inclusive.

You state in your despatch No. 9 of the 14th of January, that Mehemet Ali, in a conversation which you had with him on that day, expressed to you his determination to maintain his rights at all risks and hazards.

I have to instruct you, on the next occasion on which Mehemet Ali shall speak to you of his rights, to say to his Highness, that you are instructed by your Government to remind him that he has no rights except such as the Sultan



has conferred upon him; that the only legitimate authority which he possesses is the authority which has been delegated to him by the Sultan, over a portion of the Sultan's dominions, and which has been entrusted to him for the sole purpose of being used for the interest of, and in obedience to the orders of the Sultan, that the Sultan is entitled to take away that which he has given, that the Sultan may probably do so, if his own safety should require it; and that if, in such case, the Sultan should not have the means of self-defence, the Sultan has Allies who may possibly lend him those means.

You should also take an occasion of suggesting to the mind of Mehemet Ali, that if it should become necessary to use force in order to coerce him, and if that force should be successful, he might possibly not obtain from the Sultan the terms which had been first proposed to him, that to a garrison which capitulates in time, honourable conditions are granted; but that a garrison which insists upon being stormed, is sometimes put to the sword.

I have further to instruct you to take every proper opportunity and means of endeavouring to explain to the officers of the Turkish fleet, that it is the intention and determination of Great Britain, and of the other Powers in alliance with Turkey, to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire under its present Dynasty, and not to interfere in any way with the dignity of the Sultan, or to touch upon the territory of the Ottoman Empire. That, consequently, those officers have been led into error in imagining that they were serving the interests of the Sultan, or of their country and faith. It is to be regretted that the officers of the fleet, who have been led into error, have thereby done a serious injury to the very cause which they wished to support, and that the best course which, as good Mussulmans and faithful subjects of the Porte, they could pursue, would be to avail themselves of the first opportunity to return with their ships to Constantinople in order to rally round their Sultan and Caliph, and to defend his person and throne.

I have to add, that you will act in this matter openly, and will make no secret of your views. I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 597

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 1.)

(Extract.)

Damascus, January 18, 1840.

I HAD the honour of addressing your Lordship my last despatch, No. 18, under the 23rd ultimo.

The Mutual chief insurgent, Nisak Husein, who with his party had taken refuge in the mountains, was captured there by the British troops, and sent to the British Consulate at Aleppo. He was then sent to the British Consulate at Aleppo, and was there detained. He was then sent to the British Consulate at Aleppo, and was there detained. He was then sent to the British Consulate at Aleppo, and was there detained.

Hafiz Sheriff of Galtane was produced considerable sensation among the people, as this document was put in circulation. A translation is being made in Arabic, and is being distributed. The people were invited, and were present at this ceremony. The minds of the majority of the population is, that it is a prelude to the Sultan resuming the Government of Syria, the abolition of Ferdeh, Conscription, Statute labour and requisitions, and the restoration of the old order of Government, all which is congenial to the desire and feelings of the people. The salutary

measures and beneficial effects to be derived from this Edict, are as little understood by the people as such a system of Government is valued in civilized countries. The general mind of the population, in its depressed and ignorant state, is prepared to receive reforms promising so much good, but it is bowed in the face of such difficulty to be encountered on this subject, its eventual realization will be affected by whatever Government may rule this country; it is however to be hoped that the prominent cause which produces a neutralizing or depressive effect on the minds of the population, is the doubt of the sincerity of British Government in working out the measures of this new era.

The country is generally in a tranquil state, but a dulness and inaction pervades the whole system, and no alteration has taken place in this respect since I had the honour of addressing your Lordship my last despatch.

Mehemet Ali is reported to be daily pushing his influence in the Persian Gulf, and has been seen at the British Consulate at Aleppo, but does not appear to be doing much good. He is however, as usual, the cause of much trouble to the British Government. He is reported to be daily pushing his influence in the Persian Gulf, and has been seen at the British Consulate at Aleppo, but does not appear to be doing much good.

I hear from Haggad, that Ibrahim Pasha's irregular troops have been from Orfa, and attacked and plundered the Arabs under the Sultan's jurisdiction at Khaboon and induced some to join them, while the Egyptians are still camped at the same place. It is also reported that the Pasha has been tampering with the British Consulate at Aleppo. Ibrahim Pasha has been seen at the British Consulate at Aleppo, and has been seen at the British Consulate at Aleppo.

No. 598

Mr. Pre-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 2.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, January 20, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of my despatch\* of the 28th December of last year, which I enclose to Viscount Ponsonby, and which I hope will meet your Lordship's approval.

I have nothing fresh or interesting to offer to your Lordship's notice on the state of affairs, coming within the cognizance of this consular district, since the date of the above despatch.

His Highness the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha, who still continues to remain at Maraah, has, I learn, been of late a little indisposed, but with nothing serious.

All the Egyptian forces are now cantoned into winter quarters throughout this district, many of them along the north and north-eastern frontier; and others have gone southward for the same purpose.

I am happy to be able to inform your Lordship, that the whole of this consular district enjoys for the present every sort of tranquillity.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY

No. 599.

Mr. Consul Werry to John Bidwell, Esq.

(Private.)

(Extract.)

Damascus, January 22, 1840.

I INCLOSE you a list of the distribution of the Egyptian regular forces in Syria. At Acre very great preparations are making to repair, and put in a state

\* See Inclosure 1 to No. 574. p. 610.

of defence, that important fortress and point, by rebuilding part of the walls, particularly that towards the sea and erecting new ones and towers on the land side. I hear 500 pieces of artillery have arrived here from Egypt, and which 200 are already in place. By a measure already taken on every part of Syria to resist other eductive points to taking the Egyptians, or demonstrations made against them; and however much Mehemet Ali may feign to come into the views of the Sultan's Government, either for internal ameliorations of Government, or for a cession of territory, he assured he is taking every measure to secure at least what he holds, if not to occupy the Pashalic of Bagdad, from both the routes from Bassorah to Bagdad, and from the north by way of Merdin and Mossoul. He still dreams or hopes to establish an Arab Empire, to execute which, he must count on the division of the Great Powers, and be tacitly understood with one or more of them, as it is not reasonable to suppose he will attempt to oppose the whole of them. He is in communication with the Sultan, the Viceroy of Egypt, the Grand Vizier Hosrew Pasha, and Haid Pasha; which party, it is rumoured, is opposed to that of which Russia is at the head. But should any event of the case, I cannot think Mehemet Ali would attempt the execution of this project, unless some European Power countenanced his measures. My advices, both from Bagdad and Moghul, near Bassorah, confirm the Pasha's intentions of occupying the Bagdad Pashalic, which the operations of Kourschid Pasha, holding a line from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf, and Ibrahim Pasha's troops, from Orfa to the Kaboor, fully indicate, if not to be immediately performed will henceforward be done without much fighting, if left alone. Who can oppose him but us? And whose interests will be immediately compromised but ours, among the European Powers who are probably content to see this? The Sultan and his Government is a cypher in those provinces, so distant from the seat of Government.

France looks to strengthen herself in the Mediterranean, and possibly looks on Mehemet Ali as an ally; while Russia, if she is opposed at Stamboul, will, at least the possibility of opposition to her, is not apprehended to herself, Anatolia! The battle of Nezib, as I stated to my Lord Palmerston long previous to that catastrophe, will have the effect of inextricably embroiling the Eastern Question, and if measures are not promptly taken, may produce events detrimental to our interests.

#### Inclosure in No. 599.

#### Note of the distribution of the Egyptian Forces.

<i>Aleppo.</i>	<i>Orfa.</i>
9th Infantry.	11th Infantry.
10th ditto.	17th ditto.
14th ditto.	22nd ditto.
31st ditto.	
<i>Acra.</i>	<i>Mazrah.</i>
6th Infantry.	2nd Infantry (Guard)
34th ditto.	3rd ditto ditto.
11th Cavalry.	4th Infantry
	2nd Cuirassiers (Guard)
<i>Antak.</i>	<i>Adana.</i>
1st Infantry (Guard).	5th Infantry.
1st Artillery ditto.	
2nd ditto, (Foot).	
2nd Infantry	
12th ditto.	7th Cavalry.

<i>Meera.</i>	<i>Gaza.</i>
8th Cavalry.	2nd Cavalry.
<i>Hamah.</i>	<i>Jerusalem.</i>
30th Infantry.	25th Infantry.
1st Artillery (Horse).	
<i>Latakia.</i>	<i>Antioch.</i>
2nd Horse Artillery (Guard).	29th Infantry.
	4th Cavalry.
<i>Tripoli.</i>	<i>Damascus.</i>
2 Battalions Sappers.	2nd Horse Artillery (Guard)
<i>Idlib.</i>	<i>Hama.</i>
1st Battalion, Sappers.	1st Horse Artillery (Guard).
<i>Acra.</i>	
10th Cavalry	
18th Infantry	

Taken from the Board of Health at Aleppo, this 6th January, 1840.

(Signed) P. H. S. WERRY.

No. 600.

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 4.)

My Lord,

Beyrout, January 20, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship that the Hatti Sheriff of Latakia was published at the Serai on the 15th inst. at 10 o'clock on the 20th instant, previous notice having been given the same morning in the bazaars of the city.

No notification on the subject was made to Her Majesty's Consulate, nor to any other European authority here. The feeling produced in the country generally, by the publication of the Hatti Sheriff, is one of sincere and undiminished satisfaction.

Such cannot be said to be the case in respect to information which reached this place on the 14th inst. from Egypt, relative to the organization in that country by the Viceroy, of a Militia or National Guard. A feeling amounting to consternation has been caused here amongst both Christians and Mahomedans, by the report that several thousands of persons have concealed themselves, and others commenced migrating from a fear lest similar regulations should be extended to Syria. If such be the case, it is easy to foresee that it will be received with the utmost dissatisfaction; but I am not prepared to say at present whether any open resistance would or could be offered by the natives.

In other respects, the public tranquillity is undisturbed; but all classes are in a state of deep anxiety as to the future with reference to the existing position of affairs between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, and both commerce and public confidence are greatly affected thereby.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) N. MOORE

P.S.—The effect produced by the information received from Egypt alluded to in the preceding paragraph, is such that with a view of ascertaining whether there were any positive grounds for supposing the possibility of an invasion of Syria I have on the 1st night of Mahmoud





Count Nesselrode was in high spirits at the intelligence he had received yesterday from London, particularly at an article which had appeared in the *Morning Chronicle*, and upon which he said that since the state of the negotiation was so viewed by the supporters of the Ministry, and had been so well explained to the British public, he no longer entertained the least doubt that Russia and England would arrive to an agreement satisfactory to themselves and to Europe, and perhaps ultimately to France.

I remarked to Count Nesselrode, that I thought the statement of the grounds of the Treaty was too closely confined to the maintenance of the Sultan's Empire, without sufficient reference to the apprehension of the consequences that would ensue from its dissolution, or dissolution, which justified the intervention of other Powers, and that it might be objected to as savouring too much of what was called a "Holy Alliance" principle. Upon which his Excellency replied, that if any such objection should be felt, your Lordship would find Baron Brunnow ready to make whatever alterations you could require.

With regard to the Separate Article, his Excellency told me the amount and proportion of forces to be employed in the Turkish Straits, which your Lordship has proposed to rectify, and said it would be sufficient for Russia to hand herself to such an agreement on account of the land forces she might have to transport to the shores of the Bosphorus, and maintain there an effective position. Count Nesselrode therefore seemed to me disposed to omit any stipulation with regard to the amount of force to be employed, should the Sultan require it, by treaty with other Powers, but from an observation which I feel from him, I do not think the Imperial Government would be so easy on that score if France were a party to the Treaty. At least, he mentioned the possible desert of the French to parade a large force before the walls of Constantinople, as the only probable source of difficulty upon that part of the negotiation.

On this point, indeed, the Imperial Government is necessarily embarrassed. On the one hand, the Treaty of Unkar Skelessi still exists; on the other, the Emperor could not act without a feeling of indignation, a large French force in the vicinity of the Seraglio; but I think Count Nesselrode would prefer that no stipulation as to the amount of force should be made in the Treaty.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) CLANRICARDE.

P.S.—Count Nesselrode has received the answer of the French Government to his remonstrances, and the answer of Marshal Soult in his conversations with Count Moltke, and in his despatch of the 25th of November to Count Sebastiani, he tells me it is very weak, but in no other respect unsatisfactory, and will show it to me to-morrow.

No. 605.

Vicount Palmerston to Earl Granville

No. 85.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, March 5, 1840.

WITH reference to my former instructions to your Excellency, Nos. 394 and 395, and your despatch No. 396 of the 3rd of January last, upon the subject of the naval armaments now making in the ports of France, I have to state to your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government have been informed that, in addition to the seventeen sail of the line, of which I sent your Excellency a list in my despatch No. 394, and which are either already equipped, or in progress of equipment, for service in the Mediterranean, the "Inflexible," of ninety guns, is getting ready for sea at Rochefort; and that thus the French will soon have eighteen sail of the line, and most of them heavy ships, afloat in the Mediterranean.

If this information be true, this is a matter which must necessarily engage the serious attention of the British Government, and the more especially, because

the explanations hitherto given upon this subject by the French Government have been anything but satisfactory.

Her Majesty's Government are not aware that any Naval Power meditates an attack upon France; and Her Majesty's Government do not know of any operations which France can be called upon to undertake in conjunction with other Powers, for which so large a force can be necessary.

But if the French naval force afloat shall be raised to so large an amount, it will be impossible for Her Majesty's Government not to propose to Parliament a corresponding augmentation of the British fleet in commission; because neither public opinion in England, nor a due sense of official responsibility, would permit any Administration in this country to leave the British fleet in commission inferior to the fleet of France, so as to give to France the command of the sea, and Her Majesty's Government are persuaded, that whatever exertions may at any time be required on the part of the nation to maintain the position of Great Britain as a Naval Power, those exertions will be cheerfully, promptly, and effectually made.

But it cannot escape the sagacity of the French Government, that such augmentations and counter augmentations on the part of France and England, originating in no sudden necessity, cannot take place without producing effects extremely unfavourable to the maintenance of friendly relations between the two countries.

It is possible, indeed, that some of the ships now ready, or getting ready, at Rochefort, may be called upon to take the place of some of those now in the Levant, and that the consequence of the term of service of their crews being over, are not so much as to be run up again in ordinary, but though this is not the case, Count Sebastiani, it has never yet been distinctly stated by the French Government.

Your Excellency is instructed to take an opportunity of communicating these remarks to M. Thiers, as I shall do to M. Guizot.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 606.

Vicount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde.

(No. 41, Confidential.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, March 7, 1840.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch, No. 12, stating that Mr. Bloomfield communicated to Count Nesselrode Marshal Soult's despatch to Count Sebastiani of the 25th of November, in obedience to instructions which you had given him to do so.

With reference to that matter, I have to state confidentially to your Excellency, that Baron Brunnow showed me a private letter to himself from Count Nesselrode, in which Count Nesselrode says that he should have been glad to have been "dispensed" from receiving from Mr. Bloomfield a copy of Marshal Soult's despatch, but that Mr. Bloomfield insisted upon giving it to him, saying that he was instructed by Her Majesty's Government to do so.

I mention this to your Excellency for your information, but not in the slightest degree to express any doubt whatever of the correctness of Mr. Bloomfield's statement.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.



No. 607.

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 9.)*

No. 84.

My Lord,

Paris, March 6 1840

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches to No. 85 inclusive.

I this morning went to the Foreign Office, intending to communicate with M. Thiers upon several points which I had desired to discuss with the consideration of the French Government in consequence of the Minister's recent remarks. Our interview was, however, interrupted by the arrival of the Members of the Conseil d'Etat, who came to pay a visit of ceremony to the new President of the Council.

In the short conversation, however, that passed between us, M. Thiers said that having read over all the correspondence in his office that had any bearing upon the Turco-Egyptian Question, he was of opinion that his own opinion was entirely correct with regard to the King, but that he was not at all sure with regard to the question so important as that of the fleet, because he could express the true views of the Government to the King's Ambassador in England upon the subject. He concluded, however, that as a French Minister he must have arrived in London, the question was suspended and that there was no probability of any serious war arising from this short delay.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 608.

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 11.)*

No. 88.1

My Lord,

Paris, March 9, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your Lordship's despatches to No. 91 inclusive.

I this morning had a conversation with M. Thiers upon the subject of the naval armaments of the ports of France. I told him that I had yesterday received a despatch from you, at the moment when he had reached London, in which you stated that the French Government were not at all ready for sea, and that the serious attention of Her Majesty's Government to this information it appeared, that in addition to a list of seventeen sail of the line which your Lordship had communicated some time ago to Count Sébastiani, the French Government were in possession of equipment, the "Indes, &c." of many more, was awaiting for sea at Rochefort and that France would, therefore, soon have eighteen sail of the line, and most of them heavy ships, stationed in the Mediterranean; and I observed, that if this information were true, Her Majesty's Government would be compelled to call upon Parliament to afford the means of augmenting proportionally the British fleet, or that neither public opinion in England nor a due sense of official responsibility would allow the Ministry to leave to any other nation the command of the sea. I also remarked that such armaments, if counter-armaments were calculated to have an unfavourable effect upon the friendly relations between the two countries, which it was the acknowledged interest of both to maintain, and which I knew M. Thiers was desirous to cultivate. M. Thiers assured me that the information upon which I had been acting was correct, and that the French Government neither had equipped, nor purposed to equip, more than fifteen sail of the line, of which it was intended that nine should be stationed in the Levant, and the six remaining at Toulon. I observed that there was in the despatch a larger force than was necessary, and that the Government would be sorry to see all chance of a war thus removed.

random. To this, the French Minister replied, that for the service of transport troops to Algiers, and between Algiers and other ports on the coast, these large ships were very serviceable, and that, besides a small number of them, no other ships in the Mediterranean in which it would be possible to place the naval force of France and England united, should be less than thirty sail of the line.

M. Thiers then proceeded to say, that whatever turn affairs might take in the East, there was no danger of firing of cannon between our fleets; he hoped that the two Governments might arrive at a concordance of opinion in the Turco-Egyptian Question, and even should they not agree upon the measures to be pursued, such disagreement would not affect the friendly relations between the two countries. I then observed to M. Thiers, that although Count Sébastiani had intimated to your Lordship, that some of the ships mentioned in the list you had shown to his Excellency were to be replaced by others in the list and laid up in ordinary, no distinct statement on this subject had been given by the French Government, and that it would be satisfactory to receive such a document. His Excellency answered, that he had no objection to giving such a statement, but that in these matters there ought to be reciprocity, and that a corresponding statement of the British naval force ought to be offered to the French Government.

Our conversation on this subject ended by M. Thiers saying, that the French Government did not seek to maintain a naval force as large as that of England, but it desired that its Navy should be upon a footing to make it respected, and that its vessels individually should be able to cope with those of America and England.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 609

*The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 11.)*

(No. 16.)

Extra.

St. Petersburg, February 24, 1840

COUNT NESSELDORF seems much troubled in mind, and alarmed about the course of the Russian Government in conducting with your Lordship.

He is especially so, chiefly, at M. Guizot's nomination; 2ndly, at the delay and slow progress of the negotiation; and 3rdly, at the speech lately delivered in the House of Commons by Sir Robert Peel, in favour of our alliance with France. But he derives consolation from some leading articles that have appeared in the "Morgens Courier."

I endeavoured to comfort him by pointing out that, if, as his Excellency has said, it is essential that France should be the other Power of the Convention and in the settlement of the Syrian Question, the appointment of M. Guizot appears a great step towards that end, and that the delays caused by your Lordship, whether from pressure of business, or for reverence to Constantinople must facilitate its attainment.

I should not think the agitation of Count Nesselrode's nerves worth reporting to your Lordship, if I had not observed that M. Guizot's mission to London has occasioned much observation and uneasiness among the Ministers and principal personages about this Court.

There are in this Government two springs of action in Foreign Affairs, which it is not always easy, but which it is necessary, not to confound together. The one is the Emperor's personal feeling, generally in unison with the sentiments of, and always responded to, by his courtiers; the other is the policy of his Government, for which he controls the former.

The Emperor's personal feelings lead him to desire the separation of Her Majesty's Government from that of Louis Philippe above all things. But the policy of his Government has peace for its first object. Therefore, although a personal antipathy between the French and British Cabinets may displease the Emperor, and although Count Nesselrode for a time uncomfortable, the Russian Government will not be sorry to see all chance of a war thus removed.

Count Nesselrode observed to me in conversation that it would be very difficult to insist upon the restitution of the Fort of Acre to the Sultan, and I said, my personal opinion was, that your Lordship might be induced to concede it to Mehmet Ali, if thereby the cordial co-operation of France could be secured.

The Russian Ministers seem confident that no foreign force will be required for the defence of Constantinople, and this is their sincere desire. For, if Russia covets a portion of the Turkish Empire at this moment, it is Trebizond rather than Constantinople that she desires to occupy.

No. 810

*The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 11.)*

(No. 18.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, February 24, 1840.

YOUR Lordship's despatches to No. 24 inclusive, were delivered to me on the 17th inst. by Mr. Johnson.

Since writing my despatch No. 16, a messenger has arrived from London to inform me that your Lordship's despatch of the 10th inst. has been received.

His Excellency says, that he did not anticipate this long delay in negotiating the Convention for the settlement of Syria, which he fears may prove a long and arduous task, and which he says he cannot undertake. I told him his language was almost that of complaint, when he said, that your Lordship's sentence to invite a Turkish Plenipotentiary to repair to London had surprised him, and would occasion delay of at least two months.

Count Nesselrode assured me, that no one could desire more sincerely than did the Russian Government, that France should accede to the proposed Convention, but he said, that he saw no probability, and barely the possibility of such an event. Because the basis on which the French Government had desired to open a negotiation, differed so widely from that upon which your Lordship and Baron Brunnow were agreed, that the Cabinet of Paris would have to abandon all the propositions and questions they had put forward, the French Government has made a communication but not directly to your Lordship, the Viceroy of Egypt. Unnecessary measures must undoubtedly now be resorted to.

His Excellency said, that the language of Colonel Hodges at Alexandria had been very true. It has appeared Mehmet Ali would have been content not to resist if we would attack Constantinople, but that he would let us have Syria unopposed to the uttermost, and that he was making great preparations for war.

I repeated to his Excellency my hope that the delay, and the presence of M. Guizot in London would lead to a settlement in Paris, but that it would be different from that which he anticipated, but that I should not fail to communicate to my Government, the apprehensions entertained by the Imperial Cabinet.

I have, &c.  
Signed CLANRICARDE

No. 811

*Viscount Palmerston to Lord Bessborough.*

(No. 33.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, March 12, 1840.

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that owing to the changes which have lately taken place in the French Ministry and to consequent delay, it is uncertain whether the Ministry which has been formed at Paris will be able to negotiate a Convention with us. It is likely that the French Government will now and Mr. de Neumann are engaged in very serious negotiations, and that some definite communication should be taken by Her Majesty's Government.

ment; but it is obviously impossible for Her Majesty's Government to know what to propose to the Governments of Austria, Russia and Prussia, until Her Majesty's Government shall have been able to ascertain what France may be inclined to accede to, and what she would decline, so that we might know whether it will be possible for the Five Powers to keep together, or whether the Four will be obliged to conduct these matters to a settlement without the co-operation of France. This, however, cannot be ascertained until M. Guizot shall have received his definitive instructions from the new French Ministry. Her Majesty's Government do not at present despair of finding that the opinions of the present French Ministers may approximate more nearly than those of their predecessors, to the views of the Five Powers. The only fear entertained by Her Majesty's Government is, that Austria may hesitate to support the views of Great Britain, when the time for decision shall arrive. This fear I, however, beg to assure your Excellency, is in no wise founded on anything done or said by the Austrian Plenipotentiary. On the contrary, I must do him the justice to say, that no symptoms have been shown by him of any intention, on the part of his Government, to shrink from acting up to the full extent of the professions they have made. Nothing, indeed, could have been more satisfactory than has been the conduct both of the Austrian and of the Russian Plenipotentiary in this business; and nothing could have been more cordial or friendly than the tone of their communications with Her Majesty's Government.

Although M. Guizot has not yet been furnished with instructions calculated to give to what passes between him and me, an official character, or to enable us to arrive at any practical result, yet I have had some conversation with his Excellency, in order to ascertain from him his own views and, as far as he may know them, the views of his Government, and in order also to put him in possession of the views of Her Majesty's Government. The substance of what passed between us is as follows:—

In the opinion of M. Guizot, the Government of France entirely agrees with the Government of Great Britain, in wishing to maintain the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. He is of opinion that the best arrangement of the pending dispute would be to confine Mehmet Ali to Egypt. But the Government of France, according to M. Guizot, feels convinced that Mehmet Ali would not consent to such an arrangement without compulsion, and the French Government thinks that the means of compulsion which have been suggested by Great Britain would be insufficient. M. Guizot said, that to cut off the communication by sea between Egypt and Syria would have no decisive effect upon Ibrahim's military position in Syria; it would only compel Mehmet Ali to send by land the supplies which his Syrian Army would require, and those supplies would be sent by the same route as by land as well as by sea, though at a greater expense of time and money, than a commercial blockade of Alexandria would cause France and England more than Mehmet Ali, that any attempt to restore Candia to the Sultan by force would create a new Greek revolution in that island, and thus, he said, nothing in the opinion of France would be effectual for the accomplishment of the object in view, but the entrance of a Russian Army into Asia Minor. And such a step would, according to M. Guizot, more seriously shake the independence of the Ottoman Empire than anything which could result from the present state of things.

In support of these opinions, M. Guizot argued that the restoration of Syria would not give any real increase of strength to the Sultan; that the Sultan would be unable to govern it with advantage, and that he would not draw from it a revenue larger than the tribute which the Pasha now pays to him for it. He said that it is good organization and not extent of territory that gives strength to States, and that the Sultan would be stronger if he were to govern well and efficiently the territory which is now subject to his direct authority, than if he were to regain what Mehmet Ali actually occupies, and to administer it ill.

M. Guizot further argued, that if Mehmet Ali were contented, he would become the best friend and firmest defender of the Porte, while, on the other hand, if his pretensions were overruled he would continue to be the most dangerous enemy of the Ottoman Empire.

Everything like an event in the Levant, according to M. Guizot, must turn to the profit of Russia, who is on the spot and ready to take advantage of whatever happens. It is, therefore, the interest of the other Powers to prevent





Egypt for herself, by endeavouring, as she does, to make it continue to be a province of the Ottoman Empire.

M. Guizot promised to report all that passed between us to his Government. In the mean time, that Government cannot furnish M. Guizot with instructions with respect to this question, until it has ascertained whether it will be able to stand.

Her Majesty's Government do not, however, despair of inducing France to agree to the general principles laid down by the other four Powers, provided those other four Powers remain firm and steady to their purpose.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 612

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 32)

My Lord,

Therapia, February 16, 1840.

M. DE BOUTENEFF communicated to me this evening a despatch from Count Neuselrode, dated January 11, 1840, containing directions to M. de Bouteneff, "de s'occuper à toutes les démarches que Lord Ponsonby croit nécessaire de faire pour inspirer au Divan une juste confiance dans les intentions des Cabinets."

I have &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

No. 613

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 16.)

No. 92

My Lord,

Paris, March 13, 1840

M. THIERS this morning began a conversation with me on the Turco-Egyptian Question. He commenced by expressing his anxiety to cultivate and maintain an intimate Union and Alliance between France and England; and that he very much regretted that upon a question so important as that which now occupied the attention of all the Great European Powers, the French and British Governments having the same objects in view, should differ as to the course to be pursued. He then stated a satisfactory result. His Excellency said it was the intention of the French Government to refuse to take any part in coercive measures against the Pasha, to compel him to abandon the possession of Syria, that it was to the French Government a matter of indifference whether the Pasha retained or did not retain it; but that he was persuaded that the measures which it was proposed to adopt would fail of their object, and that the attempt would entail evils of far greater magnitude than the evil which it was intended to remove from the Egyptian occupation of Syria.

M. Thiers then went into a detail of the naval and military means of which France could bring into Asia Minor, would be successful in the defence of the Empire against the Egyptian Army in its present efficient state and command of Generals as able as Ibrahim Pasha and Dostman Bey. The Russians, he said, have had some experience of war of this nature, in their wars with the Caucasians, we have had the same experience in the wars of the Crimea. He then stated that he was of opinion that the French Government would be successful in its efforts to induce the British Government to keep in subjection the Turkish Government of Egypt, or to be left to the mercy of the Turkish Government, and the Porte thus rendered more

unequal to the defence of its European dominions than if it were in the possession of Mehemet Ali.

I said to M. Thiers, that I would not now discuss with him whether the accounts he had received of the military resources of Mehemet Ali were exaggerated or whether the Pasha was in a condition to refuse according to any arrangement proposed to him by the European Powers, but I would ask him (not however speaking in the name of my Government, for I had received no instructions to make any communication to the French Government on this subject, since the Portfolio of Foreign Affairs had been placed in his hands) whether he had any proposition other than what had been made by his predecessor in office, for settling the difference between the Porte and Mehemet Ali. M. Thiers answered, that any proposition from Her Majesty's Government would be considered by him and by his Colleagues with the most earnest desire to come to an understanding with it upon this question. I said, supposing (but I had not the slightest reason for imagining that such a proposition would be made) that it was proposed to the French Government to join with the other Powers in calling upon Mehemet Ali to give up a certain part of Syria, leaving to him the remainder, would the French Government agree to that proposition, and what would be the position taken up by France, if refused by the Pasha? To this question, M. Thiers replied that no hope could be entertained that Mehemet Ali would give up Syria; that he had found by the correspondence in his office, that the French Government had pressed with the utmost earnestness some concession from the Pasha on this point, but that the Pasha's language on this head had been invariable and most decided; that he might be induced to give up Adana besides Candia, and the Arabian Pashalik. M. Thiers then said, that I must be as well aware as he was of the impossibility of any Ministry in France, however composed, acting hostily against Egypt for the purpose of restoring to the Porte the Pashalik of Egypt. There was but one opinion in the country upon that question. I could not controvert that opinion, for I must say that I have never met with a man to whatever political party he may belong, who has held to me a different language.

M. Thiers terminated our conversation by saying that it would be his most earnest desire that a difference of opinion upon this question should not affect the good understanding between the two Governments, but that he could not be blind to the possible effects of the mutual recriminations of the press of the two countries, arising on this divergence in the policy of their respective Governments, upon the feeling of both nations.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 614

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

(No. 101)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, March 17, 1840.

WITH reference to the assertion which Marshal Soult has recently made, that in any last he told your Excellency that the French would have fifteen sail of the line in the Mediterranean, I must observe to your Excellency, that no mention of such an intention is made in any of your despatches of that period. But in your despatch No. 125 of last year, your Excellency reported that Marshal Soult stated to your Excellency that the French fleet on the Levant station would consist of ten sail of the line, besides frigates and ships of war, and that thus if the British squadron should be augmented to an equal amount the combined force would consist of twenty sail of the line.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON



Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 39.)

My Lord,

Therapia, February 22, 1840.

YOUR Lordship may like to see a paper which has been in the hands of persons here, and is stated to be a copy of the arrangement agreed to between your Lordship and Baron Brunnow the 23rd and 25th of December, 1839.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 615

Projet d'un Arrangement combiné entre M. de Brunnow et Lord Palmerston, le 23 et 25 Décembre.

1° LE but de l'arrangement sera de convenir des bases d'une pacification par laquelle l'indépendance et la sécurité de l'Empire Ottoman seraient complètement mises à couvert du danger d'une agression nouvelle de la part de Méhémet Ali.

2° D'établir que la Sublime Porte accorde à Méhémet Ali l'hérédité de l'Égypte.

3° De déterminer les limites du Pacha de l'Égypte, de manière à ce qu'elle s'étende sur le pays compris entre le Canal de Suez et le Lac de Tihana, et de là le long du Jourdain et de la Mer Morte jusqu'au Golfe d'El-Akaba; à condition que :

4° Méhémet Ali continue à reconnaître la suprématie de la Porte et paye tribut ;

5° Que tout le territoire situé en-dehors de cette ligne soit restitué à la Porte ;

6° Que la flotte du Grand Seigneur soit renvoyée à Constantinople sans que le Pacha puisse réclamer du tribut les frais de l'entretien de cette flotte.

7° La disposition ci-dessus, après avoir obtenu l'adhésion de la Sublime Porte, sera ratifiée par le Méhémet Ali et accompagnée par une sommation à la part des Puissances signataires.

8° Si Méhémet Ali refuse d'y adhérer, les Puissances procéderont à une intervention armée pour rétablir l'ordre.

9° a. On commencera par diriger l'escadre Anglaise et Française dans la Baie de Sidon pour prendre une position qui menace Ibrahim dans son flanc, intercepte les communications, et favorise la révolte des populations de la Syrie.

b. On procédera à établir l'autorité du Sultan dans l'Ile de Candie.

c. On bloquera la Syrie et l'Égypte, ce qui paralysera les ressources financières du Vice-Roi.

d. En cas que le Vice-Roi ne cède pas encore, des troupes Anglaises et Autrichiennes débarqueront en Candie et en Syrie même et un corps Russe entrera en Asie Mineure pour agir simultanément avec les troupes Ottomanes.

e. On occupera St. Jean d'Acre ; des troupes Anglaises (5,000 hommes) viendront de la Méditerranée à Suez et à travers l'Égypte, d'armées de troupes. À mesure qu'Ibrahim Pacha descendrait avec son armée vers l'Égypte, l'armée Ottomane avancerait en Syrie.

f. Destitution du Pacha et de toute sa famille.

10° En cas qu'Ibrahim Pacha marche vers l'Asie Mineure, une flotte Russe avec des troupes de débarquement viendrait sur la demande du Sultan et au nom de l'Albanie, mouiller au Bosphore, les flottes Anglaises, Françaises, et Autrichiennes, opéreraient sur la Syrie et l'Égypte, afin de forcer Ibrahim d'arrêter sa marche sur l'Asie. Pour constater l'union des Puissances, des vaisseaux Anglaises et Français, sur la demande du Sultan, prendraient une position entre Gallipoli et Mondrago, et des vaisseaux Autrichiens entre Rodosto et le Golfe de Nicomédie.

11° La présence des bâtiments de guerre étrangers dans le Bosphore et dans la Mer de Marmara cesserait dès le moment que le danger serait passé.

12° L'admission des pavillons étrangers ne serait considérée que comme une mesure exceptionnelle, adoptée à la demande seule de la Porte, mais ne porterait aucune atteinte au principe existant de la clôture des détroits en temps de paix et de guerre, principe que les Puissances s'engageraient à conséder comme faisant partie du droit public Européen. L'arrangement aura la forme d'une Convention revêtue de la signature des Plénipotentiaires de tous les Cabinets qui voudraient y prendre part.

Lord Palmerston se charge de porter ce projet devant le Conseil de la Couronne. Aussitôt qu'il en aura reçu l'approbation, les Plénipotentiaires d'Angleterre, de Russie, d'Autriche, et de Prusse, qui ont déjà des pleins-pouvoirs *ad hoc*, signeront.

Lord Palmerston invitera ensuite la France à accéder ; si elle n'adhère pas, l'admission du pavillon Français dans la Mer de Marmara n'aura pas lieu. On procédera outre sans la France.

Que les Cinq ou les Quatre Puissances aient signé l'arrangement, il sera communiqué à la Porte pour qu'elle donne son adhésion par une déclaration formelle. Cela obtenu, on procédera à imposer cet arrangement à Méhémet Ali.

Le Plénipotentiaire Autrichien adhère à ce projet en général, mais il proteste contre l'idée d'employer des troupes Autrichiennes ; et il se réserve pour l'escadre Autrichienne dans le cas prévu dans l'Article X., pleine liberté d'entrer dans la Mer de Marmara ou de ne pas y entrer. Il proteste également contre l'application de l'Article XII. en temps de guerre.

Le Conseil de la Couronne se réunira entre le 5 et 8 Janvier.

No. 616

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 37)

My Lord,

Therapia, February 26, 1840.

In obedience to your Lordship's directions, I requested that full powers might be sent to Nouri Effendi to concur in a Treaty to be negotiated at London, &c. &c. I had the honour, by last post, to acquaint you that the Porte had consented and had desired that I should forward the full powers by a messenger. The full powers have not yet been sent to be forwarded.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY

No. 617.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 38.)

My Lord,

Therapia, February 26, 1840.

M. DE BOUTENEFF communicated to me a despatch he had received from Count Nasselrode, stating that your Lordship had desired that M. de Bouteneff and I should act together for persuading the Sublime Porte to abstain from committing itself with the Pacha of Egypt, &c.

In reply, I assured M. de Bouteneff of my readiness to take any steps he should think proper, adding, that at the present moment I was not aware that any were necessary. His Excellency was of opinion that it was not, as so much had been lately done, and with entire success, to obtain the desired end.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY

No. 618.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 20.)*

(No. 39.)

My Lord,

*Therapia, February 26, 1840*

COUNT KOENIGSMARCK read to me a despatch from Baron Werther to the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires in London, giving full powers to that Minister to concur in the arrangement of the Egyptian Affair upon the basis of Prince Metternich's Note, &c., &c.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

No. 619

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 22.)*

(No. 99.)

My Lord,

*Paris, March 20, 1840*

IN my interview with M. Thiers this morning, he again reverted to the French Question. His Excellency related the arguments and the arguments on this subject which I had heard from him a week ago, and which, having been detailed in a despatch addressed by him to M. Guizot, and read to your Lordship by the French Ambassador, I need not repeat.

His Excellency expressed great regret that the discussions which had taken place had not led to an agreement on the one of conduct of the two Governments on this question. He said that the accounts which he had received from the French Consuls and Agents since our last conversation, strongly confirmed his impression that neither armament nor force would wrest from Mehemet Ali the possession of Syria. He said that if any reasonable proposition were made to him, the French Government would use its best efforts with him to induce him to accept it. I asked him whether he considered every proposition short of leaving to Mehemet Ali the possession of all Syria as unreasonable, he answered that perhaps there might be modifications in regard to the hereditary tenure of the whole, or part of it. He acknowledged that the restoration of Adana to the Porte was an important object, and that the French Government "pouera de tout son poids" to obtain it. I asked whether by the menace of the hostility of France against the Pasha, if he refused to make this concession? To this he replied by an allusion to the acknowledged public feeling of France against a war with the Pasha of Egypt; but again repeated the words "il pouera de tout son poids."

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 620.

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 22)*

(No. 100.)

My Lord,

*Paris, March 20, 1840.*

I THIS morning called upon my Turkish Colleagues, and learnt from him that he had as yet received no instructions to proceed to England. He had heard from his private friends at Constantinople that such instructions would be sent to him, but no official communication had been made to him to that effect.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 621

*The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 23.)*

(No. 21.)

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, March 10, 1840*

A LONG paper from Prince Metternich, upon the Turco-Egyptian Question, has been received here, but it has produced no effect. Count Nesselrode told me it had been written when the negotiations at London were not supposed to be going on satisfactorily, and that he considered the reasoning it contained not applicable to the present state of the question.

No. 622

*Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 23.)*

(No. 21.)

(Extract.)

*Alexandria, February 12, 1840.*

THE next subject touched upon was the attack upon the tribe inhabiting the banks of the River Khabeer (under the jurisdiction of the Sultan), by Ibrahim Pasha's irregular Cavalry from Orfa, which the Viceroy attempted to explain by saying that Ibrahim Pasha had been compelled to do so by the refusal of that tribe to furnish recruits. Mehemet Ali was evidently embarrassed on this subject, and declined answering further, unless I addressed him officially in writing.

I then mentioned a report of his Highness having been tampering with the chiefs and citizens of Merdin, and that they had sent an invitation to Ibrahim Pasha to occupy that city, and that a Catholic bishop and some of the opposing chiefs had been decapitated. Mehemet Ali explained this by saying that it was only a deputation from Maggrian Bey to his son, and that he knew nothing of the murder of the Catholic bishop.

Among the recent destitution of Ahmed Pasha, Mehemet Ali characterized the insult towards him on the part of the Sublime Porte, who having sought, six months after his defection, to arrange matters amicably with the Pasha, now testified its disappointment by that insulting measure. He added, that were he not sure of the sentiments of Mustapha Pasha, he would not have allowed him to accept the appointment. From this I entirely dissented, by declaring that I considered that the Sublime Porte was perfectly entitled to dismiss at pleasure an officer who had proved himself unfaithful.

No. 623.

*Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 23.)*

(No. 21.)

My Lord,

*Alexandria, February 12, 1840.*

VARIOUS remarks have been made about the Turkish Question. The Austrian Government have a proposition to make to the Porte, and the Porte has a proposition to make to the Austrian Government. The Porte has a proposition to make to the Austrian Government, and the Austrian Government has a proposition to make to the Porte. The Porte has a proposition to make to the Austrian Government, and the Austrian Government has a proposition to make to the Porte.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.





No. 62C.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby

No. 39 :

My Lord,

Foreign Office, March 24, 1840.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 33, inclosing a paper stated to contain the substance of an arrangement concerted between Baron Brunnow and myself on the 23rd and 25th of last December, for the settlement of the Turco-Egyptian Question; and I have to acquaint your Excellency, that this paper contains, with some exceptions, a tolerably correct summary of the substance of the conversations which have taken place between Baron Brunnow and myself.

James &  
S. PALMERSTON

No. 67

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—Received March 25.*

No. 106, Confidential.)

My Lord,

Paris, March 23, 1940.

COUNT ATTONY this day called upon the Ambassador of the Porte, for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the British Government intended to proceed to England to take a part in the negotiations on the Affairs of the East, and found that no orders to that effect had as yet reached him.

Count Appony collected from the conversation of Nouri, that his opinion was not favourable to the adoption of measures of coercion against Mehmed Ali, the position of the Pasha was too strong, he thought, to allow him to hope that they would be effectual; and he was of opinion, that if peace were concluded with Mehmed Ali, it would be a faithful vessel, on an efficient support of the Sultan. As the consequence of this opinion being known at Constantinople might be unpleasant to my Ottoman Colleague, I have marked this despatch confidential.

I have, &c.,  
S. S. GRANVILLE

120

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 20.)

No. 411

My Lord,

Therapie, February 27, 1890.

I HAVE received from his Excellency Rechid Pasha, a packet containing full powers for Nour Effendi, and instructions for that Ambassador, which, at the request of the Sublime Porte, I send by a messenger to Vienna, to be forwarded to Earl Granville at Paris.

I have, &c,  
Signed) **PONSONBY**

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received March 26.)

(No. 48)

My Lord,

Therapia, March 3, 1840.

I INCLOSE a despatch from Mr. Consul Moore, dated 21st of February, because I am not sure that your Lordship has received the intelligence it contains, and to part of which I wish to draw your attention for reasons that will appear when your Lordship receives a despatch that will be forwarded by the first messenger.

Mr. Moore says, "Secret meetings amongst the Christians and some Shaks of the Druses have been held in Mount Lebanon and a rebel has agreed to resist all attempts to disarm them or to levy conscripts. This is a serious step, and the fate of Syria is at stake."

[illegible]

officer of Her Majesty's forces I feel in the defence of the capital and I can say that even if the enemy had their way I was sure to know that Mr. Parnell would not be the commanding officer of the British forces because he is too big a coward to do so.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSENBY

Inclosure is No. 629

*Mrs. Conrad Moore to Vincent Penabaz.*

[No. 2.]

My Lord,

Beirut, February 21, 1840

SINCE I had the honour to address your Excellency under date of the 1st 3rd instant, all the masons and builders at Beyrouth have been called for by the Governor, and sent to Acro to be employed in the fortifications at that place, the bakers have likewise received orders to prepare a supply of biscuit for that fortress: similar orders have been given at Sidon.

Two battalions of Infantry have passed through this place for the same destination, and others are to follow.

The trenches are to be deepened and enlarged at Acra, whither a large quantity of lime for making mortar has also been transported. A mound on the east, raised by the Egyptian army when that place was besieged and taken, is to be levelled and prepared for use has been granted to such persons as may be desirous of quitting the city, to depart, and several have already availed of the permission, and are arrived at Sidon.

The present force at Acre consists of a regiment of Cavalry and one of Infantry, and about 500 artillerymen, but this force is to be increased.

Secret meetings amongst the Christians and some Sheiks of the Druses



have been held in Mount Lebanon, and a resolution adopted by them to resist all attempts either to disarm them, or to levy conscripts.

Solyman Pasha has left Beyrout for Sidon and Acre  
In this neighbourhood public tranquillity is maintained.

I have, &c.,  
Signed) N. MOORE

No. 630.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 26.,

No. 1101

My Lord,

Paris, March 24, 1840.

I TRANSMITTED to Nouri Effendi a despatch from his Government which was forwarded to me by Lord Ponsonby, containing official instructions to his Excellency to proceed to England to take part in the conferences at London on the Affairs of the East.

I have this evening received a note from Nouri Effendi, apprising me of his intention to quit Paris in two days to proceed to his destination.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

No. 631.

Lord Beuville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 26.

No. 1102

My Lord,

Vienna, March 10, 1840

This inclosed is from Count Neeserode to Baron Brunnow, a document doubt already known to your Lordship, but a copy of it having come into my hands, I think it expedient to inclose one to your Lordship.

I have, &c.,  
Signed) BEAUVILLE

Inclosure in No. 631

Count Neeserode to Baron Brunnow

Private)

Paris, le 1er Février, 1840.

LA lecture de vos dernières dépêches, mon cher Baron, m'a fait à la fois plaisir et peine. J'y ai vu avec une extrême satisfaction combien vous avez à vous louer des dispositions personnelles de Lord Palmerston, et d'un autre côté, combien en dépit de ses propres convictions, lui causent d'hésitation et d'incertitude la répugnance de ses collègues à prendre un parti qui les mettrait peut-être dans le cas de se séparer du Gouvernement Français, et pourrait leur donner l'apparence aux yeux du public Anglais d'avoir sacrifié l'impératif de la Russie de préférence à celui de la France. Je conçois parfaitement bien ce qui vous a donné ce dernier rapport, la situation du Ministère Anglais peut avoir d'embarrassant. Il ne semble néanmoins qu'elle se simplifierait de beaucoup si elle consentait à la réduire à ses véritables termes.

On a tort, mon cher Baron, en Angleterre de se préoccuper tant de nous et de faire à la Russie une si grosse part dans cette affaire. A proprement parler nous sommes en-dehors de la question. Nous ne sommes point des acteurs principaux, nous ne jouons qu'un rôle purement secondaire. Le débat n'est point entre la France et nous, mais entre l'Angleterre et la France. En effet, que s'est-il passé? Les Cabinets de Paris et de Londres ont proposé chacun un plan dans le but de pacifier le Levant. Le plan Français favorisait toutes les prétentions du Pacha, et repoussait l'adoption des mesures coercitives. Le

plan Anglais au contraire, restreignant à de strictes limites l'ambition de Méhémet Ali, et, en était besoin, admettait l'emploi de la force. Nous avons, comme l'Autriche et la Prusse, puisé ce plan plus conforme aux vrais intérêts du Sultan, plus propre à garantir son indépendance et sa sécurité futures, plus digne enfin des Puissances Européennes, après l'engagement spontané qu'elles avaient pris et vers la Porte de lui obtenir de meilleures conditions qu'elle n'obtiendrait elle-même si on l'avait laissée libre de négocier directement avec son vainqueur. Nous avons donc, ainsi que l'Autriche et la Prusse, adopté simplement les idées mises en avant par l'Angleterre. Mais ces idées, comme je l'ai dit, impliquaient dans leur exécution, l'emploi de mesures coercitives. Ces mesures coercitives à leur tour impliquaient certaines éventualités. Il fallait aviser aux moyens de pourvoir à cette éventualité.

C'est ici, mais ici seulement, que la Russie a commencé à entrer en scène. Les moyens dont on avait besoin, elle s'est empressée de les mettre à la disposition du Gouvernement Anglais par les concessions qu'elle lui a faites comme une preuve de sa déférence. Ainsi donc, mon cher Baron, nous n'avons point fourni le plan; nous avons purement offert les facilités nécessaires pour le mettre en œuvre. Le théorème n'est pas de nous, nous avons seulement aidé à en tirer le corollaire.

Ceci posé, de quoi s'agit-il aujourd'hui pour le Gouvernement Anglais? Non point d'opter entre la France et nous, mais entre la France et lui-même. Croit-il toujours le plan qu'il a proposé, le seul compatible avec la conservation de l'Empire Ottoman, le seul honorable pour les Puissances intervenantes, le seul qui ne pose qu'un seul problème, le seul qui ne soit qu'un simple acte de justice qu'il a consignés encore en dernier lieu dans la Note à Lord Granville? Nous nous féliciterons vivement de le voir y adhérer fidèlement, mais du moment où il reconnaît le fait, il faut de toute nécessité qu'il en accepte les conséquences. Répugne-t-il au contraire à séparer sa marche de celle du Cabinet des Tuileries, et croit-il devoir faire céder à cette considération les intérêts du Sultan, ses propres convictions et ses déclarations antérieures? Nous n'avons point à nous prononcer sur ce parti qui le concerne exclusivement, puisqu'il s'agit après tout du sacrifice de ses propositions, et non des nôtres. Du moment que la Porte aurait souscrit au plan de pacification Français, nous ne verrions aucun motif qui nous empêchât nous-mêmes d'y souscrire. Nous ne sommes point à nous inquiéter de ce que nous aurons fait, mais de ce que nous aurons dit. Les espérances trop flatteuses qu'on lui avait fait concevoir. Mais ce qu'il faut surtout se garder de faire, c'est de laisser la Russie se faire une part de jeu et de jouer à nous que d'une manière très-partielle.

Quant à notre influence sur le Divan, nous ne voyons également pas en quoi elle pourrait en souffrir. La Porte saura que nous avions tout employé pour défendre ses intérêts, et même fait tous les sacrifices qui dépendaient de nous pour faciliter en sa faveur l'application de mesures coercitives. Ces mesures venant à tomber en même temps que le plan Anglais, les ouvertures qui y avaient trait tombent également d'elles-mêmes. Nous restons dans notre première position, et nous ne sommes plus dans le cas de faire les concessions que nous avons offertes spontanément à la Russie, mais de nous en garder. Le Gouvernement Anglais, et au désir de l'aider à faire triompher ses vues bienveillantes en faveur de la Porte.

Vous voyez, mon cher Baron, que comparativement parlant, nous sommes presque désintéressés dans la question, puisque quelque soit le parti auquel l'Angleterre se détermine, notre position matérielle, ni notre amour-propre ne saurait en être gravement compromis. Je voudrais vous voir employer vos soins à faire, s'il était possible, passer cette conviction dans l'esprit des Ministres Anglais. Ils en ont peut-être que dans la négociation, mais tout le monde ne voit nullement faire jouer à notre politique un rôle prédominant, et les entraîner à tout prix dans notre sphère. Nous préférons à la vérité voir les idées de l'Angleterre prévaloir sur celles du Gouvernement Français, parce que nous avons plus d'inclination pour le Sultan, que pour le Pacha, parce que nous sommes reconnaissants à l'Angleterre des dispositions amicales et confiantes dont elle a fait preuve pour nous dans la même temps que la France nous en témoignait de toutes contraires. Mais cette préférence ne va pas jusqu'à vouloir lui imposer nos vues.

L'opinion publique a très mal à propos pour le salut de la Porte, et pour le bien de la Question d'Orient, fait de la Russie, non seulement l'un des acteurs principaux, mais le principal, dans la lutte d'influence entre la France et la Russie. Cette lutte là n'existe pas.

Il ne se trouve en jeu à Londres que des idées et des intérêts Anglais et Français. C'est à Lord Palmerston à décider qui devra décrire des uns ou des autres. Faites usage de ces observations au près de lui, mon cher Baron, et présentez-les avec l'habileté qui vous distingue. Je vous les adresse à tout hasard pour vous en servir, s'il est encore temps. J'aime toutefois à espérer qu'elles vous arriveront trop tard, c'est-à-dire, qu'au moment où vous les recevrez, le Curul et Anzous aura déjà arrêté de son libre mouvement la détermination la plus conforme à sa propre dignité et aux intérêts du Souverain qu'il a pris sous son aigle.

Recevez, &c.  
J. M. NESSELRODE

No. 632

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Bessborough.

(No. 41.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, March 26, 1840.

I HAVE to inform your Excellency, that a very bad effect has been produced upon the pending negotiations upon the Turkish Question by an article which has gone forth, that Austria would not take any active part in any measures which the Allies might take themselves, and to resort to the support of the Sultan's rights.

This opinion passes current at Paris, and is entertained by many persons in London. Her Majesty's Government know very well that this is entirely unfounded, and that Austria would be perfectly ready and willing to take any part which might properly belong to her in any measures which might be necessary, but it would be desirable that your Excellency should point out to Lord Metternich how much the successful issue of the pending negotiations may be prevented, and how much the political weight, which has arisen upon this matter

I am, &c.  
Signed PALMERSTON

No. 633.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby

(No. 43.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, March 27, 1840.

I ENCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch\* from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, stating the opinions which Nouri Effendi has expressed upon the subject of coercive measures against Mehemet Ali.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 634.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 113.)

My Lord,

Paris, March 27, 1840

NOURI EFFENDI took leave of me yesterday, stating it to be his intention to quit Paris this day for London.

I hear from M. Desages, that the Ambassador informed him that he had not

\* See No. 627, p. 646.

received full powers, only instructions to learn what is going on in the Conference in London respecting the affairs of the East, and report to his Government.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

No. 635

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 51.)

My Lord,

Therapia, March 7, 1840

I ENCLOSE a translated copy of a letter written by Mehemet Ali to the Grand Visier, which was sent in original from Rechid Pasha, and translated by M. Frederic Pisan.

Rechid Pasha also sent me a message as follows:

"Je crois que la Porte devrait faire à la lettre de Mehemet Ali une réponse vague et calculée à la tenir dans l'incertitude jusqu'à ce que le résultat des négociations à Londres nous soit connu. Je vous salue. A Londres Lord Ponsonby trouve à propos que je communique la lettre de Mehemet Ali à quatre Représentans. Quant à M. de P. je le dirai que la Porte a donné à Mehemet Ali un refus tout net. Je prie Lord Ponsonby de me faire savoir sa façon de penser sur cette nouvelle occurrence."

I add to the above. Rechid Pasha ordered the Prince of Samos to communicate to me the Pasha's opinion, &c.; and the Prince of Samos sent the Note herewith inclosed.

The Sultan himself gave orders that the letter from Mehemet Ali should be communicated to me; and that my opinion should be obtained and made known to him before anything was done in the affair (Rechid Pasha mentions this fact); and I therefore wrote in reply more fully than I would otherwise have done, that the Sultan should have before him some things which I think he might not otherwise be made acquainted with. My reply will be translated for the Sultan. Rechid Pasha approves of it. I do not think it necessary to trouble your Lordship with a copy. It contained a brief review of Mehemet Ali's letter, and particularly exposed such absurdities, as that he keeps the Sultan's fleet in order to increase the Sultan's force; that he insists upon the partition of the Empire to preserve its unity; that he is free from selfishness, because being too old to enjoy power himself he demands a third of the Empire for his children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren; that the Sultan ought to refuse the leadership of the Great Powers, because they wish to take Egypt from him (Mehemet Ali), and thereby to increase and perpetuate discord and dissension, and pave the way for the partition of the Empire amongst themselves.

I then point out the hardly disguised motive, what he says in his negotiations for war and the reduction of Egypt, &c. &c. to the Grand Visier, and observe, that it does not contain a single reason why the Porte should grant any one of the Pasha's demands; but affords many why they should be refused. I then give my opinion that Mehemet Ali's letter ought to be communicated to the Representatives of the Great Powers, so that the answer to be sent from Mehemet Ali to the Porte, if we ever answer the Sultan's Porte, shall be a direct reply, and not an answer to a question, because that Mehemet Ali will be the fact from Mehemet Ali himself.

I state, that the step Mehemet Ali has just taken appears to be evidence that he feels himself weak; and that being unable to carry his point by force, he tries to intimidate the Ottoman Government. I say why I do not think he has any force that ought to be a cause of uneasiness to the Porte, and enter into a short explanation of the dangers and ultimate ruin that might be the result of an attempt made to march troops this way, and that I see nothing to





pris la flotte. la mettraient obstacle à l'amitié de la nation, et à la longue, le peuple Mahometan ne tomberait-il pas dans un plus grand abîme?

Voilà, Monseigneur, que je vous ai exposé tels qu'ils sont réellement et en apparence et au fond, les motifs qui me guident à l'égard de la flotte. Expliquons maintenant les motifs que j'ai pour persister à demander la Syrie jusque et compris Adana et les gorges du Mont Taurus avec leurs confins.

J'ai déjà passé ma soixante-dixième année, il ne faut point d'autres preuves que je ne travaille pas pour moi-même. Mais il y a tant d'années que je vis, j'ai créé une famille, et mon désir le plus ardent est que ma famille prospère. Les fils de la Sublime Porte, et ayant dans l'Arabis des forces imposantes, et toujours prêts à agir au besoin, ils peuvent ainsi rendre des services à la religion et au Gouvernement, et faire que ma mémoire soit pour longtemps bénie dans l'histoire. Or, on persiste obstinément à me refuser Adana et les gorges du Mont Taurus, d'où je conclus qu'on veut me frustrer de l'objet que je désire obtenir, et qu'on a peut-être même d'autres intentions encore; et de là naquit la nécessité pour moi de persister dans mes demandes résoluement.

L'idée de ne pas s'arrêter au refus, et de vouloir commettre la faute et préjudiciable de recourir, à la fin, à quelques Grandes Puissances, confirme de plus en plus mon premier soupçon.

J'ai rejeté tout soit les propositions qui m'avaient été faites de concert par les Grandes Puissances, en leur faisant une réponse tout-à-fait négative, et en voici les raisons.

Rien de plus favorable à la politique des Grandes Puissances que le recours à elles: en effet, leur politique exige que la Sublime Porte soit toujours prête à des malheurs, afin qu'affaiblie par là, sa faiblesse facilite l'exécution du projet qui, depuis nombre d'années, fait l'objet de leurs méditations, — le partage de la Turquie, lorsque le temps en sera venu. Les Puissances ne sont donc pas disposées à leur offrir de la force. Elles disent, l'Egypte fait la principale force de la Sublime Porte; diminuons donc la puissance de l'Egypte; car, comme après cela la discorde et les dissensions entre les deux parties ne cesseront jamais, à la longue les deux parties s'affaibliront également, et nos vœux seront accomplis. Cela étant, il vaut mille fois mieux périr à présent d'une manière digne de l'Islamisme, et en montrant une vive foi, que périr avec désavantage dans cinq ans d'ici.

Quoiqu'il en soit, votre Altesse saura qu'on a commencé ici à faire des préparatifs de guerre qui ne sont interrompus ni de jour ni de nuit. Pour l'amour de Dieu, que votre Altesse ne permette pas que le peuple Mahometan soit plongé dans les malheurs dont il est menacé, qu'elle daigne m'accorder la faveur que je désire si ardemment obtenir, la faveur d'être admis comme un serviteur fidèle et dévoué. Non, un homme aussi judicieux, aussi éclairé que votre Altesse ne saurait ignorer qu'en me traitant avec cette clémence que j'implore, il verra ses vœux accomplis sans l'un et l'autre monde; et c'est ce qui m'encourage à prendre la liberté de vous faire de nouvelles représentations; ce que je fais, comme je l'ai dit plus haut d'une manière dénuée de toute étiquette.

Je prends Dieu à témoin que ces représentations sont franches et sincères. Plein de confiance dans la sagesse, dans l'esprit de modération qui vous anime, et dans votre qualité de mon ancien ami et Protecteur, je vous ai ouvert tout mon cœur. J'espère en Dieu, que daignant prêter une oreille favorable à mes prières, votre Altesse voudra bien mettre toute sa sollicitude à faire prendre un nouvel essor à la nation Musulmane, et renouveler votre ancienne protection à mon égard. Moi, de mon côté, qui ai recours à la clémence de votre Altesse, je me montrerai pour le reste de ma vie absolument et constamment occupé à servir, avec l'assistance divine, et avec un dévouement sans bornes, la religion et notre Gouvernement; et j'assurerais ainsi ma Religion, et mon Gouvernement. Mais, votre Altesse fait des réponses, qui portent le sceau de la franchise et de la vérité, une réponse semblable à celles qui l'ont précédée, et cherche à gagner du temps, moi

aussi, mettant en chaque circonstance toute ma confiance dans l'assistance et la faveur divines, je ne changerai pas de résolution; et votre Altesse, informée de cela, donnera les ordres qu'il lui appartient de donner.

19 Zilhedge, 1255. (23 Février, 1840)

(L. S.) MEHMET ALI

Inclosure 2 in No. 635

The Prince of Samos to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord,

Fonai, le 4 Mars, 1840

S. E. RECHID PACHA m'a montré aujourd'hui une lettre très-récente de Méhémet Ali adressée au Grand Vizir, par laquelle, après plusieurs protestations de son dévouement et de sa fidélité pour Sa Hautesse, pour la nation Musulmane, et pour l'Empire Ottoman, il le supplie, pour la dernière fois, d'interposer sa médiation auprès du Sultan, pour effectuer un arrangement à l'amiable et sans intervention des Puissances Européennes, et dont je crois superflu de citer ici le contenu dans tous ses détails, puisque son Excellence allait la remettre à M. Frédéric Pisani, pour en faire la traduction et la soumettre à votre Excellence.

Ensuite, son Excellence m'a dit que pour gagner du temps jusqu'à ce qu'il eût négocié avec les autres puissances, il en y avait une si vénérable que le Grand Vizir envoyât à Méhémet Ali une réponse ayant pour objet de lui demander quelles seraient d'après lui les conditions propres à amener un tel accommodement.

Enfin, son Excellence m'a chargé de communiquer confidentiellement son intention à votre Excellence, et de la prier de vouloir bien lui donner dans cette occasion ses conseils, et de lui faire savoir si elle approuve son opinion.

En attendant, je suis, &c.  
(Signé) ET. VOGORIDEN

No. 636

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 55.)

My Lord

Therapia, March 11, 1840

I INCLOSE a communication I have just received from the Sublime Porte, being the substance of despatches from Bagdad, Diarbekir, and Mossoul.

Your Lordship knows of the movement of Persian troops on Suleymanieh. There have been evidences tending to show some connection between the Shah and Mehemet Ali.

I have advised the Porte to be very cautious not to allow the Ottoman troops to risk a defeat, but rather to retire before the enemy if he should advance. I have given this counsel, because I doubt extremely the ability of the Turkish General, and also because I am convinced that any advance made by Mehemet Ali, may be rendered the instrument of his discomfiture by a little good management.

I hope we may receive here, shortly, some accounts from the Consuls and others, that will throw more light upon this affair.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY.



Inclosure in No. 636.

*Substance of despatches from Moussoul, Bagdad, and Diarbekir.*

(Translation.)

LE Gouverneur de Bagdad, Ali Pacha, écrit sous la date du 19 Février dernier, "le Général Egyptien Kourchid Pacha qui était il y a quel-  
 quel-temps dans le Yémen, vient d'arriver maintenant à un point distant de trente heures de Bassora. Il y mène des troupes, et fait des approvisionnements. Il fait aussi venir du Yémen sur des bâtimens, de l'artillerie, des munitions de guerre et autre matériel nécessaire, voulant, sans doute, mettre à exécution quelque projet qu'il médite."

Une lettre de M. le Ministre de Moussoul, porte en substance ce qui suit: "L'Egyptien connu sous la dénomination de Maadjoun Agam, est venu ces jours-ci avec un corps de Cavalerie considérable à un endroit appelé Sabour vers Moussoul, où il a commis des excès en pillant quelques tribus. De là il s'est dirigé vers Bassora, et par ses marches et contre-marches dans ces environs là, il trouble la tranquillité des habitans. À juger de sa manière d'agir, son intention est de frapper un coup quelque part. En cas donc, que ce Maadjoun Agam ne se retire pas avec ses cavaliers du côté d'Ourfa, et de là vers l'Égypte, son pays, des troubles éclateront dans la province de Moussoul ainsi que dans les environs de Bagdad, et sur la grande route qui y mène."

Le Moudir de Diarbekir, Saadoullah Pacha, écrit: "le Général de Brigade, Ferhad Bey, qui est à Antaba, exige, en employant même quelques moyens coercitifs, du blé et de l'orge du district de Hamaour. Le Colonel Egyptien est venu d'Ourfa sous prétexte d'acheter des mulets, et un Major s'est rendu par la grande route de Balou à Eraroun: ils y font des approvisionnements de vivres, et s'y procurent d'autres objets, et devraient faire la même chose et ayant plus encore dans le pays."

Les Pachas susmentionnés ajoutent: "indépendamment de ces procédés de la part des Egyptiens, qui font jouer des ressorts patens et caches, on voit que les autres objets en vue d'une pareille conduite est tout-à-fait opposée à la politique suivie aujourd'hui. Agissant, disent-ils, avec prudence, ils, cherchent toujours à éviter de provoquer les Egyptiens en la moindre chose; mais ils demandent des instructions de la Sublime Porte, pour savoir ce qu'ils doivent faire en cas que les Egyptiens vinssent à commettre de nouveaux actes d'agression."

No. 637

*Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 6.)*

(No. 2.)

(Extract.)

*Berlin, April 1, 1840*

I HAVE had a general conversation with Baron Werther since I arrived here from which I infer that the policy of Prussia remains unchanged; that is, that the same desire prevails to act as much as possible in concert with Austria and Russia, the results of which should be the continuance of peace. Were a difference to arise between the countries named, it is towards Austria that Prussia would incline. At the same time there is a very friendly feeling in this Cabinet towards England and France, and Baron Werther told me that M. Thiers' accession to power gave him no uneasiness. He thought his policy towards other nations would be that of conciliation and peace.

Baron Werther has a reserved opinion on the Eastern Question to Baron Bülow, as he thinks will be satisfactory to your Lordship, but he says that a special comment from your Lordship is not to be expected. At the same time, the *status quo* gives him no apprehension of war. He rejoiced at Baron Bern's appointment to London as he thought him

more able than any one to explain questions that gave umbrage to the British Government: his long service in the Foreign Office of St. Petersburg, making him master of every subject, and his views being conciliatory and favourable to English policy.

No. 638

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 6.)*

(No. 120.)

My Lord,

*Paris, April 3, 1840.*

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches to No. 119 inclusive, and I have to thank your Lordship for transmitting to me a copy of your despatch of the 12th of March to Lord Brougham containing an account of a long and interesting conversation you held with M. Guizot upon the Turco-Egyptian Question.

The arguments adduced by the French Ambassador in support of the views of the present Ministers and of their predecessors in this matter, are those which I have heard from the mouth of Marshal Soult, and of M. Thiers, as well as from the King, and which I reported in various despatches to your Lordship, but I am glad to see yet in possession of the able statement made by your Lordship in reply to these arguments, and shall avail myself of it in any future discussion that may arise upon this question with the French Minister; but I should deceive your Lordship, if I led you to expect that any change in the views or conduct of the French Government could thereby be effected, or that Her Majesty's Government would acquiesce in holding the French Government to agree to the general principles laid down by the other Four Powers (viz. 4) those Four Powers remain firm and steady in their purpose.

I am every day more and more convinced (a conviction, I believe, shared by every one of my Diplomatic Colleagues) that France will not join in hostile measures to compel the evacuation of Syria by the Egyptians, whatever may be the party who form the Government.

I have, &amp;c.,

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 639.

*Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 7.)*

(No. 3.)

(Extract.)

*Damascus, February 20, 1840*

UNDER the 18th ultimo, per Austrian steamer from Beyrout, I had the honour of addressing your Lordship my last despatch No. 1.

The environs of this city and the Damascus district is in a quiescent state. I have only heard that, on an order being sent by the Government here to the Musallim of Balbec, to seize one of the Mutin Emirs implicated in the late insurrection, that he proceeded to the house of the brother of the Governor of Balbec, residing in one of the adjacent villages, and killed him; but it appears the affair terminated there, and has produced no further consequences for the present.

I hear that a spirit of resistance has been fostered by the measures supposed to be contemplated by the Egyptian Government in respect to Beir's jurisdiction in Mount Lebanon. It is stated that the Emir requested leave who had been furnished with arms by order of Ibrahim Pacha, subsequently to the quelling of the Druse and other tribes, which the Emir Beir's trust or population was supposed to be 16,000 strong, arms were distributed to them, and part of which on the service and on other occasions, had served only by substitutes,—to deliver their arms up

to the Emir Bechir. It appears they have refused to accede to this demand, and have declared that the population are, with the Druses, determined that they shall retain their arms, which were placed in their hands, under a promise from the Egyptian Government, that they should be for the defence of themselves and their children; that this determination has arisen chiefly from the apprehensions of the population, that it is the intention of the Egyptian Government to exact from them conscripts for the Egyptian army, or to raise a militia to serve beyond the limits of the Emir Bechir's jurisdiction.

I hear that orders have been received here from the Government in Egypt, to send the six Chiefs commanding the Irregular Syrian Cavalry with their forces to Egypt: this force may amount to about 1,200 men, but is ordered to be completed to 2,000. Some difficulty has presented itself in executing the orders of the Egyptian Government in the immediate marching of these troops; they state that they were recruited for the Syrian service, and have no means either for themselves or their families, which must remain in Syria, to extend their service to a distant part of the territories of this Government. The Chiefs have required a delay of sixty days to combine arrangements on this subject. It would appear that it is the object of the Government to remove them from Syria, as both the chiefs and men contain the most turbulent spirits in the country, on which it can little repose, while they can be employed in Egypt or Arabia, with a better chance of success.

My freshest advices from Aleppo, state the destination of two regiments of Infantry from thence for the South, and I hear some Artillery is to augment that force for the same object: here it is stated that this force is for the district of Acre. No change had taken place in retiring any part of the force either from Marash or Orfa, and Ibrahim Pasha was still at the former place.

No. 640.

*Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.*

My Lords,

*Foreign Office, April 7, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordships that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople has represented to me that he is not aware that any authority has been given by Her Majesty's Government to take any measures whatever in the event of a sudden march being made upon Constantinople by the Egyptian army under Ibrahim Pasha.

Upon referring to the letter which Mr. Fox Strangways, by my direct order, addressed to your Lordships' Secretary on the 9th of September last\*, I perceive that if the instruction thereupon given by your Lordships to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford was confined to the terms of that letter, it would merely have desired him to leave at, or near the Dardanelles, a small detachment of his squadron to be ready to go up to Constantinople, if called for by the Turkish Government, in order to protect Constantinople against any threatened attack of Ibrahim Pasha.

Although the Admiral having received this intimation of the wishes of Her Majesty's Government, and bearing in mind the general spirit of his instructions, would of course feel himself authorized to comply with any such applications from the Porte, conveyed to him through Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and would accordingly proceed with the squadron under his command to the Bosphorus, for the purpose of protecting Constantinople against any attack on the part of Ibrahim Pasha, still, in order to avoid any misunderstanding on this point, I am commanded by the Queen to signify to your Lordships Her Majesty's pleasure, that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, or the officer commanding Her Majesty's Naval Forces in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, should be authorized to attend to any requisition which he may receive from the Porte, through Her Majesty's Ambassador, for the presence of the British Squadron in the Bosphorus to protect Constantinople against any attack on the part of Ibrahim Pasha, to repair to

\* See No. 307, p. 339.

the Bosphorus with his squadron, or with such portion thereof as he may think sufficient, and there to adopt, in concert with Her Majesty's Ambassador, and with the Turkish Government, the most effectual measures for the protection of the Turkish capital against an attack by the Egyptian Forces.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 641

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.*

(No. 60)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, April 7, 1840.*

YOUR Excellency states, in your despatch No. 48, that you are not aware that any authority has been given by Her Majesty's Government to take any measures whatever in the event of a sudden march being made by Ibrahim Pasha on Constantinople.

In reply, I have to refer your Excellency to the letter from the Under Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Admiralty, of the 9th of September last\*. I am to signify to your Excellency that it was said that it would be desirable that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford should be ready to repair to Constantinople, if called for by the Turkish Government, in order to protect Constantinople against any threatened attack of Ibrahim Pasha.

The Admiral being now in the Levant, I am to signify to your Excellency that the above instruction has been conveyed to him by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and that I request Constantinople against any attack on the part of Ibrahim Pasha, and would, of course, comply with any application from the Porte, conveyed to him through your Excellency, for the presence of the British fleet in the Bosphorus for such a purpose. The intention of that instruction was further more fully indicated by the instruction given to the Admiral in consequence of my letter of the 29th of October, to the Lords of the Admiralty†, of which a copy was transmitted to your Excellency, in my despatch, No. 160, of the following day, and in which I signified to their Lordships the Queen's command, that "as it appears that Ibrahim Pasha has retired from Marash, and as he does not seem to indicate any intention of advancing upon Constantinople, Her Majesty's Government are of opinion, that it would be expedient that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford should be directed to proceed with the squadron under his command, to Smyrna, or to any other convenient anchorage on the coast of Asia Minor, if the weather should compel him to leave Beika Bay."

I have further to observe, that it is probable that the advance of Ibrahim Pasha to Constantinople would lead either to the entrance of the Russian fleet into the Bosphorus, or to disturbances in Constantinople itself; and in either of those cases, the Admiral is instructed to repair to Constantinople with his squadron, if invited by the Porte. These instructions were given in pursuance of my letters to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty of the 13th, 15th, and 16th of July‡, of which copies were transmitted to your Excellency, in my despatch, No. 98, of the 19th of July; and by my letter to the Lords of the Admiralty of the 3rd of November§, of which a copy was transmitted to your Excellency, in my despatch, No. 162, of the following day, and in which I signified to their Lordships the Queen's pleasure, that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford should be authorized to attend to any requisition which he may receive from the Porte, through Her Majesty's Ambassador, for the presence of the British squadron at Constantinople, in order to support the Sultan's

\* See No. 307, p. 339.

† See Nos. 126, 127, 128, pp. 122, 153.

‡ See Nos. 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.



Government against any insurrection having for its object the overthrow of the present administration in Turkey, and the establishment of another administration favourable to the ancient order of things in that country.

The spirit too of the instructions of the 25th of June, of which copies were transmitted to your Excellency in my despatches No. 83, and "secret and confidential," of the 26th of June\*, would doubtless be considered by the British Admiral as sufficient to authorize him to take any "measure of extreme vigour (which) might become necessary to stop the advance of the Egyptians and to save the Turkish Empire." It is true that these instructions were originally given in anticipation of the possibility of an immediate march of a victorious Egyptian army upon Constantinople, and are not strictly applicable to the case now apprehended by your Excellency, of a deliberate and unprovoked advance, on the part of Ibrahim Pasha, to the shores of the Bosphorus.

Nevertheless, in order to guard against the possibility of any misunderstanding on the part of the British Admiral, a precise instruction will now be given to him, in the terms of my letter to the Admiralty of this day of which I enclose a copy, and by which the Admiral will be required on receiving through your Excellency an application from the Porte for the presence of the British squadron in the Bosphorus to protect Constantinople against any attack on the part of Ibrahim Pasha, to repair to the Bosphorus with his squadron, or with such portion thereof as he may think sufficient, and there to adopt, in concert with your Excellency and with the Turkish Government, the most effectual measures for the protection of the Turkish capital against an attack by the Egyptian forces.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 642

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.*

(No. 61)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, April 7, 1840.*

HER Majesty's Government entirely approve the advice which it appears by your despatch No. 55, you have given to the Porte, to act with great caution with reference to any movements which may be made by the Egyptian Armies in Syria and in Asia Minor, and not to expose the forces of the Sultan to the risk of being defeated in an encounter with the Egyptian forces.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 643

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 10.)*

(No. 59)

My Lord,

*Therapia, March 18, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to forward translated copies of a letter from Grand Vizier to the Pasha of Egypt, and of the latter's reply on the subject of the new appointment of a Capudan Pasha, both of which documents were communicated to me this day by his Excellency Rachid Pasha.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure 1 in No. 643.

*The Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali.—January 19, 1840.*

CONFORMEMENT aux ordres émanés de Sa Hautesse, le poste de Capoudan Pacha vient d'être conféré au Ministre du Commerce, son Excellence Saïd Pacha.

Quoique le précédent Saïd Pacha doive conserver sa décoration personnelle, il a fait cepeut-être d'après notre système, que la décoration affectée au Capoudan Pacha soit donnée à son successeur.

Par suite de ce changement, il n'est, suivant les règles de la marine, nommé un personnage convenable Commandant Supérieur de la flotte Impériale. Le Grand Vizier de Division Moustapha Pacha, étant un homme vif et intelligent de la Sublime Porte, et se trouvant là, Sa Majesté Impériale a daigné le nommer Calmakam de la flotte, pour qu'il ait, en cette qualité, à soigner toutes les affaires qui regardent les bâtimens, et avoir l'inspection sur les équipages; et j'expédie à Votre Altesse le firman contenant la double commission de Moustapha Pacha à qui Saïd Pacha écrit lui-même.

Je vous écris donc cette lettre pour vous recommander de mettre à exécution la volonté de Sa Majesté Impériale, en faisant lire publiquement le Firman susdit, afin que la commission de Moustapha Pacha soit connue des officiers et des matelots de la flotte; Votre Altesse prendra aussi la décoration affectée au poste de Capoudan Pacha et elle l'enverra au

Inclosure 2 in No. 643.

*Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier.—February 29, 1840*

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir le Firman qui annonce, qu'en vertu des ordres émanés du Trône, la dignité de Capoudan Pacha a été conférée à son Excellence Saïd Pacha, et que, comme par suite de ce changement il a fallu, d'après la règle suivie dans la marine, nommer un personnage convenable Commandant Supérieur de la flotte Impériale, Sa Hautesse a daigné nommer son Excellence Moustapha Pacha, qui se trouve ici, Calmakam de la flotte Impériale. J'ai aussi reçu la lettre par laquelle Votre Altesse me recommande de mettre à exécution la volonté de Sa Hautesse, en faisant lire le Firman susdit en présence des officiers de la flotte. Comme il est de mon devoir d'exécuter la volonté de Sa Majesté Impériale, j'ai fait remettre le Firman susdit à Moustapha Pacha par le Capitaine qui en avait été le porteur, et je l'ai fait lire ensuite publiquement à bord du vaisseau le "Marmarade", en présence de tous les officiers et capitaines qui s'y étaient réunis.

J'ai aussi donné les ordres nécessaires à Moustapha Pacha de remplir avec soin les devoirs de sa charge.

Je voulais vous faire savoir que nous ne cessons tous de former des vœux pour la conservation des jours précieux et de la prospérité de Sa Majesté Impériale, lorsque le Capitaine dont j'ai parlé plus haut, ayant exprimé le désir de retourner à Constantinople, j'ai profité de cette occasion d'écrire à Votre Altesse.

No. 644

*Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 10.)*

(No. 37)

My Lord,

*Alexandria, February 25, 1840*

BY accounts I have this day received from Kaiffa, I am informed that the fortification of St. Jean d'Acre is carried on with the greatest activity, and Ibrahim Pasha, it is said, has allowed the Governor only

thirty days to render it effective. Workmen are brought from all quarters, consisting of condemned criminals, soldiers, &c., to the amount of about 6,000. The 30th Regiment of Infantry is on its way from Damascus to reinforce the place. Solymán Pasha is expected from Saida, and 100 pieces of Artillery are to be brought from Alexandria. The extensive stores of the hospital have been filled with powder; and provisions sufficient to maintain 16,000 men, for six months, are said to be in store. Ten thousand baskets have been ordered for the object, it is said, of levelling a mound near Acre.

The inhabitants of Acre are in the greatest alarm about an expected blockade of that place.

The Mudir returned to Acre to-day, after an absence of three months, spent in collecting the contribution. His instructions were most peremptory; and it is said that he has succeeded in settling accounts with the peasants, as well as obtaining payment of the sums advanced them by Ibrahim Pasha, at an interest of 25 per cent. But this has occasioned extreme misery and desolation among the country people, many of whom were obliged to sell their oxen to escape the threatened punishment, others to abandon their homes with their families.

It is said, that the Government despairing of payment from some of the villages, has applied to the merchants who traffic with them.

The Local Government does not pay the least attention to the claims of British merchants trading with the country, a complaint which I shall do myself the honour of reporting to your Lordship shortly.

Your Lordship will doubtless form a proper appreciation of the above circumstances.

Mehemet Ali talks openly of dismantling and sinking the ships of both squadrons, arming the shores from Marabout to Rosetta, with the guns from the ships, and employing the crews and officers in defending this line of coast.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES

No. 645.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 26.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, March 6, 1840.

THE reports I receive from Mr. Consul Werry, Moore, and others, represent Syria as in a most alarming state of public excitement, caused by Mehemet Ali's recent arbitrary measures for the increase of his military forces. Mr. Werry writes to me to say, that he has addressed your Lordship on this subject, as well as his Excellency Viscount Ponsonby.

From what I learn from other sources of information, I am led to believe, that the Pasha's fears have been seriously excited in consequence of those circumstances; and that he has decided upon sending two influential and confidential agents to the headquarters of Ibrahim Pasha, for the purpose of arranging with him such measures as may prove most likely to allay the alarms that have now risen to such a height.

Large reinforcements of troops, of all arms, have arrived at Alexandria since I last had the honour of addressing your Lordship. A number of cannon of different calibres, with a large supply of shot and shell, have also been sent down here, from the arsenal of Cairo, which arsenal has been in full activity for some time past.

Your Lordship is, doubtless, informed of what even the public prints make known, that important military preparations have lately been made at St. Jean d'Acre; and that Solymán Pasha has been to that place, in order to superintend and accelerate these works of defence.

Mehemet Ali assumes a tranquil and determined demeanour; and continues to declare that he will resist to the last. He is certainly most

indefatigable and methodical in his efforts for defence, but I perceive nothing to lead me to change my opinion that it will submit to the decision of the Great European Powers, so soon as he sees them united in their purpose, and a sufficient force at hand to carry their intentions into effect.

Mehemet Ali left Alexandria this afternoon for Cairo, and I have conceived it my duty to follow him. I therefore propose proceeding to Cairo to-morrow morning, that I may observe and estimate for myself the warlike preparations he is making there. It is also my wish, if possible, to establish some sure means of information for the future, so that I may know, with some degree of accuracy, what may be ascertained about a city in which are established the Pasha's great arsenals, and from which he receives his chief supplies of munitions and provisions. I propose returning to Alexandria before the English packet ship departs on the 12th instant.

We have had several deaths here lately, said to proceed from plague. They averaged from three or four to seven. But I have seen carefully in secret that no such disease actually has existed here since it is known, and that such a report is propagated for the sole purpose of gaining time for defensive preparations, by working on the fears of Great Britain in particular, or indeed any other European Power that may prove disposed to attack the possessions of the Pasha.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

N. 646

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 29.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, March 19, 1840.

HAVING received from Mr. Consul Ogley two reports of a visit of the French brig-of-war "Bougainville," to the Island of Candia, which seemed to me to be attended with circumstances of a suspicious nature, I wrote to you on the 20th ultimo, requesting additional information, and I have the honour to acknowledge your Lordship's answer on the subject.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure in No. 640.

Mr. Consul Ogley to Colonel Hodges

(Extract.)

February 18, 1840.

IT would appear that the visit here of the French brig-of-war "Bougainville" was not limited to the examination of the coal-mines, but had also for its object the ascertaining whether the Greek inhabitants of this island would be disposed to see Crete taken possession of by the French. In fact, the French officers and Consul asked the principal Capitani of the district of Ifakia, whether they would give their signatures to that effect? to which they replied, they could not do so without consulting their countrymen. I have not been able to ascertain whether any signatures have been given, but I have been assured not.

The Capitani were asked, whether they were satisfied with the Government of the Viceroy, and whether they would sign a declaration to that effect? They replied, they were ready to do so, if the Government demanded it. This is natural; for they would be afraid to refuse to do so.

An article has appeared in a Greek Gazette which says, the British Government has obtained the signatures of the principal Cretans resident



in Greece to a document, the purport of which is, to request the British Government to take the island under its protection. It has caused some excitement here amongst the native Greeks; and I have been assured, that numerous signatures to a similar document could easily be procured here were the British Government to express a wish to have them.

No. 647

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 7)

(No. 30)

My Lord,

Alexandria, March 20, 1840.

IN reference to my despatch No. 28 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that I returned to Alexandria yesterday, having left Cairo on the morning of the 18th instant, the Viceroy preceding me by a few hours.

From all I could learn and perceive, the object of Mehmet Ali's visit to Cairo was to expedite the works now going on in the arsenal; to ascertain the precise numbers of men and horses that the Cavalry establishment at Ghizeh could furnish; and to inspire confidence in the minds of the people of the neighbourhood, whose fears have been excited to an extraordinary degree by the late levies, and other arbitrary acts of the Pasha.

Mehemet Ali does not appear to have been by any means satisfied with the condition of the public mind in Cairo. He warmly reproved Abbas Pasha, Governor of that place, for not having repressed certain manifestations of popular feeling, and even expressed some suspicions of his tampering in intrigues.

I found the arsenal in general well furnished, and the greatest activity prevailing in some departments; as, for example, in the manufactory of muskets, which is directed by an artisan from Birmingham. I have reason to think, that within a few weeks the Pasha will possess a supply of arms fully sufficient to equip any force he can possibly assemble.

I witnessed, myself, extraordinary exertions making in the manufactory of powder, where steam-engines are employed, and where men, women, and children are at work, day and night. On the 14th instant, 200 camel loads of gunpowder were sent off to Alexandria. The Pasha besides is amply provided with shot and shell.

Great efforts are making to furnish a large number of gun-carriages and extra wheels, as well as in making tumbrils, and repairing old ones. I was much struck, in examining these pieces, by the perfection of the work, but the wood appeared to me to be so rudely fashioned and imperfect, that I should greatly question its durability.

The manufactory of swords and small arms, of which there is a large supply, is by no means inferior to the workmanship of France.

Considerable quantities of boots and shoes, of European make, are in store, as well as much cloth and horn stuff for summer clothing.

I visited the cavalry establishment at Ghizeh, which is under the superintendence of a French officer of considerable experience, whom I found communicative and friendly. Most of the horses were at grass; but I was not a little struck by the order and regularity of the system adopted, in as much of the establishment as came under my notice.

The appearance and bearing of the soldiers evinced an economy and discipline which would be highly creditable to any European troops. With the exception of the Fez, and the full Egyptian breeches, with which, however, the Cavalry wear boots and spurs, there is not much difference from the usual costume and equipments of a French dragoon.

Of the citadel at Cairo, I shall say little, as its safety wholly depends on that of the forts upon Mount Mokattam, by which it is fully commanded. These forts are at present being put into a thorough state of repair, and

when terminated will be formidable; they are not as yet armed, but this might be effected within a very short delay.

The garrison of Cairo is composed at present of the following force—two regiments of Regular Infantry, each of about 4,000 men; one regiment of Baltagi, or Invalids; and in the neighbourhood of the city there are stationed,—one regiment of Regular Cavalry, about 4,500 Arabs and Turks, and about 2,000 Cavalry from Syria.

In Taura, there are also from 1,500 to 1,800 of the 35th Regiment of Infantry.

In Upper Egypt, there are three regiments of Cavalry; one at Benisouf, one at Minieh, and one at Mansalut.

On the 16th instant, about 800 Cavalry arrived at Cairo, from Syria, reporting that the whole number expected from that quarter amount to 5,000.

The 32nd Regiment of Infantry, from Esmout, which was to have proceeded to Alexandria, has received counter orders.

I hear that some Artillery has been expedited to Cosseir and Suex, but I have not as yet been able to ascertain the numbers.

In a few days, I hope to have it in my power to furnish an exact account of the shot and shell cast at the foundry of Boulac, which is in full activity.

Amongst the other defensive preparations of the Pasha, a considerable force of Artillery has been brought to this point. A regiment of that arm is at present encamped outside the town. It consists of 10 batteries, 60 brass field-pieces, and 3,200 men; the remaining 800 who

are at present at the arsenal, are now sent to the front, with the horses, which are at grass. Yesterday the Pasha reviewed this regiment. It did not perform any evolutions, but the guns were manoeuvred. Of these, four batteries executed target practice with round shot, and acquitted themselves in a manner highly creditable. The other six batteries opened and sustained for some time a rolling fire, and the guns were served actively and with efficiency. The men afterwards went through the sword exercise; but I was less satisfied with this portion of their instruction. Two additional batteries of the same regiment are daily expected to arrive from Cairo.

Having said thus much of the force, arms, and matériel possessed by Mehmet Ali, your Lordship will perhaps permit me to add, that the wealth and resources of Egypt cannot be unknown to you; they are such as enable Mehmet Ali to form, in various parts of the country, ample depôts of corn, rice, and pulse,—the usual food of the inhabitants.

But the means he still has to reserve for procuring money. His credit with the capitalists of Europe can be better estimated by your Lordship than by myself, and I therefore shall only review his financial position in this country. He has no doubt at present produce in his stores to the value of half a million sterling, but this being set off against his debts, would leave, I think, a very small balance.

Under the breaking out of a war between the Powers, the chief outlets being closed, the produce of Egypt would be no longer available, and Mehmet Ali would be obliged to rely by means of his credit alone, and by the aid of foreign exchanges.

It is my only remark, your Lordship, that the bearing of Mehmet Ali is full of defiance and insolence. In his public conversations respecting both his own legitimate Sovereign, the Sultan, and the Allied Powers, he expresses himself in terms the most unseemly and reprehensible.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES

No. 648

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville

(No. 125.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, April 7, 1840

I HEREBYWITH transmit to your Excellency a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Alexandria, inclosing an extract of a letter from Mr Consul Ogilby relative to the visit of the French ship of war "Bogamville" to the island of Candia and I have to instruct your Excellency to send to Mr Thiers your acknowledgment writing an extract of that part of Mr Ogilby's despatch which relates to the French proceedings at Candia, stating that you are instructed to do so without making any observations thereupon.

I am &c  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 649

*Nouri Efendi to Viscount Palmerston*

*Londres, le 7 Avril, 1840*

Le Souverain Ambassadeur Plénipotentiaire de la Sublime Porte, ayant été spécialement chargé par son Auguste Maître le Sultan, de se rendre à Londres pour y régler l'affaire, a communiqué à Sa Majesté par la Note Collective que les Représentans des Cours de la Grande-Bretagne, de France, de Prusse, de Russie, &c. jointes auprès du Grand Seigneur, ont présentée au Divan, le 27 Juillet, 1830, s'adresse en toute confiance à MM. les Représentans des dites Cours réunis à Londres, pour concerter avec eux les moyens d'effectuer la pacification de l'Empire Ottoman dont le repos a été troublé par les projets ambitieux de Méhémet Ali, Pacha d'Egypte.

Il est généralement connu, que depuis l'année 1827, l'Empire Ottoman a éprouvé une série de malheurs et de dévastations par terre et par mer, à la suite desquels ses moyens défensifs ont éprouvé pour le moment un grand affaiblissement. Méhémet Ali, au lieu d'aider son Souverain à se relever de ces pertes, a, au contraire, profité de l'état d'affaiblissement où se trouvait l'Empire Ottoman, pour donner suite aux desseins ambitieux et hostiles qu'il méditait contre son Souverain. En effet, il ne craignit pas de l'attaquer en 1832; et il lui envoya une partie de ses plus belles troupes. Le sultan s'effraya, et le Sultan devint lui faire espérer que la paix ne serait plus troublée dans ses États, et que le Pacha d'Egypte, en reconnaissance de la générosité avec laquelle Sa Hautesse lui avait confié le gouvernement d'une si belle province, lui administrerait dans l'intérêt de son maître. Mais, au contraire, l'épuisement où se trouvait l'Empire Ottoman à la suite de tant de malheurs, et l'affaiblissement momentané dans lequel il languissait, furent pour Méhémet Ali un motif de donner un nouvel essor à son ambition. C'est ainsi qu'il envoya, il y a deux ans, de se déclarer indépendant et d'obtenir la reconnaissance de l'Europe. Mais ces démarches, loin d'être une preuve de loyauté et de bonne foi envers la Porte, repoussèrent seulement une prétention si incompatible avec les droits de souveraineté du Sultan. Mais cette injuste prétention ne fit que changer de forme: et bientôt après, Méhémet Ali demanda avec hauteur pour lui et ses descendants l'hérédité du trône égyptien, qu'il prétendait au nom de Sa Hautesse. Il appuya sa demande de préparatifs hostiles, indiquant suffisamment son dessein d'imposer par la force à son Souverain.

Fou le Sultan Mahmoud se vit en conséquence obligé de se mettre en garde contre les nouveaux projets de son ambitieux vassal. Il réunit une armée pour sa défense. Cependant les deux armées une fois en présence,

en vinrent aux prises, il en résulta pour l'Empire Ottoman de nouveaux désastres qui brisèrent le cœur du Sultan Mahmoud, et contribuèrent à accélérer sa fin.

Malgré tant de malheurs qui vinrent fondre à la fois sur la Porte au des premiers actes du Sultan Abdoul Medjid, à son avènement au trône, fut d'offrir à son vassal rebelle l'oubli du passé et l'hérédité de l'Égypte pour lui et ses enfans, à condition que le Pacha restituerait la flotte impériale et toutes les provinces ne faisant pas partie du Pachalik d'Égypte. Au lieu de reconnaître la magnanimité de son Souverain, Méhémet Ali y répondit par des prétentions dures et hautes. Néanmoins, le Sultan allait envoyer un fonctionnaire à Alexan drie pour y faire un nouvel effort afin de régler un arrangement avec son vassal, lorsque les Cours de la Grande Bretagne, d'Autriche, de France, de Prusse, et de Russie, voyant la position désastreuse dans laquelle se trouvait le Grand Seigneur, et même par des sentimens d'amitié, de bienveillance, et de générosité, qu'il ne saurait assez reconnaître, firent signifier par le moyen

Le Soussigné prend la liberté de reproduire en tout ou en partie le contenu de cette page collective.

Sa Hauteur a attendu jusqu'à présent avec confiance l'effet de l'intérêt  
 si généreusement exprimé par cette même Note. Mais placé sous le  
 fardeau des charges extraordinaires qui pèsent sur l'Empire Ottoman, et  
 obligé de se prémunir contre l'attitude hostile et les préparatifs de guerre  
 de Méhémet Ali, le Sultan se voit empêché de donner  
 tous ses soins à la réforme des abus dans l'administration de son empire.  
 Les ressources de tout genre qui devaient servir à cette  
 réforme, s'épuisent tous les jours de plus en plus, et le Sultan  
 achèvement de voir bientôt un règne d'oppression succéder à  
 Cinq Cours Al-Isa de la Porte

Le Sénat est en conséquence chargé d'appeler la sérieuse attention de MM. les Représentans des Cours de la Grande Bretagne, d'Autriche, de France, de Prusse, et de Russie, sur un état de choses aussi pénible que dangereux pour l'existence politique de l'Empire Ottoman, dont elles ont déclaré vouloir maintenir l'intégrité et l'indépendance, et de réclamer leur coopération et leur sollicitude pour faire cesser au plus tôt des maux d'une nature aussi grave.

Pour mieux atteindre à ce but, le Souverain Plénipotentiaire est chargé par ordre du Sultan son Auguste Maître d'annoncer qu'il est muni de l'autorisation nécessaire pour conclure et signer une Convention avec M. les Représentans des dites Cours, laquelle aurait pour but d'aider le Sultan à faire exécuter l'arrangement d'après lequel Sa Hauteur avait annoncé l'intention de conférer à Méhémet Ali et à ses enfans, l'hérédité du Gouvernement de l'Égypte, à condition que le Pacha restituerait la flotte Ottomane et toutes les autres provinces ou gouvernemens en-dehors du Pachalic d'Égypte.

Le Souverain, en vertu de l'intérêt que les dites Puissances ont manifesté au Sultan, et vu la position critique où se trouve aujourd'hui l'Empire Ottoman, a l'honneur d'inviter, au nom de Sa Hauteesse, MM les Représentans de la Grande Bretagne, d'Autriche, de France, de Prusse, et de Russie, à vouloir bien se joindre à lui pour conclure une Convention dans le but ci-dessus énoncé, et pour convenir en même temps des moyens nécessaires pour y donner effet.

Le Soussigné se flatte que MM. les Représentans des dites Cours voudraient bien lui prêter leur assistance pour accomplir un œuvre qui devrait essentiellement contribuer à rendre la paix au Levant, et servir en même temps à prévenir les complications fâcheuses qui, sans cela, pourraient en résulter pour l'Europe entière.

Le Soussigné, Plénipotentiaire de la Sublime Porte, prie M<sup>rs</sup>. les Représentans des Cinq Grandes Puissances, d'agréer l'assurance de sa plus haute considération

Signo) Non mi



No. 630.

*Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.*

(No. 130.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, April 10, 1840.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of an official Note which I have received from Nouri Effendi, announcing that he is authorized to conclude and sign with the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, a Convention, having for its object to assist the Sultan to carry into effect an arrangement with Mehemet Ali, which shall confer upon that Pasha and upon his children the hereditary government of Egypt, in return for the restoration by him to the Sultan of the Turkish fleet, and of all the provinces and governments lying beyond the limits of the Pashalic of Egypt.

Nouri Effendi further requests, that the Representatives of the Five Powers will conclude with him such a Convention, and will at the same time agree with him as to the means necessary for carrying the same into effect.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 631

*Viscount Palmerston to Nouri Effendi.**Foreign Office, April 11, 1840.*

THE undersigned &c. has had the honor to receive the Note of the Pasha of Egypt, by which Nouri Effendi &c. are authorized to conclude and sign with the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, a Convention, having for its object to assist the Sultan to carry into effect an arrangement with Mehemet Ali, which shall confer upon that Pasha and upon his children the hereditary government of Egypt, in return for the restoration by him to the Sultan of the Turkish fleet, and of all the provinces and governments lying beyond the limits of the Pashalic of Egypt.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 632

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 16.)*

(No. 133.)

My Lord,

*Paris, April 13, 1840.*

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches to No. 133 inclusive.

In obedience to your instructions contained in No. 133, which I received by the post this day, I have shown to M. Thiers the copy of the Note addressed by your Lordship to Nouri Effendi, in reply to his Excellency's Note of the 7th.

M. Thiers made scarcely any observation upon the Note, but requested

me to allow him to keep it for twenty-four hours. I asked him whether any, or what answer had been given to Nouri Effendi's Note by the French Ambassador in London? M. Thiers said, none, except the acknowledgment of its receipt, and that with respect to the matter it contained, he preferred attending to the discussion of it rather than your Lordship than with Nouri Effendi: who, having assured him at the moment he set off for London, that he had neither full powers nor instructions from his Government on the question of peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, wrote a Note upon his arrival there to the Representative of France as well as to those of the other Great Powers, stating that he was, by order of his Sovereign, directed to announce to them that he was authorized to conclude and sign a Convention with those Representatives.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

No. 633

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 17.)*

(No. 135.)

My Lord,

*Paris, April 15, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship the "Moniteur" of this day, containing a speech delivered yesterday by the President of the Council in the Chamber of Peers. I was present at the debate, and the general approbation manifested of the sentiments of M. Thiers on the Question of Egypt, confirmed the opinion I have always entertained and expressed in my despatches to your Lordship, that no Ministry which could be formed in this country, would agree to the adoption by France of measures of coercion against Mehemet Ali.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

No. 634

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 20.)*

(No. 141.)

My Lord,

*Paris, April 17, 1840.*

IN my interview this morning with M. Thiers, I asked him whether he had instructed the French Ambassador in London, to give any reply to the Note which Nouri Effendi had addressed to the Representatives in London, other than the mere acknowledgment of its receipt? M. Thiers said, that the French Government having no expectation that the settlement of peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, would be advanced by any communication with Nouri Effendi, regarding the contents of his Note, had not instructed M. Guizot to answer it. With respect to the question itself, he was ready and desirous to discuss with your Lordship the means of effecting a reconciliation between the Porte and the Pasha of Egypt, but he had his doubts as to the policy of establishing a conference of the Five Powers for the attainment of that object, being of opinion that if four of the Five Powers decided upon having recourse to coercive measures to compel the restoration of Syria to the Turkish Government, the refusal of France to join in those measures, after having been a party in the conference, would be a more marked separation from the other Powers than if no such conference had taken place.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

(No. 39.)

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 3, 1840.*

YOUR Lordship has informed me in your despatch, No. 41, marked "Confidential," that you have seen a letter from Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow in which the Count states that he would have been glad to have been dispensed from receiving from Mr. Bloomfield a copy of Marshal Soult's despatch but that Mr. Bloomfield insisted upon giving it. And then, in a letter by Her Majesty's Government to you, your Lordship has no doubt whatever of the truth of Mr. Bloomfield's statement. I inclose, as an object of interest and curiosity, an original note\*, the whole of which is in Count Nesselrode's hand-writing, and which expresses his Excellency's thanks for that communication, and his sense of its confidential nature. And I send another copy of Mr. Bloomfield's letter to Count Nesselrode as an answer, and which specifies that it was at the desire of the Count that the communication was made.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) CLANRICARDE

No. 656

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston — (Received April 20.)

(No 47 Secret)

My Lord,

Therapia, March 2, 1840.

THE inclosed letters being unfit for transmission except by a messenger, I have kept them in the expectation of the arrival of one. They relate to the desires entertained by the Druses to connect themselves with the British Government. The letter addressed to the Sheiks Kaam-el-Kade and Joumouf, makes it appear that the writers may have been under the influence of an error, and therefore I wrote a letter to Mr Wood (of which I inclose a copy), desiring him to take the proper steps to make the Druses clearly understand, that the British Government never would have any object except that of being useful to the Sultan. I inclose Mr. Wood's reply.

The Druses in question, are men of chief importance in their own country, and are able to raise the population, even though the Emir Bechar should oppose it. But if that there are no other ~~for~~ <sup>for</sup> ~~any~~ <sup>any</sup> ~~more~~ <sup>more</sup> than that Prince to find some safe relief from the despotism of

I submit that it might be useful, as well as easy, to obtain hereafter for the Druses the acknowledgment of certain rights by the Sublime Porte, which were actually enjoyed *de facto*, if not *de jure*, and by means of the grant of such favours, add greatly to the success of the cause by procuring for him an ally interested in supporting its cause against its attackers. It might perhaps be considered, whether or not the Sultan d'Acre should be entrusted to the command (under the sovereignty of the Sultan) of the Chief of the Druses. I would not object to his being

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PO. SONBY

Mr. Wood to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord,

Peru, February 10, 1840

I HAD the honor to communicate to your Excellency under date the 14th of October last the sentiments of the Prussians respecting the Kurds and Jews and relative to the great desire of the Syrians to see their country under British protection, or to and in any way wrested from the sway of the Egyptians.

They have since received fresh assurances from the Government of their confidence in the same position and of their readiness to assist to the utmost of their power towards the accomplishment of a measure Her Majesty's Government may feel anxious to carry into effect.

'They have sent me an original letter from Atrampole, and I lose no time in transmitting a translation of it to your Excellency.

(Signed) **RIC HARRY WOOD,**

Volume 2 in No. 656

*Letter addressed by the Druze Sheikhs to the Sheikhs Kasim-el-Kado  
and Jonassouf*

(Translation from the Arabic)

After the usual Compliments,

YOU inform us of the excellent design you have announced to, and have renewed with, the British Government, through his Excellency the Ambassador and the Dragoman, now resident at Constantinople; that you have found them zealous, sincere, and compassionate in behalf of the Syrians; and that, moreover, you rely on the possibility of an arrangement promising relief and peace to all. May the Almighty add happiness and honour to their days at all times, and under all circumstances.

We have communicated what you say on the subject to all whose hopes are placed in your great exertions: and one and all, who are in the secret, have unanimously adopted the same opinion as the best, and trust in it. None will oppose whatever you may settle or do in such a goodly arrangement. All have given us to understand that you were their agent, as you understand them, in view of your departure to Constantinople: you must not, therefore, suspect any of them, absolutely. Whatever you may see fit and proper, that do; for the absent cannot see what those that are present can.

In case that those whom you mention (the English), agree and decide upon it, it will be, indeed, a most fortunate event, inasmuch as it will tend to the peace and prosperity of all, and is, besides, the most desirable on many considerations, for you are sufficiently aware of the disposition of the people. Their wish that it should be so, that their country should be placed under British protection, is derived from the known fame of those whom you mention, for their integrity, zeal, and the justice of their Government. No one denies it, therefore, whenever it pleases God that an opportunity should occur, and our assistance and services be required in any wise, all the Syrians will tender services that will do them honour. Not a single individual opposes it, which, after its accomplishment, will remain with us to the end of time.

You recommend to us secrecy: we obey, for we know that the preservation of secrecy often aids the result of accident. Be not, therefore, under the least apprehension, and let your mind be at ease on this point. The execution of the design can only be arrested, will care and not with negligence, and you know the desperate and helpless state of the people.



Perhaps, you observe, you will have shortly to send us notice to prepare a revolt in any movement. To take possession of this country is an exceedingly easy affair, and you need not, therefore, feel anxious about it, for you are acquainted with the fatigues and expences that were occasioned by the past, and how the people are inclined to revolt and ready to be a most willing way for assistance and aid, though they gained nothing but grief. It easy you demand this affair of the Governor the Prince and there is only the hope of its success, and you see the thing near, and there is no other way of it. You assure us that we shall not be exposed to danger as in other cases, and to apprise us of it a couple of months before hand, that we may make use of our arms.

It is desirable that one of you should come to us if practicable - if not we place our trust in God. Whenever our services are required, a the power of six strong and numerous, only ask for aid and support. Be ready always to seize the opportunity, and by the power of the Almighty, if succours be sent us, we are equal to the task required of us - only give us two months' notice, and rest assured we are capable of accomplishing what may appear difficult to any but ourselves, &c., &c.

Inclosure 3 in No. 656.

Viscount Ponsonby to Mr. Wood

(Confidential.)

My dear Mr. Wood,

February 12 1960

February 12 1810

THE RE. is something in the beginning of the letter from the  
Sultan that has the air of a answer greater encouragement than  
we give. We certainly have no designs on the rights of taking to  
ourselves any part of Syria nor any possession there elsewhere. All  
we can give help for, bearing a subsidy for Syria's tax, they  
shall be well governed under the sovereignty of the Sultan. By the  
Sultan it is par. 12. 13. 14. designate the inhabitants of those  
mountains (Lebanon, &c., &c.,) where the people have always had  
privileges and liberty, &c., &c. This, England, I hope, would like from  
the Porte and also security for it. I think it right that our minister  
should be explained to you, and you will take care these poor people are  
not deceived or allowed to deceive themselves. The British Government  
is perhaps the active Ally of the Sultan and may send forces against  
Mehermet Ali, and if that should take place we shall certainly  
consider ourselves indebted to any of the Sultan's subjects who shall  
fight against his enemies as we could call it that use as an  
incentive to him for successful subjects those favours and rewards  
we would be justly due to them and this would lead to the establishment  
of a persons reputation in a position what I think they desire to be  
in that they know how to enjoy and what will leave them free from all  
foreign interferences. These are the ideas I have only fax care to  
propose them being over &c. We must now wait and see what  
will be the result of the present state of affairs and my views except for the  
interest of the Sultan and his subjects in Syria.

Yours faithfully,  
Signed} PONSONBY

P. - I want for an opportunity to send the Syrian paper to Government by a safe conveyance but I wish to hear from you whether what I have said be or be not correct, particularly that which relates to my fear of there being some misapprehension on the part of the Syrians.

Inclosure 4 in No. 65f

Mr Wood to Viscount Ponsonby

My Lord,

*Port, February 13, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 12th instant.

It certainly appears from the answer of the Syrians, that the Sheiks reported to them the conversation they had with me, and the proposal they then made of placing Syria under British protection. To these often-repeated proposals, however, no encouragement was held out; but, on the contrary, I gave them clearly to understand, as I was verbally instructed to do by your Lordship, that England could have no wish to extend her possessions: but that if they remained the faithful subjects of the Sultan, she would endeavour to procure for them a milder government, or the means of governing themselves under the sovereignty of the Sultan.

There are arguments that the PLO was not a state to be over-looked as partners and that consequently the Egyptians would have to extend the same latitude to the new PLO as they had previously of Syria. I question whether there are advantages that would justify Egyptian Power to a long standing state extending Egyptian and Egyptian to the new Movement. Most likely it is for the sake of a new Syrian government would be even allowed to take Syria. I presume there are no advantages and that moreover, clearly in the past, it is not a good thing to promise and not to keep to a commitment to that end of an overstatement.

For example, we have found that the general term of order  $k$  of the  $n$ -th Shanks transformation is the  $k$ -th power of  $2^n$  divided by  $(k+1)!$ . We have also found that the  $k$ -th power of  $2^n$  divided by  $(k+1)!$  is the  $k$ -th term of the Taylor series for  $e^{2^n}$ . This suggests that the  $k$ -th term of the Taylor series for  $e^{2^n}$  is the  $k$ -th term of the  $n$ -th Shanks transformation.

will make it my study to rectify any erroneous notions they may have formed on the subject.

I have, &  
(Signed) **RICHARD WOOD**

No 657

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 62, Confidential.)

My Lord,

Therapia, March 23, 1840

I INFORMED your Lordship long ago that I had recommended to the Porte attention to the condition and circumstances of the military force of the Empire, with a view to preparation to resist any attack that despair or other motive might induce the Egyptian Pasha to attempt; and that it was intended to consult General Chrzanowski, when the Grand Visier should be recovered from his indisposition; and I have now to report, that the Grand Visier being restored to his usual health, he sent here to request General Chrzanowski to call on him on the 21st.

The General waited on him, and the Grand Vizior being attended by his own confidential man, Kyoth Pasha, who has a competent knowledge of the French language, entered largely into conversation with the General upon various subjects, and, amongst other things, he asked what was thought of the late measures of the Porte: to which the General replied, that they seemed to be too rapid, and if continued in the same way would dangerously affect the regal authority, on the maintenance of which depended the existence of the Ottoman Empire; that it was

thought enough had been done for the present on paper and that it was necessary to carry into effect the good measures that have been decreed. The Grand Vizier said his own opinion was similar and that a stop should be put to matters.

I then gave the liberty of saying a word of my own opinion on this subject and I thought it might interrupt my report.

I was the proposer of the adoption of the chief measures promulgated at the Harem of Gulhané, and I most highly approved of the time of it because it was in unison with Turkish feeling. I thought it enough for a beginning thus to establish the security of property and persons, to destroy the venality of offices; to give relief from the indefinite pressure of conscription for military service; to ordain fundamental amendments in the fiscal system; and to place the various descriptions of Ottoman subjects under the equal protection of the law, and removing all legal disabilities that pressed upon them. All this could be carried into execution by the authority of the Sultan, and, if executed, would reform the administration of affairs, and might prepare the nation for better institutions than a theoretical empire. I was sorry to see little done in execution of the adopted principles and a continued straining after *délat* by the adoption of new forms, and by attempts to create new powers in the State, because I foresaw from these last measures no other possible result but the deterioration of regal power in a country where there is neither aristocracy, middle classes, nor even people; no unity in religious interests, or feelings of sympathy as to the principles of a system of Government, and where the power of the Crown alone does, or can keep down the factions that would, if let loose, create a bloody anarchy, and amongst which factions that of the old Janissaries would be the first to raise its head, and thereby convulse the Empire from one end to the other, and force on foreign intervention.

The conversation between the Grand Vizier and the General was interrupted by the arrival of Rechid Pasha and Ahmed P. P. and the subject of the military defence was discussed. The General was asked for his ideas as to the best mode of acting. He stated his opinion that Mehemet Ali could not with any prudence attempt to advance upon Constantinople, but that the measures to resist should nevertheless be well prepared, that it would not be prudent to allow the Egyptian troops to encamp near the capital, and that they could be opposed at Malazgirt, where it would be easy to deprive them of all means for effecting a passage of the water. He gave in detail his plans for this, which were approved by the Grand Vizier. He said that if the Russian Army Minor, the Turkish Army was not numerous enough to waste the country through which he would have to march, that the country, however, offered little resources for the enemy; but he said it would be essential to do something at the Porte to give protection to all the vessels that might fly before that army, and afford them refuge and subsistence on this side of the water. The Ministers concurred in the plan for defence, and in the proposed treatment of fugitives.

The General was then asked if, in case of need, he would go to Kouiah, but it is to be supposed, I think, the intention was to give him the command of the troops, because the Grand Vizier had some time ago talked to him of giving him the command, and previously to that, Rechid had said to me (as I reported to your Lordship) that he saw no objection to his having the command. The General replied, that his going to Kouiah must depend upon circumstances; that if Russian troops were to be employed he could not go, because in that case he knew the Ottoman troops would not fight against Mehemet Ali, but would fly over to him, therefore that he could only fail and be disgraced, and exposed to the blame due to the acts of others. To this the Grand Vizier replied, (and what he said was confirmed by the other Ministers,) "the Porte will never consent to call in the Russians, unless the Porte is abandoned by England and France, and thereby actually forced to submit to the necessity of accepting the aid of Russia, as had been the case in 1833; and the Russians have no right to come unless called in by us, and we will never call them, but they might come in spite of us, and what would be the

result of that?" The General replied, "The result must depend upon England and France, and whether or not those Powers would allow Russia to possess this country." The Grand Vizier said, if he should see any danger of the Russians coming uncalled, or if Mehemet Ali should make his army threaten seriously our capital, we will apply to England and France, and send their fleets up to our aid."

Your Lordship will not doubt of the justness of the General's view of the conduct of the Ottoman troops, should the Russians be called on as auxiliaries, because you will have heard the same opinions from every man conversant with the people. The resource Mehemet Ali seems to look to with most anxiety is, the operation of national feelings against England and the Russians in particular. He has attributed to the Ottoman Ministers the introduction of the Miss Jemanaise. The presence of the hated enemy of the Turks, as the allies of the Porte, in the field, would confirm his words in the minds of the masses, and no native help would be given to the Porte. It might be feared the power of Russia might be thus established, and the destiny of the Sultan and the fate of Constantinople might be placed in her hands.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

No. 658.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 20)

No. 7.

Aleppo, February 20, 1840.

(Extract.)

I NOW do myself the honour to wait on your Lordship with a copy of a letter which I addressed Viscount Palmerston on the 21st of last month.

Since the date of the above communication, nothing whatever of any interest has transpired in this district, and in any way meriting your Lordship's notice.

His Excellency the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha continues to be at Marash, and all the Egyptian forces within this district, and on the north and north-east frontiers, remain without any further change, but are all cantoned on various points in suitable quarters, to meet the severe weather of the season.

Inclosure in No. 658.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby

(Extract.)

Aleppo, January 21, 1840.

HIS Highness Ibrahim Pasha continues to remain at Marash, and where, from all appearances, he will most likely pass the winter.

All the Egyptian forces are now cantoned into winter quarters, some along the north and north-east frontier, others in some of the principal towns, besides many of the regiments that have gone southwards for the same object.

The Egyptian force at Orfa remains, from all accounts, without any further change; nor have I been able to learn that their authority on that line has advanced farther, but continues to occupy the points I have already noted to your Lordship.

I am happy to be able to acquaint your Lordship that the Alexandretta district and the neighbouring mountains of the Giaour Dagh, who had several months back evinced symptoms of discontent against this Government, are, by the latest advices from our authority in that district, perfectly quiet; and, I may add, that not only that, but also the Latakia, Tripoli, and indeed every part of this Consular district, enjoys for the present every quietness.



(No. 61)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, April 21, 1840.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 47, I have to instruct your Excellency to endeavour at the proper time to persuade the Porte to give to the Druzes such privileges and exemptions as may satisfy their reasonable desires.

(Signed) I am, &c.,  
PALMERSTON

No. 664

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 22.)*

(No. 143.)

My Lord

Paris, April 20, 1840

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to No. 143 inclusive.

M. Thiers told me to-day that although the French Government would not consent to their Ambassador in London being a member of a Congress of the Five Powers, solemnly assembled to deliberate upon the propositions contained in the Note of Nouri Effendi, M. Guizot was authorized to discuss with your Lordship, and also with the Representatives of the other Powers, the means of effecting peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, and that the French Government were ready to urge upon the Pasha of Egypt, and to use their utmost influence to obtain, his acquiescence in any arrangement which, considering his position and means of resistance, there is the least chance of his accepting.

M. Thiers said, that he had written a long despatch to M. Cochelet to be read to Mehemet Ali, cautioning him not to be led by the speeches made in the Tribunes of the Chambers of France, to indulge in exaggerated expectations in regard to the conditions of peace between him and the Sultan.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

No. 661.

Mr Consul Werry to J. Nicholl, Esq.—(Received April 21)

Private.

(Extract.)

*Danvers, February 20, 1940.*

ALL the measures and operations of the Egyptian Government seem at present intended to protect Egypt and Syria from the Western or Representative Powers, though Ibrahim with his chief forces remain at Marash, and are extended into Orfa, Swenk, and Chermook, north and south, to the Khabour River; in fact, ready to proceed further in either direction, according to circumstances, next spring. It remains to be seen whether he is to be made an active instrument of Russia, or, from fortuitous circumstances, is to act in the policy and sense of the Western Powers.

I have heard a very curious story from the Agent of the Emir Bechar.

No. 662.

*Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received April 20,

No. 6.

My Lord,

Beyrouth, February 27, 1840.

I HAVE the honor to state, for your Lordship's consideration, that Sir John Lubbock, Bart., has been invited to give up His Excellency's present quarters. His Excellency at the present time goes to the country with his private secretary, and will probably be absent from the country for some time. I have the honor to be, Sir, Sir John Lubbock's obedient servant. Sir John Lubbock assured me that for the present no such intention existed on his part, since he has left this place for Sidon and Acre.

At the latter place, the most extensive preparations are making for defence, the trenches are to be enlarged and deepened, a mound in the east of that fortress, raised by the Egyptian army, is to be levelled, large supplies of biscuit and other provisions have been sent, a stock of lime, for making mortar, has also been transported there, and the works are pushed on with such vigour, that the labour is carried on by torch-light.

It is reckoned that, betwixt labourers and troops, not fewer than 13,000 men are employed at Acre. All the builders and artisans from this and the neighbouring places, have been sent to that place.

Several families have also quitted the city, it is said by permission, and are arrived at Sidon.

The military force at Acre, according to last accounts, consists of three regiments of Cavalry and two of Infantry, with 1,000 Artillery. Two American Junco's the latter were in the city a few years ago by an individual through whom I have received communications and I think you that a few months ago it was considerably increased though I have not been able to ascertain the precise number.

Secret meetings have been held in Mount Lebanon amongst the Christians and Sheiks of the Druses, and a resolution taken by them to resist all attempts either to enrol or disarm them.

The Government is everywhere collecting its outstanding revenue, and much rigour is used to compel payment. The usual advances made by Government to cultivators this year have been discontinued; the land must be tilled, in many cases, before the want of the means of sowing it.

Though public tranquillity is maintained, much anxiety is felt by all classes as to the future.

I have, &c.,  
N. MOORE.





Je tiens que le Sultan a de bonnes dispositions, ou que vous avez beaucoup de partisans, et qu'ils aient voulu vous induire ainsi en erreur. Mais si ces choses étaient vraies, l'opposition d'un Ministre et même de plusieurs Ministres, pourrait-elle les empêcher?

Plus tard, n'est-il pas bien connu que dans la Note Collective qu'ils ont présentée à la Sublime Porte, en date du 27 Juillet dernier, les Représentans des Grandes Puissances ont formellement et catégoriquement déclaré leur ferme résolution est de s'opposer à tout arrangement qui ne serait pas conforme aux intérêts de tout le monde?

Votre Altesse a voulu nous faire concevoir des soupçons sur les intentions des Puissances. Mais quel est donc leur but? Leur but est aujourd'hui ce qu'il était au commencement de la question; c'est-à-dire, que comme elles considèrent la force de cet empire comme étant nécessaire à la conservation de la balance politique de l'Europe, elles veulent que les arrangements à faire soient conformes à ce principe. Or, le partage de l'Empire Ottoman en deux parties égales soumises à deux différens Gouvernemens, serait un obstacle à l'obtention de la fin qu'elles se proposent, et voilà pourquoi les Puissances ne veulent pas que l'on y consente. Si dans cet état de choses, oubliant les devoirs que nous imposent et la fidélité que nous devons à notre Souverain, et la place que nous occupons, nous aurions osé supplier Sa Majesté Impériale d'accorder les demandes de Votre Altesse, nous nous mettrions en opposition, non avec quelques Puissances seulement, mais avec l'Europe entière, et c'est ce que l'on ne saurait nier. Tandis donc que la raison et le bon sens nous font voir que telles étaient les intentions que les Puissances de l'Europe ne cessent de nous manifester d'une manière positive, nous était-il possible de suivre une autre ligne de conduite que celle que nous avons adoptée jusqu'ici? Voulez-vous que je vous prie de prendre en considération

Si les Puissances de l'Europe n'ont pas pu jusqu'à présent faire naître un résultat conforme à nos vœux, nous ne devons pas pour cela prendre soupçon de leurs intentions; et bien que certaines circonstances aient retardé le résultat espéré, leurs sentimens à notre égard n'ont pas subi par là la moindre altération; et nous avons la certitude que les exigences impérieuses de leur politique se combineront à la fin, d'une manière favorable à nos droits clairs et patents. Tel étant le pied sur lequel nous sommes avec les Grandes Puissances, nous attendons les événemens avec la plus grande sécurité.

Vous annoncez des préparatifs de guerre, sur le ton de la menace; ce qui ne s'accorde guère avec votre prétention de fidélité et votre dévouement à Sa Hauteur, qui en ont surpris. Quant à Sa Hauteur, forte de ses droits, qui sont assés sur des bases solides, et de la protection du Ciel, elle agit en conséquence, et fera ce qu'exigent ses relations avec les Grandes Puissances.

En un mot, vous voudrez bien me faire savoir catégoriquement si vous avez, ou non, l'intention d'accepter les concessions et les faveurs que le Sultan notre Auguste Maître, en montant sur le trône, a daigné vous offrir. Comme vous connaîtrez les principes et les intentions de la Sublime Porte par les réponses qu'elle fera par écrit à vos demandes, et que vous ferez profession de fidélité et de dévouement, si, indépendamment de ces demandes, vous avez quelques idées et quelques observations à nous communiquer, vous voudrez bien le faire d'une manière claire et très-détaillée.

Je prends, en attendant, la liberté de vous donner, ainsi que notre ancienne amitié l'exige, quelques conseils analogues à notre sujet. Après le rang auquel votre Altesse est parvenue, il ne lui reste plus rien à désirer, et elle-même avoue que le principal objet de ses vœux à présent est d'assurer son avenir à ses fils et petits-fils. Or, pour y parvenir il ne faut employer que les moyens sages qui seuls y conduisent. Pour combler donc vos vœux, il faut profiter du moment actuel, car il n'est pas improbable qu'un peu plus tard vous ayez perdu l'occasion de le faire. Que votre Altesse ne prête pas l'oreille dans des affaires semblables, à des insinuations perfides d'un tas d'adulateurs; mais qu'elle écoute plutôt les représentations bienveillantes d'un ami sincère qui se fait un devoir, à son âge avancé et avec la grande expérience qu'il a acquise, de dire la vérité.

No. 664.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 70.)

My Lord,

Therapia, April 8, 1840.

I RECEIVED this evening, from Sir William Drummond Stewart, who this day arrived from Alexandria, and is now in quarantine, a note, wherein he writes.—

"The traitor Capudan Pasha," that is, Ahmed Fevzi Pasha, "has been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish and Egyptian fleets, and arrived on board just as the steamer started."

I have not seen this communication in Colonel Hodges' despatch to your Lordship, and therefore report it here.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 665.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 1.)

No 71

My Lord,

Therapia, April 9, 1840.

IT appears that Mehmet Ali, in the appointment of Ahmed Fevzi Pasha to the command of the Ottoman and Egyptian fleets, has exercised an act of sovereignty. It appears, from Colonel Hodges' despatch No. 26, that Mehmet Ali has shown his resolution to combat England, and confessed his attempts to attack British Allies. It appears that Mehmet Ali boasts of his power to raise all Turkey against the Sultan; it is possible that the delusions under which he seems to be may lead him to try a coup de main, and order Ibrahim to march upon Constantinople. If this should be his conduct, I presume the French Ambassador will act as he possibly assumes me he would do in such circumstances—that is, he would call upon the French Admiral to bring his fleet to Constantinople.

I acquainted your Lordship before with his resolution, declared to me by Major Ponsby. I acquainted your Lordship lately with the declaration of the Grand Vicer, that in case of attack he would ask for the protection of the British and French fleets. I have also reported my belief, that Mehmet Ali has been endeavouring to gain partisans here by money. I am of opinion that by so doing he might be able to raise some show of resistance to the Porte, if Ibrahim could advance, and taking all the above-mentioned matters into consideration, I think it my duty to advertize Admiral Louis of them and of my intention, in case of need to apply formally to him for aid from Her Majesty's squadron. There will be no difficulty in making everything secure here by such means even let the worst possible occur. The Porte will call on us, and will open the Dardanelles. One ship is sufficient to control Constantinople, and place the Sultan in perfect safety against such a petty danger as could be created by the partisans of the Pasha. As to danger from any other quarter, I am confident nobody will risk an attempt against us when so placed, for it would be an attempt that must fail.

I do not believe Ibrahim could march, were Mehmet to order him, without ensuring his ruin; and what I mean is only to provide against possible mischief.

I will send a copy of this despatch to Admiral Louis.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 1.)

N. 73.

My Lord,

Therapia, April 2, 1840.

I WAS desirous of knowing what impression the appointment of Mahomed Fakh Pasha had made on the French Ambassador, and I requested General Chateaubriand to write to me on the subject. I learn from the General's report, that M. de Pontois sees it much in the light others do, and that he said it would necessarily operate upon French counsels, &c. The conclusion I draw is that M. de Pontois thinks this event may offer to the French Ministry the means for getting out of the difficulty he is in by the just views of policy stated by your Lordship and the erroneous views adopted by the French press.

I have also informed myself of the feelings of the Internuncio, and I find that his Excellency considers the act of Mehemet Ali in the light of an assumption of sovereignty.

M. de Pontois said Rechid Pasha had told him that he, Rechid, would resist as long as he could the making an arrangement with Mehemet Ali, without the intervention and concurrence of the Great Powers, but that if France and England did not take some vigorous measures to settle the question, he should be forced to retire, and the Porte would then throw itself upon the protection of Russia, and make some engagement with that country similar to the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessa.

I have &c.  
S. J. P. PONSONBY

No. 667

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 1.)

No. 31.

My Lord,

Alexandria, March 27, 1840

COUNT MEDEM acquainted me of the details of an interview he had with Mehemet Ali, by a private communication. In a summary of the present position, the Pasha inquired, with some appearance of irritation, "What is your business end?" and he continued by saying, "There is now no question then open amongst you, and though a change has taken place in the French Ministry, there is no little probability as before of any alteration in the policy of that country as far as regards my interests." Count Medem replied, "Your Highness is mistaken. I believe that the question must now be brought to a final conclusion. England seems determined to act."

The Pasha rejoined, "Let England act; if she is alone, I am not afraid, and may even contend with her. I am invulnerable in Egypt." Count Medem then said, "Hear me, Pasha—your Highness is vulnerable everywhere. Do not depreciate in your own mind the means of England. We Russians know her power, and we respect it. England, on the other hand, knows ours, and does not view it with indifference. The thing most easy for her to effect, would be precisely the measure most dangerous to you. She would blockade your coasts. You know what would then be your lot in Syria. The blockade would be your ruin—you would be destroyed little by little. It would be a thousand times better for you to die in the field. The foreign merchants resident in Egypt would quit the country, your commerce would be paralysed, and your end would be wretched."

I have &c.  
S. J. H. LLOYD HODGES

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 35.)

(Extract.)

Alexandria, March 31, 1840.

IN reference to my despatch, No. 33, of the 23rd instant, I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that, accompanied by Mr. Alison, I waited upon Mehemet Ali yesterday.

I informed Mehemet Ali of the capture, near Corfu, of the Greek merchant brig, "Achille," and an Ionian trabacolo, employed for recruiting and transporting Albanian troops for the service of his Highness. At first, the Pasha denied all knowledge of this affair, but upon my insisting, and showing him the charter of the brig, he said, that the fact as I stated it was very possible,—as ever since his possessing the supreme authority in Egypt, he had always recruited his Albanian corps from their native country. As to the vessels, he said that the English might do with them whatever they pleased, but that he expected numbers of Albanians would yet reach him.

I repeated that whatever his private feelings may have been formerly, it is all accorded with his actual political relations, and his professions of devotion to the Sultan, and desire for the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, to now seduce and enrol Turkish subjects, for the purpose of acting against their legitimate Sovereign, I added, that it was perfectly known to me who were the agents of his Highness in this business, and that the effect of them all in the Consul-General of an European Power, a man who is generally believed to be far more the servant of the Pasha, than of the Government he nominally represents. My allusion was to M. Tossizza, Consul-General of Greece. The Pasha rejoined, that he had taken no measure for seducing the subjects of the Porte, he only wanted recruits for his army, and starting up, he exclaimed with great warmth, "I could, if I would, make the whole nation revolt against the Sultan, and possibly I may do so, if driven to extremities."

I next entered upon the topic of my instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 1 of the 23rd instant, and I did not proceed far in my communication, the matter of which I had some time since caused to be put in a private communication to the Pasha, and he expressed much impatience, and exclaimed abruptly, "You speak as if you were a novice in this question. I am weary of these representations. Let us drop the subject. These matters have been repeated to me, over and over again. It is useless again to refer to them." Here, Boghos Bey, seeing the Pasha much excited, and fearing that he might commit himself, requested me to write to his Highness, to which, I only replied, that my communications with the Pasha must be personal, but that if I had occasion to apply to the Minister it would be in writing, and I added, that I expected of his Highness a patient audience. I said that I regretted extremely that my communication was not of a more agreeable character, but that I really thought the blame to rest, rather with his Highness than with my Government; and that he might rest satisfied, that any representations it might become my duty to make, would always be couched in terms of due respect to the Pasha.

Resuming then the conversation, I asked Mehemet Ali, "Pray, what does your Highness purpose doing with the Turkish fleet?" to which he replied, "I shall keep it as a weapon taken from the hand of my enemies, until my differences are settled with the Porte, and then I shall send it back to the Sultan." To this I rejoined, "If the officers of the Turkish fleet knew their duty to their religion and to the Sultan, they would return with their ships to Constantinople; and I do not conceal from your Highness, that I am instructed by my Government to advise their adoption of such a course." On this, the Pasha, in a state of the greatest excitement, jumped up from his Divan, and cried, "Now you place me in a state of war. I warn you, that the first defection I perceive, I will



shoot the offender." I contented myself with answering, "your Highness may rely on it, that threats will not prevent the performance of my duty. I view with regret, the measures your Highness is adopting, and the preparations you are making; they cannot avail, and only prove the eagerness with which your Highness is rushing towards certain destruction."

I begged Mehmet Ali to inform me whether he had not recently written to Hosrew Pasha, respecting some arrangement of his differences with the Sultan's Porte. He replied that he had written such a letter about a month since, to which he expected a reply by the next steamer. At that time, he said, he had been informed that the Representatives of the Five Powers at Constantinople. I said that I had been informed, that a copy had been, by his orders, furnished to M. Cochelet; and I expressed a hope, that his Highness would have in me sufficient confidence to intrust me with the same document. To this the Pasha made no objection, but ordered Haghos Bey to furnish me with a transcript, which, however, I have not as yet received.

When about to take leave, Haghos Bey said to me, "The Pasha has been advised by the Russian Ambassador, that you will very soon see that Power at the gates of Constantinople, and in alliance with the Sultan."

It is proper that I should inform your Lordship, that the demeanour and tone of Mehmet Ali, during the whole of the political portion of this interview, manifested defiance and insolence.

I observed towards him a calm, respectful, but firm, deportment.

It is not possible to credit that Mehmet Ali, confiding in his own feeble resources, could assume such a bearing, or use such language to the Agents of Great Britain. The Pasha has declared to the Pasha, through her Representative, that whatever favourable dispositions she may entertain for his interests, she is still by no means prepared to break with England, or with her Allies, in order to support his pretensions; and that, in resentment for such a resolution, the Pasha, in a long contested dispute respecting distinctive marks of the various divisions of the Greek Church, has recently granted to Russia concessions which had been long sought for and refused to France.

As respects that portion of your Lordship's instructions relating to the officers of the Turkish fleet, I see the performance so replete with dangers for those individuals, that it is my intention to take no active measures as regards it until I receive your Lordship's further orders. Should I, however, find that there is peril to the lives of any persons who may be employed in the service of the Sultan, and who are in the vicinity of assistance of Her Majesty's Government, I shall certainly receive such persons into my house, or furnish them with an asylum on board one or other of the two vessels of war stationed here.

Under the circumstances before set forth, I cannot but be of opinion, that further action is now required from the Pasha's Government should be avoided as present as much as possible. It is really useless, and worse than useless. It can only expect to gratify itself in my belief that it is impossible to employ until I am certain that measures will be immediately followed by effects. I, therefore, have determined to remain for the present entirely passive, until the resolutions of Her Majesty's Government are made known to me.

I shall await with anxiety the reception of your Lordship's next despatches; and I trust the mode in which I have executed your Lordship's late commands may merit your approval.

Lord Beaumont to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 56.)

My Lord,

Vienna, April 24, 1840

PRINCE METTERNICH communicated to me, this morning, the result of his examination into the Turco-Egyptian Question.

It is divided into two parts: the first, inquiring into the practicability of coercive measures, the second, examining the course to be pursued if the idea of adopting them is rejected. Both are destined for communication to the Russian, and Prussian Governments.

Your Lordship will find the idea of the employment of coercive measures by the Four Powers more explicitly rejected than I have led you to expect. When Prince Metternich was asked for my opinion, he asked me for my opinion. I answered that I was governed all the time by the idea of a means for an operation against Mehmet Ali, that this being resolved, coercive measures became impossible. He was to determine to furnish the whole force required. He was to give 150,000 men. I expressed either to us or to Austria; and he said that to them it certainly would be.

The second inquiry establishes the terms to be proposed to Mehmet Ali by the Five Powers, if they can be induced to concur, and if not, by the Four. They are, the hereditary possession of the Governments of Egypt and Arabia, within the limits of its former dependence upon the Porte. The Prince draws this line in order to avoid recognizing in Mehmet Ali a right to extend his possession over the rest of Arabia. The five Pashalics of Syria to be secured for life to Mehmet Ali, and upon his death, to revert to such of his descendants as he shall designate for that portion of his succession. Candia and Adana, with such additional parts of Syria as it shall be thought fit to obtain, to be restored immediately to the Porte, and the fleet to be sent back.

Prince Metternich proposes that these terms shall not be made a subject of negotiation with the Pasha, but be offered to him by the Five Powers as the limit of the concessions he will consent to make. If they should be refused, then the Sultan's right, and the Four Powers to take upon themselves the protection of his dominions.

When he had done, I asked him if that was all; and when he inquired what more was wanting, I said that the practical conclusion arrived at by the last condition he had stated, would be that England would have to keep in the Mediterranean a fleet strong enough to keep in check the fleets of Turkey, Egypt, and France, while the other Powers would look on, bearing no part of the burthen; that if we were willing to take this charge upon ourselves, the defence of Constantinople against a maritime attack might indeed be complete; but where would be the defence for the rest of the Sultan's dominions? that it was easy to say that in case of commencing an attack, Mehmet Ali would encounter all Europe, but that he had learnt that Europe, consisting of Five Powers, might indeed be something, but that when reduced to four it was nothing at all; that without attacking Constantinople, without any overt attack whatever, Mehmet Ali might, by insurrectionary movements, aided under various pretences by his military force, succeed in detaching district after district from the Sultan's dominions, and where would be the defence? The defence to be effective could only lie in an attack upon him at home, but what probability would there be of the Four Powers combining then for such a purpose any more than now?

The Prince answered that I was perfectly right, that it was necessary to resort to the measures to be resorted to in such contingencies, and that he would write a further despatch, offering to enter into the consideration of them with the Three Powers, in case the fourth should persist in standing aloof. With a view to facilitate this, and to bind him to it, I proposed that, in case the British Government should adopt the idea, he should send an officer to London charged to enter into explanations upon this branch of the subject. He assented; and upon my asking him whether he would make the proposition to Russia and Prussia also, he answered that it would be better to wait till we learnt the intentions of England, that if she adopted his views, it would then be for her to call upon the other Powers to concert measures for the protection of the Sultan's dominions; and that if she made the invitation to the three, Austria would not only accept it herself, but support it with the other two.

Prince Metternich has said to me, that for the defence of Constantinople, Austria would furnish 60,000 men if they were required; but I shall have no faith in these professions unless they are made matter of positive stipulation. It appears also to be deducible from the inclosure in my No. 18, that Austria will hardly take part in active measures upon any ground against Mehemet Ali, unless with the full assurance that war, if it were to ensue from thence with France, should be common to the Four Powers.

In conclusion, I remarked to the Prince, that after all he had only arrived at a system which (France standing alone) would place the peace of Europe on a most unsafe foundation, and render it in great measure dependent upon Mehemet Ali. He admitted the truth of the remark without indicating the existence of a remedy.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE

No. 670

Lord Beaumont to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 2)

Confidential

My Lord,

Vienna, April 24, 1840.

YOUR Lordship will observe that the determination to take no part in active operations against Mehemet Ali was much more positively announced this day than on the 12th instant. I made in this second instance no attempt to shake it, because I knew it not to depend upon Prince Metternich, having been the result of the deliberations of the Council. I will not say that Prince Metternich has been forced to retract a proposition, but he has felt that he should not be supported if he made one, and has therefore abstained from it.

The result is, that for measures of attack against Mehemet Ali, Austria must be put out of the question.

Can she be counted upon for measures of defence to the Sultan's Empire? I cannot say, but have given your Lordship the means of ascertaining the fact, and its extent, by obtaining the engagement to send a staff officer to London if required.

Should Her Majesty's Government decide upon the measures to be taken, and the assistance to be required from Austria, much may be done towards influencing her resolves; but for this I must be placed in a different attitude from any I have hitherto held.

One great impediment has hitherto existed in the doubt which still prevails as to the union of the British Cabinet upon this question. To remove this, I must be enabled to speak in the name of the Government, stating what they propose to effect; what means they have resolved to employ; and what assistance they require from Austria and their other Allies.

In such a case, my efforts would not be confined to Prince Metternich,

but I should be enabled to assist him with his Colleagues and with the Archduke.

It is true that the approaching annual departure of Count Kotowrat, and that of Count Fiquelmont, would much impair my means of acting, and increase the difficulty of inducing this Government to take a determination, but still much may be done, within the limits of a sound discretion, whenever England will take a decided lead.

For the present it has been impossible to do more than to clear up the position. The impulse to be given will now depend upon England, and to be effective, it must bear the undoubted stamp of being the deliberate determination of the Government, and as such, sure to be acted upon and persevered in. Up to this time, the Austrian Government has not considered us to be in earnest as to our intention of acting, any more than themselves.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUVALE

No. 671

Lord Beaumont to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 2)

(No. 59)

My Lord,

Vienna, April 25, 1840.

PRINCE METTERNICH has read to me his additional despatch. Its practical part consists of the offer to concert measures for the eventual defence of the Sultan's dominions, and to send an officer for that purpose to London in the character of a mere traveller. The Prince further recommends strict secrecy for the present upon this subject.

The theoretical part of the despatch consists,—first, of a defence of Austria from the imputation of slackness, coupled with the profession of a readiness to adopt active measures of attack, if she could attain the conviction that they would not turn to the disadvantage of those employing them; and, secondly, of an assertion, that if the British Cabinet had not given way, when it was a question of signing, upon the return of M. de Brunnow to London, France would then have been drawn into the system at that time contemplated by the Four Powers, which she no longer can be. Her attitude, however, even if she should persist in standing aloof, will, according to the Prince, be less dangerous under the plan proposed by Austria, than if active measures of attack against Mehemet Ali were to be resorted to.

Be this as it may, what is certain is, that the danger will be removed further off, and that Austria is willing to incur the distant danger, while she shrinks from the immediate one. If Her Majesty's Government should, upon consideration, devise no better practicable plan, it will be but prudent to close with Austria at once, and fix her to her own propositions, for that which is attainable to-day is not always so on the morrow. If France should enter into it, there will probably arise a further difficulty in obtaining her concurrence in the contingent measures of defence for the Sultan's dominions against the encroachments or attacks of the Pasha. However, if she should go even so far as to concur in the conditions to be proposed to him, she will thereby be disabled, in strict reasoning at least, from setting herself against the measures of defence which the rejection of those conditions might render necessary.

That defence, Prince Metternich concurs in thinking, can only be made effective in the shape of an attack. In such a case, he speaks of a Russian expedition to Beyrout, forgetting the recent assertion, that the Emperor would not allow his forces to quit the Black Sea. The frequent contradictions which your Lordship will remark in the examination of the affair, show its complicated nature, and the necessity for a strict inves-



684  
tigation of what is practicable in it, and for a defined agreement between the Powers as to the parts they will respectively undertake.

When Prince Metternich suggested the attack upon Beyrout, with the view of raising Syria against the Pasha, I told him it would be an unworthy part for the Powers to excite insurrection and abandon victims, that for this reason a demonstration upon the coast of Syria was inseparably connected with an attack upon Alexandria, and could not, without the risk of disgrace, be undertaken separately.

I fear that when the question shall be fully examined into, it will be found very difficult to provide any efficient defence except for Constantinople.

I have, &c.  
Signed BEAUVALLÉ

No. 672

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 153)  
My Lord,

Paris, May 1, 1840.

I HAVE received your despatches to No. 152, relative to M. Thiers, your reply to me extracted a despatch addressed by him to M. Cochelet, for the purpose of showing that the Pasha of Egypt was not encouraged by the French Government to receive a subsidy in consideration of peace with the Sultan. In one of the extracts which he read to me M. Thiers says that France will not make a treaty of friendship with Mehemet Ali, that France will not interfere with England in the interests of the Pasha.

M. Thiers, at the same time, observed to me, that the tone of menace which General Hodgson's letter in his late communications with the Pasha, had an effect directly contrary to that which Her Majesty's Consul hoped it might produce; and that when he threatened Mehemet Ali with depriving him and depriving him not only of Syria, but of all Egypt, a great irritation was excited in the mind of the Pasha which rendered him totally incapable of listening to the prudent advice of those who otherwise might have had some influence upon his determinations.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 673

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville

(No. 167)  
My Lord,

Foreign Office, May 5, 1840

A FEW days before the adjournment of the House of Commons for the Easter recess I requested Mr. Greville to draw the attention of his Government to the question of the Naval Armaments of France, with respect to which, so many communications have taken place between the two Governments since December last.

I said, that when the Navy Estimates were discussed in the House of Commons, some members of the Opposition remarked, that the number of ships which we then had in commission would require, in order to man them, a larger number of seamen than that which we had proposed to Parliament, as the permanent establishment for the service of the year, and the Government was asked how it reconciled the number of ships in

685  
commission, and the crews which those ships must necessarily contain, with the number of men proposed to be voted. I said that, in reply to this, Lord John Russell had stated, that we hoped to be able to lay up in ordinary some of the ships of the line then in commission, and thus to reduce the number of seamen employed, so as to bring it down to the number proposed to be voted; and Lord John Russell added, that if circumstances should arise to prevent this reduction, and if the state of affairs should require the continuance of the same amount of naval force which was then employed, the Government would come down to Parliament later in the session, would state that fact, and would apply for a supplementary vote. I said, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would be obliged immediately after Easter to make his financial statement of the income and expenditure of the country, for the year ending April, 1841, and that the Government must, before that statement is made, determine finally what amount of naval force we may be obliged to keep up; that our decision on this point must mainly depend upon the course pursued by France. That if France should reduce her naval force, England would do the same; but that if France should resolve to maintain her present large amount of ships in commission, England could not reduce hers; and the Government would be obliged to apply to Parliament for a supplementary vote. I said, that I was obliged for this week, I was compelled to state the reasons which rendered it necessary, and that, if it should be occasioned by the extensive armament of France, a statement of that fact in Parliament would not produce a good effect upon the public mind of France, upon the mutual relations of the two countries. I showed M. Guizot the list, of which I inclose a copy, by which it appears, that the French have in the Mediterranean seventeen sail of the line now afloat, and equipped or equipping for service, and another ship of the line at Rochefort; while we have in the Mediterranean ten, at Lisbon two, at home two preparing for the Mediterranean, two getting ready for general service, and the three guardships; that thus, the French have eighteen sail of the line afloat, while we have, exclusive of the guardships, which have only a fourth of their complement of men, and which cannot be compared to the others in the service of the line, only sixteen. I said, that it is impossible for England to remain inferior to France in naval means, either permanently, and upon a comparison of the whole number of ships belonging to each country, or for a time, and upon comparison of the number of ships which each country may have in commission; that it appeared however to Her Majesty's Government, that it would be much better to restore the balance by mutual reduction than by a perpetual competition, and that accordingly, I had, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, to propose through him to the French Government, that if France would reduce the number of her line-of-battle ships in commission to twelve, England would fix her Mediterranean fleet at the same amount, and would in addition to that fleet, keep in commission in the seas of Europe only the two sail of the line at Lisbon, and the three guardships; the latter of which are rather head-quarter stations for the Port Admirals than an available naval force, inasmuch as they have not more than about 250 men each; and the former of which are a necessary reserve for a country which, like France, has numerous and widely scattered Colonies, possessions, and many distant interests to guard. I, at the same time, showed M. Guizot your Excellency's despatch, No. 225, of the 17th of June of last year, in which you report, that Marshal Soult had talked not of fifteen sail of the line, but of ten, as the French naval force, saying, that France had then seven in the Levant; that the French Government intended to send thither three more, which were getting ready at Toulon, and that they would then have ten in the Levant; and that if the English Government would augment the British squadron in the Mediterranean to the same amount, there would then be a combined force of twenty sail of the line ready to act for the protection of the Turkish Empire.

Your Excellency will see that there was nothing in this communication which could lead Her Majesty's Government to think, that it would be expedient or proper to abstain from proposing to Parliament : fresh grant for the purpose of keeping up the present amount of our naval force, because the proposal that the existing naval force of France should be divided into two portions, of which, one should be stationed to the east of Malta, and the other to the west of Toulon, was too nugatory to be met with any serious observation, and the measure which was announced as intended to be adopted whenever such an arrangement of the Turco-Egyptian Question as would be satisfactory to France shall be arrived at, would produce no diminution in the effective and active naval force of France, (because the real naval force of a country must be measured by the number of seamen employed,) but would only be a transfer of a part of that force from one station to another, and its application to a purpose which would be far from agreeable to England, and not by any means calculated to allay national jealousy in this country.

I am, &c.,  
Signed) PALMERSTON

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 7

My Lord,

Theraps, April 14, 1840.

The Pasha had heard of the nomination of Ahmed Fevai Pasha to be Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman and Egyptian fleets. He said it was a direct assumption of sovereign authority, and that he was glad Mehemet Ali had thrown off the mask, and that nobody could now be deceived. He asked many questions on the subject of Mehermet Ali's means for making an attempt against this capital; I stated why I thought he could not succeed in it, but that prudence required the Porte should

Rechid was highly pleased with the last news he had collected respecting the feelings of Her Majesty's Government. He said he relied upon your Lordship's firmness, and that he hoped there might be a change in the policy of the French in consequence of the late conduct of Mehemet Ali, although a very few days back the French Ambassador continued to urge him to make an arrangement with the Egyptian; but that he (Rechid) would promise me, never to make any without the concurrence of England, and whilst he continued a Minister none should be made.

I have, &c.,  
Signed) **ROZSONBY.**

No. 675.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Parnsey.—(Received May 8.)

No. 36

My Lord,

Alexandria, April 6, 1940

This step on the part of Mehmet Ali, has created much surprise and alarm in the minds of my Colleagues, and I confess that it strikes me as one of the most important and significant indications of his determination to resist, should force be resorted to against him by the Allied Powers; nay, more, that he is now determined, by some overt act, to bring the question to a crisis.

I am informed by M Cochelet, that when he remonstrated with him on the late nomination, he answered, "What would you have me do? I went lately, to Constantinople, proposals for an arrangement with the Porte; these were confided to my daughter-in-law. Twice she went with the Count Harem. I showed Pash, who told me every thing that was going on, but I am obliged to stay the Court of Constantinople. I will show these people that they cannot resist the will of France. As to Ahmed Pash, he shall always have as his ally, the whole Turkish fleet will be sent against as soon as my orders will be issued. I am terminated. If Mustapha Pash, or any other, ever comes to my house, I shall shut my door upon him, never he may go to my house. Colonel Hudges, who will go to Constantinople, I will send to Constantinople, but if he does not, I will."

I loved my Land it was true, I was struck the more at the  
unbearable necessity to exterminate the army of the French  
Army and the French. Such a sad war, but only because we  
too, we must have been a victim of the same. I was the  
counsel to the and my. The Pasha departed towards M. de  
Laurin, in an interview he had with him of the day, it was a  
insulting and defying. Indeed, M. de Laurin avowed to myself, that it  
was so. I may here remark to your Lordship, that M. Clichelet assures  
me, that on some points, such for instance as the restoring liberty to the  
officers of the Turkish squadron, he backed my representations made to  
the Pasha by your orders. He is the only one of my Colleagues who has  
uttered one word in my support. Some of the others abounded in mag-  
niloquent expressions to me, and in vast promises, which they have not  
redeemed, but seem to have been struck with a panic terror, by a few  
energetic expressions of the Pasha, in my last interview with him.

Five &c.  
G LLOYD HODGES



Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 37)

My Lord.

Alexandria, April 8, 1840.

I HAVE received information from Mr. Alison, who considers his information deserving of credit, that the Russian Consul-General has had two interviews with the Viceroy, since the arrival of the French steam-vessel on the 4th instant. Of these audiences, one followed a conversation with Boghos Bey, and seems to have been of a highly confidential nature, since the Dragoman in attendance was excluded, and none were present but the Pasha himself, Boghos Bey, and Count Modem. Instructions were subsequently sent to Ibrahim Pasha, to hold his army in readiness to march on Constantinople without delay, should events arise requiring the adoption of such a measure.

The person from whom this information is derived, spoke of the advances on the capital as dependent upon something still matter of doubt, which, he conceived, might perhaps be the view taken of it by the Russian Government. He also believes, that the instructions sent to Ibrahim Pasha, were suggested by the Russian Consul-General; and he is led to this conclusion, as well from the frequent and agreeable interviews of this Agent with Mehemet Ali, as from other reasons.

The same informant adds, that a letter has been received from Sheriff Pasha on the subject of the quarantine in Syria, which it was stated had increased the popular ferment. Sheriff Pasha referred to the opinion which had been already expressed, that if the power and jurisdiction of his Highness in Syria were not speedily confirmed and consolidated, the public feeling, exasperated by the present and other measures, might evince itself in a manner highly dangerous to the existing authority.

I have now only to leave the subject to your Lordship's own judgment and conclusions.

What I can communicate as more positive, since the facts after coming to my knowledge, were confirmed by M. Cochelet himself, is, that this gentleman, on the evening of the 4th instant, had an audience of Mehemet Ali, in the course of which he informed the Pasha that he had received despatches from M. Thiers, from which he gathered that France was inclining in her foreign policy towards a Northern Power.

The Consul-General of France, has, of late, had long and frequent interviews with the Pasha. The Consul-General of Russia has also been in active communication with his Highness. Both of these gentlemen assert as certain, that Mehemet Ali has no intention whatever of marching on Constantinople. I myself do not believe that he has such a purpose for the present; but I am strongly disposed to think, that were the Pasha urged to the utmost, he would, as a last resource, adopt that measure.

Count Modem tells me, that on remonstrating with the Pasha on his late nomination of Ahmed Pasha to the command of both fleets, Mehemet Ali replied, "that he had been urged to that course by the insulting conduct of the Porte; and that, independent of such a cause, he had long wished to grant repose to the declining years of his old servant, Mustapha Pasha, recently Admiral of the Egyptian fleet, for which purpose he had named Ahmed Pasha Inspector-General of both fleets." I have, I believe, already observed the discrepancy and equivocation contained in the titles given by the Pasha to his new Admiral, in his two conversations with M. Cochelet and Count Modem.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 38.)

My Lord.

Alexandria, April 18, 1840.

SINCE I last had the honour of addressing your Lordship on my despatch No. 37 of the 8th instant, the affairs of this country have not assumed any very novel or remarkable character.

The warlike preparations of the Pasha continue, on all sides, with extreme activity; and his air of perfect confidence in the fortunate results of his policy, seems undiminished. Every day confirms and augments my former suspicion, that Mehemet Ali is backed by the secret support and assurances of a first-rate European Power; and that he is fully prepared and resolved for any contingency.

The Representatives of the Five Powers, instead of assuming a firm and energetic deportment, have nothing to oppose to the dauntless aspect and continued progress of the Pasha, but dissension, coldness, mutual mistrust, and an utter indisposition to co-operate for the attainment of any common object. I am bound to infer, that no pronounced line of conduct is not adopted without the instructions of their respective Governments.

The interview of Mehemet Ali with Count Modem, Consul-General of Russia, has, to be frequently mentioned, been the subject of the conversation with the Pasha. I also receive news from Jerusalem, that the Governor of that city, who is so marked an attention to the Vakeel of the Russian Jews, as to inspire a belief that he acted on orders received from Alexandria.

At Alexandria, there has not recently occurred anything more worthy of note than the collection of forces at Damanhour, and the drawing off of the troops belonging to the fleets and the city; both circumstances to which I have adverted in former despatches.

About a fortnight back, 105,000 round-shot and shell arrived from Cairo.

A frigate, called the "Cafarskir," is loading with military stores, amongst which are 1,100 shell; and three or four transports are also loading in munitions. These, it is thought, are destined for St. Jean d'Acre.

The fine corvette commanded by Said Bey, son of the Pasha, is preparing for sea.

On the 16th instant, Her Majesty's steam-ship "Gorgon," and the "Daphne" corvette, sailed from this port, in consequence of orders from Admiral Sir John Lubbock, and proceeded to Malta.

The 26th and 28th Regiments of Infantry have left Cairo, and, I believe have destined to the same direction. Several influential persons had also been despatched in the same direction. Several influential persons for the purpose of levying contributions, and have assumed the Nizam costume; but the late forcible conscriptions have spread terror and dissatisfaction throughout Egypt.

The information I receive from Syria represents that country as being in a very agitated and unsettled condition. Discontent prevails to the highest extent. It is said that the Feudal Prince of Mount Lebanon, has refused to furnish 20,000 men demanded of him by the Egyptian Government. All accounts concur in declaring that the Syrians look with confidence and hope to being speedily liberated by an European army. Travellers, on whom I can rely, assure me, that the sympathies of the great mass of the Syrians are with the Russians, that the French are next in popularity; and that England is esteemed only in the third place. An opinion obtains amongst them, that the Emperor of Russia is the kinsman of the Sultan, and that he will come to the assistance of that Sovereign, and to the liberation of Syria. I hear that such notions are very studiously disseminated by Russian Agents throughout Egypt and Syria.

The fortification and victualling of St Jean d Acre continue without intermission. On the 4th ultimo, fifty thirty-six-pound guns, of Swedish manufacture, arrived there from Alexandria; and on the 5th, 148 cannon of smaller calibres, reached the same place from Tarsus, having been taken at the battle of Naxos. About the same time a large quantity of ball and shell was received.

Report says, that Acre will be defended by 640 pieces of cannon, and that provisions for one year are being accumulated, to supply 16,000 men.

The garrison of Acre, on the 9th ultimo, was as follows:—

1 Regiment (18th) Infantry  
1 Regiment (30th) Infantry, formed of invalids.  
600 Sappers and Miners. (Baltadgè.)  
300 Regular Artillery  
1,000 Irregular Artillery

Another regiment of Infantry is expected to arrive from Damascus.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGEN.

No. 678.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston. — (Received May 8.

(No. 40.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, April 29, 1840.

SINCE I had the honour of writing to your Lordship in my despatch No. 38, of the 18th instant, I have ascertained that the Pasha is about to undertake a short tour up the Delta.

I am informed by a letter received this day from our Consular Agent at Atfe, on the Mahmoudiè Canal, that four regiments of Regular Infantry, recently arrived from Cairo, are now encamped at Damashour, at which place there are also 800 men of Irregular Cavalry. In addition, several regiments from Upper Egypt and from the Hedjaz, are expected there. It is believed that two regiments will be quartered in the village of Darout-a-Hagh-el Ghiamal, about an hour distant from Atfe.

The recruitment of the National Guard continues everywhere with the utmost activity. At Cairo, Osman Bey Sennari, late Ulema of the Mosque Ahar, has undertaken to raise four regiments; and Mehemet Ali has promised, that should he succeed, he will make him Pasha of two tails. Ibrahim Aref Bey, late a merchant in Cairo, is named Brigadier-General, and has engaged to raise two regiments. Mahomed Bey, late Ulema, is to assemble other two regiments, and to be decorated with the same rank. These eight regiments are to be recruited in the city of Cairo.

Hussain Bey Surur is to be made Colonel, and is to recruit one regiment in Old Cairo.

Ali Djezzar will have the same rank, and is to form another regiment in the neighbouring suburb of Boulac.

My correspondence from Syria of the 31st ultimo, represents Ibrahim Pasha as still at Marash. It is worthy of remark, that something more than two months back, he had distributed various regiments in Hamah, Hama, and Acre &c. but that a whole of these troops, with reinforcements, have been recalled and concentrated about Marash. Three regiments of Infantry are also on the point of leaving Aleppo with the same destination.

It is reported in Aleppo, that the Egyptian Infantry is to be divided into two columns of operation, one to be stationed near Acre, and the other at Marash.

The entire force of Cavalry is concentrating in and about Hama.

In consequence of the requisition to transport the matériel of the army deposited there in the magazines.

The utmost activity prevails in perfecting the fortifications of Acre. Workmen of all kinds are impressed for this service from the adjacent cities. Requisitions for provisions and other stores, are also exacted over great part of the country, for the supply both of Acre and Alexandria.

The Government is exerting itself to disarm the mountaineers. An inconsiderable revolt had even taken place. The misery of the masses is extreme. The disaffection of the Syrians is universal.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGEN.

No. 679.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

No. 169.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, May 8, 1840.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 167, of the 5th instant, relative to the communications which have passed between M. Guizot and me respecting the amount of the naval forces of England and France respectively, I herewith inclose to your Excellency, for your information, a copy of a private letter upon that subject, which I received on the 17th ultimo from Lord Minto.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 679.

Lord Minto to Viscount Palmerston.

Private.)

My Dear Palmerston,

Admiralty, April 17, 1840.

I SEND you inclosed a list of our line-of-battle ships in commission. You will see that we have at present ten ships in the Mediterranean, and two more nearly ready, which may be sent there. These, with the two ships at Lisbon, and the three guardships at home, comprise the whole of the force (with the exception of that employed in China) which it was proposed to maintain, and for which a vote was taken from Parliament. But the Cabinet having agreed that it was inexpedient to reduce our fleet so low, whilst France maintained such a force as she has now brought forward in the Mediterranean, it has become necessary to recommission the "Vanguard" and "Rodney" instead of paying them off into ordinary, as had been intended: this alone produces an excess of from 1,200 to 1,500 men borne in the fleet beyond the number voted by Parliament, an excess which will be vastly increased, if, by maintaining her present unnecessarily great fleet in the Mediterranean, France should compel us to commission three or four ships more. I trust, therefore, that you may be able to induce the French Government to consent to a very considerable reduction of its Mediterranean fleet, since nothing could be more unfortunate than the necessity of coming down to Parliament for a supplementary vote, founded avowedly, as it must be, on some jealousy of France.

With the numberless calls upon our navy in all parts of the world it is obvious, that we must always keep at our disposal for general service, some ships beyond the number that may be considered as available for the Mediterranean in case of need; and therefore Soult's attempt to balance the number of their fleet by an enumeration of all the ships we might have in commission in the ports of the channel, or elsewhere, was perfectly unfair.



I need hardly point out to you, with reference to the list which I send, that the difference in the force of the individual ships composing the two fleets, is not less than the difference in their number.

Ever yours truly,  
(Signed) MINTO.

*Inclosure 2 in No. 679*

*Ships of the Line in Commission, April 17, 1840*

*In the Mediterranean*

Princess Charlotte	-	104 Guns.	Implacable	-	74 Guns.
Asia	-	84 "	Benbow	-	72 "
Bellerophon	-	80 "	Hastings	-	72 "
Ganges	-	84 "	Bellerose	-	72 "
Powerful	-	84 "	Edinburgh	-	72 "

*Fitting out at Plymouth, and may be sent to the Mediterranean.*

Thunderer	-	81 Guns.	Cambridge	-	78 Guns.
-----------	---	----------	-----------	---	----------

*At Lisbon*

Donegal	-	78 Guns.	Revenge	-	78 Guns.
---------	---	----------	---------	---	----------

*Guardships at the three principal ports bearing the flags of the*  
*(Commissioners-in-Chief)*

Howe	-	120 Guns.	Impregnable	-	104 Guns.
Britannia	-	120 "			

These ships, although in commission, have only their port complements of 260 men, and must be manned before they could be employed at sea.

Vanguard	-	80 Guns.	Rodney	-	92 Guns.
----------	---	----------	--------	---	----------

These ships have been brought home from the Mediterranean to be paid off into ordinary; but in consequence of the extraordinary force collected by France in the Mediterranean, I have been compelled to order them to be recommissioned.

There are, in addition to the above, three ships of the line, viz.: the Wellesley, the Melville, and the Blenheim, employed on the expedition against China.

*No. 680*

*Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.*

My Lords,

*Foreign Office, May 8, 1840*

WITH reference to my letter to your Lordships of the 7th of April, conveying to your Lordships the Queen's pleasure as to the instructions to be addressed to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, with reference to the continuing his appointment being made by the Porte for the presence of the British squadron in the Bosphorus to protect Constantinople against any attack on the part of Ibrahim Pasha; I am commanded by the Queen to acquaint your Lordships, that accounts recently received show, that it is not improbable that Ibrahim Pasha may suddenly march on Constantinople; and I am to signify to your Lordships Her Majesty's pleasure, that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford should be instructed

to station two or three sail of the line in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, to be ready to pass up to Constantinople, if invited by the Turkish Government to do so.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

*No. 681*

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby*

(No. 67)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, May 8, 1840*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a letter which, in consequence of your despatch No. 71, I have addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, conveying to their Lordships the Queen's pleasure that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford should be instructed to station two or three sail of the line in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, to be ready to pass up to Constantinople, if invited by the Turkish Government to do so.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

*No. 682.*

*Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville*

(No. 181)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, May 12, 1840*

I INCLOSE for your Excellency's information, a copy of a letter which, by Her Majesty's commands, I have addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, to provide for the possible contingency of Admiral Sir Robert Stopford being invited by the Turkish Government to pass up to Constantinople.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

*No. 683*

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 14.)*

(No. 170)

My Lord,

*Paris, May 12, 1840*

THE Turkish Ambassador, Chekib Effendi, accredited to Her Majesty, is arrived in Paris. The state of my health has hitherto prevented my seeing him. He purposes to remain in Paris about a week, and will then proceed to London.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

No. 654

Lord Beaumont to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 65.)

My Lord,

Vienna, May 3, 1840.

IN Prince Metternich's project for the settlement of the Turco-Egyptian Question, the line to be drawn in Syria is not clearly defined, I, therefore, applied to him to know whether he attached much more value to one line than to another. He said he did not, provided Adana and the passes of the Taurus were restored to the Porte; that after this the main object would be that Syria should be divided among as many of Mehemet Ali's descendants as possible; and that no part of it should ever be united to Egypt. To prevent this, he proposed that the Egyptian branch should be incapable of inheriting in Syria; that the Syrian branches should be capable of inheriting in Egypt upon repossessing their Syrian Possessions; and that the reversion of both branches should be secured to the Porte; that of the Syrian branches upon their extinction, but that of Egypt not until the extinction of the whole line of descendants of Mehemet Ali.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) BEAUMONT

No. 655

Mr. Consul Young to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 9.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, February 17, 1840

I HAVE the honour to apprise your Lordship that I have received a letter from the Consular-Agent at Acre, advising me that the greatest possible activity is displayed there in repairing and strengthening the fortifications.

Here there is another seizure of all the artisans: they are treated in every respect like convicts. It is reported that they are taken to the north.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) W. G. YOUNG

No. 656

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 8.)

(Extract.)

Aleppo, March 19, 1840

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith for your Lordship's information, copy of a despatch I addressed, under the 12th instant, to Viscount Ponsonby, which I hope will meet your Lordship's approbation.

Inclosure in No. 656

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby

(Extract.)

Aleppo, March 12, 1840

HIS Highness the Seraskier Pasha continues to remain at Marash with the same force. The Cuirassier Regiment still occupies Albestan and I learn that a detachment of Egyptian Irregular Cavalry (Bachi

Boruka have advanced in the direction of Knasterich, it is said to about four to five hours distance on this side of that town, and are busily occupied in extending and collecting the Savan Tax from all the villages throughout the whole of the country from Marash to that point, besides immense quantities of powder and shot, which I am told they are continuing to take from all classes.

There was a report in circulation about ten days ago, that the Cuirassier Regiment which had been all along at Albestan, was about to be irregularly withdrawn and advanced so near to Knasterich, that it would suddenly reach a very extensive Marash. From very good reports I have been making ever since from persons who have been in the front rank, I am positively assured that this report is incorrect, and that the Egyptian Irregular Cavalry, coming from Marash to the point of the Taurus, is not the same as the Cuirassier, which point it is said the Pasha of Marash expects to be met with at a very large village, and I expect to be as I have had the honour of stating to your Lordship; that the Cuirassier Regiment is still at Albestan, and is the only regular force to advance beyond Marash; and that the detachment of irregulars have positively reached and occupy the whole country from Marash to the point stated.

I have not heard of any change or movement in the disposition of the Egyptian forces throughout this district, who, I believe, occupy for the present the same positions as when I last addressed your Lordship.

I beg leave further to inform your Lordship, that his Excellency Maggum Bey, with the Annadis and some Irregular Cavalry (Bachi) has been ordered to proceed to the Orfa, the Towan Baglio. I am told that the principal object of Maggum Bey in these incursions into the country, which he often makes, is for the object of exacting the Savan Tax, and seizing as much plunder as possible from the inhabitants. The last advices from Orfa state that Maggum Bey had just reached that place from an expedition he had made, first against the Arabs, along the River Khabour, from whom he obtained large sums of money and a great quantity of goods, and then against the Orfa, who he had just reached Orfa; and that he afterwards had advanced in a similar manner towards the Sindjar, from whence he came. I have, I am told, your Lordship, that from inquiry I have made, I learn that Maggum Bey has under him at Orfa about 1000 Annadis, the remainder are with the Caltan Agla, in the direction of Hamah; and the total Bachi Boruka that are between Antab, Marash, and those in the direction of Orfa amount to about 1500 men.

I am informed by a person who has lately reached this from Diarbekir, that the regular force at Orfa remains without any change; but that on that line towards Diarbekir, the Egyptian authority extends at present even beyond Sweik and Chermook, and within ten hours from Diarbekir; my informant further states, that there is at present at Diarbekir about 700 of the Sultan's regular troops, with two Vixors, whose names, however, he did not know; and that if Maggum Bey chose, he might, with 500 men, take possession of that town. Further, that his Excellency the Sultan's Seraskier Sadullah Pasha had gone to Carpool, according to report, in order to superintend and raise animals, which are sent to convey the ammunition and military stores that are being landed by the Turkish Government on the coast of the Black Sea, at Trebizond and Samsoon; but on this point your Lordship will possess much more correct information than I am able to communicate from hence.

I am happy to be able to inform your Lordship, that by the latest news from Mr Vice-Consul Hays at Alexandretta, and from our different agents on the coast, every thing appears for the present to be very tranquil, and the whole of this consular district is tranquil, and enjoys perfect health. I have no recent advices from the Adana district; but from what I have been able to elicit, there does not appear to be any movement of any interest, except that the works and fortifications in the defile of the Taurus have, I understand, all been entirely finished. About a fortnight ago, 120 pieces of Artillery of those taken at Nezib were sent to Alexandretta, and there shipped on board vessels of war to be conveyed to Acre.



*Mr. Connel Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 17.)*

(No. 4.)

(Extract.)

*Damascus, March 23, 1840.*

I HAD the honour of addressing your Lordship, on the 20th ultimo, despatch No. 3.

I mentioned an aggressive act indicative of the beginning of an insurrectionary feeling of some of the Mirdas in the Hama district. I have since learnt that from 150 to 200 Mirdas have left their homes from Hama, Hama to Hama. The Government is engaged in taking measures to suppress even at the expense of sufficient numbers of regular Syrian Cavalry, and even at the expense of the regular rather than irregular in the present position of political affairs, it is not impossible that the four British troops on the Mirdas line, occupying the whole line of country from Soer to Hama, Hama, and Hama, as strong outposts, if not more, in case of a sudden change should take place of a warlike contest between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, for the possession of Syria, in which case the four British troops take to them as a relief from being brought into immediate collision with either of the contending Powers on the eastern desert line of his territories, and thereby permitting him to maintain a neutral position.

The measures and preparations taking for the victualling and defence of Acre continue the object at this district to be pursued with vigour. It is not yet known, as to the exact quantity of artillery, and its aggregate means of defence against an European force, should such be occupied in its reduction, nothing positive can be said, until a military report is scientifically made thereon, all that can at present be said thereon is, that this fortress seems to exclusively occupy the attention and energies of the Government on the coast, that the garrison may amount to about 12,000 men, principally Infantry, with artillerymen; and that the country extending from the coast, north in Syria, and the east, will be guarded by two regiments of regular Cavalry, and a regiment of Horse Artillery, and that a hill, commanding part of the fortifications is being reduced by the troops now in garrison there.

My last advices from Aleppo state, that the Egyptian regular forces, in lieu of retiring, still occupied the country to the north, as far as Albeitan, and that the Irregular Cavalry were even making incursions within a short distance of Kaisserieh, and that the forces from Orfa to the river Khaboor, south, extending Egyptian influence to the Sindjar and Merdin, and northerly, assuming an influence, if not an absolute jurisdiction and authority, beyond Swerik and Chermook, to within a few hours of Diarbekir, that in every direction the Egyptian irregular forces were occupied in obtaining spoil and pillage, and reducing the country to the Egyptian rule.

Your Lordship will observe that these measures have a tendency to render the advance of any force from the north, either Ottoman or European, of a difficult and protracted nature, while the Egyptians commanding the Sindjar and the Arab tribes on the desert line south, bring their authority in immediate contact with the Koords from the mountains of Khorasan independent of the same fierce tribes, widely and numerously scattered on all the mountains along the ranges of the Taurus, extending from Marash in a north-east direction, who have collectively always been inimical to the Sultan's power, the former alternately aiding and temporising between his power and that of Persia, and where in this case is made instrumental to the Egyptian cause, and the Syrian authority and power is rendered subordinate through Mesopotamia with Baghdad or western with Syria.

*Mr. Connel Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 18.)*

(No. 7.)

My Lord,

*Beyrout, March 27, 1840*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that since my despatch No. 6, of the 27th February, 135 pieces of cannon, taken at the battle of Nezib, have been transported to Acre, and 15,000 trees, for palisades, have been ordered for the same place.

Two days ago, the Governor visited the castles which defend Beyrout with a view, I presume, of impressing the people with the intention of Mehemet Ali of offering resistance at every point, if necessary.

The measure of surveying the paltry forts at this place from any other motive seems ridiculous; for a single brig of war would suffice to destroy them, in their present condition; nor are they of a nature to be strongly defended under any circumstances.

Although the public tranquillity is undisturbed in this neighbourhood, complaints are loud from all parts of Syria of the rigour used to enforce the payment of taxes and imposts, and there exists a feeling of strong discontent in consequence.

Accounts have to-day reached this place from Damascus, that the plague is rapidly spreading in that city; it has infected the garrison and the civil population, and has killed many of the latter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. MOORE.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 17.)*

No. 86.)

My Lord,

*Thessalon, April 25, 1840*

AT a late visit (on the 21st instant), I took occasion to mention to Rechid Pasha that I had heard from indubitable authority at Paris, accounts of the nature of the opinions expressed by Nouri Effendi, viz., "That he was not favourable to the adoption of measures of coercion against Mehemet Ali; the position of the Pasha was too strong, he thought to allow him to keep the country would be better than a total loss of it." I said that I was sure you would be a faithful vassal and an efficient supporter of the Sultan." Rechid said, "a traitor could not do more," and he set forth in true colours the mischief done to the cause of the Sultan by the Egyptian government, and the loss of the Ottoman Minister; adding, "Nouri is a fool, and shall be immediately recalled."

Rechid said, the instructions given to Chekib Effendi were entirely in the sense of your Lordship's desire, as expressed in your instructions to me, dated January 25, 1840, marked Separate, and that he was a good man, and would do well.

In reply to Rechid's inquiries, I said your Lordship had hopes of inducing the French Government to concur with the views of the British Government, and I told him you had triumphantly answered the arguments of the French Ambassador, Monsieur Guizot, in a serious, though not strictly official conversation, and that Vis. Ex. Bary had promised to report your Lordship's reasonings to his Government. I told him, there appeared to be much moderation in the present views and objects of Russia; and I took occasion to state, as if they came from myself, the considerations which recommend the policy of employing Russian forces, (should necessity oblige a recurrence to that extremity,) under the

restraint and guarantee of a treaty with the Great Powers, rather than to leave it open to the Russian Government to send military aid, independent of that check.

I appropriated to myself your Lordship's words, and the Pasha entirely concurred, adding a strong expression of his hope that no necessity for the employment of Russian forces would arise; and in reply, I stated various grounds for thinking it would not, on account of the nature of Mehemet Ali's power to assail the Porte, and the mode in which alone it could be employed, and the means England and the other friends of Turkey possessed to assist and secure the Porte. It would be superfluous to repeat his reasons, as the Pasha agreed in thinking that it would be a rash act on the part of Mehemet Ali, but nevertheless that it might be attempted, and should be carefully guarded against. The Pasha said, Mehemet Ali could give out in Asia, that the Ottoman Ministers had conspired with infidels to overthrow the religion of the Koran, &c. &c., and that an ignorant population might be excited by those assertions. He did not think they would be credited in Syria, and he could not say what addition the Asiatic population, if so excited, would be able to make to a power of an advancing army of the Pasha. He said that Ibrahim might be easily obliged to retrace his steps, in order to preserve Syria. I was confident that even if he should reach the coast, he would not pass the sea; and that, so long as the Sultan held the capital, the Government would be in security, and all could be set to rights by the aid of the friends of the Sultan; but, he said, "we are feeble now, we want immediate assistance in the case of an immediate attack, and we wish we had a Convention to assure us of it." I replied, that distance made it impossible, if the Pasha should risk an attack immediately; but up to the 7th, we knew there had been no movement for the concentration

Ibrahim's troops, that to collect them would take ten days; that if collected, it would take twenty days' march to arrive at the sea-side, and this was too little time to admit of communication with England, and to obtain what was asked for if it could be immediately conceded; that if Ibrahim should advance, a few vessels of war and steamers would render crossing the sea with troops impossible; and that a single frigate would suffice to overawe all malcontents in Constantinople. Rechid said, there could be no doubt of it, but would the ships come? I replied, "if you ask me for them when they are necessary, I will send for them, and I have no doubt the Admiral will listen to me." Rechid said, "I will apply to you in case of need." I acquainted your Lordship that I had urged the Porte to take immediate measures to resist, with its proper forces, an attack from Ibrahim. The consequence has been that the Grand Vizier has ordered the Sultan to order General Krieger to visit the country, and point out the ground most proper for placing troops to cover the coast, and to determine the site and quality of each field-works as are necessary to the defence of the position. I have engaged Rechid to desire to have employed in this work the five young Turks who were educated at Woolwich College. Colonel Dundas gave me a very high character of these men; and I believe they are nearly the only Turks who do know their business. There are some Turks who were educated in France at the expense of the Grand Vizier, but those of them who have been examined by General Chrusnowski, are worse than ignorant of their business. The Grand Vizier, however, is fond of them, and I proposed to Rechid that all should be employed, and the General (who is an engineer and artillery officer) will know how to make proper use of them. I have not yet heard what number of men can be collected for the defence of the coast. I asked Rechid, if he entertained suspicion of the fidelity of the soldiers? and he said, No.

If this measure be effected in time, as I hope it will be, and if there shall be no objection to the coming of a few ships to guard the waters, I do not foresee any danger to be apprehended from the advances of Ibrahim, but certainly if the English do not aid the Sultan, the danger will be great, because the Turks will believe that everybody has abandoned the Sultan. In that case, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi must be invoked by

the Porte, or unconditional submission made to the Pasha of Egypt; and the latter alternative I believe to be the most dangerous to the future existence of the Porte. If Ibrahim advances, it will be easy to raise all the Syrians against his government. I might answer for the inhabitants of Lebanon, the Emir Bechar, and a province beyond will act and will support them; and I think the mere appearance of a British squadron in the Mediterranean, being accompanied by an Ottoman frigate carrying the Sultan's flag will suffice for raising all those countries. The Sultan will send the frigate, and give every aid in his power.

I inclose a letter I have received from Rear-Admiral Sir John Louis, in reply to mine, when I communicated to him my despatch, No. 71, to your Lordship.

I hope these measures of precaution against a danger which is possible, may meet your Lordship's approbation.

Rechid Pasha told me, the French Ambassador had very lately urged him to make arrangements with Mehemet Ali. He also told me he had heard that the Ambassador thought the nomination of Ahmed Fevzi Pasha by Mehemet Ali, might have an effect upon opinion in France.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) P. P. P. P. P.

Inclosure in No. 680

Admiral Sir John Louis to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Private.)

My Lord,

"Ganges," Smyrna, April 16, 1840

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 12th, inclosing the copy of a despatch from your Lordship to Lord Palmerston, and I beg to thank your Lordship for the communication you have been pleased to honour me with.

Mr Robert Stopford writes me from Malta, on the 8th instant, that having received intimation from home, that a naval force would be wanted to compel the King of Naples to come to some satisfactory arrangement respecting the Sulphur Trade in Sicily, and having that day heard from Mr Temple that the King was obstinate, he was going to Naples with the "Princess Charlotte," "Benbow," "Bellerophon," "Tyne," and such steamers as he could collect, to put in force the Admiralty orders to detain Neapolitan vessels, until the King comes to the desired terms; he did not expect to be very long absent.

I have at present here six sail of the line, a frigate and a steam vessel, quite ready whenever your Lordship may deem it necessary to call on them.

Your Lordship's despatches by the "Phoenix," reached Malta in time to go on to England by the packet of the 2nd.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) J. LOUIS

No. 690

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 17

No. 671

My Lord,

Therapia, April 26, 1840

IN a former despatch, I acquainted your Lordship with the intention of the Porte to concentrate a large force of troops to attack from the Egyptian Army, having for its end to menace the capital, &c.

It appears that about 23,000 men can be employed for the above mentioned purpose; but it appears also that the Seraskier Halil Pasha



delays and neglects to do his duty, and being Commander-in-Chief, he in a manner paralyzes every body. The Grand Viceroy has lately complained of this, and says, "looks of nothing but getting money by every possible means, and as he hears it is the policy of the Seraskier that has induced the Porte to appoint Riza Pasha to be General in Asia, so as to have under his command Scutari and the country above Montania, where it is proposed to establish a camp for protection against an attempt by Ibrahim a measure which, I believe, will fully and completely answer that purpose, but as still it is necessary to move the troops, and as Hahil is still opposed, I thought it right to avail myself now of the opportunity afforded by the late messages and the supposed intentions of Mehemet Ali and to make a strong appeal to the Porte for the adoption of such measures as shall warrant its power to take for the protection of the capital, &c. &c. I state that as the Representative of a Power so zealously and actively, and expensively employed in supporting the Sultan, I was bound to urge the Porte to do what it could for its own defence, and not to allow its military force to be wholly useless through the delay of its proper employment. I said that the eyes of Europe were upon the Ottoman Ministers, and their actions as a body and as individual Ministers, would be publicly known, and applauded or condemned according as they might be meritorious or culpable.

My object in doing this is to strengthen the hands of those who may desire to rescue the country from the mischief of Hall's incapacity and avarice. I know that what I have written will be common-sense, to the Sultan, and my words may be applied for the purpose of causing an examination into the truth of the charges, but I seem to have made

I may here mention a subject connected with what I have said, by the relation it has to the security of this Government. It is this. In every part of the Empire complaints are made, and dissatisfaction exists amongst the masses of inhabitants. They are not complaints of the Government, nor dissatisfaction with the Sultan, in consequence of acts done by the Government, but are directed against the Governors and the inferior authorities employed in the Provinces who abuse their power as heretofore, whilst the population has been led to expect by the abdication of the Hattı Şerif of Government a relief from the burden of abuse of power which they are subjected to. What the Government has done in the promulgation of such a principle of justice and administration has made it impossible to neglect carrying more fully into execution those promises which have as yet, were, contradicted the people. But the Ministers, however well they may be disposed to do their duty in that respect are so hampered by Mehmet Ali, that I think they be not quite so free as their name with respect to him it may be hard to say what with energy. It is true that the actual pressure upon the Porte is in no degree to be compared with that which weighs upon Mehmet Ali, and therefore the present *status quo* may be more supportable by the Porte than by the Pasha, for on the one side there is comparatively little expense, and on the other it is of immense magnitude, but the prolongation of the Government which the delay of a final settlement of the question places every individual in the country having property, produces a stagnation that sorely affects all classes and breeds mischief.

I have &c  
Signed **PON-UNBY**

No. 691

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Received May 17.)

No. 85

My Lord,

Therapia, April 25, 1840

1 INCLOSE copy of a report from the Austrian Consul-General at Alexandria to the Internuncio, which his Excellency was so good as to

give me. It seems to me that the observations made by the Pasha are signs of his being conscious of his weakness.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) **PONSONBY**

inclosure in No. 69)

M de Laurin to the Baron de Sturmer.

Monsieur le Baron.

Alexandrie, 16 Avril, 1840.

La réponse à la lettre de Méhémet Ali Pacha, du 23 Février dernier, dont fait mention la dépêche de votre Excellence du 28 Mars dernier, vient d'être remise au Vice-Roi.

La crainte de cette réputation lui a causé une mauvaise nuit. L'ayant vu cet après-midi, son Antresse me dit que ce n'est pas une réponse à sa lettre, que tout y est vague, que le Sarrasin fait connaître son ennemi, qu'il s'est fait faiblesse et l'ingratitude de sa Suire. Porte quelque doute sur par ses Puissances, que c'est absurde et de se fier d'autorité du Sultan jusqu'à Hussein Pacha a assisté dernièrement plusieurs grands juges sans et même contre la science de sa Haute-justice qu'il est. Ce n'est pas tout, que la France n'est pas en France, qu'on ne sait pas ce qu'il y a, avant tout, par un bel exemple ses précédents, on ne les avait d'autres, on n'ont pas de sens commun, que jusqu'à ne veut pas céder la science la raison, il est pas de se méfier, à l'usage et de continuer les armées, que c'est à dire, à l'usage dans de nouveaux sermons avec le monde, que se terminent.

La conclusion de la lettre, disait Méhémet Ali, est la chose la plus curieuse qu'on lui ait jamais écrite. "On me pressa," disait-il, "d'en finir, de ne pas perdre cette bonne occasion parcequ'elle ne se présentera pas le second une fois perdue mais que j'y réfléchisse, et que je décide si l'Egypte? Cela ne peut pas être; je garderai malgré ces Messieurs la ce qui appartient, si ils veulent et de venir s'occuper de l'Egypte si garantie par la mer et par les déserts, et j'aurai bientôt 80,000 hommes réunis à Alexandrie pour repousser une attaque. Je payerai en blés les trahemens, si l'argent viendra à me manquer. J'en ai parlé aux officiers les plus éminents, il y en a soixante-jours, ils ont accueilli avec transport cette proposition et je compte sur eux."

Mehemet Ali se propose d'écarter tout cela au bénéfice des musulmans, sous la persuasion que ces projets le rendront plus traître.

Agroben, Inc.,  
(Signed) LAURIN

No. 642

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 17.)*

(No. 89, Confidential.)

My Lord,

Thetford, April 25, 1840.

1 RECEIVED this evening from his Excellency the Interior a note containing the following passages:—"Voulez qu'on vienne de me remettre une lettre de Smyrne très-séduisante, et écrite par un homme digne de confiance, et qui me prie de ne pas le nommer, il me dit tout pour tout, ce qui suit: très-à la hâte, je n'ai que le temps de vous faire savoir qu'il paraît, d'après de fortes indices, qu'il se prépare une révolution à Smyrne; soyez-en avisé. Je vous prie de ne pas faire usage de mon nom comme vous ayant donné cette nouvelle. Les Turcs achetant de la poudre clandestinement. Tout ceci pour votre personne."

The interview continues: "J'aurais ajouté moins d'importance à cette nouvelle sans la coïncidence avec ce qui vient de se passer à Andriopole: mais cette coïncidence est frappante, et je ne doute plus que ce n'

sont Méhémet Ali qui cherche à soulever partout les populations contre la Porte. Je vais en aviser Hurrey et Réchid et je crois que nous ferons bien d'écrire à nos Amiraux à Smyrne l'ordre sur le qui vive. Je me repose d'adresser, par le bateau français qui part demain, une lettre à l'Amiral Bandiera pour lui insister à s'entendre confidentiellement avec l'Amiral Anglais sur les mesures à prendre au besoin. Je vous prie de proposer l'ordre autant à nos Amiraux qu'au commandant de vos forces navales. Si vous en avez l'occasion, vous enverrez la lettre pour que je la reçoive au même temps que la mienne et avec les renseignements nécessaires pour la soustraire à la surveillance de la poste française car on ne peut pas se fier aux Français dans ces circonstances.

Myself entirely agrees with that of the Internuncio as to the action of Méhémet Ali upon those who endeavour to disturb the people because of the circulation of his proceedings in several places to create a false impression of popular discontent. I have reason to believe that Akif Pasha as well as Hattî Pasha has been acting with a view to foment such a disturbance in the Ottoman Ministry. I therefore immediately wrote Vice-Admiral Sir John Leach the letter of which I enclose copy and sent it to the Internuncio.

The step thus taken cannot, I imagine, lead to any disagreeable result, nothing will be done unless there should be a necessity for acting, and in that case, I am very sure the manifestation of our resolution to support the Sultan's authority will at once put an end to the hopes of malcontents, whilst an appearance of indifference on our part would encourage them to acts that would inevitably create a most embarrassing complication of affairs. I hope the advice I ventured to give with reference to the French, may meet with your Lordship's approbation.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure in No. 692.

Vice-Admiral Ponsonby to Admiral Sir John Leach

(Confidential)

Sir,

Thessalonica, April 26, 1840.

I HAVE received the following intelligence—There are strong rumours at Smyrna that preparations are making there for a rebellion, and the discontented Turks are clandestinely buying arms and powder.

This intelligence comes from a most respectable source and it appears to me that it ought not to be disregarded. I have in consequence communicated it to you officially and confidentially.

The Austrian Admiral Bandiera will have a similar notice given him by our Excellency the Internuncio and will communicate with you upon the subject as it will be very desirable that you should agree together upon the measures to be taken in case of necessity. There exists the greatest confidence between the British and Austrian Cabinets, and I have no doubt of your finding in Admiral Bandiera all the zeal that can be desired for the protection of the just rights and authority of the Sultan.

I take it for granted that it never will be necessary to employ actual force and that the demonstration of the resolution of the Sultan's Army to overcome him will be well able to defeat the plans of his enemies. The strongest effort of whatever may be in contemplation against the efforts of the Sultan at Smyrna and whatever may be attempted elsewhere will be counteracted by the intrigues and machinations of the Pasha of Egypt. This being the case, it may be a matter requiring great promptitude and despatch to guide the conduct to be observed towards the French Admiral, as well as it appears that the French Government even at the present time of that Pasha's departure it may be that the

French Admiral will like to screen (I hope not to favour) the agents employed by him, &c.

I hope you will acquit me of presumption, if I give an opinion, which I do solely that I may not appear to shrink from responsibility and not from any pretension to be a better judge of what ought to be done than you are. My notion is, that the best way of treating the affair will be to take it for granted that the French Admiral will, equally with yourself, support the authority of the Sultan's Government, and, consequently, to consult with him, if anything should actually happen demanding your interference; but that whenever you do come to act, great care should be taken to put it out of the power of the French to embarrass proceedings, and I presume this to be possible without occasioning any reasonable cause for their displeasure; but considering the spirit of rivalry, or perhaps I might say jealousy, known to exist at least on one party, any intermixture of nations in the performance of any service might not be safe.

I will again beg to be excused for touching these matters, and that you will recollect it is my duty to do too much rather than risk the neglect of anything to guard against the accidents that might produce dispute between us and the French.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY

N 693

The Marquis of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 18)

(No. 52)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, May 4, 1840.

I HAD the honour of an interview and a conversation with the Emperor this morning.

His Imperial Majesty talked chiefly of the Turco-Egyptian Question, and repeated his expressions of regret at the delay which had been suffered in the settlement of it, to which, he said, he saw no certain termination.

The Emperor said, that the caution and conciliatory temper shown by Her Majesty's Government had produced no good effect upon that of France, but rather the reverse; and he told me that the news received from London this morning, showed that the new French Ministry hoped to defeat the views of the other Powers, in this matter, by delay.

He then mentioned the late appointment conferred upon Ahmed Pasha by Méhémet Ali, which he characterized as a *blatant* insolent defiance; and said, that Méhémet Ali had been allowed time to strengthen himself, and to concentrate a great force to defend Egypt, while his intrigues and the spirit of insubordination of the people of Syria, would prevent the Sultan and the Allies from profiting by the withdrawal of his troops from thence.

His Imperial Majesty said our Consul at Alexandria, had spoken in a proper tone and spirit to the Viceroy; but that he ought to have had a fleet ready to support his language, which as mere menace had been premature, and worse than useless; for it had given Méhémet Ali a warning which he had been too wise to neglect.

The Emperor then reverted to the intrigues of the Pasha in every quarter of Turkey, and said, that his emissaries had been discovered upon the frontiers of Persia, and Russia, and in Kara; that Méhémet Ali hoped thereby to give them (the Russians) trouble and occupation, which was not in his interest.

The Emperor said that he still rested upon the friendship of the British Government, but that he was grieved to see that the British fleet, and that if Méhémet Ali's intrigues succeeded in exciting disturbances in Asia Minor, and in Armenia, and on the Russian frontier, new complications and new difficulties might arise.

8 R



I assured the Emperor that Her Majesty and Her Majesty's Ministers were fully determined to act up to the sentiments they had professed, and to persevere in the policy they had adopted; that without France, if France refused her co-operation, Mehemet Ali would be forced to accept the conditions agreed upon by the Allies of the Porte. I represented to His Imperial Majesty that although nothing may have been gained by the delay that has taken place, that still it was wise to incur that delay, so long as there was reason to hope that unanimity among the Great Powers might be attained, and every chance of an European war averted; that it seemed to me very essential that nothing should be left undone by us for that object, because I thought that if a war in Europe should arise, those parties would come best out of such a war, who had most reason on their side, and who had been least ready to provoke it.

The Emperor took occasion frequently in the course of the conversation, to repeat the perfect confidence he reposed in the English Government, and his satisfaction at the good understanding and cordiality existing between Russia and England, which, while it lasted, relieved him from serious anxiety upon foreign affairs, and which, he trusted, would be permanent.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) CLANRICARDE

P. S.—Count Nesselrode appears to think it possible that your Lordship's observations to M. Guizot on the engagement contracted by France by the Collective Note to the Porte of last July, may produce a good effect; and his Excellency is confident that if France joins the other Great Powers, Mehemet Ali will at once give way.

No. 694.

Nouri Effendi to Viscount Palmerston

My Lord,

Londres, le 18 Mai, 1840.

PAR la réponse en date du 11 Avril que votre Excellence a daigné faire à la Note du 7 du même mois que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui adresser, elle a annoncé qu'elle était prête à concourir immédiatement avec les Plénipotentiaires des Quatre Grands Puissances à arrêter les moyens les plus propres à réaliser les intentions bienveillantes que les Représentans des Cinq Cours ont manifestées à la Porte Ottomane par la Note Collective du 27 Juillet, 1839.

Permettez-moi, My Lord, de vous rappeler qu'il y a déjà cinq semaines passées, et l'Affaire de l'Orient reste encore dans l'état où elle était.

Ce délai, non seulement rend ma responsabilité grave vis-à-vis de mon Souverain, mais aussi contribue à alimenter et propager de plus en plus en Turquie l'inquiétude qui y règne. Les dernières nouvelles que je viens de recevoir de Constantinople, me mandent qu'il y a eu des troubles à Sophia, à Adrianople, et sur quelques autres points en Roumélie. Mon Gouvernement a des raisons de s'inquiéter de Mehemet Ali, et de l'instabilité de ces troubles, et je laisse à votre Excellence le soin de ces affaires si importantes, et je laisse à votre Excellence le soin de ces affaires si importantes.

Il est à regretter que les Cinq Puissances ne puissent se mettre d'accord sur les moyens de faire respecter les intentions bienveillantes que les Représentans des Cinq Cours ont manifestées à la Porte Ottomane par la Note Collective du 27 Juillet, 1839.

J'ai déjà eu l'honneur de prévenir votre Excellence par ma Note du 7 Avril dernier, que je suis muet de l'autorisation nécessaire pour conclure avec les Plénipotentiaires d'Angleterre, d'Autriche, de France, de Prusse et de Russie, une Convention de nature à terminer définitivement l'Affaire de l'Orient; et pour arriver à ce but, j'ai prié M. M. les Représentans des dites Cours de me prêter leur assistance, et comme je vois que l'accom-

plissement de cette œuvre dépend essentiellement des bons offices du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, je viens les réclamer instamment et prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien donner effet le plus tôt possible aux bonnes intentions d'une entente immédiate qu'elle a manifestées par la Note responsive du 11 Avril de cette année.

Cela seul pourrait tirer la Porte de la position critique où elle se trouve, et fera cesser un état de choses si préjudiciable à ses intérêts aussi bien qu'à ceux de l'Europe entière.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,  
(Signé) NOURI

No. 695

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beaconsfield

No. 70

My Lord,

Foreign Office, May 20, 1840

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch No. 65, of the 9th instant, reporting the views and opinions of Prince Metternich with regard to the line to be drawn between the Porte and Mehemet Ali in Syria.

With reference to the plan proposed by Prince Metternich for separating the Pashaliks of Syria from that of Egypt I have to inform your Excellency, that such a separation would in reality be merely nominal and illusory, because the whole would, according to that plan, remain in the power of Mehemet Ali till his death, and at his death, the whole would fall into the hands of Ibrahim Pasha, and it would be the mere delusion to fancy, that, at that time, the powerless young Ibrahim would have any possible means of compelling the Pashas to give them up their Pashaliks, or that they would have any chance of obtaining those Pashaliks.

Such a scheme may be very well for parties who wish to bind themselves, or the rest of the world, to the real nature of what they are doing, and to be consistent with a false and at least a very imperfect view of the power of Mehemet Ali, but it is difficult to imagine how any practical arrangement with honest officers, can derive any benefit from it, that such a prospective arrangement ever could be carried into effect.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 696

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby

No. 69.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, May 20, 1840.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 67, reporting that you had advised the Turkish Government to exert itself, and to adopt such measures as are within its power for the defence of Constantinople, and I have to acquaint you, that Her Majesty's Government approve the course which you have pursued in this respect.

I have also to instruct your Excellency to omit no opportunity of impressing upon the Ottoman Ministers, that one great difficulty which has hitherto impeded Her Majesty's Government from carrying fully into effect their anxious desire to assist the Sultan, is the general opinion, exaggerated no doubt, but nevertheless too prevalent, that the Sultan has by the events of last year been entirely stripped of all means of self-defence; and that the whole task of protecting him, or of enforcing his

rights, must fall upon His Highness' Alliance. In proportion, however, as the Sultan shows that he has been successful in reorganizing means of self-defence, in the same proportion will it become less difficult for Her Majesty's Government to give effect to their good wishes in the Sultan's favour.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 697

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby*

(No. 70)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, May 20, 1840.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 89, inclosing a copy of a letter which you addressed to Rear-Admiral Sir John Louis on the 26th of April, in consequence of apprehensions which were at that time entertained of a rising at Smyrna, I have to acquaint your Ex. Lordship that I have signified to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty Her Majesty's pleasure, that Sir John Louis should be instructed to act in accordance with the suggestions made by you in that letter, if circumstances should require it.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 698

*Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty*

My Lords,

*Foreign Office, May 20, 1840.*

I TRANSMIT to your Lordships a copy of a letter which Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople addressed to Rear-Admiral Sir John Louis on the 26th of April, in consequence of apprehensions which were at that time entertained of popular tumults at Smyrna; and I am to signify to your Lordships Her Majesty's pleasure, that Sir John Louis should be instructed to act in accordance with the suggestions made by Lord Ponsonby in the inclosed letter, if circumstances should require it.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 699

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 20.)*

(No. 175.)

My Lord,

*Paris, May 18, 1840.*

CHEKIB EFFENDI, the Turkish Ambassador accredited to Her Majesty, arrived here about a week ago.

I was prevented by illness receiving him when he first visited me, but he wrote a letter expressing the wish to have some conversation with me before he left Paris, and I saw him yesterday.

He appears to be intelligent, but our conversation was rather commonplace matter on the affairs of the East.

I asked him whether his Government might not be disposed in concluding an arrangement with Mehmet Ali, to make concessions and sacrifices even of some importance, rather than risk the consequences of war, and the necessity of calling to its aid a Russian army to resist the invasion of Asia Minor by Ibrahim Pasha? To this he replied, that his

Government would be satisfied with whatever was decided by the English Government, on whose friendship for Turkey it placed the most confident reliance.

He purposes leaving Paris towards the end of the week, having prolonged his stay in order to dine with Admiral Roussin, the only Frenchman whom, he said, he had found favourable to the interests of the Sublime Porte.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 700

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 26)*

No. 91

My Lord,

*Therapia, April 29, 1840.*

IN a conversation yesterday between M. de Pontons and —, the Ambassador said that the French Consul had lately had an interview with Mehmet Ali, who was as determined as ever to resist, but that he seemed to feel more the difficulties of his position, and, therefore, he might possibly be induced to abate something in his demands. This is the language the French would necessarily hold; for Mehmet Ali would be reluctant to give up all his power and influence to the Porte if he should be left in possession of anything more than what your Lordship has proposed to give him. It is evident that if Mehmet Ali is strong enough to resist the Porte, he will be a great danger to the Empire, and give just cause of alarm to the Porte, and to carry on intrigues with all discontented or corrupt Turks, it will be necessary for the Porte to be permanently under the protection of Russia; and it will be necessary for Russia to exert all her means to prevent French authority being established by the means of Mehmet Ali in Syria, or the adjoining parts. It will be necessary for the French Government to prevent Russia from exerting her power in the East, and to preserve the peace of Europe will have a direct tendency to involve the world in war. In the same conversation, M. de Pontons said he wished the English would send their six ships to Syria, and ascertain the disposition of the people of the country; and then it would be seen whether the French or the English Government was right, and the affair of Mehmet Ali might be agreed on. M. de Pontons knows, as every other man here knows, that the Syrians, of all classes and degrees and religions, pant after the English flag, and that if the English Government would send what he said arose from a wish that means might be afforded to his Government to recede with a good grace.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY

No. 701

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 29)*

No. 93

My Lord,

*Therapia, May 4, 1840.*

BY the "Blazer" steamer I received this day your Lordship's instructions Nos. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18, and also your private letter of February 4, 1840, and I learn from a letter to Count Pisani from Her Majesty's Consul at Smyrna, that those instructions were sent to Bomboz. Fortunately, your subsequent letter enabled me to say enough to Rechid Pasha to induce him to send full powers to Nouri Effendi.

I have also the honour to inclose copy of a letter from Sir John Louis brought by the steamer, which relates to my communication to him on



the subject of the apprehended disorders at Smyrna, referred to in my despatch No. 69. Mr. Consul Brant, in a private letter, speaks as if there were grounds for the alarm that was felt in that city.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 701

Mr. Consul Brant to Count Piers

Extract.)

Smyrna, May 2, 1840

THE "Blazer" steamer, which arrived here three days ago from Malta, started at one p.m. to-day for Constantinople. By her I forwarded a large packet from the Hon. Secy of State for Lord Ponsonby, which reached me by the French steamer from Malta at noon, under a blank cover from Sir Robert Stoddart. The packet contains a letter from the Admiralty of the 27th ultimo, concerning it; "The Admiral forwards to you a packet for Lord Ponsonby, which had been misssent from London, and is just returned by the mail from Bombay."

Inclosure 2 in No. 701.

Admiral Sir John Louis to Viscount Ponsonby

Her Majesty's Ship "Ganges,"  
Smyrna, April, 29, 1840.

My Lord,

I HAD yesterday the honour to receive your Lordship's letter dated the 26th, and I beg to thank your Lordship for the information. I have this day had a conference with the Hon. Secy of State, and I am glad to be able to inform your Lordship that all appears quiet here at present. Should, however, any thing occur, I shall be prepared to take such measures, in conjunction with the French and Austrian Admirals, as may be deemed best for the support and protection of the just rights and authority of the Sultan, bearing in mind the opinion which your Lordship has so kindly favoured me with. I hope, however, the presence of the squadron will prevent any disturbance taking place, should such a thing be contemplated by the agents of Mehmet Ali.

The "Blazer" arrived here yesterday from Malta, and I send her on to Tripoli with some despatches brought by her for your Lordship. I have directed Lieutenant Waugh to await your Lordship's commands, and to receive any despatches your Lordship may have to send by him. He will call at Smyrna on his way back to Malta.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) JOHN LOUIS.

No. 702

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 29.)

No. 961

My Lord,

Therapia, May 5, 1840

NOT being certain that your Lordship will receive from Her Majesty's Acting-Consul at Aleppo a despatch dated April 13, 1840, I have the pleasure to enclose it for your perusal.

It indicates a design on the part of Ibrahim to move, and what is stated respecting the establishment of a mortar-battery to command the town, may be the means intended to enable the Egyptians to leave that

inhabitants, who are extremely averse to the Egyptian Government. I have brought the matter before the Ottoman Ministers with the view of hastening their defensive measures.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 702.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.)

Aleppo, April 18, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that this Government has, within these two or three days, received orders from his Highness the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha at Marash, to get ready to start, at the first orders, the six batteries of artillery that are stationed here; which orders, I am told, are being executed with haste and great activity, but its destination is not yet known.

A gentleman, who was once in the artillery service under this Government, assures me, that the preparations now making in this department are very extensive, for it is being placed in a state of immediate active service. He further tells me, that at the barracks of Sherik Yabrak, the Government is hastily erecting a platform in the centre of that building, upon which mortars are being chosen to be placed, so as to hear and command on this town.

The 12th Regiment of the line that was here, has left this for Hamah, to replace the one there which has been ordered to Acre; and, I am told that the 2nd of the line (Guards), which is here, is also to leave for the south, to Damascus. With this exception, I have not heard of any further movement among any of the different corps of the Egyptian Army, who, I have every reason to believe, occupy the same positions as I have previously had the honour of noting to your Lordship.

The expedition of Maggoun Bey from Orfa, in the direction of the River Khaboor, has, I hear, been successful; for it is stated, that his Excellency repulsed an attack made on him by Sulhok, of the Gherba Arab tribe, and that several Chiefs of the Amazeo tribe have given in their submission to Maggoun Bey and to the Egyptian authority; but I hear from another quarter, that, on the contrary, Maggoun Bey, in an attack he made against the Gherba Arabs, got repulsed, and was obliged to retire. The first letters from Orfa will, however, bring us some authentic account with regard to this affair, which I will not fail to immediately communicate to your Lordship.

No. 703

Cheik Effendi to Viscount Palmerston.

My Lord,

Londres, le 31 Mai, 1840

LA responsabilité qui pèse sur moi dès mon début à Londres, m'impose le devoir d'adresser à V. Exc. le Comte de Palmerston, les Cinq Grandes Cours qui ont pris à cœur les intérêts du Sultan mon Auguste Maître, afin de les prier de ne pas tarder à prendre avec moi en considération l'Affaire Orientale, dont la solution est attendue avec une vive impatience par Sa Hauteur le Sultan.

Les Représentants des Grandes Puissances, par un mouvement généreux et spontané, ont arrêté le Sultan dans la voie des sacrifices que le malheureux état des affaires de l'Orient, à son avènement au trône, allait lui imposer. Quelque pénible qu'eût été l'arrangement qu'il ait fait alors, le Sultan, par son attitude, a fait comprendre que ses intentions, en ce qui concerne la Note Collective du 27 Juillet, 1839, restaient sans effet.





possession of Egypt only. Your Lordship knows the contents of the despatch, and I only mean to mark what I allude to as the foundation and cause of what I have to offer.

I do not know if M. Thiers was informed of the agreement, when he made his speech on the 14th April in the Chamber of Peers, but Refted Pasha and others think it a manifestation that France will support Mehemet Ali against the Four Powers. It is upon the possible advance of Ibrahim that I wish to offer an observation.

The Report from Aleppo, dated April 13th, transmitted in my preceding despatch, shows that preparations are making to enable Ibrahim to move, it is, however certain, that if he moves his army to threaten the capital, Syria will be raised against him, and that he will put everything upon the issue of his enterprise, and the presumption may be that he will not move unless he is effectually urged to it by the French, which they may do with the hope of obtaining ends which I will state, viz., to frighten the Porte into a negotiation with the Pasha; to create that state of things which may make it necessary for the Porte to apply for the assistance of the Powers; that the presence here of the French squadron will redouble the intrigues of the most dangerous sort for the attainment of French ends, and the defeat of the plans of the Four Powers—and they might co-operate with Mehemet Ali.

There are, perhaps, reasons why the French should not be called in; and the Porte, supported by the Four Powers, might refuse to call them upon the grounds, that the French having refused to concur in the Treaty to which the Porte is a party, and the object of which is to deprive Mehemet Ali of those possessions which the French insist upon leaving under his command, the Porte is not justified in confiding in the amicable intentions of the French as it does in the ruinous course which those who have decidedly supported the Sultan's rights against Mehemet Ali.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

No. 707

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 100.)

My Lord,

Therapia, May 13, 1840

I HOPE 18,000 troops will march instant for a position selected between Lunek and Neutari, upon the only road by which Ibrahim could pass, were he to attempt an attack; the position is in itself very strong, and it will be strengthened by some field works, and the road may be also commanded by guns from the vessels in the Sea of Marmora.

About 6,000 of the troops have been inspected near Pera; and they are admitted by some French military men, to be as fine troops as need be. General C. says one of the regiments he saw is as good as any French regiment. I do not know how Ibrahim will be able to bring a larger number to attack, and I am sure his troops are not better than those he will have to assail, who, being in position, will have an immense advantage, to say nothing of that of being directed by a man of real and known skill in the art of war.

The spirit amongst the soldiery is quite good. I think Ibrahim will not venture an attack, it would be the extreme of rashness to do so, where such preparations are made to resist him, for a defeat or a repulse would be his immediate and total ruin. The expense of these preparations will be very great, but if the Porte makes a mistake, and Ibrahim moves, though everything may be gained, for should the troops be beaten, the result will be a great advantage to the Sultan's cause.

Ibrahim to the sea-side, where he must be resisted by the Allies, or allowed to be master of Constantinople. The resistance there, however, even at the worst, would be easy enough, if the Allies choose to exert their maritime force, or if England alone exerts her own which is at hand.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

No. 708

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 5.)

(Extract.)

Damascus, April 24, 1840

NOTHING has further transpired respecting the insurgent Mutawak in the district, it was a poor that they were dispersed, and for the present, overawed by the Irregular Cavalry forces brought against them from the Adana district.

The Damascus district remains in a tranquil state, and nothing whatever of interest has taken place worthy of your Lordship's notice. Preparations are now making for the fortress of Acre, some hundred camels have been purchased here for the service of transporting provisions, &c. to the garrison. The Government here is very hard-pressed for funds, the Treasury is completely drained—so much so, that the only resource left is to levy the Kharatch, and measures are taken to obtain the Ferdeh Tax in advance.

My assistant at Aleppo, under the 8th instant, states Ibrahim Pasha to be always at Marash; and no movement of the regular forces had taken place, either from that position northwards, nor from Orfa southwards, or of the irregulars, further than I had the honour of stating to your Lordship in my last despatch.

I learn from Aleppo, under the 15th instant, that warlike preparations are making there for the north of Syria, the artillery is being placed in an efficient state for immediate service. Works are being erected for overawing Aleppo, in case the chief military force is otherwise employed; a large quantity of ammunition has been sent to the coast, and a depot is said to be forming at Beass. Two more regiments have been marched to the south—one destined for Hamah, and one for Damascus. These measures do not indicate the immediate advance of the Egyptian regular forces under Ibrahim Pasha, either from Marash northwards, or from Orfa southwards, but demonstrate the intention of a determined resistance for the retention of Syria, and at the same time holding all the disposable forces ready on the northern frontier for any emergency, either to advance, or to act on the defensive, which a change in the political position Mehemet Ali may be placed in, shall create.

No. 709

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 10.)

No. 42.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, May 15, 1840.

YOUR Lordship was pleased, in your despatch No. 4 of the 25th of March, to express certain opinions on the late actions and language of his Highness the Pasha, granting me, at the same time, liberty to show that communication to his Excellency Boghos Bey.

It appeared to me, that when the above despatch was written, your

Lordship can hardly have been fully apprized of the resolved and uncompromising course on which the Pasha seems fully decided.

If the relations of Great Britain with this Government are already sufficiently delicate, and that the means of coercion are really at hand, it may be more dangerous than useful to assume a hostile tone, and, by irritating language, widen our estrangement, and create premature difficulties.

I have therefore availed myself of the discretionary power conferred to me by your Lordship, and have refrained from acting on the above-cited despatch without strict instructions.

In conclusion, I may add, that with the Pasha himself, and every member of his Court, my personal intercourse, although somewhat reserved, continues to be perfectly satisfactory, and is marked by every proper form and courtesy.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G LLOYD HODGES.

No. 710

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.— Received June 10

No. 45

Extract.

Alexandria, May 21 1840

THE past month has not been very productive of events in Egypt. The warlike preparations in this country are continued.

The large frigate "Cafarshe" having on board seven cannon and considerable military stores, sailed from this port on the 26th of April, escorted by two sloops, and speedily followed by two transports. On the 10th of May, news reached Alexandria, that the frigate, which it is said was bound to St. Jean d'Acre, had been wrecked on her outward voyage.

On the 15th of May arrived here the former Sovereign of Dongola, Oureo, or King Thumhall. He comes to complain of the tyranny of the Pasha's Government in his late States.

In Syria there are appearances of increased activity. The fortifications of Acre are nearly completed, the coast being used in a state of defence, magazines are constructed, and stores are being distributed throughout the ports. On the last days of April, 800 camels left Aleppo with gunpowder, each bearing about two cwt. The Local Government, at the same time, gave a requisition for 150 additional camels, for the same purpose. From Aleppo 12,000 muskets were simultaneously despatched to the coast, and cartridges are being prepared in different places. Whether Ibrahim Pasha contemplates offensive, as well as defensive, warfare is not uncertain. He has caused the whole of his Artillery to be inspected, and carefully put into a condition for service. The garrison of Aleppo, with twelve batteries of Artillery new in that city, have orders to be ready to march at the slightest notice.

Maggian Bey had returned in the beginning of April to Orfa from his expedition towards the Sindjar. He had subjected all the tribes along the River Khabor, and had joined the conquered territory to the Pashaw of Orfa, although it previously depended on that of Mossoul.

No. 711

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.

(No. 13.)

Foreign Office, June 11, 1840.

Sir,

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatches to No. 47 inclusive.

In reply to your despatch No. 42, I have to acquaint you that I approve the course which you have adopted with reference to my instruction No. 4, of the 25th of March.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 712

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 14.)

(No. 103.)

Therapia, May 15, 1840.

My Lord,

THE deposition of the Seraskier (Halil) and the Festival of Mahomed's birth, have occasioned delay in the departure of the troops for the position between Isnick and Scutari, but I hope it will take place immediately.

The military part of the plan has been formed by General Chresnowski, who has had several conferences with the Grand Vizier, in company with the other Ottoman Ministers, and I hope the General will have the direction of its execution. He has been desired to get ready to set out for the appointed place.

I think it will have the effect of—

1st. Making it almost an act of madness in Ibrahim to attempt an attack against the capital, because 18,000 men, posted as the Turks will be, would be sufficient to repulse him, and troops for their expulsion; and, on the other hand, he would be exposed to a surprise attack by 20,000 and that of an indolent quality, and if he did not succeed, his whole power, which is founded upon the belief in his force, would be destroyed, and he would be attacked in the rear.

2nd. Because the assemblage of a large compact Ottoman force in such a position would dissipate the errors of those who imagine the Porte has no army, and it would put it out of the power of malecontents, and of the agents of the latter, to excite any men in Constantinople to act against the Government, they being evidently exposed to being attacked and put down and would be those troops. The same effect will be produced by the presence of a large force of artillery in the capital.

3rd. It will tend to improve the army itself, and it cannot cost any very great additional outlay, that which must at any rate be expended upon the army.

4th. These effects above stated will be the necessary result of the employment of foreign means for the defence of Constantinople, and thereby prevent inconveniences that might attend the arrangements for affording protection by foreigners. Russian forces need not be called in—the French fleet need not be called up. The pretences upon which France rests the defence of her inimical policy will be taken away, and if M. Thiers should really wish to concur with Her Majesty's Government, they will enable him to show that the present state of the country is not as has been stated to be, and that conclusions drawn from false premises are not true.



I have talked over these topics with Count Pisani, who is well acquainted with them, and your Lordship will have the goodness to examine him upon them. I have given this despatch into his charge, and he will be at your commands in Tripoli.

Count Pisani has been attacked by a disorder that requires to be treated by the best medical practice—a fugue—and under the advice of Dr. Macgregor he has asked my consent to be making a journey to London for that purpose. It was impossible to refuse this request, and he would necessarily have left this in a few days. I thought it, under these circumstances, advisable to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the return of the "Blazer" to England, and to desire the commander of that vessel to give him a passage home, by which means I shall give your Lordship the latest and most complete information that can be afforded of the state of things here. Count Pisani knows what I have done, and most of the opinions I entertain, and is also well acquainted with this country. Your Lordship cannot fail to have implicit confidence in a person who has served the Government so many years and been equally applauded by every new Ambassador for his abilities, his fidelity, his activity, and his zeal.

I hope your Lordship will approve of my having requested a passage for him, and the expense the Government will incur by it is really next to nothing.

The messenger waits to carry to your Lordship the account of the movement of the troops, which is every moment to be expected.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) P. P. SONSBY

No. 713.

*Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 15.)*

(No. 8.)

My Lord,

*Beirut, April 26, 1840.*

THE only information I have the honour to communicate on the present occasion, relates to the measures which continue to be taken for the defence of Acre.

On the 21st instant a regiment of Guards passed through Beirut for that port, where it is now estimated to be about 18,000 men, of which more than 1,000 are artillery.

The greater part of the inhabitants of Acre have retired outside the walls. The approaches to it are said to have been undermined, and besides the works to the east, others have been completed on the western side.

Military stores continue to arrive from Egypt for the same destination. Selim Pasha is for the present at Sidon.

The public tranquillity in this neighbourhood is undisturbed.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) N. MOORE

No. 714

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 15.)*

No. 201.

My Lord,

*Paris, June 12, 1840.*

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches of No. 201 inclusive.

I had a conversation yesterday with M. Thiers on the Oriental Question. It began by his saying to me that the dismissal of Hosrew Pasha from the councils of the Sultan had caused a very favourable change

in the disposition of Mehemet Ali towards his Sovereign, that the Pasha had talked of sending back the Turkish fleet to Constantinople, and on board of it his son to pay his homage to the Sultan. I asked M. Thiers what was the cause of this, which, under this favourable change in the disposition of Mehemet Ali, he indulged the hope of obtaining from him. He replied that the Pasha was less positive in regard to the retention of the fleet, which he had hitherto held as a Pasha by one of his sons, and M. Thiers believed that he would be induced to consent to the restoration of it to the Sultan. When I spoke of the necessity for exerting some measure of the court, and of some which had been thought essential for the security of the Porte, M. Thiers gave me no encouragement to hope that the declared resolution of Mehemet Ali to keep possession of the whole of it was at all changed, but he held out the expectation that the Pasha might be induced to pay a tribute for it, far greater in amount than he had hitherto been asked, and which would well compensate the Turkish Government for the loss of the fleet.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) GRANVILLE

No. 715

*Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 15.)*

No. 7)

(Extract)

*St. Petersburg, June 8, 1840*

I SAW Count Nesselrode this morning. His Excellency said that he had no late news from Constantinople, but according to the last accounts, matters were going on much as usual. He did not seem apprehensive of any advance by Mehemet Ali towards Constantinople; nor did he appear to have received any intelligence of expected revolutionary movements at Smyrna.

Count Nesselrode was evidently disappointed not to have a more favourable report on the reception of M. Thiers, and your Lordship's late proposals to the French Government on the Eastern Question. His Excellency expressed some surprise at M. Thiers's refusal to accede to the proposed measures, but had given an answer which would allow him time for communicating with Alexandria.

No. 716

*Lord Beaumont to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 16.)*

No. 60)

My Lord,

*Vienna, June 9, 1840*

PRINCE METTERNICH will forward to Baron Neumann, for communication to your Lordship, despatches from the Internuncio, representing the sense entertained by the Divan of the urgency of an early settlement of their differences with Mehemet Ali. So pressingly is this felt at Constantinople, that full powers have been sent to the Turkish Plenipotentiary in London, to sign any agreement which the Four Powers shall concur in recommending.

Prince Metternich will readily place two frigates at the disposition of the Four Powers, for any service they may concur in recommending, but he considers this to be a measure calculated to produce a violent and is anxious for a reply to his last despatches of (I believe) the 26th of April, as I wish to project the project to be taken into consideration by the Four Powers jointly, for the purpose of coming at their collective opinion and intention. He is not, however, not at all disposed to deviate in the smallest degree from the plan sketched out in those despatches.







A. but by Ibrahim and therefore the arrangement which M Thiers has put out, as a possible consequence of the favourable change which the dismissal of Hoarew Pasha may produce in the mind of Mehmet Ali happens to be the very arrangement which has actually been in existence for the last six years.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 720

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

(No. 88.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 23, 1840.

I APPROVE of your Excellency's having obtained a passage to England for M. Alexander Pasha, in H. R. Majesty's steam-vessel "Blazer," on the grounds stated in your despatch, No. 103, of the 15th of May.

The reasons which your Excellency gives in the same despatch for having urged the Porte to send a force of 18,000 men, to take up a position between Isnick and Scutari, are conclusive; and that measure cannot fail to be attended with the best results in every point of view. I have, therefore, to instruct your Excellency to continue to press its adoption, if it should not have been carried into execution when you receive this despatch.

I conclude that some gun-boats, or other small vessels of war, will at the same time be stationed so as to flank the road along which Ibrahim would have to pass, if he should succeed in getting beyond Isnick, on his advance to Scutari, and thus to support the defensive position of the Ottoman troops.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 721

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 115.)

My Lord,

Therapia, June 7, 1840

MR. ALISON has furnished the inclosed return of the forces of Mehmet Ali.

I have only to observe, that the population which supports this force is supposed to be about three millions—Egypt and the country adjacent to that population is known to be wasted by the unceasing exactions of the Pasha's government.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure in No. 721

Return of the Forces of Mehmet Ali Pasha, obtained from the books of Selim Pasha.

	Men.
In Cairo (1,940 of which are Turks), four regiments	12,800
In Syria, twenty-five regiments	87,000
In the Hedjaz, the Nedjd, and Soudan	57,000
In Rosetta	3,200
In Damietta	3,200
In and about Alexandria, land and sea forces, gunners, and men employed in the arsenal	32,800
	196,000

Or, 185,000 Regulars,  
And 41,000 Irregulars.

196,000

Return of Militia in the course of Organization.

Seyd Ahmed Garbee has engaged to raise in Alexandria two regiments	6,200
The Commandant of Rosetta, one regiment	3,200
" " Damietta and neighbourhood	6,200
" " two regiments	6,200
The Mamlouks in the four districts of Lower Egypt, four regiments	12,800

In Cairo and Environs.

Oman Bey, of Senaar, Aaleem of the College of Athar, has engaged to raise four regiments with the rank of Mirmiran	12,800
The Mirkeeva Ibrahim Aarif Bey, two regiments	6,400
The Mirkeeva, the Aaleem Mehmed Bey, two regiments	6,400
El Dexter Allee Bey, from Boulac, the port of Cairo, one regiment	3,200
Hassan Bey, from Old Cairo, one regiment	3,200
" " from the Environs, one regiment	3,200

Twenty Regiments, 65,600

Return of the Efficient Troops in Alexandria

	Men.
In the Arsenal	4,000
On board Mehmet Ali's fleet	15,000
" " Ibrahim's fleet	14,000
Troops of the line within Alexandria	1,800
Invalid pioneers	800
Turkish engineers	800
Officers of the Egyptian Artillery	4,000
Officers of the Ottoman Artillery	5,200
	40,000

The armies of the Hedjaz and the Nedjd are daily expected under Kourchid and Ibrahim Pashas.

S Y



No. 722.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 28.)*

No. 117,  
My Lord,

*Thessalonica, June 9, 1840.*

THE report made by Nouri Effendi, stating that the Ministers of Austria and Russia had told him that it would be advisable for the Porte to make some sacrifice of territory in Syria, was taken into consideration four days ago by the Council, and it was resolved not to make any concession. But the Ottoman Government relied upon your Lordship for the support of the policy that had been approved of, and for the defence of the rights of the Sultan, and the integrity of the Empire.

I have not learnt the foregoing officially, but from a source which I consider perfectly good, and to which I give entire credit, though I cannot be answerable for the truth.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 723

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 28.)*

No. 119,  
My Lord,

*Thessalonica, June 9, 1840.*

I RECEIVED yesterday a private letter from Colonel Hodges, dated Alexandria, May 29, in which he speaks of the facility with which, in his opinion, Mehemet Ali could be brought to agree to such terms as your Lordship proposed should be offered, by the employment of Her Majesty's squadron in the Levant alone.

Colonel Hodges had received reports similar to those I also have received from Syria, and other parts, stating the great and increasing discontents.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 724

*Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 29.)*

No. 15,  
My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, June 20, 1840.*

IN a late conversation with Count Nesselrode, his Excellency seemed to speak of nothing on the Eastern Question, observing that he had no intelligence of interest from Constantinople, or any apprehension of the march of Ibrahim Pasha upon the Turkish capital.

The state of the interior of Russia and some pecuniary difficulties, coupled with the vast expenses of the Circassian war, will be quite sufficient to employ the disposable funds of the Empire for this year. The hope of effecting a separation between England and France has vanished, and the Government appears indifferent about the immediate settlement of the Question, if not even desirous of delay. This may be accounted by the state of the finances, and the consequent desire to avoid any fresh military operations, which might be rendered necessary by the approach of Ibrahim Pasha to Constantinople, or the appearance of a British and French squadron in the Bosphorus.

Notwithstanding the effect of these circumstances in producing an apparent similarity of object in the present views of Russia and France, there are no symptoms of a better understanding between the Govern-

ments of the two countries; nor does that of Russia allow the existence of any alteration in her plans, or of unwillingness to act with England in supporting the Sultan, if called upon to do so.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD.

No. 725.

*Earl Grey to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 2.)*

(Most Confidential.)  
(Extract.)

*Paris, June 29, 1840.*

I PAID my respects on Saturday evening to the King and Royal Family at No. 11, the Grand Quai, in the language of the King was a repetition of the opinions I have ever and over again heard from His Majesty, ever since the news reached Paris of the defeat of the Turks at Nezib, and of the traitorous surrender of the Turkish fleet to Mehemet Ali. He thinks that during the suspense of an arrangement between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt the power and authority of the Turkish Government in Asia Minor, as well as in the provinces of European Turkey, are daily becoming weaker, and that the Powers of Europe have not available means for the coercion of Mehemet Ali.

No. 726

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 4.)*

(No. 123.)  
My Lord,

*Thessalonica, June 10, 1840.*

THE vessels sent for the Albanian troops are daily expected to arrive, and the corps will proceed at once to occupy the position between Nicomedia and Scutari, which is to be strengthened also by other corps and artillery. I have been told to-day that the preparations for the attack will be completed; and if they are, I think Ibrahim will not venture any attack, whatever may be the situation of Mehemet Ali's affairs.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 727

*Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 2.)  
My Lord,

*Paris, July 3, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit the "Constitutionnel" of yesterday's date, in which it is stated, according to the substance of a telegraphic despatch which M. Thiers has received, that Mehemet Ali, upon learning the dismissal of Hosrew Pasha, had determined to restore the Turkish fleet to the Sultan.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

*Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 6.)

(Extract.)

*Damascus, May 22, 1840.*

THE Government here continues to be very straitened in its finances. Very severe measures have been resorted to, to oblige the Christians to pay up the arrears and balance owing on the Kharatch Tax. The Ferdeh is also begun to be collected, though not due for three months hence. In this city great uneasiness exists. It is reported from good source, that the population of Haouran and the Ledgea Arabs are determined to resist the payment of the Ferdeh tax; that the Druses of the Emir Bechir's mountains, conjointly with his Christian subjects, are firmly agreed on all points to stand by each other, that it is thought they will resist at least the anticipated payment of this tax, the enforcement of which may lead to very considerable embarrassment to the Government in all its measures, situated, as those territories are, contiguous to Acre, and the absence of a sufficient military force in the Damascus district, to carry into execution its plans.

I am informed that orders were received by the Government here from Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim Pasha, to raise a militia in this city and environs, if, it is stated, two regiments of Infantry, about 7,000 men, but Sheriff Pasha and Bacher Bey have made representations to the above Chiefs that, under the actual circumstances of the absence of both regular and irregular troops, the population generally towards the Egyptian frontier, and the vicinity thereof is in restraining them and keeping them in subjection, even disarmed as they are, it would be impossible to raise such a militia. In consequence of the above, the Government have decided to refrain from such a measure, but I may remark that this is a corollary to the refusal of the Government to raise a militia in the mountains, on which I have already informed your Lordship.

The advices from Aleppo to the 6th and 13th instant, state Ibrahim Pasha to be always at Marash. The arms, ammunition, &c., transported to the coast, being chiefly those taken at the battle of Nahr, seem destined for Acre, whether to be in depot there for arming the projected militia in the south, or for Egypt, does not appear yet clear. Troops continue to be directed along the coast from the north to the south. Solyman Pasha was, by last accounts, at Sidon.

It is also stated, that the advance of Ibrahim Pasha's regular forces, at least for the present. There is a report in town very generally credited, of which no mention is made in the advices from Aleppo, that Ibrahim Pasha has experienced some losses in encounters with the Koords of the lower ranges of the Taurus; his irregular Druse Cavalry has suffered the most, and it is said an order has been received here to send a Chief, with 500 horsemen, from the Acre district to his Highness; also, that a regiment of Horse Artillery stationed here, the animals of which are now at grass, has received marching orders to join Ibrahim Pasha at Marash.

*Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 10.)

My Lord,

*Beirut, May 29, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that measures continue to be taken for the relief of the wounded and sick, and that Solyman Pasha is about to visit this and the neighbouring places on a tour of inspection.

But the most important information I have to communicate to your Lordship by this opportunity is, the refusal of the Christians of Lebanon to give up their arms at the demand of this Government. They reply to the requisition, that the Viceroy, by a firman, had granted these arms in perpetuity in lieu of those formerly taken from them, that they had faithfully used them against the aggressors, the Mamelukes and Druses, and considered much in the service, bearing the expences of their campaigns at their own cost, and they declare their intention of retaining their arms.

The Christians have allied themselves with the Druses, and they are mutually pledged to resistance.

The determination has already been proved, by their wresting from some people of the Emir Bechir who had attempted to begin the disarmament, thirty muskets, which were delivered to Druses, heretofore their enemies, but henceforward to be their allies.

In consequence of an apprehended attack by the mountaineers upon Sidon, a detachment of troops, consisting of four battalions, has been despatched to apprise Ibrahim Pasha. The Government Post betwixt this place and Sidon has been intercepted, and all we hear, indicates the commencement of a revolt.

The sentinels at the cordon established in this neighbourhood by the Health Department, hastily returned into the town last night, in consequence of an apprehended attack by the insurgents. They have been ordered to be kept in readiness, and it is said that the Government have ordered a reinforcement of troops to be sent.

It is also stated, that at present in Lebanon, that it will require some time to be able to send troops to the coast, and everything indicates a renewal of the war, and a host of troops in Syria, the Government are now in a state of alarm.

I have, however, no doubt of the success of the Government in the present crisis. I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient servant. The position of the Emir Bechir seems a very critical one, and as he is now the Viceroy, with a population under his jurisdiction now all but in a state of declared revolt.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) N MOORE.

P.S.—The French Consul here to-day privately chartered a small vessel, and sent her off with the greatest secrecy. I have ascertained that she bore despatches.

It is rumoured that two of the Emir Bechir's sons are favourable to the insurrection.

We are every hour receiving accounts of the capture of arms from straggling parties of soldiers. The Cordon at Sidon has been fixed, and the arms carried off. A strong guard is placed at each of the gates of this place, and the gunners are at their posts on the forts.

N M



*Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 10.)*

(No. 48.)

(Extract.)

*Alexandria, June 6, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that yesterday his Highness the Viceroy quitted Alexandria for Cairo. The recent incendiary attempts in the capital seem to have been the motive of this visit, but it is not supposed that the Pasha will be long absent from hence. The fires appear to have been somewhat numerous, but it is not proved that they arose out of political causes. Some of them were certainly accidental, and others are supposed to have been the work of those lawless characters who abound in all large cities, and who convert a public calamity into an opportunity for depredation. Recent accounts deny that any fire had taken place in the citadel.

Public opinion in Egypt is decidedly unsettled and feverish, without being precisely hostile to Mehemet Ali. This is caused by the dubious and uncertain appearances of the Egyptian Question, as well as by the power of the Pasha wanting that aspect of rooted stability which inspires confidence in the masses.

It is certain that the spirit of the National Guard throughout Egypt, is now very unsettled, and the Viceroy seems to fear that a secret understanding amongst the Chiefs of the new force, extends its ramifications over the whole country.

Between the Pasha and the Consul-General of Russia, a very friendly and frequent intercourse continues.

I have been informed by very high authority, that immediately after the arrival of the French steam-vessel of the 21th ultimo, the French Consul-General visited the Viceroy, and that in the conversation, M. Cochelet asked Mehemet Ali whether he found himself in a financial condition to hold out another year in his present policy? The answer of the Pasha was, that he could do so very easily, that he could now sell produce which would clear off his debts to the merchants, and defray six months of the arrears of those in his service, after which he said that he would be very well able to proceed on credit for another year. The Pasha added, that his crops of the present season, promised to be unusually productive.

I am now in a position to state, that in this conversation I may notice that the Viceroy has recently been effecting very extensive sales of produce. About the middle of May he sold 120,000 cantars of cotton, at thirteen dollars per cantar, which is three dollars per cantar cheaper than last year. About the same time, the Government disposed of 40,000 ardebs of corn, at forty-five piasters per ardeb, making 90,000 dollars. Thus the Viceroy would have recently realized 1,950,000 dollars, but that the Government usually sells more produce than it possesses, and probably will not be able to produce the complete quantities above enumerated.

This morning, the British packet "Emetje," arrived with the mails from Syria, and the information I have received is very important.

Already, in my despatches Nos 35 and 40, of the 18th and 20th of April, I had apprized your Lordship that the utmost discontent and ferment existed in Syria, and that there had been even some partial symptoms of resistance. In the middle of last month my private sources informed me, that the Pasha of Aleppo, who is the most warlike in Syria, had evinced a disposition to refuse payment of the new Miri Tax, and that several armed bodies from various points, had retired to the mountains. About the same time I received news that the insurgents under Halil, had beaten two battalions of the 25th Regiment of Egyptian Infantry quartered in Jerusalem.

The correspondence of this day proves that these indications of an unsettled spirit have not been without corresponding results, and that the condition of Syria has become most critical.

It appears that the Egyptian authorities had given orders to disarm the Christians of Mount Lebanon, but that they have refused to comply under the pretext that the arms put in their hands had been given to them by the Pasha only to replace those of which they had formerly been deprived.

It is to be remarked, that this people had formerly aided the Pasha in his wars, but that they have now joined cause with their former enemies, the Druses, and that both, in conjunction with the inhabitants of the Haouran district and other Syrian populations, appear to be fully decided on an open and formidable insurrection.

The post between Beirut and Sidon was stopped and delayed two hours by the insurgents. The horses and harness were taken; but the conductor of the mails and the correspondence were not detained or at all injured.

It seems that the Sanatory Cordon of Saida had been forced, and the arms taken from the depot of the Pasha. News was recently reaching Beirut, on the 29th ultimo, of straggling parties of Egyptian troops having been engaged and defeated by the Syrians. The city of Sidon was in a state of great agitation; all access was prevented; strong guards were stationed at the gates, and the gunners were at their posts on the forts.

The above extracts do not come to my knowledge only by the reports of Consular officers attached to this Mission, but are confirmed to me by other sources of intelligence.

The utmost diligence prevails in perfecting the fortifications of St. Jean d'Acre, and in rendering it an immense depot of all warlike stores. My advices of the middle of May inform me, that a very able European engineer, Lieutenant-Colonel Schultz, had recently arrived there, and had taken the direction of the works, some of which he disapproved and had demolished, in order to have them reconstructed on more scientific principles.

Immense quantities of munitions were continually arriving in Acre. The powder magazines, which were built by the Pasha, were now full, and the rest of that material had been deposited in the extensive stores of the arsenal.

The garrison of Acre, at the date already mentioned, was as follows:

	Men.
1st Regiment of Infantry (European)	2,000
2nd " " " " " "	2,000
2nd " " " " " "	2,000
1 Battalion of 25th Regiment Infantry	600
1 " " of Support " "	400
1 " " of Invalids " "	400
1 Company of Engineers	100
10th Regiment of Cavalry	1,000
Regular Artillery	200
Irregular do.	600
	Total 15,200
Masons and stone-cutters	1,500

The nearest military force to Acre was then at Saida, where the 6th Regiment of Infantry was quartered, and a battery of 12 guns constructed for the accommodation of a garrison of two regiments.

In the middle of May, Ibrahim Pasha was still at Marash, with a division of about 10,000 men. It was said that he had ordered five absent regiments to join him.

Solyman Pasha was about to leave Saida on a tour of inspection throughout the troops stationed in Syria, and was to establish a constant force at every point of the coast where a disembarkation might be possible.

By information of the 20th May, I learn that his Excellency Major-General Sir John Murray, G.C.B., has been appointed to command the British forces in Syria.

3 Regiments of Infantry.	2 Batteries of Heavy Artillery
3 " " of Cavalry.	2 " " of Light " "
	and about forty cannon

He had, besides, about 1,500 Bedouin or Annadi Cavalry, and a corps of 700 irregular troops. The Ghortha Arabs, dwelling on the River Khabor, and recently subjugated by the Bey, were perfectly quiet. The district of Orfa was also tranquil; and it appears that the inhabitants are highly satisfied with the wise and temperate government of Maggiun Bey.

My despatches from Canlia allude to some slight appearances of an intention to put that island in a posture of defence. The carriages of the guns in the various forts were being changed.

I do not know that I have more to add to the foregoing information, except it be the fact that the Pasha has lately declared, that should he be coerced by one or more European Powers, he is in a condition and fully determined to revolutionize the Turkish Empire.

I had neglected in the proper place to inform your Lordship, that the French steam-packet which arrived in this port on the 4th instant, is reported to have brought from Marseilles 300,000 dollars. This money was addressed to M. Zinner, Consul of Belgium, and to M. Pastoret, a French merchant. As both these gentlemen are frequently employed in the affairs of the Pasha, and as they have never been known to receive remittance of anything like so large an amount, it is confidently asserted that the above sum was really destined for the treasury of the Viceroy.

No. 731

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 7)

(No. 49.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, June 16, 1840

BY the British monthly steam-packet, I shall have the honour to furnish to your Lordship an ample narrative of late events in Syria.

I shall now briefly notice the latest information from that quarter. The Emir Keesir has declared openly for the Pasha's Government, and a large proportion of the mountaineers have returned to their homes and occupations. Still the insurgents are in force about Tripoli and Latakia, but his Highness the Pasha has taken prompt and energetic steps to crush the revolt. He even declares that the Druses have offered to march against the refractory, an assistance which he has declined.

Within the last three days I have had two long interviews with the Viceroy. He conversed on the affairs of Syria frankly, openly, and without any show whatever of doubt, fear, or hesitation. I am convinced that he has no dread of quelling the disturbances, but he seems to suspect that the Sublime Porte or her Allies may be tempted, by his present difficulties, to make some attempt on his Syrian possessions.

The Pasha has consequently despatched, or has nearly completed, for the protection of the coast of Syria, two naval divisions, consisting together, of—

3 Ships of the Line.	3 Corvettes
12 Frigates.	1 Brig

Of these, fully nine are Turkish vessels. Their Captains and superior officers are Egyptian, and the crews composed in equal numbers of Arabs and Turks. Eleven of these ships, expected to sail this day, will also bear,

2 Regiments of Turkish Marines .	6,400
2 Regiments of Egyptian Infantry .	6,400

12,800

who are to be embarked in equal proportions. This force, I presume, is destined to strengthen those points of the Syrian coast where a descent of an invading army might be practicable.

Thus much, my Lord, for the affairs of Syria, which I must now abandon, to notice more important subjects.

Yesterday I received information of so weighty a nature, as to make it desirable that I should hear the facts from the Viceroy's own lips. Accompanied, therefore, by M. de Laurin, Consul-General for Austria, I waited on his Highness at 5 o'clock p.m. I was welcomed in his name, and treated by his household and himself with marked affection and cordiality. He informed me that he had resolved to despatch to Constantinople, his former secretary and confidential servant, Sami Bey, who would leave next morning (16th June). That his Envoy would be charged with the congratulations of his Highness to the Sultan on the birth of his daughter and a complimentary present, on that happy event, of 2,000 purses (10,000*l.*). Sami Bey would also declare to the Sultan that, all along, Hosrow Pasha had been the only barrier to a friendly arrangement; and that since that personage had been removed, the Pasha was prepared to fulfil his former promises, and would restore the Turkish flag, as he had promised to do, to the Sultan's son, Said Bey.

I was much interested in the fact, which is important should be known to your Lordship, that I had influenced your opinion of the matter. I had been consulted directly, from one of the most confidential persons, who, as I understand, has seen a copy of the letter to the Sultan. He assures me that the Sultan would be very glad to receive the letter, and that the Pasha would expect his speedy restoration to power.

Yesterday morning, M. de Laurin, Consul-General for Austria, was in conversation with the Pasha at 7 o'clock.

SIGNED G. HODGES

No. 732

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 6.)

(No. 50.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, June 17, 1840.

YESTERDAY I had the honour to inform your Lordship, in a brief and guarded despatch forwarded by the French steam-packet, of the recent important circumstances connected with the Egyptian Question.

To avoid the confusion arising from a lengthened statement of numerous facts and considerations appertaining to late occurrences, I propose to divide into several despatches the matter on which it is my duty to address you.

His Highness M. de Laurin, having received from the Viceroy, early on the morning of the 14th, a despatch in which he refers to his Highness at 5 o'clock p.m. yesterday afternoon.

I was much interested in the fact, which is important should be known to your Lordship, that I had influenced your opinion of the matter. I had been consulted directly, from one of the most confidential persons, who, as I understand, has seen a copy of the letter to the Sultan. He assures me that the Sultan would be very glad to receive the letter, and that the Pasha would expect his speedy restoration to power.

The Pasha has consequently despatched, or has nearly completed, for the protection of the coast of Syria, two naval divisions, consisting together, of—

D A



many Oriental as well as European languages, and re-estimated as a man of very considerable talents.

Mehemet Ali spoke calmly, freely, and with confidence, of the affairs of Syria. He assured me that no great revolution was occasioned by a number of his orders. He said that wanting to equip his National Guards at Cairo, and knowing that there were consular depots of arms at St. Jean d'Acre, he had written a command to the Pasha to supply him. But it never the order was not understood, or the Governor refused to deliver his fortress of part of its munitions. He said he had begun to make good the requisition by demanding of the Syrian mountaineers the restoration of those arms with which they had been formerly entrusted—a measure which the Pasha said he had never contemplated.

The Viceroy informed me, that he received news of the insurrection at about half a year before, to Cairo, and that at first he had "dismissed the Nile" steam-vessels with despatches to the Emir Bechir, directing him to obey no one in the mean time, as he had resolved to proceed to Syria, and would take the important command in person. His Highness added, that subsequent intelligence had been of so tranquilizing a nature as to induce him to change his original purpose, and that he should now send, in his stead, a general Ibrahim Pasha with proper instructions for restoring the disturbed provinces to tranquillity.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No 733

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)

No. 51)

My Lord,

Alexandria, June 17, 1840.

IN connexion with as much of my despatch, No. 48, of the 6th instant, as relates to the affairs of Syria, I have now the honour to narrate the subsequent facts I have acquired.

On the 5th of June, the Pasha quitted this city for Cairo, where he arrived about 10 o'clock, a. m. of the 7th. During his voyage an express arrived from the Pasha of the Syrian coast, with a report that a body of 2,000 Arnauts and Turks, quartered near the city, was ordered to march to the revolted country, but they were countermanded shortly after, the Pasha having received satisfactory advice from Syria.

In the mean time, the "Nile" steam-vessel which I sent to the 7th inst. at 10 o'clock, a. m., of the same day, the Viceroy reached Cairo.

It was also on the 7th of June the French corvette of war, the "Agate" which had been in this port since last March was sent to visit the Syrian coast from St. Jean d'Acre to Latakia, after which she will probably return to this place.

About the same time, a naval division was ordered to be ready for service by the 20th inst. and to consist of the following ships:—It was to be commanded by Mustapha Bey, and to be thus composed:—

<i>Frigates</i> ..	Menoufich,	<i>Corvettes</i> ..	Tantah.
	Rechal,		Genna-Bahari.
	Behere,	<i>Brig</i> ..	Temaah.
	Sergehad,		
	Damietta.		

I believe that the whole or greater portion of these ships have been sailed. At the same time, a body of 2,000 Arnauts and Turks, quartered near the city, was ordered to march to the revolted country, but they were countermanded shortly after, the Pasha having received satisfactory advice from Syria. I do not know, had been received by the Egyptian Government, that the mountaineers of Lebanon had raised the Russian flag.

The Viceroy left Cairo on the morning of the 12th instant and reached Alexandria at 8 o'clock, a. m. of the 13th.

The Nile steam-vessel, I returned from Beyrout the night previous to the Pasha's arrival. At the same time, news reached Alexandria of the death of the Sultan's daughter, and of the death of the Emir Bechir. The Pasha was not at all surprised, and his wife and children were not at all affected by the news.

The Pasha, who reached the city on the 12th inst., was not at all surprised by the news of the death of the Emir Bechir, and he was not at all affected by the news. He said that the revolt was less compact and formidable than at first imagined.

From the commencement, it was fully believed that the fate of Syria depended on the part which might be taken by the Emir Bechir, Prince of Mount Lebanon. He now appears to have declared wholly for the Pasha, and to insure his fidelity, I am assured that with some plausible pretext, the Emir has been surrounded by a guard of 800 Egyptians devoted to Ibrahim Pasha. These are with him in his palace of Bet el-Dyn, near Deir-el-Ghamar. It appears, however, that the old Emir, who has a son Emir Emin, who is a General of Division in the Viceroy's army, have been active in assembling those who still remain faithful to Mehemet Ali, and that they will exert their efforts in quelling the rising insurrection.

News has reached me that, on the outbreak of the present insurrection, the French Consul at Damascus wrote to the Emir Bechir, proposing to him that M. Cochelet, the French Consul at Alexandria, should be named to mediate between the Viceroy and the insurrection. The Emir Bechir has only by some compliments and then went on nearly as follows:— "You greatly mistake the cause of the disturbances which have taken place. They are originated by some abandoned characters of Deir-el-Ghamar, or Cammar, who have been joined by all sorts of vagabonds, who act without justice, without object, and without order. My desire for peace accords entirely with the interest of the Egyptian Government. In conjunction with that Government, and by the aid of God, I hope soon to force the disorderly into subjection and to restore good order. I have advised all the honest population of the mountains not to meddle with these wicked people. I am grateful for your offer and thank you for it, as I find it a proof of your friendship."

It is true that two of the sons of the Emir Bechir, the Emirs Choum and Hach, were reported to be hostile to the Egyptian authority, and it is also true that the Emir Mahmoud, one of his grandsons, had even sent a message to the Emir Bechir, advising him to take advantage of the present insurrection, and to seize the opportunity to become independent.

It is a little difficult to state with certainty the precise condition of affairs in Syria, since those residing in that country, and who are obliged duty it is to use the utmost activity in collecting and forwarding to me information, have been very remiss in that particular.

If Mehemet Ali may be credited, who has asserted the facts to myself and to others of my Colleagues, the mountaineers have returned to their homes and occupations, and only a portion of rebels are in arms between Tripoli and Latakia.

But, probably, the safest documents from which conjectures may be derived of the more recent phases of the revolt are, first, the very politic letter already cited from the Emir Bechir to the French Consul in Damascus; and, secondly, a despatch of the 10th instant, from M. Gherkman, Austrian Consul at Beyrout, and obligingly communicated to me by M. de Laurin.

It would appear from this despatch, that his Excellency Soliman Pasha had marched from Saida against the inhabitants of Lebanon, but that the Emir Bechir had earnestly entreated him to forbear from pushing his troops into the mountains, and that the General had consented, with the proviso that the insurgents should return to their villages and give up their arms.

The Emir Bechir is reported to have also addressed his Highness Ibrahim Pasha on the same subject, and the answer of the Generalissimo

is quoted as follows:—"If your Excellency can become guarantee of tranquillity, I agree to your request, and a plenary pardon shall be granted. The peasants must demand. If they cannot, at present, pay taxes, let them say when they will be in a condition to do so. They may keep their arms, if your Excellency thinks that they will not abuse the concession."

"If what I have proposed is sufficient to quell the revolt, you may tell Solymán Pasha to send back the troops to Acre; but if otherwise, let them march on Deir-el-Ghannar."

M. Gherkman adds, that it was hoped that these concessions would calm the Maronites for the moment; but that the Druses and Mutahs were still full of dissatisfaction.

It is at least certain, that the most prompt and energetic measures have been taken by the Egyptian Authorities to crush the present rising. What troops have been sent against the rebels I do not know precisely, further than that two regiments had left Acre for that purpose. Solymán Pasha seems to command the repressing division. It is certain that the Egyptians have sent a large force into Syria, that they can, with the utmost facility, sweep any number of insurgents from the champaign countries. Whether they can do this easily, push into the mountains is another question; but they can blockade those mountains, and starve the crowded population into submission. Lebanon produces little or no corn, and imports nearly all its consumables. The above measure of coercion was instantly adopted by Solymán Pasha, as your Lordship will perceive by his inclosed orders to the Governor of Beyrout, who, on the 1st instant, communicated them to the Foreign Consuls now in that town.

I remark that many persons who have travelled in Syria, and some consular officers residing there, express their suspicion that the actual revolt will have no other results or termination than those which attended previous attempts of the same nature. This, I presume, is also the opinion of the Viceroy, for he manifests neither irresolution, uncertainty, or anxiety.

My letters from our Consul at Damascus, assure me that the Catholic Greek patriarch, with his Bishops and Clergy, have been active in fomenting the revolt and promoting its objects. It is also my duty to inform your Lordship, that in a late audience I had of his Highness the Viceroy, he hinted, with a smile, that certain Consuls of Great Britain, Austria, and Sardinia, had intrigued against him in the late disturbances, and he seemed to intimate that these circumstances would give occasion to future official communications. I assured his Highness, as I may your Lordship, of my utter ignorance of any such occurrences as those to which he alluded.

I have only to add, that I have given information of recent events to Admiral Sir John Louis, and that I have suggested the possible expediency of sending one of Her Majesty's ships of war to the coast of Syria, for the protection of British subjects and property. On the latter subject Mr Consul M... has also addressed the Viceroy from Beyrout.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES

Inclosure in No. 733

Solymán Pasha to the Governor of Beyrout

(Translation)

GIACCHÉ gli abitanti della montagna dei Drusi generalmente, si sono sollevati in ribellione vale adunque che alla ricezione di questa mia notificatione, non che a quella che sarà loro spedita, abbiano disposto l'esportazione per mare, alle scale di Giuné, Gibul e Battirun, ed egualmente per qualunque via per terra, al monte Libano generalmente, specialmente l'imbarco di granaglie ed altre provviste alle dette scale.

Se per trasgressione al presente Ordine si trovasse dei bastimenti, &c., diretti per quelli porti è necessario immediatamente romperli e farli andar a fondo, senza il minimo esito. Che l'avviso vi Serva

Circular from the Governor of Beyrout to the Representatives of the European Powers, communicating the preceding Order.

1 Rebi Akhir, 1256, (1 Giugno, 1840)

HO ricevuto il presente Ordine di sua Eccellenza il Maggior Generale Solymán Pasha, di cui avete copia acciòché prendiate la dovuta conoscenza ed in conseguenza vi compiaciati d'avvertire, da parte vostra i negozianti e capitani sotto la vostra giurisdizione per l'effetto.

(Firmato) MAHMUD BEY,  
Governatore

No. 734

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 52.)

Alexandria, June 17, 1840

My Lord

I OBTAINED information on the 15th instant that a second naval division had received orders to victual for three months, and to make ready, with the utmost expedition, to proceed to the coast of Syria. It will be composed as follows:—

		Tons	Men
Ship of the Line, No. 8,	Bedlan	80	1000
	Nararat	71	750
	Nararat	64	600
	Kaid Zafar	50	550
	Serie	50	550
Frigates	Mirat Zafar	41	562
	Naoun Bahari	50	600
	Hafa Bahman	61	620
	Nazim Zafar	52	550
	Shehab Bahary	44	550
Corvette	Misri Ferah	26	270

It is remarkable that all the above ships, except the first, belong to the Turkish squadron. The captains and junior officers will however be Egyptians, and the crews will be composed in equal numbers of Arabs and Turks.

The Turkish ships will be under the orders of Osman Bey, formerly fifth admiral (Raisa Bey) and now promoted to the rank of fourth admiral (Patrona Bey). He is son of the second admiral of the Turkish squadron and with his father and one other officer is known to have induced the Capudan Pasha, Ahmed Fevzi, to betray his trust into the power of Mehmet Ali.

It is reported that the whole maritime force on the coast of Syria will consist of—

- 1 Ship of the Line,
- 15 Frigates,
- 3 Schooners,
- 1 Brig.

It has also been determined to place on board the ships now preparing, and probably for the defence of various ports on the Syrian coast—

2 Regiments of Turkish Marines	8,400 men
2 Regiments of Egyptian Regular Infantry	6,400 "
	12,800 "



These troops will be thus distributed for transport. The Turks will sail in the "Beilan," as well as in three Egyptian frigates of the first division, which had not yet taken their departure; and the Egyptians will proceed on board the Turkish ships. The Turkish Marines will be under the orders of Hassan Bey, formerly a Colonel in the Sultan's fleet, and now raised to the rank of Brigadier-General.

His Highness Abbas Pasha, grandson of the Viceroy is expected to arrive from Cairo to-morrow, and will embark in the "Beilan" on his way to Syria, where he is to occupy a high command. The character ascribed to Abbas Pasha is that of cruelty and unrelenting severity.

These accounts of the armament differ in some minute particulars from those indicated in my despatch No. 49; but I presume that this discrepancy results from some alterations in the original dispositions.

The large naval force which the Pasha is despatching to Syria naturally excites attention, and awakens conjectures as to its objects.

It is obvious that ships can avail little in a war with mountaineers fighting from their fastnesses; and it is known that three Egyptian corvettes and three schooners of the fleet were already stationed at Beyrout. I do not either perceive that the Viceroy entertains any serious fears or doubts of being able to cope with the insurgents; but I am inclined to think that two motives may have induced the measures under my consideration, and presented them to the Pasha as necessary precautions.

1st. Possibly the information which the Viceroy has received, that various Consuls of Foreign Powers, and the body of the Greek Catholic clergy have intrigued against his authority in the late disturbances, may have inspired in his mind a suspicion, that either the Sublime Porte or some of her Allies may seek to take advantage of his existing difficulties for attempting a descent on the Syrian coast.

2nd. Mehemet Ali is perhaps of opinion that his present warlike attitude and his display of force, as well as the show of being at all points prepared for defence, may be useful supports to the negotiations for an arrangement of the Egyptian question which now occupy the thoughts of his Highness, and which constitute the main object of the recent mission of Sami Bey to Constantinople.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 735

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 53.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, June 17, 1840

HAVING yesterday morning received some information which led me to believe that Sami Bey, to whom and to whose intended voyage to Constantinople I alluded in my despatch, No. 50, of the 17th instant, was about to be charged by his Highness the Viceroy with a most important mission to the Sublime Porte, I thought it expedient to verify what I had heard from the lips of Mehemet Ali himself.

Accompanied by M. de Laurin, Consul-General for Austria, I waited on the Pasha in the evening. I was welcomed in the name of his Highness, and received with marked distinction and cordiality.

The Viceroy informed me, that Sami Bey would next morning proceed to Constantinople by an express steam-packet; that he had charged his envoy with his congratulations to the Sultan on the birth of a daughter, and in consequence of the same happy event Sami Bey would be bearer of a complimentary present to His Imperial Majesty of 2,000 purses (£10,000).

Mehemet Ali added, that Sami Bey was besides charged to inform the Sultan, that the former Grand Vizier, Hosrow Pasha, having been dismissed from office, his Highness the Pasha was now prepared to abide by his former promises, and to restore the Turkish squadron, so soon as

His Imperial Majesty should please to express his pleasure whether his fleet should be sent to him under command of the Viceroy's own son, Said Bey, or of the Pasha's Admiral, Mutash Pasha.

The French Consul-General had an audience of the Viceroy as early as 7 o'clock A.M. of the 16th instant, but I have every reason to conclude that he had no participation whatever in the recent resolutions.

It is not for me to speculate on the above important declaration of his Highness Mehemet Ali, but I ought, perhaps to state, that neither the opinion of those longest acquainted with him, nor my own observations of his character, induce in me a belief that the restoration of the Turkish fleet is likely to be entirely unconditional, or will be effected without something like a certainty of corresponding advantages. His Highness has probably already prepared the way for an arrangement with the Sublime Porte. No doubt Sami Bey, and the partisans of Mehemet Ali, will employ with skill the powerful engines of influence and guile in a youthful, manly, and corrupt court, with which both the Pasha and his agents are thoroughly acquainted.

In the mean time, the Turkish fleet is not given up; and your Lordship, when I refer to my despatch No. 52 of the 14th inst., may be assured that his Highness is conversing the ships and crews of that squadron.

It is a very oppressive and the remark of others, that the interest Mehemet Ali seems occupied by some great and important purpose, the nature of which time will develop.

In the mean time, I may notice an interesting fact, which will probably have some influence in guiding your Lordship's conjectures of the aspect which coming events may possibly assume. It was first derived from two of my colleagues; but their account was not precisely accurate, and in the haste with which my despatch, No. 49, forwarded by the French steam-packet, was prepared, I fear that I had not perfectly understood the circumstances, so that I have perhaps represented them somewhat erroneously.

Since then, however, I have obtained the particulars from his Highness the Viceroy himself, in one of my recent audiences. The words of Mehemet Ali were these: "The wife of Ahmed Fera Pasha resides in Constantinople, and lately received from the Sultana-Mother a letter which I have had in my hands. It runs thus: 'My dear friend,—Tell me of the health of your husband, and where he is. Let me know what he had done with the fleet; what are his wishes; and what his sentiments towards his Sultan. I send you a little money for your present necessities.'"

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 736.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 55.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, June 19, 1840

THE Egyptian steam-vessel, "Nile," returned to this port from Beyrout yesterday morning, and in the evening I again and then went waiting on the Viceroy.

His Highness informed me that his steamer had brought him news that the insurrection in Syria continued precisely in the same condition as when the former advices had left that country. He said that none remained in arms except the Maronites, and that he would very soon find means for bringing them to reason. He repeated again and again that when I had before assigned very limited credit to the Maronites, he offered to march against the rebels, but that, not feeling much confidence in such auxiliaries, he had declined their proposal.

I observed to Mehemet Ali, that the large naval armament he was

sending to the coast of Syria must necessarily create astonishment in Europe, and possibly alarm; that ships could not avail much in a war of the mountains; and that I trusted he would see the expediency of informing me of his objects, since this measure was likely to be misinterpreted. The Pasha answered, that troops, whose presence was required in Syria, were about to be sent there, and that the naval force was merely destined for their transport. His Highness pledged his word, most solemnly, that so soon as the Syrian revolt should be quelled, the vessels sent to that coast should return to Alexandria.

The Viceroy continued, "intriguers have been active in Syria. You and I shall have to speak of that hereafter. As to my business with the Porte, it will end quietly. All is on the eve of being settled."

I assured his Highness, that nothing would give me higher satisfaction than to see such a just and amicable arrangement made with the Porte, as might be consonant with the wishes and policy of the Great European Powers. At the same time, I remarked, that on this question I had not received any new instructions from Her Majesty's Government.

Mehemet Ali said, "It is neither from your Government nor from European Powers that I derive any assurance that my differences with the Porte are near their termination; it is from Constantinople. Now," he pursued, "I will tell you the whole matter—"

"When the late Sultan died, Hosrew Pasha possessed himself of the Imperial Signet, as much by force as by fraud. He also induced the young Sultan to address to him a letter deprecating the mental capacity of women, and censuring their interference in political affairs. By such means he obtained the support of the Sultan's Mother. She, however, had her party—a strong party. They persevered and succeeded in depriving Hosrew of the Signet. Between the young Sultan and the Pasha, the latter was dismissed. Hosrew had all along purposed to fill the vacant post of Serasker by one of his own wives. Finding himself successfully opposed in this attempt, and that Mustapha Pasha was to succeed him, the Grand Vizier at last perceived his danger. The Sultan was struck with the facility with which the head of the army had been overthrown. The example was not lost on his mind; and having always been adversely disposed to the Grand Vizier, he began to reflect on the comparative ease with which he might rid himself of an old man, now abandoned by all parties. Hosrew fell, and others will fall with him.

"Abdul Medjid has expressed his desire to put an end to our discussions; and as I seek nothing but justice, these discussions will be terminated with equity to me, and with benefit to the Sultan."

The Viceroy then repeated to me the facts already mentioned in my despatch No. 53, of the 17th June, respecting the letters sent by the Sultan's Mother to the wife of Ahmed Ferit Pasha; and his Highness terminated by saying, "I leave you now to form your own conclusions."

I have, &c.,

(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 737

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 56)

My Lord,

Alexandria, June 19, 1840.

THE Russian Consul-General, Count Medem, has just related to me the circumstances of an interview he had this morning with his Highness Mehemet Ali, and they appear to me of sufficient interest to merit the attention of your Lordship.

In conversing on the mission of Sami Bey to Constantinople, Count Medem inquired whether that Envoy had full powers to conclude an arrangement with the Sublime Porte, without ulterior reference to his

Highness. The Viceroy answered, that he had not; but that Sami Bey would report to him the fate of his propositions, and would await new instructions at Constantinople, unless the Sublime Porte should judge it expedient to send itself a Plenipotentiary to Alexandria.

Count Medem next put to the Viceroy the closest and most pressing queries, with the object of ascertaining whether his Highness purposed to restore the fleet unconditionally; and the Count even asked him, hypothetically, whether he would still maintain that intention in the event of Sami Bey failing in his negotiations?

The Pasha seemed piqued at these doubts, and said that, "for the word of Mehemet Ali," the Turkish fleet should be rendered to the Porte, whether Sami Bey succeeded in his mission or the reverse. He told Count Medem, that myself and others had put to him the same questions though not so roughly, and that he had given all the same reply; that Hosrew Pasha having been removed from power; he (Mehemet Ali) was now prepared to abide by his former promises of giving up the Turkish fleet on provision of the event should be decided.

In talking of a settlement of the Egyptian Question, which the Pasha seemed to consider settled, he spoke of Egypt and Syria as one State indissolubly linked together under his dominion and that of his family. Adana, he thought, would probably be yielded to him for life, and so too Candia. But as regarded the latter, the Viceroy observed that it would not be the wish of either England or Turkey to take it from his hands. He declared that the Sublime Porte in particular, well knows that such an event would soon be followed by the island acquiring an independence, and that if Sami Bey or any other person should be sent to Greece, as for Arabia, continued Mehemet Ali, they may do with it whatever they please. The Pasha cannot give up Arabia, as he has sworn Turkey will be perpetually holding by its own hand, and will make in that country, which of necessity must fall as much as ever under my authority.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 738.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 5.)

No. 61)

Alexandria, June 20, 1840.

My Lord,

12 o'clock, P.M.

BEFORE the closing of the mails, I have only a few moments in which to report briefly to your Lordship the latest information.

The ships of the naval force mentioned in my late despatches left the port during yesterday morning.

A letter of the 17th instant from Cairo, mentions the departure for the coast of 2,000 irregular Albanian troops, called down by a telegraphic order.

My latest Syrian news is from Jaffa, and is dated the 12th instant. It was then reported in that place, that the force under Solyman Pasha had returned to Saida, unable to approach the mountains. An export of grain from Jaffa was prohibited. The insurgents had seized the corn-mills near Saida and Beyroul, and had attacked the quarantine of the latter port.

The latest accounts from Arabia assert that the evacuation of that country by the troops of Mehemet Ali, had been countermanded by the Egyptian Government; that Kourschid Pasha was at Djidda, and Ahmed Pasha still between Mecca and Medina.

Inclosed is a species of manifesto widely circulated in St. Jean d'Acre, and other towns in that vicinity. It is understood that it proceeds from

G. C.



the Viceroy, although it is not invested with any official form. It seems well enough calculated for the limited intelligence of an uneducated population

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES

Inclosure in No. 738

*Translation of a Manifesto or Proclamation circulated largely in St. Jean d'Acre and other cities of Syria. It has no signature, but is believed to be published by order of His Highness the Viceroy of Egypt*

*The following are the preparations of Mehemet Ali for war*

THE fleets of the Sublime Porte and that of his Highness the Pasha, being united, amount to twenty-one line-of-battle ships, and nine large frigates. This being the Viceroy's force by sea may be compared with that of England, which consists of twelve or fourteen ships, unless indeed they shall hereafter add to that number. We shall also see what steps the French, in the meantime, will take.

Mehemet Ali states that he has no fear of being attacked at St. Jean d'Acre, while his fleet exists, for that no troops could force a landing on the coast so long as they shall not have a superior force in ships to protect their disembarkation. Necessity alone will decide between him and the above-mentioned Power.

This current report the Pasha circulates to the population. He adds, that he has no fear of the British forces, for he states that he respects the character of the English for their justice, but that they have no respect for him. Still he hopes that the world will make them respect him.

Ibrahim Pasha has troops enough to meet the Russians on the banks of the Euphrates. He possesses 80,000 men, besides having the addition of 25,000 men from the neighbourhood of the above river. Thus, if the Russians do meet him with an equal force, they cannot beat him. Even should they exceed that amount, he hopes to send them the same journey as he did formerly the Turkish troops.

In addition to all this, Mehemet Ali fully assures himself of the assistance of Ibrahim Pasha, and says that when Ibrahim Pasha and Soliman Pasha fight in company, they must always conquer.

In the mean time, he makes known to the population, that all the Mohammedan people will fight en masse for their religion. This has already been clearly known to the English, Russian, and Austrian Powers. Even supposing that the French will not assist the Pasha, he will also let them know that he is to be respected.

The Viceroy and his sons are determined to die as soldiers. They separate political from religious principles. The Pasha has already written a constitution to the Sublime Porte, proposing to return the Holy Land and some parts of Syria. These terms were refused on the ground that all Syria would not be yielded.

No. 739

*Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty*

My Lords,

Foreign Office, July 7, 1840

WITH reference to the letter from your Lordships' Secretary of the 3th of July, inclosing a copy of a despatch from Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, dated the 26th of June, and stating the measures which he had

adopted in consequence of the accounts which he had received of an insurrection having broken out in parts of Syria against the Egyptian authorities; I am to suggest to your Lordships, that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford should be cautioned so to shape the measures he may take for protecting British interests, as not thereby to give support to Mehemet Ali.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 740

*Cheikh Effendi to Viscount Palmerston.*

*Le 7 Juillet, 1840.*

LE Soussigné, Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire de la Sublime Porte, vient d'apprendre que Mehemet Ali Pacha d'Egypte, a annoncé l'intention de renvoyer à Constantinople la flotte de Sa Hauteuse, dans le but d'ouvrir par cette offre la voie à des négociations directes avec le Divan.

Le Soussigné se fait en conséquence un devoir de communiquer à votre Excellence Lord Palmerston le jugement qu'il porte sur cet incident.

Il a la ferme persuasion que Sa Hauteuse le Sultan ayant réclamé et obtenu la promesse d'un appui efficace de la part des Grandes Puissances, persistera dans sa résolution d'attendre l'effet de l'assistance amicale des Cabinets amis, et n'entrera point en négociation directe avec le Pacha d'Egypte, tant que l'amitié des Grandes Puissances lui fait espérer une solution satisfaisante de la crise actuelle. Il est convaincu de plus, que les offres de Mehemet Ali, sans promettre aucun résultat positif, n'ont d'autre but que de compliquer la négociation, de trainer l'affaire en longueur, et de provoquer des retards qu'il se flatte de pouvoir tourner à son profit et au profit de la Sublime Porte.

Dans cette persuasion, le Soussigné se fait un devoir d'adresser à Son Excellence Lord Palmerston la prière de ne différer d'aucune manière les délibérations actuellement ouvertes à Londres, et de n'attendre aucun résultat des propositions directement faites par Mehemet Ali. Loin de là, le Soussigné invite, avec une nouvelle instance, le Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique de hâter autant que possible les déterminations qui devront être prises afin d'en venir à un arrangement conforme à la sécurité de la Porte, comme à la dignité des Grandes Puissances qui ont promis leur appui à Sa Hauteuse le Sultan.

Le moment actuel semble être décisif pour en venir à un arrangement satisfaisant. Mehemet Ali sentant les chances de sa position, cherche à en sortir de manière à transiger directement avec la Porte et à écarter par là l'intervention des Grandes Puissances. Celles-ci, étant sincèrement amies du Sultan, ne sauraient se laisser induire en erreur par cette politique perfide de Mehemet Ali. Aussi le perdre les temps précieux en délibérations trop prolongées, elles doivent au contraire en venir promptement à une décision; convenir entre elles de concert avec le Représentant de Sa Hauteuse, les conditions à imposer à Mehemet Ali, et concerter d'avance les moyens nécessaires pour obliger celui-ci à se soumettre à cet arrangement que les Puissances Amies auront reconnu comme juste et comme irrévocable.

C'est la marche que le Soussigné se fait un devoir de signaler à l'attention du Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique comme celle qui peut seule conduire à un résultat prompt et utile. Chaque heure de retard menace la Sublime Porte d'un danger irréparable.

C'est dans cet état de choses que le Soussigné croit devoir faire un nouvel appel à l'amitié et à la sagesse du Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique, pour le conjurer de mettre immédiatement un terme à l'incertitude qui pèse sur l'Empire Ottoman, et dont il ne saurait plus longtemps supporter le poids.

Le Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique, de concert avec les autres Puissances, a permis son départ et son assistance à Sa Hautesse le Sultan. C'est l'accomplissement de cette promesse que le Soussigné vient reconnaître avec une pleine confiance dans la loyauté et dans la prévoyance de l'ouvernement Anglais, qui se permettrait point que Méhémet Ali par des faux-fuyants et par de perfides efforts, parvienne à éluder aujourd'hui la conclusion d'une affaire à laquelle tient le sort de l'Empire Ottoman.

Méhémet Ali, lorsqu'il saura que les Puissances, de concert avec la Porte, ont arrêté un plan de pacification dans la forme résoutue de le mettre à exécution, se tairait peut-être, et l'affaire se terminerait sans provoquer la moindre secousse. Mais tant que Méhémet Ali verra les Puissances se résoudre à prolonger sa résistance, agitera dans l'intention de ne point concéder et cherchera ainsi par ses propres moyens, à ébranler l'Empire Ottoman d'une manière plus dangereuse encore que par la force des armes.

C'est sur ce perfide système de Méhémet Ali que le Soussigné se fait un devoir d'appeler l'attention la plus sérieuse du Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique, en réclamant instamment une décision immédiate et définitive.

Le Soussigné a l'honneur, &c.,  
(Signed) CHEKIB

No. 741.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.

(No. 11.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 10, 1840.

I TRANSMIT herewith for your information, a copy of a Note which I have received from Chekib Effendi, the Turkish Ambassador at this Court, relative to the differences between the Porte and Mehemet Ali.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON

No. 742

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Retained July 12.)

No. 125. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord,

Smyrna, June 23, 1840

IT cannot fail to be agreeable to your Lordship to see the enclosed letters from Lord Francis Egerton and Lord Alvanley, giving an account of Syria, and the late occurrences there.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 742

Lord Francis Egerton to Viscount Ponsonby.

My dear Lord,

Smyrna, June 15, 1840

SHOULD a letter and inclosure of mine have reached you, you may be prepared for the present, as I then proposed, on my quitting Syria, to write any particulars which might appear to be worth your trouble to read respecting things in that quarter. I had expected to have any events to communicate, but the Pasha has supplied me with an interest-

tion. I first heard of it on the 26th last, when I was in Lebanon; and coming down on Beyrout two days afterwards, found the Quarantine Cordon driven in, and the mountaineers in possession of the country up to the gates. It has originated in an attempt to tax, disarm, and conscript the Christian population, hitherto exempt, and whom he armed and employed last year for the subjection of the Druse and Haouran rebels. It has spread up to the gates through the whole range of Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon; and, I believe, to Naplouse and the hill districts near Jerusalem, and probably the Haouran.

Those who know the country, and the history of similar recent occurrences, seem to consider this as the most formidable specimen which has appeared. The best evidence of its being so is, that Ibrahim has ordered his agents to concede every point in question. The Emir Bechir's son came down with a message of this description to the head-quarters of the revolt near Beyrout, but was ill received, and the leaders replied that they could place no faith in any assurances not guaranteed by Foreign Powers. I, however, heard of no hostilities beyond some trifling skirmishing outside of Beyrout, and some attempts on Sidon, where, I believe, Soliman Pasha, who went out himself, found the Mutasils too strong to attack. The Emir Bechir supports the Pasha as yet in appearance, but I do not think his influence keeps back much of the population from the revolt.

On the 11th, a French corvette and an Austrian frigate we met on her way there from Cyprus. I sent an outline of the particulars, written during the ten days we have stopped at Seio, to the Admiral, whom we found lying there with the squadron. Whether he will think it worth while to forward it, I cannot tell. It seems to me that if the revolt continue, it may affect the whole Eastern Question. On the said question, God forbid that I should carry my coals to your Newcastle. With regard to Syria itself, I cannot help saying that I can conceive no national sin greater than that of assisting in any avoidable manner to rivet the abominable system of European oppression which, under Mehemet and Ibrahim's European-Asiatic system, is desolating and depopulating every district of that country it can reach.

As a traveller, I have no grievance beyond living in fear of my life from the Egyptian soldiery at Jerusalem. Mr. Young's situation there is one of embarrassment, amounting to danger. You will perhaps consider my news from Syria as those of a person unaccustomed to witness the working of Asiatic Governments in general. All that I can vouch for is, that if the country had been governed by Alfred or Antoninus Pius, their restoration could hardly more be desired than a change of any description now is by all sects or classes.

I am myself bound up by quarantine newly enforced, and to escape from the quarantine I have taken an Austrian coast watch conveyed me here, to take me to-morrow to Athens.

Believe me, &c.,  
(Signed) F. EGERTON

Inclosure 2 in No. 742

Lord Alvanley to Viscount Ponsonby

Dear Lord Ponsonby,

Smyrna, June 16, 1840

I HAD written to you from Beyrout, inclosing a letter from the Père Ralli to the General, and giving you an account of a very serious insurrection which had just broken out in the whole of Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon. This letter I sent on board Admiral Louis's ship which was at Seio, in hopes that he would forward it immediately to you by a steamer; but as I could not communicate with him personally, in consequence of the steamer in which I was being unable to wait for me, and it is possible that he may not do so, I think it better to write to you



About the 25th of May it was known in the mountain, that Ibrahim Pasha had made the following demands of the Emir Bechir—First, the 16,000 stand of arms that had been given to the mountaineers last year, in order to keep in check the inhabitants of Damascus, the Hauran, and the Druses, and which had been solemnly given them in perpetuity; secondly, a certain number of years in advance of all the imposts; and thirdly, a conscription of 16,000 men to be taken indiscriminately from Christians and others. On receiving this order, the Emir Bechir communicated it to the different Emirs and Sheiks, and sent his Cawasses to put that part of it relating to the arms into execution; this was very feebly enforced, and universally resisted; and a general insurrection broke out through the whole mountain. The first overt act was at Jaida, where Solyman Pasha was living. The mountaineers surrounded the town, and demanded the arms that were in it; these being refused, they cut off the water for a day or two, but turned it on again, in order not to distress the inhabitants, and have since contented themselves with keeping up a strict blockade, and allowing no Egyptian or Turk to go in or out.

On the road from Beyrout to Damascus, they began by stopping the Bagdad mail on the 28th of May, and taking the letters belonging to the Government, the merchants' money and European letters they returned to Mr Moore; and on the 29th, after disarming sixteen of the Pasha's soldiers who were joining their regiment, they marched in considerable force and surrounded Beyrout; here they took post on the principal points of access to the port, and the city, and the country from within from being ground at the mills which are on the outside. This state of things continued until the 11th, when I left the place. They occasionally skirmished with some Albanians who were in the Lazaretto; and now and then one of the three Egyptian sloops of war dropped down and fired a few shots at them. So much for the active operations. In the mean time, an account of what had happened having been sent to Mehemet Ali, he despatched his steam-frigate in the greatest haste, with orders to Solyman Pasha to communicate with the Emir Bechir, and immediately withdraw the obnoxious requisitions. This was done; and on the 8th, the Emir's eldest son came down to the insurgents in order to announce to them the Pasha's intentions. At first they refused to receive him, and it is said, fired on him; but at last they heard what he had to say, and then replied by a remarkably clear and firm statement of their grievances, with which they were in full accord. In this paper, which I suppose Mr Moore has sent you, they recapitulate all the various oppressions that have been inflicted on them; put forward their services last year in a very modest manner; and conclude, by respectfully, but distinctly, refusing to consent to any accommodation, or to lay down their arms, without the guarantee of England or France. Thus stands the matter at present, and as I have travelled quite through the country since the insurrection began, and have had communication with all classes on the subject, I feel confident in my own mind that this is not a mere effervescence or momentary fit of anger at oppression, but a deep and rooted determination to shake off the intolerable yoke of the Pasha's government. Christians of all the sects are now joined with the Druses, and the most solemn pledges of fidelity to each other have been given by both sides. The enthusiasm is general; and as soon as it was known that I was an Englishman, when I arrived in a village, I was surrounded by the population, and declarations most flattering to our country made to me. What is wanted most is an English and Turkish emissary, the former bringing with him a flag of truce, and the latter an Ottoman flag, to be addressed to the Emir Bechir, and to all the other Emirs of influence on the mountain, and a special one should be kept in reserve for the Emir Bechir's eldest son, in case the old man should, from fear, refuse to accept of the offer. The English agent's presence would give support to the Emir's position, and the Ottoman flag would be a guarantee for immediately that that fact was known, the Hauran, the Druses, and indeed the whole country would rise, for such is the extreme

tyranny and horrible treatment of all classes, that I was uniformly told that the only thing they wanted for, previous to doing so, was some proof that England would support them. A Bedouin Sheik of importance, suspecting that I was an English agent, offered me 2,000 men on horseback to go from the Hauran to any part of the coast, to enter the land and bring across arms which he hoped we had there. A thousand instances of the same kind happened, and the disaffection is universal. In the mean time, the Pasha's army is eighteen months in arrears of pay, and in a very turbulent state, and the country where the insurrection is in force is impracticable for regular troops with Artillery and Cavalry, even if they were in good order. A firman proclaiming an exemption of Syria from three or four years taxes and conscription would have great effect, and one dissolving the Syrian army, and ordering the soldiers to return to their homes, might, as I am informed, be easily promulgated through it.

I have now told you what first presents itself to my mind; I shall be at Constantinople as soon as I get out of quarantine here, and if you could use your influence to get it shortened a few days for me, I should the sooner have the pleasure of telling you this long story personally.

Believe me, &c.

(Signed) ALVANLEY

No 743.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 12.)

N<sup>o</sup> 126

My Lord

Therapia, June 23, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of my letter to Rear-Admiral Sir John Louis, of which I have sent a copy to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford at Malta.

I have &c.

(Signed) PONSONBY

Inclosure in No. 743

Viscount Ponsonby to Admiral Sir John Louis

Sir,

Therapia, June 23, 1840.

I KNOW you have been made acquainted with the insurrection in Syria, and, therefore, it is unnecessary that I should trouble you with details; and I proceed to state that I have been officially called upon by Her Majesty's Consul at Beyrout to request the Commanders of Her Majesty's ships of war that there is need for the protection of British vessels to guard against the danger to which the interests, &c. of Her Majesty's subjects are exposed in that town, &c.

I have, in consequence, the honour to apply to you to furnish that support which is necessary, and I venture to observe, that the protection, to be of use, should be immediate.

I have further to state my opinion, that the present is an occasion for settling the affairs of this country, which ought not to be let slip, and that the countenance which Her Majesty's ships can give to the oppressed Syrians, in their endeavours to throw off the tyrannical yoke of the Egyptian Government, ought to be afforded. I express this opinion officially and formally. I consider it my duty to declare my opinion; Her Majesty's Admirals alone have authority to act.

I have further to add, that if ships of war shall be sent to Beyrout, the Sublime Porte will send at the same time an Ottoman frigate, which will be, of course, under the protection of Her Majesty's flag against any

attack that may be made upon it by the Egyptians. The object for which the Ottoman frigate will be sent, is to display the Sultan's standard, and thereby to give encouragement to his faithful subjects.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSOMBY

No. 744

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 12.)

(No. 127)

My Lord,

Therapia, June 23, 1840

ALTHOUGH I presume you will have received Mr. Consul Moore's report, I think it right to mention that I have been informed of the formation of a French party in the Lebanon being attempted, and likely to succeed unless counteracted. The desire to extend French influence would sufficiently account for the above; but a consequence of the success in the attempt would be very advantageous, as giving to France a powerful ally in the East. The power derived from the fact that the Pasha owed the preservation of his territories to French assistance, by that force which must belong to whoever has the means of raising at pleasure a formidable opposition to the Government. This, if it be not a motive now, will certainly be felt by the French as the strongest reason for exerting themselves to preserve whatever may be acquired.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) PONSOMBY.

Enclosure in No. 744

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Ponsonby

(Private)

My Lord,

Beirut, June 10, 1840

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of a private letter of the 5th instant, and Alexandria.

A meeting of Christians and Druses, a French and a Syrian, took place at Beirut, and a resolution was passed that they would drive the Egyptians out of Syria. I had this information from a French gentleman who was present.

This morning we have information of the arrival of the "Nile" frigate, and it is said bearing despatches from Fu'ad Bechir. The orders from Egypt are by all means to put a stop to the insurrection by coercion and conciliation. It now remains to be seen whether the insurgents will rest satisfied with any promises from the Viceroy, unless they are guaranteed by an European Power; and I think they will not. They have too often been deceived.

The ink of the Firman guaranteeing to the Christians of Lebanon their arms, was hardly dry before they were called upon to deliver them up, and to furnish conscripts.

We have not above 1,000 troops in this town, and they dare not venture out. The insurgents have again attacked the Lazaretto, with a view of getting the arms which are there; and they meditate an assault on Beyrut also. They are full of ardour, and desire of all things the troops to come out. They are now about 5,000 strong in this neighbourhood. It is supposed for 20,000.

The Franks who rule in the cities are constantly importuned by them for powder and arms, which is their greatest want. Their hope

is that succour will be afforded them from Europe, or at least by the Porte.

I am convinced the French here are endeavouring to form a party in Lebanon; and I know the French Consul has written for ships. I do trust we shall see, at least, a British man-of-war. Were I authorized to give any encouragement to the mountaineers on the part of Her Majesty's Government, I am confident they would implicitly follow any injunctions that might be imposed upon them. They abhor the Egyptians. The French, I am confident, are working to form a party in Syria. The Emir Bechir's exhortations to the insurgents to return to their homes, upon the promise of his obtaining exemption from the conscription, and retention of their arms, have hitherto proved fruitless, and he is himself menaced by them.

June 11.—Last night the Emir Fera, the son of the Emir Bechir, attended a great council at Beirut, about 100 persons were present. He was accompanied by a large number of his followers. He was brought by the Viceroy a general pardon, and a promise of exemption from the conscription, and threatened that if they refused to return to their homes, they would be exterminated.

The Emir Fera was hardly allowed to proceed to his residence, when he was met by a large number of his followers, and the council was continued. A letter from the part of England and France for the Emir Bechir, was so far as it related to the Emir Bechir, I have been able to obtain a copy of this document, which I have had hastily translated, and beg leave to inclose, together with another of a proclamation.

A French corvette is this moment arrived whilst I am writing.

A leading Emir (Emir Bechir of Babda, nephew of the Emir Bechir of Pledin) would bind himself to me to any conditions that the British Government might choose to impose. I have positive proof that the French are doing all in their power to create a party in Lebanon; and unless a counter interest is set up they will succeed.

I beg the favour of your Lordship's kind advice should I be applied to, as I think it certain I shall, to know what the views of England are likely to be in this state of affairs. I consider Egyptian influence at an end in Syria; and if arms and ammunition are supplied, the Pasha's troops will be driven out to a man or massacred.

There are 11,000 stand of arms at Pledin, the residence of the Emir Bechir, who is now in the most critical position. He has attempted to arm a party in favour of the Viceroy, but without success; and the insurgents menace an attack to get possession of these arms.

The Aleppo post, arrived to-day, was stopped by the insurgents; and we hear that the same spirit of revolt exists to the north generally. I do not see how Ibrahim Pasha can move his troops in this direction. The whole district of the coast is now in a state of insurrection. I am, Sir, very respectfully,  
Yours obedient servant,  
J. M. MOORE

The insurgents are close to the town, and I hear their musketry.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) J. M. MOORE

P.S.—I beg to apologize for the hasty translation of the memorial. The document was only received by me this morning. There is not time to make a translation of the proclamation.

\* This proves the falshood of what Mehmet Ali said to Colonel Hodges, and the language the Pasha holds to the Porte.—P



No. 745.

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 12.)*

(No. 128.)

My Lord,

I INCLOSE for your Lordship a communication from a person at Alexandria, who is well acquainted with Mehemet Ali, and who writes what the Pasha wishes to have written.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) **PONSONBY.**

Inclosure in No. 745

*Communication from Alexandria.**Alexandria, le 16 Juin, 1840.*

AUSSITOT que Son Altesse a eu la destitution de Hosrew Pacha, seul personnage de qui elle avait à se méfier, elle a nolisé le bateau à vapeur Toscan, pour l'expédier ad hoc à Constantinople avec un Envoyé qui est Sami Bey, son Secrétaire intime, pour complimenter Sa Hautesse sur la naissance de sa fille et l'entrée du nouveau Maître, et lui offrir ses hommages de soumission et de reconnaissance. Le Pacha a pu se rendre compte de l'usage que les ministres ottomans ont fait de son nom, et mal interprété ses intentions loyales. Nos diplomates d'ici augurent bien de l'issue de cette affaire, et croient que le Pacha, en se montrant si disposé à se mettre à la disposition des escadres, l'armée, les finances, ses enfans, et jusqu'à la personne même du Vice-Roi. Il est à espérer maintenant que la diplomatie de Constantinople agira de manière à conduire les affaires vers une prompte solution, en profitant de la volonté spontanée du Vice-Roi et des bonnes dispositions des nouveaux Ministres Ottomans qui veulent en finir.

No. 746

*Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 12.)*

(No. 129.)

My Lord,

*Therapia, June 23, 1840*

I have not yet heard what has been determined in Council today, and I have no chance of hearing before to-morrow what the Sultan has said to his Ministers. I will therefore send off the messenger, and make my further communication by the Austrian post, which will leave this on the morning of the 25th.

On receipt of the intelligence from Syria I made an appointment with Rechid Pasha for yesterday at noon, and before I left home the Internuncio arrived here, having seen the Pasha on his way from Pera. His Excellency communicated to me all he had heard, which is in substance what has been reported to your Lordship; and he discussed with me the state of affairs, and the mode of proceeding most proper to be adopted by us. We were entirely agreed upon all points, and we went together to Rechid's house, where a long conversation took place; and Rechid stated that the Sultan had lately been influenced by his mother and shown a strong desire to get back his fleet, that Rechid, in answer to the expression of this feeling, had said, "If His Majesty thought the fleet worth the price of Syria and a large portion of his territories, there could be no doubt of his obtaining it at that cost. But that in his opinion the Sultan's loss would not be limited to Syria, and that

concession to Mehemet Ali would place His Majesty in a most perilous situation.

I abstain from reporting the details of the conversation, which ended in the real or apparent assent of the Sultan to the reasonings of the Pasha; but Rechid says he is in dread of the intrigues of the Harem; that the Sultan yields to his Ministers when he is with them, but is again influenced by his mother when he retires. Rechid further said, that old Hosrew and others were indefatigable in their labours to overthrow the Ministry; that Hosrew had caused the Sultan to be told he ought not to preserve Ministers who were so much connected with Foreign Powers. I will observe upon this last fact, that it gives some colour to the asserted fact, that Hosrew has been lately, before his dismissal, intriguing with Mehemet Ali.

Mr de Sturmer suggested the measure of an appeal being made to the Ministers of the Great Powers for their opinion on the communications made by Mehemet Ali's messenger, Sami Bey, just arrived in the Tuscan steamer. The Baron said, that the Ottoman Ministers would be strengthened by the reply that four out of five would probably, he thought certainly, make; that the French Ambassador would be embarrassed, and was likely to take it as a referendum, the rest exhorting the Porte to continue firm to the engagement not to act except in concurrence with the Great Powers. I concurred in this, and Rechid agreed to propose it to his Colleagues.

Rechid asked me what I would advise under present circumstances? I replied, that I myself was bound to the Porte, and would be most desirous to accept the offer made at the price of Syria, &c. I said, I was bound to the Porte only because I was the presence of evil, and that I was not bound to the Porte, but I would reject the Pasha's proposals if they should prove when fully known, to be of the nature supposed, and that I would advise the Porte to send secret confidential agents into Syria, and engage the Ottoman Government to promise the inhabitants of Lebanon the enjoyment of their ancient franchises, to be guaranteed by England, &c.; further, to grant exemption from conscription, and to allow an exemption from a large portion of taxes during a specified period of time; that if the Porte adopted this line of conduct, I would send a secret agent to aid in it, and that I would endeavour to induce our Admiral to send British ships of war off Beyrout, that their presence might give courage to the Syrians; that if the Admiral did send ships, a Turkish frigate should accompany them in order to show the standard of the Sultan in union with the British.

I then showed a copy of the letter which I wrote to Lord Louis the letter of which copy is forwarded to your Lordship. It will depend upon the Admiral's answer whether the ship will be sent. The ship, the *Walker*, at the suggestion of the Internuncio, will be sent in the Turkish frigate, to take care that the ship be properly directed. The Internuncio had already offered the Pasha every support that could be given, and so demanded an audience of the Sultan, should it be necessary, and said that he was certain I would take the same steps as he promised the Pasha I would do so, and engaged to take upon myself to say to the Sultan, in case His Majesty should decide upon measures mischievous to the Crown, &c., that the Ottoman Ministers must resign. I may here state that, on the 19th instant, after the mosque, the Sultan spoke to Fethi Ahmed Pasha on the subject of retaining the fleet. Fethi replied, it could not be worth the price asked for it; that if the Sultan kept Syria, he might build another fleet; and finally, that if His Majesty thought proper to make a sacrifice of his territories, the Ottoman Ministers would all resign. The Sultan coloured and said no more.

I will not at present trouble your Lordship with more, but what I have said will show, I think, that on this occasion the Ottoman Ministers have acted well. I need not obtrude my opinions now, which have been already so often and





## ARTICLE I.

Sa Hautesse le Sultan s'étant entendu avec Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, le Roi de Prusse, et l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, sur les conditions de l'arrangement qu'il est de l'intention de Sa Hautesse d'accorder à Méhémet Ali, — conditions lesquelles se trouvent spécifiées dans l'Acte séparé ci-annexé, — Leurs Majestés s'engagent à agir dans un parfait accord, et d'unir leurs efforts pour déterminer Méhémet Ali à se conformer à cet arrangement; chacune des Hautes Parties Contractantes se réservant de co-opérer à ce but selon les moyens d'action dont chacune d'elles peut disposer.

## ARTICLE II.

Si le Pacha d'Egypte refusait d'adhérer au susdit arrangement qui lui sera communiqué par le Sultan avec le concours de leurs dites Majestés, celles-ci s'engagent à prendre, à la requête du Sultan, des mesures concertées et arrêtées entre Elles, afin de mettre cet arrangement à exécution. Dans l'intervalle, le Sultan ayant invité Ses Alliés à se joindre à lui pour l'aider à interrompre la communication par mer entre l'Egypte et la Syrie, et à empêcher l'expédition de troupes, chevaux, armes, munitions, et approvisionnements de guerre de tout genre d'une des deux provinces, l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, s'engagent à donner immédiatement à cet effet les ordres nécessaires aux commandans de leurs forces navales dans la Méditerranée, Leurs dites Majestés promettent en outre, que les commandans de leurs Escadres, selon les moyens dont ils disposent, donneront au nom de l'Alliance tout l'appui et toute l'assistance en leur pouvoir à ceux des sujets du Sultan qui manifesteront leur fidélité et obéissance à leur Souverain.

## ARTICLE III.

Si Méhémet Ali, après s'être refusé de se soumettre aux conditions de l'arrangement mentionné ci-dessus, dirigeant ses forces de terre ou de mer vers Constantinople, les Hautes Parties Contractantes, sur la requête expresse qui en serait faite par le Sultan à Leurs Représentans à Constantinople, sont convenues, le cas échéant, de se rendre à l'invitation de ce Souverain, et de pourvoir à la défense de son trône, au moyen d'une co-opération concertée en commun dans le but de mettre les deux détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles, ainsi que le détroit de l'Empire Ottoman, à l'abri de toute agression.

Il est en outre convenu, que les forces qui, en vertu d'une pareille entente, seraient envoyées à Constantinople, ne seront maintenues que pendant le temps que leur présence sera requise par le Sultan, et lorsque Sa Hautesse jugera que leur présence aura cessé d'être nécessaire, les dites forces se retireront simultanément, et rentreront respectivement dans la Mer Noire et la Méditerranée.

## ARTICLE IV.

Il est toutefois expressément entendu, que la co-opération mentionnée dans l'Article précédent, et destinée à placer temporairement les détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore et la Capitale Ottomane sous la sauvegarde des Hautes Parties Contractantes, ne sera considérée que comme une mesure exceptionnelle, adaptée à la demande expresse du Sultan, et uniquement pour sa défense dans le cas seul indiqué ci-dessus. Mais il est convenu que cette mesure ne dérogera en rien à l'ancienne règle de l'Empire Ottoman, en vertu de laquelle il a été de tout temps défendu aux habitans de guerre des Puissances Etrangères d'entrer dans les détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore. Et le Sultan, d'une part, déclare par le présent Acte, qu'à l'exception de l'éventualité ci-dessus mentionnée, il a la ferme résolution de maintenir à l'avenir ce principe invariablement établi comme ancienne

règle de Son Empire, et tant que la Porte se trouve en paix, de n'admettre aucun armement de guerre étranger dans ses détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles; d'autre part, Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, le Roi de Prusse, et l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, s'engagent à respecter cette détermination du Sultan, et à se conformer au principe ci-dessus énoncé.

## ARTICLE V.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée, et les ratifications en seront échangées à Londres dans l'espace de deux mois, ou plus tôt si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signée, et y ont apposé les sceaux de leurs armes.

Fait à Londres, le quinze Juillet, l'an de grace mil huit cent quarante

(L.S.)	PALMERSTON	(L.S.)	CHEKIB.
(L.S.)	NEUMANN		
(L.S.)	BULOW		
(L.S.)	BRUNOW		

No. 719.

*ACTE SEPARÉ annexé à la Convention conclue à Londres, le 15 Juillet, 1840, entre Sa Hautesse le Sultan et Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, le Roi de Prusse, et l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, d'une part, et la Sublime Porte Ottomane, de l'autre.*

Sa Hautesse le Sultan a l'intention d'accorder et de faire notifier à Méhémet Ali les conditions de l'arrangement ci-dessous.

## § 1.

Sa Hautesse promet d'accorder à Méhémet Ali, pour lui et pour ses descendants, le titre de Pacha d'Acre, et le commandement de la Forteresse de St. Jean d'Acre, l'administration de la partie méridionale de la Syrie, dont les limites seront déterminées par la ligne de démarcation suivante.

Cette ligne, partant du Cap Ras-el-Nakhora sur les côtes de la Méditerranée, s'étendra de la direction jusqu'à l'embouchure de la rivière Serabab, extrémité septentrionale du Lac Tibérius, longera la côte occidentale du dit Lac, suivra la rive droite du fleuve Jourdain, et la côte occidentale de la Mer Morte; se prolongera de là en droite ligne jusqu'à la Mer Rouge, en aboutissant à la pointe septentrionale du Golfe d'Akaba, et suivra de là la côte occidentale du Golfe d'Akaba et la côte orientale du Golfe de Suez jusqu'à Suez.

Toutefois, le Sultan, en faisant ces offres, y attache la condition, que Méhémet Ali les accepte dans l'espace de dix jours après que la communication lui en sera faite; et si, à l'expiration de ce délai, il n'a point de Sa Hautesse, et pendant ce temps Méhémet Ali dépose entre les mains de cet Agent les instructions nécessaires pour l'occupation de la partie de terre et de mer qui s'étend immédiatement de l'Arabie et de toutes les villes saintes qui s'y trouvent situées, de l'île de Candie; du district d'Adana; et de toutes les autres parties de l'Empire Ottoman qui ne sont pas comprises dans les limites de l'Egypte et dans celles du Pachaie d'Acre, tel qu'il a été désigné ci-dessus.

## § 2.

Si dans le délai de dix jours fixé ci-dessus, Méhémet Ali n'acceptait point le susdit arrangement, le Sultan retirera alors l'offre de l'administration viagère

du Pachalic d'Acre; mais Sa Hautesse consentira encore à accorder à Méhémet Ali, pour lui et pour ses descendants en ligne directe, l'administration du Pachalic d'Egypte, pourvu que cette offre soit acceptée dans l'espace de dix jours suivans, c'est-à-dire, dans un délai de vingt jours, à compter du jour où la communication lui aura été faite, et pourvu qu'il dépose également entre les mains de l'Agent du Sultan les instructions nécessaires pour ses Commandans de terre et de mer de se retirer immédiatement en dedans des limites, et dans les ports, du Pachalic de l'Egypte.

## § 3.

Le tribut annuel à payer au Sultan par Méhémet Ali, sera proportionné au plus ou moins de territoire dont ce dernier obtiendra l'administration, selon qu'il accepte la première ou la seconde alternative.

## § 4.

Il est expressément entendu de plus, que dans la première comme dans la seconde alternative, Méhémet Ali (avant l'expiration du terme fixé de dix ou de vingt jours) sera tenu de remettre la flotte Turque, avec tous ses équipages et armemens, entre les mains du Préposé Turc qui sera chargé de la recevoir. Les Commandans des Escadres alliées assisteront à cette remise.

Il est entendu que dans aucun cas Méhémet Ali ne pourra porter en compte, ni déduire du Tribut à payer au Sultan, les dépenses qu'il a faites pour l'entretien de la flotte Ottomane pendant tout le temps qu'elle sera restée dans les ports d'Egypte.

## § 5.

Tous les Traités, et toutes les lois de l'Empire Ottoman s'appliqueront à l'Egypte et au Pachalic d'Acre, tel qu'il a été désigné ci-dessus, comme à toute autre partie de l'Empire Ottoman. Mais le Sultan consent, qu'à condition du paiement régulier du tribut susmentionné, Méhémet Ali et ses descendants perçoivent au nom du Sultan, et comme délégué de Sa Hautesse, dans les provinces dont l'administration leur sera confiée, les taxes et impôts légalement établis. Il est entendu en outre, que moyennant la perception des taxes et impôts susdits, Méhémet Ali et ses descendants pourvoieront à toutes les dépenses de l'administration civile et militaire des dites Provinces.

## § 6.

Les forces de terre et de mer que pourra entretenir le Pacha d'Egypte et d'Acre, faisant partie des forces de l'Empire Ottoman, seront toujours considérées comme entretenues pour le service de l'Etat.

## § 7.

Si à l'expiration du terme de vingt jours après la communication qui lui aura été faite, (ainsi qu'il a été dit plus haut, § 2.) Méhémet Ali n'adhère point à l'arrangement proposé, et n'accepte pas l'hérédité du Pachalic de l'Egypte, le Sultan ne considérera comme libre de retirer cette offre, et de suivre, en conséquence, telle marche ultérieure que ses propres intérêts et les conseils de ses Alliés pourront lui suggérer.

## § 8.

Le présent Acte Séparé aura la même force et valeur que s'il était inséré mot à mot dans la Convention de ce jour. Il sera ratifié et les ratifications en seront échangées à Londres en même temps que celles de la dite Convention.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signé, et y ont apposé les sceaux de leurs armées.

Fait à Londres, le quinze Juillet, l'an de grace mil huit cent quarante.

(L.S.)	NEUMANN.	(L.S.)	CHEKIB.
(L.S.)	PALMERSTON.		
(L.S.)	BULOW.		
(L.S.)	BRUNNOW.		

No. 749.

PROTOCOLE signé à Londres, le 15 Juillet, 1840.

par les Plénipotentiaires

d'Autriche;  
de la Grande Bretagne;  
de Prusse;  
de Russie; et  
de la Porte Ottomane.

EN apposant sa signature à la Convention de ce jour, le Plénipotentiaire de la Sublime Porte Ottomane, a déclaré:

Qu'en constatant par l'Article IV. de la dite Convention, l'ancienne règle de l'Empire Ottoman, en vertu de laquelle il a été défendu de tout temps aux bâtimens de guerre étrangers d'entrer dans les détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore, la Sublime Porte se réserve comme par le passé de délivrer des Firmans de passage aux bâtimens légers sous pavillon de guerre, lesquels sont employés, selon l'usage, au service de la correspondance des Légations des Puissances amies.

Les Plénipotentiaires des Cours d'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, de Prusse, et de Russie, ont pris acte de la présente Déclaration pour la porter à la connaissance de leurs Cours.

(Signé)	NEUMANN.
	PALMERSTON.
	BULOW.
	BRUNNOW.
	CHEKIB.

No. 750.

PROTOCOLE réservé, signé à Londres, le 15 Juillet, 1840.

par les Plénipotentiaires

d'Autriche;  
de la Grande Bretagne;  
de Prusse;  
de Russie; et  
de la Porte Ottomane.

LES Plénipotentiaires des Cours d'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, de Prusse, de Russie, et de la Sublime Porte Ottomane, ayant, en vertu de leurs



Pleins-pouvoirs, conclu et signé en ce jour une Convention entre leurs Souverains respectifs pour la pacification du Levant ;

Considérant que, vu la distance qui sépare les Capitales de leurs Cours respectifs, un certain espace de temps devra s'écouler nécessairement avant que l'échange des Ratifications de la dite Convention puisse s'effectuer, et que les ordres fondés sur cet Acte puissent être mis à exécution ;

Et les dits Plénipotentiaires étant profondément pénétrés de la conviction, que vu l'état actuel des choses en Syrie, des intérêts d'humanité aussi bien que les graves considérations de politique Européenne qui constituent l'objet de la sollicitude commune des Puissances signataires de la Convention de ce jour, réclament impérieusement d'éviter, autant que possible, tout retard dans l'accomplissement de la pacification que la dite transaction est destinée à atteindre ;

Les dits Plénipotentiaires, en vertu de leurs Pleins-pouvoirs, sont convenus entre'eux que les mesures préliminaires mentionnées à l'Article II. de la dite Convention, seront mises à exécution tout de suite, sans attendre l'échange des ratifications ; les Plénipotentiaires respectifs constatent formellement par le présent Acte l'assentiment de leurs Cours à l'exécution immédiate de ces mesures.

Il est convenu, en outre, entre les dits Plénipotentiaires, que Sa Hautesse le Sultan procédera de suite à adresser à Méhémet Ali la communication et les offres spécifiées dans l'Acte Séparé, annexé à la Convention de ce jour.

Il est convenu de plus, que les Agens Consulaires de l'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, de Prusse, et de Russie, à Alexandrie, se mettront en rapport avec l'Agent que Sa Hautesse le Sultan y enverra, pour adresser à Méhémet Ali la communication et les offres susmentionnées ; que les dits Consuls prêteront à cet Agent toute l'assistance et tout l'appui en leur pouvoir ; et qu'ils emploieront tous leurs moyens d'influence auprès de Méhémet Ali, à l'effet de le déterminer à accepter l'arrangement qui lui sera proposé d'ordre de Sa Hautesse le Sultan.

Les Amiraux des Escadres respectives dans la Méditerranée, recevront les instructions nécessaires pour se mettre en communication à ce sujet avec les dits Consuls.

(Signé) NEUMANN.  
PALMERSTON.  
BULOW.  
BRUNNOW.  
CHEKIB.

No. 731.

*Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.*

(No. 103.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 15, 1840.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency copies of a Convention for the Pacification of the Levant, and of a Separate Act thereunto annexed, and of two Protocols, which have been this day signed by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and the Porte ; and I have to instruct your Excellency, immediately to communicate these documents to the Ministers of the Porte.

Your Excellency will further urge the Turkish Ministers to cause to be prepared and sent to London, with the least possible delay, the Sultan's ratification of the Convention and of the Separate Act.

I have likewise to instruct your Excellency, when the Sultan sends to Alexandria the Envoy mentioned in the first paragraph of the Separate Act, to send with that Envoy some person belonging to your Embassy, to convey to Colonel Hodges any communication or information which your Excellency may think useful to send to him, with reference to the proposals to be made to Mehemet Ali.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 732.

*Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beaumont.*

(No. 89.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 15, 1840.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency copies of a Convention for the Pacification of the Levant, and of a Separate Act thereunto annexed, and of two Protocols, which have been this day signed by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and the Porte ; and I have to instruct your Excellency immediately to communicate these documents to the Austrian Government.

Your Excellency will further urge the Austrian Government to cause to be prepared and sent to London, with the least possible delay, the Emperor's ratification of the Convention and Separate Act.

I have likewise to inform your Excellency, that instructions have been sent to Viscount Ponsonby, to despatch, with the person who may be sent by the Sultan to Alexandria, some gentleman belonging to his Lordship's Embassy, in order to convey to Colonel Hodges any communication or information which Lord Ponsonby may think useful to send to him with reference to the proposals to be made to Mehemet Ali.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 733.

*Baron Brunnow to Viscount Palmerston.*

My Lord,

*London, le 14 Juillet, 1840.*

L'ARTICLE III. de la Convention que nous venons de signer prévoit une éventualité, et annonce, le cas échéant, une co-opération concertée en commun entre nos Cours.

Pour réaliser cette intention de manière à éviter les retards que la distance des lieux pourrait faire naître, j'ai l'honneur de vous inviter, my Lord, à vouloir bien me mettre à même d'informer le Cabinet Impérial de l'étendue des secours que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique serait dans le cas de placer à la disposition de Sa Hautesse le Sultan pour accomplir l'objet que les Cours Signataires de la Convention de ce jour ont en vue d'atteindre, dans l'intérêt commun de la conservation de l'Empire Ottoman.

Veuillez agréer, &c.,  
(Signé) BRUNNOW.

No. 734.

*Viscount Palmerston to Baron Brunnow.*

M. le Baron,

*Foreign Office, July 15, 1840.*

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this day's date, and entirely agree with you that in the present state of things, and considering the distances which separate our respective Courts from the places where the measures mentioned in Article III. of the Convention of this day would be carried into effect, it is desirable that we should at once come to an understanding as to the co-operation stipulated for in that Article.

Recent events in Syria have indeed rendered it less likely than ever that



Ibrahim should venture to march upon Constantinople, but, nevertheless, we ought to be prepared for such a contingency.

There can be no doubt that if such a case were to arise, the Russian Government would be able, from its disposable means in the Black Sea, to send to the Straits of the Bosphorus a sufficient succour either of land or of naval forces, according to the nature of the case, for the defence of the Sultan; and it is not therefore for the purpose of completing a force which would otherwise be deficient, that the British contingent would be sent.

But it has been wisely judged by all the parties to the Convention which we have this day signed, that we should best promote the great objects of European policy which we all have in view, by so arranging the execution of every part of our measures, that we should in every step of our progress give manifest and indisputable proofs of our union and mutual confidence; and in this view of the matter it becomes of great importance, that a British force should co-operate with the Russian force in the contingency provided for by the Third Article of the Convention.

But the amount of naval force which we could spare for such a purpose, must necessarily be limited by a consideration of the aggregate amount of our squadron in the Mediterranean, and of the other services which that squadron will have to perform; and I had occasion to make known to your Court, by a despatch which I addressed to Lord Clanciarde in October last, that, in such a case, we should be able to send but a small number of ships to the Dardanelles and Sea of Marmora.

I have now communicated upon this matter with Lord Minto, and I have to state, that our Mediterranean squadron consists of the ships mentioned in the accompanying list; and considering the various duties which that squadron will have to perform, according to the arrangements agreed upon between the Four Powers and the Sultan, we could not conveniently undertake to detach more than three or four ships of the line, with a proportion of frigates and steamers, to co-operate with the Russian ships, in the event of the Sultan requiring the aid of the naval forces of the Two Powers for the defence of his Capital.

But the Admiral commanding our squadron in the Mediterranean will be ordered to hold the above-mentioned force ready to sail to the Dardanelles, under some steady and competent officer, the moment the Admiral shall receive from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, an intimation that the Sultan has applied for such assistance.

I am, &c.,  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

Inclosure in No. 754.

*List of Ships composing the Mediterranean Squadron.*

Princess Charlotte	-	104	guns,	Captain Fenshawe.
Asia	-	84	"	Captain Fisher.
Ganges	-	84	"	Captain Reynolds.
Powerful	-	84	"	Captain Napier.
Thunderer	-	84	"	Captain Berkeley.
Bellerophon	-	80	"	Captain Austin.
Implacable	-	74	"	Captain Harvey.
Hastings	-	72	"	Captain Laurence.
Rainbow	-	72	"	Captain Stewart.
Edinburgh	-	72	"	Captain Henderson.
Bellisle	-	72	"	Captain Nicolas.
Revenge	-	72	"	Capt. Hon. W. Waldegrave.
Castor	-	36	"	Captain Collier.
Dido	-	18	"	Captain Davies.

Carysfort	-	26	guns,	Captain Martin.
Talbot	-	26	"	Captain Codrington.
Tyne	-	26	"	Captain Townshend.
Daphne	-	26	"	Captain Dalling.
Magicienne	-	24	"	Captain Michell.
Hazard	-	18	"	Commander Wilkinson.
Wasp	-	16	"	Commander Mansel.
Jaseur	-	16	"	Commander Boulbee.
Zebra	-	16	"	Commander Stopford.
Scorpion	-	10	"	Lieutenant Gayton.
Weazle	-	10	"	Lieutenant Simpson.

*Steam-Vessels.*

Gorgon	-	6	guns,	Captain Henderson.
Cyclops	-	6	"	Captain H. T. Austin.
Rhadamanthus	-	4	"	Commander Wakefield.
Hydra	-	4	"	Commander Robinson.
Phoenix	-	4	"	Commander F. Stopford.
Confiance	-	2	"	Lieutenant E. Stopford.



PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.

No.

## CORRESPONDENCE

RELATIVE TO THE

## AFFAIRS OF THE LEVANT.

---

PART I.

---

*Foreign Office, November 1840.*